Title

Moldovan Governance and Accountability to be Discussed at Helsinki Commission Hearing

Thursday, March 05, 2020

WASHINGTON—The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission, today announced the following hearing:

MOLDOVA
Access and Accountability

Tuesday, March 10, 2020
12:30 p.m.
Rayburn House Office Building
Room 2200

Live Webcast: www.youtube.com/HelsinkiCommission

Presidential elections in Moldova are quickly approaching. However, the country’s self-proclaimed “technocratic” government has yet to demonstrate a departure from the country’s post-Soviet history of grand kleptocracy and political strife. Moldovans have demanded greater access to the global economy through European integration, yet some political leaders are pivoting East with substantial security implications for the enduring frozen conflict in the breakaway territory of Transnistria. To this day, Moldovans demand accountability for the more than $1 billion siphoned from Moldova’s biggest banks between 2012 and 2014. However, key former political leaders implicated in this and other crimes are alleged to have escaped international sanctions.

Witnesses at the hearing will explore the societal fissures, security implications, and  governance challenges at stake in the Republic of Moldova.  Can a country marred by deep corruption reverse its trajectory, and is there even any will to do so in this government?  What role will civil society play in Moldova’s reconstruction?  Will Socialist president Igor Dodon prioritize relations with Russia over the West, or manage to navigate between the two?  This hearing will explore these questions and more.

The following witnesses are scheduled to participate:

  • Ambassador William H. Hill, Global Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies & former Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova
  • Tatyana Margolin, Regional Director – Eurasia Program, Open Society Foundations
  • Valeriu Pașa, Program Manager, WatchDog.MD   
Media contact: 
Name: 
Stacy Hope
Email: 
csce[dot]press[at]mail[dot]house[dot]gov
Phone: 
202.225.1901
Relevant countries: 
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  • Murder of Ukrainian Heorhiy Gongadze Still Unsolved After 3 Years

    Mr. Speaker, the murder of Ukrainian investigative journalist Heorhiy Gongadze remains unsolved--three years after he was murdered. On September 16, 2000, Gongadze, editor of "Ukrainska Pravda," an Internet news publication critical of high-level corruption in Ukraine, disappeared.   Ukrainian President Kuchma and a number of high-ranking officials have been implicated in his disappearance and the circumstances leading to his murder. Audio recordings exist that contain conversations between Kuchma and other senior government officials discussing the desirability of Gongadze's elimination. Over the last three years, the Ukrainian authorities' handling, or more accurately, mishandling of this case has been characterized by obfuscation and stonewalling.   Last month, a prime suspect in the case, former senior militiaman Ihor Honcharov, who allegedly headed a gang of ex-police accused of several kidnappings and murders, died in police custody under mysterious circumstances. His posthumous letters--which give a detailed account of events surrounding Gongadze's death and which name names--are now being investigated by the Prosecutor General's office. A few days ago, Prosecutor General Svyatoslav Piskun indicated that some facts in the letters have proved to be true. Reportedly, warrants have been issued for two suspects in the killing.   Mr. Speaker, a credible investigation of this case by Ukrainian authorities is long overdue. At the same time, it is important to stress that not only those who committed the actual crime, but those who ordered it--no matter who they may be--need to be brought to justice.   Unfortunately, the Gongadze case is not an isolated one. The murder, and deaths in suspicious car accidents, of journalists and opposition figures, have become commonplace. Earlier this year, Ukraine's Ombudsman Nina Karpachova asserted that journalism remains among the most dangerous professions in Ukraine, with 36 media employees having been killed over the past ten years, and many more have been beaten, including several within the last few months. This past July, Volodymyr Yefremov, a journalist critical of president Kuchma who worked with the press freedom group Institute of Mass Information (11/41), died in a suspect car accident. Just two weeks ago, Ivan Havdyda, who was head of the Ternopil region branch of the democratic opposition "Our Ukraine," was found murdered in Kyiv under questionable circumstances.   Over the last three years, the Helsinki Commission, Members of the House and Senate, Department of State, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other international institutions repeatedly have raised the Gongadze murder case and urged the Ukrainian authorities to undertake a serious investigation into the this case. The response from Ukrainian officials has done nothing but cast doubt about the Ukrainian Government's commitment to the rule of law. Last year--just to cite one example--Ukrainian authorities blocked FBI experts from examining evidence gathered during the initial investigation, even after promising to accept U.S. technical assistance in the matter.   I also hope that the Ukrainian parliament will take determined action in encouraging governmental accountability for solving the Gongadze and other murders, and bringing those involved to justice.   The lack of a resolution of the Gongadze and other cases of those who have perished under suspicious circumstances has tarnished the credibility of the Ukrainian authorities in dealing with fundamental human rights.   Mr. Speaker, as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission and in the strongest possible terms, I once again urge Ukrainian authorities to take seriously the many enduring concerns regarding the circumstances that led to Heorhiy Gongadze's murder and the subsequent investigation.

  • Briefing: Property Restitution and Compensation in Post-Communist Europe: a Status Update

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  • Property Restitution and Compensation in Post-Communist Europe: A Status Update

    This briefing was the fourth hearing held by the Helsinki Commission held on restitution and compensation for property seized during the Second World War and in Communist-era Central and Eastern Europe.  The goal of the briefing was to discuss developments since the CSCE’s July 2002 hearing relating to the return of wrongfully confiscated properties in the region.

  • Property Restitution and Compensation in Post-Communist Europe: A Status Update

    The importance of this briefing, which then ranking member of the Commission Senator Benjamin L. Cardin presided over, was underscored by the fact that a central element of Nazi and communist persecution in Central and Eastern Europe was the uncompensated confiscation of real and personal property from individual and religious communities. Communism’s demise in 1990 sparked hope that regional governments would redress wrongful seizures of private and communal property. This briefing was the fourth hearing that the Helsinki Commission held whose focus was on the issue of restitution and compensation for property seized during the Second World War and in Communist era Central and Eastern Europe. A goal of the briefing, then, was to survey developments since the CSCE’s July 2002 hearing relating to the return of wrongfully confiscated properties in the region.

  • The Dutch Leadership of the OSCE

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  • Mayor Giuliani, Chairman Smith Lead U.S. Delegation to OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism

    By H. Knox Thames CSCE Counsel The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) held an historic international conference in Vienna, Austria on June 19-20 to discuss anti-Semitism within the 55 participating States. While the OSCE states have addressed anti-Semitism in the past, the Vienna Conference represented the first OSCE event specifically devoted to anti-Semitism. Former New York City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani and United States Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (N-04J) led the United States delegation. Commissioner Rep. Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL), who currently serves as a Vice President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, was also part of the U.S. delegation. Public members of the delegation were: Rabbi Andrew Baker, American Jewish Committee; Abraham Foxman, Anti-Defamation League; Cheryl Halpern, National Republican Jewish Coalition; Malcolm Hoenlein, Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations; Mark Levin, NCSJ; and, Daniel Mariaschin, B’nai B’rith. U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, Stephan M. Minikes, and the U.S. Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, Ambassador Randolph Bell, also participated. The personal representative of the Dutch OSCE Chair-in-Office, Ambassador Daan Everts, opened the meeting expressing dismay that in the year 2003 it was necessary to hold such a conference, but "we would be amiss not to recognize that indeed the necessity still exists." Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy declared "anti-Semitism is not a part of [Europe’s] future. This is why this Conference is so important, and I believe it will have a strong follow-up." Former Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, a Holocaust survivor, cited free societies as an essential element in combating anti-Semitism. The European Union statement, given by Greece, noted that anti-Semitism and racism are "interrelated phenomena," but also stated "anti-Semitism is a painful part of our history and for that requires certain specific approaches." Mayor Giuliani began his remarks to the opening plenary with a letter from President Bush to conference participants. Citing his visit to the Nazi death camp at Auschwitz, the President recalled the "inhumanity and brutality that befell Europe only six decades ago" and stressed that "every nation has a responsibility to confront and denounce anti-Semitism and the violence it causes. Governments have an obligation to ensure that anti-Semitism is excluded from school textbooks, official statements, official television programming, and official publications." 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The French delegation was led by Michel Voisin of the National Assembly, and included the President of the Consistoire Central Israelite de France, Jean Kahn, and representatives from the Ministry of Justice and the Office of Youth Affairs, National Education and Research. The French acknowledged with great regret the marked increase in anti-Semitic incidents that have occurred in France during the past two years. In response, France had passed new laws substantially increasing penalties for violent "hate crimes," stepped up law enforcement and was in the process of revising school curricula. The work of the conference was organized under several focused sessions: "Legislative, Institutional Mechanisms and Governmental Action, including Law Enforcement"; "Role of Governments in Civil Society in Promoting Tolerance"; "Education"; and, "Information and Awareness-Raising: the Role of the Media in Conveying and Countering Prejudice." Mayor Giuliani noted the fact that the conference was being held in the same building where Hitler announced the annexation of Austria in 1938. "It’s hard to believe that we’re discussing this topic so many years later and after so many lessons of history have not been learned; and I am very hopeful that rather than just discussing anti-Semitism, we are actually going to do something about it, and take action." Giuliani, drawing on his law enforcement background and municipal leadership, enumerated eight steps to fight anti-Semitism: 1) compile hate crime statistics in a uniform fashion; 2) encourage all participating States to pass hate crime legislation; 3) establish regular meetings to analyze the data and an annual meeting to examine the implementation of measures to combat anti-Semitism; 4) set up educational programs in all the participating States about anti-Semitism; 5) discipline political debate so that disagreements over Israel and Palestine do not slip into a demonizing attack on the Jewish people; 6) refute hate-filled lies at an early stage; 7) remember the Holocaust accurately and resist any revisionist attempt to downplay its significance; and 8) set up groups to respond to anti-Semitic acts that include members of Islamic communities and other communities. Commissioner Hastings identified a "three-fold role" governments can play in "combating anti-Semitic bigotry, as well as in nurturing tolerance." First, elected leaders must "forthrightly denounce acts of anti-Semitism, so as to avoid the perception of silent support." He identified law enforcement as the second crucial factor in fighting intolerance. Finally, Hastings noted that while "public denunciations and spirited law enforcement" are essential components to any strategy to combat anti-Semitism, they "must work in tandem with education." He concluded, "if we are to see the growth of tolerance in our societies, all governments should promote the creation of educational efforts to counter anti-Semitic stereotypes and attitudes among younger people and to increase Holocaust awareness programs." Commission Chairman Christopher H. Smith, who served as Vice Chair of the U.S. delegation to the Vienna Conference, highlighted how a "comprehensive statistical database for tracking and comparing the frequency of incidents in the OSCE region does not exist, [and] the fragmentary information we do have is indicative of the serious challenge we have." In addition to denouncing anti-Semitic acts, "we must educate a new generation about the perils of anti-Semitism and racism so that the terrible experiences of the 20th century are not repeated," said Smith. "This is clearly a major task that requires a substantial and sustained commitment. The resources of institutions with special expertise such as the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum must be fully utilized." In his closing statement Giuliani stressed that anti-Semitism "has its own history, it has a pernicious and distinct history from many prejudicial forms of bias that we deal with, and therefore singular focus on that problem and reversing it can be a way in which both Europe and America can really enter the modern world." He enthusiastically welcomed the offer by the German delegation to hold a follow-up conference on anti-Semitism, in Berlin in June 2004. Upon their return to Washington, Giuliani and Smith briefed Secretary Powell on the efforts of the U.S. delegation in Vienna and the importance of building upon the work of the Conference at the parliamentary and governmental levels. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

  • OSCE Holds First Annual Security Review Conference

    By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe organized a two-day Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) on June 25 and 26, 2003, in Vienna, Austria. The U.S. proposal to hold this conference was approved in December 2002 by the OSCE's Foreign Ministers' meeting in Porto, Portugal. The conference's goal was to provide increased emphasis and profile to hard security questions from agreements in conventional arms control and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) to police-related activities and combating terrorism. In this sense, the ASRC differs from OSCE's Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting held under the auspices of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, which more narrowly focuses on CSBM implementation. The meeting consisted of opening and closing plenary sessions, and four working groups devoted to a) preventing and combating terrorism; b) comprehensive security; c) security risks and challenges across the OSCE region; and d) conflict prevention and crisis management. U.S. Priorities for the Implementation Review Leading up to the conference, Helsinki Commission Co-Chairs Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO) urged the U.S. Department of State to conduct a thorough implementation review which focused on the need for the participating States to comply with their security-related OSCE commitments. Russian military operations in Chechnya and the Caucasus, democratic political control over the military, security forces and intelligence services, so-called "frozen conflicts" like those in Moldova and the Caucasus, combating terrorism, money laundering and non-proliferation were subjects of particular concern noted by the co-chairs. Conference keynote speaker Adam Rotfeld, Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, stressed that the biggest threat to the OSCE was the support by criminal and dictatorial regimes for terrorists. The organization needed to give particular focus on the Caucasus and Central Asian countries in an effort to meet this threat by building institutions and establishing the rule of law. It was also suggested that OSCE look beyond its traditional areas and include the partners countries in its activities, wherever possible. Greece, speaking for the EU, noted the OSCE's value to provide early warning, post-conflict rehabilitation, and conflict management. The EU urged that very high priority be given to human trafficking, termed "the piracy of today." Germany stressed the need to strengthen the police and border management in troubled regions. Ambassador Cofer Black, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's Senior Advisor for Counter Terrorism, urged the OSCE to focus on concrete and achievable steps to fight the financing of terrorism and press all 55 participating States to become parties to the 12 UN Conventions on Terrorism. Black recommended that the OSCE be used to strengthen travel and document security with a goal of including bio-metric data (based on the physical composure of an individual's hand or retina) in the travel documents of individuals from all participating States and sharing information on lost and stolen passports. Several delegations cited the need to do more to restrict illicit weapons trade and cited the Bishkek and Bucharest documents as blueprints for practical action. The need to limit the availability of man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) was cited by several delegations. The United States noted that, in preparing for the December OSCE Maastricht Ministerial, particular focus should be given to the priorities cited in the 2003 G-8 Action Plan which includes steps to control proliferation of MANPADS, increased security of sea transport and more effective travel documentation. These priorities were stressed by the new OSCE Special Representative for Counter Terrorism, Brian Wu, who suggested that the area of biological weaponry might need particular attention and asked if more emphasis might be placed on non-banking sources when looking into the financing of terrorism. In the working session on conflict prevention and crisis management, delegations acknowledged OSCE's lack of a "big stick" and the need to work closely with organizations and governments who had such instruments. Nevertheless, the OSCE has a good "tool box" for a variety of actions and is using it for actions such as the destruction of arms stockpiles in Georgia, police training in Kosovo, and facilitating the withdrawal of Russian troops and arms from Moldova. The Representative on Freedom of the Media noted the importance of monitoring hate speech, creating public awareness of arms trafficking and protecting journalists in conflict areas. Most delegations agreed that the OSCE had neither the mandate nor the resources to be a peacekeeping organization, but Russia emphasized it did not share this view and recommended that possibilities for joint action be discussed by OSCE with NATO and the EU. Macedonia hailed the success of the OSCE Mission in helping to manage its internal conflict. The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and the work of the Forum on Security Cooperation on small arms and light weapons are positively assessed as a contribution to the larger effort of arms control and conflict risk reduction in Europe. Limits on how much further some of these efforts could be developed, however, were questioned, and there was resistance to actual revision of some of the agreements already reached. In the past year, the OSCE has begun to look at new security risks and challenges across the region. Organized crime, including arms trafficking, was frequently highlighted as something which needed additional cooperative efforts to combat. Among the most important developments are OSCE efforts to assist countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus to improve their police services, drawing on experience gained in southeastern Europe. Throughout the meeting there was a pronounced tendency to be long on generalities and short on specifics. For example, it was noted that only 38 percent of the 55 participating States have become parties to all 12 United Nations conventions and protocols on combating terrorism, a clear OSCE commitment, yet the countries which have not were never named nor asked to explain their implementation records. Indeed, one OSCE insider concluded that the discussion on implementation of commitments to combat terrorism was not much advanced from the discussion which surrounded the earlier negotiation of those commitments. An Ambassador went as far as to remark during a plenary session that some previous statements were little more than "preemptive self-justification." Critics of the ASRC, however, should keep in mind this was the first review conference of its kind. Certainly the implementation review meetings for the human and economic dimensions of the OSCE have had to evolve and adapt over the years. For the security dimension though, calling participating States to account for instances of non-compliance has not similarly developed. As U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Stephan M. Minikes asserted in his closing statement, "This first Annual Security Review Conference has accomplished what we realistically expected it would. We must recognize that this is the first time that this conference has been held. There will be matters to work out over time. But the fact that we have made a start is very significant and together with our partners from other European and Euro-Atlantic security organizations there is much to do to follow up." Looking Ahead There are several ways in which the ASRC could be improved next year. The Annual Security Review Conference could go beyond its sole focus on OSCE tools and issues and devote specific time to actions taken by the participating States themselves. The benefit of such a review would justify the conference being lengthened by at least one day. As Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton testified at a Helsinki Commission hearing in May, "Heretofore, we have not seen the OSCE as being as much a possible vehicle to help get the kind of [non-proliferation] compliance we want. And that's why I think it's worth exploring." Perhaps more critical to the dialogue would be the opening of the ASRC to a wider audience. The OSCE's other review meetings are already open, not just to observation by those outside government but to participation by NGOs as well. In a letter to the State Department, Helsinki Commission Co-Chairmen Rep. Smith and Senator Campbell urged greater openness and transparency. They were told, however, that for the first ASRC non-inclusion of non-governmental organizations was intended to promote greater dialogue and a more critical review. Only national delegations, OSCE institutions and other European-based international organizations were invited to participate in the inaugural conference. The modalities for the conference did state that "security-related scientific institutes or 'think tanks' of international standing would be considered to be invited as keynote speakers or otherwise be represented as members of national delegations." However, the effort to do so seemed fairly limited and the "greater dialogue" and "more critical review" was not fully realized. The OSCE could do much more to draw on the wealth of expertise among security-related institutions in the United States and elsewhere. If some view the kind of NGO participation seen at other implementation meetings as not conducive to a productive meeting on security issues, at least greater use of public members on national delegations and greater use of expert analysis and insight could be pursued. Short of participation, allowing public observation would permit others a chance to see more clearly how the OSCE and its participating States address security in Europe, and opportunities to engage one-on-one with government officials in the corridors and side events. The State Department has indicated a willingness to look at possible NGO inclusion for future ASRC meetings. Finally, the development of the ASRC should be considered in the broader context of maintaining the balance among the dimensions of the OSCE which has been one of its traditional strengths. Giving balancing to the OSCE's activities was the primary justification for the ASRC. But the level of activity ultimately needs to be based on the need to promote balanced progress in the actual implementation of OSCE commitments. One very positive aspect of the review conference was the deferral of other OSCE activity in Vienna during the meeting which permitted delegates to focus their attention exclusively toward the ASRC. In the past, this has not been the case for human dimension and economic review meetings, which have had to compete with a plethora of meetings, diminishing the focus and participation of some delegations. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

  • Helsinki Commission Members Press Belgrade to Apprend Indicted War Criminals, Cooperate with Hague Tribunal

    By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor   On June 16, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell certified that Serbia and Montenegro met U.S. criteria set forth in section 578 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution. These criteria include Serbia and Montenegro’s level of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Without certification, certain bilateral assistance to Serbia would have been withheld. Leading Members of the United States Helsinki Commission have long been concerned with the level of cooperation by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro with ICTY and have consistently urged the authorities in Belgrade to do more. Concerned Commissioners have sought to increase attention paid to developments in Serbia in the aftermath of the March assassination of reformist Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. There is a general sense among Commission leaders that while Belgrade’s cooperation with the Tribunal has been improving, it still remains insufficient. In the lead up to the June 15th certification deadline, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) participated in a Commission public briefing featuring Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal. As of the May 15th briefing, Del Ponte characterized cooperation from Belgrade as uncertain, underscoring that movement comes only when it is seen as politically beneficial for the Serbian Government. She noted some cooperation in accessing documents; however, for more than a year, the prosecution has pushed for the transfer of 155 Serbian documents in connection with the Milosevic trial without success. Del Ponte expressed concern over the failure to detain wanted fugitives – particularly Veselin Sljivancanin, indicted for the 1991 Vukovar massacre in Croatia, and Ratko Mladic and five others wanted in connection with the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “Mladic is a great mystery because we know where Mladic is,” she asserted. “We passed this information to the Serbian Government in Belgrade, and nothing happened.” Del Ponte stressed that if law and order is to prevail criminal justice must be credible. Failure to bring together all those accused to trial frustrates the progress of the Tribunal and forces the witnesses to present repeatedly their own horrific accounts each time a separate case is brought to trial. She also assessed cooperation with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo during the course of the briefing. In a letter dated May 23, five Members of the Helsinki Commission urged Secretary of State Colin Powell to utilize the time prior to the certification deadline to press authorities in Belgrade to take the steps necessary to meet the certification requirements. The Commissioners recognized the significant strides Serbia has made in cooperation with the Tribunal, but underscored that “a failure to apprehend Mladic and other notorious war criminals soon would be a serious setback to the cause of reform and recovery at home and further delay Serbia’s integration in Europe.” The letter was signed by Co-Chairmen Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), and Commissioners Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD). The United States Helsinki Commission held a second briefing on June 4, detailing Serbia and Montenegro’s cooperation with the Tribunal, and the prospects for human rights and democratic development in Serbia since the lifting of the state of emergency imposed after Djindjic’s assassination. Helsinki Commission Senior Advisor Donald Kursch opened the briefing, welcoming the tough measures authorities in Belgrade have taken in the wake of Mr. Djindjic’s murder to crack down on criminal elements. Nina Bang-Jensen, Executive Director and General Counsel for the Coalition for International Justice, described Serbia’s actual cooperation with the Court as “very limited, begrudging, and only under pressure.” After last year’s certification, Serbia’s government promised a consistent pattern of cooperation, but only three surrenders and one arrest have followed. Bang-Jensen cited the failure to apprehend nineteen Bosnian Serb and Serbian indicted suspects, either living within Serbia or frequently crossing into Serbia, as an indication that the current government is inclined to protect the old regime. Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, recommended that the United States look not only at Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY, but to its overall level of commitment to rule of law. Following Djindjic’s assassination in March, the Serbian Government imposed a state of emergency to crack down on organized crime. It is estimated that more than 10,000 people were held incommunicado for up to two months under this guise. International monitors were denied access to detainees until recently, and Andersen noted that released detainees reported widespread abuse. Despite increasing pressure from the international community on Serbia’s domestic courts to shoulder greater responsibility for holding war criminals accountable, only four domestic trials were held this year. There is also no indication of upcoming trials or of a permanent commitment to such a process. Trials that have proceeded suffered from a lack of witness protection, poor case preparation by prosecutors, and problems facilitating witnesses traveling from other areas of the former Yugoslavia. James Fisfis, Resident Program Officer for Serbia at the International Republican Institute, remained optimistic. Fisfis presented the results of an IRI survey suggesting that 56 percent of Serbian citizens believe the country is now on the right track, up from 38 percent before the assassination. Sixty-four percent of Serbian respondents currently support cooperation with The Hague, seeing it as a necessary measure toward gaining international acceptance. The data suggest a window of opportunity exists for pressure to reform to have an impact. Ivan Vujacic, Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro to the United States, acknowledged that “more can be done and more will be done” in cooperation with the Tribunal, but focused on the progress made over the last two and half years, which he described as “remarkable.” In particular, he pointed to the recent arrests of three “pillars of Milosevic’s rule”: Miroslav Radic, Franko Simatovic, and Jovica Stanisic. Ambassador Vujacic said that the Serbian Government was highly committed to protecting human rights. He stated that during the war “the ultimate human right, the right to life was taken from the victims in atrocities defined as war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Vujacic promised that all indictees in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro will be arrested and transferred to The Hague. A second Helsinki Commission letter to Secretary of State Powell dated June 12th, declared that certification could not be justified at the time. The letter concluded: “To certify would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy goals supporting international justice and successful and complete democratic change in Serbia.” The letter reiterated that the Serbian authorities had yet to arrest and transfer Mladic and other indictees who are most likely in Serbia, and even this did not define the full cooperation with the Tribunal desired. Commission Members warned that if certification occurred while the required conditions remained unmet, the United States’ ability to affect change in Serbia would be diminished, making it more difficult for Serbia’s political leadership to undertake necessary reforms. Some Commission Members view the June 13 arrest of the indicted war crimes suspect Veselin Sljivancanin by the Belgrade authorities as an important positive step toward increased cooperation with the ICTY. However, continued failure to apprehend Mladic and other leading indictees remains a serious cause of concern that places barriers to Serbia and Montenegro’s full re-integration into the international community. In a press release announcing certification, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher asserted that the Secretary’s decision to certify does not indicate that Serbia has fulfilled its commitment. “We have made clear ... that the United States expects further actions to be taken in order to meet those obligations,” Boucher said, “including by arresting and transferring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.” The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

  • Helsinki Commissioners Press Belgrade to Apprehend Indicted War Criminals, Cooperate with Hague Tribunal

    By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor On June 16, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell certified that Serbia and Montenegro met U.S. criteria set forth in section 578 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution. These criteria include Serbia and Montenegro’s level of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Without certification, certain bilateral assistance to Serbia would have been withheld. Leading Members of the United States Helsinki Commission have long been concerned with the level of cooperation by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro with ICTY and have consistently urged the authorities in Belgrade to do more. Concerned Commissioners have sought to increase attention paid to developments in Serbia in the aftermath of the March assassination of reformist Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. There is a general sense among Commission leaders that while Belgrade’s cooperation with the Tribunal has been improving, it still remains insufficient. In the lead up to the June 15th certification deadline, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) participated in a Commission public briefing featuring Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal. As of the May 15th briefing, Del Ponte characterized cooperation from Belgrade as uncertain, underscoring that movement comes only when it is seen as politically beneficial for the Serbian Government. She noted some cooperation in accessing documents; however, for more than a year, the prosecution has pushed for the transfer of 155 Serbian documents in connection with the Milosevic trial without success. Del Ponte expressed concern over the failure to detain wanted fugitives – particularly Veselin Sljivancanin, indicted for the 1991 Vukovar massacre in Croatia, and Ratko Mladic and five others wanted in connection with the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “Mladic is a great mystery because we know where Mladic is,” she asserted. “We passed this information to the Serbian Government in Belgrade, and nothing happened.” Del Ponte stressed that if law and order is to prevail criminal justice must be credible. Failure to bring together all those accused to trial frustrates the progress of the Tribunal and forces the witnesses to present repeatedly their own horrific accounts each time a separate case is brought to trial. She also assessed cooperation with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo during the course of the briefing. In a letter dated May 23, five Members of the Helsinki Commission urged Secretary of State Colin Powell to utilize the time prior to the certification deadline to press authorities in Belgrade to take the steps necessary to meet the certification requirements. The Commissioners recognized the significant strides Serbia has made in cooperation with the Tribunal, but underscored that “a failure to apprehend Mladic and other notorious war criminals soon would be a serious setback to the cause of reform and recovery at home and further delay Serbia’s integration in Europe.” The letter was signed by Co-Chairmen Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), and Commissioners Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD). The United States Helsinki Commission held a second briefing on June 4, detailing Serbia and Montenegro’s cooperation with the Tribunal, and the prospects for human rights and democratic development in Serbia since the lifting of the state of emergency imposed after Djindjic’s assassination. Helsinki Commission Senior Advisor Donald Kursch opened the briefing, welcoming the tough measures authorities in Belgrade have taken in the wake of Mr. Djindjic’s murder to crack down on criminal elements. Nina Bang-Jensen, Executive Director and General Counsel for the Coalition for International Justice, described Serbia’s actual cooperation with the Court as “very limited, begrudging, and only under pressure.” After last year’s certification, Serbia’s government promised a consistent pattern of cooperation, but only three surrenders and one arrest have followed. Bang-Jensen cited the failure to apprehend nineteen Bosnian Serb and Serbian indicted suspects, either living within Serbia or frequently crossing into Serbia, as an indication that the current government is inclined to protect the old regime. Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, recommended that the United States look not only at Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY, but to its overall level of commitment to rule of law. Following Djindjic’s assassination in March, the Serbian Government imposed a state of emergency to crack down on organized crime. It is estimated that more than 10,000 people were held incommunicado for up to two months under this guise. International monitors were denied access to detainees until recently, and Andersen noted that released detainees reported widespread abuse. Despite increasing pressure from the international community on Serbia’s domestic courts to shoulder greater responsibility for holding war criminals accountable, only four domestic trials were held this year. There is also no indication of upcoming trials or of a permanent commitment to such a process. Trials that have proceeded suffered from a lack of witness protection, poor case preparation by prosecutors, and problems facilitating witnesses traveling from other areas of the former Yugoslavia. James Fisfis, Resident Program Officer for Serbia at the International Republican Institute, remained optimistic. Fisfis presented the results of an IRI survey suggesting that 56 percent of Serbian citizens believe the country is now on the right track, up from 38 percent before the assassination. Sixty-four percent of Serbian respondents currently support cooperation with The Hague, seeing it as a necessary measure toward gaining international acceptance. The data suggest a window of opportunity exists for pressure to reform to have an impact. Ivan Vujacic, Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro to the United States, acknowledged that “more can be done and more will be done” in cooperation with the Tribunal, but focused on the progress made over the last two and half years, which he described as “remarkable.” In particular, he pointed to the recent arrests of three “pillars of Milosevic’s rule”: Miroslav Radic, Franko Simatovic, and Jovica Stanisic. Ambassador Vujacic said that the Serbian Government was highly committed to protecting human rights. He stated that during the war “the ultimate human right, the right to life was taken from the victims in atrocities defined as war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Vujacic promised that all indictees in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro will be arrested and transferred to The Hague. A second Helsinki Commission letter to Secretary of State Powell dated June 12th, declared that certification could not be justified at the time. The letter concluded: “To certify would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy goals supporting international justice and successful and complete democratic change in Serbia.” The letter reiterated that the Serbian authorities had yet to arrest and transfer Mladic and other indictees who are most likely in Serbia, and even this did not define the full cooperation with the Tribunal desired. Commission Members warned that if certification occurred while the required conditions remained unmet, the United States’ ability to affect change in Serbia would be diminished, making it more difficult for Serbia’s political leadership to undertake necessary reforms. Some Commission Members view the June 13 arrest of the indicted war crimes suspect Veselin Sljivancanin by the Belgrade authorities as an important positive step toward increased cooperation with the ICTY. However, continued failure to apprehend Mladic and other leading indictees remains a serious cause of concern that places barriers to Serbia and Montenegro’s full re-integration into the international community. In a press release announcing certification, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher asserted that the Secretary’s decision to certify does not indicate that Serbia has fulfilled its commitment. “We have made clear ... that the United States expects further actions to be taken in order to meet those obligations,” Boucher said, “including by arresting and transferring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.” The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Intern Kristin Poore contributed to this article.

  • Certification of Assistance to Serbia

    Mr. Speaker, the U.S. Department of State last week made its determination to certify compliance by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro with the terms of section 578 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 108-7). This section conditions certain bilateral assistance to Serbia on progress in three areas, although by far the most critical being cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.   I agree with the Department’s assessment that progress has been made, especially since March. In particular, I welcomed action earlier this month by the Serbian authorities to apprehend Veselin Svjilancanin, indicted by the Tribunal for the 1991 massacre near Vukovar in Croatia. Although there was resistance, this action was a success and signaled what is perhaps a new determination by Belgrade to transfer all remaining indictees. Having been in Vukovar, along with my good friend and colleague Mr. Wolf, just before the city fell to Serb forces, I am glad to see all three indicted by the Tribunal for this crime will be tried in The Hague.   Nevertheless, Mr. Speaker, I am concerned that the Department’s determination was the wrong one to make. While progress has been made, it remains insufficient. Still at large and believed to have been in Serbia are several other persons, including Ratko Mladic and others, Ljubisa Beara, Vujadin Popovic, Ljubomir Borovcanin, Vinko Pandurevic and Drago Nikolic, indicted by the Tribunal for their connection to the1995 Srebrenica massacre in which thousands of innocent people were executed.   I am concerned, deeply concerned, that these individuals will continue to evade justice while officials in Belgrade may get the impression they have done enough. Clearly, they have not. Mr. Speaker, I would urge Serbian authorities to take the action necessary to remove "cooperation with the Tribunal" as an outstanding issue in our bilateral relationship. In doing so, they will also continue to help Serbia emerge from Slobodan Milosevic’s legacy of nationalist hatred.   In the meantime, Mr. Speaker, I also urge the State Department to use remaining levers to encourage not just better, but full, cooperation with the Tribunal, which Secretary Powell had assured Mr. Cardin and myself in correspondence was a position we all shared. The crimes which occurred were too severe and too horrendous to allow those responsible to escape justice.

  • Arming Rogue Regimes: The Role of OSCE Participating States

    The hearing will consider the efforts to curb the spread of deadly weapons and related militarily significant technology and equipment to dangerous regimes around the world. Rather than focus on the efforts by these regimes to acquire the material, we want to examine the capacity and willingness of participating States in the OSCE to be their source. The end of the Cold War left some states, especially those of the former Warsaw Pact, with huge stockpiles of military hardware, while economic downturns made their military industries and research institutes desperate for funds. The United States has encouraged these countries to maintain tight control over surplus equipment and convert the factories into industrial production. Still, several countries remain vulnerable to the lure of responding to the demand, even from rogue states and regimes, for weapons of mass destruction, delivery system, and small arms or light weapons.

  • Democracy, Human Rights and Justice in Serbia Today

    Donald Kursch, Senior Advisor at the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, moderated this briefing that discussed, among other things, the trajectory of democratic institutions in Serbia. This briefing was held in the wake of the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic, after which the authorities in Belgrade undertook tough measures to crack down on the criminal elements that had continued to be a barrier to Serbia and Montenegro’s full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community’s institutions. More restrictive measures against crime in Serbia and Montenegro had underscored the progress already made by democratic forces in overcoming the estrangement between the two countries and the West.

  • The Troubled Media Environment in Ukraine

    Mr. President, later this week individuals around the world will mark World Press Freedom Day. The functioning of free and independent media is tied closely to the exercise of many other fundamental freedoms as well as to the future of any democratic society. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which I co-chair, is responsible for monitoring press freedom in the 55 participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE. Recently, I reported to the Senate on the deplorable conditions for independent media in the Republic of Belarus. Today, I will address the situation of journalists and media outlets in Ukraine.   Several discouraging reports have come out recently concerning the medic environment in Ukraine. These reports merit attention, especially within the context of critical presidential elections scheduled to take place in Ukraine next year. The State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in Ukraine for 2002 summarizes media freedoms as follows: "Authorities interfered with the news media by intimidating journalists, issuing written and oral instructions about events to cover and not to cover, and pressuring them into applying self-censorship. Nevertheless a wide range of opinion was available in newspapers, periodicals, and Internet news sources."   Current negative trends and restrictive practices with respect to media freedom in Ukraine are sources of concern, especially given that country's leadership claims concerning integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Lack of compliance with international human rights standards, including OSCE commitments, on freedom of expression undermines that process. Moreover, an independent media free from governmental pressure is an essential factor in ensuring a level playing field in the upcoming 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine.   In her April 18, 2003 annual report to the Ukrainian parliament, Ombudsman Nina Karpachova asserted that journalism remains among the most dangerous professions in Ukraine, with 36 media employees having been killed over the past ten years, while beatings, intimidation of media employees, freezing of bank accounts of media outlets, and confiscation of entire print runs of newspapers and other publications have become commonplace in Ukraine.   The murder of prominent journalist Heorhiy Gongadze--who disappeared in September 2000--remains unsolved. Ukrainian President Kuchma and a number of high-ranking officials have been implicated in his disappearance and the circumstances leading to his murder. The Ukrainian authorities' handling, or more accurately mishandling of this case, has been characterized by obfuscation and stonewalling. Not surprisingly, lack of transparency illustrated by the Gongadze case has fueled the debilitating problem of widespread corruption reaching the highest levels of the Government of Ukraine.   Audio recordings exist that contain conversations between Kuchma and other senior government officials discussing the desirability of Gongadze's elimination. Some of these have been passed to the U.S. Department of Justice as part of a larger set of recordings of Kuchma's conversations implicating him and his cronies in numerous scandals. Together with Commission Co-Chairman Rep. Chris Smith, I recently wrote to the Department of Justice requesting technical assistance to determine whether the recordings in which the Gongadze matter is discussed are genuine. A credible and transparent investigation of this case by Ukrainian authorities is long overdue and the perpetrators--no matter who they may be--need to be brought to justice.   The case of Ihor Alexandrov, a director of a regional television station, who was beaten in July 2001 and subsequently died also remains unsolved. Serious questions remain about the way in which that case was handled by the authorities.   A Human Rights Watch report, “Negotiating the News: Informal State Censorship of Ukrainian Television,” issued in March, details the use of explicit directives or temnyky, lists of topics, which have been sent to editors from Kuchma's Presidential Administration on what subjects to cover and in what manner. The report correctly notes that these temnyky have eroded freedom of expression in Ukraine, as "editors and journalists feel obligated to comply with temnyky instructions due to economic and political pressures and fear repercussions for non-cooperation." To their credit, the independent media are struggling to counter attempts by the central authorities to control their reporting and coverage of issues and events.   Another troubling feature of the media environment has been the control exerted by various oligarchs with close links to the government who own major media outlets. There is growing evidence that backers of the current Prime Minister and other political figures have been buying out previously independent news sources, including websites, and either firing reporters or telling them to cease criticism of the government of find new jobs.   Last December, Ukraine's parliament held hearings on "Society, Mass Media, Authority: Freedom of Speech and Censorship in Ukraine." Journalists' testimony confirmed the existence of censorship, including temnyky, as well as various instruments of harassment and intimidation. Tax inspections, various legal actions or license withdrawals have all been used as mechanisms by the authorities to pressure media outlets that have not towed the line or have supported opposition parties.   As a result of these hearings, the parliament, on April 3rd, voted 252 to one to approve a law defining and banning state censorship in the Ukrainian media. This is a welcome step. However, given the power of the presidential administration, the law's implementation remains an open question at best, particularly in the lead up to the 2004 elections in Ukraine.   I urge our Ukrainian parliamentary colleagues to continue to actively press their government to comply with Ukraine's commitments to fundamental freedoms freely agreed to as a signatory to the Helsinki Final Act. I also urge the Ukrainian authorities, including the constitutional "guarantor", to end their campaign to stifle independent reporting and viewpoints in the media. Good news from Ukraine will come not from the spin doctors of the presidential administration, but when independent media and journalists can pursue their responsibilities free of harassment, intimidation, and fear.

  • The Critical Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation in Chechnya

    This briefing followed a defeat, by a vote of 15-21 at the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, of a U.S.–supported resolution expressing “deep concern” about reported human rights violation in Chechnya.  The developments in Chechnya since the outbreak of the war in 1994 were briefly surveyed, while the focus of discussion was largely on the human dimension of the situation and the dangers faced by average Chechen civilians. Witnesses testifying at the hearing – including Eliza Moussaeva, Director of the Ingushetia Office of the Memorial Human Rights Center; Bela Tsugaeva, Information Manager of World Vision; and Maureen Greenwood, Advocacy Director for the Europe and Eurasia division of Amnesty International – addressed the dismal state of human rights in Chechnya and the issue of international assistance, which was less effective than it could have been due to government accountability issues. The lack of infrastructure and security guarantees was additional topics of discussion.

  • Belarus Democracy Act 2003

    Mr. President, as Co-Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I have closely monitored developments in the Republic of Belarus and informed my Senate colleagues of disturbing trends in that nation. I have met with members of the fledgling democratic opposition who, at great personal risk, dare to speak out against the repressive regime led by Alexander Lukashenka. I have met with the courageous wives whose husbands disappeared because they stood up to the regime and would not be silent. Against the backdrop of this climate of fear, the powers of the state have been brought to bear against independent journalists, trade unionists, and other voices of dissent. Increasingly, Belarus has been driven into self-imposed isolation under Lukashenka devoid of legitimate leadership or accountability. A little over a year ago I addressed the Senate to voice concern over reported arms deals between the regime and rouge states, including Iraq. It appears that such sales have taken on greater importance as the Belarusian economy spirals downward. Mr. President, while some might be tempted to dismiss Belarus as an anomaly, the stakes are too high and the costs too great to ignore. Accordingly, today, I am introducing the Belarus Democracy Act of 2003, which is designed to help put an end to repression and human rights violations in Belarus and to promote Belarus’ entry into a democratic Euro-Atlantic community of nations. As a participating State in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Belarus has accepted a series of norms in the areas of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As Europe’s last dictator, Lukashenka continues to brashly trample the fundamental rights of his own people and their culture. As I alluded to earlier, independent media, non-governmental organizations, trade unions and the democratic opposition have had to operate under extremely difficult conditions, often facing serious mistreatment and an orchestrated campaign of harassment. Despite the repressions there are courageous individuals who support democracy have not been silenced. Two weeks ago, for example, Alexander Yarashuk, the leader of the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions, called on Lukashenka to immediately cease backing Saddam. Moreover, just last week, on March 12, thousands gathered peacefully in a central Minsk square to protest deteriorating economic and social conditions in Belarus. Four of the rally’s organizers – Andrei Sannikov, Ludmila Gryaznova, Dmitry Bondarenko and Leonid Malakhov – were given 15 day jail sentences for “participation in unauthorized mass actions.” Despite calls for change within Belarus, and considerable prodding from the international community, Lukashenka has shown no desire to deviate from his path of authoritarianism and personal profit at the expense of his own people. A few months ago, Lukashenka, who effectively controls the Belarusian parliament, signed into laws a new, repressive religion law. Local elections held earlier this month followed the pattern of Belarus’ 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential elections – they were a joke. Control of election commissions, denials of registration for opposition candidates, “early voting” and outright falsifications were the norm. Mr. President, the Belarus Democracy Act of 2003 would authorize additional assistance for democracy-building activities such as support for NGOs, independent media, including radio and television broadcasting to Belarus, and international exchanges. It also encourages free and fair parliamentary elections, which have been notably absent in Belarus. This bill would also deny high-ranking officials of the Lukashenka regime entry into the United States. Additionally, strategic exports to the Belarusian Government would be prohibited, as well as U.S. Government financing, except for humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products. The U.S. executive directors of the international financial institutions would be encouraged to vote against financial assistance to the Government of Belarus except for loans and assistance for humanitarian needs. The bill would also require reports from the President concerning the sale of delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies from Belarus to rogue states, including Iraq and North Korea. I am very pleased that the Ranking Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Biden, is an original cosponsor of this measure. His support will ensure that we proceed on a bipartisan basis as we work to ensure the timely adoption and implementation of this legislation. Mr. President, the goal of the Belarus Democracy Act is to assist Belarus in becoming a genuine European state, in which respect for human rights and democracy is the norm and in which the long-suffering Belarusian people are able to overcome the legacy of dictatorship – past and present. Adoption and implementation of the Belarus Democracy Act will offer a ray of hope that the current period of political, economic and social stagnation will indeed end. The people of Belarus deserve a chance for a brighter future free of repression and fear. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Belarus Democracy Act be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: S. 700 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the "Belarus Democracy Act of 2003''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States supports the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law in the Republic of Belarus consistent with its commitments as a participating state of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (2) The United States has a vital interest in the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus and its integration into the European community of democracies. (3) The last parliamentary election in Belarus deemed to be free and fair by the international community was conducted in 1995 from which emerged the 13th Supreme Soviet whose democratically and constitutionally derived authorities and powers have been usurped by the authoritarian regime of Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenka. (4) In November 1996, Lukashenka orchestrated an illegal and unconstitutional referendum that enabled him to impose a new constitution, abolish the duly-elected parliament, the 13th Supreme Soviet, install a largely powerless National Assembly, and extend his term of office to 2001. (5) In May 1999, democratic forces in Belarus challenged Lukashenka's unconstitutional extension of his presidential term by staging alternative presidential elections which were met with repression. (6) Democratic forces in Belarus have organized peaceful demonstrations against the Lukashenka regime in cities and towns throughout Belarus which led to beatings, mass arrests, and extended incarcerations. (7) Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, and Yuri Zakharenka, who have been leaders and supporters of the democratic forces in Belarus, and Dmitry Zavadsky, a journalist known for his critical reporting in Belarus, have disappeared and are presumed dead. (8) Former Belarus Government officials have come forward with credible allegations and evidence that top officials of the Lukashenka regime were involved in the disappearances. (9) The Lukashenka regime systematically harasses and represses the independent media and independent trade unions, imprisons independent journalists, and actively suppresses freedom of speech and expression. (10) The Lukashenka regime harasses the autocephalic Belarusian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish community, the Hindu Lights of Kalyasa community, evangelical Protestant churches (such as Baptist and Pentecostal groups), and other minority religious groups. (11) The Law on Religious Freedom and Religious Organizations, passed by the National Assembly and signed by Lukashenka on October 31, 2002, establishes one of the most repressive legal regimes in the OSCE region, severely limiting religious freedom and placing excessively burdensome government controls on religious practice. (12) The United States, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly, and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly have not recognized the National Assembly. (13) The parliamentary elections of October 15, 2000, conducted in the absence of a democratic election law, were illegitimate, unconstitutional, and plagued by violent human rights abuses committed by the Lukashenka regime, and have been determined by the OSCE to be nondemocratic. (14) The presidential election of September 9, 2001, was determined by the OSCE and other observers to be fundamentally unfair, to have failed to meet OSCE commitments for democratic elections formulated in the 1990 Copenhagen Document, and to have featured significant and abusive misconduct by the Lukashenka regime, including-- (A) the harassment, arrest, and imprisonment of opposition members; (B) the denial of equal and fair access by opposition candidates to state-controlled media; (C) the seizure of equipment and property of independent nongovernmental organizations and press organizations, and the harassment of their staff and management; (D) voting and vote counting procedures that were not transparent; and (E) a campaign of intimidation directed against opposition activists, domestic election observation organizations, and opposition and independent media, and a libelous media campaign against international observers. SEC. 3. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN BELARUS. (a) PURPOSES OF ASSISTANCE.--Assistance under this section shall be available for the following purposes: (1) To assist the people of the Republic of Belarus in regaining their freedom and to enable them to join the European community of democracies. (2) To encourage free and fair presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in Belarus, conducted in a manner consistent with internationally accepted standards and under the supervision of internationally recognized observers. (3) To assist in restoring and strengthening institutions of democratic governance in Belarus. (b) AUTHORIZATION FOR ASSISTANCE.--To carry out the purposes set forth in subsection (a), the President is authorized to furnish assistance and other support for the activities described in subsection (c), to be provided primarily for indigenous groups in Belarus that are committed to the support of democratic processes in Belarus. (c) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.--Activities that may be supported by assistance under subsection (b) include-- (1) the observation of elections and the promotion of free and fair electoral processes; (2) the development of democratic political parties; (3) radio and television broadcasting to and within Belarus; (4) the development of nongovernmental organizations promoting democracy and supporting human rights; (5) the development of independent media working within Belarus and from locations outside Belarus, and supported by non-state-controlled printing facilities; (6) international exchanges and advanced professional training programs for leaders and members of the democratic forces in matters central to the development of civil society; and (7) other activities consistent with the purposes of this Act. (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out this section $40,000,000 for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. (2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended. SEC. 4. RADIO BROADCASTING TO BELARUS. (a) PURPOSE.--It is the purpose of this section to authorize increased support for United States Government and surrogate radio broadcasting to the Republic of Belarus that will facilitate the unhindered dissemination of information in Belarus. (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--In addition to such sums as are otherwise authorized to be appropriated, there is authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for each fiscal year for Voice of America and RFE/RL, Incorporated for radio broadcasting to the people of Belarus in languages spoken in Belarus. (c) REPORT ON RADIO BROADCASTING TO AND IN BELARUS.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how funds appropriated and allocated pursuant to the authorizations of appropriations under subsection (b) and section 3(d) will be used to provide AM and FM broadcasting that covers the territory of Belarus and delivers independent and uncensored programming. SEC. 5. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS. (a) APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.--The sanctions described in subsections (c) and (d), and any sanction imposed under subsection (e) or (f), shall apply with respect to the Republic of Belarus until the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Belarus has made significant progress in meeting the conditions described in subsection (b). (b) CONDITIONS.--The conditions referred to in subsection (a) are the following: (1) The release of individuals in Belarus who have been jailed based on political or religious beliefs. (2) The withdrawal of politically motivated legal charges against all opposition figures and independent journalists in Belarus. (3) A full accounting of the disappearances of opposition leaders and journalists in Belarus, including Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, Yuri Zakharenka, and Dmitry Zavadsky, and the prosecution of the individuals who are responsible for their disappearances. (4) The cessation of all forms of harassment and repression against the independent media, independent trade unions, nongovernmental organizations, religious organizations (including their leadership and members), and the political opposition in Belarus. (5) The implementation of free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in Belarus consistent with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) standards on democratic elections and in cooperation with relevant OSCE institutions. (c) PROHIBITION ON STRATEGIC EXPORTS TO BELARUS.-- (1) PROHIBITION.--No computers, computer software, goods, or technology intended to manufacture or service computers, or any other related goods or technology, may be exported to Belarus for use by the Government of Belarus, or by its military, police, prison system, or national security agencies. The prohibition in the preceding sentence shall not apply with respect to the export of goods or technology for democracy-building or humanitarian purposes. (2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the issuance of licenses to ensure the safety of civil aviation and safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft of United States origin or to ensure the safety of ocean-going maritime traffic in international waters. (d) PROHIBITION ON LOANS AND INVESTMENT.-- (1) UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FINANCING.--No loan, credit guarantee, insurance, financing, or other similar financial assistance may be extended by any agency of the United States Government (including the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) to the Government of Belarus, except with respect to the provision of humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products. (2) TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY.--No funds available to the Trade and Development Agency may be available for activities of the Agency in or for Belarus. (e) DENIAL OF ENTRY INTO UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN BELARUS OFFICIALS.-- (1) DENIAL OF ENTRY.--It is the sense of Congress that, in addition to the sanctions provided for in subsections (c) and (d), the President should use the authority under section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)) to deny the entry into the United States of any alien who-- (A) holds a position in the senior leadership of the Government of Belarus; or (B) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person described in subparagraph (A). (2) SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS DEFINED.--In this subsection, the term ``senior leadership of the Government of Belarus'' includes-- (A) the President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, government ministers, Chairmen of State Committees, and members of the Presidential Administration of Belarus; (B) any official of the Government of Belarus who is personally and substantially involved in the suppression of freedom in Belarus, including judges and prosecutors; and (C) any other individual determined by the Secretary of State (or the Secretary's designee) to be personally and substantially involved in the formulation or execution of the policies of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus that are in contradiction of internationally recognized human rights standards. (f) MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.--It is the sense of Congress that, in addition to the sanctions provided for in subsections (c) and (d), the Secretary of the Treasury should instruct the United States Executive Director of each international financial institution to which the United States is a member to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any extension by those institutions of any financial assistance (including any technical assistance or grant) of any kind to the Government of Belarus, except for loans and assistance that serve humanitarian needs. (g) WAIVER.--The President may waive the application of any sanction described in this section with respect to Belarus if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that it is important to the national interests of the United States to do so. SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION. It is the sense of Congress that the President should continue to seek to coordinate with other countries, particularly European countries, a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to further the purposes of this Act, including, as appropriate, encouraging other countries to take measures with respect to the Republic of Belarus that are similar to measures provided for in this Act. SEC. 7. ANNUAL REPORTS. (a) REPORTS.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every year thereafter, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes, with respect to the preceding 12-month period, the following: (1) The sale or delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies from the Republic of Belarus to any country, the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)), has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. (2) An identification of each country described in paragraph (1) and a detailed description of the weapons or weapons-related technologies involved in the sale. (3) An identification of the goods, services, credits, or other consideration received by Belarus in exchange for the weapons or weapons-related technologies. (4) The personal assets and wealth of Aleksandr Lukashenka and other senior leadership of the Government of Belarus. (b) FORM.--A report transmitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex. SEC. 8. DECLARATION OF POLICY. Congress hereby-- (1) expresses its support to those in the Republic of Belarus seeking-- (A) to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and to consolidate the independence and sovereignty of Belarus; and (B) to promote the integration of Belarus into the European community of democracies; (2) expresses its grave concern about the disappearances of Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, Yuri Zakharenka, and Dmitry Zavadsky; (3) calls upon the Lukashenka regime in Belarus to cease its persecution of political opponents or independent journalists and to release those individuals who have been imprisoned for opposing his regime or for exercising their right to freedom of speech; (4) calls upon the Lukashenka regime to end the pattern of clear, gross, and uncorrected violations of relevant human dimension commitments of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and to respect the basic freedoms of speech, expression, assembly, association, language, culture, and religion or belief; (5) calls upon the Government of the Russian Federation to use its influence to encourage democratic development in Belarus so that Belarus can become a democratic, prosperous, sovereign, and independent state that is integrated into Europe; (6) calls upon the Government of Belarus to resolve the continuing constitutional and political crisis in Belarus through-- (A) free, fair, and transparent presidential and parliamentary elections in Belarus, as called for by the OSCE; (B) respect for human rights in Belarus; (C) an end to the current climate of fear in Belarus; (D) meaningful access by the opposition to state media in Belarus; (E) modification of the electoral code of Belarus in keeping with OSCE commitments; (F) engagement in genuine talks with the opposition in Belarus; and (G) modifications of the constitution of Belarus to allow for genuine authority for the parliament; and (7) commends the democratic opposition in Belarus for their commitment to freedom, their courage in the face of the repression of the Lukashenka regime, and the emergence of a pluralist civil society in Belarus--the foundation for the development of democratic political structures. SEC. 9. DEFINITION. In this Act, the term "appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (1) the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. 

  • In Memory of Zoran Djindjic

    Mr. Speaker, we learned today of the assassination in Belgrade of the Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic.   This is a true tragedy, not only for family and friends of Mr. Djindjic but for all the people of Serbia and, indeed, for all who struggle for human rights and democratic development.   Zoran Djindjic became a leader during difficult times in his country. He chose to stand in opposition to Slobodan Milosevic and his regime. That certainly was not the easiest course, and it took courage. Zoran Djindjic also had determination and, after repeated setbacks and obstacles, he played a key role in ousting Milosevic from power in 2000. He subsequently became, as Prime Minister of Serbia, a force for reform, recognizing that Serbia needed to cast off not only the yoke of Milosevic's rule but also Milosevic's legacy of nationalist hatred, organized crime, corruption and greed. Transferring Milosevic to The Hague in 2001 to face charges for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide perhaps best symbolized Djlndjic's continued courage and determination to conquer the sinister forces which seized his country.   Zoran Djindjic was still battling resistance to reform in Serbia when his life was taken by the vicious act of cold-blooded assassins.   These will undoubtedly be turbulent times for Belgrade, for Serbia, and for Montenegro which is just embarking on a new relationship with Serbia. This tragedy may have reverberations throughout the region, particularly in Bosnia and in Kosovo.   It is my hope and prayer, Mr. Speaker, that the people of Serbia will respond to this crime with a loud and united cry: ``Enough is enough.'' In the past, they have seen the lives of journalist Slavko Curuvija and politician Ivan Stambolic snuffed out for their advocacy of a civilized Serbia, in which human rights and the rule of law are respected.   Similarly Djindjic, too, was advocating such noble objectives. The very decent people of Serbia deserve a society which respects human rights and upholds the rule of law. That is what the leaders of Serbia must now provide without further hesitation or delay. I take heart in knowing that Djindjic had many colleagues who shared his vision of a reformed Serbia.   My deepest condolences go to the family of Zoran Djindjic. I hope that the incredible grief they must now feel will be tempered by the pride they should feel in his accomplishments and service to his country.

  • Assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic

    Mr. Speaker, I rise today with a heavy heart to condemn in the strongest possible terms the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. As a Member of Congress, I express my condolences to the government of Serbia and Montenegro and to the family of the late Prime Minister. Mr. Djindjic was one of the driving forces behind the extradition of Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague for war crimes, and also favored increased political and economic cooperation with the West. Mr. Speaker, I think it is our responsibility to encourage the government of Serbia and Montenegro to hold all of those responsible for the assassination accountable and to continue their work for economic reform and full cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal, including the turning over of those indictees who still remain at large and cooperation on the witnesses and the information that is needed. Again, Mr. Speaker, we offer our condolences to the family.

  • Mourning the Assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic

    Mr. Speaker, I want to join the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) in his comments about Mr. Djindjic, the Prime Minister of Serbia. Serbia in the 1990s, like Iraq has gone through, was under the heel of a despot who was vicious and who in my opinion was a war criminal. When the United States acted to displace the Milosevic regime and ultimately Milosevic was voted out of office because we went into Kosovo, it was Mr. Djindjic who showed the courage and the moral commitment to ensure that Mr. Milosevic would be transferred to The Hague to answer for his crimes. That trial currently is going on. It is going on because Mr. Djindjic had the courage to facilitate the transfer out of Serbia to The Hague of the alleged war criminal Slobodan Milosevic.   He has now been assassinated. We do not know yet who the perpetrator of that assassination is. Suffice it to say, we have lost someone whose courage and commitment to freedom and human rights was an important aspect for his country and for the international community. We are a lesser international community for his loss.

  • Commemorating 60th Anniversary of Historic Rescue of 50,000 Bulgarian Jews from the Holocaust

    Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, during the Holocaust, the Jews of Europe were subjected to persecution and, ultimately, targeted for total genocide--not only by foreign occupiers, but also at the hands of erstwhile friends and even their own governments. In the face of this atrocity, Bulgaria stands out for protecting its indigenous Jewish population from the evil machinery of the Holocaust. Despite official allied status with Nazi Germany, Bulgarian leaders, religious figures, intellectuals and average citizens resisted pressure from the Nazis to deport Bulgarian Jews to certain death in the concentration camps of Eastern Europe. Thanks to the compassion and courage of broad sectors of Bulgarian society, approximately 50,000 Jews survived the Holocaust. Once an ally of Nazi Germany in March 1941, the Bulgarian Government and Parliament came under pressure from the Nazi regime and enacted legislation severely curtailing the rights of the Jewish population. In February 1943, a secret meeting between, Hitler's envoy to Bulgaria, and Bulgaria's Commissar on Jewish Affairs, established a timetable for exporting to Germany the Jews in Aegean Thrace and Macedonia, territories then under Bulgarian administration, and deportation of Jews from Bulgarian cities. The deportations were to begin on March 9, 1943. Trains and boats to be used in the deportations were in place, and assembly points in Poland had already been selected when word of the plans was leaked. Almost immediately, 43 members of the Bulgarian Parliament led by Deputy Speaker Dimiter Peshev signed a petition to condemn this action. This, coupled with widespread public outcry from active citizens, political and professional organizations, intellectuals, and prominent leaders of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, led the Minster of the Interior to stay the deportation orders. Later that month, Peshev again took a bold step in drafting a letter, signed by members of the ruling coalition, which condemned the possible deportation of Jews, calling this an ``inadmissible act'' with ``grave moral consequences.'' In May 1943, the plan for deportation of the Bulgarian Jews was finally aborted. King Boris III resisted Nazi pressure to advance the plan, arguing that the Jews were an essential component of the workforce. While some 20,000 Jews from Sofia were then sent to work camps in the countryside for the remainder of the war and subjected to squalid conditions, they nevertheless survived. Tragically, there was no such reversal of fate for the estimated 11,000 Jews from Aegean Thrace and Macedonia, who did not have the protection afforded by Bulgarian citizenship. Already driven from their homes in March 1943, these individuals were transported through Bulgarian territory to the Nazi death camps. Madam Speaker, this month marks the 60th anniversary of Bulgarian resistance to the Holocaust. The people deserve our commendation for their selfless efforts to preserve such a threatened religious community, and in fact, the number of Jews living in Bulgaria actually increased during the Holocaust. Bulgaria's record of tolerance was distorted by 40 years of communist misrule which culminated in the 1984-89 forcible assimilation campaign against its largest minority, the Turks. One of the first initiatives of the government following the fall of communism in November 1989 was the reversal of this brutal campaign. A return to the wholesale suppression of minority groups as exemplified by the forcible assimilation campaign is inconceivable today, and Bulgaria is a democracy that promotes respect for fundamental rights. Last year, Bulgaria's Ambassador to the United States, Elena Poptodorova, testified before the Helsinki Commission regarding the ongoing efforts of her government to promote tolerance, consistent with Bulgaria's historical traditions. I have been particularly encouraged by Bulgaria's initiatives, in cooperation with leading non-governmental organizations, to promote the integration of Roma and non-Roma in schools. This work deserves the full support of the Bulgarian Government. I am disappointed, however, that the Bulgarian Government has not yet adopted and implemented comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, even though it pledged to do so in early 1999 in a platform of action on Roma issues, and committed to do so in the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit document. Four years have come and gone since Bulgaria made those pledges, and it is past time for those pledges to be honored. I am hopeful the Bulgarian Government will do more to combat violence motivated by racial or religious intolerance. Two cases of such violence, against Romani Pentecostals in Pazardjik, appear to have received only superficial attention from the authorities. Madam Speaker, I also was disappointed to learn of the recent passage of a new religion law in Bulgaria. Several drafts of a religion law had laid relatively dormant until the last months of 2002, when the process was expedited. As a result, it is my understanding that minority faith communities were excluded from the drafting process and assurances to have the Council of Europe review the text again were ignored. The law is prejudiced against certain religious groups and falls well short of Bulgaria's OSCE commitments. The law also jeopardizes the legal status of the Orthodox synod not favored by the Government and its property holdings, as well as threatens fines for using the name of an existing religious organization without permission. New religious communities seeking to gain legal personality are now required to go through intrusive doctrinal reviews and cumbersome registration procedures, and co-religionists from abroad have been denied visas based on poorly written provisions. Bulgaria's leadership on these various issues would be welcomed, especially in light of their plans to serve as Chair-in-Office of the OSCE in 2004. The United States is particularly appreciative of Bulgaria's firm stand against terrorism at this time, and we look forward to continued strong relations between our countries. The proud heritage stemming from the days of the Holocaust serves as a good reminder of the importance of taking stands which are right and true. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that this Congress is able to recognize that heritage and historical fact.

  • Disturbing Developments in the Republic of Georgia

    Mr. President, as cochairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I am concerned by a myriad of problems that plague the nation of Georgia a decade after restoration of its independence and nearly eleven years after it joined the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE. Among these pressing concerns that I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues is the ongoing violence against non-Orthodox religious groups, as well as allegations of torture perpetrated by Georgian security officials.   Concerning religious freedom, the situation in Georgia is one of the worst in the entire 55-nation region constituting the OSCE. Georgia is the only OSCE country where mobs are allowed to attack, violently and repeatedly, minority religious groups with complete impunity. Most recently, on January 24th, worshipers and clergy were assaulted and beaten in a mob attack on the Central Baptist Church in Tbilisi, where an ecumenical service was to have taken place. While police did eventually intervene, no arrests were made, and the planned ecumenical service between Baptists, Armenian Apostolic Church, Catholics and Lutherans was canceled. While I am pleased President Shevardnadze did issue a decree calling for a full investigation, to date no action by police or the Prosecutor General has taken place.   During the past three years of escalating mob violence, the Jehovah's Witnesses have experienced the majority of attacks, along with Baptists, Pentecostals, and Catholics. Sadly, victims from throughout the country have filed approximately 800 criminal complaints, and not one of these has resulted in a criminal conviction. The mob attacks are usually led by either Vasili Mkalavishvili, a defrocked Georgian Orthodox priest, or Paata Bluashvili, the leader of the Orthodox ``Jvari'' Union. Often the police and media are tipped off in advance of an attack--probably so that the media can arrive early and the police can show up late. The brazen leaders of these attacks have even given television interviews while mob brutality continues in the background.   In response to this ongoing campaign of violence against members of minority faiths, the leadership of the Helsinki Commission and other members of the Senate and House have been in correspondence with President Shevardnadze on numerous occasions. Congressional dismay over this ongoing issue was also reflected in language included in the omnibus appropriations bill underscoring concern over the Georgian Government's apparent resistance to prosecuting and jailing the perpetrators of these mob attacks. Despite assurances, Georgian officials have neither quelled this violence nor taken effective measures against the perpetrators of these assaults. Ironically, it appears that minority religious communities may be freer in parts of Georgia outside of Tbilisi's control than those under the central authorities.   The conference report language should send a strong message to President Shevardnadze and other Georgian leaders. They must understand the Congress's deep and abiding interest in this matter and our desire to see those responsible for the violence put in jail.   I also must express my concern regarding the widespread, indeed routine, use of torture in the Republic of Georgia. While law enforcement remains virtually nonexistent when it comes to protecting religious minorities from violent attacks, the use of torture by police remains a commonplace tool for extracting confessions and obtaining convictions in other areas. A government commission has also acknowledged that the scale of corruption in law enforcement has seriously eroded public confidence in Georgia's system of justice and the rule of law.   At one point, a few years ago, there appeared to be real political will to address this problem. Sadly, increased protections for detainees, adopted to facilitate Georgia's accession to the Council of Europe, were quickly reversed by the parliament once Georgia's admission was complete. Moreover, I am particularly concerned by remarks made by Minister of Interior Koba Narchemashvili in November. In a move calculated to look tough on crime following a notorious murder, he called for seizing control of pre-trial detention facilities from the authority of the Ministry of Justice. This would move Georgia in exactly the wrong direction. Reform must continue on two levels; continuing to move Georgia's legal standards into compliance with international norms, and improving actual implementation by law enforcement officers.   I want to see a prosperous, democratic, and independent Georgia, but these facts are deeply disturbing and disappointing. The Government of Georgia's failure to effectively address these concerns through decisive action will only further erode confidence here in Washington as well as with the people of Georgia.

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