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By Juliet Michaelsen, Max Kampelman Fellow Recently, a somewhat obscure security and confidence-building measure returned to the headlines. In October 2019, reports surfaced that the Trump Administration was considering withdrawing from the Treaty on Open Skies, an overflight arrangement designed to boost military transparency and stability across 34 signatories in North American and Eurasia. What is the Open Skies Treaty? In 1955, President Eisenhower first proposed that the United States and Soviet Union allow aerial observation flights over each other’s territories to reduce the risk of miscommunication and subsequent war. Although initially rejected by the Soviets, the idea of Open Skies was revived by President George H.W. Bush in 1989. Bush built on Eisenhower’s vision, suggesting the agreement not just be between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In 1992, the Open Skies Treaty was signed by the United States, Canada, Russia, and 21 European states. Since the treaty entered into force in 2002, membership has increased to 34 states. The treaty requires that all participants allow observation aircraft to fly over their territory to observe and take pictures of military forces and activities. These images are shared with the observing and observed states, and available for purchase by other treaty signatories. The Open Skies Treaty’s fundamental purpose—enhancing military transparency and cooperation—flows from the same set of commitments that underpin both the Helsinki Commission and the Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As Alexandra Bell noted during a Helsinki on the Hill podcast on Open Skies, this “increased openness between militaries will reduce tensions between states and limit the probability of conflict [because] if you know what another country has, if it’s clearly observable to you, you don’t have to plan for things that you’re just guessing about.” Assessing the Treaty During the treaty’s almost 18 years of implementation, the parties have conducted over 1,500 observation flights. The cooperation required to solve logistical problems (such as air traffic control) and inspect planes is one important confidence-building measure. Another is the fact that host countries also have personnel on any observation flight, thus ensuring the flight stays within its agreed plan. This collaboration increases mutual trust and encourages cooperation. Additionally, the Open Skies Consultative Commission, the implementing body of the Open Skies Treaty based at the Organization for Security and Cooperation’s (OSCE) headquarters in Vienna, provides one of the few remaining forums where the United States and Russia can discuss problems and collaborate on solutions. The treaty also allows the United States to provide an important benefit to its allies and partners, who typically ride on flights conducted by the United States. Specifically, as Rep. Emmanuel Cleaver II noted during a joint hearing of the Helsinki Commission and the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment, the treaty “allows even small countries a way to get information on military activities around them [which] has been even more important given the Kremlin’s propensity to violate established borders.” One notable example came in December 2018 after Russia attached Ukrainian naval vessels near the Kerch Strait. The United States undertook an Open Skies flight, which was “intended to reaffirm U.S. commitment to Ukraine and other partner nations,” according to the Department of Defense, a message underscored by the flight’s inclusion of personnel from Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Romania, and—crucially—Ukraine. The Open Skies Treaty also has heightened transparency, specifically between the United States and Russia. Both countries have conducted numerous observation flights over the other’s territory. The United States and its allies have flown about 500 flights over Russia since the treaty’s implementation, including 16 in 2019 alone. According to the State Department, the United States participated in nearly three times as many flights over Russia as Russia has over the United States. The images captured by these flights serve as a crucial, credible, unclassified source of information about Russian forces at a time when Europe and the United States are often uneasy about Russia’s intentions. The Open Skies Treaty does face criticism by some politicians and analysts. For example, a Senate resolution introduced by Sens. Ted Cruz and Tom Cotton calls for the United States’ withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty, citing Russia’s partial non-compliance as a major problem the treaty. Specifically, Russia has restricted Open Skies flights over its military hub in Kaliningrad and restricted the conduct of flights near its border with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, the State Department does not consider these problems insurmountable and has taken many steps to address these issues, including bringing the problem to the Open Skies Consultative Committee, restricting Russian flights over Hawaii, and denying access to two United States airbases. The Future of the Open Skies Treaty In the wake of President Trump’s reported plan to withdraw the United States from the Open Skies Treaty, many members of Congress have expressed support for the agreement and warned of the dangers of withdrawal. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Rep. Eliot Engel first sounded the alarm in a publicly released letter to National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien on October 7, 2019. In the letter, Engel expressed concern about such reports and argued that “American withdrawal would only benefit Russia and be harmful for our allies’ and partners’ national security interests.” Soon after, numerous members of Congress came together to urge foreign policy officials to keep the treaty. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Rep. Adam Smith and Sens. Robert Menendez and Jack Reed (the ranking members of the foreign relations and armed services committees, respectively), joined Rep. Engel in writing a letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Esper, highlighting the importance of Open Skies. A similar letter was sent to Secretary Pompeo by 11 Democratic senators two weeks later. In November 2019, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Alcee L. Hastings co-sponsored the bipartisan “Open Skies Treaty Stability Act,” which would prevent the president from unilaterally withdrawing the United States from the treaty by setting conditions on any potential steps towards withdrawal. The bill specifically notes that “due to the significant benefits that observation missions under the Open Skies Treaty provide to the United States and United States allies, the United States should commit to continued participation in the Treaty; and the President should not withdraw the United States from the Open Skies Treaty.” Support for the Open Skies Treaty extends beyond Capitol Hill. For example, in an October 20, 2019, Wall Street Journal contribution, former-national security officials George Shultz, William J. Perry and Sam Nunn suggested that “Open Skies has become what Eisenhower envisioned—a critical confidence-building treaty that improves Euro-Atlantic security with every flight. The U.S. should preserve this agreement, particularly in a time of renewed tensions with Russia.”  Similar calls have come from abroad. The Political and Security Affairs Committee Chair of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) strongly urged the United States to stay in the treaty, citing the increased transparency and cooperation fostered by the agreement. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry expressed their interest in “maintaining and implementing this treaty” in a statement to the Wall Street Journal. The vocal advocacy both within and outside of the United States for the continuation of the Open Skies Treaty sheds light on its important role in Euro-Atlantic security and cooperation.

By Rachel Bauman, Policy Advisor Election day began like every November day in Belarus: black. Without the time change that makes a late-autumn morning in DC bearable, darkness enveloped Belarus until almost 9:00 a.m. We would be rising much earlier than that to observe the opening of the polls for the November 17 parliamentary election. This was my second election observation, after the first round of the Ukrainian presidential election in March 2019. That election was widely considered free and fair—a great achievement for a new democracy plagued by a Soviet legacy. In Belarus, the last election generally considered free and fair was the 1994 election of President Alexander Lukashenko, who remains in power, with essentially complete control over the government, 25 years later.   Most Belarus-watchers suspected that much of the number-fudging was done before the arrival of election day observers. Early voting took place throughout the week before election day, providing an opportunity to inflate turnout numbers. Multiple opposition candidates could not even make it on the ballot due to selectively-imposed restrictions and technicalities applied to stamp out the competition well before voting took place. Neither I nor the other members of my election observation team (two diplomats already in Minsk: one from the U.S. Embassy, and one from the Swedish Embassy), expected many surprises from the conduct and outcome of the elections. The day started smoothly enough, with a standard, albeit sparsely attended, opening. As we moved on to other polling stations throughout the day, the conditions were mainly the same: observers registered with the chair of the election commission for that precinct and were seated at a table specifically for observers, both national and international. Sign directing voters to polling sites in Belarus. Because the vast majority of OSCE PA observers remained in the Minsk region, and we had traveled a few hours northeast to Vitebsk, we came across only Belarusian observers, whether from trade unions, political parties, or other groups. The observer tables were far enough away from the action that in most cases we could not see much of the voter sign-in and identification check process. When we asked to see the voter lists, we were denied in multiple instances. This was startling for me; in Ukraine, we wandered freely throughout polling stations and had access to everything. Nevertheless, the mood was festive and the people friendly. Music—from disco to Soviet favorites to patriotic tunes—played in the background at several polling places. We received candies in one location and a proud explanation of the region’s main industry in another. A few photos were taken with us, and at one polling place a neighboring observer remarked how interested she was that I had come all the way from the United States just for the election in Belarus! Despite the fun and frivolity, it became clear to us by the end of the day that, though we had seen no gross violations in conduct, the whole process lacked the transparency I had witnessed in Ukraine, or that should be expected in any OSCE country committed to democratic norms.   Nowhere was this more apparent than during the count. As usual, we were confined to the observers’ table just far enough from where the action was taking place to limit real observation. The mobile voting, early voting, and election day ballots were collected and counted in one pile, silently. Because we could not fully see or hear the count, there was no way of knowing whether it was accurate, even though the precinct chairwoman came over occasionally to riffle through the marked ballots for us. By only 9:15 p.m.—the polls had closed at 8—the count was finished and a winner declared. Votes being counted at a polling site. Our next step was to follow our companions from the polling station to the District Election Commission, where they would deliver the results protocol and election materials. After watching a few deliveries from around the area and encountering many familiar faces from earlier in the day, we decided to head back to the hotel, arriving at a remarkably early 10:30 p.m. Though it was still a long and exhausting day, many such elections, including the one I’d observed in Ukraine, had counts lasting long into the night. The next morning’s results were both surprising and unsurprising. It was no great shock to see that the reported turnout was over 77 percent—suspiciously high for elections to a body with no real power. According to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, the OSCE International Election Observation Mission noted that early voting turnout in particular (35.77 percent) seemed inflated compared to the reports of observers. More disturbingly, not a single opposition candidate was elected (there had been two in the previous parliament). That Lukashenko would not permit even a semblance of pluralism calls into question the seriousness of his seeming attempts to court the West when faced with a revanchist and controlling Russia—a topic which the U.S. Helsinki Commission explored in a hearing held shortly after the election. Observers would be wise to watch the trajectory of the country as Lukashenko navigates his tricky relationships with the West and Russia. Ultimately, stability—in large part the stability of his own job—will be first in his mind as the 2020 Belarusian presidential election swiftly approaches. A major political upheaval is not likely in the cards. When my colleague stationed in Grodna asked a young independent observer if he’d seen anything interesting or unusual during election day, the observer responded, “Unusual? No. Nothing unusual. This is Belarus. There has been nothing unusual for 25 years.”

Mongolia became an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) participating State in 2012, the most recent country to freely undertake all OSCE commitments. Previously, Mongolia—like Australia, several countries in Asia, and a number of Mediterranean nations— had been an OSCE Partner for Cooperation, states in formal dialogue with the OSCE, though not taking on OSCE commitments. This transition—from partner to full-fledged participant—is the first time such a transition had been made, and marks the first ever enlargement of the OSCE region. It signaled the strong commitment of Mongolia to the values articulated in the Helsinki Final Act. Recently, Helsinki Commission staff visited Mongolia to meet with interlocutors in government, civil society, and the private sector. The delegation found entrepreneurial partners committed to democratic values and fundamental freedoms. This was particularly impressive given that the country is located between Russia and China—large authoritarian powers known for their use of economic and other forms of coercion to achieve foreign policy goals. However, Mongolia also faces emerging challenges regarding public corruption and the rule of law. While Mongolia remains the sole strong democracy in the region, recent developments and trends may threaten its democratic achievements and its potential to be a model for other nations in the region. The OSCE is based on an idea of comprehensive security: the concept that military security, economic security, and human security must all be considered when engaging in international relations. Mongolia can be analyzed through a similar lens, with its military situation, economic situation and human rights situation all informing policy toward the country. First Dimension: Political-Military Affairs Mongolia is in the quintessential bad neighborhood. No two countries have acted as aggressively toward their neighbors Russia and China. Russia currently is in violation of all ten Helsinki principles as a result of its occupation of Crimea and continuing destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. Luckily, neither of Mongolia’s neighbors has yet opted to invade the country. Historically, Russia has acted as guarantor of Mongolia’s sovereignty against China, the much more likely candidate of the two to pose an immediate security threat. However, recently Russia has increased its cooperation with China, as demonstrated by a recent Russia-China joint military exercise. While Mongolia continues to purchase arms from Russia, this new trend of Russian-Chinese cooperation poses the most important threat to Mongolian security. Already, Mongolia has been pressured to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a China-centric political alliance—to which Russia also belongs—based on authoritarianism and dedicated to the eradication of the so-called three evils of terrorism, extremism, and separatism. However, there are also reasons to doubt the future of Russia-China cooperation. Mongolian national security experts seem certain that the scope of cooperation has a low ceiling and that much of the collaboration—like the recent military exercise—is just for show. These experts argue that Russia has no desire to subordinate itself to Chinese interests in the long-term, which it would be required to do to enhance cooperation; China is the much stronger partner. Second Dimension: Economic & Environmental Issues While a military invasion of Mongolia by China remains unlikely, China has found other ways to exert its influence in the country, largely through economic coercion. China’s economic weight and importance as a market for Mongolia—a commodity-based economy heavily reliant on its much larger neighbor—means that China can dictate terms on contracts and agreements. It can also leverage this economic power for political purposes as it famously did when it closed a key China-Mongolia border crossing for truckers after the Dalai Lama visited Ulaanbaatar. As a result, Mongolian policymakers have begun to search for new markets, products, and opportunities that could diversify their economy. One key product is cashmere. Currently, most cashmere exports to the United States originate from China, which, thanks to its enormous market, largely determines the global price of cashmere. This enables China to purchase Mongolian cashmere cheaply and prevent it from posing a challenge to the Chinese cashmere industry. The Mongolia Third Neighbor Trade Act (H.R. 2219 and S. 1188) currently being considered by the U.S. Congress would remove U.S. tariffs on Mongolian cashmere goods and increase the demand for raw cashmere within Mongolia, empowering domestic producers and eroding China’s quasi-monopolistic control of the market. In doing so, the Third Neighbor Trade Act would help to diversify Mongolia’s economy and make it more resilient against its large, aggressive neighbor to the south. It would also serve to empower women in the country, who are employed disproportionately to men in cashmere factories. However, sustainability remains a problem. The goats from which cashmere is derived feed on grass in a destructive way, pulling out root and stem. This can lead to the desertification of the environment. As demand for cashmere increases and nomads enhance their herds with additional goats, one can expect this tragedy of the commons to become worse. Though producers of cashmere goods within Mongolia have attempted to build sustainability into their business models, the U.S. Congress may wish to consider this aspect of the business to prevent any unintended environmental consequences of increased demand for Mongolian cashmere. Corruption Mongolia is currently struggling to address an ongoing public corruption problem, in part through the Independent Agency Against Corruption, an independent investigative law enforcement agency designed to fight graft. Still, reporting shows that bribery and abuse of public office remain a problem in the country and one that should be of concern as an OSCE participating State. Mongolia was recently added to the grey list kept by the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF). The FATF is the premier international governing, rulemaking, and peer evaluation body for financial conduct. Its most potent tool is the FATF black list, which identifies countries that do not comply with its list of international financial standards designed to prevent threat financing and money laundering. The price of landing on this black list is immense—banks will not do business with blacklisted countries, or entities located within them, leading to enormous losses in potential revenue. The grey list serves as the warning list prior to inclusion on the black list. Though grand corruption may have gotten in the way of completing the necessary reforms to avoid a designation on the FATF grey list, in Mongolia’s case, it appears that the problem may be primarily one of capacity. Mongolia has never had to establish the anti-money laundering framework of a more developed country and lacks the training and expertise to bring itself in compliance. The U.S. Department of the Treasury is already providing assistance to Mongolia to build robust anti-money laundering systems that will get it off the grey list. An OSCE field mission could also assist with these and other capacity problems; however, all participating States must agree to allow Mongolia to host such a mission. Russia continues to block this move. Rule of Law While lack of capacity explains many of Mongolia’s compliance problems, signs indicate that certain powerful political players are seeking to roll back rule of law safeguards in the country. Recently, a law was passed enabling the National Security Council of Mongolia—a small body consisting of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker—to dismiss judges due to claims of corruption. While the council argues that reform necessary to take down corrupt judges who would otherwise be defended by the patrons they serve, it is not hard to imagine how this power could abused. At least 17 judges have been dismissed in this fashion. The National Security Council claims that this power will no longer be necessary once they have completed reforms that should weed corruption out of the judiciary. This reform includes new bodies to both select and discipline judges. Third Dimension: Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues Media Consolidation Media consolidation is a growing problem for journalism in Mongolia. The major media outlets of the country are owned by a handful of individuals who use this ownership to further their political agendas. As a result, journalists are at risk of self-censorship or even pushed to promote stories that further the political narratives of the media tycoons. Media consolidation breeds a problematic information environment in Mongolia and contributes to a lack of opinion diversity. Closing Space for Civil Society Mongolia also seems threatened by the potential for the ruling elite to close the space for the operation of civil society. A draft law proposes creating a public fund that would serve as the exclusive funding source for all civil society operations. This would mean that civil society would be forced to comply with the conditions put on this fund or cease to exist. While this approach is not yet law, interlocutors warned that the next election will be one to watch and could lead to the consolidation of power should certain elements be victorious. Conclusion Mongolia is a country with great potential to contribute to the Helsinki Process if it is empowered to do so. By joining the organization in 2012, it proved that the OSCE could grow. Now, it seeks to demonstrate its leadership once again by receiving an OSCE field mission at a time when many of its neighbors are trying to close theirs—like Kazakhstan—or have successfully closed theirs—like Azerbaijan. With the right combination of ambition and caution, Mongolia could lead the way to a future of democracy in the steppe. However, there are warning signs that Mongolia could be heading in the wrong direction. The United States should do everything in its power to prevent this—both via diplomatic engagement and economic assistance. The clearest way for Congress to do this is through the passage of the Third Neighbor Trade Act. The OSCE too should focus its efforts on Mongolia as a far-flung state with immense potential. Mongolians could take up leadership positions in its institutions, potentially even serving as a Chair-in-Office in the near future. By becoming more visible in the organization itself, Mongolia can build its profile as a leader and the OSCE can take advantage of its expertise in preserving democracy in a hard neighborhood.