The Srebrenica Massacre of 1995, H.Res. 199

Hon.

Benjamin Cardin

United States

House of Representatives

109th Congress

First Session

Congressional Record, Vol. 151

No. 47

Thursday, January 20, 2005

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join our colleague and Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, in cosponsoring House Resolution 199, regarding the 1995 massacre at Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

For us, the congressional debates regarding the nature of the Bosnian conflict and what the United States and the rest of the international community should do about it are increasingly part of history. Now focused on other challenges around the globe, it is easy to forget the prominence of not only Bosnia, but the Balkans as a whole, on our foreign policy agenda.

It would be a mistake, however, to ignore the reality of Srebrenica ten years later to those who were there and experienced the horror of having sons, husbands, fathers taken away never to be seen again. Their loss is made greater by the failure to apprehend and transfer to The Hague for trial people like Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic who were responsible for orchestrating and implementing the policies of ethnic cleansing.

Following the Srebrenica massacre, the United States ultimately did the right thing by taking the lead in stopping the bloodshed and in facilitating the negotiation of the Dayton Agreement, the tenth anniversary of which will likely be commemorated this November. Thanks in large measure to the persistence of the U.S. Congress and despite the resistance of some authorities particularly in Belgrade and Banja Luka, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia remains a necessary precondition for improved bilateral ties and integration into NATO and the European Union. Meanwhile, the United States and many other countries have contributed significant resources, including money and personnel, to the region's post-conflict recovery.

It is therefore appropriate that we, as the leaders of the Helsinki Commission, introduce and hopefully pass this resolution on Srebrenica ten years later, not only to join with those who continue to mourn and seek closure, but also to understand why we have done what we have done since then, and, more importantly, to learn the lesson of failing to stand up to those in the world who are willing to slaughter thousands of innocent people. The atrocities committed in and around Srebrenica in July 1995, after all, were allowed to happen in what the United Nations Security Council itself designated as a "safe area."

In confirming the indictments of Mladic and Karadzic, a judge from the international tribunal reviewed the evidence submitted by the prosecutor. His comments were included in the United Nations Secretary General's own report of the fall of Srebrenica, which described the UN's own responsibility for that tragedy. Let me repeat them here:

After Srebrenica fell to besieging Serbian forces in July 1995, a truly terrible massacre of the Muslim population appears to have taken place. The evidence tendered by the Prosecutor describes scenes of unimaginable savagery: thousands of men executed and buried in mass graves, hundreds of men buried alive, men and women mutilated and slaughtered, children killed before their mothers' eyes . . . .These are truly scenes from hell, written on the darkest pages of history.

Relevant issues:

Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and War Crimes

Relevant countries:

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Serbia

Leadership:

Ben Cardin

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article

Srebrenica: Twelve Years after the Genocide and the Signing of the Dayton Accords

Monday, December 03, 2007

By Cliff Bond, Senior Advisor In February of this year, the International Court of Justice issued a decision confirming that an act of genocide had been committed in the UN designated safe haven of Srebrenica in July 1995. The court decision came at a time when political tensions were already high in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A hotly contested election and a failed attempt at constitutional reform a few months earlier had led senior politicians to revert to war-time rhetoric not heard since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in late 1995. Many in the international community failed to appreciate how the decision would further sharpen inter-ethnic tensions and unleash a pent-up sense of humiliation and injustice among Bosnian Muslims for the failure to either prevent this atrocity or hold its principle perpetrators, indicted but still at-large Bosnian Serb wartime leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, accountable. In response to this deteriorating political situation and in view of my experience as a former U.S. Ambassador to Sarajevo, then-High Representative Christian Schwartz-Schilling, the senior international representative responsible for implementing Dayton, asked me in May to serve as his Envoy to Srebrenica. My one year mandate was to address concerns of Srebrenica’s residents and future returnees for justice, security and a better life. The Helsinki Commission kindly made me available to serve on a part-time basis for this purpose. Mid-way through this mandate I am pleased to report progress is being made by local authorities and the international community working constructively together to improve conditions in the Srebrenica region, albeit much more needs to be done. At the beginning of our work in Srebrenica we faced the need to reduce political tensions on the ground. Without calming the situation and creating space for dialogue, progress and cooperation would not have been possible. Many factors contributed to a now-improved environment, but a decision to remove an Orthodox church constructed illegally on privately-owned Bosnian Muslim land in the village of Konjevic Polje, not far from Srebrenica, was certainly important. This had been a long standing dispute and action on it underscored that in every part of Bosnia and Herzegovina the rights of citizens, regardless of ethnicity, must be respected. Unfortunately, the decision is yet to be fully implemented. The sooner it is, the more confidence it will generate and the more trust will be built among the citizens of Srebrenica. But this is a small step when compared with the continued liberty of many of those who planned and carried out the genocide at Srebrenica, which remains a source of frustration for the survivors. The actions of incoming High Representative Miroslav Lajcak in early July to accelerate investigations of the suspects of the Srebrenica atrocities was significant, as was the full cooperation in implementing these measures by the authorities of the Republika Srpska – the Bosnian Serb entity, which along with the Muslim-Croat Federation, make up the decentralized state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A decision to fund a team of international investigators and then to open a branch of the State Prosecutor’s Office in Srebrenica were also meant to reinforce this effort and speed up prosecutions. Taken together, these actions assured the public that the individuals who played a part in the crimes at Srebrenica will eventually be brought to justice. Another significant step had been taken earlier by Lajcak’s predecessor, Christian Schwartz-Schilling. He acted to establish the legal authority for the Srebrenica-Potocari Foundation (a memorial and cemetery for the victims) at the state level and provided for its security through a state-level law enforcement agency. This addressed a fundamental concern of surviving family members for the Foundation’s future once the Office of the High Representative and the exceptional international presence ended in the country. This should be viewed as a human and moral gesture taken out of recognition of the tragedy that occurred, not as a political one, as some have chosen to portray it. The decision deserves the full support of all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the current situation in terms of public order around the Srebrenica region is good, returnees are understandably sensitive to the issue of security. We are working with entity authorities to establish and maintain more ethnically balanced policing in the municipality. Along with the speedier prosecution of war criminals, nothing would make returnees to the region feel more secure and protected. When I came back to Srebrenica in May this year, I found it little changed since my first visit in 2001. In the past six months the authorities of the Republika Srpska have invested more than $25 million in infrastructure and other public service improvements in the region and deserve credit for the effective way in which this has been carried out. Additional funding will be dedicated for this purpose in the entity’s 2008 budget and municipal authorities will be involved in planning and identifying priorities for this spending. The state-level Council of Ministers has also approved an approximately $7 million spending package for infrastructure development, business promotion and the improvement of public services. This is a good package of measures, and includes physical improvements to the town’s center, but it needs to be implemented as quickly as possible. The Federation has also devoted some $2.5 million to support sustainable returns and directed some of its public enterprises to invest in the region. A Development Conference was organized in Srebrenica by the U.N. Development Program, international donors and the municipality on July 3. Its object was less about raising more money, though it did, and more about better coordination among donors to produce a more visible impact of the considerable assistance already dedicated to the region. Donors need to better align their activities with the municipality’s own priorities and be more transparent and inform the public of their programs and results. Nothing will change economic conditions for the better in Srebrenica more than the generation of new jobs. Small but still important first steps have been taken to expand Bosnian Muslim employment opportunities in public services and enterprises in the area, and this is a positive step. More certainly needs to be done on this score. The real potential for job creation, however, is in the private sector and through attracting new investment to the region. This is why we organized a major investment conference on November 6. The conference demonstrated that investor opportunities and interest exist in Srebrenica, and an American and Slovene firm announced plans to invest in the municipality at the end of the conference. There have been additional expressions of investor interest since, but now local authorities must work, with the support of the international community, to translate this potential into actual investment and more jobs. Despite an agreement signed by the Federation and the Republika Srpska earlier this year on improving access to health services, returnees to Srebrenica complain that they are still unable to get the treatment and benefits to which they are entitled. This is also true of other social services, which like health care are the competency of each entity. The problems arise as refugees return from one entity to another. Entity authorities must cooperate in finding a solution to this as a matter of urgency, not only for Srebrenica, but for other returnee communities throughout the country. Unless you have spent time in Srebrenica, you cannot appreciate how isolated the community is. Currently most villages in the area have no access to radio or television signals, and this only strengthens a sense of isolation and abandonment. Thankfully, the Dutch and U.S. governments are working to establish radio and television coverage throughout the area. A U.S. firm, Cisco Systems, will also soon provide wireless broadband Internet access to the community, allowing Srebrenica’s schools and youth to connect with the outside world. All of these positive initiatives will only succeed if a constructive dialogue is maintained among the members of the Srebrenica community. Dialogue requires courage and confidence and will be essential in the months ahead if we are to reach agreement on such issues as developing Srebrenica’s natural resources, including its mineral springs which were a major pre-war tourist attraction, bringing other business to the region and providing a better ethnic balance to its police and other public services, including in the senior ranks. In my work over the last six months, I have found the people of Srebrenica, after all that they have been through and in the midst of continuing real hardship, are capable of working together to build a better future. In this they can serve as an example to the political leaders of their country who must work together to achieve the constitutional and other reforms that can secure Bosnia and Herzegovina’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.
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Bosnia-Herzegovina: Outstanding Issues in Post-Conflict Recovery and Reconciliation

Thursday, November 08, 2007

The hearing will focus on outstanding issues from the 1992-95 conflict, which was characterized by violent ethnic cleansing, and how they shape politics, society and economic development in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. Issues of particular interest include bringing those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide to justice, the successful return of displaced persons and refugees, and the identification of missing persons. Like virtually all European countries, Bosnia-Herzegovina has strong aspirations for European integration, but the legacy of the war has made a popular consensus to necessary reform efforts exceedingly difficult to obtain.
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Combating Hate Crimes and Discrimination in the OSCE

Tuesday, November 06, 2007

Congressman Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL), Chairman of the CSCE, held a briefing on hate crimes and discrimination in the OSCE region. Joining Chairman Hastings at the dais were Helsinki Commissioners Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR) and Congresswoman Hilda Solis (D-CA). The briefing focused on intolerance and discrimination within the 56 countries that make up the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Congressman Hastings emphasized the discrimination against the Roma and other minorities of Turkish, African, and south Asian descent when they attempt to apply for jobs, find housing, and get an education The panel of speakers – Dr. Dou Dou Diene, United Nations Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance; Dr. Tiffany Lightbourn, Department of Homeland Security, Science & Technology Directorate; and Mr. Micah H. Naftalin and Mr. Nickolai Butkevich, UCSJ: Union of Councils for Soviet Jews – spoke of the rising popularity of right-wing extremist party, who espouse vicious anti-Semitic slogans and appeal to a 19th century form of European ethnic identity. In addition, Urs Ziswiler, the Ambassador of Switzerland, attended the briefing and commented on the rise in xenophobic views in Switzerland.
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Parliamentary Elections in Serbia Reveal Progress in Democratic Development but also Support for Nationalist Causes

Monday, March 19, 2007

By Clifford Bond and Robert Hand On January 21, Serbia held elections for the 250-seat parliament, the National Assembly. Monitored by more than 300 international observers under OSCE auspices, including two members of the Helsinki Commission staff, the elections were overwhelmingly viewed as being conducted in a free and fair manner. The outcome and related institutional questions, on the other hand, indicate that Serbia’s political development remains burdened by the legacy of the Milosevic regime that ruled for over a decade before being ousted in 2000, even as the country moves in an increasingly democratic direction. These elections were held in the aftermath of the dissolution of the state-union between Serbia and Montenegro following the latter’s declaration of independence in June 2006. Serbia subsequently adopted a new constitution in October 2006. Looming over these formal developments and new elections, however, is the larger question of Kosovo’s future status. The actual timing of the elections was used as a pretext for delaying a UN recommendation on Kosovo, which is expected shortly. Based on the conduct of previous elections in Serbia, there was little concern that these elections would fall short of international standards. However, some concerns were raised regarding the conduct of the earlier constitutional referendum, which witnessed a strong, last-minute push of voting in some regions with the apparent purpose of ensuring a positive outcome. The constitution itself is controversial, particularly in its numerous references to Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, which may have led some segments of Serbian society to boycott the referendum. Undoubtedly, more important international concerns include the uncertain direction of Serbia’s political development and a desire to strengthen Serbia’s democratic institutions. OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Goran Lennmarker, a Swedish parliamentarian, was designated by the OSCE Chair-in-Office to lead the short-term election observation mission as Special Coordinator. The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) conducted a long-term observation effort headed by retired German Ambassador Geert Ahrens. Perhaps the chief criticism of the election process was the obvious gap between the voter’s choice and the actual selection of the person who ultimately takes a parliamentary seat. The Serbian voter chooses a political party or coalition on the election list, but, once it is determined how many seats a particular party/coalition gets, the party leadership then has ten days in which to select which of the 250 persons on its submitted party list actually take a seat. This method of selecting parliamentarians has been criticized for lacking transparency and effectively concentrating attention not on specific candidates and their views or abilities but on the political party leaders who retain control over their members. This leadership control may be further strengthened by requiring deputies to sign undated letters of resignation which can be used to remove them if they fail to observe party discipline. On the other hand, efforts were undertaken – albeit not without some opposition -- to modify existing law and encourage minority representation, including lowering the number of signatures for parties representing ethnic minorities from the normal 10,000 to only 3,000 and dropping the threshold needed to enter the parliament from 5 percent of the votes case to 0.4 percent (1/250) of those cast. Two Hungarian and two Romani political parties joined a Bosniak coalition from the Sandzak region and an Albanian coalition from southern Serbia on the election ballot. Albanian participation was the first since 1997, although two Albanian-based political parties which originally joined the coalition subsequently withdrew and supported a boycott of the elections. The election campaign was long by Serbian standards and quite intense. In contrast to the constitutional referendum campaign, the issue of Kosovo’s status did not dominate campaign rhetoric. Instead, there was considerable and perhaps refreshing discussion of economic issues, for example, reflecting the fact that despite significant economic growth, unemployment remains high. EU enlargement may also increasingly isolate Serbia and its people within the region. Some parties focused more heavily on corruption, property restitution and other economic issues. The democratic and nationalistic range of the dominant Serbian political parties differed on integration mostly in their degree of enthusiasm and differentiation between support for joining the European Union on the one hand and joining NATO on the other. They likewise differed on Kosovo mostly to the degree to which its loss to Serbia was an acknowledged inevitability. Comments by politicians and diplomats from other countries supporting reformist parties late in the campaign prompted cries of interference from more nationalist parties. Observers monitoring media coverage of the campaign reported a very balanced approach, particularly among the broadcast media, as well as a positive tone indicating almost too much official instruction about how to remain neutral. The print media’s performance was more uneven in its campaign coverage, but low reliance on print media in Serbia made such differentiation of questionable significance. Election day was largely dry and unseasonably mild, and this contributed to high voter turnout of above 60 percent. This reversed trends toward voter apathy in previous elections. Out-of-country voting also took place for Serbian citizens in 34 other countries. Upon visiting their designated polling station, over 8,500 in all, voters typically encountered a polling board enlarged by political party representation to often as many as 20 to 30 or more members. Nevertheless, with few exceptions the polling was conducted in a professional manner that respected the secrecy of the ballot and made election-day manipulation, if any was intended, difficult to accomplish. The ballot presented the same list of 20 political parties or coalitions to voters across the country, albeit in different languages depending on concentrations of ethnic minorities residing in the area. Unlike the referendum in which the constitution would either pass or fail, polling board members represented political parties that had no real expectation of an outright victory and merely hoped to achieve or maybe exceed the high end of predictions based on public opinion polls. This likely reduced tension on election day, including during the critical counting of ballots once polls closed, despite significant political differences within polling boards. The Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), a civic non-governmental organization, helped reduce tension by peppering Serbia with close to 4,000 domestic observers to discourage irregularities. The day after the election, before final results were announced, the International Election Observation Mission held a press conference to announce its preliminary conclusions. As Special Coordinator, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Goran Lennmarker released the joint statement which began with the clear statement that the “parliamentary elections in Serbia were free and fair. They provided a genuine opportunity for the citizens of Serbia to freely choose from a range of political platforms. The 20 lists of political parties and coalitions vigorously competed in an open campaign environment. The election campaign was calm, and checks and balances ensured that the election reflects the will of the people, in line with the OSCE’s Commitments as well as with the Council of Europe standards.” The OSCE’s ODIHR released an additional report of its preliminary findings based on the month-long observation of its 28-member team. Despite the overwhelmingly positive assessment, the Republican Election Commission did cancel results in 14 polling stations due to irregularities. World reaction to the results focused heavily on the continued support among the Serbian electorate for the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) led by indicted war criminal Vojislav Seselj, which garnered 28.7 percent of the vote, up from 27.6 percent in the last elections in 2003. That, of course, rightly leads to concern about Serbia’s inability to reject the extreme nationalism fostered by the Milosevic regime throughout the 1990s. On the other hand, the Democratic Party (DS) of President Boris Tadic came in second with 22.9 percent of the vote, an increase from 12.6 percent in 2003 and an indication that entrenched nationalist sentiments have not negated strong support for democratic development and integration. The coalition led by the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) of the current Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, gained only 16.7 percent of the vote, compared to 17.7 percent in 2003. The DSS, which bridges the nationalist/democratic divide in Serbian politics, appears to be replaced by the DS as the leading reform-oriented party in Serbia. G17-Plus, which has focused heavily on economic reform, saw its percentage of support drop but retained enough for parliamentary representation, as did the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), once led by Slobodan Milosevic. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a newer party led by Cedomir Jovanovic which more completely than any other rejects the Milosevic legacy, crossed the 5 percent threshold by leading a coalitions of like-minded parties. The Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) of Vuk Draskovic, which traditionally featured prominently in Serbia’s multi-party political history, did not. One Hungarian and two Romani parties, along with the Bosniak and the Albanian coalition, won one or more seats in the National Assembly. The odds that the SRS will be part of a coalition government appear to be slimmer than one year ago, when that was a major concern. Instead, the hope is for the DS and the DSS to overcome differences to form a new government with the support of other democratic forces, such as the G-17 Plus. Such a coalition could advance Serbia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Prime Minister Kostunica’s past government relied on SPS support to stay in power, and he has indicated an unwillingness to enter a coalition with the Radicals. Personality conflicts, as well as differences over important issues such as cooperation with the Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the appropriate response to an expected UN proposal on the status of Kosovo could complicate coalition formation. Most leading Serbian parties have counted on international concern over Serbia’s political direction to delay an expected UN recommendation, but that appears increasingly unlikely. A proposal on a new status for Kosovo will jolt the Serbian political scene. Many in Serbia feel victimized by the Milosevic regime. They fail to fully appreciate, however, the tremendous damage and suffering inflicted on the neighboring peoples of the former Yugoslavia during the Milosevic era through the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and a deep distrust resulting from Serbia’s inability to acknowledge that reality. Serbia will not fulfill its democratic promise until it fully comes to terms with this recent history. For that reason full cooperation with The Hague Tribunal remains essential. Over the longer term, democratic forces inside the country should prevail and advance Serbia’s reconciliation with its neighbors and its full integration into Europe, but without a mental break with its past this task will take longer and be more difficult to accomplish.
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Remarks by Ambassador Clifford G. Bond at the International Forum Bosnia

Saturday, March 10, 2007

It is good to be back in Sarajevo again and I feel very much at home in this city and this country. When Dr. Mahmutcehajic invited me to speak at today’s conference on “American Policy in the Western Balkans,” I suggested that it might be best if I provided a perspective on the on-going work of the Helsinki Commission, which is where I am currently serving, and its impact on U.S. policy in the Balkans. The Commission is a unique institution made up of members of the U.S. Congress. It is not an easy task to generalize about the views of Commission members since each representative and senator is independent. Those who serve on the Commission do so because they share a commitment to human rights and democracy, and want to have an impact on U.S. engagement on these issues especially in the OSCE area, but beyond as well. Congress’ role in foreign policy, as in other areas, is to ensure that policy reflects the democratically expressed will of the American people. It balances the expertise of diplomats at the State Department and other Executive Branch agencies with a consideration of what the public will support. This is one reason why U.S. foreign policy has taken a more comprehensive view of security that includes democratic development and human rights, as opposed to a more “realpolik” view of the world. This was evident in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. In response to conflict in Bosnia, for example, many in Congress pressed the Bush and later Clinton Administration for a more activist and a more interventionist response. Members of Congress, including members of the Commission at that time, were among the first in government to advocate not only for efforts to contain the conflict but for decisive action, including the use of force if necessary, to stop it. Whenever I addressed an audience in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in the past, the question invariably arose of whether the Balkans remained a priority for the U.S. Obviously the region receives much less attention today than it did 10 years ago. But it would be incorrect to say that the Balkans is ignored and developments on the ground are not being followed on Capitol Hill. There remains an understanding within Congress that the work of the international community is incomplete in this region and that the states of the western Balkans deserve to be integrated into Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions. This has sustained Congressional support for NATO enlargement and the process of EU integration of the western Balkans, a view that runs even deeper among members of the Helsinki Commission. Moreover, at the initiative of representatives of the more than 300,000 members of the Bosnian-American diaspora, a new bipartisan Bosnian Caucus is being set up within Congress to focus on and support issues of importance to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region. The Helsinki Process and the Commission Now let me say a few words about the work of the Helsinki Commission. As I said, it is an independent agency created by Congress in 1976 to advance human rights and encourage compliance with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly its human rights commitments. The Commission is composed of members of both houses of the U.S. Congress. Successive agreements within the Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have expanded these common Helsinki standards into a whole framework of human and humanitarian rights. These have come to be termed the “human dimension” of the OSCE’s work. These agreements are not treaties, but political commitments which all participating states, including Bosnia and its neighbors, have adopted on the basis of consensus. Significantly, however, these same states have agreed that these are issues of direct and legitimate concern to all participating states of the OSCE and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned. Democracy and human rights are thus matters of international concern. This has created a Helsinki process of bilateral and multilateral dialogue that includes the active participation of NGOs as well as governments in assessing the level of compliance with these common commitments. One element of that process is an annual review of implementation which takes place in Warsaw. I participated in the 2006 session and can assure you that it provided a forum for frank and open exchange of how our countries are or are not living up to our OSCE commitments. My own government faced serious criticism in terms of some aspects of its conduct of the fight against terrorism. Since 1989, Europe has undergone an historic transformation and the OSCE has played a vital role in this process of transition to democracy, particularly in the post conflict situation in the western Balkans. Much of this work has been driven on the ground by its field missions, such as the one headed here in Sarajevo by Ambassador Davidson. The Commission believes strongly that this work remains critical to the states of the western Balkans in helping them to overcome a legacy of communism and war. A permanent democratic transformation in the western Balkans will require a rethinking of the overall conditions of society with an aim of protecting rights and instituting peaceful change. Public debate needs to be expanded beyond a discussion of group rights to the rights of the individual and improving the overall quality and dignity of life, which is the essence of the OSCE’s human dimension. This process has not advanced nearly as far as it must to build modern societies in the region. Integration through Consolidating Democracy and Rule of Law Let me now review some of the areas of particular interest to the Commission and its members and where it will be pushing to influence U.S. policy in future. These are areas where I think more public debate and more active local NGO engagement with governments in the region will be essential. As I said, the Commission has been a strong advocate for the integration of the region into Euro-Atlantic institutions. This remains the best long term strategy for securing both peace and prosperity. The key to that integration is consolidating democracy, rule of law and good governance. There has been tremendous progress in this regard, but complacency must be avoided. Political leaders in Bosnia have come to realize that reforming their Dayton-era constitution in ways that make the government more functional and compatible with EU requirements is a necessary step. The U.S. Senate adopted a resolution (S. Res 400, 109th Congress) last year voicing support for this constitutional reform process. It did not advocate for specific changes, which must be decided by the people of Bosnia, not the international community. From the perspective of the Helsinki Commission, however, we think it critical that reforms, in addition to changes in the structure of government, guarantee the human and civic rights of all the citizens of BiH. As you know, the current constitutional provisions restrict Serbs living in the Federation, Bosniaks and Croats living in the RS, and non-constituent peoples, no matter in what part of the country they reside, from running for the post of BiH presidency. This is a violation of both the European Convention on Human Rights and the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document. This inability of all citizens to fully participate in BiH’s political life should be corrected. If we look at elections as another benchmark of progress in consolidating democracy, we can see that virtually all countries in the western Balkans are approaching the international standards for free and fair elections. Last October’s elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina were judged by the OSCE to be in line with international standards. Similarly the general elections held recently in Serbia were judged by OSCE as being conducted in a free and fair manner. Going beyond the technical conduct of these elections, however, the results and the tenor of the elections in the region are a matter of concern. In Bosnia nationalistic campaign rhetoric approached pre-war levels and polarized the electorate along ethnic lines. In Serbia the strong showing of the Serbian Radical Party and statements by other politicians indicated a lack of willingness among a large part of the population to come to terms with the crimes committed during the Milosevic era. Hopefully, over time, democratic forces in the region will prevail and a true reconciliation can be achieved. Without a meaningful break with the past and a full recognition in Serbia and the Republika Srpska (RS) of the crimes that were committed during the Milosevic era, however, this task will be immensely more difficult to accomplish. The decision of the International Court of Justice on February 26 does not change the need for this recognition or absolve Serbia or the Republika Srpska of responsibility in this regard. The ICJ confirmed an act of genocide was committed and that Serbia was in a unique position to prevent it. By failing to do so, Serbia violated the Genocide Convention and continues to violate it by not bringing the perpetrators of that genocide to justice. The court’s decision also makes clear that the full responsibility for conducting that genocide lies with the leadership and members of the military in the RS at that time. Unfinished Business It was to bring war criminals to justice and to determine the objective truth of what occurred in the Balkans that the Helsinki Commission was an early proponent of the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. It has pressed all countries in the region to fully cooperate with the Tribunal. The Commission has welcomed the establishment of the War Crimes Chamber within the BiH State Court, and the decision to transfer more cases from The Hague to the region for local prosecution. Despite building this indigenous capacity to conduct trials, there is a strongly felt sense within the Commission that the work of the International Tribunal should not be concluded until Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic are brought to justice. The real message that Belgrade should take from the ICJ’s verdict on February 26 and convey to these indicted war criminals is that: “your time is up.” Other consequences of the war are still being dealt with. More than ten years after Dayton, additional mass graves continue to be uncovered. The Helsinki Commission recently organized a briefing on Capitol Hill at which Amor Masovic reported on the work of the State Missing Persons Commission. We believe that international support for determining the identification of these missing persons must continue. The right of refugees and displaced persons from the Balkan conflicts to return home has not been fully guaranteed. The 2005 Sarajevo Declaration on Refugee Return and Integration was a notable achievement in this regard, but implementation of this trilateral arrangement has been too slow. The Commission has urged Bosnia and Croatia and Serbia in particular to intensify efforts to ensure durable solutions for resettlement are found and displaced persons and refugees given access to all rights, including the right to property and citizenship. The legal issues involved are complicated, but with political will these can be managed and refugees re-integrated into society. In the midst of war in the 1990’s the region was confronted with a new and dangerous form of organized crime – human trafficking. Considerable progress has been made in the region in combating this modern day form of slavery, but even greater efforts are required. Trafficking also needs to be looked upon as not just as one field of criminal activity, but as part of a wider issue of corruption in the region. While criminals organize this activity, it is corruption that allows them to get away with it or go unpunished when caught. Preventing Future Conflict A fundamental principle behind the Helsinki Final Act is that there can be no true security without a commitment to democracy and human rights. Addressing the root causes of intolerance and discrimination are therefore essential to preventing future conflict in the region. The OSCE has done pioneering work in this area and is developing programs to prevent hate crimes and discrimination by confronting the sources of intolerance and by strengthening respect for ethnic and religious diversity. In a series of high level conferences the OSCE has sought to encourage states to collect hate crimes statistics, share information and strengthen education to combat intolerance as well as increase training of law enforcement officials. This is clearly a subject of importance to the entire region and governments should be cooperating in this work. We want to encourage regional participation at the next high level meeting on tolerance to be held in June in Bucharest. The Romanian government is now putting together an agenda which will cover racism, anti-Semitism and intolerance against Muslims and Christians as well as relevant programs to combat this discrimination. We want the conference to consider ways that our societies can move beyond tolerance to acceptance and recognition of diversity. I hope we can count on broad government and NGO representation from the region, but particularly from Bosnia, at the conference. Bosnia can and should be a leader in promoting dialogue among religious groups. We would very much like to see Bosnia host an OSCE event on this theme in future. At the Warsaw human dimension’s meeting last year there was only one Bosnian NGO represented. This was the National Council of Roma, but its participation was very significant for us. The plight of the Roma has been a special concern of the Helsinki Commission. No group within the former Yugoslavia has faced discrimination and exclusion so broadly as the Roma have. They continue to be deprived of housing and property rights, face difficulties in accessing personal documents and establishing citizenship. Many have no access to healthcare or education. In view of this widespread discrimination, not just within the Balkans but throughout Europe, the OSCE has sought to address the specific problems of the Roma. Your local Bosnian Helsinki Committee has also recently translated a human rights manual into Romani and I hope this will assist this marginalized community to assert and defend its rights. Eight governments of central and southeastern Europe have taken their own political initiative, titled the “Decade of Roma Inclusion,” to close the gap in welfare and living conditions between the Roma and non-Roma in their societies. Their aim is to break the cycle of poverty and exclusion by 2015. Several of the western Balkan states are active in this initiative. My understanding is that Bosnia is not yet a participant. It should be. One way to judge a society is by how well it protects the rights of those least able to realize them on their own. Any sincere effort to create modern, rights-based societies in the Balkans cannot overlook the plight and abuse of the civil, political, economic and social rights of the Roma. Among fundamental freedoms is the right to religious expression and belief. This is an issue of deep concern to Commission members. The right to practice your faith is no more secure than your readiness to acknowledge the right of others to practice theirs. Since the fall of communism various laws have been adopted in the region to provide for religious freedom, but these have unfortunately had the effect in some respects of restricting this fundamental right. They set numerical thresholds for the registration of religious groups, discriminate in favor traditional faiths, and place limits on free speech and proselytizing. These restrictions are particularly burdensome to new religious denominations and can lead to harassment against and stigmatization of their members. Albania, in contrast, has adopted a progressive law which provides for a neutral registration system that is applied universally. This is a model others in the region should consider adopting. Meanwhile, there is a need to step up efforts to respect the sanctity and ensure the safety of places of worship that have been targets of ethnically based violence in Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo. Governments need to adopt a “zero-tolerance” approach in responding to such provocations. Finally let me address the situation of Kosovo. The pending decision on the final status of Kosovo has given rise to much anxiety and apprehension in the region. Much of the debate on Kosovo has focused on the larger issues of sovereignty, territorial integrity and self-determination. Within Congress and even within the Helsinki Commission reaching a consensus on the right outcome in Kosovo is difficult, but two things are clear. First, there is no connection between Kosovo’s future and the recognized sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Second, whatever form a Kosovo settlement takes, the fundamental issue in the Commission’s view is whether or not it improves the respect for human rights, especially the rights of those people belonging to the Serb, Roma and other minority communities. Those rights include the protection of property and the right of return for displaced persons. Any settlement should also encourage a process of integration and inclusion of these minority communities within a broader Kosovo society. From this perspective the proposed plan of UN Special Envoy Ahtissari can serves as a solid basis for compromise. Even if Belgrade and Pristina cannot agree on the issue of status, they should be engaged in serious negotiations to protect the rights of these minority communities. But whatever becomes of Kosovo, the OSCE and other international human rights standards must apply there and the OSCE must be fully involved in monitoring implementation of any settlement to assure these rights are respected. Conclusion My remarks have focused on some areas of concern, but let me say in conclusion that the region of the western Balkans has come a long way since the 1990’s. The international community has made a substantial investment in the peace, stability and reconstruction in the region, and we welcome this progress. Slovenia is a full-fledged member of NATO and the EU. Croatia is well on the road to membership in both, and Macedonia and Albania are making progress in the right direction. In a welcome development at the end of last year, Bosnia, Serbia and newly independent Montenegro were invited to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace. The regional trajectory is positive. More importantly, the EU and NATO have made a political commitment to include all of the western Balkan states into Euro-Atlantic institutions, and recognized that Europe will be incomplete without your countries. That does not relieve you of the responsibility to meet the conditions of membership in these institutions, but it does offer a bright future for the region. The issues your societies now face are perhaps less dramatic than achieving peace was a decade and more ago. These are issues of complying with human rights norms and improving the quality of life and the relationship between the individual and his or her government. These issues should be a matter of open, public debate in local and regional fora like this one. For too long nationalism and an “us versus them” mentality have dominated public discussion and driven politics in the region. It is time politicians on all sides put down the megaphones and drop the rhetoric that they have been using to polarize the situation. A new dialogue based on an open discussion of these human issues needs to replace it. This is essential to preventing future conflict, promoting economic and social development and sustaining peace. Only political will on the part of governments and party leaders and the full engagement of NGOs and citizens in this Helsinki process of dialogue can get this job done and complete the transition of the western Balkan states into permanent and stable democracies.
statement

Southeastern Europe: Moving from Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide to Euro-Atlantic Integration

Thursday, December 07, 2006

When I was appointed Chairman of the Helsinki Commission in early 1995, Mr. Speaker, the U.S. foreign policy establishment and its European counterparts were seized by a genocidal conflict of aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many here in the Congress were already deeply involved in bipartisan efforts to end the conflict by urging a decisive, international response under U.S. leadership. I can still recall the sense of horror, outrage and shame when the Srebrenica massacre occurred and nothing was done to stop it and other atrocities committed against civilians. Slobodan Milosevic, meanwhile, was comfortably entrenched as Serbia’s leader, with Kosovo under his repressive thumb. The situation was truly bleak. Today, relative calm prevails throughout the Balkans region, though simmering tensions and other serious problems could lead to renewed crisis and conflict, if left unchecked. Overcoming the legacy of the past and restoring dignity and ensuring justice for the victims will require sustained engagement and vigilance. Integrating the countries of the region into European institutions can advance this process. Slovenia has become a full-fledged member of both NATO and the European Union. Croatia is well on its way to similar membership, and Macedonia and Albania are making steady progress in the right direction. In a welcome development, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the epicenter of bloody carnage and mass displacement in the mid-1990s, was invited last week to participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program, along with Serbia and the newly independent state of Montenegro. As a longstanding member and leader of the Helsinki Commission, I want to highlight some of the numerous initiatives we have undertaken in an attempt to draw attention to developments in the Balkans and to influence related policy. Since 1995, we have convened more than 20 hearings on specific aspects of the region as well as related briefings, legislation, letters, statements and meetings. These efforts have been undertaken with an uncommon degree of bipartisanship. In this regard, I particularly want to thank the Commission’s outgoing Ranking Member, Mr. Cardin of Maryland, for helping to make this a reality. Among the Commission’s most noteworthy accomplishments, I would include garnering the strong support that contributed to the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and pressing countries to cooperate in bringing those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide to justice. I would include the change in U.S. policy from relying on Milosevic to implement the Dayton Agreement to supporting democracy in Serbia as the long-term and genuine partner in building regional peace and stability. We have maintained a significant focus on elections, encouraging all the countries in the region to strive to meet international standards for free and fair elections as well as referenda. There has been tremendous progress in this regard. The Commission’s support for the OSCE, I believe, has helped the organization’s field activities in southeastern Europe to be more successful in promoting respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the people, regardless of ethnicity. Finally, on the more controversial policy of NATO’s action against Serbia in 1999, the Commission served as a forum to air differing views on the policy response while finding common ground in addressing the humanitarian crises, documenting human rights abuses and holding human rights violators to account. Mr. Speaker, while welcoming this progress in southeastern Europe, I would caution against complacency as the region faces significant challenges. Maintaining positive momentum will require much from actors in the region as well as the international community, including the United States. First and foremost is the situation in Kosovo. The pending decisions that will be made on Kosovo’s status give rise to growing expectation as well as apprehension and concern. Despite the many debates on larger issues of sovereignty, territorial integrity and self-determination, these decisions should and will ultimately be judged by whether or not they lead to improved respect for human rights, especially the rights of those people belonging to the Serb, Roma and other minority communities in Kosovo. The members of the minority communities deserve to be treated as people, not as pawns in a fight over territory and power. They should be allowed to integrate rather than remain isolated, and they should not be discouraged from integration when opportunities arise. I remain deeply concerned that these issues are not being given the attention they deserve. Whatever Kosovo becomes, OSCE and other international human rights standards must apply. Similarly, there is a need to ensure that justice is vigorously pursued for the victims of horrendous human rights violations. Conditionality on assistance to Serbia, as well as on that country’s integration, must remain firmly in place until Belgrade cooperates fully in locating at-large indicted war criminals and facilitating their transfer to the ICTY in The Hague. It is an outrage that Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic remain at large. After refusing to take meaningful action on these cases, Serbia cannot be let off the hook now, but should be pressed to comply with its international obligations. A related issue is that of missing persons. Ten years after Dayton, additional mass graves continued to be uncovered, and the identification of the remains of relatives and loved ones is important for the survivors of past atrocities and their societies. The Commission recently held a briefing on identifying remains found in mass graves in Bosnia, and I hope that support for determining the fate of missing persons can be further strengthened. While some progress has been made in combating trafficking in persons in the region, all countries there need to intensify their efforts to end this modern-day form of slavery. Political will and adequate resources will be required, including through enhanced efforts by law enforcement and more vigorous prosecution of traffickers while providing protection for their victims. Religious freedoms also remain a cause for concern. Various laws in the region allegedly providing for religious freedom do more to restrict this fundamental right by establishing thresholds for registration, by discriminating against small or new religious groups through tiers of recognition with associated privileges for traditional faiths, and by precluding the sharing of creeds or limiting free speech. These restrictions are particularly burdensome to smaller religious groups and can lead to stigmatization, harassment, and discrimination against their members. For instance, Kosovo’s new religion law singles out certain communities for special status while failing to address how other religious groups can obtain juridical personality as a religious organization, thereby creating a significant legal void from the start. I urge Kosovo authorities to follow the progressive Albanian system and create a neutral registration system of general applicability. Macedonia is considering a draft law now, and I hope authorities will fully adopt the recommendations of the OSCE Panel of Experts on Religious Freedom, as certain provisions of the draft regarding the granting of legal personality need additional refinement. I similarly call on Serbian officials to amend their current law and ensure all groups seeking registration receive legal status. Meanwhile, there is a need to step up efforts to respect the sanctity and ensure the safety of places of worship that have in the past been the targets of ethnically-based violence in Kosovo, Bosnia, Serbia and elsewhere. Mr. Speaker, concerted efforts by courageous leaders in the Balkans and elsewhere have helped move the region from the edge of the abyss to the threshold for a brighter and more prosperous future. I congratulate the countries of southeastern Europe on the progress achieved thus far and encourage them to make further progress to ensure that all of the people of the region benefit.
hearing

Human Rights, Democracy, and Integration in South Central Europe

Thursday, June 15, 2006

The hearing, led by the Hon. Christopher H. Smith, the Hon. Sam Brownback , and the Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, focused primarily on the legal restrictions on religious activities and other attacks on religious freedom, lagging efforts to combat trafficking in persons, discrimination and violence against Roma, and the prevalence of official corruption and organized crime. The efforts to encourage Bosnia-Herzegovina to move beyond the limitations imposed by the Dayton Peace Agreement will be discussed. Further, the plight of the displaced and minority communities of Kosovo, and the need for Serbia to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal will also be covered.
article

From Promises to Practice: Implementation of National Policies on Roma, Sinti and Travellers

Tuesday, June 13, 2006

By Erika Schlager, Counsel for International Law A recent conference on Romani issues provided a positive benchmark on how far the international community has come in addressing discrimination toward Europe’s largest ethnic minority group. The meeting also served to highlight how much more national governments have to do to address the needs of Roma in their countries. On May 4 and 5, 2006, the Government of Romania, along with several inter-governmental and non-governmental partners, hosted an “International Conference on the Implementation and Harmonization of National Policies for Roma, Sinti, and Travellers: Guidelines for a Common Vision.” The two-day meeting, conducted in Romani, Romanian, and English, was well attended and focused on housing, employment, community policing, and the status of Roma in Kosovo. Although one opening speaker joked that the magnitude of logos on display for the numerous hosts reminded him of medieval European heraldic insignia, the meeting demonstrated that at least in one area – Romani issues – two major players in this field, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, are able to put aside institutional rivalries in favor of cooperation. The conference hosts included the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the European Union Monitoring Center, the European Roma and Travellers Forum, the OSCE, the Project on Ethnic Relations, and the Romanian Government in its capacity as Chair of the Council of Europe and as President of the Decade of Roma Inclusion. The Bucharest conference was convened to follow up on a similar meeting held in October 2005 in Warsaw. The title of the meeting underscored one of the key goals of Romani activists: turning promises into practice. For national governments, this means developing both the legal framework as well as the political will necessary for the full implementation of national policies and practices that meet the needs of their Romani minorities. Currently eight countries – Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Slovakia – participate in the “Decade of Roma Inclusion.” The Decade is a multilateral initiative, supported by the Open Society Institute (OSI) and the World Bank, designed to establish measurable national goals for improving the situation of Roma in four priority areas: education, employment, health, and housing. In the context of this initiative, all of the countries involved have adopted national action plans as a basis for addressing these specific areas during the period 2005-2015. Romani leaders look to opportunities like the Bucharest conference to push for improved implementation of the action plans. Nicolae Gheorghe, a veteran of the Romani civil rights movement who will soon conclude his tenure as the OSCE Senior Advisor remarked that, 16 years ago, he thought the impetus for change would come from international organizations. Today, he suggested, change must be implemented by national governments. The focus of the conference was by no means exclusively on the eight Decade countries. While these eight countries collectively are home to roughly half of Europe’s Romani population, the addition of Central Europe’s large Romani minority into an expanded European Union has also served to heighten the attention given to Romani issues in Western Europe. This heightened awareness was reflected in the inclusion of speakers from countries such as Finland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Indeed, one Council of Europe speaker drew pointed attention to problems “in some of the oldest members of the European Union.” The situation of Roma in Kosovo as well as Kosovo Romani refugees and internally displaced person was addressed in a plenary session that underscored the widespread concern over the precarious situation of that particular Romani community. The plight of Kosovo Roma remains a top priority for Romani activists across the region. Some speakers argued that Romani representatives should be included in the ongoing status talks on Kosovo. The conference also addressed the issues of housing, employment, and police relations as they relate to the Romani communities. A Council of Europe official suggested that, in the aftermath of Romania’s recent floods, the Romanian Government should take advantage of the opportunities presented in the post-emergency context to regularize the legal status of Romani housing in flood-affected areas. A Hungarian Romani police officer noted that the inspiration for his transnational Romani Police Officers Association came from a meeting in New York with representatives of the National Black Police Officers Association. Changes Bring New Challenges As a benchmark for progress, the conference clearly showed how far the international community has come in addressing Roma issues. In 1994, the OSCE held its first seminar on Romani human rights issues. At that meeting, two interventions illustrated clearly the chasm that separated governments from the experiences and perspectives of their most vulnerable citizens. On one side stood Florina Zoltan, who described the brutal pogrom in Hadareni, Romania, that one year earlier had left her a young widow. On the other side, an Italian Government official welcomed the opportunity to attend a meeting where one could finally talk about that pesky “Gypsy crime problem.” There was little room for dialogue, let alone mutual cooperation. Twelve years later, the landscape has changed dramatically. Many government delegations to the Bucharest conference included Romani officials, and the improvements made in protecting the basic human rights of Roma now leaves enough political space for the discussion of other factors which contribute to the marginalization of Europe’s largest minority. (At the same time, this development prompted one Romani NGO to lament the virtual decapitation of the Romani civil rights movement: as more Roma move into government and inter-governmental positions, there are fewer independent Romani voices to hold those authorities accountable.) As the number of international meetings on Romani issues has increased in recent years, organizers of such meetings face considerable challenges in meeting the ever higher expectations for them, and governments, non-governmental actors, and international organizations must work hard to avoid duplication and create a sense of forward motion and real change. And, as suggested in concluding remarks by a Council of Europe representative, such conferences must figure out how to reach out to local governments, national parliaments and, above all, the majority populations which are the source of the discrimination Roma face.
hearing

Advancing the Human Dimension in the OSCE: The Role of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Wednesday, May 17, 2006

This hearing, led by the Helsinki Chairman the Hon. the Hon. Sam Brownback, Co-Chairman the Hon. Christopher H. Smith Office, and ranking member the Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, examined the role that Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has played over the last fifteen years. ODIHR’s role in advancing human rights and the development of democracy in the OSCE participating States was noted and agreed to be particularly important. ODIHR is engaged throughout Western Europe and the former Soviet Union in the fields of democratic development, human rights, tolerance and non-discrimination, and promotion of the rule of law and has set the international standard for election observation. Within the hearing, the challenges that ODIHR faces were examined, specifically those instigated by the Russian Federation, Belarus and a small minority of the OSCE participating states seeking to undermine the organization under the guise of reform. ODIHR has earned an international reputation for its leadership, professionalism, and excellence in the area of election observation. That being said, ODIHR’s mission is much broader, encompassing a wide range of human rights activities aimed at closing the gap between commitments on paper and the reality on the ground in signatory countries.
briefing

Tools for Combating Anti-Semitism: Police Training and Holocaust Education

Tuesday, May 09, 2006

The Helsinki Commission held a briefing on Holocaust education tools and law enforcement training programs undertaken by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Co-Chairman Smith cited the vicious murder of Ilan Halimi as a reminder of the need to redouble efforts to combat anti-Semitism and to speak out when manifestations of related hatred occur. The briefing highlighted specific programs which promote awareness of the Holocaust and provide law enforcement professionals with the tools to investigate and prosecute hate-inspired crimes. Paul Goldenberg, a Special Advisor to ODIHR who designed the law enforcement training program which assists police to recognize and respond to hate crimes, stressed that law enforcement professionals must be recognized as an integral part of the solution. Dr. Kathrin Meyer addressed the challenges presented by contemporary forms of anti-Semitism and highlights ways to address the subject in the classroom. Other witnesses – including Rabbi Andrew Baker, Director of International Jewish Affairs for the American Jewish Committee; Stacy Burdett, Associate Director of Government and National Affairs, Anti-Defamation League; and Liebe Geft, Director, Simon Wiesenthal Center’s Museum of Tolerance also presented testimony at this briefing.
statement

Remarks by Hon. Christopher H. Smith on The Coalition for International Justice

Thursday, March 30, 2006

Mr. Speaker, it has come to my attention that a Washington-based non-governmental organization, the Coalition for International Justice, will close its offices this week after 10 years of service to the cause of justice around the world. Serving as Chairman and Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission for that same period of time, I have worked closely with the Coalition and seen the effect of its work. Ten years ago, the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a priority in U.S. foreign policy, a conflict in which numerous war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide were committed. Many of us fought for the inclusion of basic justice as an element in our country's policy response, and an international tribunal was fortunately created for that purpose. At the time, however, support was lukewarm at best; many saw efforts to apprehend and bring to justice those responsible for heinous crimes as too far-reaching, perhaps unachievable, and potentially detrimental to efforts to end the conflict through diplomacy. The Coalition for International Justice was a tireless advocate of another view, one that saw no true peace, nor the resulting long-term stability, in Bosnia or anywhere else, without appropriate consideration of justice. Time has since shown how correct that view has been. Bosnia and Herzegovina has come a long way since the mid-1990s, in large part because those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide were instead removed from positions of authority and made accountable at the tribunal located in The Hague. Many of those people might still be at large had the Coalition, among others, not advocated a tough policy toward those powers who were harboring and protecting them. Many of us can remember the State Department's hesitancy, let alone that of many European foreign ministries, to these tough measures. Today, however, the United States maintains an effective conditionality on assistance to Serbia and, along with the European Union, on Serbia's integration efforts due to the particular failure to transfer Ratko Mladic to The Hague. Similar linkages apply to another at-large indictee, Radovan Karadzic. Representatives of the Coalition for International Justice participated in numerous briefings and hearings of the Helsinki Commission on this subject, and were always available to provide useful information when justice in the Balkans became part of our policy debates. The Coalition similarly assisted the international criminal tribunal established for Rwanda in its efforts to be fair, responsible and effective in the provision of justice. Its mandate later expanded to help the investigation and prosecutions process in East Timor, to establish a tribunal for Khmer Rouge crimes in Cambodia, and to create a Special Court for Sierra Leone. It helped track the finance of such notorious figures as Charles Taylor, Saddam Hussein and the Khartoum elites, in addition to Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic. Most recently, the Coalition has been part of the international effort not just to hold those responsible for the genocide in Darfur accountable from the crimes already committed but to protect the civilian population there from continuing to be victimized. Mr. Speaker, I have appreciated the work of the Coalition for International Justice as a resource of accurate information, and as an advocate to a reasonable, practical approach to the sometimes controversial subject of international justice. While its board and staff may have concluded that the Coalition has largely accomplished the tasks it was created to address, they know, as do we, that horrible crimes continue to be committed against innocent people in conflicts around the world. I am confident that the dedicated individuals who made the Coalition such a success will continue, through other organizations and offices, in the struggle for international justice.
statement

Remarks by Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin on The Coalition for International Justice

Thursday, March 30, 2006

Mr. Speaker, I want to pay tribute to the fine, effective work of the Coalition for International Justice as that organization closes its offices this Friday. Ten years ago, the world allowed genocide to occur in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Shocked by this fact, as well as the associated war crimes and crimes against humanity, many Americans both within government and among the public decided to take action. As scenes of the destruction were broadcast to homes across this country, support grew for holding those responsible for the senseless killing accountable. Some dedicated experts in the field of international justice formed the Coalition, often known as “CIJ”, to help guide the development of the international tribunal established for that purpose. While justice remains elusive, not just in the Balkans but elsewhere, the Coalition has been an indispensable part of the progress achieved in the last decade to hold more people accountable for horrible crimes, in Europe, Africa and elsewhere around the globe. The Coalition, in fact, argues not only for responding to crimes already committed but taking necessary actions to stop ongoing atrocities and to prevent future war crimes. This presents a challenge to the international community and its natural tendency to avoid taking bold and decisive action, and reflects the lessons learned from Rwanda that the international community cannot stand by as genocide occurs. I am extremely pleased that CIJ has taken a leadership role in galvanizing the international community to respond to the ongoing genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. As the Ranking member of the Helsinki Commission, most of my work with the Coalition for International Justice has been related to what is unfortunately the still unresolved issue of obtaining Serbia's full cooperation with the International Criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), located in The Hague. Despite the democratic ouster of Slobodan Milosevic in late 2000 and his transfer to The Hague in 2001, Belgrade's cooperation with the tribunal has not been good. Despite Serbia's own need to break with a horrible past, and despite the obvious need for surviving victims and families to have some closure, Serbian officials have largely responded only when pressure is applied. Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, perhaps the two people most directly responsible for the slaughter of thousands of innocent people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, remain at large. It has been clear for some time that Mr. Mladic has been protected by the military. Serbia's future integration in Europe is placed at risk by this irresponsible behavior. The Coalition for International Justice has been indispensable in tracking the developments of the tribunal, as well as following reports of where at-large indictees may be, as well as what access prosecutors have had to evidence and witnesses. The Coalition also has done excellent work in analyzing the work of the tribunal itself. This has been important. International justice is a relatively new phenomenon, and things have not always developed smoothly. The Coalition has not been an apologist for ICTY or the other war crimes tribunals, and has brought attention to areas where improvement was needed. The Coalition should take great satisfaction that today, 10 years after genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the war crimes chamber of Bosnia's court system now has the ability to handle the emotional and controversial cases from that dark time. The staff of the Coalition for International Justice has always been outstanding, and has provided critical assistance to myself, my personal staff, and the Helsinki Commission staff that work on these issues. CIJ staff have been more than willing and able to help those of us in Congress who have worked to ensure common concerns about international justice are appropriately reflected in U.S. foreign policy. Board members Mark Ellis, John Heffernan and Jim Hooper were involved from the earliest days, when few were certain justice would even be considered in diplomatic efforts to bring peace and stability to the Balkans. Staff past and present, including Edgar Chen, Stefanie Frease and Eric Witte, provided expertise not only on the work of the tribunals but also on the countries and conflicts the tribunals were created to address. I want to highlight in particular Nina Bang-Jessen, CIJ's Executive Director, who so effectively combined expertise and advocacy. She oversaw the Coalition as it broadened its focus to include not only the former Yugoslavia but Rwanda, Cambodia, Sierra Leone and today, Darfur. Ongoing humanitarian catastrophes, Mr. Speaker, may frustrate us, but those who have worked at the Coalition for International Justice can take satisfaction knowing they did something about it and advanced the cause of international justice beyond where it otherwise would be. They have saved lives and brought war criminals to justice, and played a role in preventing future crimes against humanity. For that, we owe them our thanks and best wishes.
statement

The Dayton Agreement's Tenth Anniversary

Tuesday, December 06, 2005

Mr. Speaker, the tenth anniversary of the Dayton "General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina" is being commemorated here in Washington, in Dayton, Ohio, and in various European capitals. Despite its shortcomings, the Dayton Agreement has, in fact, formed the basis for maintaining peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and building a country devastated by a horrible conflict that included atrocities on a scale not seen in Europe since World War II. The very fact that discussions now center on moving beyond the confinement of Dayton's provisions through constitutional reform is a confirmation of the agreement's success. This success, as is widely known, did not come easily but required constant pressure from the international community. One area of particular concern to me has been the necessity, recognized in Dayton, to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, located in The Hague and commonly known as ICTY, in order to punish those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Officials in Republika Srpska, one of the two political entities into which Dayton divided Bosnia and Herzegovina, have been particularly recalcitrant in this regard, and most persons captured in this entity have been through the efforts of NATO-led peacekeeping units. Officials in Serbia have also resisted cooperating with The Hague in transferring indictees and providing access to evidence and witnesses. Fortunately, a combination of outside pressure--including conditionality on assistance and on Euro-Atlantic and European integration--and increasing revelations of the true nature of the Milosevic regime and its activities have led to considerable improvements in the last year. Many more individuals have now been taken into custody. Both in Bosnia and in Serbia, it is increasingly recognized that cooperation with international tribunal will not go away as a demand of the international community. Some go a step further and note that the same criminal circles which harbor persons indicted for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide also undermine democratic institutions and thwart economic recovery. Some, but too few, also see it as a moral necessity to recognize the horrors that were committed in name of the nation. I applaud the efforts of those brave persons representing non-governmental organizations who have helped to document the atrocities which have taken place and increased public awareness of what really happened. I am also pleased to know that, ten years after Dayton, a War Crimes Chamber in the Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been established and, with continued assistance, will relieve ICTY's work load and continue its work as necessary. Together, prosecuting war crimes will provide justice to the victims, strengthen the rule of law in the region, and hopefully serve to deter future war criminals from committing crimes against humanity. There would be added enthusiasm for commemorating Dayton, however, if it were coupled with the arrest and transfer of Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, who have been indicted by ICTY particularly for their responsibility regarding the genocide at Srebrenica in July 1995. The House commemorated the anniversary of that horrific event in which almost 8,000 individuals, mostly men and boys, were massacred in the days following an assault on the undeclared "safe haven." Other at-large indictees also must be arrested and transferred. I therefore use this time, the commemoration of the Dayton Agreement signed ten years ago, to call upon those authorities in Serbia and in the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina to do the right thing, apprehend the remaining indicted persons, transfer them, and erase this as an outstanding issue not only in our bilateral relations but as an obstacle to integration. In the meantime, Mr. Speaker, I call upon my colleagues to continue to support efforts that require consideration of ICTY cooperation as a determinant of U.S. policy.
statement

Ten Years After Dayton

Friday, November 18, 2005

Mr. Speaker, ten years ago this month a genocidal conflict was brought to an end in the Balkans. By initialing a "General Framework for Peace" at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, on November 21, 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged from almost four years of that conflict wondering whether it could survive as an independent unitary state and recover from the utter destruction not only of its towns and cities but of its own, multi-ethnic society. Time dulls our recollection of what the carnage in Bosnia was really about, so I believe it important to recall the nature of this, the most horrific phase of Yugoslavia's violent and bloody demise. Active on the Helsinki Commission which I co-chair today, I took part in many sobering hearings which documented the atrocities and discussed policy responses. The Bosnian conflict was, in large part, characterized not by opposing military forces but by groups of thugs, armed and orchestrated by the Milosevic regime in Serbia, wreaking havoc on innocent civilians. Tens of thousands were raped or tortured in detention centers and camps established across the country. While figures may vary substantially, the death toll is commonly estimated at about 200,000, while two million people--half the country's population--were displaced. We can well remember the photos of emaciated detainees at Omarska, the live coverage of the shelling and siege of Sarajevo, and the recently released video footage of the execution of captured young men near Srebrenica. While the decreasing advantages enjoyed by the Serb militants by late 1995 made a settlement possible, the Dayton Agreement did, in fact, help to bring this nightmare to an end. At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that its compromises reflect a failure by the international community, including the United States, to intervene much earlier in the conflict in response to clear violations of international principles and what many, including myself, consider genocide. The international community repeatedly failed to take decisive action, including the credible threat of the use of force, to compel the brazen Serb militants to stop their aggression. Instead, time was spent deploying peacekeeping forces under United Nations auspices when there was no peace to keep. UNPROFOR's presence thwarted more effective responses, such as lifting the arms embargo which denied the sovereign country of Bosnia and Herzegovina its right, as a member of the United Nations, to defend itself. As town after town, including some declared to be "safe-havens" by the United Nations, fell to the forces of ethnic cleansing, the international community acquiesced to a reality, codified by Dayton, of a country divided into two political entities characterized by an ethnic bias unworthy of 21st century democracy. One entity is a Bosnian Federation forged by the United States in 194 between Bosnia's Muslims or Bosniaks, and Croats. The other entity, Republika Srpska, is dominated by Serbs and represents what the militants among them started the conflict to create. The compromises accepted at Dayton, influenced by years of international inaction, also have made subsequent implementation difficult, and extremely expensive in terms of personnel, equipment and funds. Many persons indicted for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide evaded justice for years, some to wreak havoc later in Kosovo and elsewhere, and some like Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, remain at large. With the economy destroyed and both organized crime and official corruption rampant, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina became passive and dependent on the international community for their very survival. Perhaps the greatest flaw in the Dayton Agreement was its heavy reliance on Slobodan Milosevic himself to follow its terms, which he did only under considerable pressure. Betting on the man most responsible for igniting the conflict meant undercutting the development of democratic forces in Serbia which are necessary for the long-term stability of southeastern Europe. Many of us worked hard to correct this flaw in the immediate post-Dayton years, and continue to encourage democratic forces in Serbia to reckon fully with the Milosevic legacy. Fortunately, along with the eventual ouster of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, we have seen more vigorous and positive action to move ahead in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the past five years. More of the displaced have returned to their original homes than was thought possible when Dayton was negotiated. It hasn't been easy for many who return as members of a minority population, but determination has helped them to prevail. More and more individuals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including Milosevic, have been transferred to The Hague, and, at a recent Helsinki Commission briefing, we learned that Bosnia's own War Crimes Chamber has been established and is ready to conduct sensitive trials in accordance with the rule of law. Srebrenica is being acknowledged as the crime that it was. Defense and police reform are underway, helping to pave the way for Bosnia's further Euro-Atlantic and European integration. The region around Brcko, so brutally contested during the conflict that not even Dayton could determine its status, now provides a model of multiethnic cooperation and economic recovery for the rest of the country. There are now discussions of constitutional reforms which, if adopted, will hopefully make the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina a sum of its citizens and not a balance of its ethnicities. If the Dayton Agreement succeeded in anything, Mr. Speaker, it was because its detailed provisions and improved implementation have provided the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina with both the parameters of a state and enough time to bring their country back from the abyss. I have increasing confidence that they will succeed in moving from what was admittedly a "General Framework for Peace'' to a solid basis for unity, freedom, prosperity and integration. In the meantime, the international community has much it still needs to learn and develop. The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina gave new purpose to NATO and enabled it to begin operating out of area. Fifty years after the Holocaust, those who commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide no longer operate with complete impunity. Still, the international community, whether the United States and its allies, regional bodies or the United Nations, remains slow in responding to human suffering, or in recognizing the implications massive human rights violations can have on international security. It too readily accepts the reality of innocent people being attacked, brutalized and killed. Look at the response during the assault on Srebrenica and then at the response to Darfur today; the similarities are strong. I therefore hope, Mr. Speaker, that Dayton's tenth anniversary is commemorated in a way that includes not only encouragement for Bosnia and Herzegovina to move beyond the agreement's limiting provisions, but encouragement for all policymakers to learn from the lessons of inaction in the face of evil.
hearing

The Future of Human Rights in Kosovo

Thursday, May 26, 2005

This hearing, held by Sen. Sam Brownback and Rep. Chris Smith , stressed, among other things, that there was still a lot of work to be achieved regarding human rights in Kosovo, such as security and property issues. In particular, Brownback and Smith focused on the international community, including countries in the OSCE region. This hearing was held with increased diplomatic activity that may have led to consideration of Kosovo’s status in 2005 in mind. Witnesses to this hearing included Soren Jessen-Petersen, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and Head of the UN Mission in Kosovo, and Charles L. English, Director of the Office of South Central European Affairs at the U.S. Department of State.
statement

Remembering the Srebrenica Massacre

Wednesday, April 13, 2005

Mr. Speaker, I want to bring to the attention of my colleagues House Resolution 199, regarding the 1995 massacre at Srebrenica in eastern Bosnian-Herzegovina. In July, ten years will have passed since thousands of Bosniaks perished in what was the worst atrocity committed during the three-and-a-half years of conflict in Bosnia. This was an absolute fiasco by the international community, eroding its credibility and principles. Those of us who worked together at the time in urging a more decisive international response can remember the horror associated with that conflict. Many may ask: why do this? Why focus on what happened ten years ago in a region that we are encouraging to look forward to a future that includes further European integration? I believe it is impossible to look forward without acknowledging the past and what really happened at Srebrenica. We have many lessons to learn from the past. First, the very fact that many of those responsible for the Srebrenica massacre--especially Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic and others, not only have evaded justice in The Hague but may be receiving protection and are held almost as folk heroes by some indicates that the past has not been fully understood. Hundreds of people currently holding positions of responsibility are only now being investigated for possible connections to the massacre. Clearly the myths and propaganda originally used to justify a slaughter still hold sway in the minds of too many people. Second, the international community must learn not to repeat the mistakes it made with horrible consequences in 1995. Some lessons have been learned. For the first time since World War II, for example, an international tribunal was created to prosecute those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. That body has borne some results, though its task is not complete. Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not some reckless act, as some suggest, but a needed response made increasingly difficult by unnecessary delay. Mutual congratulations will undoubtedly come later this year when commemorating the ten year anniversary of the Dayton Agreement. We would do well, however, to recall that it was the simple shame of allowing thousands to be massacred within one of the international community's officially designated "safe areas" that finally motivated serious consideration of action against the brazen thugs responsible for these crimes. Unfortunately, it took additional atrocities before effective action was taken. It is also helpful to listen to some of the words spoken in the aftermath of the Srebrenica massacre. For example, 27 non-governmental organizations, including religious and humanitarian organizations not usually inclined to support the use of force, as well as Muslim and Jewish organizations not known for taking common stands, issued a powerful statement: Bosnia is not a faraway land of no concern to our "national interest." At stake is the global commitment to fundamental human values, the right not to be killed because of one's religious or ethnic heritage, and the right of civilians not to be targeted by combatants. At about the same time, the U.N.’s rapporteur for human rights in the former Yugoslavia, former Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiezki, explained why he could no longer ‘‘continue to participate in the pretense of the protection of human rights’’ and chose to resign in response to the events at Srebrenica. Known as a thoughtful, principled man, he said: One cannot speak about the protection of human rights with credibility when one is confronted with the lack of consistency and courage displayed by the international community and its leaders. . . . Crimes have been committed with swiftness and brutality and by contrast the response of the international community has been slow and ineffectual. If, when listening to these words from ten years ago, we think of subsequent events including Darfur today, we realize how little we have indeed learned. In Bosnia-Herzegovina we also produced examples of the best in humanity, people in the international community, aid workers, soldiers, diplomats, journalists, monitors and advocates, who risked and sometimes gave their lives to prevent further loss of life. I particularly mention in this connection the American negotiators Robert Frasure, Joseph Kruzel, and Nelson Drew who died while traveling Bosnia’s dangerous, war-torn roads. They deserve our gratitude for the efforts to restore peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, Mr. Speaker, we cannot forget the memory of the victims of Srebrenica and those who survived, but were traumatized by the debacle at Srebrenica. Many continue to wonder about the ultimate fate of the missing, even as new mass graves have been unearthed in northeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina. For these people, ten years is not long ago, and recognizing the pain and anguish they experienced may help bring closure for them. Some of these victims, I should add, have come to our country as refugees and are now Americans. They will no doubt be remembering the tragic events at Srebrenica ten years ago. I will not detail here the almost unspeakable horrors that were part of the massacre at Srebrenica in July 1995. Some of the events are mentioned in House Resolution 199. Mr. Speaker, I hope that my colleagues will give this measure their serious consideration and active support.
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Religious Freedom in Southeastern Europe

Wednesday, January 05, 2005

By H. Knox Thames, CSCE Counsel While the free practice of religion is generally enjoyed in Southeastern Europe, problematic policies exist that run counter to commitments made when countries from the region joined the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Issues range from discriminatory legal schemes denying small religious communities registration to harsh government actions against unpopular religious groups and their leaders. As will be discussed, having a legal mechanism for religious groups to achieve juridical personhood is important in ensuring religious freedom for all. Furthermore, this does not necessitate the creation of special religion laws, as legal status can be established through tax or corporation laws. Albanian and Bosnian Examples Despite shortcomings in other areas, Albania’s system for conferring registration and legal status to religious communities could serve as a model to others in the region. All religious groups with at least five members and meeting minimal criteria may obtain legal and non-profit status under the Law on Associations, the same status given to any applicant group, whether religious or secular. Albania’s neutral approach avoids the problematic entanglements of special religion laws common elsewhere in the region. Bosnia and Herzegovina missed an opportunity to lead by example, as many parts of its recently passed Law on Freedom of Religion and the Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities are well constructed, explicitly protecting manifestations of religious belief while limiting the ability of the government to interfere in the internal affairs of a religious group. Unfortunately, the law also contains troubling provisions which include penalties against free speech while setting numerical thresholds for obtaining legal status. For unregistered groups to qualify for official status, they must meet a membership threshold of at least 300 citizens. The law could be brought into harmony with OSCE commitments, should the Bosnian parliament amend the law, either expunging or significantly reducing this numerical requirement. While there has been marked improvement in recent years, the lack of physical security for minority religious communities and their places of worship as well as ineffective law enforcement and judicial action remain real problems. Police and prosecutors in Bosnia and Herzegovina have proven slow or unwilling to protect minority groups in some areas. The answer is not a specially crafted religion law with novel criminal penalties, but better enforcement of current laws by police and determined prosecutions by authorities. OSCE Leadership: Bulgaria and Slovenia Despite Bulgaria’s status as OSCE Chairman-in-Office in 2004, religious freedom conditions took a turn for the worse when, in July, the authorities seized properties used by the alternative Bulgarian Orthodox synod for more than 10 years. The 2002 Law on Religions blatantly favors the Bulgarian Orthodox Church over the alternative Orthodox synod and other religious groups, thereby providing legal cover for the church seizures. While there is no numerical threshold for registration, the legal system established by the law appears open to manipulation and arbitrary decisions. Additionally, the sanctions available under the Law on Religions are also ambiguous yet far-reaching, potentially restricting a variety of religious freedom rights. It is not too late for Bulgarian authorities to erase this dark spot by immediately reinstating to the alternative synod full control of the seized properties until the courts settle the dispute. The overall situation for religious freedom is good in Slovenia, which became Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE on January 1, 2005. The registration system for religious communities is simple, and there are no numerical thresholds or formal requirements to overcome. While the small Muslim community in Ljubljana has experienced problems in obtaining permission to build a mosque, it appears the matter is being resolved. One city counselor successfully initiated a referendum in May opposing the zoning regulation change to allow the building of the mosque. However, the Constitutional Court found the referendum to be unconstitutional, thereby removing this hurdle to construction. It is hoped there will be no further bureaucratic delays, so construction can begin as Slovenia takes up the OSCE chairmanship. Law and Practice in Croatia and Macedonia While the freedom to practice religion is generally respected in Croatia, the Law on the Legal Status of Religious Communities passed in July 2002 falls short of OSCE commitments, establishing a discriminatory, tiered system of registration. For a new religious group to enjoy the rights and benefits available with the higher Religious Communities status, it must demonstrate a membership of at least 500 individuals and be registered under the lesser Religious Association status for five years. Benefits explicitly given to Religious Communities include: freedom to operate independently; capacity to determine their internal organization; freedom to conduct religious meetings in their own or leased space; tax exemptions; the right to establish schools; and ability to receive state funding. Considering Croatia’s candidacy for the European Union, current EU members France, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and Slovenia do not use membership thresholds in conferring registration. In addition to the excessive numerical threshold and the five-year prohibition on registering new groups as Religious Communities, the law declares that the name and insignia of a religious group may not contain the official names and insignia of other countries. Doing so will cause the denial of registration. In addition, it is unclear under the law whether Religious Communities or Associations may legally conduct meetings in private homes or apartments. To lessen the likelihood of problems in the future and to set a positive example for others, Croatia should correct these deficiencies, as well as eliminate or significantly reduce the 500-member threshold. The legal framework governing religious freedom in Macedonia is ambiguous, due to Constitutional Court decisions striking down provisions of the 1997 Law on Religious Communities and Religious Groups, such as the numerical threshold for registration. Since religious groups are required to register, the lack of a clear mechanism can be problematic. Adding to the confusion, the U.S. State Department reports that the remaining provisions of the religion law are not consistently applied, leading to arbitrary delays in granting registration. The government could easily close this gap by creating simple avenues to obtain equal status either through the civil or administrative code. In addition to these legal problems, concern exists about the situation surrounding Bishop Jovan (Zoran Vraniskovski). Macedonian officials, in response to the ecclesiastical dispute concerning the status of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, have over-reacted to Jovan’s activities on behalf of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Authorities in January 2004 arrested Jovan for conducting a church service in a private apartment. Responding to complaints of neighbors about disturbing the peace is appropriate, but sentencing him to 18 months in jail for “causing national, racial or religious hate, discord and intolerance” is excessive and unjustified. Escalating things further, police officials in October reportedly bulldozed the foundations of a new chapel Jovan’s followers had begun to build, allegedly because local authorities had not received permission to start construction. (There is also concern about reports the government intends to demolish another Serbian Orthodox Church established in the village of Luzani.) Those sympathetic to the larger issues surrounding the Macedonian Orthodox Church and its status should be among the first to defend the rights of others to participate in the church of their choosing. The government, at least, must exhibit more restraint and end these harassments, and also pay reparations for the destroyed buildings. Problematic Draft Laws Elsewhere The legal framework for Serbia remains uncertain, since the 1976 communist-era law was abandoned in 1993. A draft religion law circulated earlier this year contained numerous shortcomings, blatantly tilting the playing field in favor of seven “traditional” communities and establishing the numerical threshold of 1000 members for new groups to register. Despite improvements, the new draft micromanages the affairs of religious groups, while making contingent most of the rights and benefits available to religious communities on the meeting of the burdensome 1000-member threshold. For smaller groups, this will result in the serious limitation of their activities; the draft prohibits unregistered groups from renting or owning land for worship, using private apartments for meetings, holding public events, receiving donations or opening schools or orphanages. Registration can be revoked for vague and arbitrary reasons – if a group “destroys family” or “disrupts spiritual integrity . . . for the purpose of . . . spreading its doctrine.” The draft reaches into the internal affairs of religious groups, as all are “obliged” to “inspire understanding” of others and not “spread lies, prejudices or intolerance” against other faiths. In addition, local officials would be empowered to monitor how religious groups use voluntary contributions. Serbian authorities are urged to seek technical assistance and input from individuals on the OSCE Panel of Experts on Religious Freedom or Belief, just as their predecessors at the federal, Yugoslav level did roughly two years ago, in order to develop a new draft that comports with international norms and practice. Regarding other issues, a dispute over a Romani church in Leskovac will be resolved when municipal authorities fulfill a pledge to provide some of the land nearby for an alternative site. The State Department reports the Belgrade Islamic community continues to have problems obtaining land and government approval to open an Islamic cemetery. In addition, in response to the burning of two mosques in March, reports indicate that 12 people of the 100 plus arrested have been charged with criminal offenses, and news of convictions should be forthcoming. There is also concern about religious freedom in Kosovo, as reportedly only three individuals have been found guilty for their involvement in the March violence that resulted in the destruction or damage of 30 Serbian Orthodox Churches and monasteries. The two-year prison sentences issued were suspended, making the penalties nothing more than a slap on the wrist. In addition, recent legislative initiatives are troubling, as the latest draft of the Law on Religious Freedom and Legal Status of Religious Communities falls short of international standards. The drafting process has been closed to minority religious communities, as well. The comments of minority communities should be actively sought and fully considered during the public debate. Among its many problematic portions, the draft creates the preferential status of a Religious Community, while providing virtually no rights for the lesser Union of Natural Persons. Small or new groups are prevented from obtaining Religious Community status, as they must have 500 members and have been operating in Kosovo for at least five years, but it is unclear how that time is tolled. Only Religious Communities can publish materials, either in print or electronically, or obtain funds from voluntary contributions. The draft unduly limits speech and activities of all groups, stating they shall not “disrupt other religious communities, or citizens without religious convictions, in public manifestation of religion or other conviction.” The government may also select certain religious groups to participate in the Committee for Relations with Religious Communities, thereby giving favored faiths an inappropriate degree of oversight or veto over other religious groups. Lastly, for existing Religious Communities, the law would make rights contingent on reregistering successfully within six months of passage. There is growing concern by reports coming out of Romania regarding a new draft religion law being reviewed by a parliamentary subcommittee. Reliable sources indicate this legislation is based on the highly flawed 1999 draft, which set the numerical threshold for registration at 0.5% of Romania’s population, or over 100,000 people. If reports are true, it is deeply concerning that the parliament would resurrect this seriously problematic bill rather than starting afresh and incorporating the views of interested Romanian religious communities. The OSCE Panel of Experts would be willing to provide technical assistance if invited by the government, and such a gesture would help ensure the legislation upholds all OSCE commitments on religious freedom.
hearing

Advancing U.S. Interests through the OSCE

Wednesday, September 15, 2004

The OSCE has been a pioneer in defining an integrated approach to security, one in which human rights and economic well-being are as key to a nation’s stability as are traditional military forces. It remains not only the largest trans-Atlantic organization, but the one with the broadest definition of security. The OSCE has also created the most innovative habits of dialogue and collective action of any multilateral organization in the world. The focus of the hearing will be how the OSCE can be used most effectively to highlight and advance the interests of the United States. Among the subjects to be covered will be objectives for the December (2004) meeting of Foreign Ministers in Sofia; recent high-impact security initiatives; expectations for the upcoming Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw; and refining and strengthening the OSCE.
statement

Resolution on the Recent Violence in Kosovo

Wednesday, March 24, 2004

Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing a resolution which expresses the sense of the House regarding the recent violence in Kosovo. Supporting the resolution as original co-sponsors are my colleagues on the Helsinki Commission: Mr. Cardin, Mr. Pitts and Mr. Hastings. Last week, close to 30 people were killed, hundreds were wounded and over 3,000 persons were displaced by renewed ethnic violence in Kosovo. In addition, considerable property was damaged or destroyed, in particular Orthodox Churches. In retaliation, protesters in Serbia damaged or destroyed several mosques. This violence was noteworthy mostly in its scale. As a practical matter, the situation for minority communities in Kosovo, including Serbs and Roma, has not been good since the United Nations, backed by a NATO-led peace operation, took control in 1999. A few weeks ago, I met with Serbian Orthodox Bishop Artemije, who presented documentation of attacks on churches and monasteries in Kosovo. As Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I recall the horrors which Slobodan Milosevic and his regime inflicted on the Albanian population of Kosovo. Attacks on places of worship and the lack of measures to stop these obviously vulnerable sites from being attacked again and again are inexcusable, as are the attacks on innocent people, be they Serbs, Albanians, Roma or anybody else. This resolution says that the violence must stop. It supports Kosovo achieving benchmarks which, if met, would effectively mean the protection of human rights and democratic development as well. It support the international community taking greater action, including providing more security, in order to achieve this progress. I believe this resolution should be able to garner wide support. This House should be on record as condemning the violence and saying that the human rights situation for the people who live there, regardless of their ethnicity, must improve.
article

Helsinki Commission Reviews Work of Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia

Thursday, December 11, 2003

The Helsinki Commission held a briefing on the path to justice in southeastern Europe on October 7. Presenting his remarks at the briefing was Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Judge Meron began his remarks by underscoring the immensity of the task at hand. The vast scale of the crimes committed during the Yugoslav conflict, he said, "the murders, the rapes and deportations, the acts of torture, destruction and cruelty, would dwarf the capacity of any single court to bring more than a partial, a very partial reckoning." Nevertheless, he said, the tribunal struggles on, patiently and temperately disclosing the truth, giving the victims "a chance to see their sufferings recorded and at least in some small measure vindicated." Judge Meron asserted that the tribunal demonstrates the viciousness of those who built their power with hate-filled beliefs and sends a compelling message "that only through genuine reconciliation can all the peoples of the former Yugoslavia create thriving societies." Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) underscored the important role the tribunal plays. In his opening remarks, Chairman Smith explained that the court was a way of helping to break the climate of impunity and "ensuring that those responsible for heinous crimes would be held to account." Commissioner Cardin, likewise, described strong United States support for the court, saying that the United States Congressional Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has raised the war crimes issue at every annual meeting in the last decade. Cardin has sponsored numerous initiatives over the years aimed at bolstering support for the work of the ICTY. The United States took a leading role in the creation of the ICTY, and funds approximately one quarter of its annual budget. Given the significance placed on the ICTY and its mission, three issues were highlighted: the compliance by participating States with ICTY demands; the implications of the ICTY's completion strategy; and, the procedural methods of the court. All three participants insisted on compliance from states in turning over indictees and granting increased access to evidence and archives. Commissioner Cardin recalled that "there are still indictees who have not been turned over to The Hague. Some highly visible indictees, such as Mladic and Karadzic, we've now been talking about for too many years." Judge Meron contended that while states in the region have increased their cooperation, such cooperation still needs to be made more complete. Sixteen indicted individuals, he explained, are still at large, including Serb army chief Ratko Mladic, Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, as well as Ante Gotovina, one-time Commander of the Split Military District. Meron said that the international community needs to use what he regards as its considerable leverage with the countries of the region to convince them to arrest and deliver to The Hague the most senior people allegedly responsible for war crimes. Meron noted improvements from Serbia-Montenegro, stating that he is "encouraged by the emerging spirit of cooperation in Belgrade which has produced some significant results in the last year." But, he said, more needs to be done. Serbia, he argued, must arrest Mladic, whose whereabouts, it is believed, are known; improve access to archives; and end the bottleneck in meeting the demands presented by the ICTY prosecutor. Meron said the tribunal is also "expecting maximum cooperation...from Zagreb" and insisted that "there is no bias or preference of the target of our cooperation." Judge Meron, however, reserved particularly harsh words for Republika Srpska. That entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he said, "has not been cooperating at all.... There has been no compliance on their part, and much more international pressure is needed." With UN Security Council deadlines for completion approaching, Chairman Smith expressed his concern that key indictees would decide to simply wait out the tribunal's mandate. Judge Meron assured the Commission that the tribunal "will not move toward any closure before we have people like Mladic, Karadzic, and Ante Gotovina at The Hague." Smith expressed his full support for such a policy, stating that "to allow people like Mladic and Karadzic to escape justice by running out the clock would be a gross violation of human rights in and of itself." As part of the ICTY's completion strategy, Judge Meron said the court intended to transfer some low- to mid-level cases from the ICTY to competent courts in the region, in particular the special war crimes chamber within the newly reconstituted State Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo. He expressed his appreciation to the international community for supporting this body and hoped that the United States and others would follow through on their promises for generous financial contributions. In addition to improving the legal capacity to try war criminals, Meron praised the Sarajevo court for the training it will provide to lawyers and judges in the area and "the message of democracy and the rule of law that will be triggered by such a court." Because of the fragility of the social system in Bosnia-Herzegovina, every bench of the Sarajevo court will have two international judges and only one local judge. He expressed his desire that, over time, the social environment will change to allow the composition to be reversed to give more significant representation to local judges. When asked whether cases could be transferred to war crimes chambers and courts elsewhere in the region other than the Sarajevo court, Judge Meron said he did not believe it feasible at the moment. At the same time, he argued, "War crimes trials have the greatest resonance when they take place very close to the theater of crime, the place where the crimes have been committed, where the victims or their families still live." He said, therefore, that it was his hope to have "more and more trials conducted in the area." Given the approaching of Security Council deadlines, Judge Meron also discussed some procedural changes the ICTY has adopted in its completion strategy. He described several internal initiatives made by the court attempting to improve efficiency. The tribunal has reformed its procedures for interlocutor appeals to reduce the number of interruptions in the trial and has restricted prosecutorial evidence that judges deem duplicative or unnecessary. Its ability to finish working in a timely fashion, he said, also depends on the choices the prosecutor makes on future indictments. In response to a question from the audience, Judge Meron commented about the tribunal's sentencing procedures. The tribunal has at times been accused of meting out sentences that are not commensurate with the gravity of the crime committed. Others have accused the tribunal of passing sentences for some defendants that were much greater than sentences for others convicted of similar crimes. Without sentencing guidelines from the Security Council, Judge Meron said, the tribunal has had to create its own common law. He stated though that he had "no reason to believe that as a general proposition our sentencing has not been within the parameters of what I would consider to be just and reasonable." Nevertheless, Judge Meron said, he has formed a working group of several judges to address the sentencing issue because he believes there is no aspect of the tribunal's activities that cannot be improved further. The tribunal, according to Judge Meron, represents an enormous experiment in international cooperation. Starting almost from scratch, the ICTY had to create its own rules of procedure and evidence. This effort, the judge claimed, will have an impact even beyond the specific crimes considered. He concluded, "The sort of judgments that we will leave behind from very detailed problems of definitions of international crimes, on the interpretation of the evidence, on the conflicts of evidence, on how to reconcile the notions of common law and civil law, will prove to be, I think, a very important legacy to us all." This briefing was the latest in a series of United States Helsinki Commission events and other activities this year intended to promote justice in southeastern Europe through improved cooperation with the ICTY. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

The Srebrenica Massacre of 1995, H.Res. 199

The Srebrenica Massacre of 1995, H.Res. 199

Srebrenica: Twelve Years after the Genocide and the Signing of the Dayton Accords

Bosnia-Herzegovina: Outstanding Issues in Post-Conflict Recovery and Reconciliation

Combating Hate Crimes and Discrimination in the OSCE

Parliamentary Elections in Serbia Reveal Progress in Democratic Development but also Support for Nationalist Causes

Remarks by Ambassador Clifford G. Bond at the International Forum Bosnia

Southeastern Europe: Moving from Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide to Euro-Atlantic Integration

Human Rights, Democracy, and Integration in South Central Europe

From Promises to Practice: Implementation of National Policies on Roma, Sinti and Travellers

Advancing the Human Dimension in the OSCE: The Role of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Tools for Combating Anti-Semitism: Police Training and Holocaust Education

Remarks by Hon. Christopher H. Smith on The Coalition for International Justice

Remarks by Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin on The Coalition for International Justice

The Dayton Agreement's Tenth Anniversary

Ten Years After Dayton

The Future of Human Rights in Kosovo

Remembering the Srebrenica Massacre

Religious Freedom in Southeastern Europe

Advancing U.S. Interests through the OSCE

Resolution on the Recent Violence in Kosovo

Helsinki Commission Reviews Work of Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia

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