Co-Chairman Wicker on Secretary of State’s New Designations under International Religious Freedom ActThursday, December 10, 2020
WASHINGTON—Following U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s December 7 designations for Countries of Particular Concern (CPC) and the Special Watch List for the worst religious freedom violations, Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker (MS) issued the following statement: “Secretary Pompeo rightfully redesignated Tajikistan and Turkmenistan as Countries of Particular Concern. These governments continue to arrest, detain, and torture people for their faith, despite repeated CPC redesignations. It is time for the president to take actions required by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, which include sanctions against foreign government officials who have committed or are responsible for severe and egregious religious freedom violations. “Russia’s continued presence on the Special Watch List underscores the need for the Senate to pass the Ukraine Religious Freedom Support Act. The Kremlin brutally persecutes religious communities in the parts of Ukraine it illegally occupies or otherwise controls by force. This legislation would ensure the president has the authority necessary to hold Russian government officials accountable for their brutality in Ukraine. “Under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan commendably has released religious prisoners, registered more religious organizations, and maintained the ban on police raids against religious communities. However, it is essential that reforms continue. Uzbekistan should work with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and Council of Europe’s Venice Commission on its draft religion law to ensure that the final version complies with Uzbekistan’s OSCE commitments and international obligations.” As participating States of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Russia, and Uzbekistan have repeatedly made commitments to recognize, respect, and protect religious freedom. Even though Turkmenistan has been a CPC since 2014 and Tajikistan since 2016, presidents have always waived taking the presidential actions against them required by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. Russia has been on the Special Watch List since 2018. In November 2020, the House of Representatives unanimously passed the Ukraine Religious Freedom Support Act (H.R. 5408) introduced by Helsinki Commissioners Rep. Joe Wilson (SC-02) and Rep. Emanuel Cleaver, II (MO-05). The Senate companion (S. 3064), introduced by Sen. Wicker and cosponsored by Helsinki Commissioner Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (NH), also awaits Senate action. Under binding international humanitarian law, like the Geneva Conventions, the Russian Government is responsible for religious freedom violations in Ukrainian territory it occupies or controls through armed groups it commands. The Ukraine Religious Freedom Support Act would authorize the president to consider Russia’s worst religious freedom violations in Ukrainian territory—not just violations in Russia—when determining whether to designate Russia as a CPC. Uzbekistan was a CPC from 2006 to 2017 and on the Special Watch List from 2018 to 2019. Sen. Wicker has repeatedly urged Uzbekistan to request a review of its draft religion law by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institution for Human Rights. Sen. Wicker made the requests in a 2018 letter to Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov, during a 2018 Helsinki Commission hearing, and in a 2019 public statement. A recent joint review by ODIHR and the Venice Commission review concluded that although “the Draft Law brings some improvements compared to the existing legislation…the Draft Law also maintains major restrictions and suffers from deficiencies that are incompatible with international human rights standards.” The review included recommendations to make the law compliant.
2020 OSCE Mediterranean ConferenceWednesday, December 09, 2020
By Zantana Ephrem, Max Kampelman Fellow and Michelle Ikelau Ngirbabulka, Max Kampelman Fellow In 2020, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has faced the unprecedented crisis of COVID-19, as well as numerous other challenges. On November 3, the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation Group gathered to virtually share best practices and discuss areas for long-term cooperation on topics including women’s economic empowerment and the environment. Political representatives of the 57 OSCE participating States, the six OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia), and various international organizations participated in the event. Sweden, as Chair of the 2020 OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation Group, organized the event, which focused on promoting security in the OSCE Mediterranean region through sustainable development and economic growth. Foreign Minister of Sweden Ann Linde offered opening remarks, along with Agron Tare, Deputy Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Albania, and Ambassador Tuula Yrjölä, Officer-in-Charge / OSCE Secretary General. Two thematic sessions focused on advancing women’s economic empowerment and contribution to development, as well as on the need to strengthen international environmental cooperation. Women’s Economic Empowerment Advancing women’s economic empowerment continues to be a priority for OSCE Member States despite these challenging times, as demonstrated in the first session moderated by Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the OSCE H.E. Leena Al-Hadid. She opened the session by highlighting existing gaps in women’s political and economic participation, even though many countries have adopted several policies to improve women’s economic empowerment and their economic advancement. Hadid also discussed how COVID-19 has highlighted and exacerbated persistent inequities in unpaid household work, domestic violence, and permanent exits from the labor force. The panel opened for input from participants where Spanish Ambassador-at-Large for Gender Equality in Foreign Policy Clara Cabrera, among others, discussed best practices as well as posed questions to panelists. Panelists shared their countries’ relevant experiences with narrowing existing gaps in gender equity in areas such as income, labor force participation, access to financial resources, and the digital divide. “COVID-19 has exacerbated inequalities but also has centered our action precisely in economic empowerment. We’ve seen this in the global action for economic empowerment. Mediterranean partners are key in this, including women in all decision-making responsibilities. Response policies will not be sustainable, fair, or impactful if they do not include women and girls’ empowerment.” – Clara Cabrera, Spanish Ambassador-at-Large for Gender Equality in Foreign Policy Ms. Natalia Strigunova, deputy director of the Department of Multilateral Economic Cooperation and Special Projects of the Russian Federation Ministry for Economic Development, and Mr. Roger Albinyana, director of Mediterranean regional policies and human development at the European Institute of the Mediterranean, shared opportunities to advance women’s economic empowerment through legislative action that supports mothers, narrows gaps in educational attainment, and increases financial support for women participating in the labor force. Stroganov highlighted the importance of eliminating the digital divide between men and women that persists in both rural and urban areas throughout Russia by promoting vocational and educational training opportunities and partnerships with the private sector and online education platforms like Open Academy. Mr. Albinyana shared similar best practices around the use of policy to eliminate inequities in educational attainment, women’s employment, and access to finances and capital. Policies instituting paid maternity leave and banning discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status for capital are essential to empowering women. Dr. Lenita Freidenvall of Sweden stated that her country’s efforts have focused on improving gender equality through policies that drive decision-making and resource allocation, ultimately aiming to build a society in which women and men can live their lives to their utmost potential regardless of sexual orientation, gender, age, or sex. Specifically, these policies include improving access to affordable childcare, equal distribution of parental leave, and improved access to financial capital. Mrs. Hana Rado, chief operating officer of McCann Tel Aviv, co-founder and chairperson of AloTok, and president of Supersonas Israel, noted the disproportionate burden of unemployment women in Israel face during COVID-19. She shared five solutions for economic advancement, including investments and policies that provide financial literacy, management, and leadership development. These initiatives also aim to support the mother, equal pay, and women in business, as well as protect the safety and security of women both in the public and private sphere. Promoting Environmental Cooperation “Our post-COVID-19 recovery strategies should be used as an opportunity to take on important reforms towards fulfilling the sustainable development goals, as well as the goals of the Paris agreement. We need to ensure that the recovery is based on the green transition. Lack of action towards climate neutrality will bring about consequences and costs that by far exceed the transition costs.” – Ann Linde, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden The session focusing on promoting environmental cooperation was opened by H.E. Ambassador Yasser Sorour, deputy assistant foreign minister of Egypt, who highlighted how water scarcity, drought, and rising sea levels are the most pressing environmental concerns in the region. A panel of experts, moderated by H.E. Ambassador Vuk Žugić, the coordinator of OSCE economic and environmental activities, discussed the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters and extreme weather events, and how poor governance and mismanagement and degradation of natural resources pose threats to the environment and security of the OSCE region and the Mediterranean. Dr. Malin Mobjörk, senior researcher and director of the Climate Change and Risk Programme at the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute, touched on how environmental issues jeopardize tourism, a significant aspect of many Mediterranean countries’ economies. She elaborated on how the accelerated rate of environmental change also affects economies and puts livelihoods at risk. Mr. Grammenos Mastrojeni, deputy secretary general for energy and climate action at the Union for the Mediterranean, asserted that strengthening cooperation and partnerships to address environmental challenges magnified by climate change can facilitate sustainable development in all its aspects, advance green growth, and foster common security. He also emphasized the need to mitigate nonrenewable resources and implement renewable energy initiatives. The conference concluded by discussing how the OSCE’s 2021 priorities will focus on women's economic empowerment, comprehensive access to security, equal access to justice, security amongst OSCE states, and COVID relief and mitigation. Official delegations present at 2020 OSCE Mediterranean Conference included: Jordan Morocco Israel Cyprus Finland Greece Slovenia Turkey Malta Spain Egypt Hungary Italy Poland Portugal Croatia
COVID-19 IMPACTS OSCE’S 2020 HUMAN DIMENSION WORKMonday, December 07, 2020
By Erika Schlager, Counsel for International Law; Janice Helwig, Senior Policy Advisor; and Shannon Simrell, Representative of the Helsinki Commission to the U.S. Mission to the OSCE The regular and planned schedule of OSCE meetings for 2020 was significantly altered by the COVID-19 pandemic. It now falls to the 2021 Chair-in-Office, Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde, to steward the Organization—and its human dimension activities—through the next phase of the pandemic. Changes to the OSCE’s regular order began on March 14, when Austrian authorities ordered a lockdown in response to the emerging pandemic. OSCE meetings in Vienna, where the OSCE is headquartered, were canceled for the second half of that month. Pressing business was conducted remotely, which allowed the Permanent Council to renew the mandate for the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine and adopt the SMM budget on March 19. After a regularly scheduled recess from April 6 to April 17, some OSCE meetings resumed as the organization shifted to primarily online meetings. Some used a “hybrid” or “blended” format, permitting in-person engagement in Vienna (to the extent that in-person gatherings were allowed by changing local health measures), reinforced by additional participation through videoconferencing. Two-day Supplementary Human Dimension Meetings, the Alliance Against Trafficking meeting, and the Annual Security Review Conference were held in a hybrid format. Some other meetings, such as the annual Human Dimension Seminar in Warsaw, were not held at all. Separately, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly canceled its annual session, which had been scheduled in Vancouver in July. 2020 Human Dimension Implementation Meeting As the participating States and the OSCE institutions strove to adjust to circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic, convening the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) presented particular challenges due to its length and complexity. Reflecting the extraordinary times, the 2020 Human Dimension Implementation Meeting was canceled by decision of the participating States. Spanning two weeks, the HDIM is significantly longer than other OSCE meetings. It typically draws more than a thousand representatives of government and civil society from across the OSCE’s expansive time zones. According to its mandate, the HDIM holds six hours of formal sessions each day covering the full range of human dimension concerns including freedoms of assembly, association, expression, and religion or belief; countering anti-Semitism, racism, and xenophobia; and democratic institutions such as free and fair elections, the rule of law, and independence of the judiciary. Dozens of side events are also organized by nongovernmental organizations, OSCE institutions, other international organizations, and participating States, which meet for up to an additional six hours a day. Side events allow participants to focus on specific issues of concern in greater depth. The most significant aspect of HDIM is that civil society representatives may speak during formal sessions on equal footing with government representatives. Governments and civil society alike use HDIM as a forum to cultivate contacts among and between civil society and governments. As a practical matter, the critical human rights violations that would be the focus of any implementation review were unabated by the pandemic. On the contrary, some governments used the pandemic to distract from their long-standing human rights shortcomings. In addition, the pandemic created additional areas of concern, such as government surveillance ostensibly related to health monitoring, punitive measures against real or alleged critics of a government’s pandemic responses, and the scope and duration of emergency measures adopted in response to the pandemic. When considering how to hold the HDIM in the context of COVID-19, organizers and participants alike debated how, or indeed whether, HDIM’s unique aspects could be shoe-horned into an on-line format. The United States argued that the HDIM could and should be convened in an adjusted, blended format. “It is precisely because of the impact of the pandemic on human rights and democracy that the HDIM must be held. [. . .] 2020 is EXACTLY the year we need HDIM most.” Harry Hummel, advisor to the Netherlands Helsinki Committee with extensive experience attending HDIMs, noted that some of these challenges had already been met for the first two Supplementary Human Dimension Meetings and that hybrid meetings would have some advantages. However, he concluded that all online or hybrid HDIM variants would have significant disadvantages for civil society, particularly since one of the most important components of the HDIM—informal, person-to-person contacts—could not be replicated virtually A majority of OSCE participating States agreed. After extensive consultations among participating States, the Chair-in-Office, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) —the OSCE institution mandated to organize the HDIM—the Permanent Council decided on September 11 that the HDIM (originally scheduled for September 21–October 2) would, exceptionally, not take place in 2020 due to the unprecedented, extraordinary, and unpredictable circumstances caused by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The Permanent Council also stated that this decision did not establish any precedent for the organization of future HDIMs. Following the announcement, Chairman Alcee Hastings stated, “We should use this time wisely by redoubling our efforts to ensure that all OSCE participating States implement their OSCE commitments. The pandemic has revealed—and in some cases amplified—human rights shortcomings, democratic weaknesses, racial inequities, and social vulnerabilities across the region.” At a hearing before the Helsinki Commission on September 17, OSCE Chair-in-Office Edi Rama reaffirmed the importance of HDIM. He stated, “This is a huge loss for our organization. Together with [the] Permanent Council, [the] Human Dimension Implementation Meeting is a constituent part of the OSCE’s mechanism for the review and assessment of the implementation of our commitments.” Working to Keeping Human Dimension Issues Top of Mind To provide an additional platform in 2020 for human dimension issues, the OSCE held a series of webinars between September 28 and November 6, 2020, organized by ODIHR in cooperation with the Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM) and the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), and with the support of the 2020 Albanian OSCE Chairmanship. The sessions focused on racism, xenophobia, and intolerance and discrimination; combating racism and discrimination against Roma; the rule of law; access to information and freedom of the media; democratic lawmaking; multilingual education; and human rights defenders. Some of the webinars touched on subjects such as the prevention of torture (part of the discussion on human rights defenders) and access to information that also were the subject of subsequent negotiations for Ministerial Council decisions. Although the webinars raised important human rights issues, they could not substitute for the HDIM, particularly as their format and short duration did not permit significant dialogue with civil society. Looking Ahead to 2021 In a December 3 address to the annual OSCE Ministerial Council, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun called for sustained vigilance. “We must press governments to uphold their human dimension commitments, give audience to the voices of civil society, and hold a Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in 2021 where governments are called to account for their actions,” he said. As 2021 Chair-in-Office, Sweden will have the task of consulting with the participating States on the entire calendar of OSCE meetings and events, continuing to adjust plans as needed in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. There has been strong support among participating States for moving the HDIM, which is typically been held in the early fall, to earlier in the year to prevent any conflict with the annual United Nations General Assembly meeting. Given the inability to hold a regular HDIM in 2020, if public health conditions permit, it would be ideal to move the HDIM forward in 2021.
Europe Whole and Free? The Future of the OSCEThursday, December 03, 2020
On November 20, the Woodrow Wilson Center, in cooperation with the U.S. Helsinki Commission, hosted “Europe Whole and Free: The Future of the OSCE.” The event discussed a divided Europe and the responsibility of the United States to help obtain peace on the continent. The event featured Helsinki Commission Ranking Member Sen. Ben Cardin (MD) and Commissioner Rep. Robert Aderholt (AL-04), as well as other leading voices on European security and cooperation. The event celebrated the 30th anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which was signed by 34 heads of state and government during a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Summit (CSCE) held in the French capital from November 19 to 21, 1990. The political agreement charted a path forward following Cold War confrontation and ushered in a new era as states made an unprecedented commitment to domestic individual freedoms, democratic governance, human rights, and transnational cooperation. By institutionalizing the CSCE as a platform to realize peace and security, this process created the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which today is the world’s largest regional security organization, comprising 57 participating States. Participants delved into the history of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, acknowledging that these agreements hold particular importance as milestones of European and transatlantic cooperation. They also expressed optimism concerning transatlantic cooperation under President-elect Joe Biden and stressed the importance of continuing dialogue regarding Charter of Paris commitments. “I think Joe Biden recognizes that U.S. involvement globally is going to be in the United States’ interest,” said Sen. Cardin. “You’re going to see a president who will embrace those allies that share our values, but he’ll engage all of the countries. But he’ll be anchored in our values, which, by the way, are the Helsinki Final Act values and reinforcing the Charter of Paris.” As democracy and human rights are systematically challenged in the OSCE region, Robert Ryberg, Deputy Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden and incoming OSCE Chair-in-Office, noted that recent developments in Ukraine and Belarus demonstrate that nearly all serious challenges to the OSCE region’s security stem from situations where the fundamental principles of Helsinki and Paris are not respected. Many speakers pointed out the need for accountability within the OSCE and reinvigorated political investment from participating States in order to realize Chart of Paris ideals. “As no one participating in that Paris Charter could predict the collapse of the Soviet Union, which at that time was literally only a year away, we cannot yet see the contours of the world that will emerge from the lockdowns that we are seeing now and this disruption that the coronavirus has really brought to the entire world,” said Rep. Aderholt. “Whatever the future holds, I believe that a revitalized OSCE will be a powerful asset for our leaders as they navigate in a new era and as we continue to call upon all governments to respect inalienable rights.” Speakers also called for a reinvigoration, and in some cases reform, of the OSCE, as well as the promotion of multilateralism, as avenues to continue the vital work of the OSCE. Photos Courtesy of the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France
A Parliamentary Perspective on the 30th Anniversary of the Charter of ParisThursday, December 03, 2020
On November 20, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) and the French Delegation to the OSCE PA hosted a commemorative event celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Speakers reflected on the momentous document and discussed how to the OSCE can continue to provide value within today’s complex international framework. The Charter of Paris was signed by 34 heads of state and government during a Summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the French capital from November 19 to 21, 1990. The political agreement charted a path forward following Cold War confrontation and ushered in a new era as states made an unprecedented commitment to domestic individual freedoms, democratic governance, human rights, and transnational cooperation. The agreement led to the institutionalization of the CSCE as well as the regularization of its meeting, setting the stage for the transformation of the ongoing conference to an organization, the OSCE, in 1995. This included the founding of the Parliamentary Assembly in 1991. As the Charter of Paris turns 30, speakers reflected on its history and expression of hope for unity, stability and peace – goals which seemed attainable at the time but appear more distant today. Ann Linde, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden and incoming OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, stressed the OSCE and OSCE PA’s critical role in resolving challenges that threaten the OSCE region’s collective security, such as Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the post-election crackdown in Belarus. OSCE PA President George Tsereteli said, “it is clear that we as politicians and parliamentarians need to work very hard.” He encouraged his colleagues to confront crises in democracy and strive to realize Charter of Paris commitments. Participants of the event acknowledged the need to strengthen participating States’ commitments to the charter’s ideals through cooperation and dialogue. These calls for action were within the context of current geopolitical conflicts, as well as an effort to find ways to reach consensus with Russia. “The OSCE has become the premier international organization promoting human rights… It is a proud record, but it’s a record that can be improved. The OSCE needs to work on openness, access to non-governmental organizations. But the problem within the OSCE states today is principally noncompliance of the states with the principles, not the deficiencies in the organization itself,” said Helsinki Commission Ranking Member and OSCE PA Special Representative on Anti-Semitism, Racism and Intolerance, Sen. Ben Cardin. “Every state can do better,” Cardin said. “So, let us on this 30th anniversary of the Paris Charter remember our mission to build, consolidate, and strengthen democracies as the only system of government of our nations. You cannot be neutral in democracy.”
The OSCE Celebrates 30 Years of the Charter of ParisFriday, November 20, 2020
By Emma Derr, Max Kampelman Fellow November 21, 2020, marks the 30th anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, a groundbreaking document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The charter was signed by 34 heads of state and government during a CSCE Summit in the French capital from November 19 to 21, 1990. The political agreement charted a path forward following Cold War confrontation and division caused by Soviet domination in the east. It ushered in a new era as states made an unprecedented commitment to domestic individual freedoms, democratic governance, human rights, and transnational cooperation. By institutionalizing the CSCE as a platform to realize peace and security, this process transformed the multilateral Conference into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which today is the world’s largest regional security organization, comprising 57 participating States. The charter states, “Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past. The courage of men and women, the strength of the will of the peoples and the power of the ideas of the Helsinki Final Act have opened a new era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe.” Known by many as the “Helsinki Process,” both the CSCE and its OSCE successor have been based on ten principles guiding relations between participating States, enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. The charter marks a triumph of the comprehensive definition of security these principles represent and a moment of unity, which participating States hoped to maintain through enhanced cooperation. During the OSCE’s three-session Security Days event in October “Revitalizing Trust and Co-operation in Europe: Lessons of the Paris Charter,” former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III, who played a leading role in the charter’s formation, recalled signing the agreement as an “optimistic, almost festive event.” “It encapsulated so much that was positive about the process that had begun with the Helsinki Final Act in 1975,” he said. “It envisioned a new and inclusive continent based largely on western values, particularly the value of democracy.” The Enduring Value of the OSCE Since 1990, the OSCE has acted as a forum for political dialogue and a platform for joint action across North America, Europe, and Asia through its institutions, structures, and field operations. As its occupation of Crimea and military intervention in Eastern Ukraine have led to Russia’s isolation and sanctions by the United States and others in recent years, the OSCE is one of the few remaining multilateral forums for American diplomats to directly engage with their Russian counterparts. As an organization promoting the principles of democracy and as a forum for conflict resolution, the OSCE is a valuable tool to hold authoritarian regimes accountable throughout the region, which stretches from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission Rep. Alcee L. Hastings and U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE James S. Gilmore III see the OSCE as a forum where the United States remains engaged and committed to the ideals cemented in the Charter of Paris. “Through the OSCE, the United States directly confronts the deceit of Russia and other authoritarian powers. By raising our voices, through our participation and leadership, we reassure our friends that the United States stands with them and supports our shared values against the growing tide of autocracy,” Rep. Hastings and Amb. Gilmore stated in an August 2020 op-ed. The organization continues to play a critical role in regional conflicts in and amongst participating States. The OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine is the only independent observer group with a permanent presence in the war zone. “The OSCE’s broad membership and comprehensive definition of security make it an ideal platform to advocate for our interests in a vital region,” stated Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker and Ranking Member Sen. Ben Cardin in a 2018 article describing the OSCE’s timeless value. “Its institutions remain singularly placed to moderate regional conflicts, promote respect for human rights, and safeguard essential elements of democracy.” The OSCE operates field missions in 13 participating States with the goal of supporting the development of host countries’ democratic institutions, legal frameworks, and ability to meet various human rights, media freedom, and policing commitments. OSCE field mission staff are praised by Carnegie Europe Senior Fellow Thomas de Waal as “some of the unsung heroes of Europe’s darkest corners.” The Charter of Paris articulated a new era of economic commitments, and the OSCE provides frequent opportunities for representatives of OSCE governments to discuss best practices concerning free market economies, economic cooperation and environmental issues. The OSCE also organizes international election observation missions to transitional and well-established democracies alike, observing and reporting on adherence to democratic election commitments. New Challenges Much has changed since the end of the Cold War, and the anniversary of the charter provides an opportunity to renew commitments to cooperation and examine how the OSCE will meet current and emerging challenges. During October’s Security Days event, former OSCE Secretary General and former High Commissioner on National Minorities Ambassador Lamberto Zannier called for reinvigorated political support and investment by participating States to enable the OSCE to continue its vital work. He cited the post-Soviet transition in Ukraine and Serbian elections in Kosovo as examples of these efforts. During his remarks at the event, Baker concluded that in this spirit, the OSCE can find new methods of cooperation to meet 21 century challenges. “Our message should not be much different than it was three decades ago,” he said. “States should fulfill the promises they made in the Paris charter 30 years ago.” The 30th anniversary inspired other webinar discussions, such as IFSH Hamburg’s Event, “30 Years Charter of Paris: Lessons for Pragmatic Cooperation in the OSCE Area,” which discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the Charter of Paris, as well as potential reforms to the OSCE. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) also engaged in the anniversary and hosted the event “(Dis)functional International Security Institutions? The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Today.” The OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly and the French Delegation to the Assembly held an online, public discussion “The 30th Anniversary of the Charter of Paris: A Parliamentary Perspective,” on November 20, which discussed how to the OSCE can continue to provide value within today’s complex international framework. Finally, on November 20, the Woodrow Wilson Center in cooperation with the U.S. Helsinki Commission also hosted an event, “Marking the 30th Anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe - Europe Whole and Free: The Future of the OSCE.” The discussion included the U.S. Helsinki Commission’s Ranking Member Sen. Ben Cardin and Commissioner Rep. Robert Aderholt, as well as other leading voices on European security and cooperation. Photos Courtesy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France
Rodchenkov Act Passes Senate, Goes to President for SignatureTuesday, November 17, 2020
WASHINGTON—Yesterday, the Rodchenkov Anti-Doping Act (H.R. 835) passed the U.S. Senate, completing its course through both chambers of Congress. The bill now goes to President Donald Trump for signature. Passage of the bipartisan legislation has been spearheaded by Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker (MS) and Commissioner Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (RI) in the Senate and former Commissioners Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (TX-18) and Rep. Michael Burgess (TX-26) in the House of Representatives. The bill passed the House of Representatives in October 2019. “This legislation is a great bipartisan accomplishment for the rights of athletes, the protection of whistleblowers, and our common goal of keeping criminals out of international sports,” said Sen. Wicker. “The world’s top athletes should not have a life achievement ripped away from them through fraud—and no whistleblower should live in fear of retaliation for exposing that fraud, as Dr. Rodchenkov has been forced to do.” “Russia’s malicious, corrupt behavior on the international stage demands a strong rejoinder,” said Sen. Whitehouse. “The World Anti-Doping Agency and the International Olympic Committee have failed to hold Russia accountable for its brazen cheating program in Sochi. Ahead of the next Olympics, the Rodchenkov Anti-Doping Act will create stiff penalties for doping and send a message to Russia and the world that state-sponsored fraud will not be tolerated.” The bill advanced through the legislative process entirely on consensus-based procedures, demonstrating the wide bipartisan support for the measure. The legislation also has received overwhelming support from amateur and professional sport organizations, including the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA), the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee (USOPC), the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee Athletes’ Advisory Council, the U.S. Olympians and Paralympians Association, Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), the National Hockey League (NHL), and PGA TOUR. The Rodchenkov Anti-Doping Act will: Establish criminal penalties for participating in a scheme in commerce to influence a major international sport competition through prohibited substances or methods. This section applies to all major international sport competitions in which U.S. athletes participate, and where organizing entities receive sponsorship from companies doing business in the United States or are compensated for the right to broadcast their competition there, so that international fraud against Americans will not go unpunished. Penalties will include fines of up to $1,000,000, or imprisonment of up to 10 years, depending on the offense. Provide restitution to victims of such conspiracies. Athletes and other persons who are victims of major international doping fraud conspiracies shall be entitled to mandatory restitution for losses inflicted upon them by fraudsters and conspirators. Protect whistleblowers from retaliation. By criminalizing participation in a major international doping fraud conspiracy, whistleblowers will be included under existing witness and informant protection laws. Establish coordination and sharing of information with the United States Anti-Doping Agency. Federal agencies involved in the fight against doping shall coordinate and share information with USADA, whose mission is to preserve the integrity of competition, inspire true sport, and protect the rights of athletes, to enhance their collective efforts to curb doping fraud. In 2016, Dr. Grigory Rodchenkov exposed the Russian state-sponsored doping scandal that took place during the 2014 Sochi Olympics. By deceiving international anti-doping authorities and swapping athletes’ samples, Russian officials cheated U.S. athletes out of Olympic glory and U.S. corporations out of honest sponsorships. These corrupt officials used bribes and illicit payments, sometimes through U.S. financial institutions, to commit this fraud. Unfortunately, the masterminds behind the Russian doping operation escaped punishment for their actions because there was no U.S. legal mechanism to bring them to justice. In February 2018, the Helsinki Commission held a briefing featuring Dr. Rodchenkov’s attorney, Jim Walden, on combating fraud in sports and the role of whistleblowers in safeguarding the integrity of international competitions. In March, Commissioners Sen. Ben Cardin (MD) and Sen. Cory Gardner (CO) and Rep. Jackson Lee met with Dr. Rodchenkov to discuss the threat posed by Russia to the United States, corruption in international sports bodies, and how the United States can contribute to the international effort to counter doping fraud. In July, the Helsinki Commission held a hearing that explored the interplay between doping fraud and globalized corruption and U.S. policy responses, including the Rodchenkov Anti-Doping Act. In October 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted seven individuals for involvement in a Russian-operated military intelligence program in which GRU officers are alleged to have conducted sophisticated hacking of U.S. and international anti-doping agencies who investigated and publicly condemned Russia’s state-sponsored doping program. The hacking victims also included 230 athletes from approximately 30 countries. The operation was part of a disinformation campaign in which victims’ personal email communications and individual medical and drug testing information, sometimes modified from its original form, was used to promote media coverage to further a narrative favorable to the Russian government. In October 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted a further six individuals for involvement in a Russian-operated military intelligence program in which GRU officers are alleged to have conducted sophisticated hacking of entities and organizations involved with the 2018 PyeongChang Olympic Games.
OSCE ELECTION OBSERVERS RELEASE 2020 PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON THE UNITED STATES GENERAL ELECTIONSFriday, November 13, 2020
By Emma Derr, Max Kampelman Fellow and Robert Hand, Senior Policy Advisor The U.S. election system has passed the “extreme stress test,” according to the head of the 2020 general election observation mission organized by the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe. International observers representing 39 OSCE participating States presented their preliminary conclusions at a press conference on November 4, 2020 in Washington D.C. The observation mission is a joint effort between the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA). Ambassador Urszula Gacek of Poland, who led the ODIHR observers, said the U.S. electoral system had been subjected to an “extreme stress test” this year due to COVID-19 and the polarized political climate. While announcing the mission’s findings, she concluded, “The American electoral process appears to have passed that test.” Observers deliver the post-election statement in Washington D.C. Photo courtesy of the OSCE PA. In 1990, all OSCE participating States pledged to hold free and fair elections and to invite international observers. To meet this OSCE commitment, in March 2020 the U.S. Department of State invited the OSCE to observe the November 3 elections. As part of the OSCE election observation process, the observers focus their reporting on issues such as legal framework, election administration, new voting technologies, campaign environment and finance, and coverage of elections by media. Recommendations are then issued to improve the electoral processes to benefit citizens. “The United States is leading by example, showing that election observation is a way to promote democracy both at home and abroad,” said OSCE Parliamentary Assembly member Michael Georg Link, who served as Special Coordinator and leader of the short-term observer mission. This is the ninth election the OSCE has observed in the U.S. since 2002. The OSCE began its work during the summer of 2020 by conducting a comprehensive review of the electoral process. A Needs Assessment Report was published in July, which recommended observation. Once the core team of the observation mission was deployed, an Interim Report was released in October. Head of OSCE PA election observation mission Kari Henriksen in Ann Arbor, Michigan in October. Photo courtesy of the OSCE PA. The Needs Assessment Report noted “the conduct of these elections will be the most challenging in recent decades” and that “in a highly polarized environment, there is an increased need for external and independent overview of the electoral process, including of the election day proceedings.” ODIHR sent a limited election observation mission (LEOM) to the United States on September 29, which included observing early voting. The core team was comprised of eleven experts from ten participating States, led by Gacek. On election day, 50 observers were deployed by ODIHR, alongside 65 observers that included parliamentarians and support staff from the OSCE PA, to 30 states and the District of Columbia. Michael Georg Link and Andreas Nothelle speak with a poll worker at a polling station in Washington D.C. on Election Day. Photo courtesy of the OSCE PA. Despite the challenges, the OSCE team was confident it produced a thorough, impartial, fact-based assessment. As Link noted, the OSCE’s role is not to draw a “thumbs up, thumbs down” political conclusion or compare results to other countries or even to previous elections in the same country. The mission hopes to foster post-election dialogue about its recommendations, and a final report is expected in January 2021. All OSCE election observation reports are accessible on the OSCE website. Findings Overall Assessment The OSCE’s Preliminary Report concluded that the November 3, 2020 general elections were free and fair, as well as “competitive and well managed despite legal uncertainties and logistical challenges.” It also noted that the pluralistic and diverse media provided comprehensive coverage of the campaign. Freedom of expression was respected, and a wide range of available election-related information enabled voters to make an informed choice. Early and postal voting was significantly expanded, allowing for higher voter participation amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The work of election administration under difficult circumstances “enjoyed general confidence.” The elections were “extensively observed” by both partisan and non-partisan citizen observers, which increased the transparency of the election process. The preliminary report stated, “Election day was orderly and took place in a peaceful atmosphere without unrest or intimidation. Mitigating measures against the pandemic were generally in place and followed.” Any interruptions at polling places due to problems with voting equipment were quickly addressed. Political Polarization The 2020 presidential campaign was characterized by deep political polarization. During the year, controversy arose regarding the conduct of elections amid the COVID-19 pandemic which took hold in February and March. The death of George Floyd in Minneapolis in late May elevated calls for racial justice, leading to peaceful protests as well as confrontation and instances of violence. The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission 2016 Final Report said that the last presidential campaign was characterized by harsh personal attacks and intolerant rhetoric by one candidate, a trend that continued in 2020. This year’s preliminary findings highlighted the incumbent president’s “discriminative and pejorative statements” and also noted that “the two leading presidential candidates accused each other of corruption, fraud, working for foreign interests, an inability to lead, and support for extremist groups.” Overall, the international election observers concluded that this rhetoric shifted the focus away from policies and party platforms and toward negative campaigning. Legitimacy of Elections The 2020 Interim Report noted that many ODIHR election observers expressed concerns about the “the incumbent President’s repeated allegations of a fraudulent election process and postal vote in particular.” This led to concern over public trust in the process and outcome as well as the potential for political violence in the aftermath of elections. At the November 4 press conference, Link stated that “baseless allegations of systematic deficiencies, notably by the incumbent President, including on election night, harm public trust in democratic institutions.” Link and Gacek both said that the OSCE’s observations will be ongoing as the votes continued to be counted. “Nobody – no politician, no elected official – should limit the people’s right to vote. Coming after such a highly dynamic campaign, making sure that every vote is counted is a fundamental obligation for all branches of government,” said Link. Alternative Voting The preliminary findings indicate “an unprecedented volume of litigation over voting processes in the months before the elections, with over 400 lawsuits filed in 44 states.” The report states that such litigation, focusing on minimizing the COVID-19 health risks of in-person voting, created uncertainty and placed undue burden on voters and election officials. Despite these obstacles, opportunities to vote early were expanded due to the pandemic. The interim report said that even though there was concern over the level of preparedness of election officials with minimal exposure to postal votes, many states allowed absentee ballots to be processed before election day and allowed voters to correct mistakes that may have otherwise led to ballot rejection. According to the preliminary report, “Early voting was conducted in-person in 39 states and the District of Columbia, with voting periods ranging from 45 to 3 days. Long queues were reported in a number of states. All states provided voters with the option to cast a postal ballot…By election day, more than 100 million voters had already cast their votes.” The OSCE observed the processing and handling of postal ballots and reported no indication of systemic problems or issues. Secrecy of the vote is not guaranteed by all states for postal and out-of-country electronic voting, which the report—in line with several previous EOM reports—notes does not align with OSCE commitments. Election Observation On election day, the OSCE observed the election process and visited a limited number of polling stations. According to the preliminary report, “Election day was observed by numerous partisan and non-partisan citizen observers across the country, with rights and responsibilities ranging from observing signature and ballot verification to challenging the eligibility of a voter or of individual ballots.” Gacek lauded the enormous effort made by election workers and citizens working the polls, as well as a record voter turnout amidst pandemic challenges and legal uncertainty. “We were received very favorably -- made to feel very welcomed,” said Gacek. Five states and the District of Columbia permit observation by international observers by law, and eighteen states restrict observation. During the press conference, Link noted that there are a number of states where international election observers are not allowed inside polling premises. The OSCE has noted these restrictions since its 2004 report. Link said that he hoped state laws would be amended to allow for international observer access, as the current restrictions are not in line with OSCE commitments. However, Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution devolves the responsibility to conduct elections to the states. As a part of this power, each state has different laws about election observers. Some do not allow international election observers into polling places. Other states do, but most are silent on the matter, leaving it to the discretion of election officials. Disenfranchisement Disenfranchisement has been an issue raised by OSCE election observation missions since 2008. For example, the OSCE noted that U.S. residents of the District of Columbia and overseas territories do not have voting representation in Congress. Also, an estimated 5.2 million citizens are not permitted to vote due to criminal convictions, even after serving their sentence. The OSCE notes that this restriction disproportionately affects African Americans and violates the principles of universal suffrage. Voter Registration and Identification As stated in previous reports of OSCE election observation missions to the United States, 2020 observers concluded in the “Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions” that voter registration and identification requirements can be unduly restrictive for certain groups of citizens, such as Native Americans and low-income citizens. Identification documents are required in 34 states. Campaign Finance Since 2008, OSCE reports on U.S. elections noted a high level of campaign spending; this year, the mission estimated that campaign expenditures were expected to reach $14 billion. OSCE concerns include campaign finance laws that facilitate a lack of donor transparency and unlimited spending of Super PACs.
Coronavirus in the OSCE RegionFriday, October 30, 2020
By Emma Derr, Max Kampelman Fellow A novel coronavirus was first identified in Wuhan, China in December 2019. Termed COVID-19, the disease spread rapidly around the globe. As of October 2020, 1.18 million people have died from COVID-19, and over 227,000 of these deaths have occurred in the United States. COVID-19 is one of the most devastating public health crises since the Spanish Flu of 1918. From hospital beds to protective gear, governments across the world face significant challenges in combating its morbidity and death rates. In addition to the domestic coronavirus policies implemented at the national level, multilateral organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have taken their own steps to curb the vast negative impacts of the novel coronavirus. Examples of Coronavirus Policy Responses across the OSCE Region Countries in the OSCE region have developed a wide variety of policies to combat the significant public health, political, and economic challenges caused by the coronavirus. As the number of cases has surged or declined in various countries, coronavirus restrictions are changing on a weekly basis. In most countries, policies exist at a national level, and many countries have also imposed regional restrictions. In the United States, state and local authorities impose their own restrictions. The varying responses of the United States, Sweden, France, and Turkmenistan illustrate the many coronavirus policy differences that exist in the OSCE region. The scientific publication “Our World in Data,” in collaboration with the University of Oxford, created a “Government Response Stringency Index” using nine response indicators, including school closures and travel bans. With 100 as the strictest ranking, the index currently ranks the United State at 62.5, France at 46.76, and Sweden at 37.04. Turkmenistan is not on the index. Government Response Stringency Index as of October 28, 2020. Graphic courtesy of Our World in Data. United States In the United States, federal action largely has been confined to restrictions on international travel and immigration, with state governors enacting their own policies concerning closures and restrictions. State policies differ in scope and timeline but most center around issues such as face mask requirements, the number of people who can gather, health guidelines for business operations, social distancing measures, state travel restrictions and quarantine orders, restaurant and bar capacities, prohibitions on non-essential medical procedures, and in-person or online school decisions. Local officials, such as state health officers and mayors, have also imposed restrictions at the county or city level, sometimes in conflict with more or less stringent state-level guidance. State restrictions change rapidly, but the New York Times has created a map with up-to-date state data and policy actions. France The French government first locked down the country on March 17, requiring citizens to provide travel permits when leaving their homes. In May, France began to gradually reopen schools and public transport at the same time as other European countries, such as Belgium and Spain, eased restrictions. Masks are mandated on public transit and recommended when social distancing guidelines cannot be followed. According to France’s government website, as of October, local curfews were imposed in the Paris region, as well as eight other cities. These changes arrive amid a European “second wave,” which includes a spike in coronavirus cases in France. On October 29, another lockdown was announced and is expected to extend until December 1. All nonessential travel outside the home is strictly prohibited as it was with the first lockdown, but this time around, schools will remain open. Sweden In the spring of 2020, Sweden kept its borders open, and became one of the few OSCE participating States that did not go into lockdown. Instead, gatherings of over 50 people, sporting events, and visits to nursing homes were prohibited; bars, restaurants and schools remained open. The general advice issued by the Public Health Agency of Sweden reminds citizens to stay at home when experiencing symptoms, wash their hands regularly, and socially distance from one another. The agency does not recommend face masks in public spaces. Due to its high per capita death rate, Swedish health officials recently released national restrictions on nightclubs, as well as other regional measures. On October 26, new local guidelines were introduced in Uppsala and Malmo, where cases have been increasing. Residents were told to avoid public transport and to only socialize with people within their households. Turkmenistan Turkmenistan is the only OSCE participating State to deny that it has been affected by COVID-19. There is significant doubt both in the international community and among Turkmen NGOs that this is the case. There have been numerous deaths of high-level government officials and people in prisons reportedly due to “pneumonia.” Humanitarian concerns have been raised as patients with COVID-19 symptoms have been overwhelming hospitals. Although the World Health Organization visited the country and did not directly contradict the official narrative, following the visit, Turkmen authorities imposed “preventive” restrictions similar to those in other countries. The country has restricted travel and border crossings; closed restaurants, shopping malls, theaters, and parks; and mandated the use of masks and social distancing in public. OSCE Action The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the world’s largest regional security organization with 57 participating States. Leaders of OSCE institutions and offices have stated their continuing commitments to OSCE principles and stress the importance of unity and solidarity as its nations fight to control the pandemic. “Now is the time for unity. The COVID-19 virus does not distinguish between peoples or countries; its threat is universal. This underscores that security is common, comprehensive and indivisible,” said the Chair of the OSCE Permanent Council Igli Hasani and his colleagues in a letter earlier this year. The OSCE seeks to provide leadership through guidelines and policy recommendations that address the challenges presented by the novel coronavirus. The organization has also been active in examining the economic, environmental, and security implications of the coronavirus across the OSCE region. “In today’s highly interconnected world, it is necessary to have strong solidarity and a cooperative approach at all levels: community, state, regional, and global,” stated Vuk Zugic, OSCE Coordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities. Minority Groups and Vulnerable Populations On the Helsinki on the Hill podcast “Communities at Risk,” Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, the former OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and a current OSCE PA High-Level Expert, spoke about providing protection for the most vulnerable during this health crisis. “We felt that the issue of protecting the diversity of the society and ensuring that all social groups are included in the policies, and there is an equal treatment for all, was not at the forefront of the concerns of many governments,” he said. “We started to see problems of discrimination. We started to see problems with hate speech. We started seeing problems with access of some of the population to basic services.” In March, as OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Zannier released recommendations for short-term responses to COVID-19 to support social cohesion in OSCE states, and in April, the HCNM released a full set of policy recommendations that call on countries to take into account diversity when implementing state emergency measures, such as providing public services and media communications in minority languages. Voting and Elections The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is mandated to address issues related to democracy, human rights, and rule of law, including freedom of the press, freedom of movement, and democratic elections. ODIHR released a report in October outlining best alternative voting practices in the context of COVID-19, focusing on secrecy, equality, and universality. Human Trafficking ODIHR also conducted an empirical survey of survivors of human trafficking and issued a report in June that examined the impact of COVID-19 on human trafficking trends and recommended how OSCE states could respond. According to OSCE PA Special Representative on Trafficking in Persons and former Helsinki Commission Chair Rep. Chris Smith, “The COVID-19 pandemic has increased the vulnerability of children to becoming victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation. Today, with most schools closed, children are spending more of their time online where they are vulnerable to being groomed by sexual predators and lured into trafficking situations. One way we can fight this and protect our children now is by education to keep them safe online and by developing age-appropriate training tools for children, parents and educators.” Parliamentary Diplomacy The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) has hosted several webinars focused on the effects of the coronavirus on human rights and democracy. The webinar titled “COVID’s impact on conflicts in the OSCE region” addressed obstacles to conflict resolution, humanitarian aid efforts, and implementation of the fundamental principles agreed to under the Helsinki Final Act. Helsinki Commissioner and Chair of the OSCE PA General Committee on Political Affairs and Security Rep. Richard Hudson attended the discussion and stated his concern over “the COVID-19 pandemic and its potential to further inflame existing conflicts in the OSCE area or potentially generate new ones.” He said it was important for the Parliamentary Assembly to stay informed on the OSCE’s role in the conflict cycle, specifically in Ukraine and Georgia. Other speakers emphasized his message and noted that people in conflict zones are on one of the most dangerous frontlines of the pandemic. In May, the OSCE PA hosted a webinar titled “Respecting Human Rights and Maintaining Democratic Control During States of Emergency.” In his comments, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Alcee L. Hastings (FL-20) emphasized the importance of protecting fundamental freedoms. “I am sorry, but not surprised that some governments have taken the need for emergency measures as an opportunity for repressive measures,” he stated. “Hungary is the only OSCE participating State that does not have a sunset clause for the expiration of its emergency measures or requiring parliamentary approval for an extension. Parliamentary oversight is absolutely essential, especially when governments seek to exercise extraordinary powers.” During the webinar, Sen. Ben Cardin (MD), Helsinki Commission Ranking Member and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Special Representative on Anti-Semitism, Racism, and Intolerance, also addressed concerning aspects of COVID-19 emergency responses. “Emergency provisions which restrict freedom of speech or freedom of the media are especially concerning and may actually undermine our efforts to address this health emergency. We need to ensure that journalists, medical professionals, scientists and others can provide the public with information we need to battle COVID,” he said. OSCE Field Missions OSCE field missions have been actively adapting to support host countries’ needs during this pandemic. Since April, several missions have helped to provide medical supplies and equipment to their host countries. The OSCE Presence in Albania, a field operation that cooperates with Albania’s Border and Migration Police, donated medical supplies to Albania’s Border Police in May. The team also visited border crossing points to assess existing protocols. The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe provided protective gear and sanitizing supplies to its partners in Tajikistan, and the OSCE mission to Montenegro delivered food and hygiene products to support the country’s Red Cross. Handover of personal protective equipment to Regional Health Administration of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region on July 25, 2020. (Photo courtesy of OSCE/Umed Qurbonov) The OSCE has also facilitated online medical trainings for border officials in Turkmenistan and donated IT equipment to the Canton 10 Ministry of Education to support Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine has been impacted by the pandemic by restrictions on mission member movement, but the mission nevertheless continues to be a key international actor in the country, informing on developments in the conflict areas of Donetsk and Luhansk.
Hastings and Wicker Call for Free and Fair Elections, Anti-Corruption Action, and Protection of Human Rights in KyrgyzstanTuesday, October 27, 2020
WASHINGTON—In response to the tumultuous change of power in Kyrgyzstan, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Alcee L. Hastings (FL-20) and Co-Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker (MS) issued the following statement: “Kyrgyzstan should ensure that changes to its electoral system adhere to the rule of law, are transparent, and allow for input from civil society. Its citizens, many of whom took to the streets in protest over allegations of vote buying and corruption during the annulled October 4 parliamentary election, should have confidence that the system is fair and that new elections are conducted properly and reflect the will of the people. “For the country to move forward, authorities should seriously address endemic corruption and protect private businesses and foreign investment. We are also disturbed by reports of pressure and harassment directed toward political opposition, human rights activists, and journalists. We urge Kyrgyzstan to ensure that human rights are protected during this difficult time, including the rights of persons belonging to ethnic minorities. “We believe that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe could play an instrumental role in assisting Kyrgyzstan with any electoral or constitutional changes, as well as preparations for and observation of new elections. It also could support the role of civil society and independent media. Kyrgyzstan should take full advantage of this possibility.” What started as a popular revolt by youth and opposition groups over fraudulent elections on October 4 and endemic corruption resulted in the resignation of President Jeenbekov and the installation of Sadyr Japarov as both Kyrgyzstan’s acting president and prime minister. OSCE election observers concluded that the October 4 parliamentary election “was competitive and candidates could, in general, conduct their activities freely” but “credible allegations of vote buying remain a serious concern” and “a number of controversial CEC decisions raised questions about its impartiality.” The country will hold both new parliamentary and new presidential elections. Presidential elections have been scheduled for January 10, but the timing for parliamentary elections remains unclear. Parliament has already made some changes to the electoral code and is discussing further reform. Japarov announced that he would step down as president in December to allow him to run for president and thereby get around a constitutional provision that bans the acting president from doing so.
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A Transatlantic Plan for Racial Equity and JusticeThursday, October 22, 2020
From the United States to Germany, and Canada to Poland, the killing of George Floyd by a white Minnesota police officer has galvanized a transatlantic movement for human rights and social justice. Activists have managed to sustain their cumulative mobilization in honor of countless lives, most recently in outcries following the September grand jury acquittal of officers involved in the killing of Breonna Taylor, who had been sleeping when they broke down her door with a battering ram to execute a no-knock warrant. Most Western countries have not seen mobilization on this scale or of this scope in several decades, yet organizations, businesses, and institutions continue to debate how best to meaningfully respond. Demands for action have been innumerable, yet national responses have been limited and, in many cases, insufficient in scope to secure and stabilize communities. This is a moment for nations and alliances to consider their responsibilities in the underlying systems that have yielded inequitable outcomes and less security for the most marginalized than for their better-off peers. On Sept. 22, the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament convened a joint meeting and advanced toward a transatlantic response to systemic racism. The United States and other Western democracies are grappling with their shared inheritance of persistent practices that date back to when race-based discrimination was enshrined in laws—when Black people were legally and morally deemed to be no more than expendable property. The cumulative weight of generations of such treatment — in culture, in politics, and in the economic system — has led to radically unequal and inequitable societies and set the stage for international protests against racial inequality and injustice. The November 2020 elections in the United States will have a substantial impact on the ability of democratic countries to address their failure to ensure the same rights, protections, and opportunities for all their populations because of enduring institutional and systemic racism. If the discriminatory impacts of colonialism and the transatlantic slave trade endure in the systemic treatment of impacted populations, only meaningful multilateral and transatlantic engagement that empowers the descendants of the colonized and enslaved will meet the demands of demonstrators pouring into streets across the globe. The next U.S. presidential administration should seek national and international political commitments by its allies, alliances, and international organizations, coupled with investment commensurate with the insidious scope of the hate we seek to overcome. The Need for a Transatlantic Response World War II brought about global carnage that demanded sophisticated international cooperation towards economic recovery. The Economic Recovery Act of 1948, proposed by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall and passed by the U.S. Congress, resulted in more than $13 billion invested in the reconstruction of Europe. This investment was critical in Europe’s recovery, in cementing ties between Western democracies, and in obstructing the westward spread of Communism. This moment again calls for a similarly substantial investment in the reconstruction of economies, but this time the economic objective is genuinely transatlantic and the scourge that must be confronted is one with deep historic roots. The COVID-19 pandemic may have accelerated the inevitability of such a policy. As the coronavirus lays waste to economies on both sides of the Atlantic, it exacerbates the inequities of systemic racism. Research has shown that socially disadvantaged communities, including those impacted by systemic racism, are more susceptible and vulnerable to the consequences of the pandemic. National responses to the pandemic have already outweighed the scale of the Marshall Plan, yet sufficient attention has not been given to how this moment can be seized to rebuild our societies and economies with inclusive policies that make our communities more resilient, even as they make them more equitable. Now is the time for the United States to forge transatlantic agreements with the United Kingdom and the European Union, to address racism at the scope and scale of the historic Marshall Plan. What Would a Transatlantic Plan to Address Racism Look Like? Over the last decade, the United States has established a range of bilateral agreements in the Western Hemisphere to advance social inclusion for racial and ethnic equality. Joint action plans and memoranda of understanding with Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay have fostered everything from academic exchanges with Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) to public- and private-sector solutions for racial health disparities, access to education, and equal access to the justice system. Why don’t similar agreements exist to advance these objectives in a transatlantic context? Members of Congress and parliamentarians in Europe have advocated for just that since the 2009 Black European Summit at the European Parliament and in subsequent transatlantic exchanges. A joint declaration last month from members of the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress emphasized the role of the recently established European Union (EU) Commission Anti-Racism Coordinator to facilitate the adoption of national action plans for EU Member States and the United States. Such national action plans, due by 2022, would reinforce a much-needed EU-U.S. Joint Action Plan on Racial and Ethnic Equality and Inclusion that could be negotiated by the next U.S. presidential administration. Momentum is building for multilateral and bilateral agreements, to draw from and build on the global racial justice movement. Potential opportunities are already before us. A future U.S.-U.K. Free Trade Agreement following Brexit, for example, should include incentives for economic empowerment of British and American communities marginalized by systemic racism. The British Parliament and the U.S. Congress should be required, as part of any such agreement, to conduct regular equality impact assessments for populations affected by said agreement. Both legislative chambers could turn to relevant legislation. They could be guided by relevant U.K. legislation, such as the Equality Act 2010, in order to provide metrics against which any such agreement could be measured. In addition to annual metrics, however, both nations also should measure the realization of long-term goals to empower and uplift marginalized communities. In terms of opportunities within the EU, the European Commission’s Action Plan on Racism released at the end of September should incorporate multilateral considerations. The plan calls for a robust role for public-private partnerships of EU Institutions and member States with civil society in convening a summit against racism in Spring 2021. The summit would produce a commitment to develop joint action plans with the United States, the United Kingdom, and other nations implicated in the enduring legacy of colonialism and the transatlantic slave trade. Notably, the plan also calls for a consistent approach to collecting data on equality, which has long been a contentious issue among EU member States since World War II. Throughout much of the 20th century, many European nations argued against disaggregated ethnic data collection for fear it would be used by ethnic majorities to enact hateful policies. Marginalized groups, however, have advocated for such data collection for decades to inform policy and determine benefits that could rectify the legacy of colonialism and the transatlantic slave trade. Without such data, there are few means to disabuse electorates in Europe of false narratives and assumptions about the role and history of ethnic and racial minorities in Europe. The new plan must navigate this historical context and catalyze more investment in the impact of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). This should include any efforts to implement the related demands of the European Parliament. Any exploration of new trade negotiations between the United States and the European Union should include measures to empower minority and women-owned small and medium-sized enterprises and economic incentives intended to dismantle institutional racism. Inequities Highlighted by the Coronavirus Global protests for racial justice were no doubt intensified by the systemic inequities revealed and compounded by the coronavirus. At the same time, the pandemic has precipitated governmental reinvestment in national economies, demonstrating that governments can indeed execute large-scale strategies to improve and safeguard their democracies when the political will exists. It should be evident in our bilateral and multilateral agreements that anything less than full inclusion for all inhabitants of our nations results in vulnerabilities that leave us all less secure. Given the shared history of slavery, racism, institutional prejudice, and systemic inequity across the Atlantic, it follows that we should seize this moment to begin to conceive of transnational mechanisms to address the sordid legacy of grave social injustice, and deploy our economic resources and capacities to healing a wound that is now centuries old. (Editor’s note: Readers also might be interested in Just Security’s series Racing National Security.)
Chairman Hastings Commends Cyprus for Ending Golden Passport ProgramTuesday, October 13, 2020
WASHINGTON—Following the decision of Cyprus to cancel its so-called golden passport program, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Alcee L. Hastings (FL-20) issued the following statement: “Golden passports are routinely abused by kleptocrats and crooks looking to hide their identity by using dirty money to purchase a second citizenship. I commend Cyprus for its decision to terminate this program and urge other EU countries to follow suit. Ending golden passports will help ensure that the EU provides no safe haven for those who would abuse its openness. Citizenship should not be for sale.” The Cyprus golden passport program has long faced criticism for its abuse by corrupt foreign officials. Both Transparency International and Global Witness have released reports highlighting the dangers of the Cyprus golden passport program, and the European Commission singled out Cyprus in its 2019 report on citizenship-by-investment in the EU. An Al Jazeera investigation entitled “The Cyprus Papers” found that more than 1,000 wealthy Russians received a Cypriot passport between 2017 and 2019, accounting for more than half of all applicants, and a recent undercover video allegedly showed senior Cypriot officials discussing how to enable a convicted criminal to purchase a golden passport.
OSCE representatives, community leaders share urgent proposals to combat discriminatory police violenceMonday, October 12, 2020
On October 6, 2020, the OSCE Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, in cooperation with the Helsinki Commission, convened “Policing in Diverse Societies: Principles and Good Practices.” The webinar, which provided an opportunity to exchange knowledge, challenges and best practices, attracted over 100 attendees including practitioners, parliamentarians, and other representatives of the OSCE participating States. Christophe Kamp, officer-in-charge of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, opened the online event, one of several taking place ahead of next year’s 15th anniversary of the 2006 Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies. Participants assessed the continued relevance and operational applicability of these guiding principles, as well as how best to further their scope. Senator Ben Cardin, Helsinki Commission Ranking Member and OSCE PA Special Representative on Anti-Semitism, Racism, and Intolerance, highlighted relevant legislation that has been introduced in the U.S. and focused on law enforcement reform as a way forward following protests over discriminatory, aggressive policing. “From Russia to Canada, our country is not alone in confronting issues of discriminatory policing and racial justice in the region,” he noted. “Working together with the High Commissioner’s office and other OSCE institutions, we can strengthen efforts to ensure that racial justice and the protection of human rights for all as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act.” Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, a high-level expert for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and former OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, underscored the role of police violence in interethnic conflict and instability in societies. He discussed protests that erupted across the OSCE region following the tragic death of George Floyd and how aspects of the OSCE, such as its Police Matters and Tolerance and Non-discrimination units, could be instrumental in reducing conflict in the region. Other speakers included Hilary O. Shelton of the NAACP, who emphasized the urgent need to implement cultural sensitivity and awareness training for police forces. He said this training could decrease discrimination, combat stereotypes, and foster relationships between law enforcement and communities. Anina Ciuciu, community organizer of Collective #EcolePourTous, highlighted the need for structural changes in France to address police violence and brutality and noted continuing incidents between police and Romani communities. She shared that on average, minorities are “20 times more likely to be checked by police, and three times more likely to be brutalized by police.” Nick Glynn, senior program officer with Open Society Foundation and a former UK police officer, called for increased diversity in law enforcement, an expansion of community policing and demilitarization of police to address the multifaceted problem. Ronald Davis of the Black National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives cited the need for systematic changes in law enforcement, including changes in police culture. Alex Johnson, U.S. Helsinki Commission Chief of Staff, moderated the discussion and detailed the history of law enforcement in the U.S. “The policing system from a perspective of personnel and practice should reflect the diversity of their societies, be it linguistic, ethnic, racial, religious, or any other identity,” he concluded.
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What’s Washington’s role in Belarus?Tuesday, October 06, 2020
The United States should lift up Belarusian civil society, according to experts, and slap tougher sanctions on mid-level government officials abusing protestors. The Trump administration should widen sanctions against human-rights abusers in Belarus and ramp up support for civil-society groups monitoring president Alexander Lukashenko’s crackdown, according to former State and Treasury department officials. Lukashenko purged his political opponents from the ballot in mid-August and unleashed security forces against civilians protesting the election. The crackdown has not cowed Lukashenko’s opponents, who have called for his ouster every weekend for the past two months. Over 100,000 people protested in Minsk on Sunday. The United States penalized senior members of Lukashenko’s inner-circle last week in an effort to push the embattled leader to negotiate. The State Department announced in September that the United States no longer recognizes Lukashenko’s government, and coordinated the sanctions with wider penalties from Europe. Both the Trump administration and European Union officials could be doing more to support the protestors, experts told National Journal. “I think both the U.S. and the EU need to go much further than they have so far, in terms of the number of people that they sanction,” said Michael Carpenter, director at the Penn Biden Center, who called for sanctions against “mid-level” Belarusian officials directly responsible for the human-rights abuses. Belarus-specific sanctions date to the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004, and a Bush-era executive order that sets out guidelines for penalizing officials responsible for undermining democracy. Lawmakers added further penalties in 2011. The Trump administration targeted eight people Friday, including the head of Belarus’s elections and the chief of Belarus’s security forces, and the European Union sanctioned 40 people. The United Kingdom and Canada also announced sanctions over the weekend, including against Lukashenko himself. The sanctions are only one part of Belarus policy, experts stressed, which is ultimately supposed to push Lukashenko to negotiate. Exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya asked German Chancellor Angela Merkel to mediate the negotiations on Tuesday. Judy Dempsey, a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, predicted that Merkel would take up the challenge—but would have to act quickly. Russian President Vladimir Putin might accuse the EU of meddling in Belarus’ government should the talks drag, Dempsey told National Journal. “If Merkel does take on this mediating role, it’s got to be incredibly sophisticated and it’s got to be very fast,” said Dempsey. The United States may not play a direct role in mediating the talks, but the Trump administration might put more pressure on Lukashenko by targeting mid-level officials inside his government. Former State Department sanctions coordinator Daniel Fried told National Journal that the State Department and OFAC could craft an executive order to authorize “status-based” penalties: those which authorize Treasury to target specific people based on their employment. Officials could then work with Belarusian civil society to identify targets, like “the plainclothes cops roughing up dissidents.” “Putting this into legislation is hard as hell, and then it’s not as flexible,” said Fried. “It’s far better to let OFAC do it, in coordination with the State Department.” Lawmakers have remained largely hands-off on Belarus, besides offering statements in support of those protesting against Lukashenko. In July, the Senate passed a resolution condemning the arrest of opposition candidates and political protesters. The chair and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee separately called out Lukashenko’s handling of the election in early August, and later in the month issued a joint statement calling for sanctions against those responsible for human-rights abuses. The upper chamber might support Belarus policy by advancing Trump’s ambassadorial nominee to Belarus, several former officials and experts told National Journal. The United States and Belarus haven’t exchanged ambassadors since 2008. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee advanced career State Department official Julie Fisher favorably out of committee in late September. Democratic Sen. Chris Murphy voted against the nomination, and argued that sending the ambassador to Belarus during the crackdown would reward Lukashenko. Some experts disagreed, and said having an ambassador in Minsk could help the United States coordinate policy with civil-society groups and would send an important signal to domestic opposition. Sen. James Risch told Murphy that the State Department believed having an ambassador to Minsk was “the best way to help the Belarusian people.” Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s office did not respond to emailed questions about Fisher’s nomination; Senate Foreign Relations Committee spokesperson Suzanne Wrasse told National Journal that McConnell has “a number of priorities,” and that ambassadorial nominations were “on the list.” While former officials agreed that ramping up support for civil society groups and sanctioning mid-level Belarusian officials could be effective at prodding Lukashenko to negotiate, they disagreed over whether also to target large state-owned firms that form the backbone of the Belarusian economy. Carpenter, Fried, and other former Obama administration officials suggested that penalizing the companies could end up hurting protestors, many of whom work on the factory floors. The Lukashenko government has close ties with heavy industry, however, and a few lawmakers told National Journal they support lifting waivers granting them access to the U.S. market. Rep. Alcee Hastings asked Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin in mid-August to cancel sanctions waivers for several Belarusian companies. Hastings led the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe election-monitoring mission for Belarus’s 2006 presidential election, and now heads the Helsinki Commission, a congressionally-created agency that coordinates OSCE policy on Capitol Hill. The Treasury Department has not responded to Hastings’ letter. “Providing support to the Lukashenko regime by allowing its state-owned companies access to our financial system is unacceptable, and the sanctions announced on individuals last week by the Treasury Department are a step in the right direction,” said Hastings in a statement to National Journal. “However, Lukashenko himself has long been a prime candidate for Global Magnitsky sanctions, and failing to include him among the sanctioned individuals is a severe oversight.” Last fall, the state-owned Belarusian oil company Belneftekhim retained lobbyist David Gencarelli to push for the continuation of a licensing exemption allowing the company to purchase “crude oil with delivery to the refineries in the Republic of Belarus.” The Treasury Department extended relief to Belneftekhim and other heavy-industry players, giving them continued access to the American market until April 2021. “What we’ve seen over the years with Lukashenko is he’s a very skillful player juggling between the U.S. and Europe, which is a natural market for Belarus, and Russia,” said Sofya Orlosky, senior program manager for Europe and Eurasia at Freedom House. The EU has similarly sought to keep Lukashenko from sliding into Putin’s orbit, periodically lifting and reimposing sanctions on his government for human-rights abuses. The bloc suspended financial penalties in 2016 after Lukashenko granted “amnesty” to a number of political prisoners, which Orlosky said normalized Lukashenko’s undemocratic behavior. “There’s been, as it were, a limit to the severity of sanctions in the past, because the argument was made at least implicitly that we don’t want to alienate Belarus too much or throw them into Russia’s arms,” said Nigel Gould-Davies, a former British ambassador to Belarus. The Trump administration has pursued normalization with Minsk for the past several years, prior to Lukashenko’s crackdown. The State Department’s top political official, David Hale, met with Lukashenko in Minsk in September 2019, and stated afterward that the U.S. was ready to exchange ambassadors “as the next step in normalizing our relationship.” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Minsk in February for the same purpose. The difference now, according to Gould-Davies: The legitimacy of Lukashenko’s regime “is basically broken.” Very few people support the government, aside from people working directly for the state, which undercuts calls for moderation in the West. “He enjoys no significant support outside of those who actually work for the state,” said Gould-Davies.
Statement at the OSCE Event "Policing in Diverse Societies: Principles and Good Practices"Tuesday, October 06, 2020
In the past months, we have seen a rise in anti-racism protests and movements across the globe. However, there is nothing recent about the roots of systemic racism that were planted in our societies centuries ago. Through targeted and conscious action in the United States and throughout the OSCE region, this racism can be removed, root and branch. Addressing racism has long been a focus of my work as Special Representative on Anti-Semitism, Racism, and Intolerance for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and as a U.S. Senator in the leadership of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, simply because when we advance racial justice and civil rights, we strengthen the foundations upon which our democracies were established. It is for this reason, that the U.S. Helsinki Commission has joined forces with the High Commissioner on National Minorities’ Office to hold today’s event following several hearings and other initiatives the Commission has advanced on international racial justice and human rights at home following the tragic death of George Floyd. I am pleased that Hilary Shelton of the NAACP is also with us today to discuss the work of civil society in addressing this problem. In the past I have said, “before they first put on a badge, a police officer takes an oath to uphold the law. Most do so with the best intentions and carry out their duties with a willingness to help communities. But in far too many communities around the country, the system in which they work has been failing. People are dying at the hands of police, predominantly people of color. Accountability has been tied to public videos rather than doing the right thing.” Black lives matter and we must do better to protect the civil rights, human rights, and lives of men, women, and children of our country and throughout the OSCE region. My state of Maryland has had numerous protests in response to the tragic police killing of George Floyd, Freddie Gray, Breonna Taylor, and other African-American members of our community. In response, I have called for a federal civil rights investigation into the killing of George Floyd, and some years ago introduced the End Racial and Religious Profiling Act (ERRPA) and the Law Enforcement Trust and Integrity Act (LETIA). I co-sponsored the Justice in Policing Act in the Senate, which would combat police misconduct, excessive force, and racial bias in policing. The Justice in Policing Act legislation included my ERRPA and LETIA legislation, which has passed the House but has stalled in the Senate. I have been proud to work with my House and Senate colleagues on this and other legislation that requires enhanced profiling data collection for our Justice Department; conditions State and local law enforcement funds on combating profiling, and requires performance-based standards to ensure that instances of misconduct will be minimized through training and oversight. Other important provisions included in the Justice in Policing Act will save lives. The bill bans choke holds by federal authorities and conditions federal law enforcement funds for State and local governments on the adoption of choke hold bans. It also bans no-knock warrants in federal drug cases to address the tragic circumstances that led to the death of Breonna Taylor and others. Importantly, this legislation also calls for steps critical to demilitarizing our police forces. I have repeatedly said we are a civilian society; not a military state--and we must encourage more professionalism, consistent with changing our police officers' mentality from a warrior mindset into a guardian mindset. This means limiting the transfer of military-grade equipment to State and local law enforcement and requiring Federal uniformed police officers to wear body cameras. Finally, the legislation holds police accountable in courts and gives better tools to the Department of Justice and State attorneys general to investigate and prosecute police misconduct. In 2016, the Department of Justice concluded that the Baltimore Police Department had targeted African-American residents for disproportionate and disparate treatment and that this widespread pattern and practice was illegal and unconstitutional. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland is now overseeing a complete overhaul of the Baltimore Police Department, which began in 2017. We have made progress since the tragic death of Freddie Gray in Baltimore in 2015, but recent events indicate we have so much more work to do. These are examples of legislative and legal aims that could serve as a guide across the globe. I welcome today’s event as an opportunity to consider these and other practices that can improve law enforcement and its relations with our communities. I have seen the extraordinary difference it can make when public leaders acknowledge past injustices, work to heal and repair the past, and build safe and inclusive societies. I have seen how empowering communities to reimagine public safety in an equitable and just way can transform our societies. Mark Duggan in the UK, Adama Traore in France, Oury Jalloh in Germany are just some of the Black and minority European lives that have been lost to police killings over the past two decades whose names have been recalled in recent protests. While Roma populations continue to be the victims of unwarranted police raids and excessive use of force sometimes resulting in death. From Russia to Canada, our country is not alone in confronting issues of discriminatory policing and racial injustice in the region. Working together with the High Commissioner’s office and other OSCE institutions, we can strengthen efforts to ensure racial justice and the protection of human rights for all as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act.
WHY SOCIAL INCLUSION IN FOREIGN POLICY MATTERSMonday, October 05, 2020
By Nida Ansari, 2019 State Department Detailee / Policy Advisor The U.S. National Security Strategy articulates “a strong and free Europe to advance American prosperity and security; the promotion of universal values, democracy, and human rights where they are threatened; and opposition to Russian aggression and disinformation” as a key U.S. foreign policy goal for Europe. However, the transatlantic partnership between the United States and Europe, grounded in the U.S.-led post-World War II order based on alliances with like-minded democratic countries and a shared commitment to free markets and an open international trading system, recently has been tested, in part due to a declining faith in democratic institutions. According to a 2020 Pew Research study, in 11 of the 57 countries that make up the region of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), approximately half of those surveyed are dissatisfied with the way democracy in their countries is functioning, regardless of whether the economies are advanced or emerging. Italy, Greece, and the United States report some of the highest levels of dissatisfaction. In Europe, such dissatisfaction—particularly in nations that have traditionally been U.S. allies—can be attributed in part to internal domestic challenges including economic decline, the rise of antiestablishment political parties, the weakening of the rule of law, increased migration, and heightened security concerns. To renew confidence in the shared values that underpin the transatlantic partnership, the United States needs to bolster initiatives that restore faith in democratic institutions. Efforts should focus on the future generation of emerging leaders to foster sustainable western democracies and preserve the transatlantic partnership. Social inclusion initiatives can play a key role in sustaining western democracies and the transatlantic partnership in the face of growing domestic and international challenges. Why Integrate Social Inclusion into U.S. Foreign Policy toward Europe? According to the most recent Eurostat data, 22.4 percent of the EU population—including women, young people, people with disabilities, and migrants—are at risk of social exclusion, defined as the lack of fundamental resources, as well as the inability to fully participate in one’s own society. Social exclusion has historically particularly inhibited young people from being better equipped with the capacity, tools, and innovative solutions to effectively participate in democratic life, and have equal access to resources to take part in social and civic engagement. To take action to directly address historic inequities impacting youth, emerging leaders were called upon during the sixth cycle of the European Union (EU) Youth Dialogue to lay out a path for inclusive policymaking. Following a Council of the European Union Resolution in November 2018, the EU Youth Strategy 2019-2027 introduced eleven European Youth Goals, among them quality employment for all, inclusive societies, and space and participation for all. The Eurostat data indicates the critical need to empower young and diverse populations with the knowledge, tools, opportunity, and access to fully participate in democracies. Additionally, amid signs of weakening democratic institutions and rapid demographic change, emerging leaders from diverse backgrounds are uniquely positioned to address underlying societal tensions and develop strategies for understanding and addressing causes of exclusion. When youth and diverse populations are unable to fully participate in economic, social, political, cultural and civic life, disparities in labor market participation, employment opportunities and uneven political and civic participation increase. However, given the capacity to organize, express their views, and play a constructive and meaningful role in decision making processes, emerging leaders are more likely to demand and defend democracy institutions. Engaging young and diverse leaders therefore is essential to secure the future of transatlantic relations and can only help inform the U.S. strategy on confronting deeper trends effectively. Inclusive leadership has never been more relevant. The notion of what leadership looks like has changed and grown more complex and diverse in the 21st century. In order to uphold core democratic values and transatlantic relations, there needs to be a redesign and rethinking of transatlantic engagements with this complexity in mind in the domain of foreign policy and diplomacy. As U.S. and European democracies move towards more inclusive societies, both sides need to capture the pulse of young and diverse populations who have been socially and economically underrepresented and bring their voices to the table. Operationalizing Social Inclusion within U.S. Diplomacy To deepen diplomatic engagements with regional counterparts, the State Department would benefit from adding a new resource to the diplomatic toolkit: institutionalizing a sustainable, ongoing social inclusion unit for Europe, similar to the Race, Ethnicity, and Social Inclusion Unit that currently exists in the State Department’s Western Hemisphere Bureau, to increase the level of participation of populations who have historically been excluded from participating in the democratic process. The unit would incubate social inclusion initiatives and assist various regional and functional bureaus to meet these efforts. European youth leaders have expressed interest in increasing their mobilizing efforts; however, they often have insufficient access to inclusive networks and need guidance on implementation. Therefore, this unit would convene youth leaders to collaborate on community-based initiatives and ideas being pursued around the world, share best practices with U.S. practitioners on inclusive measures and strategies to address regional imbalances on both sides of the Atlantic. Programs that the State Department has conducted with the Helsinki Commission, such as the Transatlantic Inclusion Leaders Network administered by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the recently launched On the Road to Inclusion, have shown enormous promise in identifying young and diverse political and civil society leaders committed to strengthening their democracies, including through civic education and social inclusion initiatives. Such programs have enjoyed bipartisan support in the U.S. and Europe and should be strengthened as part of an overall initiative to instill strategic U.S. policies and programming that ensure the spread and sustainability of democratic principles on both sides of the Atlantic.
in the news
U.S., EU Sanction Belarus in Coordinated Western ActionFriday, October 02, 2020
Lukashenko government lashes out, saying no ‘self-respecting’ state would agree to demands posed by the West. The U.S. and European Union imposed sanctions against Belarus officials on Friday, part of a coordinated effort by Western allies to censure the authoritarian regime over accusations of political repression and rigging elections. The EU reached an early morning deal to advance a sanctions package against more than three dozen Belarusian individuals deemed responsible for suppressing protests and for election fraud. Hours later, the U.S. Treasury Department blacklisted eight senior figures in longtime President Alexander Lukashenko’s government or associated with his rule. Among those blacklisted were Interior Minister Yuriy Khadzymuratavich Kareau and top election commission officials. The EU’s action against Belarus, together with a joint statement reprimanding Turkey for drilling in waters claimed by Cyprus and Greece, was meant as a broader message of mounting concern that Europe’s eastern periphery, a region that once held hopes for a spread of democracy, is increasingly turning back to its authoritarian past. Divisions within the EU stymied an attempt to sanction Turkey during a summit this week, but officials said the bloc could approve punitive actions in the future. The EU was able to move forward with its Belarus sanctions package, originally promised in August, after Greece and Cyprus secured the statement calling for Turkey to halt its drilling. While the U.S. sanctioned Mr. Lukashenko in 2006, the EU declined for now to include the Belarussian leader himself in their action. Officials said the president, who previously was the subject of EU sanctions that were lifted in 2016, still could be targeted again later. The EU sanctions came into effect Friday afternoon. Mr Lukashenko’s interior minister was also one of the highest-profile names on the EU sanctions list. The Belarus foreign ministry condemned the sanctions and said the government also enacted its own sanctions list, which won’t be made public. It said it may also reconsider its participation in joint programs with the EU and could cut diplomatic ties if further EU sanctions are levied. “The sanctions were introduced as a punitive measure…for the fact that Belarus did not comply with a set of ultimatum requirements that no self-respecting sovereign state would satisfy,” the foreign ministry said in a statement. The statement didn’t address the specific allegations of election-rigging and violent political repression. The U.S. and EU sanctions follow the imposition of sanctions on Mr. Lukashenko and seven senior figures in his government by the U.K. and Canada on Tuesday, a sign of widening discontent in the West over ongoing repression of peaceful protests against his purported victory in a disputed election. Western officials have accused Mr. Lukashenko and his allies of multiple human rights violations in detaining and allegedly torturing protesters following the Aug. 9 vote, which Mr. Lukashenko’s opponents and Western governments say was rigged in his favor to extend his more than a quarter-century in power. The EU has called for a rerun of the presidential elections with international supervision. It has warned it could add additional sanctions if Mr. Lukashenko refuses to enter dialogue with the opposition. The U.S. sanctions targeted officials the Treasury Department said run government offices responsible for the political repression, human rights abuses and election fixing. Besides the top two Interior Ministry officials, the Treasury also blacklisted the two leaders of Interior’s Internal Troops, Yuriy Henadzievich Nazaranka and Khazalbek Bakhtsibekavich Atabekau. “The Belarusian people’s democratic aspirations to choose their own leaders and peacefully exercise their rights have been met with violence and oppression from Belarusian officials,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. The Trump administration declined for now to revoke a special license giving the nine largest state-owned companies in Belarus access to the U.S. financial system, as urged by the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a government body that advises administrations on sanctions. While the EU’s Belarus sanctions had broad support, the bloc has been deeply split over how to respond to Turkey’s increasingly frequent flexing of military muscle in the region, including its unilateral moves to explore and drill for energy resources in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey says it has the right to seek energy resources in the region. With respect to Turkey, the EU leaders settled on diplomacy for now, issuing the joint statement but threatening sanctions if Ankara didn’t show willingness to improve ties. Western diplomats said tensions between Ankara and Athens this summer rose to levels not seen since the 1970s, when Turkey and Greece came close to a direct military conflict over Cyprus. Greece and Turkey are North Atlantic Treaty Organization members. However, Turkey has for now suspended its energy activities in waters claimed by Greece but not by Cyprus. Separately, Turkey and Greece reached an agreement Thursday, mediated by NATO, to take measures to avoid an air or naval clash in the eastern Mediterranean, including a hotline between the two countries. European diplomats have also grown alarmed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decision to send troops into Libya and Syria, its unconditional support for Azerbaijan in renewed fighting with Armenia and its acquisition of advanced weaponry from Russia. On Thursday, French President Emmanuel Macron said France had clear evidence that jihadist fighters were leaving Syria to go to fight in Nagorno-Karabakh via Turkey. Mr. Macron had earlier criticized Ankara for what he called its bellicose comments against Armenia over its conflict with Azerbaijan. —Ann Simmons in Moscow contributed to this article.
Ranking Member Sen. Cardin to Join OSCE Event on Policing in Diverse SocietiesThursday, October 01, 2020
WASHINGTON—On October 6, 2020, Helsinki Commission Ranking Member Sen. Ben Cardin (MD) will join the office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities for an online event to discuss the principles of policing in diverse societies, as well as challenges and best practices among OSCE participating States. POLICING IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES Principles and Good Practices Tuesday, October 6, 2020 9:30 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. EDT / 3:30 p.m. – 6:00 p.m. CEST Watch Live: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3mDc6TDQo8 Sen. Cardin, who also serves as the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Special Representative on Anti-Semitism, Racism, and Intolerance, will offer opening remarks at the event. Other speakers include: Christophe Kamp, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Officer in Charge Hilary Shelton, Director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Washington Bureau, Senior Vice President for Advocacy and Policy The event follows more than a decade of racial justice efforts by the U.S. Helsinki Commission, including a bicameral letter sent to the President of the European Commission in July 2020 led by Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Alcee L. Hastings (FL-20) and Helsinki Commissioner Rep. Gwen Moore (WI-04). The letter, which also was signed by Sen. Cardin; Helsinki Commissioners Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (NH), Rep. Emanuel Cleaver (MO-05), and Rep. Marc Veasey (TX-33); and 35 other Members of Congress, called for a sweeping plan of action following the European Parliament’s Juneteenth Day resolution.
Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendments to the bill (H.R. 2121) to make available funds under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to expand democracy, good governance, and anti-corruption programs in the Russian Federation in order to promote and strengthen democratic government and civil society in that country and to support independent media.
The Clerk read as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Russian Democracy Act of 2002''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the leadership of the Russian Federation has publicly committed itself to building--
(A) a society with democratic political institutions and practices, the observance of universally recognized standards of human rights, and religious and press freedom; and
(B) a market economy based on internationally accepted principles of transparency, accountability, and the rule of law.
(2) In order to facilitate this transition, the international community has provided multilateral and bilateral technical assistance, and the United States' contribution to these efforts has played an important role in developing new institutions built on democratic and liberal economic foundations and the rule of law.
(3)(A) Since 1992, United States Government democratic reform programs and public diplomacy programs, including training, and small grants have provided access to and training in the use of the Internet, brought nearly 40,000 Russian citizens to the United States, and have led to the establishment of more than 65,000 nongovernmental organizations, thousands of independent local media outlets, despite governmental opposition, and numerous political parties.
(B) These efforts contributed to the substantially free and fair Russian parliamentary elections in 1995 and 1999.
(4) The United States has assisted Russian efforts to replace its centrally planned, state-controlled economy with a market economy and helped create institutions and infrastructure for a market economy. Approximately two-thirds of the Russian Federation's gross domestic product is now generated by the private sector, and the United States recognized Russia as a market economy on June 7, 2002.
(5)(A) The United States has fostered grassroots entrepreneurship in the Russian Federation by focusing United States economic assistance on small- and medium-sized businesses and by providing training, consulting services, and small loans to more than 250,000 Russian entrepreneurs.
(B) There are now more than 900,000 small businesses in the Russian Federation, producing 12 to 15 percent, depending on the estimate, of the gross domestic product of the Russian Federation.
(C) United States-funded programs have contributed to fighting corruption and financial crime, such as money laundering, by helping to--
(i) establish a commercial legal infrastructure;
(ii) develop an independent judiciary;
(iii) support the drafting of a new criminal code, civil code, and bankruptcy law;
(iv) develop a legal and regulatory framework for the Russian Federation's equivalent of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission; (v) support Russian law schools; (vi) create legal aid clinics; and (vii) bolster law-related activities of nongovernmental organizations.
(6) Because the capability of Russian democratic forces and the civil society to organize and defend democratic gains without international support is uncertain, and because the gradual integration of the Russian Federation into the global order of free-market, democratic nations would enhance Russian cooperation with the United States on a wide range of political, economic, and security issues, the success of democracy in Russia is in the national security interest of the United States, and the United States Government should develop a far-reaching and flexible strategy aimed at strengthening Russian society's support for democracy and a market economy, particularly by enhancing Russian democratic institutions and education, promoting the rule of law, and supporting Russia's independent media.
(7) Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Russian Federation has stood with the United States and the rest of the civilized world in the struggle against terrorism and has cooperated in the war in Afghanistan by sharing intelligence and through other means.
(8) United States-Russia relations have improved, leading to a successful summit between President Bush and President Putin in May 2002, resulting in a ``Foundation for Cooperation''.
(b) PURPOSES.--The purposes of this Act are--
(1) to strengthen and advance institutions of democratic government and of free and independent media, and to sustain the development of an independent civil society in the Russian Federation based on religious and ethnic tolerance, internationally recognized human rights, and an internationally recognized rule of law; and
(2) to focus United States foreign assistance programs on using local expertise and to give local organizations a greater role in designing and implementing such programs, while maintaining appropriate oversight and monitoring.
SEC. 3. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.--It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government should--
(1) recognize that a democratic and economically stable Russian Federation is inherently less confrontational and destabilizing in its foreign policy and therefore that the promotion of democracy in Russia is in the national security interests of the United States; and
(2) continue and increase assistance to the democratic forces in the Russian Federation, including the independent media, regional administrations, democratic political parties, and nongovernmental organizations.
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.--It shall be the policy of the United States--
(1) to facilitate Russia's integration into the Western community of nations, including supporting the establishment of a stable democracy and a market economy within the framework of the rule of law and respect for individual rights, including Russia's membership in the appropriate international institutions;
(2) to engage the Government of the Russian Federation and Russian society in order to strengthen democratic reform and institutions, and to promote transparency and good governance in all aspects of society, including fair and honest business practices, accessible and open legal systems, freedom of religion, and respect for human rights;
(3) to advance a dialogue among United States Government officials, private sector individuals, and representatives of the Government of the Russian Federation regarding Russia's integration into the Western community of nations;
(4) to encourage United States Government officials and private sector individuals to meet regularly with democratic activists, human rights activists, representatives of the independent media, representatives of nongovernmental organizations, civic organizers, church officials, and reform-minded politicians from Moscow and all other regions of the Russian Federation;
(5) to incorporate democratic reforms, the promotion of independent media, and economic reforms in a broader United States dialogue with the Government of the Russian Federation;
(6) to encourage the Government of the Russian Federation to address, in a cooperative and transparent manner consistent with internationally recognized and accepted principles, cross-border issues, including the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, crime, trafficking, and corruption;
(7) to consult with the Government of the Russian Federation and the Russian Parliament on the adoption of economic and social reforms necessary to sustain Russian economic growth and to ensure Russia's transition to a fully functioning market economy and membership in the World Trade Organization;
(8) to persuade the Government of the Russian Federation to honor its commitments made to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the November 1999 Istanbul Conference, and to conduct a genuine good neighbor policy toward the other independent states of the former Soviet Union in the spirit of internationally accepted principles of regional cooperation; and
(9) to encourage the G-8 partners and international financial institutions, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to develop financial safeguards and transparency practices in lending to the Russian Federation.
SEC. 4. AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961.
(a) IN GENERAL.--
(1) DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW.--Section 498(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2295(2)) is amended--
(A) in the paragraph heading, by striking ``DEMOCRACY'' and inserting ``DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW'';
(B) by striking subparagraphs (E) and (G);
(C) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (I);
(D) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following:
``(E) development and support of grass-roots and nongovernmental organizations promoting democracy, the rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the political process, including grants in small amounts to such organizations;
'`(F) international exchanges and other forms of public diplomacy to promote greater understanding on how democracy, the public policy process, market institutions, and an independent judiciary function in Western societies;
``(G) political parties and coalitions committed to promoting democracy, human rights, and economic reforms;
``(H) support for civic organizations committed to promoting human rights;''; and
(E) by adding at the end the following:
``(J) strengthened administration of justice through programs and activities carried out in accordance with section 498B(e), including-- ``(i) support for nongovernmental organizations, civic organizations, and political parties that favor a strong and independent judiciary; ``(ii) support for local organizations that work with judges and law enforcement officials in efforts to achieve a reduction in the number of pretrial detainees; and ``(iii) support for the creation of legal associations or groups that provide training in human rights and advocacy, public education with respect to human rights-related laws and proposed legislation, and legal assistance to persons subject to improper government interference.''.
(2) INDEPENDENT MEDIA.--Section 498 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2295) is amended--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (13) as paragraphs (4) through (14), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) INDEPENDENT MEDIA.--Developing free and independent media, including--
``(A) supporting all forms of independent media reporting, including print, radio, and television;
``(B) providing special support for, and unrestricted public access to, nongovernmental Internet-based sources of information, dissemination and reporting, including providing technical and other support for web radio services, providing computers and other necessary resources for Internet connectivity and training new Internet users in nongovernmental civic organizations on methods and uses of Internet-based media; and
``(C) training in journalism, including investigative journalism techniques that educate the public on the costs of corruption and act as a deterrent against corrupt officials.''.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--Section 498B(e) of such Act is amended by striking ``paragraph (2)(G)'' and inserting ``paragraph (2)(J)''.
SEC. 5. ACTIVITIES TO SUPPORT THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.--In providing assistance to the Russian Federation under chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.), the President is authorized to-- (1) work with the Government of the Russian Federation, the Duma, and representatives of the Russian Federation judiciary to help implement a revised and improved code of criminal procedure and other laws; (2) establish civic education programs relating to democracy, public policy, the rule of law, and the importance of independent media, including the establishment of ``American Centers'' and public policy schools at Russian universities and encourage cooperative programs with universities in the United States to offer courses through Internet-based off-site learning centers at Russian universities; and (3) support the Regional Initiatives (RI) program, which provides targeted assistance in those regions of the Russian Federation that have demonstrated a commitment to reform, democracy, and the rule of law, and which promotes the concept of such programs as a model for all regions of the Russian Federation.
(b) RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY AND VOICE OF AMERICA.--RFE/RL, Incorporated, and the Voice of America should use new and innovative techniques, in cooperation with local independent media sources and using local languages as appropriate and as possible, to disseminate throughout the Russian Federation information relating to democracy, free-market economics, the rule of law, and human rights.
SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, INDEPENDENT MEDIA, AND THE RULE OF LAW.
Of the amounts made available to carry out the provision of chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.) and the FREEDOM Support Act for fiscal year 2003, $50,000,000 is authorized to be available for the activities authorized by paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 498 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by section 4(a) of this Act.
SEC. 7. PRESERVING THE ARCHIVES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST AND NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ANDREI SAKHAROV. (a) AUTHORIZATION.--The President is authorized, on such terms and conditions as the President determines to be appropriate, to make a grant to Brandeis University for an endowment for the Andrei Sakharov Archives and Human Rights Center for the purpose of collecting and preserving documents related to the life of Andrei Sakharov and the administration of such Center. (b) FUNDING.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out subsection (a) not more than $1,500,000.
SEC. 8. EXTENSION OF LAW.
The provisions of section 108(c) of H.R. 3427, as enacted by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113, shall apply to United States contributions for fiscal year 2003 to the organization described in section 108(c) of H.R. 3427.
Amend the title so as to read: ``An Act to make available funds under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to expand democracy, good governance, and anti-corruption programs in the Russian Federation in order to promote and strengthen democratic government and civil society and independent media in that country.''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Watson) each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the bill under consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?
There was no objection.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
This bill, the Russian Democracy Act, ensures that American assistance will continue to be available to help strengthen and consolidate democracy in the Russian Federation. While this seems to be a routine measure, we should take a few minutes to note what this bill represents. The mere fact that we can talk of democracy in Russia as a reality in the present and not some dim prospect in the hazy future is one of the many wonders of the past decade that have grown familiar and now is largely taken for granted. Its existence, however, is a testament to the deep commitment to fundamental values shared by peoples all over the world.
Mr. Speaker, this bill before us represents an important part of the effort to continue that democratization. It focuses our attention and assistance on many of the prerequisites of a free and a prosperous society, including the creation of a resilient civil society, the strengthening of an independent press, and the establishment of the rule of law.