War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia

By Cliff Bond, Senior Advisor In February of this year, the International Court of Justice issued a decision confirming that an act of genocide had been committed in the UN designated safe haven of Srebrenica in July 1995. The court decision came at a time when political tensions were already high in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A hotly contested election and a failed attempt at constitutional reform a few months earlier had led senior politicians to revert to war-time rhetoric not heard since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in late 1995. Many in the international community failed to appreciate how the decision would further sharpen inter-ethnic tensions and unleash a pent-up sense of humiliation and injustice among Bosnian Muslims for the failure to either prevent this atrocity or hold its principle perpetrators, indicted but still at-large Bosnian Serb wartime leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, accountable. In response to this deteriorating political situation and in view of my experience as a former U.S. Ambassador to Sarajevo, then-High Representative Christian Schwartz-Schilling, the senior international representative responsible for implementing Dayton, asked me in May to serve as his Envoy to Srebrenica. My one year mandate was to address concerns of Srebrenica’s residents and future returnees for justice, security and a better life. The Helsinki Commission kindly made me available to serve on a part-time basis for this purpose. Mid-way through this mandate I am pleased to report progress is being made by local authorities and the international community working constructively together to improve conditions in the Srebrenica region, albeit much more needs to be done. At the beginning of our work in Srebrenica we faced the need to reduce political tensions on the ground. Without calming the situation and creating space for dialogue, progress and cooperation would not have been possible. Many factors contributed to a now-improved environment, but a decision to remove an Orthodox church constructed illegally on privately-owned Bosnian Muslim land in the village of Konjevic Polje, not far from Srebrenica, was certainly important. This had been a long standing dispute and action on it underscored that in every part of Bosnia and Herzegovina the rights of citizens, regardless of ethnicity, must be respected. Unfortunately, the decision is yet to be fully implemented. The sooner it is, the more confidence it will generate and the more trust will be built among the citizens of Srebrenica. But this is a small step when compared with the continued liberty of many of those who planned and carried out the genocide at Srebrenica, which remains a source of frustration for the survivors. The actions of incoming High Representative Miroslav Lajcak in early July to accelerate investigations of the suspects of the Srebrenica atrocities was significant, as was the full cooperation in implementing these measures by the authorities of the Republika Srpska – the Bosnian Serb entity, which along with the Muslim-Croat Federation, make up the decentralized state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A decision to fund a team of international investigators and then to open a branch of the State Prosecutor’s Office in Srebrenica were also meant to reinforce this effort and speed up prosecutions. Taken together, these actions assured the public that the individuals who played a part in the crimes at Srebrenica will eventually be brought to justice. Another significant step had been taken earlier by Lajcak’s predecessor, Christian Schwartz-Schilling. He acted to establish the legal authority for the Srebrenica-Potocari Foundation (a memorial and cemetery for the victims) at the state level and provided for its security through a state-level law enforcement agency. This addressed a fundamental concern of surviving family members for the Foundation’s future once the Office of the High Representative and the exceptional international presence ended in the country. This should be viewed as a human and moral gesture taken out of recognition of the tragedy that occurred, not as a political one, as some have chosen to portray it. The decision deserves the full support of all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the current situation in terms of public order around the Srebrenica region is good, returnees are understandably sensitive to the issue of security. We are working with entity authorities to establish and maintain more ethnically balanced policing in the municipality. Along with the speedier prosecution of war criminals, nothing would make returnees to the region feel more secure and protected. When I came back to Srebrenica in May this year, I found it little changed since my first visit in 2001. In the past six months the authorities of the Republika Srpska have invested more than $25 million in infrastructure and other public service improvements in the region and deserve credit for the effective way in which this has been carried out. Additional funding will be dedicated for this purpose in the entity’s 2008 budget and municipal authorities will be involved in planning and identifying priorities for this spending. The state-level Council of Ministers has also approved an approximately $7 million spending package for infrastructure development, business promotion and the improvement of public services. This is a good package of measures, and includes physical improvements to the town’s center, but it needs to be implemented as quickly as possible. The Federation has also devoted some $2.5 million to support sustainable returns and directed some of its public enterprises to invest in the region. A Development Conference was organized in Srebrenica by the U.N. Development Program, international donors and the municipality on July 3. Its object was less about raising more money, though it did, and more about better coordination among donors to produce a more visible impact of the considerable assistance already dedicated to the region. Donors need to better align their activities with the municipality’s own priorities and be more transparent and inform the public of their programs and results. Nothing will change economic conditions for the better in Srebrenica more than the generation of new jobs. Small but still important first steps have been taken to expand Bosnian Muslim employment opportunities in public services and enterprises in the area, and this is a positive step. More certainly needs to be done on this score. The real potential for job creation, however, is in the private sector and through attracting new investment to the region. This is why we organized a major investment conference on November 6. The conference demonstrated that investor opportunities and interest exist in Srebrenica, and an American and Slovene firm announced plans to invest in the municipality at the end of the conference. There have been additional expressions of investor interest since, but now local authorities must work, with the support of the international community, to translate this potential into actual investment and more jobs. Despite an agreement signed by the Federation and the Republika Srpska earlier this year on improving access to health services, returnees to Srebrenica complain that they are still unable to get the treatment and benefits to which they are entitled. This is also true of other social services, which like health care are the competency of each entity. The problems arise as refugees return from one entity to another. Entity authorities must cooperate in finding a solution to this as a matter of urgency, not only for Srebrenica, but for other returnee communities throughout the country. Unless you have spent time in Srebrenica, you cannot appreciate how isolated the community is. Currently most villages in the area have no access to radio or television signals, and this only strengthens a sense of isolation and abandonment. Thankfully, the Dutch and U.S. governments are working to establish radio and television coverage throughout the area. A U.S. firm, Cisco Systems, will also soon provide wireless broadband Internet access to the community, allowing Srebrenica’s schools and youth to connect with the outside world. All of these positive initiatives will only succeed if a constructive dialogue is maintained among the members of the Srebrenica community. Dialogue requires courage and confidence and will be essential in the months ahead if we are to reach agreement on such issues as developing Srebrenica’s natural resources, including its mineral springs which were a major pre-war tourist attraction, bringing other business to the region and providing a better ethnic balance to its police and other public services, including in the senior ranks. In my work over the last six months, I have found the people of Srebrenica, after all that they have been through and in the midst of continuing real hardship, are capable of working together to build a better future. In this they can serve as an example to the political leaders of their country who must work together to achieve the constitutional and other reforms that can secure Bosnia and Herzegovina’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

By Ronald J. McNamara, International Policy Director Spain’s Foreign Minister, Miguel Angel Moratinos, appeared before the Helsinki Commission on October 29, in his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, to discuss developments in the 56-nation OSCE before ministers meet in Madrid in late November. Similar hearings with the top political leader of the Vienna-based organization have been convened annually since 2001. Finland will assume the year-long chairmanship beginning in January. In prepared remarks, Commission Chairman Alcee L. Hastings noted, “While the participating States may share a common view of Europe on paper, translating that vision into reality is another matter altogether. While all OSCE commitments have been agreed to by all of the countries, the fact is that there are human rights commitments that have been on the books for many years that would not be agreed to by some today. Indeed, the OSCE, and its precursor, the CSCE, have served as barometers for relations among the participating States. Frankly, the current barometric pressure is low, signaling a likely impending storm.” Commission Co-Chairman Benjamin L. Cardin, also in a prepared statement, commended the Government of Spain for organizing the 2005 Córdoba Conference on Anti-Semitism and on Other Forms of Intolerance. He noted that the Helsinki Commission has been particularly active in the face of the spike of anti-Semitism and related violence in the OSCE region. “We appreciate your efforts to keep this important issue on the OSCE agenda with the reappointment of the personal representative on different aspects of tolerance as well as the related conferences convened this year in Bucharest and Córdoba,” said Cardin. The October 2007 Córdoba Conference focused on intolerance and discrimination against Muslims, a priority concern of the Spanish chairmanship. Commissioner Louise McIntosh Slaughter, who chaired the hearing, expressed particular appreciation for the Minister’s recognition of the distinctive contributions of parliamentarians to the Helsinki process. Slaughter has been a long-time active participant in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. She welcomed the timeliness of the hearing and recognized the complicated dynamics evident in the lead up to the Madrid Ministerial. “I know you have an ambitious agenda for the Madrid meeting and the Russians and others may complicate your work given the OSCE rule requiring consensus,” she said, continuing, “over the years, I have appreciated the opportunity to work closely with fellow parliamentarians from throughout the OSCE region, from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The OSCE PA has provided important leadership on issues from combating anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance to promoting projects aimed at protecting the environment, to combating the scourge of human trafficking and advancing security among the participating States.” As one of Congress’ leading voices on equal rights for women, Commissioner Slaughter also commented on the OSCE PA’s trailblazing work in this area, as well. Moratinos’ testimony covered a wide range of accomplishments during the Spanish chairmanship as well as the numerous outstanding and potentially contentious issues on the OSCE’s agenda. On Kosovo, the Minister stressed, “We have managed over the years to maintain a neutral and unbiased position in regard to the status of Kosovo and the communities recognize this effort of OSCE. While the OSCE is not directly involved in the status negotiation, we are, as OSCE, contributing to the process of creating the necessary conditions on the ground for the implementation of the status settlement.” In response to a query from Slaughter about a possible unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo and the prospects for renewal of OSCE’s current mandate covering operations in Kosovo which expires at year’s end, Moratinos stressed that “it's very important that OSCE maintain its engagement in Kosovo, whatever is going to be the future status. We are ready to stay in Kosovo in order to focus on monitoring protection of the rights of communities, particularly regarding the centralization and the protection of cultural and religious sites.” With regard to longstanding conflicts in the OSCE region, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office pointed to the Organization’s continuing work to facilitate a settlement on the Transnistrian issue in Moldova, through participation in the "five-plus-two" negotiations. Regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, he reported that while ongoing mediation efforts by the OSCE Minsk Group have not resulted in a breakthrough in the settlement process, the parties nevertheless remain committed to continuing the negotiations. Moratinos cited concern over serious incidents both in Abkhazia and the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. He discussed the chairmanship’s efforts in the aftermath of the August 6th missile incident between Russian and Georgia, stressing the need for forward-looking measures to build confidence between the two OSCE countries and avoid similar incidents in the future. Turning to Afghanistan, the OSCE's newest Partner for Cooperation, Slaughter remarked, “When I first flagged the concerns regarding the problems in Afghanistan in the OSCE context, some people said ‘that isn't our concern, it's outside the OSCE region.’ Well, one of the lessons of September 11 is that events in seemingly faraway lands do matter for the people there and ultimately for our own security.” Moratinos, in response, said “The situation in Afghanistan continues to have a substantial impact on security in Central Asia. In this respect, the OSCE is considering a serious border management project, particularly in Tajikistan. We hope to encourage counterparts in Afghanistan in these border related activities.” Spain is proposing an informal discussion on the margins of the Madrid Ministerial on the OSCE’s role in promoting the stability and future of Afghanistan. Slaughter referred to a recent meeting she had with Afghanistan’s President Karzai in which she underscored the importance of the movement of women in that country and the benefits of educating his young Afghan girls. An outspoken supporter of Kazakhstan’s longstanding bid to chair the OSCE, Moratinos remarked, “this bid has been welcomed by all members of the Organization and we hope and we are sure that this is an excellent opportunity for Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and the OSCE as a whole. For now, there is not a final consensus regarding the date of the chairmanship by Kazakhstan, but as Chairman-in-Office, Spain is actively seeking to build a consensus amongst all OSCE states on this important decision for the Organization.” Broaching concerns over observation of upcoming parliamentary elections in the Russian Federation scheduled for December 2, Commissioner Slaughter cited remarks by a senior Russian elections official suggesting that there would be a numerical limit to the number of international observers, including OSCE observers to 400 in total. Slaughter pointed out that the OSCE alone deployed over 450 in 2003 for the last election to the State Duma, Russia’s parliament. In response, Moratinos stated, “If there is a danger in the debate of election observation, it is that some participating States, to a certain extent, would like to shift the discourse away from commitments and the fulfillment, or lack of fulfillment. We find it unhelpful to call into question the well established OSCE practice on election observation, which so far has proved most fruitful. In this respect, it is our concern that the announcement made by the Russian representative in Vienna indicating that the invitation to observe the Duma election would be ‘ala carte.’” On the thorny issue of Russian intransigence in the OSCE, Ranking Minority Member Christopher H. Smith, in a prepared statement, underscored that the power of ideas remains a meaningful force today as witnessed by the drama being played out in the arena of the OSCE between those committed to pluralistic democracy and those pursuing authoritarianism, euphemistically termed “managed democracy, and dictatorship, as in Belarus and others. “Compromising on core values or watering down longstanding commitments is not the solution to the current impasse. Rather, our responsibility is to remain steadfast to these values and principles to which all participating States – including those now recalcitrant – have promised to uphold in word and deed,” warned Smith. Moratinos concluded by focusing on the future of the OSCE against the backdrop of discontent among some participating States, notably Russia, Belarus and like-minded countries with some of the activities of the Organization and its direction as well as uncertainty over sustained funding of OSCE, including potential gaps between U.S. rhetorical support and actual commitment of resources. On the former, the Minister suggested that perhaps the time was ripe for the convening of an OSCE summit meeting of Heads of State or Government from the participating States. The last OSCE summit was held in Istanbul, Turkey, in 1999. Skeptics might question the prudence of organizing a summit now, given the acrimony over fundamental aspects of the OSCE standing in stark contrast to the 1990 Paris Summit which opened a new chapter in the Helsinki process firmly rooted in a commitment to pluralistic democracy and free and fair elections. On the question of U.S. funding of OSCE, Moratinos voiced concern over “some rumors” regarding possible cuts in support and enlisted the support of members of the Helsinki Commission in addressing the matter. “I know that the Helsinki Commission plays a unique role as a forum for debate on the burning issues of the day facing the OSCE and the region. In so doing, this Commission pays unique tribute to the longstanding and continued engagement by the United States with the OSCE and the values that underpin it,” said Moratinos.

By Winsome Packer and Janice Helwig, Staff Advisors The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conducted its fifth Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) in Vienna, Austria June 19-20, 2007. The ASRC serves as a framework for participating States to review the OSCE’s work in the political and military dimension on an annual basis. It also promotes dialogue on arms control, confidence building measures, and other security issues among participating States and with other international organizations. Previous ASRCs have launched OSCE initiatives to address new security threats, including travel document security and container security. This year, the ASRC came just days after an extraordinary Conference on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) which ended in little more than an agreement to continue dialogue. Discussion of the CFE Treaty continued at the ASRC, but there was also discussion on other regional arms control issues, counter-terrorism, and the so-called “frozen” conflicts. The U.S. used the ASRC to promote ideas on fighting terrorism through increased OSCE border management work and involvement in Afghanistan, to stress the importance of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), and to provide detailed information on the need for a missile defense system in Europe. While there was general agreement on the need to strengthen border security and resolve ongoing regional conflicts, Russia pushed back against the U.S. and EU on the CFE Treaty and blatantly disagreed with the U.S. on the need for a missile defense system in Europe. Advancing United States Security Priorities Mr. Daniel Fata, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy, headed the U.S. delegation to the conference. During the opening session of the ASRC, Mr. Fata reiterated the long-standing US commitment to ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty as soon as Russia completes withdrawal of troops stationed in Georgia and Moldova against the wishes of those governments. He noted that the actions of some countries to increase their capability to use weapons of mass destruction requires a strong commitment on the part of the United States and its allies to develop the means to protect against potential attacks. For this reason, the U.S. would provide ASRC participants with details on its proposal to establish a missile defense system in Europe. Mr. Fata also proposed several concrete areas where increased OSCE work could help strengthen regional security and fight terrorism: Cyber Security: The recent cyber disruption in Estonia showed how vulnerable States are to cyber attacks on their infrastructure. The OSCE could help address vulnerabilities in cyber security in order to protect critical infrastructure such as power and energy distribution systems, banking, communications, cargo, and passenger transportation systems. Terrorism: Intensify focus on the threat of terrorism and consider meaningful initiatives to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts. Border Security: In order to combat the illegal trafficking in money, people, narcotics, and weapons, extend the OSCE’s border security concept beyond land borders, to include air and sea borders. The OSCE should give particular attention to improving border security programs in Central Asia, and should support Afghanistan’s request for assistance with border security and police training. Arms Control Discussion of arms control issues centered around the CFE Treaty and the U.S. proposal to establish a missile defense system in Europe. Russia and the U.S. were in opposition on both issues. Russia linked the two issues, in an apparent attempt to portray the U.S. as thwarting regional arms control. Russian Representative Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Grushko expressed his regret that the previous week’s extraordinary conference on the CFE concluded without a resolution of the concerns regarding the Treaty. He observed that the OSCE’s work on arms control and confidence building initiatives has stalled. He warned that the current CFE Treaty was not congruent with the present military-political reality and that the Adapted CFE Treaty is in danger of being outdated if not ratified soon. He alluded to U.S. and EU views that the CFE Treaty cannot be ratified while Russian troops remain in Georgia and Moldova and contended that such “artificial political linkages” to the Adapted CFE have led to the impasse. Mr. Grushko also criticized the new US missile defense plans; arguing that they contradict the OSCE principles of partnership and cooperation, as the decisions to deploy the system was taken unilaterally. He expressed interest in continuing dialogue on the issues in an upcoming autumn meeting. Later, Russia again threatened a “moratorium” on the CFE Treaty, against what it called the backdrop of planned US missile defense sites in Eastern Europe and plans for US military bases in Bulgaria and Romania. U.S. Representative Fata provided a detailed presentation on the US rationale for pursuing a missile defense system in Europe. He placed the main threat squarely on Iran’s attempts to establish a ballistic missile capability. Although Iran does not currently have that capability, building a defense system takes time and must be started now. Mr. Fata outlined the proposed structure of the system, which would include interceptors and radars based where they would provide the most coverage - in Poland and the Czech Republic. In addition, an early warning radar system would be placed in Southeastern Europe. He stressed that the system poses no threat to Russia as it is purely defensive, and has no offensive capability. He stressed that the US has engaged with Russia on its missile defense plans for more than two years. Finally, Mr. Fata stated that the US system is complimentary to NATO’s short and medium range missile defense systems. Russia expressed doubts regarding the United States’ assertions pertaining to Iran’s progress in advancing ballistic missile capabilities and questioned the need for a missile defense system. Russia said that United States unilateral action in establishing such a system directly threatens Russia’s security and pointed out that Russia has made a counterproposal to the US for the use of other systems in Azerbaijan. Counter Terrorism In contrast to the polarized arms control discussion, there was general support for OSCE’s counterterrorism work. Hungarian Ambassador, Istvan Gyarmati, currently Director of the International Center for Democratic Transition, set the stage for the discussion by arguing that the fundamental security dynamic changed after 9/11 from a state order to one in which non-State actors are the driving force and threat. Dr. Peter Neumann, Director of the Center for Defense Studies at Kings College, added that States must work to reduce factors that contribute to the ability of terrorist groups to attract supporters, such as poverty, discrimination, and violations of human rights. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) stressed the need to fight hate crimes and the distribution of hate propaganda. The EU, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Canada supported OSCE work in this regard. Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Grushko, praised OSCE’s efforts in combating terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized criminal activities. He supported increased OSCE work against drug trafficking, including an OSCE pilot project to train Afghan counter-narcotics policemen. The U.S. also supported increased OSCE work on border management. The OSCE should extend border management programs to include air and sea borders, and should also increase work in Central Asia and extend it into Afghanistan. Protecting vulnerable infrastructure that is dependent on the internet should be another priority. “Frozen” Conflicts Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia all raised so-called “frozen” conflicts in the region. Moldova asked for the resumption of negotiations on Transniestria and stressed that its territorial integrity must be preserved. Azerbaijan and Armenia presented their views on Nagorno-Karabakh; Azerbaijan stressed the need to find a legal status for it. Russia said many of these conflicts have ties to Russia because they include Russian-speaking populations. However, the main responsibility for resolving the conflicts lies with the parties themselves. Alluding to Kosovo, Russia stressed that any agreement must be approved by all parties and that no solution should be imposed by the international community.

By Clifford Bond and Robert Hand On January 21, Serbia held elections for the 250-seat parliament, the National Assembly. Monitored by more than 300 international observers under OSCE auspices, including two members of the Helsinki Commission staff, the elections were overwhelmingly viewed as being conducted in a free and fair manner. The outcome and related institutional questions, on the other hand, indicate that Serbia’s political development remains burdened by the legacy of the Milosevic regime that ruled for over a decade before being ousted in 2000, even as the country moves in an increasingly democratic direction. These elections were held in the aftermath of the dissolution of the state-union between Serbia and Montenegro following the latter’s declaration of independence in June 2006. Serbia subsequently adopted a new constitution in October 2006. Looming over these formal developments and new elections, however, is the larger question of Kosovo’s future status. The actual timing of the elections was used as a pretext for delaying a UN recommendation on Kosovo, which is expected shortly. Based on the conduct of previous elections in Serbia, there was little concern that these elections would fall short of international standards. However, some concerns were raised regarding the conduct of the earlier constitutional referendum, which witnessed a strong, last-minute push of voting in some regions with the apparent purpose of ensuring a positive outcome. The constitution itself is controversial, particularly in its numerous references to Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, which may have led some segments of Serbian society to boycott the referendum. Undoubtedly, more important international concerns include the uncertain direction of Serbia’s political development and a desire to strengthen Serbia’s democratic institutions. OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Goran Lennmarker, a Swedish parliamentarian, was designated by the OSCE Chair-in-Office to lead the short-term election observation mission as Special Coordinator. The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) conducted a long-term observation effort headed by retired German Ambassador Geert Ahrens. Perhaps the chief criticism of the election process was the obvious gap between the voter’s choice and the actual selection of the person who ultimately takes a parliamentary seat. The Serbian voter chooses a political party or coalition on the election list, but, once it is determined how many seats a particular party/coalition gets, the party leadership then has ten days in which to select which of the 250 persons on its submitted party list actually take a seat. This method of selecting parliamentarians has been criticized for lacking transparency and effectively concentrating attention not on specific candidates and their views or abilities but on the political party leaders who retain control over their members. This leadership control may be further strengthened by requiring deputies to sign undated letters of resignation which can be used to remove them if they fail to observe party discipline. On the other hand, efforts were undertaken – albeit not without some opposition -- to modify existing law and encourage minority representation, including lowering the number of signatures for parties representing ethnic minorities from the normal 10,000 to only 3,000 and dropping the threshold needed to enter the parliament from 5 percent of the votes case to 0.4 percent (1/250) of those cast. Two Hungarian and two Romani political parties joined a Bosniak coalition from the Sandzak region and an Albanian coalition from southern Serbia on the election ballot. Albanian participation was the first since 1997, although two Albanian-based political parties which originally joined the coalition subsequently withdrew and supported a boycott of the elections. The election campaign was long by Serbian standards and quite intense. In contrast to the constitutional referendum campaign, the issue of Kosovo’s status did not dominate campaign rhetoric. Instead, there was considerable and perhaps refreshing discussion of economic issues, for example, reflecting the fact that despite significant economic growth, unemployment remains high. EU enlargement may also increasingly isolate Serbia and its people within the region. Some parties focused more heavily on corruption, property restitution and other economic issues. The democratic and nationalistic range of the dominant Serbian political parties differed on integration mostly in their degree of enthusiasm and differentiation between support for joining the European Union on the one hand and joining NATO on the other. They likewise differed on Kosovo mostly to the degree to which its loss to Serbia was an acknowledged inevitability. Comments by politicians and diplomats from other countries supporting reformist parties late in the campaign prompted cries of interference from more nationalist parties. Observers monitoring media coverage of the campaign reported a very balanced approach, particularly among the broadcast media, as well as a positive tone indicating almost too much official instruction about how to remain neutral. The print media’s performance was more uneven in its campaign coverage, but low reliance on print media in Serbia made such differentiation of questionable significance. Election day was largely dry and unseasonably mild, and this contributed to high voter turnout of above 60 percent. This reversed trends toward voter apathy in previous elections. Out-of-country voting also took place for Serbian citizens in 34 other countries. Upon visiting their designated polling station, over 8,500 in all, voters typically encountered a polling board enlarged by political party representation to often as many as 20 to 30 or more members. Nevertheless, with few exceptions the polling was conducted in a professional manner that respected the secrecy of the ballot and made election-day manipulation, if any was intended, difficult to accomplish. The ballot presented the same list of 20 political parties or coalitions to voters across the country, albeit in different languages depending on concentrations of ethnic minorities residing in the area. Unlike the referendum in which the constitution would either pass or fail, polling board members represented political parties that had no real expectation of an outright victory and merely hoped to achieve or maybe exceed the high end of predictions based on public opinion polls. This likely reduced tension on election day, including during the critical counting of ballots once polls closed, despite significant political differences within polling boards. The Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), a civic non-governmental organization, helped reduce tension by peppering Serbia with close to 4,000 domestic observers to discourage irregularities. The day after the election, before final results were announced, the International Election Observation Mission held a press conference to announce its preliminary conclusions. As Special Coordinator, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Goran Lennmarker released the joint statement which began with the clear statement that the “parliamentary elections in Serbia were free and fair. They provided a genuine opportunity for the citizens of Serbia to freely choose from a range of political platforms. The 20 lists of political parties and coalitions vigorously competed in an open campaign environment. The election campaign was calm, and checks and balances ensured that the election reflects the will of the people, in line with the OSCE’s Commitments as well as with the Council of Europe standards.” The OSCE’s ODIHR released an additional report of its preliminary findings based on the month-long observation of its 28-member team. Despite the overwhelmingly positive assessment, the Republican Election Commission did cancel results in 14 polling stations due to irregularities. World reaction to the results focused heavily on the continued support among the Serbian electorate for the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) led by indicted war criminal Vojislav Seselj, which garnered 28.7 percent of the vote, up from 27.6 percent in the last elections in 2003. That, of course, rightly leads to concern about Serbia’s inability to reject the extreme nationalism fostered by the Milosevic regime throughout the 1990s. On the other hand, the Democratic Party (DS) of President Boris Tadic came in second with 22.9 percent of the vote, an increase from 12.6 percent in 2003 and an indication that entrenched nationalist sentiments have not negated strong support for democratic development and integration. The coalition led by the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) of the current Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, gained only 16.7 percent of the vote, compared to 17.7 percent in 2003. The DSS, which bridges the nationalist/democratic divide in Serbian politics, appears to be replaced by the DS as the leading reform-oriented party in Serbia. G17-Plus, which has focused heavily on economic reform, saw its percentage of support drop but retained enough for parliamentary representation, as did the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), once led by Slobodan Milosevic. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a newer party led by Cedomir Jovanovic which more completely than any other rejects the Milosevic legacy, crossed the 5 percent threshold by leading a coalitions of like-minded parties. The Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) of Vuk Draskovic, which traditionally featured prominently in Serbia’s multi-party political history, did not. One Hungarian and two Romani parties, along with the Bosniak and the Albanian coalition, won one or more seats in the National Assembly. The odds that the SRS will be part of a coalition government appear to be slimmer than one year ago, when that was a major concern. Instead, the hope is for the DS and the DSS to overcome differences to form a new government with the support of other democratic forces, such as the G-17 Plus. Such a coalition could advance Serbia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Prime Minister Kostunica’s past government relied on SPS support to stay in power, and he has indicated an unwillingness to enter a coalition with the Radicals. Personality conflicts, as well as differences over important issues such as cooperation with the Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the appropriate response to an expected UN proposal on the status of Kosovo could complicate coalition formation. Most leading Serbian parties have counted on international concern over Serbia’s political direction to delay an expected UN recommendation, but that appears increasingly unlikely. A proposal on a new status for Kosovo will jolt the Serbian political scene. Many in Serbia feel victimized by the Milosevic regime. They fail to fully appreciate, however, the tremendous damage and suffering inflicted on the neighboring peoples of the former Yugoslavia during the Milosevic era through the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and a deep distrust resulting from Serbia’s inability to acknowledge that reality. Serbia will not fulfill its democratic promise until it fully comes to terms with this recent history. For that reason full cooperation with The Hague Tribunal remains essential. Over the longer term, democratic forces inside the country should prevail and advance Serbia’s reconciliation with its neighbors and its full integration into Europe, but without a mental break with its past this task will take longer and be more difficult to accomplish.