The Russian Government Violates Its Security, Economic, Human Rights Commitments and Agreements

The Russian Government Violates Its Security, Economic, Human Rights Commitments and Agreements

Hon.
Christopher H. Smith
United States
House of Representatives
114th Congress Congress
First Session Session
Thursday, October 22, 2015

Mr. Speaker, yesterday I chaired a hearing of the Helsinki Commission that examined the Russian government’s repeated violations of its international security, economic, and human rights commitments. 

In accord with the three dimensions of security promoted by the OSCE and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Commission looked at Russia’s respect for the rule of law through the lens of three ‘‘case studies’’ current to U.S.-Russian relations—arms control agreements; the Yukos litigation; and instances of abduction, unjust imprisonment, and abuse of prisoners. 

Forty years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, we face a set of challenges with Russia, a founding member of the organization, that mirror the concerns that gave rise to the Helsinki Final Act. 

At stake is the hard-won trust between members—now eroded to the point that armed conflict rages in the OSCE region. The question is open whether the principles continue to bind the Russian government with other states in a common understanding of what the rule of law entails. 

In respect of military security, under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum Russia reaffirmed its commitment to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and existing borders. Russia also committed to refrain from the threat or use of force or economic coercion against Ukraine. There was a quid pro quo here: Russia did this in return for transferring Soviet-made nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil to Russia. 

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent intervention in the Donbas region not only clearly violate this commitment, but also every guiding principle of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. It appears these are not isolated instances. In recent years, Russia appears to have violated, undermined, disregarded, or even disavowed fundamental and binding arms control commitments such as the Vienna Document and binding international agreements, including the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), and Open Skies treaties. 

In respect of commercial issues, the ongoing claims regarding the Russian government’s expropriation of the Yukos Oil Company are major tests facing the Russian government. In July 2014, GML Limited and other shareholders were part of a $52 billion arbitration claim awarded by the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 

In response, the Russian government is threatening to withdraw from the ECHR and seize U.S. assets should American courts freeze Russian holdings on behalf of European claimants, while filing technical challenges that will occupy the courts for years to come. All of this fundamentally calls into question Russia’s OSCE commitment to develop free, competitive markets that respect international dispute arbitration mechanisms such as that of the Hague. 

I note that U.S. Yukos shareholders are not covered by the Hague ruling for their estimated $6 billion in losses. This is due to the fact that the United States has not ratified the Energy Charter Treaty, under which European claimants won their case, as well as the continued absence of a bilateral investment treaty with Russia. This has handicapped U.S. investors in Russia’s energy sector, leaving them solely dependent of a State Department espousal process with the Russian government. 

We were all relieved to learn that Mr. Kara-Murza is recovering from the attempt on his life—by poisoning—in Russia earlier this year. His tireless work on behalf of democracy in Russia, and his personal integrity and his love of his native country is an inspiration—it is true patriotism, a virtue sadly lacking among nationalistic demagogues. 

Sadly, the attempt on Mr. Kara-Murza’s life is not an isolated instance. Others have been murdered—most recently Boris Nemtsov—and both his and Mr. Kara-Murza’s cases remain unsolved. 

In other cases, such as the abductions, unjust imprisonments, and abuses of Nadiya Savchenko, Oleg Sentsov, and Eston Kohver, we are dealing the plain and public actions of the Russian government. Nadiya Savchenko, a Ukrainian pilot and elected parliamentarian, was abducted by Russian government agents, imprisoned, subjected to a humiliating show trial, and now faces 25 years in prison for allegedly murdering Russian reporters—who in fact were killed after she was in Russian custody.  Meanwhile, a Russian court has sentenced Ukrainian film director Oleg Sentsov on charges of terrorism. Tortured during detention, Sentsov’s only transgressions appear to be his refusal to recognize Russia’s annexation of the peninsula and his effort to help deliver food to Ukrainian soldiers trapped on their Crimean bases by invading Russian soldiers. And the kidnaping and subsequent espionage trial against Estonian law enforcement officer Eston Kohver demonstrates the Russia’s readiness to abuse its laws and judicial system to limit individual freedoms both within and beyond its borders. 

The Magnitsky Act that I had the honor to co-sponsor was in part meant to address human rights abuses such as these. It sanctions those involved in the abuse, and works to discourage further human rights violations while protecting those brave enough to call attention to their occurrence. It troubles me greatly to hear that the Administration’s listings of sanctioned individuals has thus far only targeted ‘minor players,’ rather than those who pull the strings.  

Leadership: 
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  • The OSCE at a Crossroads

    Dr. Terry Hopmann is one of few American academics who has followed the Helsinki Process as it developed over four decades from a multilateral conference of 35 countries dealing with Cold War divisions – the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe – to a regional organization of 57 countries confronting a broad range of challenges across its security, economic and human dimensions – today’s Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As well-acquainted with the intricacies of its institutional development as the diplomats who negotiated them, Hopmann also considers the Helsinki Process and its importance in the context of the broader development of European affairs and the U.S.-Russian relationship.  In his current capacity as Professor of International Relations and Conflict Management at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), based in Washington, DC, Hopmann not only introduces the OSCE to graduate students preparing for a career in international relations but also invites them to contribute to the intensive study of OSCE-related hot spots, including through field visits to areas such as Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh.  Focusing especially on security issues, Dr. Hopmann frequently interacts with the Helsinki Commission, both at OSCE-organized meetings in Europe and at Commission-organized briefings and hearings in Washington. In light of the numerous challenges the OSCE currently faces, including Russia’s markedly aggressive behavior and fears of an eroding U.S. commitment to European security and cooperation, Helsinki Commission staff recently sought Hopmann out to discuss the utility of the Helsinki Process in the past, and the interplay of U.S., Russian and European interests through the OSCE today and into the future. The OSCE’s Value Hopmann asserts in no uncertain terms that “OSCE membership is very beneficial for the United States.”  The organization has made major contributions to defusing conflicts and increasing military transparency, Hopmann believes; he also underlines the need to keep in mind the organization’s role in the defense of human rights. “The OSCE’s defense of national sovereignty, minority rights, and other important socio-political freedoms, together help prevent or at least de-escalate conflict, and make escalation harder. We see this precise action with regards to Ukraine right now. There’s a lot of value in that,” he notes. “The OSCE remains important for the U.S. in promoting its interests abroad, and at relatively low cost,” Hopmann adds.  “Still, the OSCE needs more support. The United States has struggled to engage with multilateral organizations and this represents a major issue. Without permanent and knowledgeable diplomatic representation and without the guarantee of adequate funding and resources, the OSCE’s capacity to act is severely hindered, and we play a role in that. Furthermore, the fact that we do not have a permanent representative there at the moment devalues the OSCE in ways that are dangerous.” Hopmann calls for the United States to continue to “support the OSCE institutions and missions, help its fellow member states in their work at the OSCE, and not forget its commitment to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, nor lose sight of their significance.” In the past, the Helsinki Process made important contributions to stability and peace in Europe, Hopmann believes. The confidence-building measures developed through the Helsinki Process of the mid-1970s, in particular, “initiated the practice of international observation and greater transparency. As a result, states could now better distinguish military maneuvers and exercises from preparations for a surprise attack. In many ways this was the most important breakthrough during the Cold War, greatly reducing the risk for surprise attack from the Soviet Union. This anxiety was a root cause of the Cold War and animated the conduct of both Western and Eastern powers. Of course, there were the ideological arguments that influenced the political landscape, but in Europe, the fear of Soviet aggression was immense.” At the time these confidence-building measures were negotiated, the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was still a vivid, recent memory. Hopmann also acknowledges the value of the other, non-military baskets of issues discussed in the Helsinki context. “The human rights basket was also important, though not as immediate,” he observes. “For the negotiators, this basket was less about human rights, but more about the promotion of human interaction. It was, effectively, an agreement to begin encouraging cultural and educational exchange.  In the shorter term, the first basket [on political-military issues] was critical, but in the longer term, the third basket [on human rights] became more important - particularly after the 1986 Stockholm agreement updated the CSBMs that were at the heart of Helsinki’s Basket 1. Then, following the Vienna Review Conference that concluded in early 1989, suddenly people were guaranteed the right to enter and leave their own country. Here, we see the first breach in the Iron Curtain when Hungary allowed people to cross freely into Austria – it didn’t all fall at once in 1989, rather it was a gradual process that started with a CSCE set of expanded principles. “ Hopmann considers the institutional development of the European security architecture in the post-Cold War period to have in many ways played out to the OSCE’s disadvantage.  Although initially successful in the 1990s with the deployment of field missions, successive U.S. administrations have missed an opportunity by viewing the OSCE as an organization principally relating to human rights concerns, rather than political-military security. “We missed the idea that NATO and the OSCE are not mutually exclusive,” he says “While we’ve contributed a lot to the OSCE, NATO remains the priority for policy makers in Washington. We have yet to realize how closely and effectively they can and should be working together. I believe this is our biggest foreign policy mistake since the end of the Cold War. It is the most effective way to bring Russia to the negotiating table and it is far easier to work with them in Vienna than the UN. The OSCE remains a security institution, like NATO, and as long as we value using all diplomatic measures to resolve conflict before using military force, we’re making a mistake by underutilizing the OSCE.” A growing European Union has not necessarily helped, Hopmann believes.  “The development of the E.U. has somewhat complicated the operation of the OSCE. Through the creation of its own common foreign and security policy and other initiatives, Brussels has duplicated OSCE institutions, but without the participation of the United States and Russia. Thus, the E.U. alone simply isn’t as effective,” he observes. “There is a lot of overlap between the two bodies and this begets structural and bureaucratic blockages that prevent action, especially when E.U. and OSCE representatives diverge or try to do the same thing independently. So, like OSCE-NATO relations, the E.U.’s relationship with the OSCE is occasionally marked by competition that hurts both parties’ effectiveness.” The View from Kremlin Walls Many of the earlier successes of the Helsinki Process were enabled by a very different leadership in Moscow than that we see today, Hopmann suggests. Under the late-Soviet leadership and Russian President Yeltsin, “there was a real interest to engage more with the West. They were, generally speaking, in support of Helsinki and didn’t view it as a threat to Russian interests,” he says. “That strongly contrasts with Putin. Putin has a totally different worldview and perceives the OSCE’s interests as inimical to Russian national priorities. We now find a much stronger, more belligerent Russia that no longer trusts the OSCE to help protect its interests, as it once did.”  This dynamic creates a real danger that Russia could turn away from the OSCE completely.  “The Kremlin could decide to leave as a result of domestic pressure or as a result of frustration with the West and its criticism. The Russians feel that they are attacked on all sides in the OSCE and obviously derive no joy from it,” Hopmann notes.    He therefore warns against outright rejection of all Russian concerns in the OSCE area, for instance as regards ensuring the protection of Russian-speaking populations in neighboring states.  “It is paramount that, in the spirit of Helsinki, we ensure Russian minorities are treated equally and fairly, to avoid perceived provocations by the West that might serve as a pretext for Russia to intervene. He suggests the closure of earlier OSCE missions in the Baltic states might have been perceived by Moscow, rightly or wrongly, as evidence that the OSCE was no longer responding to Russian concerns. Russia’s military occupation and subsequent illegal annexation of Crimea might have been averted, Hopmann asserts, had its view of the OSCE not evolved so dramatically from the first post-Cold War decade to the second.  While objecting to Kosovo’s bid for statehood based on core OSCE commitments regarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, even a decade ago Moscow was willing to engage diplomatically to resolve the issue. In the case of Crimea in 2014, it was not. “They prioritized military force over diplomacy – the precise kind of behavior the OSCE was designed to discourage,” Hopmann states.  He predicts that “while this decision may have been tactically effective, it will hurt Russia in the long run. The OSCE is designed to deal with these situations and it has the institutional framework to do so effectively – Russia failed to take advantage of the OSCE and we’re all now paying the price.” Still, Moscow recognizes that the OSCE is still valuable to Russian interests, according to Hopmann: “Russia wields a lot of influence in the OSCE because of their effective veto power under the consensus rule – indeed, the Kremlin recognizes the sway it carries in it and recognizes the OSCE as the place where it can effectively and discreetly negotiate with both the U.S. and the E.U. Ultimately, the OSCE is designed precisely to facilitate this kind of diplomatic interaction, and it meshes more closely with Putin’s view of how diplomacy should be conducted than the U.N. I believe it is for this reason that the Russians have been willing to work with the OSCE on some issues, including the conflict in Ukraine.” Effectively engaging Russia at the OSCE will remain a challenge, Hopmann adds, suggesting that a multilateral format may be useful.  “The most important question we face is how to continue the discussion and being firm with Russia when it blatantly violates OSCE norms as it did in Ukraine, without going overboard with our criticisms,” he says. “There are some countries, like Austria, Finland and Switzerland that are simply better at dealing with Russia, due to their past or current neutrality. Russia prefers to deal through them and likely finds it easier to appear to cooperate with them than working directly with the U.S.” On the OSCE’s Role in Conflicts The OSCE is demonstrating clear added-value in conflict areas today, according to Hopmann, including in and around Ukraine, and as regards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Hopmann praised the OSCE as having “played a key role in ensuring the [Ukraine] conflict does not escalate and cause more destruction. Indeed, within the limits of its mandate and available resource, the OSCE has done admirable work; however, this scope is limited and much remains to be done. Thus, the best thing the U.S. can do is to continue to support the OSCE’s mission and the Minsk process. It’s not ideal, but there’s no better option.”  Frustration over the OSCE’s inability to overcome the absence of political will to prevent or stop the conflict altogether should not overshadow its success in ascertaining the facts on the ground and galvanizing a defense of key principles guiding international behavior, he believes.  Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, Hopmann suggests that the OSCE has moderated what could otherwise be a much more intense conflict.  “The presence of the OSCE has helped already,” he says. “Its presence helped diffuse the four day war last year and prevented it from becoming a more violent conflict. Still, there is significant risk that the conflict will escalate and this highlights the importance of OSCE and the role it may play in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh question.” Hopmann believes that an alignment of U.S.-Russian interests in Nagorno-Karabakh, even if partial, may be helpful here.  “The OSCE absolutely has the mandate and ability to negotiate such a deal and to organize peace-keeping initiatives to ensure the conflict does not start up again. That being said, this process will be long, complicated, and expensive,” he predicts. The Future Hopmann concedes that the OSCE will remain beset for the foreseeable future with challenges largely emanating from the consensus-based decision-making process, over which any one country (including Russia) effectively has a veto.  However, he remains convinced that “that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t continue dialogue. In fact, we must continue dialogue. Many people remain committed to the OSCE and its values, including some Russian diplomats – though they’re keeping a low profile at the moment. This bodes well not only for change in the OSCE, but also for Russia. Change is not impossible, and keeping the dialogue channels open is of incredible importance. Without them, when the chance to encourage positive change does appear, we will not be able to capitalize on it. We worked together immediately after the Cold War to diffuse East-West tensions and ensure a peaceful Europe. There is no reason we cannot do that again.” Professor Hopmann was interviewed by Bob Hand and Alex Tiersky, Helsinki Commission Staff.

  • Helsinki Commission Advisor Discusses ZAPAD 2017

    On September 27, 2017, Helsinki Commission Global Security and Political-Military Affairs Advisor Alex Tiersky joined Ambassador Kurt Volker, Dr. Stephen Blank, and Ambassador Eitvydas Bajarunas at a public seminar to discuss the execution, outcomes and aftermath of Russia’s large-scale ZAPAD 2017 military exercise. Hosted by the Central and East European Coalition, Russia on NATO’s Doorstep: The West's Response to the Kremlin's Wargames was moderated by Dr. Mamuka Tsereteli. During the discussion, Tiersky shared his experience as one of only two American officials who was invited by the Belarusian government (who partnered with Russia for the joint military exercise) to be present for the conclusion of ZAPAD 2017. Tiersky commended the Belarusian government for offering the Distinguished Visitors program that he participated in along with representatives of the OSCE, the Red Cross and NATO, as well as defense attachés from various countries. The program included an extensive briefing on the aims, parameters, and intent behind the exercise, as well as an opportunity to witness an impressive live-fire demonstration at the Borisov training ground.  Belarusian briefers underlined that the aim of the program was to offer as much transparency as possible; the exercise was purely defensive in nature and neighboring countries had nothing to fear, Tiersky was told.  However, Tiersky added, the program offered by Belarusian authorities – while commendable – fell short of fulfilling the spirit of commitments to military transparency under the Vienna Document, which would have provided a greater opportunity for evaluating the exercise's scale and scope through broader participation by OSCE participating states and more intrusive inspection measures.  While impressive and worthwhile, the distinguished visitors program was thus not in itself sufficient to draw broad conclusions about ZAPAD, according to Tiersky. Tiersky concluded by describing how ZAPAD did little to assuage broader concerns related to Russian unwillingness to fulfill its commitments to military transparency, including under the Vienna Document (through for example its increasing use of snap exercises), as well as Russian violations of various arms control measures that have been essential contributors to peace and security in Europe for decades.

  • A New Ocean in the North: Perils and Possibilities

    Increasingly navigable waters and technological advances have opened the Arctic to further exploration, and an abundance of natural resources is driving investment in the region. Given the Arctic’s economic potential and environmental implications, the “High North” is likely to become a new theater of international engagement. As one of eight Arctic nations, the United States holds a vested interest in encouraging economic development in the region. However, U.S. Arctic infrastructure is underdeveloped and is dwarfed by Russia’s investment in the region. Moreover, like other Arctic nations, the United States must contend with the challenge posed by melting ice caps and rising sea levels. The briefing examined the importance of the development of Arctic infrastructure as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) least-developed region becomes more accessible. It also analyzed the challenges faced by the international community to promote greater cooperation in unlocking the region’s potential.

  • Witness to ZAPAD

    For months, watchers of European security have focused unprecedented attention on one, singular scheduled event:  ZAPAD 2017, a Joint Strategic Military Exercise conducted by Russia and Belarus from September 14 to September 20, 2017. The author, the political-military affairs advisor for the U.S. Helsinki Commission staff, attended the final phase of the exercise as a Distinguished Visitor at the invitation of the Government of Belarus.    ZAPAD 2017, the most anticipated—and, in some quarters, feared—military exercise in recent memory concluded on September 20. The extensive maneuvers by Belarusian and Russian forces took place at a number of training ranges in Belarus and on nearby Russian territory and featured a broad range of military capabilities. The planned exercise was in some ways routine; it followed a well-known Russian schedule of readiness-enhancing exercises that rotates among Russia’s military districts on a quadrennial basis (“ZAPAD,” or “West,” takes place in the Western Military District). However, unlike previous exercises, ZAPAD 2017 took place in a strategic context now defined by Russian aggression in Ukraine and Georgia—incursions that were, according to western analysts, facilitated by Russian exercise activity.  The Russian leadership's track record of aggression, dismissiveness towards transparency, and geopolitical unpredictability understandably put its neighbors to the west on edge.  These countries have seen prior Russian exercises serve as cover for force build-ups that enabled, for instance, the illegal attempted annexation of Crimea. Leading officials ranging from Baltic defense ministers, to the Ukrainian President, to the Secretary General of NATO raised concerns about what ZAPAD 2017 might mean for the security of Belarus' neighbors, both before the exercise and during its execution. Download the full report to learn more. Contributors: Alex Tiersky, Senior Policy Advisor

  • Arctic Development to Be Discussed at Helsinki Commission Briefing

    WASHINGTON—The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission, in conjunction with the Senate Arctic Caucus, Senate Oceans Caucus, and Congressional Arctic Working Group, today announced the following briefing: A NEW OCEAN IN THE NORTH: PERILS AND POSSIBILITIES Thursday, October 5, 2017 3:30 PM – 5:00 PM Dirksen Senate Office Building Room G11 Live Webcast: www.facebook.com/HelsinkiCommission Increasingly navigable waters and technological advances have opened the Arctic to further exploration, and an abundance of natural resources is driving investment in the region. Given the Arctic’s economic potential and environmental implications, the “High North” is likely to become a new theater of international engagement. As one of eight Arctic nations, the United States holds a vested interest in encouraging economic development in the region. However, U.S. Arctic infrastructure is underdeveloped and is dwarfed by Russia’s investment in the region. Moreover, like other Arctic nations, the United States must contend with the challenge posed by melting ice caps and rising sea levels. The briefing will examine the importance of the development of Arctic infrastructure as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) least-developed region becomes more accessible. It will also analyze the challenges faced by the international community to promote greater cooperation in unlocking the region’s potential. The following panelists are scheduled to speak: Julie Gourley, Senior Arctic Official, U.S. Department of State Iina Peltonen, Embassy of Finland in the United States Rear Admiral Michael F. McAllister, Commander, 17th Coast Guard District, U.S. Coast Guard Melanie Bahnke, President and CEO, Kawerak, Inc. Mark Smith, CEO, Vitus Energy

  • Building Cyber Confidence between Adversaries

    State-based cyber threats are an increasingly dominant part of the global security landscape.  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has, in recent years, sought to play a leading role in the international system by developing confidence building measures between states to reduce the risks of cyber conflict. The cyber diplomacy at the OSCE features discussions and (voluntary) agreements among 57 participating States – including the United States and, crucially, Russia. Advocates of this approach suggest that, in the longer term, it could lead to the development of norms of state behavior in cyberspace – and thus contribute to greater stability and security in the international system. On September 28, 2017, the U.S. Helsinki Commission held a briefing on cyber diplomacy moderated by Global Security and Political-Military Affairs Advisor Alex Tiersky. The panelists—Tim Maurer, co-director of the Cyber Policy Initiative and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Jaisha Wray, Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Emerging Security Challenges in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance at the U.S. Department of State; and Alex Crowther, Senior Research Fellow and Director of Research at the National Defense University’s Center for Technology and National Security Policy—discussed how OSCE confidence-building measures (CBMs) might work to decrease the risk of cyber conflict. These CBMs are voluntary in nature and allow states to read one-another’s postures in cyberspace. Mr. Maurer provided the audience an overview of the state-based threats these measures seek to diminish and listed several historical examples, such as the 2007 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on Estonia, the offensive cyber activity of the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, and the Stuxnet operation. He noted that, in the last decade, there has been a significant uptick in these threats, as there are 30 states that either have or are developing offensive cyber capabilities. Additionally, he applauded the groundwork the United Nations has laid towards addressing this pressing concern. Ms. Wray communicated the U.S. priority of establishing norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace. In her view, cyber activity has a unique potential to destabilize, because of its few outside observables and distributed vulnerability. She noted that participating States of the OSCE are currently in the process of implementing the CBMs agreed upon last year. Dr. Crowther offered a national security perspective on the topic, emphasizing the importance Russian participation in confidence-building. He attributed much of the progress on this issue to the 2015 decision of the Group of Governmental Experts that existing international law applies to cyberspace. In closing, he warned of the danger that cyber-enabled operations in a world saturated with smart devices.

  • OSCE Debates Environmental Policy and Economic Development in Prague

    By Paul Massaro, Policy Advisor From September 6 to September 8, 2017, the OSCE convened the 25th Concluding Meeting of the Economic and Environmental Forum. This annual conference brings together participating States for a wide-ranging discussion on policy as relates to the Second Dimension of the OSCE, or economic and environmental issues. The theme of the 2017 conference was “Greening the Economy and Building Partnerships for Security in the OSCE Region,” a topic selected by Austria, the current OSCE Chair-in-Office. At a time when natural disasters like Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria are devastating U.S. communities, such a discussion could not be more relevant. Add to that the joblessness and low growth rates that continue to plague many parts of the region and you have a broad debate on the issues that most impact the everyday life of citizens of the OSCE region. The Forum took the form of a series of thematic panels featuring experts drawn from the UN, the NGO community, and academia, as well as from the relevant ministries of OSCE participating States. Forum participants were particularly concerned with the effect that climate change is having on the frequency and magnitude of natural disasters, as illustrated by the extreme weather in the Caribbean and the United States. Much of the conference was devoted to discussing energy efficiency measures and renewable energy as a means to counteract the effects of burning fossil fuels on the environment. Experts agreed that energy efficiency and renewable energy are not separable concepts: the latter must be pursued to achieve the former. Participants were also deeply concerned about youth unemployment, especially in relation to violent extremism. Many participating States struggle with unemployment or underemployment, which exacerbates the factors that lead youth to radicalize. Experts discussed countering violent extremism through more flexible labor market policies as well as addressing the exploitation of unemployment or underemployment by extremist recruiters. Connectivity—transport, trade facilitation, and economic cooperation—was also discussed extensively. (Connectivity is distinct from economic integration, which envisions a deeper level of policy harmonization.) Experts and representatives from participating States generally agreed that two regions in particular could profit mightily from expanded connectivity: Southeastern Europe, or the Balkans region, where important steps toward greater connectivity are being made, and Central Asia, which remains among the regions with the lowest interregional trade in the world. The economic and environmental situation in the Eastern Donbas was also an important part of the discussion. Experts expressed severe concern that the shelling in the industrial region could lead to ecological disaster should, for example, the chemical plants that dot the area be hit and their chemicals seep into drinking water. Participants also discussed how to reestablish connectivity in this region, which once was a cohesive economic sphere. However, representatives from participating States argued that any discussion of regional connectivity would be for naught until Russia ceases its backing of militants in the region and enables a ceasefire to take effect. Generally speaking, the mood of the conference was one of consensus. Despite disagreements on certain issues, participating States tend to be of one mind when it comes to the need to prevent and prepare for natural disasters, increase energy efficiency, and encourage job and business creation, all topics that made up the majority of the discussions at the 25th Concluding Meeting of the Economic and Environmental Forum. Although minor disagreements cropped up in all of these topics, they were ephemeral and did not lead to prolonged debate. This general consensus may be a result of the fact that the arguably most controversial aspect of the OSCE’s Second Dimension, anti-corruption, was absent from all discussions. This is because this topic was addressed at the 2nd Preparatory Meeting of the 25th OSCE Economic & Environmental Forum in Astana and likely also because it was not a critical aspect of the theme of the Chair-in-Office. Nonetheless, at least a single panel on the topic would have been a welcome addition given its central importance to good governance. All in all, the Forum was a smooth and useful exercise that provided participating States with many worthwhile insights. Paul Massaro attended the conference as a representative of the U.S. Helsinki Commission.

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  • Batyr Berdiev: Poems from Prison

    And when we leave our house, where all is so familiar – The flower vase and the worn out carpet – The shadow of our quiet hope will stay at home, Reflected in the eyes of those who remember us. And life will continue, as our life was once lived, And, of course, other songs will be sung, But human hearts, like soldiers of hope Will again and again both suffer and dream.                                                             —Batyr Berdiev On September 15, the NGO campaign “Prove They Are Alive!” published a book of poems written by Turkmenistan’s former Foreign Minister and former Ambassador to the OSCE Batyr Berdiev, one of more than a hundred people who have disappeared in Turkmenistan’s prisons. The poems appear to have been written between December 2002 and March 2003 and were smuggled out of prison, most likely in 2003. Most are dedicated to Berdiev’s wife and son; they speak of his love for them, of freedom, and of their life while he was serving as Ambassador to the OSCE in Vienna. The book was unveiled at a side event at the 2017 OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) in Warsaw, Poland, with the participation of Helsinki Commission staff. Berdiev was arrested in December 2002 in connection with an alleged coup attempt against then-President Niyazov in November 2002. His “confession” was broadcast on Turkmen television later that month, and he was convicted in January 2003 in a closed trial and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. There are credible reports that he was tortured following his arrest. His relatives have had no information about his fate or whereabouts since, although there have been several conflicting reports of his death in Turkmenistan’s notoriously inhumane high-security Ovadan Depe prison.  The Helsinki Commission has continued to raise his case – along with others who have disappeared in Turkmenistan’s prisons – over the fifteen years since Berdiev’s arrest, in meetings with Turkmen officials, letters, and public briefings. The “Prove They Are Alive” campaign has also published an updated list of persons who have disappeared in Turkmenistan’s prisons, which has now grown to 112. Some of the new additions include persons who were arrested only this year. Following the arrests of Berdiev and hundreds of others in the wake of the alleged 2002 coup attempt, the United States and nine other countries invoked the OSCE Moscow Mechanism, which triggered an international investigation and report on the situation and treatment of those accused of being involved. Every year at the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, the United States makes a special statement urging the government of Turkmenistan to provide information on and access to those who have disappeared in the country’s prison. Read the book of poems by Batyr Berdiev.

  • Human Rights and Democracy in Russia

    From September 11 to September 22, 2017, the OSCE participating States meet in Warsaw, Poland, for the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM).  The HDIM is Europe’s largest annual human rights event. Over the course of two weeks, the 57 participating States will discuss compliance with consensus-based commitments on full range of fundamental freedoms, democracy, tolerance and nondiscrimination, and humanitarian concerns. The Russian Federation has adopted, by consensus, OSCE commitments relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms, free and fair elections, the rule of law, and independence of the judiciary. However, in many areas the Russian government is failing to live up to its commitments. Download the full report to learn more. Contributors: Erika Schlager, Counsel for International Law, Scott Rauland, Senior State Department Advisor, and Michael Newton, Intern

  • Helsinki Commission to Hold Briefing on Cyber Diplomacy

    WASHINGTON—The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission, today announced the following briefing: “BUILDING CYBER CONFIDENCE BETWEEN ADVERSARIES: CAN THE OSCE HELP ESTABLISH RULES OF THE ROAD?” Thursday, September 28, 2017 2:00 PM Russell Senate Office Building Room 385 Live Webcast: www.facebook.com/HelsinkiCommission State-based cyber threats are an increasingly dominant part of the global security landscape.  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has, in recent years, sought to play a leading role in the international system by developing confidence building measures between states to reduce the risks of cyber conflict. The cyber diplomacy at the OSCE features discussions and (voluntary) agreements among 57 participating States – including the United States and, crucially, Russia. Advocates of this approach suggest that, in the longer term, it could lead to the development of norms of state behavior in cyberspace – and thus contribute to greater stability and security in the international system. Speakers will describe the state-based cyber threats that the OSCE discussions seek to address; evaluate the development of these confidence building measures; and assess the present value and future potential of these diplomatic discussions. The following experts are scheduled to participate: Tim Maurer, Co-Director and Fellow, Cyber Policy Initiative, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Alex Crowther, Senior Research Fellow, Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University Jaisha Wray, Acting Deputy Director, Emerging Security Challenges Office, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State

  • The Rule of Law: Justice for the Bytyqi Brothers

    By Robert Hand, Policy Advisor From September 11 to September 22, 2017, the OSCE participating States meet in Warsaw, Poland, for the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM).  The HDIM is Europe’s largest annual human rights event. Over the course of two weeks, the 57 participating States will discuss compliance with consensus-based commitments on full range of fundamental freedoms, democracy, tolerance and nondiscrimination, and humanitarian concerns. OSCE commitments recognize that adherence to the rule of law is essential to democratic governance and to ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They also emphasize the importance of providing justice in cases of criminal acts which egregiously violate human rights and fundamental freedoms. Justice not only punishes the perpetrator of the crime; it also brings closure to the victim or surviving family and friends, and it allows the society in which it took place to move forward. The Murder of the Bytyqi Brothers Ylli, Agron, and Mehmet Bytyqi were all United States citizens, born near Chicago, Illinois, to ethnic Albanian parents from Kosovo.  (Previously an autonomous province of Serbia within the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo has been an independent state since 2008.) The three brothers, all in their 20s, responded to the brutality of the 1999 Kosovo conflict by joining the so-called “Atlantic Brigade” of the Kosovo Liberation Army.  Hostilities ceased in June of that year, following a NATO air campaign designed to stop Serbian forces from repressing the local population and committing atrocities.  About two weeks later, the Bytyqi brothers agreed to escort an ethnic Romani family, who had been neighbors of the Bytyqi family in Kosovo, to a place of greater safety.  Dressed in plain clothes and unarmed, the brothers accidently strayed across an unmarked administrative border and were arrested by the Serbian police.  They were jailed for two weeks for illegally entering the country.  Rather than being released, Ylli, Agron, and Mehmet Bytyqi were instead placed in the custody of a special operations unit of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs and taken to a training facility where all three were murdered.  Two years later, their bodies were found with hands bound and gunshot wounds to the back of their heads, buried atop an earlier mass grave of approximately 70 murdered Kosovo civilians. Justice Denied While an investigation reportedly continues, no individual has been found guilty – or even charged – for the murder of the Bytyqi brothers.  Senior U.S. officials and Members of Congress, including several serving on the Helsinki Commission, repeatedly have urged that action be taken by Serbian authorities, including war crimes prosecutors in regard to this case; a resolution to that effect is pending in the U.S. House of Representatives.  While serving as Prime Minister from 2014 to 2017, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic promised quick action on several occasions, both in public gatherings and in private meetings with the Bytyqi family.  Recently, however, he has reportedly criticized those who remind him of his promises or who express concern about the close connections the leading suspect in the case, former Interior Ministry official Goran “Guri” Radosavljevic, has with the ruling Serbian Progressive Party. The execution-style murder of Ylli, Agron, and Mehmet Bytyqi was clearly an extrajudicial act committed by government forces, a horrific crime like so many committed by the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic throughout the 1990s.  The surviving Bytyqi family, currently residing in New York state, has asked for nothing more than bringing those responsible to justice. U.S. Government officials have also called for justice in a case of the three murdered U.S. citizens, even as they otherwise express support for Serbia and its European aspirations. Human rights groups in Serbia have joined the call for justice, including as a way to distance their country from a period in its recent past marked by aggressive nationalism and egregious human rights violations on a massive scale. All that remains if for Serbian authorities to take the action promised by their political leaders.            

  • American Scientist Suffers Under Turkey’s Faltering Rule of Law

    By Everett Price, Policy Advisor From September 11 to September 22, 2017, the OSCE participating States meet in Warsaw, Poland, for the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM).  The HDIM is Europe’s largest annual human rights event. Over the course of two weeks, the 57 participating States will discuss compliance with consensus-based commitments on full range of fundamental freedoms, democracy, tolerance and nondiscrimination, and humanitarian concerns. This feature article on Turkey coincides with the September 19 session of HDIM 2017, which focuses on whether OSCE participating States are implementing their commitments related to rule of law. On September 11, the first day of the meeting, the Turkish delegation walked out to protest that an NGO it alleged has ties with the Gulen movement was allowed to register for HDIM. A NASA scientist based in Houston, Texas has spent the last 14 months in a Turkish prison, caught in the same dragnet that has ensnared tens of thousands of Turkish nationals since the failed coup attempt that played out in Turkey during the night of July 15, 2016. The scale of the Turkish government’s crackdown since that chaotic night is difficult to comprehend, but this scientist’s story illustrates the kind of ordinary lives that the sweeping purges upended with only the slimmest of justifications. A 37-year old dual citizen of the United States and Turkey, Serkan Golge is married to Kubra, also a dual US-Turkish national. The couple has two young sons, aged eight and one.  They have lived in a two-story home in a quiet suburb of Houston since 2013, when Serkan landed a contract as a senior research scientist at NASA’s Johnson Space Center, focusing on the effects of solar radiation on the astronauts aboard the International Space Station. Serkan’s mind, once immersed in scientific observation and the boundless expanse of outer space, is now mostly trapped in the contemplation of his small prison cell and the national political drama that landed him there. For the past 14 months, he has been detained in Iskenderun prison on the Mediterranean coast of southeastern Turkey, 25 miles from the Syrian border—he has spent the last 12 months in solitary confinement, allowed outside his cell just one hour every day. *** On the morning of July 23, eight days after the failed coup, Serkan and his family were wrapping up a month-long stay with his parents in Antakya, Turkey. The surreal night of the coup attempt, including pitched street battles between rebel military units and civilians in Istanbul and Ankara, had seemed a world away to the Golges on vacation in Turkey’s southern Hatay province. But as Serkan and his family were loading up a car to go to the airport to begin their return trip to Houston, the coup’s aftermath arrived at their doorstep. Plainclothes state security officials approached Serkan as he emerged from the house and detained him on suspicion of membership in the so-called “Fethullah Terrorist Organization” (FETO) that the Turkish government has accused of plotting the overthrow attempt. “FETO” is the pejorative term coined by the Turkish government for a major social and religious movement in Turkey led by the Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen who has lived in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania since 1999. Once a political ally of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Gulen movement fell out with AKP officials in recent years as the movement asserted its independence in various state organs, particularly the courts. President Erdoğan perceived the Gulen movement as a threat and started to purge its allies in state ministries, followed by the private sector. It was no surprise to most observers when Erdoğan declared “FETO” responsible for the coup and moved to eviscerate every last remnant of the group in Turkish institutions, whether in the public sector, business, media, civil society, or education.  Serkan is currently on trial and faces up to 15 years in jail if convicted of belonging to “FETO.” Yet the evidence that ostensibly links him to the organization, establishing his complicity in the coup and justifying his prolonged detention, is astonishingly thin. A distant disgruntled relative appears to have denounced Serkan to authorities to settle an old score relating to an inheritance dispute. Based on the relative’s statements, authorities arrested Serkan and raided his parents’ home where they seized upon a single one-dollar bill as evidence. Turkish authorities claim that Fethullah Gulen gave blessed American dollar bills to his followers; thus, national security trials around the country have scrutinized countless dollar bills in their deliberations. His relative further testified to his suspicion that Serkan worked for the CIA. When questioned about this at trial, the relative acknowledged that his claim was based solely on the fact that Serkan lived in the United States. Authorities have also questioned Serkan about his college degree from a major Gulen-affiliated university that the government closed in 2016. He reminded authorities that he attended the university on a government-funded scholarship—a reminder of the ruling party’s formerly cozy relationship with the organization it now denounces as public enemy number one. A dollar bill, a U.S. passport, and a college degree: this is the evidence that has landed an American citizen in solitary confinement for a year in Turkey. *** Serkan’s experience reflects the plight of the tens of thousands of people arrested, imprisoned, or fired from their jobs for suspicion of involvement in the attempted coup. The state of emergency decrees that paved the way for these massive purges did not specify the criteria for detention and dismissal. As a result, baseless assertions about an individual’s suspected links to “FETO” have caused people to lose their jobs, be stripped of their professional licenses, or thrown in jail without even the most minimal due process. In all, the government has detained more than 110,000 people, of whom 50,000 are under arrest. These detentions have swelled Turkey’s prison population and prompted the government last year to release 38,000 inmates just to make room for the influx. Reliable information is not available for the number of ongoing trials or convictions but last month the government issued a decree extending the maximum pre-trial detention period from five to seven years, underscoring how prolonged detention without conviction can serve as punishment itself. Of the 140,000 people who lost their jobs, so far 30,000 have been allowed to return to work. Meanwhile, 80,000 people who lost jobs have appealed their cases to a temporary State of Emergency Procedures Investigation Commission established by Ankara in July 2017. The case load created by the purges would strain the judicial system under normal circumstances, but the situation faced by the Turkish judiciary today is anything but normal.  Prior to the coup attempt, President Erdogan had already embarked on a campaign to extend his influence over the judicial branch and promote party loyalists within its ranks. In the coup’s aftermath, this campaign kicked into high gear. Since July 2016, President Erdogan dismissed more than 4,200 judges and prosecutors—approximately a quarter of the total—on suspicion of subversive loyalties.  Of the 900 new judges recruited as replacements in April, opposition leaders claim 800 have ties to the ruling party.  The independence of the Turkish judiciary further eroded in April 2017 when a controversial nationwide referendum narrowly approved constitutional changes that increased the President’s influence over the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP). The powerful CJP “oversees the appointment, promotion, transfer, disciplining, and dismissal” of judges. Under the newly enacted constitutional amendments, the President now appoints nearly half of the CJP and the Turkish parliament appoints the rest, easily giving the ruling party a majority on the council.  Straining under the weight of an overwhelming case load and immense political pressure, Turkey’s judiciary appears to lack the capacity and capability to deliver timely and credible justice for Serkan Golge and thousands like him. *** Back in Houston, the Golges’ house is now on the market. Kubra has opted to remain in Turkey, living with her in-laws in Antakya; she fears that even if the government let her and her sons out of the country it might not let them back in.  She covered the mortgage from abroad for the past year, but the mounting financial pressure was unsustainable. Her eldest son should have begun second grade this month at his local public school in Houston. He says he misses his old room, his books and toys. She is able to visit Serkan once a week where she and the children can speak to him by phone through a glass pane. Once every two months, they can meet in person and embrace, always under the watchful gaze of prison guards. Serkan’s next trial date is set for October 13th. For now, the Golge’s homecoming in Houston is postponed indefinitely: every new hearing brings with it the hope of acquittal and the dread of an unjustified conviction.  In May, the Helsinki Commission’s leadership, joined by the co-chairmen of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, sent a letter to President Trump urging him to raise Serkan’s case, among others, with President Erdogan during the latter’s official visit to Washington. The letter highlighted the cases of other American prisoners and a detained veteran Turkish employee of the U.S. Consulate in Adana accused of supporting a Kurdish terrorist organization. The letter further encouraged the President to seek consular access for U.S. diplomats to detained Americans in Turkey—a courtesy the government has so far denied them. The Commission will continue to highlight these and other cases in Turkey and urge Ankara to uphold its commitments as a participating State of the OSCE to human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law.

  • Preventing Modern Slavery through Education of Children

    From September 11 to September 22, 2017, the OSCE participating States meet in Warsaw, Poland, for the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM).  The HDIM is Europe’s largest annual human rights event. Over the course of two weeks, the 57 participating States will discuss compliance with consensus-based commitments on full range of fundamental freedoms, democracy, tolerance and nondiscrimination, and humanitarian concerns. As traffickers seek to lure adolescents into exploitation, holistic anti-trafficking education of teachers and children directly in schools is emerging as a critical tool to fight modern day slavery across the OSCE region.  Education has long been used in the prevention of human trafficking, the first of “3 Ps”—prevention, prosecution, and protection—around which most of the OSCE participating States have structured their laws to combat trafficking in human beings.  For instance, embassies and consulates include trafficking warnings and trafficking hotlines in information to individuals seeking visas, especially those individuals coming to be domestic servants. Tourists are educated in airports about the legal penalties of sexually exploiting vulnerable children.  Flight attendants and hotel operators are trained in how to recognize and safely report potential trafficking victims. Members of the law enforcement community are educated in the procedures for identifying trafficking victims among migrant and refugee flows through programs like the OSCE Extra Budgetary Project, which successfully concluded its third training last week in Vicenza, Italy.  International organizations have targeted aid for trafficking awareness education in countries where severe lack of economic opportunity makes teens extremely vulnerable to sham offers of jobs abroad. However, traffickers are increasingly preying upon children’s social vulnerability, not just economic need.  Social vulnerability—such as feelings of alienation, unresolved emotional or physical abuse, learning disabilities, or unfamiliarity with a new culture and language—means that children of every socio-economic background across participating States are at risk of being taken advantage of by traffickers.  Children’s often unlimited and unmonitored access to the internet can also endanger them.  Traffickers scout social media with fake profiles, looking for children they can extort into trafficking.  A child sends a half-naked photo to their “new friend” on social media, who then threatens to send the photos to the child’s parents and friends—unless the child does as they say.  No child is immune, but some are now smarter than their would-be traffickers. Non-governmental organizations in the United States and United Kingdom have been taking prevention to new heights through programs to train children in schools how to avoid being ensnared by human traffickers.  The Frederick Douglass Family Initiatives PROTECT project, and Just Enough UK, to name a few, have pioneered curricula that helps children—and their teachers—navigate the new faces and ploys of modern day slavery. Including age-appropriate, anti-trafficking education of teachers and school children in the standard curriculum for all children means that the suffering and harm caused by human trafficking can be halted early—or avoided altogether.  At a recent hearing in the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Co-Founder and Executive Vice President of the Frederick Douglass Family Initiatives, Robert Benz, observed, “The cost benefits to taxpayers, for preventing or mitigating human trafficking at an early stage, are enormous. The human benefit for preventing someone from being victimized is incalculable.” Such educational initiatives may soon benefit from new federal government grants in the United States.  Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Rep. Christopher Smith, Special Representative for Human Trafficking Issues to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and author of the U.S. laws that establish and fund the “3Ps”, included in the new Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act (H.R. 2200) authority for the training of teachers and students to recognize and avoid human trafficking.  H.R. 2200 passed the House of Representatives in July and awaits consideration in the U.S. Senate.

  • Helsinki Commission Chief of Staff Meets with New ODIHR Director Gísladóttir

    On September 13, Helsinki Commission Chief of Staff Ambassador David T. Killion met with the new Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Ingibjörg Gísladóttir, during the 2017 OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) in Warsaw, Poland. Ambassador Killion stressed the Commission’s commitment to the autonomy and work of ODIHR, and highlighted several Commission priorities including fighting anti-Semitism and racism; combating trafficking in persons; promoting religious freedom; and strengthening democratic institutions. He also noted the Commission’s support for the work of the ODIHR Contact Point on Roma and Sinti Issues. Ambassador Killion urged Director Gísladóttir to continue ODIHR’s positive collaboration with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, noting strong Commission support for OSCE election observation. Turning to the HDIM, he emphasized the importance of the continued open participation of civil society in the event, which is a singular feature of the annual meeting. He said the Commission will continue to fulfill its mandate to monitor the participating States’ compliance with their OSCE commitments, with particular regard to those relating to human rights.  

  • Criminal Defamation and "Insult" Laws in the OSCE Region

    From September 11 to September 22, 2017, the OSCE participating States meet in Warsaw, Poland, for the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM).  The HDIM is Europe’s largest annual human rights event. Over the course of two weeks, the 57 participating States will discuss compliance with consensus-based commitments on full range of fundamental freedoms, democracy, tolerance and nondiscrimination, and humanitarian concerns. Numerous international documents, including those adopted by the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), establish freedom of expression as a fundamental right. However, the right to free speech is not absolute. Consistent with international law, certain kinds of speech, such as obscenity, may be prohibited or regulated. When governments do restrict speech, those restrictions must be consistent with their international obligations and commitments; for example, the restrictions must be necessary in a democratic country and proscribed by law. Criminal defamation and "insult" laws are often defended as necessary to prevent alleged abuses of freedom of expression, but they are not consistent with OSCE norms and their use constitutes an infringement on the fundamental right to free speech. Despite this, criminal defamation and insult laws continue to be abused for political purposes in several OSCE participating States. Download the full report to learn more. Contributors: Erika Schlager, Counsel for International Law, and Jordan Warlick, Office Director

  • The 2017 Human Dimension Implementation Meeting: An Overview

    Each year,1 the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) organizes the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) in Warsaw, Poland. As Europe’s largest annual human rights conference, the HDIM brings together hundreds of government and nongovernmental representatives, international experts, and human rights activists for two weeks to review OSCE human rights commitments and progress.  The 2017 HDIM will be held from September 11 to September 22. Human Dimension Implementation Meeting 2017 The HDIM allows participating States to assess one another’s implementation of OSCE human dimension commitments, identify challenges, and make recommendations for improvement. The HDIM agenda covers all human dimension commitments, including freedoms of expression and the media, peaceful assembly and association, and religion or belief; democratic elections; the rule of law; tolerance and non-discrimination; combating trafficking in persons; women’s rights; and national minorities, including Roma.  Each year, three special topics are selected for a full-day review.  2017 special topics will be 1) ensuring “equal enjoyment of rates and participation in political and public life,” 2) “tolerance and nondiscrimination,” and 3) “economic, social and cultural rights as an answer to rising inequalities.”  This year’s meeting will take place at the Warsaw National Stadium (PGE Narodowy), the site of the NATO summit earlier this year. The meeting will be webcast live. Background on the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting When the Helsinki Final Act was signed in Finland in 1975, it enshrined among its ten Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States (the Decalogue) a commitment to "respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion" (Principle VII). In addition, the Final Act included a section on cooperation regarding humanitarian concerns, including transnational human contacts, information, culture and education. The phrase “human dimension” was coined to describe the OSCE norms and activities related to fundamental freedoms, democracy (such as free elections, the rule of law, and independence of the judiciary), humanitarian concerns (such as trafficking in human beings and refugees), and concerns relating to tolerance and nondiscrimination (e.g., countering anti-Semitism and racism). One of the innovations of the Helsinki Final Act was agreement to review the implementation of agreed commitments while considering the negotiation of new ones. Between 1975 and 1992, implementation review took place in the context of periodic “Follow-up Meetings” as well as smaller specialized meetings focused on specific subjects. The OSCE participating States established permanent institutions in the early 1990s. In 1992, they agreed to hold periodic Human Dimension Implementation Meetings” to foster compliance with agreed-upon principles on democracy and human rights. Additional changes to the modalities for the HDIM were agreed in 1998, 2001, and 2002, which included shortening the meeting from three weeks to two weeks, and adding three “Supplementary Human Dimension Meetings” annually on subjects selected by the Chairmanship-in-Office on particularly timely or time-sensitive issues. One of the most notable features of the HDIM is the strong participation of non-governmental organizations. The United States has been a strong advocate for the involvement of NGOs in the HDIM, recognizing the vital role that civil society plays in human rights and democracy-building initiatives. OSCE modalities allow NGO representatives to raise issues of concern directly with government representatives, both by speaking during the formal working sessions of the HDIM and by organizing side events that examine specific issues in greater detail. 1 In exceptional years when the OSCE participating States hold a summit of heads of state or government, the annual review of human dimension commitments is included as part of the Review Conference which precedes the summit, and also includes a review of the political-military and economic/environmental dimensions.

  • Taming the OSCE’s Least-Developed Region: the Arctic

    By Paul Massaro, Policy Advisor, U.S. Helsinki Commission, Dave Zwirblis, Coast Guard Fellow, Office of Chairman Roger F. Wicker, Neal McMillian, NOAA Fellow, Office of Chairman Roger F. Wicker, and Alanna Schenk, Intern, U.S. Helsinki Commission The Arctic region—with its rapidly growing ecological, political, and economic importance—is almost as large as Africa, yet it is often overlooked in critical policy debates. As an Arctic nation and one of two nuclear powers within the region, the United States is central to Arctic development and maintaining the stability of the region. Despite including all eight Arctic nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been largely dormant when it comes to Arctic issues. However, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) includes a Special Representative for Arctic Issues, Ola Elvestuen of Norway, and has passed resolutions on the Arctic at its Annual Sessions, including as part of the 2010 Oslo Declaration and the 2013 Istanbul Declaration. Given the growing importance of the Arctic, the OSCE has many opportunities to increase its engagement in the Second Dimension—its portfolio of economic and environmental issues—in ways that would supplement the work of the Arctic Council, the primary intergovernmental actor in the region. Economic Opportunities In the near future, there likely will be a significant rise in human activity along the Northern Route. As sea ice melts, new shipping lanes are opening up offering unprecedented access to trade routes, natural resources, and even tourism opportunities. For example, the CRYSTAL SERENITY, a 1,000 passenger luxury cruise liner, is conducting a first of its kind month-long Arctic cruise through the Northwest Passage in summer 2017.  Increased maritime traffic and engagement stemming from these economic opportunities present numerous new challenges for the Arctic nations.  The Arctic region remains underdeveloped and lacking in critical infrastructure. The absence of continuous and robust U.S. and international community assets means response to any type of transportation or environmental disaster in these remote areas would be extremely slow and difficult to execute. Additionally, only 4.7 percent of the U.S. Arctic and 9 percent of the total Arctic waterways are charted to modern navigation standards.  Any increase in economic development and shipping in the Arctic will require cooperation from all stakeholder nations to build up the emergency infrastructure and provide the icebreaker vessels necessary to conduct pollution response and cleanup, search and rescue, and maritime security operations. Currently, the U.S. Coast Guard only has two polar icebreakers in operation.  These vessels break channels through the ice to maintain shipping lanes, perform search and rescue and law enforcement operations, and act as platforms for scientific research.  The Coast Guard’s oldest icebreaker and only one capable of heavy icebreaking, the POLAR STAR, was commissioned in 1976 and is operating well past its intended service life. If this vessel were to break down, it would be a single point of failure in the United States’ ability to protect its sovereign interests throughout the Arctic.  According to a 2011 Coast Guard assessment, the agency will need a minimum of six icebreakers to fulfill its statutory missions in the polar regions.  In an effort to recapitalize its aging icebreaker fleet, the Coast Guard plans to award a contract to a U.S. shipbuilder in 2019 with anticipated delivery of the first vessel by December 2022. Other Arctic nations, including Canada, Sweden, Finland and Demark have limited icebreaking capability as well. Russia currently owns and operates a fleet of more than 40 icebreakers. Ensuring that the increasing economic activity in the Arctic region is sustainable can only be achieved if the Arctic nations become fully engaged as soon as possible. It is imperative that this infrastructure is developed responsibly and sustainably with regard for the Arctic land and people—whether it is through low-effect shipping, sustainable shipping lanes, or science-based marine management.  Throughout this economic development, engaging and involving the native Arctic peoples will be vital to integrate Arctic communities into the global economy during this time of rapid change. Environmental Challenges The way that the Arctic nations respond to the changing climate and its respective perils and possibilities will shape the world’s response to climate change and the future of international cooperation.  Science and technology in the Arctic present opportunities for this collaboration. The Arctic is an emerging hotbed for scientific research.  Much is still to be learned regarding ice sheets, under-ice conditions, glacial dynamics, polar ecosystems, and biodiversity.  In the face of rapid ecological changes, it is vital for the international science community to come together to gather baseline information and develop the infrastructure to monitor the ecological changes. Based on temperature changes and shifts in food regimes, species are moving around the Arctic, shifting from territorial waters into the newly accessible Arctic high seas.  While commercial fleets have yet to coalesce in the high-seas Arctic, the international community has the unique opportunity to develop governance frameworks and complete baseline studies in anticipation of the new fishery.  In 2015, five Arctic nations—the United States, Canada, Russia, Denmark, and Norway—agreed to halt high seas fishing in the Arctic until research gaps on the condition of the emerging fisheries were better understood.  Oil spill prevention and response as well as search and rescue are areas where infrastructure is minimal in the Arctic. Emergency response efforts are hindered by an absence of basic logistical support and infrastructure. Furthermore, while private companies have invested in infrastructure related to oil and gas exploration and extraction, this is not sufficient to fulfill infrastructure needs and additional investment will be required.

  • Beyond Pipelines: Breaking Russia’s Grip on Post-Soviet Energy Security

    By Paul Massaro, Policy Advisor, and Andras Olah, Intern In 2007, the Helsinki Commission held a hearing titled “Pipeline Politics: Achieving Energy Security in the OSCE Region,” which focused on energy security in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe. The hearing took place in the wake of the first major Ukrainian-Russian gas dispute in 2006 that demonstrated not only the Kremlin’s willingness to use its energy resources as a weapon to meddle in its immediate neighbors’ domestic affairs, but also the extreme dependency of much of  Europe on Russia’s energy supplies. At the time, experts and policymakers focused primarily on the enhancement of security of supply through the construction of new energy infrastructure, including pipelines, which would allow the diversification of energy imports of countries in the OSCE region. Ten years later, the energy landscape of the world fundamentally has changed. As Peter Doran, the Executive Vice President of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), stressed at a July 2017 Helsinki Commission briefing titled “Energy (In)security in Russia’s Periphery,” new energy infrastructure been built and the regulatory environment of the EU’s energy sector has significantly improved. At the same time, the shale gas revolution in the United States and the simultaneous development of a global liquid natural gas (LNG) market offers European gas consumers more alternative options to Russian gas imports than ever before. Most countries in Central and Eastern Europe have improved their energy security by the implementation of crucial reforms in their energy sectors. For example, in Ukraine, where for a long time “energy oligarchs” profiting from dodgy gas deals with Gazprom torpedoed any meaningful reform initiatives, a recent landmark decision has eliminated energy subsidies that have been a lucrative source of corruption for decades. However, Moscow has resisted surrendering its monopolistic market position and is fighting back through politically motivated energy projects designed to exploit the fault lines between European countries’ differing energy policies. The most important Kremlin-sponsored projects to date have been the planned Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream pipelines, which will carry gas to EU countries by circumventing Russia’s immediate post-Soviet neighbors. According to Doran, the Kremlin aims to end the role that neighbors like Ukraine, and to a lesser extent Moldova, currently play in the transit of gas to the EU through the Brotherhood and the Trans-Balkan pipelines. The success of Nord Stream 2 potentially could result in the loss of billions of dollars in transit revenues for Ukraine and Moldova, as well as diminishing their geopolitical importance for Europe, while subsequently enabling Russia to reassert its old influence over them by exploiting their diminished energy security. As a result of massive infrastructure projects promoted by the EU to develop reverse flow capacities on existing pipelines and create new interconnections, Ukraine is now capable of purchasing gas from a Western direction and, for the first time, since November 2015 has ceased buying gas contractually from Russia altogether. New pipeline infrastructure projects, namely the planned expansion of the Iaşi-Ungheni pipeline, as Lyndon Allin, Associate at Baker Mackenzie, pointed out at the same briefing, might enable Moldova in the medium-run as well to reduce its dependence on Russian gas that currently constitutes almost a 100% of its total gas consumption. Nevertheless, the effectiveness and profitability of these regional gas transit systems could be severely endangered once the transit of gas is diverted to other pipelines, potentially hampering the prospects of further gas infrastructure modernization, which is necessary for both countries to ensure their energy security. Moreover, as both ‘Stream projects’ would circumvent the region, Russian gas could become the only one that can be bought from the east as well as the west direction, strengthening Gazprom’s monopolistic market position in the region.  While political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have been pushing recently for the introduction of U.S. LNG to the region to serve as a new ‘external solution’ to the above mentioned challenges, as Edward Chow, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), noted at the briefing, the main challenge for post-Soviet Eastern European countries remains an internal one. While the level of energy infrastructure might already be close to sufficient, the biggest problem for post-Soviet countries remains the underdeveloped nature of their energy sectors that lack harmonized and stable regulations, consistently-applied property rights, and transparency. Additionally, as Dr. Mamuka Tsereteli, Senior Fellow of the Central Asia – Caucasus Institute pointed out, energy security could not be achieved without high-levels of cross-border market integration, even if physical infrastructures are in place. The underdeveloped nature of post-Soviet Eastern European countries’ energy sectors has been having a severe impact on the energy security of those states, in particular of Ukraine, which could be easily self-sufficient—even without the import of U.S. LNG—in natural gas if private investment was not being discouraged by the opaque, uncompetitive, and corrupt nature of its energy sector. Once the right regulatory environment is established, Ukraine, for instance, could possess an immense gas transmission and storage infrastructure that, if properly upgraded, as well as connected to the energy networks of Central European countries, could lead to the establishment of a highly liquid East Central European gas trading hub with a spot-based gas trade. This could create increased energy security in the entire region by improving both the level of competition and the diversification of supplies. While the West could offer the countries of post-Soviet Eastern Europe, Ukraine and Moldova in particular, alternative energy sources (e.g. U.S. LNG), these should and could not serve as a substitute for structural reforms and capacity-building, which are ultimately necessary to achieve true energy security in the region.

  • Journalists Persecuted 2017: Illustrative Cases

    By Jordan Warlick, Staff Associate Natasha Blaskovich, Intern Katya Kazmin, Intern With a section on the “improvement of working conditions for journalists”, the Helsinki Final Act explicitly recognizes the importance of journalists for democratic and open societies. Despite the signing of the agreement in 1975, the situation for journalists is still very grim in several countries in the region. The U.S. Helsinki Commission continues to monitor these conditions closely and remains concerned with: (a) murder, violence, and other egregious acts that harm the safety of journalists; (b) imprisonment of journalists for their work; (c) other restrictions that impede the work of journalists and a free press. The journalists featured below are representative of those persecuted so far this year. Afqan Muxtarli (Azerbaijan) – Muxtarli and his family fled to neighboring Georgia in 2015 after Muxtarli received threats related to corruption investigations into Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and other officials. Following Muxtarli’s disappearance on May 29, 2017, Muxtarli’s lawyer told Radio Free Europe that the journalist was abducted in Tbilisi and handed over to Azerbaijani officers at the border. Muxtarli believes that these officers planted €10,000 on him and then promptly arrested him, in order to incriminate him for illegally crossing the border with a large sum of money and no passport. Amnesty International and other international human rights organizations have criticized the Azerbaijani government for its oppression of journalists and suppression of free speech. Georgia’s Interior Minister has stated that Georgia has launched an investigation into this allegedly unlawful imprisonment. Mehman Huseynov (Azerbaijan) – Huseynov, a well-known journalist and blogger in Azerbaijan, was sentenced to two years in prison on March 3, 2017 on defamation charges. Huseynov had been under a travel ban since 2012, and was reportedly harassed and intimidated by the police for years. In early January 2017, Huseynov was arrested in Baku, taken to the Nasimi police station where he was held incommunicado, and repeatedly beaten and abused. Although he filed a formal complaint with the prosecutor’s office and made his abuse public, Huseynov’s allegations were declared groundless and not investigated. Huseynov was accused of defamation by the Nasimi police chief, and was found guilty in May 2017. Halina Abakunchyk (Belarus) – Abakunchyk is a correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), a U.S.-government-funded service. She was detained overnight on March 12, 2017, accused of “participating in an unsanctioned rally,” and then fined approximately $300 for covering large nationwide protests in March over a tax on the unemployed. Abakunchyk was one of 32 journalists arrested and/or fined for similar offenses while covering the protests.   Zhanbolat Mamay (Kazakhstan) – Mamay is the editor of the Tribuna newspaper, one of the few independent papers in Kazakhstan to have survived a recent trend of pressure and harassment from the government. Arrested on February 10, 2017, Mamay stands accused of being an accomplice to money-laundering, along with opposition leader and former head of BTA Bank, Mukhtar Ablyazov, in 2009. Before his arrest, Mamay told RFE/RL that he felt he was being followed. Since his arrest, Mamay has complained of being beaten and extorted while in prison. There are concerns for the safety of Mamay and his family as well as the provision of a fair trial. The Committee to Protect Journalists and other organizations have called for his release. Nikolai Andrushchenko (Russia) – Andrushchenko was a Russian journalist known for reporting on issues provocative to the Russian regime, including corruption. When Andrushchenko was attacked by assailants in St. Petersburg on March 9, 2017, he was in the midst of investigating reports of corruption and human rights abuses, allegations including the involvement of local police. He was found unconscious several hours later and taken to a hospital where brain surgery was performed, leaving him in a coma. He died on April 19, 2017. Prior to the March 9 attack, Andrushchenko had been attacked at least two times in the last decade. In November 2016, assailants attacked him on his doorstep. He was also attacked in November 2007, weeks before he was jailed for two months on false charges of defamation and obstruction of justice. The police have not informed the newspaper which Andrushchenko co-founded, Novy Peterburg (New Petersburg), of any progress in the investigation. Dmitry Popkov (Russia) – Popkov, the chief editor of local independent newspaper Ton-M in Siberia, was found shot dead in his backyard in Minusinsk on May 24, 2017. Popkov was known for investigating alleged abuses of power and corruption. Ton-M’s motto, “We write what other people stay silent about,” made the newspaper – and Popkov himself – long-time targets. Shortly before his murder, Popkov had published reports regarding a federal parliamentary audit that revealed corruption in the local administration. An investigation has been launched by the regional branch of Russia’s Investigative Committee and Popkov’s journalism is being treated as a potential motive for the murder. Nur Ener (Turkey) – Ener, a journalist for the daily Yeni Asya, was detained by police after they raided her apartment in the middle of the night on March 3, 2017. Accused of being affiliated with the Fethullah Gülen network, Ener’s formal charges are unknown to her lawyer and she is allowed only 45 minutes of family visits a week and one hour with her lawyer. A former roommate of Ener, who was arrested after the July 2016 coup attempt, is said to have given Ener’s name to the police in the aftermath of the coup. Some of Ener’s critical reporting, including an interview where the guest criticized certain government policies, may have also been a reason for her arrest. According to the Committee to Project Journalists, Ener is one of over 80 journalists imprisoned in Turkey – the largest jailer of journalists in the world. Oguz Guven (Turkey) ­­– Guven is the website editor-in-chief of Cumhuriyet daily. He was detained on May 12, 2017 for spreading terrorist propaganda, a popular charge against journalists in Turkey. The arrest allegedly was prompted by the newspaper’s tweet about the death of Mustafa Alper, a senior Turkish prosecutor involved in prosecuting suspects in the July 2016 coup attempt. Cumhuriyet has come under extreme pressure from the Turkish government, with 17 journalists and board members standing trial on July 24. Guven and his colleagues could face prison sentences as long as 43 years. Stanyslav Aseyev (Ukraine) – Aseyev, a freelance journalist who contributed to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty under the name Stanyslav Vasin, has been missing from Donetsk since June 3, 2017.  On July 16, Yehor Firsov, a former Ukrainian lawmaker and close friend of Aseyev, said he received information through unofficial sources that the journalist was detained by pro-Russian separatists. Aseyev allegedly faces charges of espionage by the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), who have threatened him with up to 14 years’ imprisonment. Other journalists highlighted in Political Prisoners in Russia: Mykola Semena (Ukraine) – Semena, a Crimean journalist, has been charged under Article 280.1 of Russia’s criminal code, which penalizes "public calls for actions violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation." The law was added to the Russian criminal code in December 2013, and came into force in May 2014 - several weeks after Crimea was annexed by Russia. Semena was one of the only independent journalists to remain on the peninsula following Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea. He contributed reporting to RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service and its Crimea Desk. On April 19, 2016, after Russian police searched Semena’s home and confiscated computers and storage media, the de facto Crimean prosecutor-general ordered Semena to remain on the peninsula while he was investigated for alleged “calls to undermine Russia’s territorial integrity via the mass media.” Semena has been forced to stay in Crimea ever since, despite his requests to travel to Kyiv for urgently needed medical care. Semena’s trial has been adjourned and delayed several times this year. If he is found guilty, he could face five years in prison. Roman Sushchenko (Ukraine) – Sushchenko, a Ukrainian journalist, is charged under article 276 of Russia’s criminal code (espionage). He has worked as a Paris-based correspondent for Ukraine’s state news agency, Ukrinform, since 2010. He was detained at a Moscow airport on September 30, 2016, upon his arrival from Paris on private business. He was accused of collecting classified information on the activities of Russia’s armed forces and the National Guard. Mr. Sushchenko denies any involvement in espionage. His employer, Ukrinform, also considers the accusations false and called his detention a “planned provocation.” Mr. Sushchenko’s attorney is Mark Feygin, who previously represented Pussy Riot and Nadezhda Savchenko. Sushchenko’s pre-trial detention has been extended several times by the Lefortovsky District Court of Moscow since his arrest, and is currently set until September 30, 2017. Photos Cited: Afqan Muxtarli: Facebook Mehman Huseynov: Facebook Halina Abakunchyk: RFE/RL Zhanbolat Mamay: RFE/RL Nikolai Andrushchenko: RFE/RL Dmitry Popkov: TON-M Nur Ener: Platform for Independent Journalism (P24) Oguz Guven: Twitter Stanyslav Aseyev: RFE/RL

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