The Troubled Media Environment in Ukraine

The Troubled Media Environment in Ukraine

Hon.
Ben Nighthorse Campbell
United States
Senate
108th Congress Congress
First Session Session
Tuesday, April 29, 2003

Mr. President, later this week individuals around the world will mark World Press Freedom Day. The functioning of free and independent media is tied closely to the exercise of many other fundamental freedoms as well as to the future of any democratic society. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which I co-chair, is responsible for monitoring press freedom in the 55 participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE. Recently, I reported to the Senate on the deplorable conditions for independent media in the Republic of Belarus. Today, I will address the situation of journalists and media outlets in Ukraine.

 

Several discouraging reports have come out recently concerning the medic environment in Ukraine. These reports merit attention, especially within the context of critical presidential elections scheduled to take place in Ukraine next year. The State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in Ukraine for 2002 summarizes media freedoms as follows: "Authorities interfered with the news media by intimidating journalists, issuing written and oral instructions about events to cover and not to cover, and pressuring them into applying self-censorship. Nevertheless a wide range of opinion was available in newspapers, periodicals, and Internet news sources."

 

Current negative trends and restrictive practices with respect to media freedom in Ukraine are sources of concern, especially given that country's leadership claims concerning integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Lack of compliance with international human rights standards, including OSCE commitments, on freedom of expression undermines that process. Moreover, an independent media free from governmental pressure is an essential factor in ensuring a level playing field in the upcoming 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine.

 

In her April 18, 2003 annual report to the Ukrainian parliament, Ombudsman Nina Karpachova asserted that journalism remains among the most dangerous professions in Ukraine, with 36 media employees having been killed over the past ten years, while beatings, intimidation of media employees, freezing of bank accounts of media outlets, and confiscation of entire print runs of newspapers and other publications have become commonplace in Ukraine.

 

The murder of prominent journalist Heorhiy Gongadze--who disappeared in September 2000--remains unsolved. Ukrainian President Kuchma and a number of high-ranking officials have been implicated in his disappearance and the circumstances leading to his murder. The Ukrainian authorities' handling, or more accurately mishandling of this case, has been characterized by obfuscation and stonewalling. Not surprisingly, lack of transparency illustrated by the Gongadze case has fueled the debilitating problem of widespread corruption reaching the highest levels of the Government of Ukraine.

 

Audio recordings exist that contain conversations between Kuchma and other senior government officials discussing the desirability of Gongadze's elimination. Some of these have been passed to the U.S. Department of Justice as part of a larger set of recordings of Kuchma's conversations implicating him and his cronies in numerous scandals. Together with Commission Co-Chairman Rep. Chris Smith, I recently wrote to the Department of Justice requesting technical assistance to determine whether the recordings in which the Gongadze matter is discussed are genuine. A credible and transparent investigation of this case by Ukrainian authorities is long overdue and the perpetrators--no matter who they may be--need to be brought to justice.

 

The case of Ihor Alexandrov, a director of a regional television station, who was beaten in July 2001 and subsequently died also remains unsolved. Serious questions remain about the way in which that case was handled by the authorities.

 

A Human Rights Watch report, “Negotiating the News: Informal State Censorship of Ukrainian Television,” issued in March, details the use of explicit directives or temnyky, lists of topics, which have been sent to editors from Kuchma's Presidential Administration on what subjects to cover and in what manner. The report correctly notes that these temnyky have eroded freedom of expression in Ukraine, as "editors and journalists feel obligated to comply with temnyky instructions due to economic and political pressures and fear repercussions for non-cooperation." To their credit, the independent media are struggling to counter attempts by the central authorities to control their reporting and coverage of issues and events.

 

Another troubling feature of the media environment has been the control exerted by various oligarchs with close links to the government who own major media outlets. There is growing evidence that backers of the current Prime Minister and other political figures have been buying out previously independent news sources, including websites, and either firing reporters or telling them to cease criticism of the government of find new jobs.

 

Last December, Ukraine's parliament held hearings on "Society, Mass Media, Authority: Freedom of Speech and Censorship in Ukraine." Journalists' testimony confirmed the existence of censorship, including temnyky, as well as various instruments of harassment and intimidation. Tax inspections, various legal actions or license withdrawals have all been used as mechanisms by the authorities to pressure media outlets that have not towed the line or have supported opposition parties.

 

As a result of these hearings, the parliament, on April 3rd, voted 252 to one to approve a law defining and banning state censorship in the Ukrainian media. This is a welcome step. However, given the power of the presidential administration, the law's implementation remains an open question at best, particularly in the lead up to the 2004 elections in Ukraine.

 

I urge our Ukrainian parliamentary colleagues to continue to actively press their government to comply with Ukraine's commitments to fundamental freedoms freely agreed to as a signatory to the Helsinki Final Act. I also urge the Ukrainian authorities, including the constitutional "guarantor", to end their campaign to stifle independent reporting and viewpoints in the media. Good news from Ukraine will come not from the spin doctors of the presidential administration, but when independent media and journalists can pursue their responsibilities free of harassment, intimidation, and fear.

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  • Briefing Surveys Human Rights of Russia's Roma Population

    By Erika Schlager CSCE Counsel on International Law On September 23, 2004, the United States Helsinki Commission held a briefing on “The Roma in Russia.”  Panelists included Dimitrina Petrova, Executive Director, European Roma Rights Center; Alexander Torokhov, Director, Roma Ural; and Leonid Raihman, a consultant for the Open Society Institute specializing in minority issues in the former Soviet Union. 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Torkohov offered a number of recommendations to improve the current situation.  With respect to education, he suggested creating preschool programs for Roma children to improve literacy, working with both children and parents to understand the value of education, and facilitating cooperation between parents and schools.  Given the pronounced bigotry against Roma that characterizes portrayals of Roma in the broadcast and print media, he also suggested training journalists to improve their professional skills. Leonid Raihman focused on ill treatment of Roma by the police, access to justice, and problems associated with the lack of personal documents, including passports.  Endemic corruption among the poorly paid and poorly trained police in Russia has fostered an environment in which Roma are the routine victims of extortion by the police.  This extortion, in turn, contributes to the economic marginalization of Roma. Raihman also described the serious and complex problem of personal documents for the Roma.  He said the absence of personal documents, as well as the rigid nature of the personal documents system in Russia, represents an aspect of the problem.  However, he felt that ethnicity was the primary reason for problems in obtaining a passport.  “Administration officials,” he stated, “especially in housing and immigration departments abuse the discretionary decision-making power accorded to them by the passport system to discriminate against Roma and members of the vulnerable groups.” Mr. Raihman urged the U.S. Government to use its power “to persuade the Russian Government to place the human rights problems which the Roma face high on their agenda.”  He stated that it is time for the Russian Government, as well as the rest of the world, to acknowledge and deal with the problems faced by the Roma in Russia. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords.  The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Intern Judy Abel contributed to this article.

  • Azerbaijan's Presidential Elections

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  • Supporting Democracy in Belarus

    Mr. President, I welcome the unanimous passage of the Belarus Democracy Act, BDA, by the United States Senate last night following similar action by the House of Representatives earlier this week. As co-chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I am particularly pleased at timely adoption of this important legislation. I thank Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden for their assistance in facilitating consideration of this bill by the full Senate.   Repression and stagnation have been the hallmarks of the regime of Aleksandr Lukashenka, the leader of Belarus who increasingly tightened the noose around those who express independent views. A series of fundamentally flawed elections have left Belarus without legitimate executive and parliamentary leadership. Against this backdrop, preparations are underway for parliamentary elections and a referendum later this month. The elections take place in an environment in which the regime has intensified its repression of the remaining independent media and vilification of the opposition and their supporters. Lukashenka is also seeking to manipulate the situation to extend his rule by eliminating constitutional term limits for president, possibly paving the way for him to become a ``president-for-life.''   As co-chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I have maintained a strong interest in Belarus and have tried to inform my Senate colleagues about the increasingly troubling developments in that strategically located country, whose 10 million people have suffered cruelty at the hands of czars, Nazis, Communists and now, Aleksandr Lukashenka. During my service on the Commission, I have met and come to know many of the courageous individuals, who often at personal risk have spoken out in support of democracy in the face of Europe's last dictatorship, including the spouses of opposition leaders and a journalist who disappeared in 1999 and 2000 because they dared speak to the truth.   Belarus, under Lukashenka, has the worst human rights record in Europe. His regime has increasingly violated basic human rights and freedoms. The goal of the Belarus Democracy Act is to help put an end to repression and human rights violations in Belarus and to promote Belarus' entry into a democratic Euro-Atlantic community of nations following years of self-imposed isolation.   The Belarus Democracy Act authorizes additional assistance for democracy-building activities such as support for NGOs, independent media, including radio broadcasting to Belarus, and international exchanges. It also encourages free and fair parliamentary elections, which have been notably absent in Belarus and which look to be highly problematic when they are held on October 17, judging by the pre-election environment and the regime's tight control over the electoral process.   The BDA includes sense of the Congress language that would prohibit U.S. Government financing, except for humanitarian reasons and U.S. executive directors of the international financial institutions would be encouraged to vote against financial assistance to the Government of Belarus except for loans and assistance for humanitarian needs. The bill also requires a report from the President concerning the sale of delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies from Belarus to rogue states and on the personal wealth and assets of Lukashenka.   Nearly 2 years after the introduction of the Belarus Democracy Act the situation in that country has spiraled downward. Adoption and implementation of the Belarus Democracy Act will offer hope that the current period of political, economic and social stagnation will indeed end. It shows our concrete support for the courageous individuals, non-governmental organizations, independent media and independent trade unions struggling mightily against the machine of repression. And it shows our support for the people of Belarus, who deserve a chance for a brighter future.

  • Urging the Government of Ukraine to Ensure Democratic, Transparent, and Fair Elections Process for Presidential Elections on October 31, 2004

    Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased that the House moved to the timely consideration of H. Con. Res. 415, which calls upon the government of Ukraine to ensure a democratic, transparent and fair election process for that country's presidential elections that are about to take place on October 31. As chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I join the gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde) in sponsoring this important resolution. H. Con. Res. 415 makes clear the expectation that Ukrainian authorities should, consistent with their own laws and international agreements, ensure an election process that enables all of the candidates to compete on a level playing field.   International attention, Mr. Speaker, is now rightly focused on ensuring free, fair, open and transparent presidential elections on October 31, with a second round likely on November 21. These elections are critically important to the future of Ukraine, yet we see on a daily basis an election campaign that seriously calls into question Ukraine's commitment to OSCE principles.   Without exaggeration, Ukraine is facing a critical election, a choice not only between Euro-Atlantic integration versus reintegration into the former Soviet Eurasian space, but a choice between further development toward a European-style democracy, such as in Poland or Hungary, versus the increasingly authoritarian system that prevails in Russia today.   Unfortunately, the pre-election environment in Ukraine gives great cause for concern. Ukrainian voters clearly are not receiving balanced and objective information about all of the candidates in the race. Ukraine's state-owned television channels are heavily biased against the democratic opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, who is leading in the polls nevertheless.   Independent media providing Ukrainians with objective information about the campaign, including channel 5, are being shut down in various regions. Journalists who do not follow the secret instructions from the presidential administration, it is called temnyky, are harassed and even fired. Given the stakes in these elections, Mr. Speaker, we should not be surprised that the ruling regime has launched an all-out campaign against the free media and against the opposition, the most recent of numerous examples being the highly suspicious poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko.   In addition, numerous obstacles to a free and fair political campaign have been placed by the national authorities, including intimidation of citizens, candidates and campaigns, the harassment of citizen expressions of political views, and the illegal use of State resources to promote the candidacy of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich.   Equal conditions for candidates, including unimpeded access to media, and an end to the intimidation and harassment of candidates and citizens must be provided during the remainder of the presidential campaign and will be key in determining whether or not the Ukrainian presidential elections will be judged as free and fair by the OSCE and the international community.   The elections will be a watershed for the future direction of that country.   Ukraine has tremendous potential. An independent, democratic Ukraine where the rule of law prevails is vital to the security and stability of Europe. Ukrainian authorities need to radically improve the election environment, however, if there is to be hope for these elections to meet those standards.   Mr. Speaker, this resolution urges the Ukrainian government to guarantee freedom of association and assembly, and it is not guaranteed now; ensure full transparency of the election process; free access for Ukrainian and international election observers; and unimpeded access by all candidates to the media on a nondiscriminatory basis.   I urge all Members to support this.   Text of H. Con. Res. 415   Whereas the establishment of a democratic, transparent, and fair election process for the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine and of a genuinely democratic political system are prerequisites for that country's full integration into the Western community of nations as an equal member, including into organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO);   Whereas the Government of Ukraine has accepted numerous specific commitments governing the conduct of elections as a participating State of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including provisions of the Copenhagen Document;   Whereas the election on October 31, 2004, of Ukraine's next president will provide an unambiguous test of the extent of the Ukrainian authorities' commitment to implement these standards and build a democratic society based on free elections and the rule of law;   Whereas this election takes place against the backdrop of previous elections that did not fully meet international standards and of disturbing trends in the current pre-election environment;   Whereas it is the duty of government and public authorities at all levels to act in a manner consistent with all laws and regulations governing election procedures and to ensure free and fair elections throughout the entire country, including preventing activities aimed at undermining the free exercise of political rights;   Whereas a genuinely free and fair election requires a period of political campaigning conducted in an environment in which neither administrative action nor violence, intimidation, or detention hinder the parties, political associations, and the candidates from presenting their views and qualifications to the citizenry, including organizing supporters, conducting public meetings and events throughout the country, and enjoying unimpeded access to television, radio, print, and Internet media on a non-discriminatory basis;   Whereas a genuinely free and fair election requires that citizens be guaranteed the right and effective opportunity to exercise their civil and political rights, including the right to vote and the right to seek and acquire information upon which to make an informed vote, free from intimidation, undue influence, attempts at vote buying, threats of political retribution, or other forms of coercion by national or local authorities or others;   Whereas a genuinely free and fair election requires government and public authorities to ensure that candidates and political parties enjoy equal treatment before the law and that government resources are not employed to the advantage of individual candidates or political parties;   Whereas a genuinely free and fair election requires the full transparency of laws and regulations governing elections, multiparty representation on election commissions, and unobstructed access by candidates, political parties, and domestic and international observers to all election procedures, including voting and vote-counting in all areas of the country;   Whereas increasing control and manipulation of the media by national and local officials and others acting at their behest raise grave concerns regarding the commitment of the Ukrainian authorities to free and fair elections;   Whereas efforts by the national authorities to limit access to international broadcasting, including Radio Liberty and the Voice of America, represent an unacceptable infringement on the right of the Ukrainian people to independent information;   Whereas efforts by national and local officials and others acting at their behest to impose obstacles to free assembly, free speech, and a free and fair political campaign have taken place in Donetsk, Sumy, and elsewhere in Ukraine without condemnation or remedial action by the Ukrainian Government;   Whereas numerous substantial irregularities have taken place in recent Ukrainian parliamentary by-elections in the Donetsk region and in mayoral elections in Mukacheve, Romny, and Krasniy Luch; and   Whereas the intimidation and violence during the April 18, 2004, mayoral election in Mukacheve, Ukraine, represent a deliberate attack on the democratic process: Now, therefore, be it   Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress--   (1) acknowledges and welcomes the strong relationship formed between the United States and Ukraine since the restoration of Ukraine's independence in 1991;   (2) recognizes that a precondition for the full integration of Ukraine into the Western community of nations, including as an equal member in institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is its establishment of a genuinely democratic political system;   (3) expresses its strong and continuing support for the efforts of the Ukrainian people to establish a full democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights in Ukraine;   (4) urges the Government of Ukraine to guarantee freedom of association and assembly, including the right of candidates, members of political parties, and others to freely assemble, to organize and conduct public events, and to exercise these and other rights free from intimidation or harassment by local or national officials or others acting at their behest;   (5) urges the Government of Ukraine to meet its Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) commitments on democratic elections and to address issues previously identified by the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE in its final reports on the 2002 parliamentary elections and the 1999 presidential elections, such as illegal interference by public authorities in the campaign and a high degree of bias in the media;   (6) urges the Ukrainian authorities to ensure--   (A) the full transparency of election procedures before, during, and after the 2004 presidential elections;   (B) free access for Ukrainian and international election observers;   (C) multiparty representation on all election commissions;   (D) unimpeded access by all parties and candidates to print, radio, television, and Internet media on a non-discriminatory basis;   (E) freedom of candidates, members of opposition parties, and independent media organizations from intimidation or harassment by government officials at all levels via selective tax audits and other regulatory procedures, and in the case of media, license revocations and libel suits, among other measures;   (F) a transparent process for complaint and appeals through electoral commissions and within the court system that provides timely and effective remedies; and   (G) vigorous prosecution of any individual or organization responsible for violations of election laws or regulations, including the application of appropriate administrative or criminal penalties;   (7) further calls upon the Government of Ukraine to guarantee election monitors from the ODIHR, other participating States of the OSCE, Ukrainian political parties, candidates' representatives, nongovernmental organizations, and other private institutions and organizations, both foreign and domestic, unobstructed access to all aspects of the election process, including unimpeded access to public campaign events, candidates, news media, voting, and post-election tabulation of results and processing of election challenges and complaints;   (8) strongly encourages the President to fully employ the diplomatic and other resources of the Government of the United States to ensure that the election laws and procedures of Ukraine are faithfully adhered to by all local and national officials, by others acting at their behest, and by all candidates and parties, during and subsequent to the presidential campaign and election-day voting;   (9) strongly encourages the President to clearly communicate to the Government of Ukraine, to all parties and candidates, and to the people of Ukraine the high importance attached by the Government of the United States to this presidential campaign as a central factor in determining the future relationship between the two countries; and   (10) pledges its enduring support and assistance to the Ukrainian people's establishment of a fully free and open democratic system, their creation of a prosperous free market economy, their establishment of a secure independence and freedom from coercion, and their country's assumption of its rightful place as a full and equal member of the Western community of democracies.

  • Belarus Democracy Act of 2004

    Mr. Speaker, I rise to urge passage of H.R. 854, the Belarus Democracy Act. With important parliamentary elections in Belarus scheduled for October 17, it is essential that we pass the Belarus Democracy Act. This Congress must demonstrate its strong support for pro-democracy forces in Belarus and advance U.S. interests in the region. Now is the time to send a strong signal. Since his election in 1995, Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenka has steadily undermined democratic institutions through a series of unfair elections and a seriously flawed constitutional referendum. The U.S. State Department, Helsinki Commission which I Chair, as well as the OSCE, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Union and other international entities have all chronicled the appalling state of human rights and democracy there. Located in the heart of Europe, Belarus is juxtaposed to our NATO allies and will soon border the European Union. The Lukashenka regime has repeatedly violated basic freedoms of speech, expression, assembly, association and religion. Since I introduced the Belarus Democracy Act last year, the situation in Belarus has only become more difficult. Just within the last few months, the independent media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), independent trade unions, religious groups, and democratic opposition leaders have faced increased harassment, arrest, detentions, and even violence. Opposition leaders have been imprisoned and beaten. NGOs have been closed down with increasing frequency. Independent media outlets continue to feel the wrath of the powers-that-be, including closures, defamation lawsuits, exorbitant fines, confiscations of newspapers or the suspension of their distribution, censorship and the deportation of an independent journalist from Ukraine who had lived in Belarus since 1990. Independent trade unions are subject to a pattern of obstruction, harassment and intimidation by the authorities. In short, the situation in Belarus continues its downward spiral with daily reports of growing repression and human rights violations. Here in Washington and at various OSCE Parliamentary Assembly meetings, I've had occasion to meet with the wives of the disappeared. The cases of their husbands, Yuri Zakharenka, Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, and journalist Dmitri Zavadsky who disappeared in 1999 and 2000 and are presumed to have been murdered, are a stark illustration of the climate of fear that pervades in Belarus. I am pleased that just last week the United States, together with the European Union, has decided to restrict admission to four top Belarusian officials implicated in these politically motivated disappearances. Reports of arms and weapons deals between the Belarusian regime and rogue states continue to circulate. Lukashenka and his regime were open in their support of Saddam Hussein. On August 24, the Treasury Department charged that Infobank of Belarus has been involved with money laundering involving fraudulent transactions pertaining to Iraq, where funds laundered by Saddam Hussein's regime were derived from schemes to circumvent the UN Oil-for-Food program. PROVISIONS OF BDA Mr. Speaker, the main purpose of the BDA is to demonstrate U.S. support for those struggling to promote democracy and respect for human rights in Belarus despite the onerous pressures they face from the anti-democratic regime. This bill authorizes necessary assistance for democracy-building activities such as support for NGOs, independent media, including radio and television broadcasting to Belarus, and international exchanges. The bill also encourages free and fair parliamentary elections, conducted in a manner consistent with international standards, in sharp contrast to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential elections in Belarus which flaunted democratic standards. As a result of those elections, Belarus has the distinction of lacking legitimate presidential and parliamentary leadership, which contributes to its self-imposed isolation. Parliamentary elections now have an added dimension, with Lukashenka's September 7 announcement of a referendum to take place on the same day, that would pave the way to extend his rule beyond 2006, when his tenure is due to expire, to potentially join the ranks of "presidents for life" like President Niyazov in Turkmenistan and others in Central Asia. As matters stand now, the deck appears to be stacked in Lukashenka's favor, as the Belarusian Government has almost total control of the electoral process. Opposition parties have been allocated a negligible percentage of seats on district and precinct election commissions, and many candidates proposed by Belarusian democratic opposition parties have been denied registration. To their credit, the embattled opposition and non-governmental organizations have not given up. I have met with the leaders of the Belarusian opposition and have been impressed with their determination to participate in the coming elections and their courageous work to advance democracy, human rights and the rule of law, despite all of the obstacles placed in their way by the Lukashenka regime. In addition, this bill includes “sense of Congress” language that would impose sanctions against the Lukashenka regime. U.S. Government financing would be prohibited, except for humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products. The U.S. Executive Directors of the international financial institutions would be encouraged to vote against financial assistance to the Government of Belarus except for loans and assistance that serve humanitarian needs. This bill also requires reports from the President concerning the sale or delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies from Belarus to rogue states and on the personal assets and wealth of Lukashenka and other senior leadership in Belarus. I hope that the Belarus Democracy Act will help support those who desire a genuinely independent, democratic Belarus and serve as a catalyst to facilitate Belarus' integration into democratic Europe. The measure is designed to be a counterweight to the pattern of clear, gross and uncorrected human rights violations by the Lukashenka regime. The Belarusian people, who have suffered so much both under past and present dictatorships, deserve to live in a society where democratic principles and human rights are respected. We must stand firmly on the side of those who long for freedom.

  • Helsinki Commission Chairman Delivers Remarks on Belarus, Ukraine Elections

    * Conference on the Implications of the East European Elections: Ukraine and Belarus The Heritage Foundation Thank you for inviting me to participate in your important and timely session. Both Ukraine and Belarus face important elections in the coming month.  Both are societies burdened by the Soviet communist legacy of the past.  Both were “Captive Nations” and both, albeit to varying degrees,  are vulnerable to Russia’s political and economic influence, especially  as all too many among the Russian political elite have not yet reconciled themselves to the loss of empire.  Both now border on NATO and the EU.   Both face serious challenges to democracy and Euro-Atlantic integration. There are many other similarities.  There are also important distinctions. Belarus is ruled by a dictator who controls the levers of power and increasingly all facets ofBelarusian society.  Given the level of control and repression, there are few counterweights to Lukashenka’s rule.  The parliament, the National Assembly lacks real powers and Members have little power to be independent of Lukashenka’s strong-arm tactics.  Civil society, including NGOs and independent media, is under a tight lid.  Fundamentally flawed elections have left that country lacking a legitimate president and legislature. Ukraine, for all of the backsliding, scandals, and problems with respect to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, has institutions that act at least somewhat as a check on the powers-that-be, despite the ruling regime’s attempts to control and, in some instances, stifle genuine democratic development and civil society.  Civil society is tolerated to a greater extent than in Belarus, and independent media, while under severe pressure, is more widespread.  There are competing centers of power and many diverse economic, political and social interests in Ukraine.  In the case of Ukraine, despite the progress in many areas since independence, there have been significant problems with respect to implementation of OSCE human dimension commitments, including in the areas of media freedoms, freedom of association and assembly, corruption, the rule of law and elections.  The largest faction in the Rada is that of democratic opposition and presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine.  The pro-presidential parliamentary majority has disintegrated, with the defection earlier this month of the party led by Rada Speaker Lytvyn.  Genuine political competition exists, and, of course, there is competition among the oligarchs.  In Belarus, there is only one oligarch.  Although the Kuchma regime might be tempted, thus far, they have not been able to act with the same degree of impunity that Lukashenka exhibits. International attention is rightly now focused on ensuring free, fair, open and transparent presidential elections on October 31 with a second round likely in late November.  These elections are critically important to the future of Ukraine, yet we see on a daily basis an election campaign that calls into question Ukraine’s commitment to OSCE principles.  Without exaggeration, Ukraine is facing a critical presidential election – a choice not only between Euro-Atlantic integration versus reintegration into the former Soviet Eurasian space, but a choice between further development toward a European-style democracy, such as in Poland or Hungary,  versus the increasingly authoritarian system that prevails in Russia today. Many analysts and organizations, including the Helsinki Commission, have chronicled the numerous election campaign violations taking place inUkraine.  We continue to maintain our strong interest and concern.  Along with Chairman Henry Hyde, I joined him in introducing H.Con.Res. 415, calling on the Government of Ukraine to ensure a democratic, transparent, and fair election process for the presidential campaign.  We make clear the expectation that Ukrainian authorities should – consistent with their own laws and international agreements – ensure an election process that enables all of the candidates to compete on a level playing field.   We urge the Ukrainian Government to guarantee freedom of association and assembly, ensure full transparency of the election process, free access for Ukrainian and international election observers, and unimpeded access by all candidates to the media on a non-discriminatory basis. Unfortunately, the pre-election environment in Ukraine gives great cause for concern.  Ukrainian voters clearly are not receiving balanced and objective information about all the candidates in the race, independent media providing Ukrainians with objective information about the campaign – including channel 5 – is being shut down in the regions, and journalists who don’t follow the infamous secret instructions from the presidential administration, or temnyky, are harassed and even fired.  Ukraine’s state-owned television channels are blatantly anti-Yushchenko.  Given the stakes in these elections, we should not be surprised that the ruling regime has launched an all-out campaign against the free media and against the opposition, the most recent of numerous examples being the highly suspicious poisoning of Victor Yushchenko.  To its credit, the Rada last week overwhelmingly approved a resolution creating a special commission to investigate this alleged assassination attempt.  We will be eager to see if the investigation will get underway.  Four years have passed since the killing of independent journalist Georgi Gongadze, and the case remains unresolved.  As you know, Gongadze was bravely exposing high-level corruption in Ukraine. The Rada has also created an ad-hoc committee to monitor the upcoming election.  Prime Minister Yanukovych, the presidential candidate of the ruling regime, instead of welcoming this move, called the Rada move “disloyal”.  This speaks volumes.   The independence exhibited by the Rada in Ukraine would be unthinkable in Belarus.  There, serious and persistent violations have been committed in most human dimension areas, including freedom of speech, association and assembly, media freedoms, religious liberties, elections and the rule of law.  Thanks to Lukashenka’s iron rule, Belarus has the worst human rights record in Europe today, although Russia under the increasingly authoritarian rule of President Putin appears to be catching up, and, perhaps, even emulating Mr. Lukashenka.  Regrettably, the Belarusian authorities have disregarded the four democratic benchmarks established by the OSCE in 2000 – ending repressions and the climate of fear, permitting a functioning independent media, ensuring transparency of the elections process, and strengthening the functions of parliament. Lukashenka has flaunted shamelessly his 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit declaration commitments for a political dialogue, with OSCE participation which stressed the necessity of removing "all remaining obstacles in Belarus to this dialogue by respecting the principles of the rule of law and the freedom of the media.” Lukashenka has pointedly ignored this commitment and the situation with respect to the rule of law and media freedoms has only continued its steady deterioration.  At the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Bucharest in 2000, I offered language to continue to deny the seating of the illegitimate Lukashenka parliament.  We won.  I continued to fight this battle until 2003, when the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly abandoned this position and seated the Members of the National Assembly.  Since that time, I’ve continued to be an outspoken critic of the dismal human rights record of the Lukashenka regime. Parliamentary elections are scheduled in Belarus for October 17, and they now have an added dimension, with Lukashenka’s September 7 announcement of a referendum that would pave the way to extend his rule beyond 2006, when his ten-year tenure is due to expire, to potentially join the ranks of “presidents for life,” like President Niyazov in Turkmenistan and others in Central Asia.   The fact that, according to the Belarusian electoral code, a referendum cannot contain any questions related to presidential elections will certainly not deter him.  Interestingly, opinion polls suggest that most Belarusians are against extending Lukashenka’s rule, and the threshold for passage of the referendum is high, as at least 50 percent of all eligible voters – and not merely those casting ballots – have to vote “yes” for the referendum to pass.  We will see how they manipulate that one. Nevertheless, to say that the deck is stacked in favor of Lukashenka is an understatement.   The Belarusian Government has almost total control over the electoral process and considerable experience in conducting elections that, to put it mildly, do not meet international democratic standards.  For example, opposition parties have been allocated a mere two percent of seats on the district election commissions, and an appalling 0.2 percent of the 7,000 precinct commissions.  One-third of the candidates proposed by Belarusian opposition parties were reportedly denied registration. Ladies and gentlemen, to their credit, Belarus’ repressed and embattled opposition and NGOs have not yet given up.  We need to continue to support these brave men and women and all those struggling for democracy and human rights in Belarus.  I am the sponsor of the BelarusDemocracy Act, which is waiting for consideration by the full House.  The BDA is intended to promote democracy, human rights and rule of law inBelarus, including assistance for democracy building activities such as support for NGOs, independent media, international exchanges and international broadcasting.  We want to stand firmly on the side of those who long for freedom.  As President Bush noted at Madison Square Garden earlier this month [on September 2], “The story of America is the story of expanding liberty:  an ever-widening circle, constantly growing to reach further and include more. Our nation’s founding commitment is still our deepest commitment:  In our world, and here at home, we will extend the frontiers of freedom.” We are eager to have governments and parliaments in both countries with whom we can join forces to combat the scourges of our day, such as human trafficking, HIV/AIDS which has reportedly infected one percent of Ukraine’s population, or corruption and cooperation on movement towards common security and Euro-Atlantic integration.  We know that hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian and Belarusian women and children have been trafficked mostly to Europe and the Middle East over the course of the last decade.  The problem is especially acute in Ukraine – one of the largest source countries in Europe.  Ukraine is also a major transit country.  Both Ukraine and Belarus have been designated in the most recent State Department report as Tier II countries (there are three tiers), meaning that these governments do not yet fully comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making significant efforts to do so.  As the lead author of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and its reauthorization which became law in 2003, I am pleased that our government, the OSCE and other international organizations and NGOs are devoting resources to combat this modern day slavery, but much more remains to be done. For both Ukraine and Belarus, the best guarantee for their survival as independent countries is the full establishment of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, including, very importantly, democratic elections.  In short, the best guarantee is their implementation of commitments both nations freely undertook when they joined the OSCE.  Standing in solidarity with the courageous pro-democracy in both countries and with the people of Belarusand Ukraine, we must continue to encourage compliance with these commitments. END REMARKS

  • The Romani Minority in Russia

    The Helsinki Commission examined the situation of the Romani minority in Russia, with a focus on hate crimes, police abuse, and discrimination in the aftermath of the terrorist attack in Beslan, during which Russian President Vladimir Putin referred to the potential for many ethnic-confessional conflicts in the Federation. Reports by Roma of racially motivated attacks by law enforcement agents were also points of discussion. Panelists – including Dr. Dimitrina Petrova, Executive Director of the European Roma Rights Center; Alexander Torokhov, Director of Roma Ural; and Leonid Raihman, Consultant for Open Society – provided background information on Russia’s Romani minority, setting their discussion in the current context of the current political, economic and security climate in Russia.

  • Advancing U.S. Interests through the OSCE

    The OSCE has been a pioneer in defining an integrated approach to security, one in which human rights and economic well-being are as key to a nation’s stability as are traditional military forces.  It remains not only the largest trans-Atlantic organization, but the one with the broadest definition of security.  The OSCE has also created the most innovative habits of dialogue and collective action of any multilateral organization in the world.  The focus of the hearing will be how the OSCE can be used most effectively to highlight and advance the interests of the United States.  Among the subjects to be covered will be objectives for the December (2004) meeting of Foreign Ministers in Sofia; recent high-impact security initiatives; expectations for the upcoming Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw; and refining and strengthening the OSCE.

  • Ukraine's Quest for Mature Statehood: Ukraine's Transition to a Stable Democracy

    Thank you for inviting me to participate in this conference on Ukraine 's Transition to a Stable Democracy. Media freedom is an especially important topic with the upcoming presidential elections in Ukraine , in what will be a defining year with respect to Ukraine 's democratic transition. Given the stakes, we should not be surprised by the fact that the powers-that-be have launched an all-out campaign to pressure the media.  Freedom of expression - and its corollary, freedom of the media - is one of the most basic human rights. It is vital to the development of civil society. Numerous OSCE agreements include various commitments on freedom of the media. These are agreements that Ukraine has voluntarily and freely committed to abide by as one of the 55 participating States of the OSCE.  The Helsinki Commission, whose mandate is to monitor and encourage compliance by the OSCE States with their OSCE agreements, has also maintained a strong interest in freedom of media in general and recognizes its importance in democratic development. As many of you know, the Commission has also maintained a strong interest in Ukraine and has, over the last several decades, been steadfast in encouraging Ukraine's independence. We are eager to have as an ally a democratic country where human rights are respected and the rule of law prevails.  We continue to maintain our strong interest and concern, especially with the critically important October 31 presidential elections. I am the original cosponsor of a House resolution, H.Con.Res. 415, introduced by Rep. Henry Hyde, the Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, calling on the Government of Ukraine to ensure a democratic, transparent, and fair election process for the presidential election. (This resolution, which was introduced by Commission Co-Chairman Sen. Campbell, has recently passed the Senate and will soon be taken up by the House.) The resolution outlines measures Ukrainian authorities need to take - consistent with their own laws and international agreements - to ensure an election process that enables all of the candidates to compete on a level playing field. The resolution specifically identifies violations to free media and urges unimpeded access by all parties and candidates to print, radio, television, and Internet media on a non-discriminatory basis.  Unfortunately, the situation with respect to the media in Ukraine in the run-up to the elections is discouraging. The election - apparently because of the clear-cut choice between current Prime Minister Yanukovich, and leader of the Our Ukraine democratic bloc Victor Yuschenko - seems to have frightened those who are now in power. It seems the ruling regime has decided to interfere in media election coverage at an unprecedented scale, presumably with the expectation that the interference will ensure their victory at the polls.  The OSCE recently assessed the media situation in the election campaign. They noted that overall, media pluralism is present in Ukraine - different views are represented and politicians of all ranks are regularly criticized - and in general the legal framework is satisfactory. On the other hand, according to OSCE and many other observers, "the one view dominating the airwaves is that of the government", due to an ownership structure closely connected to, or influenced by the current government. It is also due to the infamous so-called "temniki" or "secret instructions" to media from the presidential administration about what or what not to cover and how to cover it. The institutional framework of frequency allocation and licensing also allows for favoritism in the electronic media.  In short, the electronic media is heavily dominated by government and oligarchs, and the media tilts heavily towards Yanukovich, while casting Yuschenko in a negative light. The media is under attack:  * Since the beginning of this year, Ukrainian authorities have harassed, closed and filed lawsuits against numerous electronic and print media.  * Radio Liberty , an important source of objective information, and other radio stations such as Radio Kontynent have been either partially or totally taken off the air. Months of promises to various U.S. officials that Radio Liberty would be put back on the air have come to naught.  * Print runs have been permanently or temporarily stopped for several newspapers. Just a few days ago, authorities in the Kharkiv region temporarily confiscated 42,000 copies of the newspaper Without Censorship. Other media face politically motivated law suits.  * Volia cable, the leading cable television operator in Ukraine , (which carries the only channel which reports objectively on the democratic opposition - Channel 5) is experiencing severe pressure from the Prosecutor-General's office. Almost all cable companies that carry Channel 5 received a variety of threats and tax inspections, and some reportedly had cables "accidentally" cut.  * Reporters face harassment and censorship daily for their objective reporting.  Ladies and Gentlemen, equal access to media must be provided during the remainder of the presidential campaign and will be key in determining whether or not the presidential elections will be judged as free and fair by the OSCE and the international community. The elections will be a watershed for the future direction of that country. Ukraine has tremendous potential. Ukrainian authorities need to radically improve the election environment, including the media environment, if there is to be hope for these elections to meet OSCE standards.  In just two days, on September 16, we will mark the fourth anniversary of the killing of independent journalist Georgi Gongadze, who was exposing high-level corruption in Ukraine. His murder has been subject to numerous international protests, including statements, intercessions, and queries, by me and other Helsinki Commission members. Ladies and gentlemen, it is a case of a massive cover-up by high-level officials.  This is the fifth time that your conference is being held. The first took place four years ago just two days after Gongadze's disappearance. It was at that first conference that representatives of the Helsinki Commission and State Department first called for the Ukrainian government to investigate his disappearance. Four years later, the case remains unresolved. Ukrainian President Kuchma and a number of high-ranking officials have been implicated in his disappearance and the circumstances leading to his murder. The Ukrainian authorities' handling, or more accurately mishandling of this case, has been characterized by obfuscation and stonewalling, destruction of evidence, and the persecution and even death, in one instance, of those who tried to tell the truth about the case.  Tragically for Ukraine, the handling of this case has made a mockery of the rule of law. Not surprisingly, lack of transparency illustrated by the Gongadze case has fueled the debilitating problem of widespread corruption reaching the highest levels in Ukraine. A credible and transparent investigation of this case by Ukrainian authorities is long overdue and the perpetrators - no matter who they may be - need to be brought to justice. I hope that well before the sixth of your conferences, this case is resolved, as well as the cases of at least 18 other journalists in Ukraine who, according to Western media watchdog organizations, have died because of their work.  These journalists, including Mr. Gongadze, were exposing the massive problem of corruption and crime in Ukraine. One important issue intimately linked with corruption and crime worldwide - a global scourge to which Ukraine is by no means immune - is the trafficking of women and children. Each year, an estimated 600,000 to 800,000 girls, boys, women and men, including tens of thousands of Ukrainians, are bought and sold like chattel across international borders, many of them for brutal exploitation in the commercial sex industry. The plight of these individuals has touched many hearts and has led to a global movement to eradicate this form of modern-day slavery known as trafficking in human beings.  In November 2000, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, which I authored, was enacted with broad, bi-partisan support. The Act provides a framework for combating trafficking through law enforcement, prevention programs, and assistance to those victimized. The Act mandated major changes in U.S. law, including severe penalties of up to life in prison for those who traffic in humans and treatment of the victims - mostly women and children - as victims of crime rather than criminals themselves. This past December, President Bush signed a reauthorization of the Act, which I also wrote, to expand and strengthen the U.S. response to this scourge.  Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian women and children have been trafficked mostly to Europe and the Middle East over the course of the last decade, making it one of the largest source countries in Europe . It is also a major transit country. Ukraine has been designated in the most recent State Department report as a Tier II country (there are three tiers), meaning that the Ukrainian Government does not yet fully comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making significant efforts to do so. I am pleased that our government, the OSCE and other international organizations and NGOs are devoting resources to combat this modern day slavery, but much more remains to be done. I encourage the Ukrainian Government to make further progress, and implement its Comprehensive Program to Combat Trafficking in Persons, better coordinate with law enforcement officials of destination countries, and fight government corruption.  By conducting free and fair elections, respecting media freedoms, including resolving the Gongadze case, and effectively tackling the scourge of trafficking, the Ukrainian authorities will go a long way in restoring the trust of the citizens of Ukraine and strengthening Ukraine's independence, democracy, sending a powerful signal of its readiness to join the Euro-Atlantic community of nations. I stand in solidarity with the Ukrainian people as they strive to achieve these important goals.

  • Background: OSCE Election Observation

    The United States has provided important leadership within the 55-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in advancing democracy and human rights. In 1990, the U.S. and all OSCE participating States agreed by consensus to the Copenhagen Document, reaffirming principles to strengthen respect for fundamental freedoms, and inviting observers from other participating States to observe national elections. That same year, a U.S.-sponsored initiative led to the creation of the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODllR) as the OSCE's focal point for all election-related matters, including election observation, technical assistance, and the review of electoral legislation. Thus OSCE commitments require participating States, including the United States, to invite other participating States to observe their elections. Consistent with this commitment, the U.S. formally invited ODllR to send observers to elections in 1996, 1998 2000 and 2002. In 2002, ODllR deployed a team of 10 international observers to Florida and produced a largely positive report saying "measures adopted in Florida can serve as an example of good practice to the rest of the U.S. and other OSCE participating States." In 2003 ,two ODIHR observers came to observe the California gubernatorial recall election. Each year, the ODllR deploys thousands of observers to monitor elections throughout the OSCE region in order to assess participating States ' compliance with OSCE election-related commitments. At the parliamentary level, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has developed a particularly active program for monitoring elections. The United States has fielded thousands of American election observers in OSCE countries since the early 1990s as part of these missions. ODllR missions are funded from the core budget of the OSCE to which the U.S. contributes 9% annually. These funds cover expenses for ODllR experts and basic support of the mission and are not used to finance the participation of individual observers. Thus, election observation has become an integral part of U.S. efforts to advance democracy throughout the OSCE region. Consistent with its OSCE commitments and in keeping with customary practice, the United States Government - through the U. S. Mission to the OSCE in Vienna - extended an invitation for the ODllR to observe the U.S. elections in November. An ODllR assessment team was in Washington September 7- 10 and visited the Federal Election Commission, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission the Republican and Democratic National Committees, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute and relevant non-governmental organizations. An assessment report will be prepared with recommendations concerning whether or not to observe, if so where, and how many observers following their return to Warsaw, Poland. While most ODIHR election observation missions have been deployed to the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, elections in established democracies have also been observed. The latter have included France (2002 presidential), the United Kingdom (2003 devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), and Spain (2004 parliamentary). In an unprecedented development, ODllR was invited to observe the 2004 elections to European Parliament in 25 OSCE participating States: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France Germany, Greece Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania Luxembourg, Malta The Netherlands Poland, Portgal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The only OSCE participating State to outright refuse to invite an election observation mission was Yugoslavia in 2000 under then-President Slobodan Milosevic. Prepared by the staff of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

  • Helsinki Commission Leadership Engages Heads of Nine CIS Countries

    By Elizabeth B. Pryor CSCE Senior Advisor On July 21, 2004, the bipartisan leadership of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) responded to a Declaration signed by nine members of the group known as the Commonwealth of Independent States. The text was presented to the OSCE Permanent Council earlier this month by Russia ’s Ambassador to the OSCE, Alexey N. Borodavkin. The presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan signed the declaration. CIS members Azerbaijan and Georgia declined to sign. Turkmenistan did not participate. While acknowledging that the OSCE occupies “a key place in the European security architecture,” the Declaration maintains that the organization has been unable to adapt to the changing political and security environment. The Helsinki Commission leadership – Chairman Representative Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Co-Chairman Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), House Ranking Member Representative Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) and Senate Ranking Member Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) – responded to each of the nine presidents who signed the Declaration. The Commissioners noted that three of those signing the Declaration, President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan, and President Karimov of Uzbekistan actually signed the original Helsinki Final Act document when their countries were accepted as OSCE participating States in 1992. In the letter to President Nazarbaev, the Commission leaders stressed that they “were particularly troubled to see Kazakhstan included on the signatories to the declaration, since you have expressed an interest in undertaking the chairmanship of the organization [OSCE] in 2009.” In their replies, Commissioners agreed about the importance of the Vienna-based OSCE and that its ability to adapt was essential to its continued relevance. They pointed out, however, that many of the assertions of the Declaration were already being addressed by the participating States. The CIS signatories had criticized the OSCE for “failing to implement in an appropriate manner” the fundamental documents of the organization, stating that the OSCE is not observing an allegedly agreed Helsinki principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Refuting the assertion that the OSCE was failing to implement its principles, the Commission leaders pointed out that the participating States, not the organization, are responsible for such implementation: “We should look to capitals when failures in implementation arise, not Vienna .” On the matter of “internal affairs,” the leadership reminded the presidents that this issue was definitively decided in the politically-binding concluding document to the 1991 Moscow Human Dimension meeting, which states: “They [the participating States] categorically and irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension ... are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.” Turning to the assertion that there is a serious imbalance between the three security dimensions of the OSCE – political-military, economic and environmental, and the human dimension – the Commissioners noted that since the issue of “imbalance” in OSCE priorities was raised several years ago, there has been significant movement in anti-terrorism and tangible military security issues. For example, path-breaking agreements on export controls for MANPADs, on assistance for reduction of excess ammunition, and on uniform standards for travel documents have been achieved in the last few months. The economic dimension is also being revitalized. For example, the OSCE has the most concrete and robust action plan to fight human trafficking of any international organization. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has called for a ministerial-level meeting to discuss ways of halting terrorist financing and has spoken out for increased membership in the World Trade Organization. Though welcoming the development of all of the OSCE dimensions, the Commissioners took issue with the idea that this should come at the expense of the promotion of human rights. The CIS signatories expressed concern that human dimension activities are concentrated in the states of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia , and that unfair standards regarding elections are directed at these nations. They went on to accuse OSCE missions of focusing on human rights and democratic development at the expense of the “full range of work covered by the Organization.” In response to the assertion that undue concentration was focused on human rights in the countries of the CIS and former Yugoslavia , the Commission leaders noted that on 85 occasions since January 2003 the Helsinki Commission had addressed, often publicly, human rights concerns in NATO countries. Public criticism of actions by the United States , as in the recent criminal treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison, has also been made in OSCE meetings and has been taken seriously. The United States has made clear that free and fair elections are crucial to the ongoing process of democratic development and welcomes election monitors to its own national elections in November 2004. The letters also addressed the continued need to locate missions or other OSCE representatives in the former Soviet and Yugoslav countries. In the case of every signatory to the CIS Declaration, there are persistent human rights violations and backward trends on democratic development. Specific concerns were cited for each country, including fraudulent conduct of elections, hindrance of free media, curtailment of religious freedom and freedom of assembly, corruption among public officials and, in several of the countries, detention of political opposition leaders. These abuses have been documented in the Commission report Democracy and Human Rights Trends in Eurasia and East Europe. It is with the goal of reversing these trends that all OSCE states have agreed to the establishment and retention of these missions. The poor implementation record on OSCE commitments argues for the continued necessity of these field offices, the Commissioners concluded. Finally, the leaders of the Commission expressed the hope that the discussion of OSCE’s development would move beyond the Declaration’s inaccurate reinterpretations of key OSCE documents and center on concrete suggestions. They welcomed any positive proposals that the presidents might offer. In this, as in all their work, the Helsinki Commission expressed confidence that by working together, the States of the OSCE region could reach their goal of true security and cooperation in Europe. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

  • OSCE Election Commitments Reaffirmed

    By Chadwick R. Gore CSCE Staff Advisor Representatives of the OSCE participating States and a variety of non-governmental organizations met in Vienna, Austria, July 15 and 16 for a Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Election Standards and Commitments.  The first of a multi-part process, the meeting was organized by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in keeping with the December 2003 Maastricht Ministerial Council Decision on elections. That decision tasked the ODIHR “to consider ways to improve the effectiveness of its assistance to participating States in following up recommendations made in ODIHR election-observation reports and inform the Permanent Council on progress made in fulfilling th[e] task.” The decision also tasked “the Permanent Council, drawing on expertise from the ODIHR, to consider the need for additional commitments on elections, supplementing existing ones, and report to the next Ministerial Council.” The next Ministerial Council is scheduled for Sofia, Bulgaria, December 6 and 7, 2004. However, several days prior to the Vienna meeting, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE Permanent Council, Ambassador Alexey N. Borodavkin, delivered an intervention to the Permanent Council presenting a Declaration by some member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) “regarding the state of affairs within the OSCE.”  The intervention presented a wide range of sharp criticisms of the OSCE, not the least of which was a supposed inability to “adapt itself to the demands of a changing world and ensure an effective solution of the problems of security and co-operation in the Euro-Atlantic area.” The Declaration went on to accuse the organization of interfering in internal affairs and failing to respect the sovereignty of States. The OSCE was also accused of applying double standards and failing to take into account the realities and specific features of individual countries. Then Borodavkin laid what many believed to be the groundwork for the approach of countries associated with the Declaration to the SHDM: These attitudes manifest themselves particularly in the work of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which mainly deals with monitoring and assessment of election results in participating States. This work of the ODIHR is frequently politicized and does not take into account the specific features of individual countries. For that reason, we believe it necessary to draw up standard objective criteria for assessments by the ODIHR and OSCE missions of election processes throughout the OSCE area. Thus, as the attendees approached Vienna, many were expecting a classic stand-off between a group of former Soviet states, led by the Russian Federation, and at least the United States, if not many members of the European Union, over the role of election observation and the various commitments, especially provisions of the Copenhagen Document. Hints of Russian dissatisfaction with the OSCE’s democracy promotion activity can be traced back to a terse statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on August 1, 2000, the 25th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act.  “Attempts to turn it [OSCE] exclusively into an instrument of ‘democratizing’ individual states will only land the OSCE in an impasse. They are fraught with the danger of a retreat from the Helsinki principles and, in the end, the degradation of the Organization.  Opening remarks at the Vienna meeting were delivered by Ambassador Ivo Petrov, Chairman of the Permanent Council, and Ambassador Christian Strohal, Director of ODIHR. Strohal mentioned that there might be a need for new commitments to address future challenges regarding referenda, new technology and election standards from outside the OSCE. He thought there might be a need for additional commitments to further universal suffrage, increase transparency, enhance accountability of election and political authorities, and to maintain public confidence in the electoral process. Alexander Veshnyakov, Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, gave the initial keynote speech. Those waiting to see if the Russian Federation would continue the line of attack started at the July 8 meeting of the PC were not disappointed. Mr. Veshnyakov quickly pointed out that electoral standards and commitments need to be added to converge “our ideas for the democratic process and help remove possibilities of double standards. The democratic process can be used for anti-democratic means.” He then proceeded to point out that the Copenhagen Document must be fleshed out and rights need to be promoted, agreements since Copenhagen have been diverse and detailed, and despite shortcomings, the OSCE must be given its due for applying these standards. Veshnykov cited the new “vector” in elections toward European-wide documents on standards in draft form in some twenty Central Election Commissions and that the adoption of the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the European Commission for Democracy through Law, also known as the Venice Commission, could be the source for a “Copenhagen II.” Interestingly he lamented the lack of a “binding character” to the existing commitments and felt that making them binding with sanctions for the failure could be useful to help develop common goals. The main complaint expressed was that each state should know precisely what has been agreed in such commitments: the current commitments are too vague, just a set of guidelines as opposed to standards, and thus have led to the development of double standards in both practice and election observation criteria. Jean-Pierre Kingsley, the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, was the second keynote speaker. He addressed several issues of common concern, such as the role of the media, control of money, and public versus private concerns. He contrasted the fundamental tension as between egalitarians and libertarians. Three sessions were structured to address the key areas of ODIHR’s concerns to fulfill their Maastricht tasking: The OSCE/ODIHR 2003 Progress Report “Existing Commitments for Democratic Elections in OSCE Participating States”; implementation of existing OSCE commitments for democratic elections and follow up on OSCE/ODIHR recommendations; and, identification of possible areas for supplementing the existing OSCE commitments and potential need for additional commitments. Moderators of the sessions were Steven Wagenseil, First Deputy Director of the ODIHR and Patrick Merloe, Senior Associate and Director of Election Programs, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Introducers, who presented the core content of each session in their remarks, were: Mr. Merloe; Professor Christoph Grabenwarter, Substitute Member of the Council on Democratic Elections, Council of Europe; Pentii Väänänen, Deputy Secretary General, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly; Mr. Kingsley; Jessie Pilgrim, Legal Expert; and, Jeno Szep, Advisor, Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials. The general thrust of each session was remarkably similar. It quickly became clear that there was a near consensus that while clarification of the details of a few of the existing commitments might be desirable, if not outright necessary, reopening the Copenhagen election commitments to debate was not necessary or desirable. Many delegations restated in various ways that those commitments, and those from all the other OSCE documents that have addressed elections, have created a body of obligations and guidance so fundamental and expansive that there is little new that can or ought to be added. Most interesting was the statement of the European Union that expressed the general opinion:  “If we really need to consider if new commitments are necessary, if so, where?” The European Commission addressed the issue, “We don’t need a Copenhagen II, but maybe a Copenhagen Plus.” However, a few speakers did mention specific areas of concern, and former Soviet states that are signatories to the aforementioned Declaration made comments of note. Mr. Merloe saw the possibility to enrich, reinforce and amplify the existing commitments might be forthcoming, possibly at Sofia. He reminded the meeting that those areas critical to all elections are: establishing public confidence in the electorate; establishing universal equal suffrage; transparency at all stages; and, accountability of all authorities. The opening statement from the U.S. Delegation reiterated these points, emphasizing that elections cannot be assessed solely by examining the technical aspects of voting, and transparency and accountability are absolutely essential components of democratic elections. Regarding the ODIHR election monitoring teams, the United States took the opportunity to underscore that: [T]he U.S. does not see ODIHR’s election monitoring efforts as “politicized,” but rather as objective and based upon standards set out in the OSCE commitments stipulated in the 1990 Copenhagen Document and the 1991 Moscow Document and reaffirmed in the Charter for European Security adopted at the Istanbul Summit.  Furthermore, the U.S. emphasized that ODIHR monitoring teams should not be seen as “interference in [a country’s] internal affairs,” but rather as an international resource, like the Election Assistance Commission that works domestically in the United States, which is available to countries that seek to improve public confidence in elections and uphold their OSCE commitments. NGOs from the Russian Federation, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine (note: all States that signed the CIS Declaration) uniformly complained that their governments fail to fulfill the existing OSCE commitments.  So why, they asked, would the OSCE need new commitments when governments fail to meet the existing ones? By contrast, the government representatives of Belarus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Armenia (all signatories of the CIS Declaration) complained that the Copenhagen commitments were more like guidelines than standards.  Some said that the commitments should be obligatory instead of voluntary. Mr. Väänänen pointed out that often when returning to a country a few years after observing elections and providing recommendations for electoral improvements the same problems remain. The attitude of the state leadership and the nature of the problems found are the crux of the problem (numerous comments regarding the need for political will in follow up to observation missions’ recommendations were made throughout the meeting). Mr. Pilgrim discussed six issues of concern that need to be addressed. Public confidence is critical to the legitimacy of all elections. Electronic voting, which is becoming the norm, must produce a verifiable paper trail. Referenda or recounts must not be used to end or change a term of office as this practice is in direct conflict with the Copenhagen commitments. Observation is necessary to guarantee other criteria. Transparency includes public knowledge about the role of money, i.e. public disclosure of all funding and expenditures is necessary for public confidence. The protection of electoral rights – registration, party regulation, media access, etc. – while assumed, must be actively pursued. An extensive discussion regarding electronic voting was held. The distinction between voting on an electronic device, such as a touch-screen device, versus E-voting over the Internet was made by Dr. Szep. The need for the electronic device to produce an auditable paper trail seemed universally accepted as a basic standard for use of such systems. However, the German Delegation described the degree of public skepticism and lack of confidence in electronic devices, and “that is why we’re going to stay on paper.” The primary problem with E-voting seems to be the lack of public trust, but there is hope that in time, with the improvement of technology and security software, this will change. During the closing session, DeForest B. Soaries, Jr., Chairman of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, expressed the general consensus of the meeting in the U.S. Delegation’s closing statement.  Reiterating that the United States remains as committed as ever to the OSCE commitments laid out in the 1990 Copenhagen Document and in subsequent OSCE documents, he made clear the openness of the United States to ideas on how the OSCE election commitments, and especially their implementation, can be improved. However, he said, there is no need to re-open the Copenhagen commitments as they provide the guidelines and benchmarks necessary to achieve democratic, free, and fair elections. Mr. Soaries pointed out that the OSCE does not yet have specific commitments related to the participation of internally displaced persons in electoral processes or concerning accountable, balanced, and impartial election administration, and a more systematic mechanism that might be considered for follow up to election observation missions’ recommendations. Interestingly, the comments from the representatives of countries associated with the Declaration were quite benign and agreeable at the end of the session, emphasizing the forward-looking nature of the meeting. Ambassador Strohal described the further steps in the process, noting that the ODIHR would be forthcoming with recommendations to the Permanent Council on any changes to the election standards and commitments in preparation for the Ministerial Meeting in Sofia in December.  The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

  • Urging the Government of Ukraine to Ensure a Democratic, Transparent, and Fair Election Process for the Presidential Election on October 31, 2004

    Mr. President, I rise to urge passage of S. Con. Res. 106, a bipartisan resolution calling upon the Government of Ukraine to ensure a democratic, transparent and fair election process for the presidential elections scheduled to be held in late October. This resolution, by encouraging fair, open and transparent elections, is a concrete expression of the commitment of the U.S. Congress to the Ukrainian people. The resolution underscores that an election process and the establishment of a genuinely democratic political system consistent with Ukraine's freely undertaken OSCE commitments is a prerequisite for Ukraine's full integration into the Western community of nations as an equal member, including into NATO. The October elections will be vital in determining Ukraine's course for years to come. They present the Ukrainian authorities with a real opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to OSCE principles and values. As Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I would point out that Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma recently cosigned a Declaration with Russia and leaders of several other independent former Soviet states criticizing the OSCE for focusing too much attention on human rights and democratization. While disappointing, this diatribe is not surprising given the fact that under President Kuchma's leadership, Ukraine's record in such as media freedoms, elections, the rule of law and corruption has moved in the wrong direction. It is up to the OSCE states, including Ukraine, to implement their freely undertaken OSCE commitments and to take corrective measures if necessary--something I hope the Ukrainian authorities will be mindful of in the run-up to the elections. Ukraine's pre-election environment has already been decidedly problematic and of great concern to the United States and the international community. The pending resolution, S. Con. Res. 106, focuses squarely on key problem areas, including increasing control and manipulation of the media and attempts by national authorities to limit access to international broadcasting, including Radio Liberty. Among other concerns are the serious obstacles to free assembly and a free and fair political campaign as well as substantial irregularities in several recent elections, most notably, the mayoral election held in April in the western Ukrainian city of Mukacheve. This election was marred by intimidation, violence, fraud and manipulation of the vote count, electoral disruptions and irregularities. According to the most recent report of the nonpartisan Ukrainian nongovernmental Committee of Voters of Ukraine: There was no improvement in the political environment in June compared to April and May. Instead, CVU observed an increase in the number of cases of government pressure on the opposition designed to impede their activities. Potential candidates did not enjoy equal access to the media. The level of criminal interference in the pre-election process remains very high, thus threatening free elections. GPO's PDF S. Con Res. 106 outlines those measures the Ukrainian authorities need to take--consistent with their own laws and international agreements--for a free, fair, open and transparent election process. The Ukrainian authorities at all levels, including the executive, legislative and judicial branches, need to ensure an election process that enables all of the candidates to compete on a level playing field. This includes the various ministries and agencies involved directly or indirectly in the elections process, as well as Ukraine's courts. Ukraine's October presidential elections should be a watershed for the future direction of that country of great potential. Ukrainian authorities need to radically improve the election environment if there is to be hope for these elections to meet OSCE standards. By doing so, they will go a long way in restoring the trust of the citizens of Ukraine and strengthening Ukraine's independence and democracy. Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the resolution be printed in the Record. S. Con. Res. 106 Whereas the establishment of a democratic, transparent, and fair election process for the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine and of a genuinely democratic political system are prerequisites for that country's full integration into the Western community of nations as an equal member, including into organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Whereas the Government of Ukraine has accepted numerous specific commitments governing the conduct of elections as a participating State of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including provisions of the Copenhagen Document; Whereas the election on October 31, 2004, of Ukraine's next president will provide an unambiguous test of the extent of the Ukrainian authorities' commitment to implement these standards and build a democratic society based on free elections and the rule of law; Whereas this election takes place against the backdrop of previous elections that did not fully meet international standards and of disturbing trends in the current pre-election environment; Whereas it is the duty of government and public authorities at all levels to act in a manner consistent with all laws and regulations governing election procedures and to ensure free and fair elections throughout the entire country, including preventing activities aimed at undermining the free exercise of political rights; Whereas a genuinely free and fair election requires a period of political campaigning conducted in an environment in which neither administrative action nor violence, intimidation, or detention hinder the parties, political associations, and the candidates from presenting their views and qualifications to the citizenry, including organizing supporters, conducting public meetings and events throughout the country, and enjoying unimpeded access to television, radio, print, and Internet media on a non-discriminatory basis; Whereas a genuinely free and fair election requires that citizens be guaranteed the right and effective opportunity to exercise their civil and political rights, including the right to vote and the right to seek and acquire information upon which to make an informed vote, free from intimidation, undue influence, attempts at vote buying, threats of political retribution, or other forms of coercion by national or local authorities or others; Whereas a genuinely free and fair election requires government and public authorities to ensure that candidates and political parties enjoy equal treatment before the law and that government resources are not employed to the advantage of individual candidates or political parties; Whereas a genuinely free and fair election requires the full transparency of laws and regulations governing elections, multiparty representation on election commissions, and unobstructed access by candidates, political parties, and domestic and international observers to all election procedures, including voting and vote-counting in all areas of the country; Whereas increasing control and manipulation of the media by national and local officials and others acting at their behest raise grave concerns regarding the commitment of the Ukrainian authorities to free and fair elections; Whereas efforts by the national authorities to limit access to international broadcasting, including Radio Liberty and the Voice of America, represent an unacceptable infringement on the right of the Ukrainian people to independent information; Whereas efforts by national and local officials and others acting at their behest to impose obstacles to free assembly, free speech, and a free and fair political campaign have taken place in Donetsk, Sumy, and elsewhere in Ukraine without condemnation or remedial action by the Ukrainian Government; Whereas numerous substantial irregularities have taken place in recent Ukrainian parliamentary by-elections in the Donetsk region and in mayoral elections in Mukacheve, Romny, and Krasniy Luch; and Whereas the intimidation and violence during the April 18, 2004, mayoral election in Mukacheve, Ukraine, represent a deliberate attack on the democratic process: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That Congress— (1) acknowledges and welcomes the strong relationship formed between the United States and Ukraine since the restoration of Ukraine's independence in 1991; (2) recognizes that a precondition for the full integration of Ukraine into the Western community of nations, including as an equal member in institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is its establishment of a genuinely democratic political system; (3) expresses its strong and continuing support for the efforts of the Ukrainian people to establish a full democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights in Ukraine; (4) urges the Government of Ukraine to guarantee freedom of association and assembly, including the right of candidates, members of political parties, and others to freely assemble, to organize and conduct public events, and to exercise these and other rights free from intimidation or harassment by local or national officials or others acting at their behest; (5) urges the Government of Ukraine to meet its Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) commitments on democratic elections and to address issues previously identified by the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE in its final reports on the 2002 parliamentary elections and the 1999 presidential elections, such as illegal interference by public authorities in the campaign and a high degree of bias in the media; (6) urges the Ukrainian authorities to ensure—   (A) the full transparency of election procedures before, during, and after the 2004 presidential elections; (B) free access for Ukrainian and international election observers; (C) multiparty representation on all election commissions; (D) unimpeded access by all parties and candidates to print, radio, television, and Internet media on a non-discriminatory basis; (E) freedom of candidates, members of opposition parties, and independent media organizations from intimidation or harassment by government officials at all levels via selective tax audits and other regulatory procedures, and in the case of media, license revocations and libel suits, among other measures; (F) a transparent process for complaint and appeals through electoral commissions and within the court system that provides timely and effective remedies; and (G) vigorous prosecution of any individual or organization responsible for violations of election laws or regulations, including the application of appropriate administrative or criminal penalties; (7) further calls upon the Government of Ukraine to guarantee election monitors from the ODIHR, other participating States of the OSCE, Ukrainian political parties, candidates' representatives, nongovernmental organizations, and other private institutions and organizations, both foreign and domestic, unobstructed access to all aspects of the election process, including unimpeded access to public campaign events, candidates, news media, voting, and post-election tabulation of results and processing of election challenges and complaints; and (8) pledges its enduring support and assistance to the Ukrainian people's establishment of a fully free and open democratic system, their creation of a prosperous free market economy, their establishment of a secure independence and freedom from coercion, and their country's assumption of its rightful place as a full and equal member of the Western community of democracies.

  • Urging the Government of Belarus to Ensure Democratic, Transparent, and Fair Election Process

    Mr. Speaker, I am a co-sponsor of H. Con. Res. 652 which urges the Government of Belarus to ensure a democratic, transparent, and fair election process for its parliamentary elections in October 2004. As the sponsor of the Belarus Democracy Act (H.R. 854), which has also been reported out by the International Relations Committee, it is important that the House call specific attention to these upcoming fall elections. Mr. Bereuter, in his capacity as Chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Europe, has lent his support of the Belarus Democracy Act as well.   Belarus' poor track record with recent elections--which were judged as not meeting international democratic standards by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe--and more broadly with the situation with respect to human rights and democracy in Belarus, underscore the need for this resolution. Belarus, under autocratic ruler Alexander Lukashenka, has the worst human rights record in Europe today. Repressions against members of the democratic opposition, non-governmental organizations, the independent media and independent trade unions have become commonplace. Independent thought and action are anathema to Lukashenka, who over the last 10 years has consolidated his power to an alarming extent.   Mr. Speaker, I hope that the Belarusian authorities will take this resolution seriously, as it provides them with a blueprint on what they need to do to have their elections conform with OSCE standards. Unfortunately, four benchmarks for free and fair elections established by the OSCE 4 years ago still not been met. Thus far, the pre-election environment has not been encouraging. Last month, three opposition parliamentarians staged an 18-day hunger strike demanding changes in the Election Code, which still includes several undemocratic provisions. The reform bill was overwhelmingly defeated by the Lukashenka-controlled parliament.   Belarusians still have no opportunity to receive independent viewpoints through broadcast media. Opposition access to the state media is virtually non-existent; rather the political opposition is often vilified. Just yesterday Lukashenka, talking about his hopes for a pro-government majority in the October elections, said: "I strongly hope that the people will make the right choice," and added that "the people will take a close look at traitors, black sheep ..... wolves in sheep's clothing, and we will help them if they don't." This is not a good harbinger for the elections--and the election campaign has not even begun!   Mr. Speaker, it is vital that we convey to the Belarusian authorities our call for a free, fair, open and transparent parliamentary election process consistent with Belarus' freely undertaken OSCE commitments. The long-suffering Belarusian people deserve no less.

  • Advancing Democracy in Albania

    Albania is expected to hold new parliamentary elections, and further reform is viewed as key to their success.  The country has faced tremendous challenges in its democratic development since emerging from harsh communist rule and self-imposed isolation in the early 1990s. Despite highly polarized politics and splits within the Socialist camp in particular, there has been renewed progress.  Albania, nevertheless, continues to face the difficult task, common to the region, of tackling organized crime and official corruption. The Albanian Government is making efforts, for example, to combat trafficking in persons, though it remains a source and a transit country for women and children who are sexually exploited or used as forced labor elsewhere in Europe.  Meanwhile, Albania has maintained strong bilateral ties with the United States and cooperated with the international response to past regional conflicts. The country is a strong supporter of the war on terrorism and works within the framework of the Adriatic Charter, a U.S. initiative that includes Macedonia and Croatia, in laying the groundwork for further European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

  • Commission Hearing Surveys Human Rights in Putin's Russia

    By John Finerty Staff Advisor The United States Helsinki Commission held a hearing on May 20, 2004 to review governance practices and human rights in the Russian Federation under President Vladimir Putin.  Witnesses focused on media independence, religious freedom, judicial procedures, xenophobia and anti-Semitism, and the war in Chechnya. Opening the hearing, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) expressed apprehension that President Putin was leading Russia in an authoritarian direction, increasingly reliant on Russia’s security apparatus and intelligence agencies to govern the country.  Commission Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) also voiced his concerns, focusing on corruption in the Russian Government and abuses in the war in Chechnya. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Steven Pifer stated that Russians enjoy freedom of travel and emigration, and an independent print media that engages in robust political debates; religious association and expression is generally free, and Russians have incorporated voting into their political practices. However, Pifer voiced concern with the Putin administration’s undue influence on judicial proceedings, state control or sway over the broadcast media, the pressuring of non-governmental organizations, anti-Semitism, abuses in the war in Chechnya, and the lack of a level electoral playing field for the political opposition. Ambassador Pifer cited the U.S. record of advocating democratization and human rights to the Russian leadership, while pursuing cooperation on mutual security interests such as the war on terrorism, arms control, counter-proliferation, and the resolution of regional conflicts. Gary Kasparov, former world chess champion and chairman of Committee 2008: Free Choice, presented a critical view of the Putin administration, lamenting the slide of the Russian Government into authoritarianism.  He described a variety of policies undertaken by the Putin administration that he viewed as backtracking from the democratic progress of the 1990s, including the curtailment of civil liberties and the flagrant abuse of human rights. Specifically, Kasparov described government influence over the broadcast media and manipulation of elections. The war in Chechnya had been sidelined as a topic of news discussion, he asserted, thus facilitating the concealment of wartime human rights abuses.  He also faulted the media for disregarding the ineptness of government responses to terrorist attacks. On elections, Kasparov characterized the December 2003 parliamentary polls as unfair, and predicted that President Putin would use parliamentary maneuvers to change the constitution and extend his term, perhaps indefinitely. Mr. Kasparov condemned Russian activities in the Chechen war and described how “hundreds of Chechens, if not thousands, are being interrogated, tortured and killed” by Russian soldiers. He called for the deployment of independent observers to monitor Russian behavior and promote observance of human rights.  As a final critique, Kasparov charged that Putin had stripped the judicial system of its independence and was using it to silence political opponents and critics, such as Mikhail Khordorkovsky and Igor Sutyagin. As for solutions, Kasparov highlighted his efforts to expose the corruption of the December 2003 elections through a lawsuit and public advocacy. He also urged the United States to use diplomatic means to leverage the Russian Government into democratic and civil liberties concessions. Edward Lozansky, president of Russia House and the American University in Moscow, offered a contrasting opinion, pointing to the successes of the Putin administration in taming the “oligarchs” and encouraging economic growth. He viewed state control of the broadcast media as less of a crisis, contending that free alternatives, such as print, electronic, and foreign media, provide the people with a variety of viewpoints. Ultimately, Dr. Lozansky argued, “President Putin enjoys overwhelming support of the Russian people” and that the Russian people “can freely express their opinions.” In closing, Lozansky suggested the United States should not undermine its relationship with Russia through unnecessary criticism, since bilateral cooperation between the nations remains essential in the war on terrorism, space exploration, energy, and the environment.  Engagement and dialogue, rather than condemnation, is paramount, he suggested. Reverend Igor Nikitin, president of the Association of Christian Churches in Russia, offered a mixed assessment of the status of religious liberty in Russia.  In northwest Russia and St. Petersburg particularly, religious tolerance is the norm.  In other regions, however, Protestant churches and other non-Orthodox denominations have experienced discrimination and bureaucratic malfeasance.  For instance, an unconstitutional requirement for churches to register their members – as opposed to merely the institution – is frequently enforced by local authorities, and a Moscow court has ordered the “liquidation” of the city’s community of Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Nikitin urged measures to educate Russian officials on the importance of religious freedom as a civil liberty. Nickolai Butkevich, Research and Advocacy Director of the Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union, discussed the situation regarding xenophobia and the treatment of minorities in Russia. Mr. Butkevich noted that President Putin has made efforts at the national level to combat xenophobia, but that implementation of relevant directives is uneven at the local level. Some regions and cities have combated xenophobia and anti-Semitism, while other authorities have actively encouraged it. Mr. Butkevich described cases in Vladivostok, Voronezh, and other cities where individuals had been subject to abuse and local authorities reacted uncaringly or in collusion with perpetrators. In answer to a question posed by Chairman Smith on the disparity between the Russian Government’s public and international pronouncements that it will combat anti-Semitism and its failed implementation of such policies domestically, Butkevich blamed the disparity on a lack of prioritization by the central government.  Mr. Kasparov contended though that President Putin has done nothing to address anti-Semitism or quell xenophobia. Answering other questions on the attitudes of the United States and the West toward the Chechen situation, governmental corruption, and the judiciary, Dr. Lozansky replied that Russia is stabilizing under the pragmatic policies of President Putin and that the international community must engage the country on matters of mutual interest. The witnesses responded with divergent views as to whether Russia was moving toward autocracy.  While Kasparov made his case strongly that Russia was, Lozansky again insisted that it was not.  Mr. Butkevich suggested that Russia was “backsliding toward authoritarianism,” but that President Putin certainly retains popular support. Reverend Nikitin stressed that the next few years will determine whether Russia evolves toward civil and religious liberty or tsarist, oppressive governance reemerges. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives, and one official from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Intern Colby Daughtry contributed to this article.

  • Georgia's "Rose Revolution"

    First, a “revolution” was possible in Georgia because during Eduard Shevardnadze’s tenure, opposition leaders, parties and society had developed leeway for action which did not exist elsewhere in the Caucasus, not to speak of Central Asia. Since the late 1980s, many parties and NGOs had emerged, as had relatively free media. Their freedom of maneuver and action, which translated into effective political influence, reflected Shevardnadze’s own relatively liberal attitudes, the weakness of the Georgian state— i.e., its inability to control and co-opt competing center of power and authority—and Georgians’ unruly national character. Moreover, international NGOs were deeply involved in Georgian events. Much press and analytical attention has been focused on the Open Society Institute of the Soros Foundation, which funded critically important groups like Georgia’s Liberty Institute, its leading human rights organization. Some Liberty Institute associates traveled to Serbia to study how Slobodan Milosevic had been ousted. Closely allied with 5 the Liberty Institute was the student movement Kmara [“Enough”], which mobilized opposition to vote fraud countrywide. These groups, urged on by opposition politicians, were determined not to let Shevardnadze and Georgia’s entrenched political groups steal the election. Second, the Georgian state, crippled by corruption, was extremely weak. The worst consequence of this weakness was that criminals and crooked officials did not worry about the possible penalties of breaking the law. But this weakness ultimately made possible November’s Rose Revolution by dissipating the state’s ability to resist better organized players. True, international organizations and foreign capitals were urging a peaceful resolution of the showdown and warning Shevardnadze—whom everyone expected to remain in office until 2005—that resorting to violence would end in disaster. But by November 2003, Shevardnadze could no longer command the state’s coercive apparatus; in the end, nobody was willing to act against crowds peacefully calling, first, for new elections and then for his resignation. Third, Georgia’s key opposition leaders were united. Unlike counterparts in Armenia and Azerbaijan, “Misha” Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze were able to overcome their longstanding differences and competing ambitions to act together. While the latter two may have—as reported—trailed the former in his conviction that Shevardnadze had to go, they overcame their doubts and hung together until the final triumph. Saakashvili, for his part, has continued to collaborate with them after his inauguration and often restates his determination to keep doing so. Fourth, Georgia had Rustavi-2 TV, which powerfully shaped public opinion. In fact, the events in Georgia last November have demonstrated convincingly the power of independent—i.e., not state-controlled—television in former Soviet republics. It was a failed attempt by the state to pressure Rustavi-2 in November 2001 that produced the biggest public protest in Georgia before November 2003. At that time, thousands of demonstrators not only forced Shevardnadze to back down, he was compelled to dismiss his entire government. Not for nothing has the ruling elite in other former Soviet states contrived so consistently to keep TV in its own hands. If there is any downside to the influence Rustavi-2 wielded in Georgia, it is the strengthened conviction of repressive rulers elsewhere to prevent at all costs the emergence of analogous TV stations. Fifth, economic conditions in Georgia had been deteriorating for years, with no respite in sight. Over the last few years, residents of Baku and Yerevan have told Helsinki Commission staff that things were getting better, even if slightly, but in Tbilisi conditions had fallen steadily. A seemingly endless stream of winters without heat or electricity and little or no prospect of improvement sapped support for Shevardnadze. Desperate Georgians had concluded by November 2003 that almost anything was better than what they had, despite the uncertainties. Within Georgia, the Rose Revolution greatly accelerated the country’s scheduled political processes, resolving several fundamental problems and opening the door to new opportunities. In one stroke, a longanticipated political succession that was expected to feature a long winnowing process, tough negotiations and possibly violence among contending groups was eclipsed by a sustained manifestation of popular will. The Rose Revolution has had a major impact on the other countries of the former Soviet Union. First of all, it was an inspiring victory for democracy and even peaceful conflict resolution. While ruling elites have stolen elections throughout the former Soviet space, in Georgia a group of opposition leaders managed to unite and unify behind themselves large enough numbers of voters to thwart an attempted theft of the vote. No less important, they did so peacefully, settling the dispute between state and society without bloodshed. The Georgian events have created an important precedent and elsewhere have inspired frustrated opposition activists who followed Georgian events closely.

  • Report on The 2003 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Armenia

    In February and March 2003, Armenia held its fourth presidential election since independence. According to the official results, President Robert Kocharian won re-election in two rounds, defeating challenger Stepan Demirchian 67.4 percent to 33.5 percent. Despite the official tallies, Kocharian’s re-election was difficult. He failed to win over 50 percent of the vote in the February 19th first round, necessitating a runoff with Demirchian—the first time a sitting president in the Caucasus has been forced to a second round. The opposition organized large anti-Kocharian demonstrations in Yerevan before the first round. Some opposition leaders made threatening statements, warning, for example, of violence if Kocharian tried to rig the vote. Considering the opposition’s inability to rally around one candidate, Armenia’s record of poor elections and Kocharian’s hold on the state apparatus, his failure to win a first round victory was surprising. His agreement to participate in a runoff may have been a concession to widespread opposition sentiment and concern that claims of outright victory in an increasingly tense, polarized atmosphere might have led to major confrontations. Nevertheless, the authorities did not flinch during the second round. In the interim, some 200 opposition supporters were detained for participating in demonstrations. About 80 of them received prison terms, often in closed hearings without benefit of counsel. OSCE observers concluded that both rounds failed to meet international standards. State media displayed egregious favoritism towards the incumbent, on whose behalf state resources were used lavishly. Ballot stuffing, especially during the second round vote count, was rampant. The most positive feature of the elections was an unprecedented, live, televised debate between Kocharian and Demirchian before the second round. The election has cast a cloud on Kocharian’s legitimacy and deeply strained government-opposition relations. Armenia’s failure to hold a fair election has entrenched a pattern of vote fraud and has worrisome implications for the country’s democratization, as illustrated by the judgement of Kocharian’s powerful Defense Minister and campaign manager, Serzh Sarkissian: “People who have grown up and lived in Europe cannot understand our mentality. They have their rules and views on democracy, and we have ours.” Armenia’s Constitutional Court refused to annul Kocharian’s victory, but did cast doubt on his legitimacy by recommending a vote of confidence in the president. It was the first time a constitutional court in the former USSR did not routinely affirm official election results. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was quick to congratulate Kocharian. Washington, however, echoed the OSCE/ODIHR view of the election. President Bush’s letter to Kocharian, sent after significant delay, did not contain the word “congratulations.”  A statement of the U.S. Delegation to the OSCE on May 29 expressed solidarity with the ODIHR assessment of Armenia’s parliamentary election: “The markedly mixed assessment of [the] elections is particularly disappointing considering the great progress Armenia has otherwise made over the past 11 years in building a modern society of which its people and government can be justly proud.” The United States called on Armenia to launch “swift action on the [ODIHR’s] recommendations” for electoral reform as “the best reaffirmation of the commitments that Armenia has made to the basic principles of democracy and fundamental human rights that OSCE represents.”

  • The 2003 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Armenia

    In February and March 2003, Armenia held its fourth presidential election since independence. According to the official results, President Robert Kocharian won re-election in two rounds, defeating challenger Stepan Demirchian 67.4 percent to 33.5 percent. OSCE observers concluded that both rounds failed to meet international standards. State media displayed egregious favoritism towards the incumbent, on whose behalf state resources were used lavishly. Ballot stuffing, especially during the second round vote count, was rampant. The most positive feature of the elections was an unprecedented, live, televised debate between Kocharian and Demirchian before the second round. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was quick to congratulate Kocharian. Washington, however, echoed the OSCE/ODIHR view of the election. President Bush’s letter to Kocharian, sent after significant delay, did not contain the word “congratulations.”  

  • Activists Brief Commission on the War in Chechnya, Civil Society and Military Reform in Russia

    By John Finerty CSCE Staff Advisor The United States Helsinki Commission held a briefing entitled “The War in Chechnya and Russian Civil Society” on June 17, 2004 with representatives of one of the largest and most active nongovernmental organizations in Russia, the Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia. Valentina Melnikova, National Director of CSM, and Natalia Zhukova, Chairwoman of the Nizhny Novgorod Committee of CSM, briefed the Commission on their efforts to publicize and protest human rights abuses in the Russian military and the current state of civil society in Russia. Helsinki Commission Senior Advisor Elizabeth B. Pryor opened the briefing, noting concerns that President Vladimir Putin’s verbal attacks on human rights organizations and their funding sources – delivered on May 26 during his annual State of the Federation address – may indicate future trouble for Russian NGOs perceived as politically hostile to the Kremlin. Ms. Zhukova described the work of her committee and addressed the impact of Putin’s recent comments on the committee’s activities.  The Nizhny Novgorod Committee is one of 300 such bodies under the umbrella of CSM, comprising approximately 30 volunteer workers and handling nearly 2,000 requests for assistance from parents and soldiers annually.  “The problem is that most [people] have simply no idea of what’s going on in their military…because television is censored,” she said. According to Zhukova, the Nizhny Novgorod Committee also provides assistance to approximately 700 deserters annually, precipitated by “beatings, harsh hazing on the part of officers and other soldiers, a criminal environment in the unit, lack of medical assistance, cases of extortion of money, [and] use of soldiers for slave labor.”   In cooperation with the Foundation for Civil Liberties, CSM provides mediation services with authorities and legal assistance to the military deserters and their families. The Committee also works to ensure social protection for veterans of the Chechen wars with disabilities, lobbying and leading demonstrations in support of adequate allowances for wounded soldiers, and the families of those killed in action. Regarding the recent condemnation of Russian NGOs by top military and administration officials, Ms. Zhukova noted, “I can’t say that we experience direct persecution.… But after the onslaught announced by the Minister of Defense and after the State of the Nation address by President Putin, we believe that we have to expect financial pressure.” President Putin’s May 26 address, in which he accused some NGOs of serving “dubious group and commercial interests” rather than those of the Russian people, has been “viewed by the local authorities as an order,” according to Ms. Zhukova.  Since Putin’s speech, she noted, the local governor has revoked the Committee’s discount on their office rent, resulting in a tenfold cost increase.  Moreover, local funding has been depleted because “local businessmen have been so intimidated by the onslaught against us by the Ministry of Defense and by President Putin that we cannot expect anything from them,” she said. Neither does CSM receive substantial financing from abroad, Zhukova maintains, “We serve the interests of millions of Russian soldiers and their parents, defending them from arbitrary rule and lawlessness of the authorities.” Ms. Melnikova addressed the effects of the Putin administration on Russian civil society.  The Russian people, she asserted, have been deprived of both political opposition and independent media since Putin came to power.  She listed “the closed nature of the Chechen war, lack of information, [and] direct deceit of the population by the authorities,” as the negative effects of his administration’s actions.  As a result of Putin’s policies, she said, “The war in Chechnya has ceased to exist as far as the Russian public is concerned.”  Through media controls and a vigorous propaganda campaign, she said, the Russian Government has led the people to believe “that what’s going on in Chechnya is a counterterrorist operation, that we are fighting Arab mercenaries and Al Qaeda units.”  “In reality, the Chechen problem has nothing to do with international terrorism or Islamic fundamentalism…. There is no trace of stabilization in Chechnya, and there are no attempts by the Russian authorities to strive for a peaceful resolution of the problem,” Melnikova stated. Portraying the Russian military as a “decrepit, poorly managed, federally-corrupted structure,” she described the same grim situation as Ms. Zhukova.  In Chechnya, she charged, Russian officers force young men to become military criminals.  If they return from service alive, they are often psychologically or physically disabled, and abandoned by the government that sent them to Chechnya. In answer to a question by Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) regarding the recently enacted Russian legislation on alternative military service, Melnikova called the alternative civil service law “inadequate.” She noted that it requires that soldiers serve terms double the length of ordinary military service, perform tasks that do not serve civil society, and often work hundreds of miles away from home.  The panelists requested that Chairman Smith raise such issues as the fate of a bill regarding civilian control of the armed forces, which has been introduced in the State Duma, and the possibility for a second amnesty for military deserters when he meets with the Speaker of the State Duma at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session in early July. Chairman Smith indicated that U.S. officials have, in past meetings with Russian leaders, raised concerns about violent hazing of military conscripts.  In response, Melnikova provided Smith with recent copies of “The News of the Committee of the Soldiers’ Mothers,” featuring vivid photographs of soldiers that had suffered serious injuries as a result of such hazing.  “Russian officers do not treat their soldiers as human beings,” she said, “therefore, everything goes on as before.” Regarding the international community’s response to the Chechen conflict, Melnikova claimed: “There is not enough pressure exerted on Mr. Putin. … Ten years of war have infuriated both the Russian military and the Chechens to such an extent that we don’t see any possibility of peaceful resolution....  But I think Russia’s partners simply have to exert pressure on Putin to make him make at least some tentative steps toward peace, maybe offer some intermediate negotiations, maybe seek some mediation efforts on the part of governments or nongovernmental organizations.  At least something has to be done.” Ms. Melnikova further criticized “the active connivance of the leaders of Western countries, including the United States” as one of the key reasons for the continued restriction of human rights in Russia.  She voiced concern that Washington leaders now believe “that the Russian people don’t need democracy…. That the West supports the anti-democratic policies of the Russian authorities is simply absurd,” she said. She concluded by stating that the CSM “advocates and conducts a social campaign for military reform, for abolition of conscription and for the [establishment] of a professional armed force,” as well as for peace in Chechnya and the expansion of civilian control over the military.  The CSM provides direct aid to more than 50,000 soldiers and their families annually. Finally, Melnikova argued that the “legal slavery, chaos, and corruption at all levels of the Russian military compromises not only Russian civil society but also the strategic objectives of Russia’s allies, including nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Absent democracy,” she said, “there can be no safe Russia.” Asked about recent attacks on nongovernmental organizations by Putin administration officials, Melnikova mentioned that Putin’s criticisms were preceded by comments by the Minister of Defense and Deputy Minister of Justice to the effect that NGOs were pursuing subversive or illegal activities.  Although she hopes that NGOs will not be targeted by the national authorities, she said that the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky has tempered her optimism. Responding to questions about funding from Russian oligarchs, Melnikova stated, “Oligarchs dread to touch us [because] there is always a chance that the authorities can charge any businessman with any crime and throw him in prison, and they know it.” The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords.  The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Intern Christen Broecker contributed to this article.

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