Title

Troubled Partner: Growing Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan

Tuesday, July 16, 2013
Senate Room 201-00 Capitol Visitor Center
Washington D.C., DC 20515
United States
Moderator(s): 
Name: 
Shelly Han
Title Text: 
Senior Advisor
Body: 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Name: 
Paul Carter
Title Text: 
Senior State Department Advisor
Body: 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Witnesses: 
Name: 
Thomas Melia
Title: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy
Body: 
U.S. Department of State
Name: 
H.E. Elin Suleymanov
Title: 
Ambassador
Body: 
Republic of Azerbaijan
Name: 
Eldar Namazov
Title: 
Leader of the "El" Movement
Body: 
National Council of Democratic Forces in Azerbaijan
Name: 
Samad Seyidov
Title: 
Dsc
Body: 
MP
Name: 
Erkin Gadirli
Title: 
Chairman of the Assembly
Body: 
Republican Alternative
Name: 
Mariam Lanskoy
Title: 
Director
Body: 
Russian and Eurasia, National Endowment for Democracy

This briefing provided an opportunity to discuss current events in Azerbaijan and the prospects for a free and fair election. Recent political trends in Azerbaijan include reported intimidation, arrests, and use of force against journalists and human rights activists; tough new NGO registration requirements; legal restrictions on the Internet, including criminalizing online “libel” and “abuse”; restrictions on freedom of assembly, forceful dispersion of unsanctioned protests, detention of demonstrators; and unfair administration of justice, including arbitrary arrest and detention, politically motivated imprisonment, lack of due process, lengthy pre-trial detention, and executive interference in the judiciary.

Witnesses testifying at this briefing addressed these trends and the overall political environment for human rights and fundamental freedom, which had worsened in recent years. They urged the government of Azerbaijan to respect universally recognized freedoms such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association, and not to penalize individuals for attempting to exercise these freedoms and to take concrete steps to enhance political stability during the important election year.

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