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Reports

Helsinki Commission staff regularly issue public reports concerning implementation of OSCE commitments in participating States, election observation, and more.

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  • Helsinki-Related Legislation in the 115th Congress

    Between January 1 and May 15, 2017, U.S. Helsinki Commissioners introduced more than a dozen bills and resolutions on issues relating to the Commission’s mandate to monitor and encourage compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and other commitments undertaken by the 57 participating countries of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Senator Roger Wicker (MS), the Commission’s Chairman, and Senator Ben Cardin (MD), Ranking Senate Commissioner, have been particularly active.  Representative Chris Smith (NJ), the Commission’s Co-Chairman, and Representative Alcee Hastings (FL), Ranking House Commissioner, have also introduced several pieces of legislation. Other Commissioners, both House and Senate, have contributed to the effort.   The bills and resolutions cover a wide range of issues, from ensuring the Helsinki Principles are defended and promoted in U.S. foreign policy to encouraging improved U.S. implementation of Helsinki commitments at home. Several have been introduced in response to Russia’s threat to its neighbors and European security, while others address broader concerns about developments in Europe and the OSCE Partner countries of the Mediterranean region.    Download the full report to learn more. 

  • The OSCE as a Model: Asian Insights

    From April 14 to 22, 2017, Helsinki Commission Chief of Staff Ambassador David Killion and Policy Advisor Paul Massaro traveled to Tokyo, Japan and Seoul, South Korea for consultations with these OSCE Asian Partners for Co-operation. Major topics of discussion included the call for a Helsinki Final Act-inspired arrangement for northeast Asia and the heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The future of the OSCE Asian Partners dialogue and further cooperation with the OSCE and other European institutions were also discussed. The OSCE Asian Partners for Cooperation is a grouping of countries in Asia with which the OSCE engages in a perm-anent, active dialogue, recognizing the linkages between European and Asian security. Currently, the OSCE Asian Partners include Japan, which joined in 1992; the Republic of Korea; which joined in 1994; Thailand, which joined in 2000; Afghanistan, which joined in 2003; and Australia, which joined in 2009. Mongolia was previously an Asian partner, having joined the grouping in 2004, but became a full OSCE participating State in 2012. The trip offered Helsinki Commission staff the opportunity to get a firsthand account of the situation in northeast Asia at a critical time, and ahead of the annual OSCE Asian Partners Conference taking place in Berlin later this year. Download the full report to learn more.

  • Russian Military Aggression in Europe: A Resurgent Threat to Stability

    On March 21 and March 23, 2017, expert witnesses—including Gen. Curtis M. Scap-arrotti, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander-Europe—testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) about ongoing Russian activities in the European region. The impact of Russia’s military aggression and its failure to uphold fundamental international agreements were of paramount importance to Helsinki Commission Chairman Senator Roger Wicker (MS), a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Senator Jeanne Shaheen (NH), also a Helsinki Commissioner and a senior member of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. Three key themes emerged in the Commissioners’ questioning: the challenges Russian military activities, including exercises, pose to the stability of the European security environment; Moscow’s flaunting of its security-related commitments; and the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in addressing these violations Download the full report to learn more.

  • Consensus Denied? Challenges for OSCE Decision-Making in 2017

    Over the past decade, it has been increasingly difficult for the 57 participating States of the Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to achieve the consensus necessary to address key issues facing the OSCE region, as well as to make decisions that shape the internal functioning of the organization.   In contrast to the bloc-to-bloc confrontations of the Cold War, there often is overwhelming support from most OSCE countries for specific decisions or actions.  However, the Russian Federation regularly represents the single dissenting country; without consensus, under OSCE rules, the proposal fails.  Some participating States have tried to accommodate Russian recalcitrance, believing it will give Moscow a greater stake in the OSCE; others see Moscow’s obstructionism succeed and are tempted to play the same game. Such efforts only encourage greater intransigence and move the OSCE away from the core principles and values around which all participating States once rallied. Download the full report to learn more.

  • Seminar on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement

    United States Representative Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL), Co-Chairman of the United States Helsinki Commission (CSCE) and Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), convened the “CSCE Seminar on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement,” July 22 and 23, 2009 at the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C. The seminar hosted more than 50 participants from the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as Members of the United States Congress, U.S. government officials, non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives, and special guests.

  • Report on the 2005 Human Dimension Implementation Meeting

    From September 19-30, 2005, the participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) met in Warsaw, Poland, for a Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM). The HDIM forum, which meets each year, is convened by the OSCE to discuss the compliance of participating States with the full range of the human dimension commitments to which they had previously agreed. The 2005 HDIM drew record attendance by 331 nongovernmental organizations from across the OSCE region.1 In addition, on October 20, the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna held a follow-up discussion to the HDIM discussions.

  • Report on Slovakia's Religion Law

    Since the ouster of the Meciar regime in 1998, Slovakia has made a remarkable transition to democracy. Once described as “the black hole of Europe,” Slovakia officially became a member of NATO on March 29, 2004 and joined the European Union on May 1, 2004. Most recently, Bratislava hosted the joint summit held by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Moreover, Slovakia has become a voice for fundamental freedoms in its own right. At the same time, the United States has continued to raise a number of longstanding concerns with Slovakia. The most serious human rights problems in Slovakia are those experienced by members of the Romani minority, who face profound discrimination in most walks of life as well as racially motivated violence. The Slovak law concerning religion is also problematic, as it contains the most demanding registration scheme in the entire OSCE region. Due to the discriminatory nature of the current legal structure, new religious communities or groups unable to meet the burdensome numerical requirements are denied rights and privileges afforded to recognized religious groups. At the 2003 OSCE Maastricht Ministerial Council, Slovakia and all other participating States pledged to “ensure and facilitate” the free practice of religion or belief “alone or in community with others . . . through transparent and non-discriminatory laws, regulations, practices and policies.”  In light of this and other OSCE commitments, it is hoped Slovakia will amend the registration system and eliminate the numerical threshold.

  • Azerbaijan's Presidential Elections

    On October 15, 2003, Azerbaijan held presidential elections. According to the official results, Ilham Aliev defeated seven challengers, winning over 76 percent of the vote. His closest challenger was Isa Gambar, leader of the opposition Musavat Party, with 14 percent. The OSCE observation mission announced on October 16 that the election failed to meet international standards “in several respects.” Nevertheless, ODIHR’s final report in November bluntly concluded that the election failed to meet OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections. … There was widespread intimidation in the pre-election period, and unequal conditions for the candidates. … The counting and tabulation of election results were seriously flawed. … Postelection violence resulting in the widespread detentions of election officials and opposition activists further marred the election process. … ” Washington congratulated Ilham Aliev in August 2003 when he was named prime minister. State Department representatives criticized the election process but it was widely perceived in Azerbaijan that the United States had favored Aliev’s candidacy.

  • The 2003 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Armenia

    In February and March 2003, Armenia held its fourth presidential election since independence. According to the official results, President Robert Kocharian won re-election in two rounds, defeating challenger Stepan Demirchian 67.4 percent to 33.5 percent. OSCE observers concluded that both rounds failed to meet international standards. State media displayed egregious favoritism towards the incumbent, on whose behalf state resources were used lavishly. Ballot stuffing, especially during the second round vote count, was rampant. The most positive feature of the elections was an unprecedented, live, televised debate between Kocharian and Demirchian before the second round. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was quick to congratulate Kocharian. Washington, however, echoed the OSCE/ODIHR view of the election. President Bush’s letter to Kocharian, sent after significant delay, did not contain the word “congratulations.”  

  • Georgia's "Rose Revolution"

    First, a “revolution” was possible in Georgia because during Eduard Shevardnadze’s tenure, opposition leaders, parties and society had developed leeway for action which did not exist elsewhere in the Caucasus, not to speak of Central Asia. Since the late 1980s, many parties and NGOs had emerged, as had relatively free media. Their freedom of maneuver and action, which translated into effective political influence, reflected Shevardnadze’s own relatively liberal attitudes, the weakness of the Georgian state— i.e., its inability to control and co-opt competing center of power and authority—and Georgians’ unruly national character. Moreover, international NGOs were deeply involved in Georgian events. Much press and analytical attention has been focused on the Open Society Institute of the Soros Foundation, which funded critically important groups like Georgia’s Liberty Institute, its leading human rights organization. Some Liberty Institute associates traveled to Serbia to study how Slobodan Milosevic had been ousted. Closely allied with 5 the Liberty Institute was the student movement Kmara [“Enough”], which mobilized opposition to vote fraud countrywide. These groups, urged on by opposition politicians, were determined not to let Shevardnadze and Georgia’s entrenched political groups steal the election. Second, the Georgian state, crippled by corruption, was extremely weak. The worst consequence of this weakness was that criminals and crooked officials did not worry about the possible penalties of breaking the law. But this weakness ultimately made possible November’s Rose Revolution by dissipating the state’s ability to resist better organized players. True, international organizations and foreign capitals were urging a peaceful resolution of the showdown and warning Shevardnadze—whom everyone expected to remain in office until 2005—that resorting to violence would end in disaster. But by November 2003, Shevardnadze could no longer command the state’s coercive apparatus; in the end, nobody was willing to act against crowds peacefully calling, first, for new elections and then for his resignation. Third, Georgia’s key opposition leaders were united. Unlike counterparts in Armenia and Azerbaijan, “Misha” Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze were able to overcome their longstanding differences and competing ambitions to act together. While the latter two may have—as reported—trailed the former in his conviction that Shevardnadze had to go, they overcame their doubts and hung together until the final triumph. Saakashvili, for his part, has continued to collaborate with them after his inauguration and often restates his determination to keep doing so. Fourth, Georgia had Rustavi-2 TV, which powerfully shaped public opinion. In fact, the events in Georgia last November have demonstrated convincingly the power of independent—i.e., not state-controlled—television in former Soviet republics. It was a failed attempt by the state to pressure Rustavi-2 in November 2001 that produced the biggest public protest in Georgia before November 2003. At that time, thousands of demonstrators not only forced Shevardnadze to back down, he was compelled to dismiss his entire government. Not for nothing has the ruling elite in other former Soviet states contrived so consistently to keep TV in its own hands. If there is any downside to the influence Rustavi-2 wielded in Georgia, it is the strengthened conviction of repressive rulers elsewhere to prevent at all costs the emergence of analogous TV stations. Fifth, economic conditions in Georgia had been deteriorating for years, with no respite in sight. Over the last few years, residents of Baku and Yerevan have told Helsinki Commission staff that things were getting better, even if slightly, but in Tbilisi conditions had fallen steadily. A seemingly endless stream of winters without heat or electricity and little or no prospect of improvement sapped support for Shevardnadze. Desperate Georgians had concluded by November 2003 that almost anything was better than what they had, despite the uncertainties. Within Georgia, the Rose Revolution greatly accelerated the country’s scheduled political processes, resolving several fundamental problems and opening the door to new opportunities. In one stroke, a longanticipated political succession that was expected to feature a long winnowing process, tough negotiations and possibly violence among contending groups was eclipsed by a sustained manifestation of popular will. The Rose Revolution has had a major impact on the other countries of the former Soviet Union. First of all, it was an inspiring victory for democracy and even peaceful conflict resolution. While ruling elites have stolen elections throughout the former Soviet space, in Georgia a group of opposition leaders managed to unite and unify behind themselves large enough numbers of voters to thwart an attempted theft of the vote. No less important, they did so peacefully, settling the dispute between state and society without bloodshed. The Georgian events have created an important precedent and elsewhere have inspired frustrated opposition activists who followed Georgian events closely.

  • Report: Bosnia and Herzegovina's Draft Religion Law: Draft Text Fails to Meet OSCE Commitments on Religious Freedom

    Authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are presently considering a draft religion law which enumerates the rights and obligations of religious communities and the government. Many aspects of the current draft law fully comply with Bosnia and Herzegovina's commitments as a participating State in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Unfortunately, the draft law also contains some troubling provisions that should be altered before adoption. The "Law on Freedom of Religion and the Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina" emerged from the joint state presidency, developed by the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, and was submitted to parliament in June. Parliamentary consideration of the legislation is expected this fall. This report includes specific recommendations which, if adopted and implemented, would help bring the draft into conformity with OSCE commitments. Ten years ago, the country was in the midst of a four-year conflict marked by horrific atrocities against civilians, massive ethnic cleansing and genocide. The scars of that conflict impact to this day practically all law making in Bosnia and Herzegovina and present a peculiar challenge when addressing the role of religion in society, especially since the leading national groups are largely defined by their Islamic, Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic faith or related cultural heritage. While opinions vary on the necessity of a specific law on religion, the eventual passage of an improved, progressive text would help Bosnia and Herzegovina implement its OSCE commitments and, at the same time, set a higher mark for religious tolerance that neighboring countries have yet to match.

  • Bosnia and Herzegovina's Draft Religion Law: Draft Text Fails to Meet OSCE Commitments on Religious Freedom

    This report analyzes a draft law under consideration in 2003 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would have enumerated the rights and obligations of religious communities and the government. Many aspects of the draft law fully complied with Bosnia and Herzegovina's commitments as a participating State of the OSCE. However, the report found that the draft law also contained some troubling provisions, which were especially worrying given the country's experience with religious and ethnic violence only four years prior.

  • Democracy and Human Rights Trends in Eurasia and East Europe: A Decade of Membership in the Organization

    The ten-year anniversary of the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), an original signatory to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, fell in 2001. The following year marked another milestone, perhaps less widely noted: the passage of a decade since the entry of the Eurasian and East European States into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which embraces all of Europe, the former Soviet Union, the United States and Canada. Membership in the organization is predicated on the acceptance of certain bedrock principles of democracy, a wide array of human rights commitments and modern norms of statecraft, including respect for the rule of law and promotion of civil society. This report conducts a review of Eastern European and Eurasian countries' records on these commitments over the course of the decade following the Soviet Union's collapse.

  • Democracy and Human Rights Trends in Eurasia and East Europe: A Decade of Membership in the Organization

    The ten-year anniversary of the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), an original signatory to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, fell in 2001. The following year marked another milestone, perhaps less widely noticed: the passage of a decade since the entry of the Eurasian and East European States into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)*, which embraces all of Europe, the former Soviet Union, the United States and Canada. Membership in the now 55-nation organization is predicated on the acceptance of certain bedrock principles of democracy, a wide array of human rights commitments and modern norms of statecraft, including respect for the rule of law and promotion of civil society. Each of the OSCE participating States, including those examined in this report, has committed to “build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations.” Similarly, the participating States have declared that “human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings, are inalienable and are guaranteed by law. Their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of government. Respect for them is an essential safeguard against an over-mighty State.” In a step designed to preserve the unity of the Helsinki process, each new participating State submitted a letter accepting in their entirety all commitments and responsibilities contained in the Helsinki Final Act, and all subsequent documents adopted prior to their membership (see Appendix I). To underscore this continuity, the leaders of each of the countries signed the actual original Final Act document (see Appendix II).

  • Human Rights and Inhuman Treatment

    As part of an effort to enhance its review of implementation of OSCE human dimension commitments, the OSCE Permanent Council decided on July 9, 1998 (PC DEC/241) to restructure the Human Dimension Implementation Meetings periodically held in Warsaw. In connection with this decision - which cut Human Dimension Implementation Meetings from three to two weeks - it was decided to convene annually three informal supplementary Human Dimension Meetings (SHDMs) in the framework of the Permanent Council. On March 27, 2000, 27 of the 57 participating States met in Vienna for the OSCE's fourth SHDM, which focused on human rights and inhuman treatment. They were joined by representatives of OSCE institutions or field presence; the Council of Europe; the United Nations Development Program;  the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;  the International Committee of the Red Cross; and representatives from approximately 50 non-governmental organizations.

  • Report on Azerbaijan's Parlimentary Elections

    On November 5, 2000, Azerbaijan held its second parliamentary election since gaining independence. The Central Election Commission [CEC] reported that turnout was 68.8 percent. In the proportional voting for 25 of the parliament’s 125 seats, President Heydar Aliev'’s party— Yeni [New] Azerbaijan— [YAP] came in first, with 62.5 percent. Only three other parties passed the sixpercent threshold: the Azerbaijan Popular Front “Reformers,” (10.8 percent); the Civic Solidarity Party (6.3 percent); and the Communist Party (6.28 percent). Yeni Azerbaijan, along with nominally independent, pro-presidential candidates, also took most of the 100 seats decided in single-mandate districts, giving Aliev’s party about 90 percent control of parliament. The victory of Yeni Azerbaijan was a foregone conclusion. During the registration period, the CEC excluded two opposition parties, Musavat and the Azerbaijan Democratic Party [ADP], for allegedly not having 50,000 valid signatures. International observation missions judged that Azerbaijan’s elections in 1995 (parliamentary), 1998 (presidential) and 1999 (local) all failed to meet international norms. All Azerbaijani opposition parties have denounced the election as rigged. Most opposition parties, however, refused to take part in the January 7 repeat elections. After negative judgements by international observers of four elections since 1995, it is fair to say that Azerbaijan has made no real progress in conducting elections that allow voters to determine who governs them. Despite some improvements on January 7, the election’s outcome was decided in November through massive falsification, which  left government-opposition relations at a low point. At the same time, the opposition is more fractured than ever. Its leaders were unable or unwilling before the November 5 first round to present President Aliev and Yeni Azerbaijan with a united front and party list.  

  • Report on the Russian Presidential Elections March 2000

    On March 26, 2000, Acting President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin, running with the backing of the “Unity” party, was elected by a sizable margin to a full 4-year term. As reported by the Central Election Commission, Putin received almost 53 percent, with 39,740,434 votes out of a field of 11 candidates and the option of voting “against all candidates.” His nearest competitor, Communist Party chairman Gennady Zyuganov, tallied a little under 30 percent with almost 22 million votes. The rest of the field showed single-digit percentages. More than 75 million people took part in the election, for a 68.74 percent turnout. A comparatively small number of voters, about 1.5 million, chose the “none of the above” option. Details of the election results are listed below. The presidential election was occasioned by the abrupt resignation of President Boris Yeltsin on New Year’s Day, 2000, and his appointment of Prime Minister Putin as Acting President. Yeltsin had been elected to a second term in 1996. As Acting President, Putin had promoted a no-compromise policy in pressing the war against Chechnya, and created an image of returning Russia to stability after the economic and social uncertainties of the Yeltsin presidency. Putin ran an almost “above it all” campaign, refusing to issue a platform or make significant election-oriented policy statements. In its March 27, 2000 press release, the elections were characterized by the International Election Observation Mission (a joint effort of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)  Office of Human Rights and Democratic Institutions, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the Council of Europe) as "[marking] further progress for the consolidation of democratic elections in the Russian Federation.”" Both the Communist Party and Yabloko leadership claimed to have “evidence of blatant violations in several regions.” The final report of the OSCE/ODIHR observer mission also found that “Notwithstanding the CEC effort to enforce the law vigorously, candidates, campaign organizations and supporters circumvented the law in some cases.”

  • Report on Croatia's Parliamentary Elections

    Parliamentary elections held in Croatia on January 3, 2000, were marked by increased fairness in the election law, and greater transparency in election administration, allowed opposition parties to win a majority. Nearly a decade of nationalist, authoritarian rule by the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) of the late Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman, ended. Since April 1990— when it defeated the League of Communists which ruled Croatia since World War II— the HDZ maintained its grip on power through elections which were not blatantly fraudulent but nevertheless fell far short of the “free and fair” standard agreed to by OSCE participating States, including Croatia. There were signs throughout 1999 that the HDZ might resort to more blatant forms of election rigging in light of growing popular sentiment for change, but the passing of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in December diminished the ability of the party’s rank-and-file to manipulate the results with impunity. On election day itself, the transparency of the electoral system, including widespread observation by civic organizations and political parties, was combined with such a strong desire for change that the will of the people could not be distorted. For example, voter turnout was exceptionally high—75 percent— despite the timing of the election. Performance of polling committees was professional. The chief exception to this were the electoral practices in the “diaspora” vote held in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, where incredibly high turnout was combined with poor procedures in many of the 29 polling stations. The result was a clear victory for the leading opposition coalition of the Social Democratic Party of Ivica Racan and the Croatian Social Liberal Party of Drazen Budisa, which won 71 of the 151 seats in the House of Representatives. A second coalition of the four remaining significant opposition parties also did well, winning 24 seats, and were invited into the new coalition government with Racan as Prime Minister. Meanwhile, in elections held for a new President of the Republic, the four-coalition candidate Stipe Mesic, from the Croatian People’s Party, won in a second round vote on February 7, 2000. The combined results bode well for a more democratic political system in Croatia with diminished power for the presidency, greater cooperation with the International Tribunal in The Hague prosecuting war crimes, and progress in Dayton implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the return of Croatia’s own displaced Serb population.

  • U.S. Statements at the 1999 OSCE Review Conference

    In February 1999, officials from 90 governments, including representatives from many OSCE participating States, visited Washington for the First Global Forum on Fighting Corruption among justice and security officials. Participants concluded that their governments must cooperate more closely if they were to succeed in promoting public integrity and controlling corruption among their officials. OSCE efforts served as an example to others when the international community gathered in the Netherlands in 2001 for the Second Global Forum on Fighting Corruption.

  • Report on the Presidential Election in Georgia

    On April 9, 2000, Georgia held a presidential election. According to the Central Election Commission, turnout was almost 76 percent. Incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze won reelection with about 80 percent of the vote. Former Communist Party boss Jumber Patiashvili came in second, with 16.6 percent. The other candidates on the ballot were largely irrelevant. Though Shevardnadze’s victory was anticipated, it remained unclear until election eve whom he would defeat. Batumi Alliance leader Aslan Abashidze, boss of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria, had announced last year plans to mount a presidential race, but many expected him to drop out, as he had no real chance of winning. By threatening a boycott, Abashidze won concessions from the CUG on the election law, but his overall strategy collapsed when his Batumi Alliance colleague, Jumber Patiashvili, announced plans to run against Shevardnadze no matter what. One day before the election, Abashidze withdrew, leaving Patiashvili as Shevardnadze’s only serious contender. The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights election observation mission began its assessment by stating that “considerable progress is necessary for Georgia to fully meet its commitments as a participating state of the OSCE.” Among the problems in the election, ODIHR noted, inter alia, the authorities’ support for the incumbent, the failure of state media to provide balanced reportage, and the dominant role of the CUG in election commissions at all levels. While voting was generally conducted “calmly,” the “counting and tabulation procedures lacked uniformity and, at times, transparency.” The ODIHR also observed ballot stuffing and protocol tampering. Shevardnadze’s prospects for resolving the conflict in Abkhazia are bleak and he has little reason to expect help from Russia. Since the beginning of Russia’s latest campaign against Chechnya, Moscow has accused Tbilisi of allowing or abetting the transit of Chechen fighters through Georgian territory. These allegations also aim to pressure Georgia in negotiations about the withdrawal of Russia’s four military bases. High-level Russian political and military figures have made it plain that Moscow will try to retain the bases and will reassert its interests in the region to counter gains by Western countries, especially the United States. Tbilisi will need help from the United States in resisting a newly aggressive Moscow. Eduard Shevardnadze has long enjoyed good relations with Washington, which gratefully remembers his contribution as Soviet Foreign Minister to ending the Cold War peacefully. The United States has provided substantial assistance to Georgia and backed Shevardnadze morally as well. Presumably the congratulations tendered at the beginning of the State Department’s April 10 statement reflected appreciation for his past services, rather than acceptance at face value of the election’s results. President Clinton noted the election’s shortcomings in a post-election letter to Shevardnadze, reiterated Washington’s longstanding exhortation to attack corruption, and pressed him to implement urgent economic changes.

  • Report on Parliamentary Elections in Kyrgyzstan

    On February 20, 2000, Kyrgyzstan held the first round of its second parliamentary election since gaining independence in 1991. For the first time, parties competed for 15 of the lower chamber’s 60 seats. According to the Central Election Commission (CEC), about 65 percent of voters turned out. In party-list voting, the Communist Party came in first, winning 28 percent. The pro-presidential Union of Democratic Forces was second, with 19 percent. Four other parties passed the 5-percent threshold, in the following order: the Democratic Party of Women (13 percent); Party of Afghan Veterans (8 percent); Ata-Meken (6 percent); and My Country (5 percent). Much of the real drama took place before the first round, when opposition parties headed by potential challengers to President Askar Akaev were excluded. The controversial election law carefully required parties to have been registered for a year before the election in order to field a party list. This provision barred the Ar-Namys [Honor] Party, headed by former Vice President Felix Kulov. Also disqualified was El (Bei Bechara) [Party of Poor People], led by businessman and parliament member Danyar Usenov, because its charter did not state specifically it intended to participate in elections. On February 4, the opposition Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (DDK), which had been already registered to participate, was also excluded for allegedly holding a congress without the necessary quorum. Even before the election, the observation mission of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) took the unusual step of issuing a statement on February 8 criticizing the exclusion of these parties. After the first round, the mission, along with an observer delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, judged the election not to have fully corresponded to OSCE standards. Though the voting and vote count had proceeded well in most districts, parties and candidates had not been able to participate on an equal basis and state media favored pro-government candidates and parties while attacking opposition figures, especially Kulov.  

  • Report on Macedonia's Presidential Election

    On October 31, 1999, Macedonian voters went to the polls to choose a new president. Six candidates entered the contest, and the inability of any of them to win a majority of the votes cast required a second round on November 14 between the top two vote-getters. Boris Trajkovski of the ruling Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Democratic Party for Macedonian Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) edged out his opponent, Tito Petkovski, of the opposition Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), although irregularities forced second-round reruns on December 5 and were used by Petkovski supporters as a pretext for questioning the integrity of the result.

  • Report on Ukraine's Presidential Elections: October and November 1999

    On November 14, President Leonid Kuchma was re-elected for another 5-years term as President of Ukraine, beating Communist Party candidate Petro Symonenko, with 56.3 percent of the votes to Symonenko's 37.8 percent. More than 27 million people, nearly 75 percent of the electorate, turned out to vote. Nearly one million people, or 3.5% of the voters, selected the option of voting for neither candidate. Despite the economic decline and widespread corruption that were hallmarks of his first term, voters chose to re-elect Kuchma, principally out of fear of a return of communism, and certainly not due to any enthusiastic embrace of his economic policies. While there were violations of Ukraine's elections law and OSCE commitments on democratic elections, especially during the second round, these did not have a decisive affect on the outcome, given Kuchma's substantial margin of victory (over five millions votes). The elections were observed by some 500 international observers, with the largest contingent by far coming from the OSCE, and some 16.000 domestic observers. While the West welcomed the Ukrainian people's rejection of communism and any plans to reinvent the Soviet Union or Russian empire, the lack of economic reforms, as well as inappropriate governmental involvement in the election campaign, dampened Western exuberance over Kuchma's election victory. Following his victory, President Kuchma claimed a mandate and promised to work resolutely for economic reforms. This, however, needs to be weighed against his dismal economic record and the questionable resumes of some of his major campaign supporters. Western governments, including the United States, almost immediately reiterated their commitment to assisting Ukraine's transition to democracy and a market economy. At the same time, these governments are waiting to see if the reality will match the rhetoric of reform.                     

  • Report on Georgia's Parliamentary Elections: October 1999

    On October 31, 1999, Georgia held its third parliamentary election since gaining independence in 1991. President Eduard Shevardnadze’s ruling party, the Citizens Union of Georgia, scored a convincing victory. According to the Central Election Commission, in the first round, the CUG won 41.85 percent of the party list voting, or 85 seats, along with 35 single districts. The opposition Batumi Alliance, led by Ajarian strongman Aslan Abashidze, came in second, with 25.65 percent of the vote and seven districts, gaining 51 seats. Industry Will Save Georgia was the only other party to break the sevenpercent threshold for parliamentary representation, managing 7.8 percent and 14 seats. In second-round voting on November 14, the CUG increased its lead, picking up ten more seats, and then won another two in a November 28 third round, for a total of 132. The Batumi Alliance’s final tally was 59. Overall, the CUG has an absolute majority in Georgia’s 235-seat legislature, improving on the position it held from 1995-1999. The outcome did not indicate how tense the race had been between the CUG and the leftist, proRussian Batumi Alliance. A win by the latter threatened to move Georgia into Russia’s orbit and away from market reforms. The election also offered a foretaste of next year’s presidential contest, when Abashidze runs against Shevardnazde. With such high stakes and relations so confrontational between the contending forces, charges of widespread fraud dogged the elections. Of the Central Election Commission’s 19 members, only 13 signed the document announcing the results. Nevertheless, OSCE’s observation mission called the first round of the election a “step towards” compliance with OSCE commitments, adding that most of the worst violations occurred in Ajaria. OSCE’s verdict after the November 14 second round was more critical, noting violence at some polling stations and vote rigging and intimidation at others. OSCE’s initial cautiously positive judgement, however, allowed Eduard Shevardnadze to claim that democratization is proceeding in Georgia and that the country’s admission to the Council of Europe was well deserved.

  • Report on Armenia's Parliamentary Elections

    On May 30, 1999, Armenia held its second parliamentary election since gaining independence. Twenty-one parties and blocs contested 56 seats set aside for party voting and over 700 individual candidates competed in 75 majoritarian races to fill the legislature’s 131 seats. According to official results, turnout was almost 56 percent. The big winner in the election was the Unity bloc, an alliance of the Republican Party, headed by Defense Minister Vazgen Sarkissian, and the People’s Party of Karen Demirchian, Armenia’s last Communist leader. OSCE observation missions had criticized Armenia’s parliamentary and presidential elections in 1995, 1996 and 1998, so Yerevan had to hold better elections to restore its damaged reputation. The May 30 election was also supposed to formalize the shift of power in early 1998, when the governing party—the Armenian National Movement (ANM)—collapsed as its leader, Levon Ter-Petrossyan, was forced out and Vazgen Sarkissian came openly to the fore. Though Armenia’'s May 30 election was a clear improvement over previous elections, concerns persist about overall political trends. Armenia is unique among former Soviet republics in that its president, despite broad constitutional prerogatives, is not the most powerful political actor. Vazgen Sarkissian, as Defense Minister, had already gained a remarkable hold on the military, the executive branch and even the legislature, while also heading a veterans’ organization that controls most local authorities. Such concentration of authority in the hands of one politician bodes ill for separation of powers and the development of civil society. Even more troubling, Sarkissian’s record does not inspire confidence in his commitment to democracy. He now has to overcome his reputation and manage his own transition to a democratic statesman. Following the lead of the OSCE, the U.S. State Department noted the improvements over past elections but emphasized the need for further progress to bring Armenia’s elections up to OSCE standards and raise public trust in the process. With the OSCE’s assessment having at least been better than in past elections, Yerevan can hope for the first official visit to Washington of President Kocharian this fall.  

  • Kazakstan's Parliamentary Elections

    The Helsinki Commission compiled a report on Kazakstan’s parliamentary election in 1999. It noted that the election did mark some forward movement; the registration of opposition political parties -- specifically the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and Azamat, along with the already registered Communist Party -- promised to give voters an opposition alternative on October 10 and to institutionalize the involvement of opposition parties in Kazakstan’s political life beyond the election. Other positive steps included the CEC’s lowering of the candidates’ deposit, the law’s provision for domestic observers and the sanctioned experiment with exit polling. The accreditation of over 2,500 non-partisan domestic observers throughout Kazakhstan was also a significant development. Even more important was an October 6 live, televised debate, which allowed voters to familiarize themselves with parties and candidates and gave some opposition figures who had not received free air time, such as Communist Party leader Serokbolsyn Abdildin, their only opportunity to campaign on television.

  • Report on Human Rights: the Role of Field Missions

    In late April, the Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) held a four-day seminar on "Human Rights: The Role of Field Missions." The topic for the ODIHR's annual seminar was chosen in light of the growing numner and size of OSCE missions, each of which must address human rights issues in the context of different mandates. Indeed, some missions appear to have mandates which might encourage their members to want to ignore human rights problems, but the situation in the countries where these missions are deployed can have human rights abuses so severe that monitoring and reporting become a central activity. Even where human rights are highlighted in mandetes, the work of field mission can be hampered by a lack of expertise and training, coordiantion problems and inadequate support by OSCE instituition and participating States. At the time of the seminar, the OSCE had deployed 11 long-term missions, 8 other field activities similar to missions, and 3 representative offices to assist implementation of bilateral agreements. These field operations are located mostly in the Balkans, the Baltics, the Caucuses, Central Asia and thew westernmost states emerging from the former Soviet Union, and they range in size from four to 2000 mandated mission members. The largest and most well-known missions are those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and, eclipsing the other two, Kosovo. Indeed, it was the preparetion for the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) which sparked quent, ongoing NATO action against Yugoslav and Serbian forces were the dominant issues in European affairs at the time the seminar was held.   

  • Report on Macedonia's Parliamentary Elections of October and November 1998

    When, on October 18, the citizens of Macedonia voted for a new parliament, they not only had choices between extremes but also among several moderate candidates. The more open environment reflected growing political maturity in a country beset by instability—both internal and external—since becoming an independent state in 1991. Approximately 1,200 people representing political parties, electoral coalitions and independent candidates competed for the 120 seats in the Macedonian Assembly. Eighty-five of those seats were contested on a majority basis in districts, while the remaining 35 seats were determined by proportional voting for party, coalition and independent lists across the country. The mixed system represents an agreement between the ruling and opposition parties to abandon a solely majority-based system viewed as favoring those in power. The newly established electoral districts were more consistent demographically, although ethnic Albanians continued to allege that they were still left somewhat under-represented. The ruling Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), the successor to the former League of Communists, ran essentially on its own in the elections. The main challenge to the SDSM came from an unlikely coalition of the nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), named after the 19th century extremist Macedonian liberation group, and the newly formed and politically liberal Democratic Alliance (DA). A secondary challenger was the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the product of a recent merger of two moderate political parties. The election picture was complicated by the continued existence of a practically separate polity in Macedonia, the Albanian community which constitutes at least 23 percent of the country's population and has its own political parties. For these elections, however, moderates in the Macedonian Government formed a coalition with more nationalistic Albanian parties. The campaign environment was open and competitive, with fewer government controls on access to information than before. In addition, election administration was more transparent, with opposition parties able to participate more fully. Given the close results of the first round, campaigning in districts with second-round voting was notably more negative and tense. In addition, there were some problems with the timely release of results, raising suspicions about the ruling parties willingness to fully respect the outcome. Problems like family- or group-voting were evident, but there were few signs of intentional manipulation during the voting. In the second round, however, there were some reports of party representatives checking voter registration cards outside polling stations, as well as more ominous proxy voting practices. The VMRO-DPMNE/DA coalition emerged victorious, and the ruling SDSM conceded defeat. President Kiro Gligorov, whose office will be contested in 1999, selected VMRO-DPMNE head Ljupco Georgievski to form a new government. Georgievski has continued the SDSM's practice of inviting Albanian parties to join the government, despite not needing these parties to form a government. Neither a calm change of government nor an effort to be inclusive are characteristic of politics in former Yugoslav republics, and these signs of political stability will hopefully enable Macedonia to steer clear of ethnic conflict on its own territory at a time when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is deploying an extraction force to assist unarmed civilian monitors in conflict-ridden Kosovo to the north.

  • Legal Status of Religious Groups in the US (1999)

    The United States does not require religious groups to register with the government in order to organize, meet, collect funds, or claim federal tax-exempt status. Such a registration requirement would violate a core freedom guaranteed by the United States Constitution. This overview identifies the underpinnings of this freedom, including a discussion of the United States Constitution's religion and speech clauses. Following this discussion, the issues of association, legal status and tax exemption are addressed. Foundational to civil liberties inthe United States is the principle that government was created by and exists at the will of the people. Governmental power is a limited power conferred to the government by the people. In the United States, the fundamental rights of the individual are paramount and they may only be abrogated by the government under very limited and defined circumstances. Freedom of religion is a fundamental,  natural, and absolute right, deeply rooted in the American constitutional system. Available to all, citizen and non-citizen, the free exercise of religion includes the tight to believe and profess whatever religious belief one desires. Government officials may not compel any person to affirm a religious belief or punish the expression of religious doctrine deemed by officials to be false. The individual's freedom of conscience embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all. This fundamental right was established by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the first of the original Bill of Rights. Specifically, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States forbids the government to make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise of religion. While originally an inhibition to action by the United States Congress only, the First Amendment has been made applicable to the individual state governments, as well, through the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.The First Amendment guarantees that the government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion, or otherwise act in a way which establishes a state religion. This constitutional constraint on the government's ability to enact legislation regarding religion has two primary aspects. First, the government is prevented fromenacting a law that requires citizens to accept a particular religious belief. Second, this constitutional provision safeguards the free exercise of each person.'s chosen for of religion. These two interrelated concepts are known, respectively, as the "establishment" and "free exercise" clauses. A Russian translation of the text is available here.

  • Report on Azerbaijan's Presidential Election

    On October 11, 1998, Azerbaijan held presidential elections. The contest pitted incumbent President Heydar Aliev, the former Communist Party leader who returned to power in 1993, against moderate opposition leader Etibar Mamedov, political maverick Nizami Suleimanov, and three other candidates with little recognition or following. While no one seriously expected Aliev to lose, the opposition candidates were hoping for a second round. Five leading opposition politicians—Abulfaz Elchibey, Isa Gambar, Rasul Guliev, Ilyas Ismailov and Lala Shovket—boycotted the vote, unwilling to legitimize by their participation an election they believed would be unfair. Negotiations that took place in August between the government and the boycotting opposition over the most controversial aspect of the election—the composition of the Central Election Commission—proved unsuccessful, with the authorities rejecting the opposition’s demand for equal representation on the CEC. The five leaders, joined by numerous other parties and groups in the Movement for Electoral Reform and Democratic Elections, urged voters not to go to the polls. The authorities minimized the boycott’s significance, arguing that the opposition leaders knew they had no chance in a fair election and therefore preferred to claim fraud and not participate. Beginning August 15, the boycotting parties organized a series of rallies and demonstrations to pressure the government and call for fair elections. These were the first mass street actions in Azerbaijan in years. The authorities refused to let the opposition hold a demonstration in Freedom Square, in the center of Baku, offering alternative venues instead. On September 12, protesters clashed with police, resulting in arrests and injuries. Afterwards, authorities and opposition tried to reach agreement on the demonstrators’ route, and most pre-election rallies, some of which drew big crowds, were largely peaceful. The increasingly tense relations between the government and boycotting opposition parties were one factor in the OSCE/ODIHR’s appraisal of the election.  In ODIHR’s view, these failings outweighed the positive aspects of the election, such as the election law, which all sides acknowledged as acceptable, the freedom for candidates to speak openly on television, the abolition of censorship and provisions for domestic observers. The OSCE/ODIHR assessment was that the election fell short of meeting international norms. With the OSCE assessment placing in question the official results, the CEC’s failure to publish election protocols until long after the stipulated time period heightens doubts about President Aliev’s standing. The election was largely a referendum on his five-year presidency. Since his return to power in 1993, he has not solved the major problems besetting the country. The NagornoKarabakh conflict remains unsettled; Azerbaijani territory is still under Armenian occupation and no refugees have returned to their homes. Living standards for the great majority of the population have declined precipitously, though it is widely known that a tiny stratum of corrupt officials and businessmen have become rich. Moreover, the predominance of people from Nakhichevan - Aliev’s home region - in positions of power exacerbates general discontent.

  • Report on Parliamentary and Municipal Elections in Montenegro

    On May 31, 1998, Montenegro held elections for the 78 seats in the republic’s parliament as well as for seats in the local councils of its 21 municipalities. These elections took place in a political environment marked by tension between Montenegro and Serbia, the only two of the six former Yugoslav republics which have established a new federal relationship. At issue was whether the Serbia-dominated federation created in 1992 and controlled by the authoritarian Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic would permit Montenegro to develop economically and politically on its own and, if not, whether Montenegro would make its own move toward outright independence. Milosevic seems unwilling to concede Montenegro’s de jure autonomy within the federation and would likely resort to some use of force to maintain control over what is, in fact, Serbia’s only access to the sea. Moreover, Montenegro’s relationship with Serbia is a divisive issue internally, pitting those ethnic Montenegrins with pro-Serb inclinations, especially in the north, against those who stress the republic’s distinctness from Serbia and are supported in their position by the sizable Bosniac (Muslim) and Albanian communities. Those favoring a close relationship with Serbia rallied around former Montenegrin President and current Yugoslav Prime Minister Momir Bulatovic, while those advocating a more independent course strongly supported the current President, Milo Djukanovic. Both came to power under the auspices of the former Communist party, now called the Democratic Party of Socialists, but Djukanovic was able to wrestle control of the party and oust his one-time mentor Bulatovic in presidential elections in 1997. Differences have been so strong in Montenegro in support of one or the other since that time that many predicted the parliamentary elections would be accompanied by civil violence. The elections were carried out in a relatively free and fair manner. The campaign period was marked by openness to differing points of view and a growing independent media. The results of the elections were clearer than anticipated, with the election coalition surrounding Djukanovic’s Democratic Party of Socialists winning 42 of the 78 seats compared to Bulatovic’s Socialist People’s Party, which won 29 seats.

  • Report on Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina

    On September 12 and 13, 1998, elections were held in Bosnia-Herzegovina for offices ranging from the collective state presidency to several local counsils. These elections were the latest in what have been an angoign series of elections since the Dayton Agreement ended the Bosnian conflict in December 1995. Like those in 1996 and 1997, these elections were also administered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) through a Provisional Election Council (PEC). Continuous elections, if held in as free and fair a manner as possible, have been viewed by the international community as a means to bring stability and recovery to a country divided by extreme nationalist political leaders, particularly among the Serb population, many of whom remain in positions of power or influence. There were few of disruptions during the two days of voting. Unfortunately, in what were otherwise well administered elections, there were major, albeit unintentional, flaws in the OSCE-prepared voter registration lists, preventing or making it difficult for many citizens to vote and encouraging local suspicions of international manipulation. Nevertheless, international observers deployed by the OSCE concluded that the will of the people was generally reflected in the results. These results did not bring any major change in Bosnia's political leadership, which remains largely in the handes of political parties representing the three major ethnic groups - the Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats. They did, however, continue the trend of previous elections in bringing greater diversity to Bosnian politics. Among the Bosniac population in the Bosnian Federation, the opposition which promoted a multi-ethnic Bosnian society did make some gains, while among Bosnian Croats there was an advance in the simple fact that some serious alternatives existed. In Republika Srpska, however, nationalist sentiment showed a resiliency which the international community found disappointing given the major effort over the past year to promote political moderation. This was especially reflected in the defeat of the incumbent President of Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavsic. Overall, the 1998 elections may represent one small but definite step toward eventual political reunification of Bosnia's two entities and social reintegration after the devastating conflict. On the other hand, such incremental change may be insufficient to counter the solidification of the country's division. It is uncertain whether time is working for, or against, Bosnia's future as state. The elections have made certain, however, that structural change in the electoral and even the political process - promoting a social consensus across ethnic lines - is now needed. Within the next year, the international community must work to see if the Bosnian people themselves are prepared for such a step.   

  • Report on Moldova's Parliamentary Elections

    On March 22, 1998, Moldova held its second multi-party elections to the 101-member parliament since achieving independence in August 1991. The Communist Party, which had been under legal prohibition until 1994, won just over 30 percent of the vote, translating into 40 seats out of 101. The results were a rejection by the voters of the previously powerful Agrarian Democrats, who did not cross the 4 percent threshold required for entry as a party into the new parliament. The election law required that a party/bloc or individual candidate garner 4% of the votes cast before being eligible for a seat in Parliament. Other big losers were the protocommunist Socialist-Unity bloc, which had taken second place in the 1994 parliamentary elections. There were no significant irregularities or major election law violations observed by Commission staff or reported by other Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCEPA) observers. A major exception to the OSCEPA judgment was the situation in Transdniestria “where neither candidates nor voters had even close to adequate conditions for exercising their civil rights.” The new Moldovan parliament opened its session on April 21, 1998.  Deputies are elected for a four year term.  

  • Report on Armenia's Presidential Election

    On March 30, 1998, Armenians went to the polls to choose a president in a runoff between Robert Kocharian—Armenia’s Prime Minister, Acting President and former President of Nagorno-Karabakh—and Karen Demirchian, former Communist Party leader of Armenia. The election followed first round voting on March 16, in which none of the 12 candidates managed to win the necessary 50 percent of the ballot. According to Armenia’s Central Election Commission, in the second round, Kocharian won 59.48 percent to Demirchian’s 40.52 percent, to become Armenia’s second president. Reported turnout was 68.14 percent. After two flawed elections in 1995 and 1996, the March 1998 vote offered Armenia, under different leadership,  an opportunity to redeem its image as a democratizing state. Most observers concurred that the campaign was better than in earlier elections: no candidate was excluded from the race, there were no serious impediments to campaigning, and the candidates received their allotted air time. But the preliminary statement of the OSCE/ ODIHR observation mission, issued after the first round, emphasized violations and warned that the recurrence of such problems during the second round might place the election’s legitimacy in doubt. The Council of Europe and the CIS Parliamentary Assembly, however, gave the March 16 voting good grades and openly disputed the assessment of the OSCE/ODIHR. Armenian-American groups accused the OSCE/ODIHR of anti-Armenian bias, reflecting a purported tendency to pressure Armenia into accepting the OSCE’s allegedly pro-Azerbaijani proposals on Nagorno-Karabakh. Helsinki Commission monitoring of both rounds yielded a mixed picture. The most serious problem observed during first-round voting was disorganization in small polling stations swamped by large numbers of voters, and the vote count went well in a precinct where numerous violations took place in 1996. But the vote count observed during the second round featured blatant fraud: the ballot box was tampered with during the vote; extra ballots were present in the box in large and obvious packets; the vote count made no effort to distinguish valid from improper votes; the precinct committee was in direct contact with Kocharian headquarters throughout the count; and the precinct protocols were falsified to make the numbers add up—in the direct view of the foreign observers. All the falsified votes were for Kocharian, who was openly supported by most members of the precinct committee. At least one fifth —and maybe as many as half— of the votes counted in this precinct were false. Subsequently, at the district election level, the box containing the ballots’ detachable “coupons” (a mechanism designed to prevent fraud) arrived over an hour late with the lid ripped open.  Based on these observations, and the accounts of many ODIHR observers at their debriefing, there is reason to harbor grave doubts about the reliability of the officially-reported results.  

  • Report on Ukraine's Parliamentary Election

    Ukraine’s March 1998 parliamentary elections resulted in a parliament similar in composition to the previous parliament, albeit with a somewhat more Communist tilt. The left constituted about 40 percent of parliament’s membership, with the remainder a mix of centrists, independents and national democrats. The new parliament included many new faces - only 141 deputies from the old parliament were in the new one. The parliamentary elections were held under a new election law which replaced the majoritarian system, introducing a mixed electoral system where half of the 450 deputies are elected from single-mandate districts and half from national party lists. While there were violations, transgressions and irregularities during the campaign and voting, Ukrainian voters generally were able to express their political will freely, and the results of the elections do appear to reflect the will of the electorate. The elections were conducted under a generally adequate legal and administrative framework, but the late passage of laws and regulations relating to the election–as well as late decisions regarding the Crimean Tatars—led to confusion and uncertainty about the electoral process. The campaign was generally peaceful in most of the country. However, it was marred by some tension, including incidents of violence, especially in Odesa and Crimea. The failure to allow non-citizen Crimean Tatar returnees the opportunity to vote, in contrast to arrangements that allowed them to vote in the 1994 elections, also tainted the elections. The state apparatus did not always display neutrality, and there were instances of harassment and pressure on opposition media.

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