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That a large sum of U.S. funding supports Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression is well understood. What few people know is that the Pentagon, State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have teamed up to create a comprehensive monitoring process to ensure that funding is used effectively and transparently. The process appears to be working.  On March 1, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul (R-Texas) summed up what he saw on an official oversight trip that took him to Poland and Ukraine: “To date, no significant acts of fraud or misuse involving U.S. assistance have occurred.” Rep. Lisa McClain (R-Mich.) of the House Armed Services Committee reached a similar conclusion after her own visit to the front. She said, “[When you] actually see the inventory of weapons that we are sending and just how they are getting from Point A to Point B and how we’re tracking them … that, I can assure you, raised my level of confidence. There is a saying, ‘One look is worth 1,000 reports.’”    While the Ukraine mission commands significant bipartisan support, lawmakers want to be confident, ahead of additional funding votes, that the executive branch is being a good steward of taxpayer dollars. At an open House Armed Services Committee hearing on Feb. 28, lawmakers heard from military and civilian officials, including Pentagon Inspector General Robert Storch, about how the department accounts for weapons and related support.   Storch described several elements of the oversight mission that ensure due diligence: approximately 20 ongoing and planned audits; a criminal investigative service unit detecting and preventing fraud; forward deployment of personnel into the region to oversee assistance before weapons cross into Ukraine; and identification of potential oversight obstacles.   Storch and his colleagues regularly report back to lawmakers and executive branch leaders. Armed Services Committee Chairman Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) explained that lawmakers receive monthly classified briefings from the department, in addition to congressionally mandated written reports.   The risk of arms being diverted by Ukrainians was raised by members. Storch explained that based on a combination of inventory reviews, access to tracking data, and in-person site visits by personnel from the Office of Defense Cooperation at the embassy in Kyiv, U.S. officials have seen “no signs of diversion or that the Ukrainians are not following procedures.” The only contentious exchange on the issue occurred when a reported claim of weapons diversion raised by a member during questioning turned out to be sourced to an uncorroborated article published by Global Times, a Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece known for peddling disinformation.   Storch also noted at the hearing the importance of working across federal departments given that assistance for Ukraine includes non-defense spending. To that end, the inspectors general from the Defense Department, State Department and USAID formed an interagency working group that, as of January, was running 64 ongoing and planned oversight projects and had completed 14 others. These projects cover a range of activities, including end-use monitoring of weapons, audits of contracts, and safeguards for direct funding assistance for the Ukrainian government.   Even with these measures in place, key congressional leaders are not complacent. McCaul and his upper chamber counterpart, Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Sen. Jim Risch (R-Idaho), have pressed the case on oversight of funding that is delivered through non-U.S. government actors such as aid organizations and international financial institutions. A December 2022 letter to the Government Accountability Office from the two lead Republicans overseeing the State Department and USAID outlined requests for information and sharp questions meant to generate greater transparency.   Republican leaders also have helped to correct the record on funding details. Some Republican members opposed to supporting Ukraine have emphasized the statement that the U.S. has “sent over $113 billion in foreign aid to Ukraine.” That claim conjures up an image of unlimited sums being shipped into Kyiv, but it is missing critical context for how assistance for Ukraine works in practice.  The lead Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), has written that “40 percent of U.S. aid for Ukraine, or about $44 billion, is being spent here at home on our defense industrial base and readiness.” Far from being foreign aid handouts, this funding is a critical investment in an overlooked aspect of U.S. national defense and the workers and innovation that support it. And the broader package is far from charity: It is helping a partner to defend its sovereign territory and cripple a key American adversary’s military without putting Americans in combat.  None of this is to say the administration has been immune from critique for its Ukraine policy.  Indeed, both Republicans and Democrats in Congress have pushed the administration to enhance its support for Ukraine. Wicker aptly calls this position “more, better and faster,” referring to the quantity, quality and delivery speed of weapons for Ukraine’s defense.  The oversight process itself also has room to grow. The inspectors general for Defense, State and USAID are making the case for having a greater, regular presence inside Ukraine for auditing purposes given the difficulties of evaluating programs remotely. Reps. Jason Crown (D-Colo.) and Mike Waltz (R-Fla.), both stalwart defenders of support for Ukraine, recently encouraged the administration to enable just that.  Sooner or later, Congress will have its say. On Feb. 28, Assistant Secretary of Defense Celeste Wallander told House appropriators that the administration could not rule out asking Congress for supplemental Ukraine funding in the coming months before the end of the fiscal year. That is, existing funds meant to last through September 2023 may be spent more quickly than anticipated. Congress then would need to act to sustain key Ukraine-related assistance programs.  Ongoing oversight of assistance will not satisfy members of Congress advocating to end all U.S. support for Ukraine. But lawmakers who want to hold Moscow accountable while using taxpayer dollars wisely demonstrate that support for Ukraine and robust oversight can be complementary — and in the United States’ national interest.   

TBILISI, March 9 (Reuters) - Ruling lawmakers in the South Caucasus country of Georgia on Thursday scrapped plans to introduce what critics called a Russian-inspired "foreign agents" law after two days of intense street protests in the capital Tbilisi. Here is a guide to what's going on: WHAT IS THE PROPOSED 'FOREIGN AGENTS' LAW? - Individuals, civil society organisations and media outlets that receive 20% of their funding from abroad would have been required to register as an "agent of foreign influence" with the Georgian Justice Ministry. - Rights groups say the "foreign agent" tag is a designed to make it easier for the government to discredit its opponents. WHY WAS IT INTRODUCED? - Government officials said the proposals were necessary to root out "foreign influence" and "spies", and that Georgians have the right to know who funds non-government organisations (NGOs). - Parliamentary leaders have also said the bills would help unmask critics of the influential Georgian Orthodox Church. - It says it is modelled on the U.S. 1938 "Foreign Agents Registration Act", which primarily covers lobbyists and organisations directly working for or under the control of foreign governments. WHAT DID CRITICS SAY? - Opponents said the legislation was inspired by a 2012 Russian law that has been used extensively to crack down on dissent for the past decade. Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili, a former French diplomat who wants to steer the country closer to Europe, said she would veto it - though parliament could have overruled her. - Some 400 Georgian NGOs signed a letter saying the bill was "an attack on Georgian values" that would "hinder Georgia's progress towards EU membership". - Human Rights Watch said it "would have a serious chilling effect on groups and individuals working to protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law". - Georgian lawmakers brawled during a hearing on the bill this week, and tens of thousands of people protested, chanting "no to the Russian law". HOW DID THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REACT? - EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said the bill went against EU values and Georgia's aim of joining the bloc, and its adoption "may have serious repercussions on our relations." - The U.S. Helsinki Commission, a U.S. government agency, said the law demonstrated "the present government's increasing embrace of Russia". - The State Department said Washington was "deeply troubled" by the bill. Washington has rejected comparisons with its own legislation. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF RUSSIA? - Georgian society is strongly anti-Moscow following years of conflict over the status of two Russian-backed breakaway regions, which flared into war in 2008. The two countries have no formal diplomatic relations. - Opponents say the ruling Georgian Dream party, however, has close relations with the Kremlin. Its founder Bidzina Ivanishvili is Georgia's richest man, having amassed his fortune in Russia during the chaotic privatisations of the 1990s. - The Kremlin said on Thursday it had nothing to do with events in Georgia, rejected claims the laws were inspired by Russia, and expressed concern about the unrest. - "The Kremlin didn't inspire anything there, the Kremlin has absolutely nothing to do with it. ... If I understand it correctly, one version was very similar to an equivalent law in the United States," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said. - Tbilisi has not imposed sanctions on Moscow over the war in Ukraine, despite large-scale protests in the country calling for a tougher line against Russia's invasion. WHAT ABOUT EUROPE? - Opinion polls routinely show that a majority of Georgians are pro-European. - Georgia applied for EU "candidate status" last March, alongside Ukraine and Moldova. But Brussels rebuffed Tbilisi's bid, citing concerns over the rule of law and judicial independence, among other factors. - Critics say the ruling party is merely paying lip service to the idea of EU membership. - The EU's delegation to Georgia praised the decision to withdraw the bill, calling on the country's political leaders to resume pro-EU reforms. HAS THE LAW BEEN KILLED? - On Thursday, the government said it was putting the law's passage through parliament on hold. - It attacked the "radical opposition" and a "machine of lies that presented the bill in a negative light". - It said it would launch a public consultation period to "better explain to the public what the bill was for and why it is important". - On Tuesday, lawmakers had sent the bills to the Venice Commission, a Council of Europe body that advises countries on the impact draft laws have on the functioning of democracy and human rights, and said they would await feedback. - The opposition has called for a new protest starting at 7 p.m. (1500 GMT) on Thursday, demanding that the government formally denounce the plans and release all those detained during the demonstrations.

It’s clearly an attack on Georgia’s EuroAtlantic choice, an attack on Georgia’s democracy, an attack on Georgia’s strategic partnerships with the West, and an attack on the Georgia and US bilateral relationship. It’s also quite self-evidently, an expression of deference to Moscow and an alignment with Russian interests in the region, – CSCE Senior Policy Advisor Michael Hikari Cecire tells RFE/RL’s Georgian Service of the controversial law that was set to be imposed this week. “Legislation like this is so painfully undemocratic,” he notes. “What it does is signal the ruling party’s willingness to undermine and attack all elements, all institutional edifices, of the remnants of Georgia democracy. It’s not just the law itself which is abysmal, it’s really an assault on the last redoubt of independent thought in Georgian society, and that’s civil society and the media. It also signals a willingness to turn the power of the state against any other forms of independent or democratic expression.” Michael Hikari Cecire joined the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), where he focuses on the South Caucasus and Black Sea regional affairs, as a senior policy advisor, in 2021. Previously, he was an analyst at the Congressional Research Service, before that serving as a policy advisor, strategic researcher, and Eurasia regional analyst supporting the Department of Defense and other US government agencies. We sat down with him to discuss the foreign agents bills the Georgian Dream ruling party were set to put into force this week. The interview took place before the party offered to withdraw the bills following 48 hours of protest and rioting. One of the arguments we’ve heard for those supporting these bills is the very same argument that Russia used back in 2012 to introduce a similar legislation: “Well, if the US has it, why can’t we?” What do you think of these comparisons? Does the US having FARA justify Georgia doing what it’s doing? What is clear is that the Georgian Dream political leadership isn’t even bothering to offer their own independent, even bad faith, arguments for this law. They are just aping Russian arguments that were made about their law, and Azerbaijani arguments about their derivative law, demonstrating their fealty to Moscow and a lack of independent thought even to create their own separate narrative. It’s very sad to watch that play out. I don’t think most Georgians are buying it, though, because it’s so blatant and so unoriginal. And for the record, I think it is worth saying that this has nothing to do with FARA, which is a very narrow bit of legislation and really only covers those who are working for and on behalf of foreign governments and foreign political parties. It’s really speaking to lobbyists in particular, to represent these interests, and has nothing to do for the most part with civil society or the media. There is a sense in society that, should this law pass, it would merely be the start of a path to somewhere bad. Where does that path lead? Crossing that line is an opening to other sorts of law or actions that can really radically transform Georgia from an imperfect but vibrant and pluralistic democracy, into a fully autocratic and perhaps even authoritarian country, and one in league with Russia. And as such, because Russia has no allies and only vassals, essentially a tributary to Moscow. We have to make it clear where we stand. And we stand with the Georgian people. We stand with Georgia’s democracy If all your nominal partners in the West, and all of those whose counsel you should be heeding domestically, are telling you not to do it, then that means your partnership and your source of counsel is coming from elsewhere. And that elsewhere is quite evidently Russia. The rationale for this is unclear, and there are a number of potential reasons this may be the case, but none of them are good, and none of them are satisfactory in terms of why Georgia should be going down this route. What can or should the West do about it? I think that we need to do what we are doing, which is to make it very clear that this is an attack on not just our relationship, and not just on the will of the Georgian people, but also an abrupt and deliberate shift into Moscow’s column. It’s clear to me that they don’t care very much about the health or maintenance of Georgia’s democracy, per se, or even about Western integration, and this is also something that could make a lot of things that we previously never would have entertained suddenly possible, such as the elimination of a lot of support for Georgia’s participation in western forums and the travel, prestige and attention that comes with it. It also means potentially that certain people are going to start for the first time genuinely entertaining the thought of what individual sanctions might be considered and on whom they should be levied. The democracy support is not going to end. It may have to change, but it’s not going to end. But you know, the way we support other elements in Georgia, particularly the way we support the state as a whole, may not be justifiable if the state is captured by a party that has become openly pro-Russian. Sanctions would mark a genuine change from the words, however critical, we’ve been hearing for years now, to a whole new phase of actually doing something. What would those actions be? And had the West done it years ago, could this have been prevented? I’ve been very open about the fact that I was not comfortable with sanctions in the past. In the past, sanctions were not the right move, because it seemed to feed into the worst paranoid tendencies of the Georgian Dream leadership; the idea that we are actively trying to undermine them and overthrow them. A lot of those perceptions led us to where we are today. In the past, I was not supportive of sanctions, but actions do have consequences, and this descent into full and open alignment with Moscow is an attack on Georgia’s democracy, and it represents a point we cannot hope for something better to come out of; we can’t hope that carrots and incentives can turn things around by themselves. Instead, we have to make it clear where we stand. And we stand with the Georgian people. We stand with Georgia’s democracy. I think that certain sanctions might be considered- not in the sense that “we are going to do it because we want to,” but to make it very clear that a line has been crossed, or is going to be crossed, beyond which only dark things exist. We certainly shouldn’t be writing off an entire party if they’re genuinely willing to return to their democratic obligations There is this idea that the US has been trying to overthrow Georgian Dream, which is patently false. And there’s this idea that there have even been shadow sanctions related to this Credit Suisse business, which is also patently false. We haven’t done anything. In fact, we’ve been remarkably nuanced and remarkably restrained, in many respects. Would those sanctions include individual sanctions on the big elephant in the room that might well be behind all of this? Everything would be looked at. Absolutely. But one thing that’s important to say is that nothing is irreversible. And as bad as things are, they don’t need to go further. And there is a path back to friendship, cooperation. Even with Georgian Dream? If they are able to demonstrate a genuine willingness to come back and not take this authoritarian term, then why not? But they have to make that part clear; we have to really see it. Under those conditions, the US and Georgia still have a potentially very bright future, and there is a possibility of great bilateral relations. We can go back to that. That’s my hope, but the ball is in their court. Does this not remind you of the West’s incessant attempts to find mutual ground with Putin over the years? No, because I think Russia has never not been an empire. And Russia, in every political expression, has been a violent and poorly oriented empire. In Georgian Dream, there’s clearly a difference in its sliding into subservience to Moscow. But it wasn’t all that long ago that we had a very productive and good relationship with the Georgian Dream government, when Margvelashvili was president and Kvirikashvili was prime minister. It wasn’t perfect, but no country that we work with is perfect. Not even our own. So I don’t think there’s anything necessarily inherent. It’s the same with the UNM – it’s not necessarily an authoritarian party because they took an authoritarian turn at some point. They also did a lot of good, and we also had a great relationship with them at times. We have to be open minded, and we certainly shouldn’t be writing off an entire party if they’re genuinely willing to return to their democratic obligations. But until that happens, it’s all rather academic, unfortunately.

The U.S. delegation to the parliamentary assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has urged the assembly to host its meetings in OSCE states that are prepared to block Russia's participation, vowing not to allow Russia’s "reprehensible propaganda to go unchallenged" at the OSCE or in any other international forum. "The world must hold Russia accountable for its aggression and for the war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide it is committing against the people of Ukraine," the delegation said on February 23 in a statement. The statement also pledged "sustained and steadfast" support for Ukraine on the eve of the one-year anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of the country. “We will continue to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes to restore Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty over its 1991 borders," the U.S. delegation said. The parliamentary assembly OSCE kicked off a two-day meeting earlier in Vienna amid harsh criticism of Russia's war in Ukraine and a boycott by Ukraine's delegation. Austria granted visas to several Russian delegates to attend the meeting as it started on February 23, despite calls by dozens of countries for Moscow's envoys to be banned from the Vienna-based OSCE, prompting widespread criticism, including from senior U.S. lawmakers. Ukraine and Lithuania are boycotting the gathering of representatives from the 57-member pan-European security body, which started one day before the anniversary of Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine that started the deadliest and most devastating conflict in Europe since World War II. It was the first time that members of the Russian State Duma have journeyed to the European Union in an official capacity since being sanctioned for supporting the war, notably by voting in favor of seizing the four Ukrainian territories of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya. The Russian delegates have faced harsh criticism from the outset, as a Slovak member delivered a statement on behalf of the boycotting Ukrainian delegation. "They [the Russian delegates] are not here for genuine dialogue nor for cooperation. They are here to spread their propaganda," the Ukrainian statement read, adding, "They are here to try and justify the war crimes they have committed and desecrate the principles of international law and human decency." The assembly's president, Swedish lawmaker Margareta Cederfelt, added to the criticism, saying in her opening remarks, "Today some parliamentarians are aiding and abetting the crime of aggression." Cederfelt said she felt sympathy for "the fact that some members find it unbearable to sit in the same room as the aggressors." But she called on participants to use the two-day gathering as "your opportunity to stand up for Ukraine and to confront the lies from the aggressors." Austria's decision to allow the Russian delegation into the country triggered protests despite Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg's explanation that it was his country's diplomatic obligation to allow participants from member states to attend the meeting. The previous two meetings of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly -- in July in Birmingham, England, and in the Polish capital, Warsaw, in November -- were held without Moscow's participation as both times the Russian delegation was denied visas. Representative Steve Cohen (Democrat-Tennessee), a member of the U.S. Helsinki Commission leadership who is attending the Vienna meeting, acknowledged Austria's reasoning behind the move to allow the Russians in, but told RFE/RL on February 22 that the visas should not have been granted. "Russia has violated every part of the reasons for this meeting to happen at all. And I think when a country goes that far, that maybe that they shouldn't be permitted." In a separate interview with RFE/RL on February 22, Joe Wilson, a Republican Congressman who heads the Helsinki Commission, said allowing Russia to attend the meeting sends "the wrong message to the world." The OSCE, the post-Cold War successor of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, is involved in issues such as arms control, promotion of human rights, media freedom, and the monitoring of free and fair elections.