Executive Summary:

Russia poses a serious and persistent threat to its neighbors, the United States, and the democratic world. Even if the country’s current regime were to be replaced today, Russia would still face systemic obstacles to becoming a free and democratic state. Until Russia can reckon with its imperial history and present, cease using repression and corruption as tools of power, and build governing institutions that are grounded in respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, Russia cannot be a responsible international actor. We need to be prepared to contest Russia for the long term.

Ukraine defeating the Russian invaders is a necessary, but not sufficient, step towards not only forcing Russia into significant reflection and reform, but also towards uprooting Russian influence and countering Russian aggression more broadly. Ukrainian victory would preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty as an independent, democratic state, while also stopping Russia from pursuing further conquest in the Visegrad 4, Baltics, Caucasus, and beyond. By fully empowering Ukraine to defeat Russia, the United States can demonstrate to countries who believe Russia is their best hope for protection and support that Russia is, in fact, a poor partner and that the United States and other democracies are more reliable.

Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea regions, which constitute the core portfolio of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, the United States must implement a comprehensive strategy to contest Russia. This process should include supporting and empowering our partners and allies who are on the front lines of countering Russian influence, offering economic and security arrangements that are viable alternatives to Russia’s, and investing in institutions that hold Russia accountable.

In the Visegrad 4 and the Baltics, we should engage partners who have a shared history of Soviet occupation and a unique understanding of the Russia threat. This expertise should be leveraged and prioritized within NATO, the EU, and broader European leadership to strengthen collective defense.

In Central Asia, Russia’s war on Ukraine has significantly shifted the geopolitical landscape, impacting the relationships between Central Asian countries and Russia and reshaping internal political and economic dynamics. These changes offer an opportunity for the United States to increase its engagement in the region to counter Russian influence and to support the efforts of Central Asian states to realign their foreign relations.

In the Western Balkans, Russia has preyed on internal divisions and flagging U.S. engagement to disrupt the region’s integration into Western institutions, including NATO and the EU. The U.S. should target poisonous, Russia-affiliated actors in the region who engage in corrupt and destabilizing behavior while redoubling our support for regional security, stability, and energy independence.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has provided Türkiye with both challenges and opportunities, reshaping its relationships with Russia, the West, and countries within Central Asia. Should Türkiye’s balancing act between Russia and NATO prove unsustainable in the long run, Ankara may be forced to choose sides more decisively, which could lead to either a stronger integration with the West or a pivot towards a more independent, and potentially more strained, foreign policy.

As the Caucasus stand at a pivotal moment in their history, the United States must update our understanding and assumptions to better align our approach to the democratic aspirations of people in the region and our strategic interests. By recalibrating our policies to account for the new realities on the ground, supporting democratic movements, and applying strategic pressure where necessary, the United States can help foster a more stable, prosperous, and independent South Caucasus.

To effectively counter the long-term threat posed by Russia in the Black Sea, the United States must adopt a comprehensive, sustained strategy that recognizes the Black Sea as a critical theater of competition. A long-term approach should prioritize building a credible deterrent to Russian aggression, supporting democratic governance and rule of law, and fostering regional cooperation frameworks that limit Russia’s ability to exploit divisions and vulnerabilities.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with its broad geographical participation and robust concept of security, has emerged as a unique platform for the United States to contest Russia, advance national and regional security priorities, reverse the region’s democratic backsliding, ensure Russian accountability, and bolster allies like Ukraine. Russia’s war against Ukraine and its hostility towards OSCE itself has prompted States to creatively reinvigorate how OSCE delivers on its mandates of democracy promotion and accountability.

Each of these regions and venues presents particular challenges to and opportunities for U.S. engagement. However, through persistent efforts geared towards fostering prosperity and democracy and countering Russia’s authoritarian influence, we can minimize Russia’s ability to threaten free societies. This report will provide a roadmap for minimizing and containing Russia’s destructive behavior until internal forces necessary to fundamentally change Russia emerge.