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statement
Turkey and Possible Military Equipment Sales
Thursday, November 02, 2000Mr. Speaker, the United States has a longstanding dynamic relationship with our NATO ally, the Republic of Turkey, and I believe that the strength of that relationship relies on forthright candor. I have willingly recognized positive developments in Turkey, and I have sought to present fairly the various human rights concerns as they have arisen. Today, I must bring to my colleagues' attention pending actions involving the Government of Turkey which seem incongruous with the record in violation of human rights. I fear the planned sale of additional military aircraft to Turkey could potentially have further long-term, negative effects on human rights in that country. As Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I presided over a hearing in March of 1999 that addressed many human rights concerns. The State Department had just released its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices covering 1998. Commissioner and Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Harold Hongju Koh noted in testimony before the Commission that ‘serious human rights abuses continued in Turkey in 1998, but we had hoped that the 1998 report would reflect significant progress on Turkey's human rights record. Prime Minister Yilmaz had publicly committed himself to making the protection of human rights his government's highest priority in 1998. We had welcomed those assurances and respected the sincerity of his intentions. We were disappointed that Turkey had not fully translated those assurances into actions.’ I noted in my opening statement, ‘One year after a commission delegation visited Turkey, our conclusion is that there has been no demonstrable improvement in Ankara's human rights practices and that the prospects for much needed systemic reforms are bleak given the unstable political scene which is likely to continue throughout 1999.' Thankfully, eighteen months later I can say that the picture has improved- somewhat. A little over a year ago the president of Turkey's highest court made an extraordinary speech asserting that Turkish citizens should be granted the right to speak freely, urging that the legal system and constitution be ‘cleansed,’ and that existing ‘limits on language’ seriously compromised the freedom of expression. The man who gave that speech, His Excellency Ahmet Necdet Sezer, is the new President of the Republic of Turkey. Last summer several of us on the Commission congratulated President Sezer on his accession to the presidency, saying, in part: We look forward to working with you and members of your administration, especially as you endeavor to fulfill your commitments to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and commitments contained in other Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) documents. These human rights fundamentals are the bedrock upon which European human rights rest, the solid foundation upon which Europe's human rights structures are built. It is worth remembering, twenty-five years after the signing of the Final Act, that your predecessor, President Demerel, signed the commitments at Helsinki on behalf of Turkey. Your country's engagement in the Helsinki process was highlighted during last year's OSCE summit in Istanbul, a meeting which emphasized the importance of freedom of expression, the role of NGOs in civil society, and the eradication of torture. Your Presidency comes at a very critical time in modern Turkey's history. Adoption and implementation of the reforms you have advocated would certainly strengthen the ties between our countries and facilitate fuller integration of Turkey into Europe. Full respect for the rights of Turkey's significant Kurdish population would go a long way in reducing tensions that have festered for more than a decade, and resulted in the lengthy conflict in the southeast. Your proposals to consolidate and strengthen democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Turkey will be instrumental in ushering in a new era of peace and prosperity in the Republic. The Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents can serve as important guides in your endeavor. We all recall the pending $4 billion sale of advanced attack helicopters to the Turkish army. I have objected to this sale as leading human rights organizations, Turkish and western press, and even the State Department documented the use of such helicopters to attack Kurdish villages in Turkey and to transport troops to regions where civilians were killed. Despite repeated promises, the Turkish Government has been slow to take action which would hold accountable and punish those who have committed such atrocities. And we recently learned of the pending sale of eight even larger helicopters, S-80E heavy lift helicopters for Turkey's Land Forces Command. With a flight radius of over three hundred miles and the ability to carry over fifty armed troops, the S-80E has the potential to greatly expand the ability of Turkey's army to undertake actions such as I just recounted. Since 1998, there has been recognition in high-level U.S.-Turkish exchanges that Turkey has a number of longstanding issues which must be addressed with demonstrable progress: decriminalization of freedom of expression; the release of imprisoned parliamentarians and journalists; prosecution of police officers who commit torture; an end of harassment of human rights defenders and re-opening of non-governmental organizations; the return of internally displaced people to their villages; cessation of harassment and banning of certain political parties; and, an end to the state of emergency in the southeast. The human rights picture in Turkey has improved somewhat in the last several years, yet journalists continue to be arrested and jailed, human rights organizations continue to feel pressure from the police, and elected officials who are affiliated with certain political parties, in particular, continue to be harassed. Anywhere from half a million to 2 million Kurds have been displaced by the Turkish counter insurgency campaigns against the Kurdistan Workers Party, also known as the PKK. The Turkish military has reportedly emptied more than three thousand villages and hamlets in the southeast since 1992, burned homes and fields, and committed other human rights abuses against Kurdish civilians, often using types of helicopters similar to those the Administration is seeking to transfer. Despite repeated promises, the Government of Turkey has taken few steps to facilitate the return of these peoples to their homes, assist them to resettle, or compensate them for the loss of their property. Nor does it allow others to help. Even the ICRC has been unable to operate in Turkey. And, finally, four parliamentarians, Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogÿan, and Selim Sadak, continue to serve time in prison. We cannot proceed with this sale, or other sales or transfers, when Turkey's Government fails to live up to the most basic expectations mentioned above. Mr. Speaker, I think it is also time that the United States establishes an understanding with Turkey and a credible method of consistent monitoring and reporting on the end-use of U.S. weapons, aircraft and service. An August 2000 report from the General Accounting Office (GAO) entitled ‘Foreign Military Sales: Changes Needed to Correct Weaknesses in End-Use Monitoring Program’ was a cause for concern on my part regarding the effectiveness of current end-use monitoring and reporting efforts. While we had been assured that end-use monitoring was taking place and that the United States was holding recipient governments accountable to the export license criteria, the GAO report reveals the failure of the Executive Branch to effectively implement monitoring requirements enacted by Congress. For example, the report points out on page 12: “While field personnel may be aware of adverse conditions in their countries, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency has not established guidance or procedures for field personnel to use in determining when such conditions require an end-use check.” For example, significant upheaval occurred in both Indonesia and Pakistan within the last several years. As a result, the State Department determined that both countries are no longer eligible to purchase U.S. defense articles and services. However, end-use checks of U.S. defense items already provided were not performed in either country in response to the standard. DSCA officials believed that the State Department was responsible for notifying field personnel that the criteria had been met for an end-use check to be conducted. However, DSCA and State have never established a procedure for providing notification to field personnel. Currently, the end-use monitoring training that DSCA provides to field personnel consists of a 30-minute presentation during the security assistance management course at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. This training is intended to familiarize students with end-use monitoring requirements. However, this training does not provide any guidance or procedures on how to execute an end-use monitoring program at overseas posts or when to initiate end-use checks in response to one of the five standards. In the past there have been largely ad hoc attempts to report on the end-use of U.S. equipment. Therefore, I was pleased to support the passage of H.R. 4919, the Security Assistant Act of 2000 that was signed by the President on October 6. Section 703 of this Act mandates that no later than 180 days after its enactment, the President shall prepare and transmit to Congress a report summarizing the status of efforts by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to implement the End-Use Monitoring Enhancement Plan relating to government-to-government transfers of defense articles, services, and related technologies. I want to commend House International Relations Committee Chairman Ben Gilman for his efforts in trying to make our end-use monitoring and reporting programs effective and accurate. I look forward to working with him and others to ensure that an effective and credible monitoring program is put in place without further delay. We must be consistent in our defense of human rights, and our relations, including our military relations, must reflect that commitment. For this reason, Mr. Speaker, I am not prepared to support the sale of additional weaponry and aircraft to Turkey at this time.
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statement
Russian Arms Sales to Iran
Thursday, October 26, 2000Mr. Speaker, there is no greater sponsor of terrorism in the world than the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran has taken Americans for hostages, given weapons to suicide bombers, and taken the lead in the movement to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. There is no government more radical, more extremist, or more dangerous to our national interests. So why did Vice President Al Gore cut a deal with the Russians to allow weapons sales to Iran? Al Gore himself when he was Senator introduced the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act in 1992. And now he winks and nods to Viktor Chernomyrdin, letting him know it is okay to violate American national interests. Mr. Speaker, the recent bombing of the U.S.S. Cole demonstrated again how serious a threat terrorism is to America and her allies. It is a violation of law to tell Russians it is okay to sell arms to Iran. Worse, it places American lives at risk. And now they are trying to hide it from Congress. We expect better judgment from a man who wants to be our President.
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publication
U.S. Statements at the 1999 OSCE Review Conference
Friday, September 01, 2000In February 1999, officials from 90 governments, including representatives from many OSCE participating States, visited Washington for the First Global Forum on Fighting Corruption among justice and security officials. Participants concluded that their governments must cooperate more closely if they were to succeed in promoting public integrity and controlling corruption among their officials. OSCE efforts served as an example to others when the international community gathered in the Netherlands in 2001 for the Second Global Forum on Fighting Corruption.
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statement
President Putin's Visit to Moldova
Tuesday, June 13, 2000Mr. Speaker, President Putin of Russia continues to maintain a heavy schedule of international visits. Among the several destinations, he is scheduled to visit Moldova later this week. The Republic of Moldova is located principally between the Prut River on the west and the Dniestr River to the east, between Romania and Ukraine. A sliver of the country, the `left bank' or `Transdniestria' region, extends beyond the Dniestr River and borders with Ukraine. The 4.3 million population in Moldova is 65 percent ethnic Romanian, with significant Ukrainian and Russian minorities. Gagauz, Bulgarians, Roma, and Jews constitute the bulk of the remainder. While Moldova and Romania were united between World Wars I and II, following seizure by the Soviets in World War II, Moldova became a Soviet `Republic.' When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Moldova gained its independence and is now an internationally-recognized sovereign state, a member of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and a host of other international organizations. When Moldova became independent, there were approximately 15,000 Soviet troops of the 14th Army based in the Transdniestria region of Moldova. In 1992, elements of these troops helped pro-Soviet elements establish a separatist state in Transdniestria, the so-called Dniestr Moldovan Republic. This state, unrecognized and barely changed from the Soviet era, continues to exist and defy the legitimate authorities of Moldova. Meanwhile, elements of the former Soviet army, now the Russian army, remained in Transdniestria after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Renamed the Operational Group of Forces, they presently number about 2,500. The Moldovan Government has wanted the troops to leave, and the Russians keep saying they are going to leave. The Moldovan and Russian Governments signed an agreement in 1994 according to which Russian forces would withdraw in three years. Obviously, that deadline has passed. Russia was supposed to remove her forces from Moldova as a part of the Council of Europe accession agreement in February 1996. In fact, language in the declaration of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit insists that Russia remove its military arsenals from Moldova by December 2001 and its forces by December 2002. This latest OSCE language enhances language included in the 1994 Budapest document and the 1996 Lisbon document calling for complete withdrawal of the Russian troops. Mr. Speaker, there is no legitimate security reason for the Russian Government to continue to base military forces on the territory of a sovereign state that wishes to see them removed. This relatively small contingent of troops is a vestige of the Cold War. I would add also that the United States Government has agreed to help finance some of the moving costs for the Russian equipment. I would hope President Putin will assure his hosts in Moldova that the Russian forces will be removed in accordance with the OSCE deadline, if not earlier.
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briefing
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
Thursday, February 20, 1997This briefing focused on the topics of European security and NATO enlargement, specifically in terms of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Elements of the treaty that remained especially important, including the goal of avoiding destabilizing concentrations of forces in Europe and the goal of creating greater transparency and promoting information exchange among governments in Europe, were discussed. Witnesses testifying at this briefing spoke to the need for amendments and changes to the CFE, but maintained the relevance of the treaty to international security. Different strategies for making these changes related to Russian pressure and NATO involvement were presented.
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publication
U.S. Statements on the Human Dimension, 1996 OSCE Vienna Review Conference and Lisbon Summit
Friday, November 01, 1996This compendium of statements illustrates the U.S. perspective that one of the key and distinguishing features of the OSCE is the interlocking framework of critical, politically binding commitments which provide a common set of principles to which all participating States can aspire. The OSCE draws its real strength and practical flexibility from participating states' commitments to the values of the original Helsinki Act, rather than from a legalized, treaty-based institutional structure. A fundamental strength of the OSCE is the review process, which provides a regular opportunity to assess a participating states' efforts to further the realization of the Helsinki Accords within its own borders, and in its relations with other OSCE states. The OSCE is increasingly a pillar of European security. By facilitating honest implementation review the OSCE can strengthen security links based on common values.
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publication
Report: US Helsinki Commission Delegation to Georgia and Azerbaijan
Friday, April 26, 1996From April 22-26, 1996, Commission staff attended, along with 30 media professionals, the International Conference on Conflict in Trans-Caucasus [sic] and the Role of Mass Media, held in Kobuleti, Ajaria (an Autonomous Republic in Georgia). The conferences organizers were the OSCE Office of Democratic Institu- tions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Mission to Georgia, the Council of Europe and the Tbilisi-based Black Sea Press Information Agency. The project was co-sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development, through the Eurasia Foundation. Participants came from Baku, Tskhinvali (South Ossetia), Stepanakert (Nagorno-Karabakh), Tbilisi and Yerevan. Organized by the ODIHR as a follow-up to the 1995 Human Dimension Implementation Review Meeting in Warsaw, the conference was one in a series on the role of the media in conflict situations and in systems undergoing the transition from communism. The stated aim of these conferences is to develop aware- ness of and working recommendations for the journalists working in conflict regions on the role the media can play in preventing and resolving conflicts. A secondary goal is to give journalists from states or regions in conflict the opportunity to meet, discuss common problems and establish personal contacts to promote the exchange of information. Other scheduled conferences examine the role of the media in the former Yugoslavia (June 1996) and the situation of the media in Uzbekistan (October 1996). One important reason conference organizers chose Kobuleti was that Ajaria has managed to avoid the destruction and disruption visited upon the rest of Georgia in the last several years by ethnic conflicts and by gangs of marauding criminals associated with various paramilitary groups. Under the iron grip of Aslan Abashidze, the Chairman of Ajarias Supreme Soviet, Ajaria has been relatively calm, and has taken in refugees from Georgias ethnic-separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Since these conflicts are technically unre- solved, Tbilisi, the capital, would have been problematic for Abkhaz and South Ossetians, whereas Ajaria seemed a more neutral site.
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hearing
Turkey-U.S. Relations: Potential and Perils
Tuesday, September 19, 1995The hearing examined both the potential mutual benefits of closer relations with Turkey, and the peril of unconditional support for a government unable to resolve crises that threaten the existing political order and regional stability. Turkey, a NATO ally and OSCE participating State is poised as a unique strategic and economic partner astride the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. Turkey stood by the United States in Korea, against Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, and in its aftermath in Operation Provide Comfort. Turkey also supported our efforts to bring peace to Bosnia. The potential benefits of closer cooperation are obvious. At the same time, however, a complex and profound crisis increasingly divides Turkey's citizens along national, ethnic, and religious lines, threatening the existing social and political order. Extremist violence and terrorism is polarizing Turks and Kurds, Islamic groups, both secular and anti-secular proponents. While the rights of all Turkish citizens under the mantle of combating terrorism, Kurds bear the brunt of such repression.
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briefing
Russia and NATO: Moscow’s Foreign Policy and the Partnership for Peace
Friday, May 06, 1994This briefing examined what role Russia would play in the Partnership for Peace and NATO. It also looks at human rights concerns as well as military, security, and economic relations bewteen Russia and the West. Several complexities of this situation in the context of the post-communist period were addressed. Witnesses testifying at the briefing – including Lawrence DiRita, Deputy Director of Foreign and Defense Policy for the Heritage Foundation and Dr. Phillip Petersen, Principle Researcher for the Potomac Foundation – evaluated the Partnership for Peace Framework, which worked towards establishing partnerships with a number of European country, including those of the former Soviet Union. The role of Russian policy in this partnership was an especially debated topic.
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hearing
The Yugoslavia Conflict: Potential for Spillover in the Balkans
Wednesday, July 21, 1993This hearing reviewed the potential for spillover in the Yugoslav conflict. In particular, the hearing examined the aggression in Bosnia- Herzegovina and the possible effects of this on its own ethnic communities and on those of neighboring countries. The economic decline that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia provided additional hardships for the large refugee population in the region. The Commissioners examined how the U.S. should respond, and whether current policies, such as sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, are effective.
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hearing
Human Rights Policy Under the New Administration
Thursday, June 10, 1993The purpose of this hearing was to examine the euphoria of the post-Cold War age in regards to the lack of confidence and political drive on how to promote commitments made in the Charter of Paris agreement. The hearing reviewed the actions made in the Balkans and Serbia’s continual territorial aggression and also developed democratic countries selectively applying human right policies. The Commissioners stressed the need for continual assistance to democratically developing countries, but to those countries that disrespect universal human rights should have additional pressures applied to change this behavior. The distinguished witnesses and Commissioners discussed ways in which the U.S. can help play a role in strengthening the United Nation’s ability to promote and protect human rights, as well as how the U.S. could use greater use of regional bodies similar the CSCE in conflict resolution.
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hearing
War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia
Thursday, February 25, 1993This hearing focused on the ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the international community’s commitment to prosecuting those guilty of war crimes and providing humanitarian relief. In particular, the hearing looked into systemic rape and forced impregnation in the former Yugoslavia. The hearing also largely focused on what measures the U.S. should adopt to assist communities and women affected by gender violence from the conflict. In addition, the Commissioners and witnesses discussed measures to prosecute individuals guilty of war crimes and how to address the refugee crisis.
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hearing
War Crimes and the Humanitarian Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia
Monday, January 25, 1993This hearing focused on the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the international community’s commitment to prosecuting those guilty of war crimes. Confidence and security building measures, in relation to the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina were discussed, as well as the stability of the multi-ethnic layering of the newly formed countries. The hearing also focused on possible U.S. measures to improve regional stability and to relocate displaced persons. Such measures included disbanding the arms embargo on Bosnia and improving economic conditions for the millions affected by the conflict.
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hearing
The Yugoslav Republics: Prospects for Peace and Human Rights
Wednesday, February 05, 1992This hearing reviewed the political crisis and the civil conflict in Yugoslavia. The purpose was to examine the different aspects in which is fueling the crisis. The hearing looked at the role of the OSCE process in its efforts to shape the international strength in resolving the Yugoslav conflict. Representatives from the European community gave testimony on the proposals and plan implementation carried out by the European Council and of the member states. The issue of military hardware and tensions related to large mobilized forces were mentioned, along with the peace settlement dimension for the succeeding states of Yugoslavia.
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hearing
The New Commonwealth of Independent States: Problems, Perspectives, and U.S. Policy Implications
Thursday, January 09, 1992This hearing discussed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of a series of succeeding states. The hearing covered the theme of regional and ethnic divisions as key elements in the unpredicted dissolution of the Soviet Union. The witnesses covered the particular challenges of securing peaceful independence from the “commonwealth of former Soviet Republics” and the democratization process. The conversation centered on the human rights dimension and the process of newly created states signing on to several international treaties and obtaining memberships in international organizations.
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publication
Vienna Review Meeting of the CSCE - Phase III and IV
Friday, January 01, 1988The main activity of the Vienna Meeting throughout Phases III and IV was the presentation and negotiation of proposals for inclu sion in the concluding document of the meeting. The number (more than 160), complexity and controversial nature of many of these proposals led to the extension of the Vienna Meeting well beyond its target closing date of July 31. These factors, along with other elements such as continuing major shortcomings in the implementa tion of existing commitments, are largely responsible for the continuation of the Vienna Meeting into 1988. The slow pace of progress already evident in Phase II continued through the next phase. Each side defended its own proposals but showed little disposition to begin the process of compromise which could lead to the conclusion of the meeting. The main procedural development during this phase was the appointment of coordinators from the neutral and non-aligned states to guide the work of the drafting groups. This development provided greater order and structure for the proceedings but did little to advance the drafting work or to induce compromises. Other major developments during this phase were the introduction of the long-awaited Western proposal on military security and the tabling of a comprehensive compromise proposed in Basket III by two neutral delegations, Austria and Switzerland. Both proposals were put forth at the very end of the phase and thus did not have much impact until the next phase. The Western (NATO) proposal on military security questions was designed as a response to the Eastern proposal which envisioned two main objectives: another round of negotiations on confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) to build upon the successful Stockholm meeting and the initiation of negotiations on conventional disarmament, both within the same CSCE forum. The Western response to this proposal was delayed primarily because of United States and French differences over the connection between the conventional arms negotiations and the CSCE process, the French arguing that the negotiations should be an integral part of the process and the U.S. insisting that they be independent. The issue was resolved by agreement that the negotiations would be "within the framework of the CSCE," but should remain autonomous.
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publication
The Miroslav Medvid Incident - Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (Part 2)
Friday, May 01, 1987This report results from an investigation directed by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe into the attempted defection of Miroslav Medvid and other similar incidents of involuntary repatriation of Soviet and Soviet-bloc nationals, with recommendations for any appropriate changes in US law. This investigation began in July 1986, with research into available public source background material. By September 1986, fieldwork commenced, consisting primarily of witness interviews, records reviews, and search for other evidentiary materials. More than 200 interviews and 100 informal contacts were conducted by CSCE investigators. A few investigative initiatives were hampered by foreign government and Executive Branch decisions to deny access to certain witnesses and records. However, the effect of the omissions was minimized by the preponderance of other available evidence on the issues. This report presents a narrative story of The Medvid Incident, followed by the factual and legal issues raised by the events (Part I). The second section examines other incidents of repatriation cases, including case studies and analyses, and a statistical examination of deserting crewmen and apprehensions.
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publication
The Miroslav Medvid Incident - Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (Part 1)
Friday, May 01, 1987This report results from an investigation directed by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe into the attempted defection of Miroslav Medvid and other similar incidents of involuntary repatriation of Soviet and Soviet-bloc nationals, with recommendations for any appropriate changes in US law. This investigation began in July 1986, with research into available public source background material. By September 1986, fieldwork commenced, consisting primarily of witness interviews, records reviews, and search for other evidentiary materials. More than 200 interviews and 100 informal contacts were conducted by CSCE investigators. A few investigative initiatives were hampered by foreign government and Executive Branch decisions to deny access to certain witnesses and records. However, the effect of the omissions was minimized by the preponderance of other available evidence on the issues. This report presents a narrative story of The Medvid Incident, followed by the factual and legal issues raised by the events (Part I). The second section examines other incidents of repatriation cases, including case studies and analyses, and a statistical examination of deserting crewmen and apprehensions.
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publication
List of Organizations Involved in Exchange Programs with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Wednesday, October 01, 1986The Commission developed this report to help interested persons and organizations participate in exchange programs with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe: Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. It lists organizations which conduct exchange programs and other contacts with these countries. The parties to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe declared their intention to expand cooperation in security, economic, humanitarian, information, culture, and education affairs and to respect and put into practice certain basic principles, including those of human rights. The Final Act was signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975, by 35 heads of state or government, including the United States, Canada, and every state in Europe except Albania. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) was created as an independent government agency in 1976 to monitor compliance with the Final Act and to encourage U.S. governmental and private programs to expand East-West economic and cultural cooperation and exchange of people and ideas. In the Final Act, the signatories express the view that cultural exchanges and development of relations in education and science contribute to the strengthening of peace, better mutual under standing, and enrichment of the human personality. In the Com mission's view, exchange programs with the Soviet bloc countries break down barriers and lessen distrust. They help Americans learn about the views and goals of these societies. Such programs help expose the peoples of these countries to the values and goals of our pluralistic society. Critical to such programs is that Americans are given the opportunity to tell the Soviets and their allies on a personal level about their concern for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
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hearing
Stockholm Meeting of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE)
Wednesday, October 01, 1986In this hearing, which Rep. Steny H. Hoyer presided over, took place on the heels of the Stockholm Meeting of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). Concerning the conference, Chairman D’Amato stated, “This package of confidence- and security-building measures is designed to bring about greater openness with respect to European security and reduce the risk of war.” One of the main aspects of this “package” was the first inclusion of provisions for onsite inspection in an East-West agreement. The conference had large implications for the Helsinki process. For instance, one named concern was that security could overshadow human rights. The witness (Ambassador Barry) did say, though, that the conference could, if properly implemented, reduce the risk of war in Europe, contribute to greater security and openness, and lead to improved East-West relations.
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Confidence and Security Building Measures
In the years following the Helsinki Final Act, a key component of European security was the development of a comprehensive set of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) designed to reduce the risk of conflicts, increase trust among the OSCE participating States, and contribute to greater openness and transparency in the field of military planning and activities.
One of the main CSBMs is the Vienna Document, which requires participating States to exchange information on their military forces, equipment, and defense planning – for example, providing prior notification of troop maneuvers and allowing for the observation of military exercises. The Vienna Document also provides for inspections and evaluation visits that can be conducted on the territory of any participating State that has armed forces. According to the OSCE, on average, participating States have historically undertaken some 90 inspections and 45 evaluation visits each year.
In the runup to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, elements of the Vienna Document were invoked by Ukraine and the Baltic states as part of diplomatic efforts to avert the looming crisis. However, Russia (and Belarus) refused to engage or provide clarifications required under the Document’s provisions. While this development successfully highlighted Russia’s deliberate lack of transparency and likely hostile intentions, it also underlined the extent to which CSBMs rely on good faith engagement by all sides to meet the measures’ stated intent of preventing conflict and build trust.
Helsinki Commissioners have actively promoted OSCE CSBMs through hearings, briefings, and statements, as well as through advocacy at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.
Staff Contact: Alex Tiersky, senior policy advisor