Kleptocrats of the Kremlin: Ties Between Business and Power in RussiaThursday, July 20, 2017
On July 20, 2017, the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe held a staff-led briefing on Russian kleptocracy. Panelists included Brian Whitmore, Author of the Power Vertical Blog and Senior Russia Analyst at Radio Free Europe; Ilya Zaslavskiy, Research Expert at the Free Russia Foundation and Academy Associate with Chatham House; Dr. Anders Aslund, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and Professor at Georgetown University; Marius Laurinavicius, Senior Analyst at the Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis and a former Fellow with the Hudson Institute; and Ambassador Daniel Fried, Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council and former Coordinator on Sanctions Policy at the US Department of State. The discussion, which was covered by C-SPAN 1, was moderated by Paul Massaro, Helsinki Commission Policy Advisor on Economic and Environmental Issues. Whitmore provided an insightful overview, explaining how kleptocracy ensures the control of loyal elites while simultaneously providing the Kremlin with a tool of statecraft internationally. In a compelling argument, he compared corruption with communism, as the Kremlin's use of kleptocracy is reminiscent of the use of communism as a tool for international influence during Soviet times. Zaslavskiy spoke about how the current regime took the worst but most practical lessons from the Communist party, the KGB, and organized crime, and amalgamated these practices into the corrupt system that exists today. Therefore, he rejected the term “oligarch,” deeming it irrelevant. This notion would assume that businesses act independently, when in reality, their operations depend on the Kremlin's approval. Dr. Aslund, in agreement with Zaslavskiy, concluded that oligarchy is over, as it has been assimilated by the state. He broke down the Kremlin's system of kleptocracy into four different aspects: firstly, the state institutions, the security agencies, and the judiciary; secondly, the state corporations; thirdly, President Putin's circle of loyal cronies who benefit from asset stripping and procurement contracts from the state; and lastly, the West. Western complicity is an essential aspect of Russian kleptocracy, as cronies take advantage of rule of law in the West to secure assets from the East. Dr. Aslund called for tougher measures to ensure transparency and beneficial ownership. Laurinavicius then joined in to provide a Baltic perspective, arguing that lessons can be learned from the three Baltic States, the front line in the fight against Russian kleptocracy. Laurinavicius argued that Putin's regime uses kleptocratic cronies to achieve goals that the state cannot achieve itself. He emphasized how the Baltic region has been a target of these kleptocratic tactics as early as 1991 in the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Lastly, Ambassador Fried expanded on tools to combat kleptocracy. He cited journalistic exposure and governmental pressure as two critical aspects of a comprehensive strategy. Naming the Global Magnitsky Act as a legislative vehicle that allows lawmakers to go after Russian human rights abusers, Ambassador Fried called for additional legislation to target individuals complicit in Kremlin's system of kleptocracy. Ambassador Fried ended the panelists' testimonies on a hopeful note: "I do not believe that Russia is doomed to live forever its worst history. I don’t accept the notion of a civilizational divide. In Russian history, Russia does, when it fails at external aggression, turn to internal reform, and has sometimes been successful. And the period of Russian history we think of as the most successful, the period that gave us world-class literature and art and music, and a rapidly developing economy, and the beginning of a more modern economic system, came as a result of its – the failure of its aggression and failure in various wars – Crimean War, Russo-Japanese War. I mention this because it is important to remember what it is we are trying to achieve. We are not trying to achieve a weakening of Russia. We are trying to achieve a defeat of Putinist Russia, the better to have a better relationship with that better Russia."
One Year Later: Seeking Justice for Pavel SheremetThursday, July 20, 2017
When investigative journalist Pavel Sheremet died in a car explosion in central Kyiv on July 20, 2016, his assassination garnered global media attention. Upon learning the tragic news, then-OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mijatović condemned the murder, saying, “This killing and its circumstances must be swiftly and thoroughly investigated, and the perpetrators brought to justice.” However, one year later, virtually no progress has been made on his case. Furthermore, the escalating harassment and attacks against journalists in Ukraine, coupled with a culture of impunity for perpetrators, is worrisome for Ukraine’s democratic future. To ensure they meet the aspirations of the Ukrainian people, authorities in Kiev must reaffirm their commitment to freedom of the press by ensuring the perpetrators of Sheremet’s murder—and similar cases of killing, assault, and harassment—are brought to justice. Download the full report to learn more. Contributors: Jordan Warlick, Office Director, and Amelie Rausing, Intern
Democracy in Central & Eastern Europe Focus of Upcoming Helsinki Commission BriefingTuesday, July 18, 2017
WASHINGTON—The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission, today announced the following briefing: DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: RENEWING THE PROMISE OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS Wednesday, July 26, 2017 2:00 PM to 4:00 PM Capitol Visitors Center Room SVC-215 Live Webcast: www.facebook.com/HelsinkiCommission In 1990, at a moment of historic transition, the countries of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe adopted a watershed agreement recognizing the relationship between political pluralism and market economies. To advance both, they committed to fundamental principles regarding democracy, free elections, and the rule of law. In recent years, however, concerns have emerged about the health of the democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in the face of ongoing governance challenges and persistent corruption. At this briefing, speakers will examine the current state of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and analyze efforts to address the region’s challenges. They will also discuss the declaration adopted on June 1 by civil society representatives, members of business communities, and others, which seeks to reinvigorate the region’s democratic trajectory, support democratic and economic reform, and strengthen the transatlantic partnership. The following panelists are scheduled to speak: Andrew Wilson, Managing Director, Center for International Private Enterprise Peter Golias, Director, Institute for Economic and Social Reforms, Slovakia Andras Loke, Chair, Transparency International, Hungary Marek Tatala, Vice-President, Civil Development Forum, Poland Additional comments will be provided by: Jan Surotchak, Regional Director for Europe, International Republican Institute Jonathan Katz, Senior Resident Fellow, German Marshall Fund
Helsinki Commission Announces Briefing on Kleptocracy in RussiaThursday, July 13, 2017
WASHINGTON—The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission, today announced the following briefing: KLEPTOCRATS OF THE KREMLIN: TIES BETWEEN BUSINESS AND POWER IN RUSSIA Thursday, July 20, 2017 3:30 PM – 5:00 PM Dirksen Senate Office Building Room G11 Live Webcast: www.facebook.com/HelsinkiCommission Eighteen years after he first took power, Vladimir Putin rules a Russia increasingly characterized by censorship, political repression, and human rights violations. A central feature of Putin’s authoritarian regime is sprawling corruption. This corruption undermines the legitimacy of public institutions domestically and internationally via an opaque network of interlocutors who enable assets to be stolen from the Russian people and hidden abroad. While the president is the primary beneficiary, the Kremlin’s brand of kleptocracy depends on a loyal group of cronies, who acquire untold wealth by ensuring that state institutions follow Kremlin directives, and that private businesses play along or stay out of the way. The briefing will examine the dynamics of Putin’s closest circle in order to establish who most strengthens and benefits from his rule. Additionally, briefers will analyze how these cronies advance Putin’s geopolitical goals and interests. The following panelists are scheduled to speak: Brian Whitmore, Senior Russia Analyst, Radio Free Europe Ilya Zaslavskiy, Research Expert, Free Russia Foundation Dr. Anders Aslund, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council Marius Laurinavicius, Senior Analyst, Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis Ambassador Daniel Fried, Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council
Energy (In)Security in Russia’s PeripheryThursday, July 13, 2017
On July 13, 2017, the U.S. Helsinki Commission held a briefing on “Energy (In)security in Russia’s Periphery.” Energy security is an important topic that belongs to the OSCE’s Second Dimension. This briefing addressed energy security challenges in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, in particular in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Panelists included Peter Doran, Executive Vice President and Interim Director at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA); Edward Chow, Senior Fellow at the Energy and National Security Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Andrian Prokip, Senior Associate at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center and Energy Expert at the Institute for Social and Economic Research; Lyndon Allin, Associate at Baker McKenzie; and Dr. Mamuka Tsereteli, Senior Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. The panelists provided a background on energy security both generally and in the regional context of the post-Soviet space, as well as in the specific case studies of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Mr. Doran stated that the energy security situation in Europe, and also in Russia’s immediate neighborhood, has fundamentally changed as a result of the end of energy scarcity in the world and the construction of new energy infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe in a positive way. However, the bad news is that Russia is not willing to accept this game-changing market shift and is fighting back. For instance, the panelists agreed on the key role that Azerbaijan could play for the supply of energy not only in the post-Soviet space, but also in other European countries. They noted, however, in order for world-class projects, like the ones operating or being planned in Azerbaijan, to become a reality, the achievement of market integration is critical. Unfortunately, market integration in Southeastern Europe is exactly what Russia has been trying to prevent with the tool of energy corruption, which it uses to keep its neighboring countries dependent on it for energy supplies, and to obtain kompromat on various political leaders in the region. Mr. Doran specifically cited the case of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, which he argued is a political and not a commercial project for Russia to gain more influence over European, and in particular Ukrainian, energy security. When it comes to ways of approaching energy security, panelists agreed that it must be achieved not by top-down but rather with bottom-up solutions, citing the specific example of Ukraine, which could easily become self-sufficient if it implemented crucial reforms that hinder much-needed private investment in its energy sector. In particular, Mr. Chow observed that, while external challenges must be confronted and overcome, the implementation of crucial structural reforms in the energy sectors of post-Soviet countries is critical to meet the challenge that Russia poses. For example, he regards corruption in the energy sector in Ukraine as the key reason for the nation’s energy insecurity. The panelists agreed that U.S. political leaders should be careful about making promises to politicians in the region, for example the oft-cited promise that U.S. LNG exports will be able to substitute for Russian gas and solve the energy security problems of the region. Instead, as the panelists pointed out, the emphasis should be put on supporting the energy market development of countries in the post-Soviet space. Mr. Prokip stressed that the recently proposed reforms in Ukraine must go forward. In particular, progress must be made in implementation, which he argued could only happen if the West is willing to exert more pressure on the Ukrainian authorities, while continuing to provide advice and assistance. In both Chow’s and Prokip’s view, U.S. energy exports cannot serve as a substitute for structural economic reforms in Ukraine. Following a similar line of argument, Mr. Allin pointed out that, in the case of Moldova, it is the Moldovans who need to make more effort to solve their own problems, rather than looking only to foreign partners for external solutions. Finally, Dr. Tsereteli reminded the audience that structural reforms and the openness to trade and investment that accompanies them can lead to post-Soviet countries’ integration in the global economic system, as was the case in Georgia, which managed to improve its energy security significantly this way.
Helsinki Commission Briefing to Examine Energy Security in Russia’s PeripheryMonday, July 03, 2017
WASHINGTON—The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission, today announced the following briefing: ENERGY (IN)SECURITY IN RUSSIA’S PERIPHERY July 13, 2017 3:30 PM – 5:00 PM Dirksen Senate Office Building Room G11 Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has used its neighbors’ dependence on its energy supplies as a source of geopolitical leverage and sought to keep their energy sectors underdeveloped and corrupt. Ukraine has recently managed to implement crucial reforms in its energy sector, but challenges remain. Meanwhile, initiatives for similar reforms in Moldova have stalled, while Georgia has successfully reformed its energy sector and developed new infrastructure. Why are these outcomes so different and what more can be done to achieve energy security in post-Soviet Eastern Europe? This briefing will provide a general overview of energy security in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, and examine challenges and opportunities in the energy sectors of these states. Briefers will discuss the role that corruption plays in preventing the implementation of effective reforms as well as strategies to curb Russian influence. The following experts are scheduled to participate: Peter Doran, Executive Vice President and Interim Director, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) Edward Chow, Senior Fellow, Energy and National Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Andrian Prokip, Senior Associate, Kennan Institute; Energy Expert, Institute for Social and Economic Research Lyndon Allin, Associate, Baker McKenzie Mamuka Tsereteli, Senior Fellow, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
2017 Trafficking in Persons Report – the OSCE RegionTuesday, June 27, 2017
By Allison Hollabaugh, Counsel Human trafficking remains a pressing human rights violation around the world with the International Labor Organization estimating that nearly 21 million people are enslaved at any given time, most of them women and children. As part of U.S. efforts to combat human trafficking, the U.S. Department of State today released the 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report), reflecting the efforts of 187 countries and territories to prosecute traffickers, prevent trafficking, and to identify and assist victims, as described by the Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children. Trafficking Victim Identification and Care: Regional Perspectives According to the new TIP Report, in the 2016 reporting year, countries in the OSCE region identified 304 more trafficking victims than in the previous year, for a total of 11,416 victims. This increase is particularly notable when compared to the East Asia and Pacific, Near East, South and Central Asia, and Western Hemisphere regions, where victim identification declined, but still maintained a generally upward trend over 2014. Trafficking victim identification and care is critical for proper management of refugee and migrant flows. In order to help law enforcement and border guards identify trafficking victims among the nearly 400,000 migrants and refugees entering the region last year, the OSCE Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Human Beings launched a new project to conduct multiple trainings, including simulation exercises, through 2018. The first training in November 2016 included participants from 30 OSCE participating States. Victim identification and care are also critical for successful prosecutions. Nearly every region of the world saw a drop in prosecutions of human traffickers, but an increase in convictions in the 2016 reporting year. This trend may reflect a growing knowledge among prosecutors of how to successfully investigate and prosecute a trafficking case. It also may reflect an overall increase in trafficking victims who have been identified, permitted to remain in-country, and cared for such that the victims—now survivors—are ready, willing, and able to testify against their traffickers. Despite the dramatic decline in prosecutions (46 percent) in the OSCE region, convictions held steady at nearly the same numbers as the previous year. Individual Country Narratives Along with regional statistics, the TIP Report also provides individual country narratives, recommendations for the most urgent changes needed to eliminate human trafficking, and an assessment of whether the country is making significant efforts to meet the minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking. Tier 1 countries meet the minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking. Tier 2 countries do not yet meet the standards, but are making significant efforts to do so. Tier 2 Watch List countries do not meet the minimum standards and are making significant efforts to do so, but have a very large or increasing number of trafficking victims, have failed to demonstrate increasing efforts over the previous year, or lack a solid plan to take additional steps in the coming year. Tier 3 countries do not meet the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so. Twenty-five OSCE participating States qualified for Tier 1 in the TIP Report. Nineteen participating States qualified for Tier 2, including Ukraine, which was upgraded this year after four years on the Tier 2 Watch List. Five participating States were designated for the Tier 2 Watch List, including Hungary, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria.* Four participating States were on Tier 3, including Belarus, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. States on Tier 3 may be subject to sanctions. Legislation authored by Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Rep. Chris Smith—who also serves as the Special Representative for Human Trafficking Issues to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly – requires the TIP Report to be produced every year. In recent years the report has also included an assessment of the United States. Since the inception of the report, more than 100 countries have written or amended their trafficking laws, with some nations openly crediting the report for inspiring progress in their countries’ fight against human trafficking. * OSCE participating States Andorra, Monaco, Lichtenstein, and San Marino are not included in the TIP Report.
The Romanian Anti-Corruption Process: Successes and ExcessesWednesday, June 14, 2017
Corruption is an issue of particular concern to the United States and the OSCE because of the threat it poses to security, economic development and human rights. Romania has a history of combating corruption since the fall of Communism, and to this day struggles to maintain transparency in its government institutions and businesses. The fight against corruption is the modern arena for the protection of democratic institutions and freedoms, which for Romania means the strengthening of its institutions and rule of law. The U.S. Helsinki Commission’s hearing on June 14, 2017, focused on Romania’s anti-corruption process, examining progress as well as recommendation for the United States to help support these goals. “Romania’s anti-corruption efforts have garnered international attention and have been held up as an example for other countries, such as Ukraine,” observed Chairman Wicker. “We want those efforts to be successful. In holding this hearing today, we hope to support those working to fight against corruption in a way that is consistent with the rule of law and strengthens the democracy Romanians have worked so hard to build.” Witnesses at the hearing included Ambassador Marc Gitenstein, former U.S. Ambassador to Romania from 2009 to 2012 and a partner at leading global law firm, Mayer Brown; Ms. Heather Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, and Director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies; Mr. David Clark, a British foreign policy commentator and consultant with Shifting Grounds; and Mr. Philip Stephenson, Chairman of the Freedom Group and former partner of the International Equity Partners. Witnesses overwhelmingly stressed the need for continued anti-corruption work in Romania and made recommendations for strengthening and improving those efforts. In his opening statement, Ambassador Gitenstein conveyed his optimistic view of Romanian anticorruption efforts, and pointed to the recent mass demonstration in January of this year—the largest in Romania since 1989—as evidence of strong public support for continued progress. In this regard, he said Romania was a model for the region, and continues to meet benchmarks set by the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) of the EU - a special monitoring mechanism established by the EU as a condition for Romania’s accession. Ms. Conley characterized the fight against corruption as “a matter of national security.” While echoing Ambassador Gitenstein’s optimism, she underlined that Romania is not done with its fight against corruption. She stated that the United States decreased the amount of assistance to Romania after the country’s accession to the EU and NATO, suggested that this was a mistake. “This is what leaving the policy playing field looks like,” Ms. Conley argued. She warned that allowing corruption to spread and create weaknesses within Romanian institutions would allow for future exploitation by Russia. Mr. David Clark expressed concern regarding several areas of Romania’s anti-corruption measures, which he said had been tainted by the politicization of justice, collusion between prosecutors and the executive branch, intelligence agency influence over the process, lack of judicial independence and other abuses of the process. He doubted the accuracy of the European Union’s CVM progress reports due to the Union’s “epic capacity for wishful thinking,” as evidenced by how slow the EU has been to respond to the serious deterioration of democratic standards in Hungary and Poland. He pointed to several troubling human rights violations in Romania and urged the Helsinki Commission to ask hard questions of the State Department and support better reporting on corruption issues in the annual State Department Country Reports on Human Rights. Mr. Phil Stephenson described his personal experience with the Romanian judicial system and his ongoing investigation by DICOTT, an antiterrorism organization in Romania, stating that “the fight against corruption itself has been corrupted.” He appreciated the attention that the Commission was bringing to the issue of corruption in Romania and argued that continued attention will protect against deficiencies in the anti-corruption process. Note: The unofficial transcript includes a Romanian translation.
Helsinki Commission to Hold Hearing on Romanian Anti-Corruption ProcessWednesday, June 07, 2017
WASHINGTON—The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission, today announced the following hearing: THE ROMANIAN ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCESS: SUCCESSES AND EXCESSES Wednesday, June 14, 2017 9:30 AM Senate Visitors Center (SVC) Room 212-210 Live Webcast: http://www.senate.gov/isvp/?type=live&comm=csce&filename=csce061417 Since the fall of Communism, Romania’s greatest challenge has been the fight against corruption. This fight has largely succeeded, with powerful national-level prosecutors (the National Anticorruption Directorate) getting public support and scoring large numbers of convictions ranging from the level of local politicians to former Prime Ministers. However, two worrying trends have developed recently. First, in what was seen as an attempt to exempt government officials from prosecution, a move by the government to pardon government officials whose abuse of office caused damages of less than $47,000 led to the largest mass protests since 1989. Second, there are indications that some elements of the Romanian state, including possibly the security services, are using the necessary and popular fight against corruption as a pretext, in a few cases, to punish political opponents and expropriate business interests. The hearing will examine the current state of the Romanian anti-corruption process with goal of understanding its successes and excesses and how best to respond. The following witnesses are scheduled to testify: Ambassador Mark Gitenstein, Special Counsel, Mayer Brown Heather Conley, Senior Vice President, Center for Strategic and International Studies David Clark, Foreign Policy Commentator and Consultant Philip Stephenson, Chairman, Freedom Capital
Russia’s Weaponization of Corruption (and Western Complicity)Tuesday, June 06, 2017
By Paul Massaro, policy advisor and Amelie Rausing, intern Russia’s weaponization of corruption—its export of corrupt practices via the abuse of western legal and financial loopholes in order to further its geopolitical goals—has stimulated anti-American sentiment in Europe and galvanized extremist forces on both sides of the Atlantic. While Moscow pushes its anti-globalization narrative, it is simultaneously taking advantage of globalization to export its own version of crony capitalism to many countries in the OSCE region. The Russian brand of corruption thrives off of globalization and depends on access to the global financial system. Under this model, weak property rights and lack of rule of law support a corrupt system at home, where markets are distorted and courts are politicized. State funds are looted and assets are acquired through corporate raiding and asset stripping. Cronies then siphon off national funds to safe havens outside of former Soviet countries. Offshored money can be used to buy real estate, education, and health care in the United States and in Europe. It can also be used back home, to finance rigged elections, support local political figures, reward loyal cronies, and fund projects strategically important for geopolitical goals. Stolen money can also buy influence and keep foreign governments friendly. In the meantime, popular discontent brews domestically. Western politicians often argue that globalization undermines corruption and authoritarianism. In reality, that is not the whole story. The emergence of a parallel, opaque, financial system that allows dictators to anonymously and untraceably funnel money to the West is one of the direst consequences of an increasingly globalized world. European and American lawyers, bankers, lobbyists, and accountants provide services that facilitate and benefit from the laundering of stolen assets. Illicit wealth is then invested in real estate in cities like London, New York, and Miami. In many cases, victims are well aware of the West’s complicity in funneling off their hard-earned taxes and state budgets. Their sense of powerlessness is further fortified when the United States and European countries fail to trace and recover funds that have vanished in the global financial system. It strengthens the sense of a culture of impunity for grand corruption, a public setback that can then be exploited by extremist voices. In Russia, “Londongrad” is widely known as the capitol of Russia’s stolen wealth. Furthermore, in the digital era, stolen assets are flaunted on social media for everyone to see. Last year, reporters from the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and Novaya Gazeta established that a 280-plus foot super-yacht named St. Princess Olga belonged to Putin crony and Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin after examining the social media accounts of his rumored girlfriend, Olga Rozhkova. While the exact price of the yacht is unknown, it is estimated to be around $190 million. At best, the United States and other Western countries are accused of facilitating the looting of corrupt countries. At worst, they drive and benefit from the transfer of financial assets from the East to the West. Disdain of the West becomes especially contagious when people like Russian opposition leader and anti-corruption blogger Alexei Navalny start to express frustration with Western complicity in money laundering. It is bad news when freedom fighters and dissidents, traditional allies of the United States, start to question the West’s commitment to democratic development. The failure to return ill-gotten assets, especially when they have been invested in the U.S. economy, diminishes the United States’ democratic legitimacy and America’s claim to be a champion of freedom. The perception of a hypocritical West with sham values is then exploited by opportunist politicians and media, who egg on anti-American sentiment with this carefully constructed narrative about globalization. This narrative fuels extremism and terrorism and it is in the United States’ national interest to encounter it. The Helsinki Commission recently investigated one aspect of this phenomenon in a staff-level briefing titled, “Countering Corruption in the OSCE Region: Returning Ill-Gotten Assets and Closing Safe Havens.” This briefing demonstrated that strengthening mechanisms for repatriation and accountability in the financial sector needs to be a priority. When these illicit assets are safeguarded in places where democratic governments have some leverage then it is important to use it to ensure the responsible return of funds for the benefit of victims. To avoid looking hypocritical, financial organizations and law firms that enable the looting cannot profit from the repatriation process. There are many different methods required to combat corruption and responsible asset recovery might not seem like the most critical at first glance. However, it is an essential step for preventing future corruption. Recovered assets can be invested in the rule of law and aspects of civil society that serve as corruption watchdogs. Responsible and transparent repatriation has the potential to empower these watchdog organizations, strengthening the backbone of democratic development.
Countering Corruption in the OSCE Region: Returning Ill-Gotten Assets and Closing Safe HavensThursday, June 01, 2017
The World Bank estimates that twenty to forty billion dollars are stolen from developing countries every year. The majority of stolen funds are never found, and even if they are, recovering stolen assets and repatriating victims is a complicated process. The process often involves many different countries with different legal frameworks and financial structures. On June 1, 2017, the Helsinki Commission held a briefing on asset recovery in the OSCE region. Ill-gotten assets from the region frequently end up in money laundering safe havens in the West, where Western financial services enable the safeguarding of stolen funds. Briefers included Charles Davidson, executive director of the Kleptocracy Initiative at the Hudson Institute; Brian Campbell, legal advisor for the Cotton Campaign; and Ken Hurwitz, senior managing legal officer on anti-corruption with the Open Society Justice Initiative. The briefing was moderated by Paul Massaro, economic and environmental policy advisor with the Helsinki Commission. Panelists at the briefing discussed methods to achieve responsible repatriation for grand corruption. After tracing and freezing assets, Western authorities are faced with the dilemma of how to return assets stolen by kleptocrats to the people of that country. A critical part of anti-corruption work, successful repatriation can empower civil society and democratic development in affected countries. In turn, civil society and the judiciary can play critical roles in fighting and exposing grand corruption. Panelists drew comparisons between the challenges associated with returning assets stolen by the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan and the successful case in Kazakhstan, where $115 million in disputed assets was returned to the people through the BOTA Foundation. While grand corruption takes on many different forms, most corrupt countries in the OSCE region are former members of the Soviet Union and have imported Moscow’s own brand of corruption. Panelists discussed how the lack of transparency and accountability in Western financial systems facilitate the looting of former Soviet countries. Additionally, they argued for the United States’ national interest in countering corruption and ensuring responsible repatriation.
Asset Recovery in OSCE Region to be Focus of Upcoming Helsinki Commission BriefingTuesday, May 23, 2017
WASHINGTON —The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission, today announced the following staff-led briefing: "Countering Corruption in the OSCE Region: Returning Ill-Gotten Assets and Closing Safe Havens" Thursday, June 1, 2017 10:30 AM – 11:30 AM Dirksen Senate Office Building Room G11 Combating corruption has been an essential element of the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for decades. This has involved a multitude of activities, including the exchange of information to identify, trace, and suppress money laundering. But what happens with the corrupt assets recovered from such operations? This briefing will explore the historical context for asset recovery as an integral part of the global fight against corruption, with a special focus on the OSCE region. Briefers will discuss corruption prevention mechanisms in the OSCE and beyond, the U.S. national interest in countering corruption, and methods of ensuring responsible repatriation. The following experts are scheduled to participate: Charles Davidson, Executive Director of the Kleptocracy Initiative, Hudson Institute Brian Campbell, U.S.-based Attorney Ken Hurwitz, Senior Managing Legal Officer on Anticorruption, Open Society Justice Initiative Moderator: Paul Massaro, Policy Advisor, Helsinki Commission
The Growing Russian Military Threat in EuropeWednesday, May 17, 2017
Russian military aggression in recent years has flagrantly violated commitments enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act relating to refraining from the threat or use of force against other states; refraining from violating other states’ sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence; and respecting the right of every state to choose its own security alliances. The Commission’s hearing on May 17, 2017, closely examined Russia’s military threats in Europe – especially in terms of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its attempts to influence events in other neighboring countries – alongside its ongoing violations of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures. Witnesses included Dr. Michael Carpenter, Senior Director of the Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement at the University of Pennsylvania and former Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense; Mr. Stephen Rademaker, Principal with the Podesta Group and former Assistant Secretary of State; and Ambassador Steven Pifer, the Director of the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at the Brooking Institution and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. In his opening statement, Helsinki Commission Chairman Senator Roger Wicker reiterated that under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has violated a number of commitments enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other agreements, among them, the inviolability of frontiers or the principle of refraining from the threat of use of force against other states. “The Russian leadership has chosen an antagonistic stance, both regionally and globally, as it seeks to reassert its influence from a bygone era,” Chairman Wicker said. He was echoed by Representative Chris Smith, Co-Chairman of the Commission, who added that Russian aggression is more than a localized phenomenon. “Russia is threatening the foundations of European security and recklessly endangering the lives of millions,” Representative Smith said. Dr. Carpenter, the first witness to testify in the hearing, said that the Kremlin was relying on denial, deception, and unpredictability to advance its goals. “In the non-NATO countries, Russia has proven it is willing to use military force to achieve its aims. In NATO countries, it is turning to asymmetric tactics, such as cyberattacks, cover subversion operations, and information warfare,” he said. Mr. Rademaker, who testified next, noted that Russia will comply with various arms control treaties like Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Open Skies, and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, only as long as it serves its interests. He concluded that the Kremlin sees security in Europe as a zero-sum game–diminishing the security of its neighbors keeps Russia stronger in Moscow’s view. The third witness, Ambassador Pifer, focused on Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine crisis. “The Kremlin is not pursuing a settlement of the conflict, but instead seeks to use a simmering conflict as a means to pressure and destabilize the government in Kiev,” Ambassador Pifer said, adding that a change in Moscow’s policy is necessary to bring peace to Ukraine. Ambassador Pifer also argued that the US should consider applying additional sanctions on Russia related to its annexation of Crimea. Mr. Carpenter later echoed those concerns and said that the US should focus on financial sanctions in order to increase its pressure on Russia. He also said that the Magnitsky Act is “vastly underutilized by both the previous administration and this administration.” “If we do not check Russian aggression with more forceful measures now, we will end up dealing with many more crises and conflicts, spending billions of dollars more on the defense of our European allies, and potentially seeing our vision of a Europe whole and free undermined,” Mr. Carpenter argued. Answering a question on where the Kremlin could be expected to agitate next in Europe, Mr. Carpenter pointed to the countries of the Western Balkans that remain, in his view, “in the crosshairs of Russian influence operations now.” He said that Serbia and Macedonia are particularly vulnerable and the potential for a full-fledged ethnic conflict in the Balkans is very high. Mr. Rademaker added that the Western Balkan countries lie outside of NATO and therefore “present an opportunity for Russia.” He also expressed worries that the Baltic states, although members of NATO, are at risk as the Kremlin sees the area as a “near-abroad” and thinks Russia is entitled to play “a special security role” in the region. “We need to begin to shape Russian thinking, that they have to understand that there are certain places that the West will not tolerate Russian overreach and will push back on,” Ambassador Pifer concluded. “And hopefully, as we shape that thinking, maybe Moscow comes around to a more accommodating view on some of these questions.”
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Former Top U.S. Officials Call For New Sanctions, More Aggressive Action On RussiaWednesday, May 17, 2017
WASHINGTON -- The United States should impose new sanctions and move more aggressively to "shape Russian thinking" in response to Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and elsewhere, former top State and Defense department officials said. Michael Carpenter, who was the Pentagon’s top Russia official until January, said the measures Washington should take should include deploying an armored brigade permanently to the Baltics and restricting some Russian surveillance flights over U.S. territory now authorized under the 2002 Open Skies treaty. "If we do not check Russian aggression with more forceful measures now, we will end up dealing with many more crises and conflicts, spending billions of dollars more in the defense of our European allies, and potentially see our vision of Europe whole and free undermined," Carpenter told a hearing of the U.S. Helsinki Commission on May 17. Carpenter, along with former State Department arms control director Stephen Rademaker, also suggested that the United States should consider returning intermediate-range cruise missiles to Europe, in response to Russia’s alleged violations of a key Cold War-era arms agreement. Rademaker told the commission that Russia will comply with important treaties like Open Skies, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe but only when it is in Moscow’s interest. When it isn’t in Moscow’s interest, "it will seek to terminate them…or violate them while continuing to play lip service to them...or it will selectively implement them," he said. Russia, for its part, has repeatedly denied violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty and instead accuses the United States itself of violating the agreement. Carpenter called for more financial sanctions that leverage U.S. dominance in financial markets, for more pressure on top Russian officials, and he said that the so-called Magnitsky Act, a 2012 law that puts restrictions on alleged Russian human rights offenders, had been "vastly underutilized." Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, said the list should be expanded to include relatives of Kremlin-connected oligarchs and other powerful government officials, for example, to keep their children from enrolling at U.S. colleges and universities or spouses from "going on London shopping trips." During last year's election campaign, U.S. President Donald Trump repeatedly expressed a conciliatory approach toward Moscow, saying more cooperation was needed in the fight against terrorism. Since taking office, however, the administration has largely maintained the stiff-armed policy initiated by Trump's predecessor, Barack Obama. The Helsinki Commission is a U.S. government agency that monitors international adherence to the 1975 Helsinki Accords on human rights.
Russian Military Activities in Europe to Be Examined at Upcoming Helsinki Commission HearingMonday, May 08, 2017
WASHINGTON—The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission, today announced the following hearing: “THE GROWING RUSSIAN MILITARY THREAT IN EUROPE: ASSESSING AND ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE” Wednesday, May 17, 2017 9:30 AM Senate Visitors Center (SVC) Room 208/209 Live Webcast: http://www.senate.gov/isvp/?type=live&comm=csce&filename=csce051717 Russian military aggression in recent years has flagrantly violated commitments enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act relating to refraining from the threat or use of force against other states; refraining from violating other states’ sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence; and respecting the right of every state to choose its own security alliances. Witnesses will review Russia’s military activities in Europe, and how Moscow has consistently and deliberately undermined its OSCE and related arms control commitments. Witnesses will also explore if and how Russia could be coaxed back into compliance, and assess the OSCE as a vehicle to address the growing instability and unpredictability in the European security environment. The following witnesses are scheduled to testify: Michael Carpenter, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia; currently Senior Director at the Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement Steven Pifer, Senior Fellow and Director of the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at the Brookings Institution Stephen Rademaker, Principal, Podesta Group; former Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Bureau of Arms Control and the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
World Press Freedom Day 2017Wednesday, May 03, 2017
By Jordan Warlick, Staff Associate Although freedom of the press is recognized by democracies around the world as an essential and basic human right, emerging reports show that it is globally in decline, even in countries considered strong democracies. The recently published Freedom House 2017 Freedom of the Press Report and Reporters Without Borders’ 2017 World Press Freedom Index both indicate grim trends – Freedom House declares press freedom at its lowest point in 13 years, and Reporters Without Borders describes the “ever darker world map” it has published this year. The OSCE region is not uniform when it comes to freedom of the press. OSCE participating States include some of the freest nations in the world, like Norway and the Netherlands, alongside some of the least free nations, like Azerbaijan and Turkey. The worst-performing region in the aforementioned Freedom House report is Eurasia, while the best-performing is Europe, both of which are largely encompassed in the OSCE region. The central problems of media freedom are also varied between countries, from violence, intimidation, and incarceration of journalists; to emerging contempt for the media among politicians; to media outlet ownership and transparency issues. While some countries require more attention and monitoring than others, any conditions that impede on press freedom or that are considered harmful for journalists deserve attention. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media was an office created in 1997 to do just that: monitor and assist participating States with compliance commitments on freedom of expression and free media. The most recent OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatović, was a fierce advocate for the rights of journalists across the OSCE. The OSCE participating States currently are in the process of selecting her successor, an appointment that requires consensus among the 57 OSCE participating States. This office’s function as a watchdog for violations and deteriorating conditions for media has been critical to bringing attention to issues and cases that may otherwise go unnoticed. Still, undemocratic regimes, changing political tides in the region, and the evolving landscape of journalism present ongoing challenges. Over the last week alone, the Helsinki Commission has held three different events where media freedom has been an important topic of discussion: a hearing on human rights abuses in Russia; a briefing on Russian human rights violations of Ukrainian citizens; and a briefing on human rights in Turkey after its referendum on changes to the constitution. At the hearing on human rights in Russia, each witness brought attention to the Kremlin’s control of the media and persecution of independent journalists. The briefing on Russian human rights violations against Ukrainian citizens focused on the incarceration of filmmaker Oleg Sentsov, but highlighted other cases of imprisoned journalists such as Roman Sushchenko of Ukrinform News and Mykola Semena, a contributor to Radio Free Europe. On Turkey, Freedom House panelist Nate Schenkkan described the severe restrictions on access to information and underscored Turkey’s status as the number one jailer of journalists in the world. If there is any hope for the future of press freedom in these countries where media is especially unfree, it is in the passion and talent of journalists who are committed to holding their governments accountable despite the risks. It is vital that the United States continue to be an exemplar of and advocate for freedom of the press, enshrined by our founders in the First Amendment in recognition of its importance for democracy, for other countries around the world.
Political Prisoners in RussiaTuesday, May 02, 2017
Principle VII of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act recognizes the right of individuals to know and act upon their human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. The following individuals who were profiled in the Helsinki Commission's April 2017 hearing, "Democracy & Human Rights Abuses in Russia: No End in Sight," illustrate the many cases of political prisoners in Russia today. Dmitry Buchenkov – Buchenkov was charged under Article 212 of the Russian criminal code (“participation in mass riots”) and Article 318 (“use of force against a representative of the authority”) for his participation in the 2012 Bolotnaya Square protests against fraud in the 2011 presidential elections. He was arrested in December 2015 and is currently under house arrest. He is recognized by Memorial as a political prisoner not only because the alleged offense did not take place, but also due to the lack of a fair trial and the disproportionate use of pretrial detention in light of the charge against him. His case illustrates the prosecution of individuals for engaging in nonviolent public protest against the government in general and the Bolotnaya Square cases in particular. Oleg Navalny – Navalny was charged under Article 159 (“swindling on a large scale”), article 159.4 (“swindling on a particularly large scale in the entrepreneurial sphere”), and article 174.1.a (laundering of funds on a large scale acquired by a person through a crime committed by him”). He was sentenced to 3 ½ years in a closed proceeding, Memorial considers him a political prisoner because the alleged offense did not take place and he was not given a fair trial. In reality, Oleg Navalny was targeted because he is the brother of prominent political activist Alexei Navalny. It appears the authorities are unwilling to make a martyr out of Alexei Navalny but seek to exert pressure on him by persecuting his brother. Oleg Navalny’s case illustrates the willingness of the government to target family members as a means of exerting pressure on political activists, which is specifically prohibited under the OSCE 1989 Vienna Concluding Document. Darya Polyudova – Polyudova was charged under article 280 of the Russian criminal code (“public appeals for extremist activity” and “public appeals for actions aimed at a violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation”) in connection with her participation in preparation for a march that did not take place. In reality, she was indicted for criticizing Moscow online for its support of Russia-backed separatists in Ukraine's east. She is recognized as a political prisoner because the offense did not take place, her right to a fair trial was violated, and the government disproportionately used pretrial detention given the nature of the charges. She was sentenced to two years in prison, becoming the first person in Russia convicted under a 2014 law criminalizing calls for separatism on the Internet. Her case illustrates the government’s prosecution of Russian nationals who criticize Russia’s actions and policies in Ukraine. Sergei Udaltsov – Udaltsov was charged under Article 30 of the Russian criminal code (“preparation of actions aimed at organizing mass riots”) and Article 212 (“organization of mass riots”) after participating in the Bolotnaya Square protests. He has been arrested multiple times before for protesting against the government. Memorial recognizes him as a political prisoner on the grounds that he was charged with an offense that did not take place; his right to a fair trial was violated; and the government disproportionately used pretrial detention. He was sentenced to four years and six months in prison. Ivan Nepomniashchikh – Nepomniashchikh was charged with Article 212 of the Russian criminal code (“participation in mass riots”) and Article 318 (“use of force against a representative of the authority”). He is recognized as a political prisoner on the grounds that he is being prosecuted for exercising his right to freedom of assembly; he is being charged with an offense that did not take place; he was not allowed a fair trial; and the government disproportionately used pretrial detention. He is another example of those being prosecuted for participating in the Bolotnaya Square protests against the 2011 fraud in the presidential election. Alexei Pichugin – Pichugin was charged under Article 162 of the Russian criminal code (“robbery”) and Article 105 (“murder”). At a closed trial, Pichugin, the former head of internal economic security for the Yukos Company then headed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was sentenced to life imprisonment in a special-regime penal colony. He has been in prison since 2003 and is recognized as a political prisoner on the grounds that his prosecution was conducted without a fair trial. The European Court on Human Rights also has held that Pichugin was denied a fair trial. Oleg Sentsov – Senstov is a Ukrainian filmmaker imprisoned in Russia since 2015, and was the focus of a separate Helsinki Commission briefing. Sentsov was arrested in the Russian-occupied Crimean territory of Ukraine and charged under Article 205.4 of the Russian criminal code (“organization of a terrorist group”), Article 205 (“terrorist act committed by an organized group”), Article 30 in connection with Article 205 (“preparation of a terrorist act”), Article 30 in connection with Article 222 (“attempted illegal acquisition of firearms and explosive devices”), and Article 222 (“illegal acquisition and storage of far arms and explosive devices”). He was accused of planning an attack on a monument to Lenin, a charge he denies. He was sentenced in a Russian military court to 20 years in a strict regime penal colony for terrorism. Other Illustrative Cases Alexander Kolchenko – Kolchenko, a Crimean activist, was charged under article 205 of Russia’s criminal code (art. 205.4 part 2: "Participation in a terrorist organization," and art. 205, paragraph "a," part 2: "A terrorist act conducted by a terrorist group"). He refuted the accusations of terrorism. Mr. Kolchenko was detained in May 2014, in Simferopol, Crimea, shortly after Russia took control over the peninsula. On August 25, 2016, the North Caucasus District Military Court of Russia sentenced Mr. Kolchenko to 10 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime colony. He is serving his sentence in the Chelyabinsk Oblast, in the city of Kopeysk, a facility notorious for its poor treatment of convicts. Mr. Kolchenko is recognized as a political prisoner by Russia’s Memorial watchdog group. Mykola Semena (under a travel ban) – Semena, a Crimean journalist, has been charged under Article 280.1 of Russia’s criminal code, which penalizes "public calls for actions violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation." The law was added to the Russian criminal code in December 2013, and came into force in May 2014 - several weeks after Crimea was annexed by Russia. Semena was one of the only independent journalists to remain on the peninsula following Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea. He contributed reporting to RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service and its Crimea Desk. On April 19, 2016, after Russian police searched Semena’s home and confiscated computers and storage media, the de facto Crimean prosecutor-general ordered Semena to remain on the peninsula while he was investigated for alleged “calls to undermine Russia’s territorial integrity via the mass media.” Semena has been forced to stay in Crimea ever since, despite his requests to travel to Kyiv for urgently needed medical care. Roman Sushchenko (in pre-trial detention) – Sushchenko, a Ukrainian journalist, is charged under article 276 of Russia’s criminal code (espionage). He has worked as a Paris-based correspondent for Ukraine’s state news agency, Ukrinform, since 2010. He was detained at a Moscow airport on September 30, 2016, upon his arrival from Paris on private business. He was accused of collecting classified information on the activities of Russia’s armed forces and the National Guard. Mr. Sushchenko denies any involvement in espionage. His employer, Ukrinform, also considers the accusations false and called his detention a “planned provocation.” Mr. Sushchenko’s attorney is Mark Feygin, who previously represented Pussy Riot and Nadezhda Savchenko. Memorial, a Russian organization established to report on the crimes of Stalinism, documents cases of political prisoners as well as cases of those persecuted for their faith.This information was compiled by Helsinki Commission staff from Memorial, the U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices, and news sources. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom also tracks cases of individuals imprisoned in connection with their faith.
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How the State of Russian Media Becomes the State of International MediaFriday, April 28, 2017
It was a bad week for reports on freedom of the media in Russia. On Wednesday, Reporters Without Borders released its 2017 world press freedom index. Russia came in at 148, after such bastions of independent media as South Sudan and Thailand. On Thursday, a Ukrainian human rights delegation briefed the Helsinki Commission on the case of Oleg Sentsov — a Ukrainian filmmaker imprisoned in a Siberian penal colony for his opposition to the annexation of Crimea — and abuses of Ukrainian journalists and creative professionals more broadly. On Friday, Freedom House unveiled its Freedom of the Press 2017 report. That report gives Russia partial credit for the world’s 13-year low in press freedom. “Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia has been a trailblazer in globalizing state propaganda. It continues to leverage pro-Kremlin reporting around the world,” the report states. The three taken in tandem tell a story — one in which violence against journalists in Russia and the region is connected to violence against journalism around the world. Consider the case of Oleg Sentsov. In 2015, Sentsov was sentenced to 20 years in prison for planning terrorist attacks in Crimea. In his trial, he said he had been tortured. The international human rights community believes this to have been payback for the filmmaker’s outspoken stance against the annexation of Crimea (it is also worth noting that Russia treated Sentsov, a Ukrainian, as though he were a Russian citizen; after the annexation of Crimea, Russia considered all who did not explicitly apply for Ukrainian citizenship to be Russian, to which Sentsov objected in court by saying, “I am not a serf to be transferred with the land”). Russian-backed media reported it as a terrorism case. And so the case contains both the physical threat that looms over journalists and creative types who fail to parrot the party line and also the threat that Russian state-backed media can pose to understanding in the wider world. “Many people perceive [Russian state-backed media] not as propaganda, but as an alternative point of view,” Natalya Kaplan, Sentsov’s cousin, told Foreign Policy in an interview before heading to the Helsinki Commission briefing. “They tend to trust what Russian propaganda says.” In the case of Sentsov, that means some outside of Russia (to say nothing of those in it) thought he was neither filmmaker nor terrorist, but some combination of the two. Americans can no longer tell the difference between actual fake news and fake fake news, Ukrainian PEN member Halya Coynash told FP. “The thing is that you really think the media and information you get from Russian media, it is media. Which is wrong. We have state media, and state media are part of [the] strategy of [the state],” said Mustafa Nayyem, journalist turned Ukrainian member of parliament. Alternative facts are not facts, and false equivalences are not equivalent. But consumers of Russian state-backed media around the globe can be duped into treating them as such, Nayyem said. He argued Russia presents reality and a bold-faced lie as though they are but two different perspectives, the truth of which lies somewhere in the middle, for viewers to decide for themselves. “We know that [Sentsov] never was involved in some attacks, or in some revolution, in terroristic things. He’s a filmmaker, and his movies are recognized internationally. The lie is that this guy was a terrorist, and no one even tried to understand the basis of this [accusation] … There is guy: a filmmaker, and a terrorist. What is true? They think that maybe he’s some filmmaker-terrorist. It’s insane.” Nayyem ardently believes those who want to protect freedom of media and speech need to build up conventions regulating what are accepted as media outlets and news. But there’s a thin line between banning propaganda and furthering censorship and repression. Russia’s independent Dozhd (TV Rain), for example, was recently banned in Ukraine for reporting that Crimea is part of Russia. “Recent democratic gains have bolstered media freedom overall,” the Freedom House report states, “but restrictions on Russian outlets and attempts to foster ‘patriotic’ reporting raise questions about the government’s commitment to media autonomy.” And besides, even Ukrainians, more prepared for Russian media influence than their western counterparts, are not entirely immune. “The Russian media are much better funded” than their Ukrainian counterparts, Kaplan said, and it takes time and resources to counter reports put out by the Russian state-backed media machine. “Even my Ukrainian friends who live in Kiev, after watching two hours of Russian TV, start to question themselves. ‘Am I a fascist?’” Kaplan does not, at present, see much reason for optimism. While it was a bad week for reports on the state of Russian media, it was inevitably a much worse week for those trying to correct or improve it. “Journalism in Russia is dead. It happened quite a while ago,” Kaplan said. “There are small islands of freedom of speech in Russia,” she said, but they aren’t on TV, and they aren’t available to those who don’t know how to access certain sites. Besides, she said, the sophisticated propaganda machine will figure out how to move onto the internet, too. “Russian journalists face the biggest challenge. Their job is simply to survive.” Hanging in the air is the idea that, at present, surviving is actually journalism’s job, too.
Oleg Sentsov and Russia's Human Rights Violations against Ukrainian CitizensThursday, April 27, 2017
On April 27, the U.S. Helsinki Commission held a briefing focusing on human rights violations against Ukrainian citizens. In particular, this hearing was used as a platform to raise awareness for Oleg Sentsov, a political prisoner being held in Siberia. Sentsov was honored by PEN America this year with their 2017 Freedom to Write award for his work exposing Russian human rights violations. Panelist included Natalya Kaplan, cousin of Oleg Sentsov and campaigner for his freedom, and journalist in Kiev; Mustafa Nayyem, Member of Ukrainian Parliament and former journalist and early organizer of the 2013 Euromaidan protests; and Halya Coynash, spokesperson for Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group. The panelists provided much context and background detailing Sentsov and others’ cases. Natalya Kaplan spoke to the audience about the terrible conditions her cousin faces in Siberia, including torture, while Mustafa Nayyem spoke about the need to pressure Russia publically to end these human rights abuses. Halya Coynash reminded the audience of the severity of this case by highlighting that Sentsov was the first Ukrainian to be so brazenly imprisoned after the Russian occupation of Crimea; in her eyes, this was the first time the full force of Russian government had been used to fabricate charges and host a show trial against a Ukrainian. The panelists agreed that the media freedom situation in Russian-occupied territory is dire and only growing worse. Of greatest concern was the length to which Russia is willing to go in their efforts to arrest and prosecute journalists. Russia also sets a dangerous precedent with its recent attempts to foist Russian citizenship onto Ukrainians in Crimea, in efforts to undermine international court rulings and give legitimacy to its actions. When it comes to monitoring the human rights situation in Ukraine, the panelists expressed concerns with the lack of access to political prisoners and the inability to target individual Russians involved in creating the sham trials. The panelists believed that the ability to target individuals involved in these trials would be extremely helpful in de-escalating the situation, and they made many references to the Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. Overwhelmingly, the response to these issues was a desire to work with Congress to strengthen and update the Magnistky Act, as well as broaden civil society and NGO engagment. Mustafa Nayyem expressed hope that NGOs, such as PEN America, would play a more pivotal role in helping prevent future repression. News articles following the briefing expressed hope that there would be work within Congress to better address issues involving Ukrainian political prisoners.
Helsinki Commission Calls for Proclamation Recognizing Importance of Helsinki Final ActWednesday, April 26, 2017
WASHINGTON—Helsinki Commission Chairman Senator Roger Wicker (MS) today introduced a bipartisan Senate resolution urging President Trump to recognize the importance of the Helsinki Final Act – the founding document of today’s Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – and its relevance to American national security. The resolution was cosponsored by all other Senators currently serving on the Helsinki Commission: Sen. Ben Cardin (MD), Sen. John Boozman (AR), Sen. Cory Gardner (CO), Sen. Marco Rubio (FL), Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (NH), Sen. Thom Tillis (NC), Sen. Tom Udall (NM), and Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (RI). “Peace and prosperity in the OSCE region rest on a respect for human rights and the preservation of fundamental freedoms, democratic principles, and economic liberty. Unfortunately, the commitment to these ideals by some OSCE participating States is eroding,” Chairman Wicker said. “The shrinking space for civil society in many nations has become reminiscent of the Communist era – a time when many Helsinki Monitoring Groups were violently persecuted for their courageous support of basic human rights,” he continued. “With its actions in Ukraine and Georgia, the Russian Federation in particular has demonstrated how closely such internal repression can be tied to external aggression. We were reminded of these abuses in this morning’s Helsinki Commission hearing. I urge the President to make it clear that Helsinki principles are vital not only to American national interests but also to the security of the OSCE region as a whole.” “What was remarkable about the Helsinki Final Act was the commitment that these standards we agreed to would not only be of internal interest to the member country, but that any country signatory to the Helsinki Final Act could challenge the actions of any other country,” said Ranking Commissioner Cardin, who is also Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “We have not only the right but the responsibility to call out countries that fail to adhere to the basic principles that were agreed to in 1975.” Defining security in a uniquely comprehensive manner, the Helsinki Final Act contains 10 principles guiding inter-state relations, among them respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief (Principle VII). Other principles include respect for sovereign equality (Principle I), the territorial integrity of states (Principle IV), and states’ fulfilment in good faith of their obligations under international law (Principle X). S.Con.Res.13 encourages President Trump to reaffirm America’s commitment to the principles and implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. The resolution also calls on the President to urge other participating States to respect their OSCE commitments and to condemn the Russian Federation's clear, gross, and uncorrected violations of all 10 core OSCE principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act.
Mr. Speaker, earlier today I introduced H.R. 6067, the Rodchenkov Anti-Doping Act (‘‘RADA’’) because in the realm of international sports, it has become almost commonplace for too many athletes to yield to the temptation of bridging the gap between their own skill and the pinnacle of athletic achievement by resorting to performance enhancing drugs.
And to conceal this fall from grace, cheaters are employing increasingly sophisticated modes of masking the use of any proscribed drugs.
This practice, some of it state-sanctioned, undermines international athletic competition and is often connected to more nefarious actions by state actors.
This is why it is necessary for Congress to enact H.R. 6067, the bipartisan Rodchenkov Anti-Doping Act (‘‘RADA’’ Act)
The legislation I have introduced is bipartisan, and bears the name of courageous whistleblower Dr. Grigory Rodchenkov, a valiant man who revealed the true extent of the complex state-run doping scheme which permitted Russia to excel in the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, and which resulted in its ban from the 2018 Olympic Games.
While he was complicit in Russia’s state-run doping program, Dr. Rodchenkov regrets his role and seeks to atone for it by aiding the effort to clean up international sports and to curb the rampant corruption within Russia.
The RADA Act is a serious step towards cracking down on the use of performance-enhancing drugs in major international competition because it establishes criminal penalties and civil remedies for doping fraud.
A number of other nations, including Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain, have embraced criminal sanctions for doping fraud violations and it is time for the United States to be added to this list.
Doping fraud in major international competitions—like the Olympics, the World Cup and the Tour de France—is often linked with corruption, bribery and money laundering.
It is not just victory that criminals engaged in doping fraud snatch away from clean athletes—athletes depend on prize money and sponsorships to sustain their livelihoods.
The United States has a large role to play in ferreting out corruption in international sports.
Not only do U.S. athletes lose out on millions in sponsorships, but when a U.S. company spends millions to create a marketing campaign around an athlete, only to have that athlete later implicated in a doping fraud scandal, the damage to that company’s brand can cost tens of millions.
This has been the story of Alysia Montaño, a U.S. runner who competed in the 2012 Summer Olympics games in London and placed fifth place in the 800 meters behind two Russian women finishing first and third.
These women were later found to have engaged in doping fraud by the World Anti-Doping Agency, meaning that Ms. Montaño had rightfully finished third, which would have earned her a bronze medal.
Ms. Montaño estimates that doping fraud cost her ‘maybe half a million dollars, if you look at rollovers and bonuses, and that’s without outside sponsorship maybe coming in.’
She adds, ‘That’s not why you’re doing it, but you still deserve it.’ She certainly does. Until now, defrauded U.S. athletes and companies have had little recourse against doping fraud.
A recent article published by The New York Times titled ‘‘U.S. Lawmakers Seek to Criminalize Doping in Global Competitions’’ references the RADA as a step in the right direction toward criminalizing doping in international sports.
The RADA is an important step to stemming the tide of Russian corruption in sport and restoring confidence in international competition.
Mr. Speaker, I include in the RECORD the New York Times article published June 12, 2018 entitled ‘‘U.S. Lawmakers Seek To Criminalize Doping in Global Competitions’’, which cites RADA as a step in the right direction toward criminalizing doping in international sports.
[From the New York Times, June 12, 2018]
U.S. LAWMAKERS SEEK TO CRIMINALIZE DOPING IN GLOBAL COMPETITIONS (By Rebecca R. Ruiz)
United States lawmakers on Tuesday took a step toward criminalizing doping in international sports, introducing a bill in the House that would attach prison time to the use, manufacturing or distribution of performance-enhancing drugs in global competitions.
The legislation, inspired by the Russian doping scandal, would echo the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which makes it illegal to bribe foreign officials to gain a business advantage. The statute would be the first of its kind with global reach, empowering American prosecutors to act on doping violations abroad, and to file fraud charges of a different variety than those the Justice Department brought against top international soccer officials in 2015.
Although American leagues like Major League Baseball would not be affected by the legislation, which would apply only to competitions among countries, it could apply to a league’s athletes when participating in global events like the Ryder Cup, the Davis Cup or the World Baseball Classic.
The law would establish America’s jurisdiction over international sports events, even those outside of the United States, if they include at least three other nations, with at least four American athletes participating or two American companies acting as sponsors. It would also enhance the ability of cheated athletes and corporate sponsors to seek damages, expanding the window of time during which civil lawsuits could be filed.
To justify the United States’ broader jurisdiction over global competitions, the House bill invokes the United States’ contribution to the World Anti-Doping Agency, the global regulator of drugs in sports. At $2.3 million, the United States’ annual contribution is the single largest of any nation. ‘‘Doping fraud in major international competitions also effectively defrauds the United States,’’ the bill states.
The lawmakers behind the bill were instrumental in the creation of the 2012 Magnitsky Act, which gave the government the right to freeze financial assets and impose visa restrictions on Russian nationals accused of serious human rights violations and corruption. On Tuesday, the lawmakers framed their interest in sports fraud around international relations and broader networks of crime that can accompany cheating.
‘‘Doping fraud is a crime in which big money, state assets and transnational criminals gain advantage and honest athletes and companies are defrauded,’’ said Sheila Jackson Lee, Democrat of Texas, who introduced the legislation on Tuesday. ‘‘This practice, some of it state-sanctioned, has the ability to undermine international relations, and is often connected to more nefarious actions by state actors.’’
Along with Ms. Jackson Lee, the bill was sponsored by two other Congressional representatives, Michael Burgess, Republican of Texas, and Gwen Moore, Democrat of Wisconsin.
It was put forward just as Russia prepares to host soccer’s World Cup, which starts Thursday. That sporting event will be the nation’s biggest since the 2014 Sochi Olympics, where one of the most elaborate doping ploys in history took place.
The bill, the Rodchenkov Anti-Doping Act, takes its name from Dr. Grigory Rodchenkov, the chemist who ran Russia’s antidoping laboratory for 10 years before he spoke out about the state-sponsored cheating he had helped carry out—most notoriously in Sochi. At those Games, Dr. Rodchenkov said, he concealed widespread drug use among Russia’s top Olympians by tampering with more than 100 urine samples with the help of Russia’s Federal Security Service.
Investigations commissioned by international sports regulators confirmed his account and concluded that Russia had cheated across competitions and years, tainting the performance of more than 1,000 athletes. In early 2017, American intelligence officials concluded that Russia’s meddling in the 2016 American election had been, in part, a form of retribution for the Olympic doping scandal, whose disclosures Russian officials blamed on the United States.
Nations including Germany, France, Italy, Kenya and Spain have established criminal penalties for sports doping perpetrated within their borders. Russia, too, passed a law in 2017 that made it a crime to assist or coerce doping, though no known charges have been brought under that law to date.
Under the proposed American law, criminal penalties for offenders would include a prison term of up to five years as well as fines that could stretch to $250,000 for individuals and $1 million for organizations.
‘‘We could have real change if people think they could actually go to jail for this,’’ said Jim Walden, a lawyer for Dr. Rodchenkov, who met with the lawmakers as they considered the issue in recent months. ‘‘I think it will have a meaningful impact on coaches and athletes if they realize they might not be able to travel outside of their country for fear of being arrested.’’
The legislation also authorizes civil actions for doping fraud, giving athletes who may have been cheated in competitions—as well as corporations acting as sponsors—the right to sue in federal court to recover damages from people who may have defrauded competitions.
Ms. Jackson Lee cited the American runner Alysia Montaño, who placed fifth in the 800 meters at the 2012 Summer Olympics. Two Russian women who placed first and third in that race were later disqualified for doping, elevating Ms. Montaño years later. ‘‘She had rightfully finished third, which would have earned her a bronze medal,’’ Ms. Jackson Lee said, noting the financial benefits and sponsorships Ms. Montaño could have captured.
The bill would establish a window of seven years for criminal actions and 10 years for civil lawsuits. It also seeks to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation, making it illegal to take ‘‘adverse action’’ against a person because he or she has disclosed information about doping fraud.
Dr. Rodchenkov, who has lived in the United States since fall 2015, has been criminally charged in Russia after he publicly deconstructed the cheating he said he carried out on orders from a state minister.
‘‘While he was complicit in Russia’s past bad acts, Dr. Rodchenkov regrets his past role in Russia’s state-run doping program and seeks to atone for it by aiding the effort to clean up international sports and to curb the corruption rampant in Russia,’’ Ms. Jackson Lee said, calling Tuesday’s bill ‘‘an important step to stemming the tide of Russian corruption in sport and restoring confidence in international competition.’’