In Memory of Zoran Djindjic

In Memory of Zoran Djindjic

Hon.
Christopher H. Smith
United States
House of Representatives
108th Congress Congress
First Session Session
Wednesday, March 12, 2003

Mr. Speaker, we learned today of the assassination in Belgrade of the Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic.

 

This is a true tragedy, not only for family and friends of Mr. Djindjic but for all the people of Serbia and, indeed, for all who struggle for human rights and democratic development.

 

Zoran Djindjic became a leader during difficult times in his country. He chose to stand in opposition to Slobodan Milosevic and his regime. That certainly was not the easiest course, and it took courage. Zoran Djindjic also had determination and, after repeated setbacks and obstacles, he played a key role in ousting Milosevic from power in 2000. He subsequently became, as Prime Minister of Serbia, a force for reform, recognizing that Serbia needed to cast off not only the yoke of Milosevic's rule but also Milosevic's legacy of nationalist hatred, organized crime, corruption and greed. Transferring Milosevic to The Hague in 2001 to face charges for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide perhaps best symbolized Djlndjic's continued courage and determination to conquer the sinister forces which seized his country.

 

Zoran Djindjic was still battling resistance to reform in Serbia when his life was taken by the vicious act of cold-blooded assassins.

 

These will undoubtedly be turbulent times for Belgrade, for Serbia, and for Montenegro which is just embarking on a new relationship with Serbia. This tragedy may have reverberations throughout the region, particularly in Bosnia and in Kosovo.

 

It is my hope and prayer, Mr. Speaker, that the people of Serbia will respond to this crime with a loud and united cry: ``Enough is enough.'' In the past, they have seen the lives of journalist Slavko Curuvija and politician Ivan Stambolic snuffed out for their advocacy of a civilized Serbia, in which human rights and the rule of law are respected.

 

Similarly Djindjic, too, was advocating such noble objectives. The very decent people of Serbia deserve a society which respects human rights and upholds the rule of law. That is what the leaders of Serbia must now provide without further hesitation or delay. I take heart in knowing that Djindjic had many colleagues who shared his vision of a reformed Serbia.

 

My deepest condolences go to the family of Zoran Djindjic. I hope that the incredible grief they must now feel will be tempered by the pride they should feel in his accomplishments and service to his country.

Leadership: 
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The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords.  The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Interns Colby Daughtry and Erin Carden contributed to this article.

  • Radio Liberty Stifled in Ukraine

    Mr. President, several weeks ago, I addressed the Senate, in my capacity as Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, on critical Presidential elections scheduled to be held later this year in Ukraine. In the latest twist in the lead up to those elections, yesterday Radio Liberty was abruptly informed that its Ukrainian Service programming would be removed from its major radio broadcaster’s FM schedule, beginning February 17. In a press release, RFE/RL President Tom Dine said, "This is a political act against liberal democracy, against free speech and press, against RFE/RL, and shows, once again, that Ukraine's political leadership is unable to live in an open society and is compelled to 'control' the media as if it were the good old days of the Soviet Union."                                         This is not the first time that there has been official Ukrainian pressure to drop RFE/RL broadcasting since September 2001, shortly after the murder of independent journalist Heorhiy Gongadze and the release of secretly-recorded tapes in Ukrainian President Kuchma's office implicating him and other high-ranking officials in the disappearance, corruption, and other dubious actions. Radio Liberty covers these and many issues about life in Ukraine, serving as an objective source of information in a media environment increasingly dominated by these authorities. In the past I have spoken out about Ukraine's troubled pre-election environment, including its media environment. This latest move, together with repressive measures against the democratic opposition and independent media over the course of the last few months, raise profound questions as to whether the October presidential elections will be free, fair, open, and transparent, in a manner consistent with Ukraine's freely undertaken OSCE and other international commitments. Effectively unplugging an important independent source of information does not bode well for democracy in Ukraine.

  • Belarusian Authorities Continue to Stifle Democracy

    Mr. President, as Co-Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I want to update colleagues on developments in the Republic of Belarus, a country with the poorest human rights record of any country in Europe today. In the last year, Belarusian dictator Lukashenka's assault on civil society has steadily intensified, with the liquidation of NGOs, violence against opposition activists, and repression of the independent media and trade unions. The situation in Belarus continues its downward spiral with daily reports of growing repression and new human rights violations.   Since the beginning of the still relatively New Year, NGOs such as the Belarusian Language Society and the Belarusian Helsinki Committee have experienced increased harassment. The Minsk City Court has ordered the liquidation of the Independent Association of Legal Research. Leaders of the opposition "Five Plus" bloc, who are in Washington this week, were recently detained and searched by customs officials at the Polish-Belarusian border. The officials were reportedly looking for printed, audio or video materials that could "damage the political and economic interests of the country." Human rights activists or independent journalists such as Natalya Kolyada, Nina Davydowskaya, Iryna Makavetskaya, Aksana Novikava and Aleksandr Silitsky continue to be subjected to threats, detentions or heavy fines. Others, including activists of the youth group ZUBR, have been arrested for holding an unauthorized picket demanding a thorough investigation of the disappearances of three democratic opposition members Yuri Zakharenka, Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, and journalist Dmitri Zavadsky.   Independent media outlets also continue to feel the wrath of the powers that be, including libel proceedings against Narodnaya Volya, Belarus' largest independent daily; the confiscation of Asambleya, a bulletin of the Assembly of the Belarusian Democratic NGOs; the refusal by the Belarusian Postal Service to distribute the independent newspaper Regionalniye Novosti; the confiscation of copies, in the town of Smorgon, of the independent newspaper, Mestnaya Gazeta; and the censoring of the independent newspaper Volnaya Hlybokaye in the Vitebsk region. Several Jewish cemeteries are being destroyed, Baptist congregations are being fined and Krishna followers detained.   In an unusual step, the International Labor Organization, ILO, has established a commission of inquiry, only the eleventh time in the body's 84-year history, to examine violations of trade union rights in Belarus. Meanwhile, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe's Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights unanimously ratified a report on political disappearances in Belarus. The just-released report severely criticizes the Belarusian authorities, stating that "steps were taken at the highest level of the State actively to cover up the...disappearances" of several high-profile members of the opposition in 1999 to 2000 and that senior Belarusian officials may be involved.   Last year I introduced the Belarus Democracy Act of 2003, S. 700, which is designed to help promote democratic development, human rights and rule of law in the Republic of Belarus, as well as encourage the consolidation and strengthening of Belarus' sovereignty and independence.   While some might be tempted to dismiss Belarus as an anomaly, the stakes are too high and the costs too great to ignore. It is important for us to stay the course and support Belarus in becoming a genuine European state, in which respect for human rights and democracy is the norm and in which the long-suffering Belarusian people are able to overcome the legacy of dictatorship- past and present. The Belarus Democracy Act, which enjoys bipartisan support, is an important, concrete way to exhibit our support. I urge colleagues to support this measure and look forward to timely consideration of the Belarus Democracy Act.

  • Troubling Pre-Election Developments in Ukraine

    Mr. President, as Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission and the sponsor of the 2002 Senate-passed resolution urging the Ukrainian Government to ensure a democratic, transparent and fair election process in advance of their parliamentary elections, I find recent developments relating to upcoming presidential elections in Ukraine deeply troubling.   Ten months before these critical elections, a constitutional amendment is making its way through the Ukrainian parliament designed to ensure that the current, corruption riddled powers-that-be retain their grip on power, neutralizing the leader of the biggest democratic fraction in parliament and Ukraine’s most popular politician, Victor Yushchenko. The amendment calls for abbreviating the presidential term for the October 2004 elections to two years, with the election of a president by the parliament in 2006, notwithstanding opinion polls indicating that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians support preserving direct presidential elections. This amendment had been approved by Ukraine’s Constitutional Court in a decision which has led many observers both within and outside of Ukraine to question the independence of the Court. The Court’s decision a few weeks ago to allow President Kuchma to run for a third term - despite the 1996 constitution’s two-term limit, has only raised more questions.   Media repression continues, including the issuance of directives sent to media by the Presidential Administration on what and how issues and events should be covered, especially in the electronic media. A recent Freedom House report concludes that "the current state of affairs of Ukraine’s media raises serious questions as to whether a fair and balanced electoral contest can be held." Newspapers critical of the authorities are subjected to various methods of repression, including attacks against journalists, arrests of publishers, "special attention" via tax inspections, administrative controls over distribution and pressure on advertisers.   Mr. President, at the same time, administrative measures are being taken to prevent lawful political activity, the starkest example of which was the disruption - instigated by the authorities - of a national congress of the Yushchenko-led Our Ukraine bloc in Donetsk last November. Most recently, a presidential decree dismissed the elected Our Ukraine mayor of Mukachevo - despite a ruling by the Supreme Court which confirmed that he had been elected in a legitimate way. In a telling twist, an acting mayor from the political party led by the head of the Presidential Administration, Victor Medvedchuk, has been installed.   As Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I share the concern of colleagues on both sides of the aisle that the presidential election in Ukraine scheduled for October be free, fair, open and transparent and conducted in a manner consistent with Ukraine’s freely-undertaken commitments as a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Helsinki Commission, consistent with our mandate to monitor and encourage compliance with OSCE agreements by all participating States, will continue to follow the situation in Ukraine closely.   Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of a recent Washington Post editorial on troubling pre-election developments in Ukraine be included in the Record. Thank you, Mr. President.   There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:   [From the Washington Post, Jan. 12, 2004] A Resolution for Ukraine   According to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, the Bush administration's first foreign policy resolution for 2004 is "to expand freedom." And not only in Iraq and the Middle East: In an op-ed article published in the New York Times, Mr. Powell promised to support "the consolidation of freedom in many new but often fragile democracies . . . in Latin America, Europe, Asia and Africa." We hope that support will extend beyond the rhetoric that too often has substituted for genuine democratic advocacy during President Bush's first three years, and that it will be applied even where the United States has interests that make toleration of autocracy tempting.   One region where such U.S. engagement, or its absence, might prove decisive is the band of former Soviet republics to the west and south of Russia. Several are struggling democracies; others are ruled by autocrats. Almost all are under threat from Moscow's resurgent imperialism. As the tiny state of Georgia recently demonstrated, democracy is the best defense against Russian President Vladimir Putin's attempts to create a Kremlin-dominated sphere of influence. Countries that have held free and fair elections have tended to gravitate toward strengthening their independence and seeking good relations with the West, while unstable autocrats are more likely to yield to Mr. Putin.   The country closest to a tipping point may be Ukraine. Like Russia, Ukraine has an electoral democracy tainted by corruption and strong-arm tactics and an economy warped by clans of oligarchs. Much of its population, however, aspires to integration with the West. President Leonid Kuchma has been linked to corruption and serious human rights violations. In recent months he has been moving steadily closer to Mr. Putin, allowing a Russian takeover of much of Ukraine's energy industry and signing an economic integration treaty.   Now Mr. Kuchma appears to be looking for ways to curtail Ukraine's democracy so that he can prolong his own hold on power when his term expires this year. Last month his allies in Parliament pushed through the first draft of a constitutional amendment that would cut short the term of the president due to be elected in October and provide that future presidents be chosen by Parliament, where Mr. Kuchma's forces retain control. Then the judges he appointed to the Supreme Court ruled that the constitution's two-term limit does not prevent Mr. Kuchma from serving again. The president's cronies protest that they are only moving the country toward a more parliament-centered system, and Mr. Kuchma coyly says he has not "yet" decided to seek another term. But the effect of his moves would be to neutralize the country's most popular leader, Viktor Yushchenko, who, polls say, would win the next presidential election if it were fairly held.   More than Mr. Kuchma's quest for continued power is at stake. Mr. Yushchenko is popular precisely because he is associated with those Ukrainians who seek to consolidate an independent democracy and move the country toward integration with Europe. Mr. Putin surely will be sympathetic to Mr. Kuchma's subversion of the system. The question is whether the Bush administration will work with Western Europe to mount an effective counter. Freedom could be consolidated this year in Ukraine or slip away. The outcome may just depend on how well Mr. Powell keeps his resolution.

  • Strong Substance, Potent Politics Mark Historic Maastricht OSCE Ministerial Council

    By Elizabeth B. Pryor, CSCE Senior Advisor The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) once again demonstrated its ability to promote candid political discussion and take prescient decisions when the Eleventh OSCE Ministerial Council met December 1-2, 2003. The meeting took place in Maastricht, the Netherlands, capping the Dutch chairmanship of the OSCE, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. Ministers and other senior officials from the 55 OSCE states engaged in extensive consultations and approved an impressive array of action programs and strategic initiatives. Members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, including Helsinki Commissioner Rep. Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL), and representatives of OSCE partner states and other affiliated organizations joined them. Secretary of State Colin Powell led the United States delegation. The Ministerial meeting was historic, not only for the quantity and quality of the decisions it took, but because it signaled a move away from defining the organization solely on the basis of broad formalized statements. The flexibility of the organization was also on display. When one participating state threatened a veto on jointly agreed political positions, the Chairman and other members turned it into an opportunity to forcefully reiterate their determination to see conflicts resolved through the standards set in OSCE agreements. They also intensified the pressure to fulfill previously taken commitments. The result was a stronger expression of collective political will than might have been made in a compromise document. By moving beyond the predictable rhetoric of a communiqué, the OSCE underscored its own political vitality and the unique platform it offers for frank debate and creative political action. The Maastricht Ministerial took place in the wake of Georgia’s "Revolution of the Roses" and was attended by the Acting President of Georgia, Nino Burjanadze. That situation, and growing concern over disputes in the Transdniestria region of Moldova, produced frank comments from the Ministers, opening the way for real dialogue on the issues and an expression of international concern that was impossible to ignore. Secretary Powell was among those who used the unconstrained OSCE stage to address issues directly. He cautioned that no support would "be given to breakaway elements seeking to weaken Georgia’s territorial integrity" and called for international support for the new elections to be held January 4, 2004. The European Union, and Dutch OSCE Chairman echoed this, voicing their own warnings against interference in Georgia’s democratic development. The Chairman also strongly reasserted the OSCE’s role in deliberations over the political future of Transdniestria. He was joined by many of the Ministers, who took exception to Russian efforts to broker an inequitable accord outside of the internationally coordinated mediation process. While applauding some progress on arms reductions by Russia in Transdniestria, the U.S. delegation, as well as many others, spoke forthrightly of the need to fulfill all provisions of the 1999 Istanbul agreement which called for the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova. Even when given an extension to withdraw by December 31, 2003, no progress has been made. The exchange also gave Russia the opportunity to express its viewpoint: that ratification of the revised Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was being held up over the implementation of the Istanbul commitments and that the collapse of its diplomatic initiative in Moldova would delay any chance of reaching a settlement. The initiatives unanimously agreed by the Ministers reflect the OSCE’s dedication to strong standard setting and innovative yet practical solutions for entrenched problems. The decisions taken on security issues continue OSCE’s long tradition of crafting action-oriented agreements with low political cost and long-term stabilizing effects. The development of more secure travel documents, export controls on portable air defense systems, "best practices" for the transfer of small arms and new measures for the destruction of stockpiles of ammunition are among the most robust set of security decisions taken in recent years by any international organization. The United States welcomed these decisions and praised the OSCE’s work as an example of effective multilateralism. These concrete action programs were coupled with a comprehensive strategy for addressing the changing security environment of the 21st century. The holistic OSCE approach to stability is evident in this document, which encompasses everything from arms control to environmental concerns and fighting corruption. "The [Helsinki] Final Act tells us that lasting security requires not just respect for the sovereignty of states, but also respect for the integrity of human beings," noted Secretary Powell in Maastricht. In keeping with this integrated approach to security, the OSCE agreed to a strategic roadmap for tackling the difficult problem of trafficking in human beings. The OSCE Action Plan is the most detailed blueprint devised by any international organization; in Maastricht Ministers decided to appoint a Special Representative to ensure that its provisions are carried out. In addition, the OSCE approved a comprehensive policy for improving the situation of Roma and Sinti, the first of its kind in the region. They also strengthened their commitment to an enhanced economic and environmental work plan. In a matter of particular interest to numerous Helsinki Commissioners, the Maastricht Ministerial formally welcomed the offer by Germany to host a conference on anti-Semitism in Berlin. Belgium will host a meeting on racism, xenophobia and discrimination. In a letter to Secretary Powell in the lead up to the ministerial, Commissioners urged U.S. leadership in securing agreement on the German proposal as well as other areas of particular concern, including disturbing developments in Turkmenistan, Chechnya, Belarus and severe limitations placed on minority religious communities in some parts of the region. "The United States’ leadership is essential to secure consensus on initiatives on combating anti-Semitism and racism; human trafficking; internally displaced persons; corruption and international crime; cooperation with the ICTY; withdrawal of foreign forces from Moldova; and the Annual Security Review Conference," Commissioners wrote. Ministers also addressed the wider sharing of OSCE norms, principles and commitments with others, pledging to identify additional fields of cooperation and interaction with OSCE Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Cooperation. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce.

  • Helsinki Commission Reviews Work of Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia

    The Helsinki Commission held a briefing on the path to justice in southeastern Europe on October 7. Presenting his remarks at the briefing was Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Judge Meron began his remarks by underscoring the immensity of the task at hand. The vast scale of the crimes committed during the Yugoslav conflict, he said, "the murders, the rapes and deportations, the acts of torture, destruction and cruelty, would dwarf the capacity of any single court to bring more than a partial, a very partial reckoning." Nevertheless, he said, the tribunal struggles on, patiently and temperately disclosing the truth, giving the victims "a chance to see their sufferings recorded and at least in some small measure vindicated." Judge Meron asserted that the tribunal demonstrates the viciousness of those who built their power with hate-filled beliefs and sends a compelling message "that only through genuine reconciliation can all the peoples of the former Yugoslavia create thriving societies." Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) underscored the important role the tribunal plays. In his opening remarks, Chairman Smith explained that the court was a way of helping to break the climate of impunity and "ensuring that those responsible for heinous crimes would be held to account." Commissioner Cardin, likewise, described strong United States support for the court, saying that the United States Congressional Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has raised the war crimes issue at every annual meeting in the last decade. Cardin has sponsored numerous initiatives over the years aimed at bolstering support for the work of the ICTY. The United States took a leading role in the creation of the ICTY, and funds approximately one quarter of its annual budget. Given the significance placed on the ICTY and its mission, three issues were highlighted: the compliance by participating States with ICTY demands; the implications of the ICTY's completion strategy; and, the procedural methods of the court. All three participants insisted on compliance from states in turning over indictees and granting increased access to evidence and archives. Commissioner Cardin recalled that "there are still indictees who have not been turned over to The Hague. Some highly visible indictees, such as Mladic and Karadzic, we've now been talking about for too many years." Judge Meron contended that while states in the region have increased their cooperation, such cooperation still needs to be made more complete. Sixteen indicted individuals, he explained, are still at large, including Serb army chief Ratko Mladic, Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, as well as Ante Gotovina, one-time Commander of the Split Military District. Meron said that the international community needs to use what he regards as its considerable leverage with the countries of the region to convince them to arrest and deliver to The Hague the most senior people allegedly responsible for war crimes. Meron noted improvements from Serbia-Montenegro, stating that he is "encouraged by the emerging spirit of cooperation in Belgrade which has produced some significant results in the last year." But, he said, more needs to be done. Serbia, he argued, must arrest Mladic, whose whereabouts, it is believed, are known; improve access to archives; and end the bottleneck in meeting the demands presented by the ICTY prosecutor. Meron said the tribunal is also "expecting maximum cooperation...from Zagreb" and insisted that "there is no bias or preference of the target of our cooperation." Judge Meron, however, reserved particularly harsh words for Republika Srpska. That entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he said, "has not been cooperating at all.... There has been no compliance on their part, and much more international pressure is needed." With UN Security Council deadlines for completion approaching, Chairman Smith expressed his concern that key indictees would decide to simply wait out the tribunal's mandate. Judge Meron assured the Commission that the tribunal "will not move toward any closure before we have people like Mladic, Karadzic, and Ante Gotovina at The Hague." Smith expressed his full support for such a policy, stating that "to allow people like Mladic and Karadzic to escape justice by running out the clock would be a gross violation of human rights in and of itself." As part of the ICTY's completion strategy, Judge Meron said the court intended to transfer some low- to mid-level cases from the ICTY to competent courts in the region, in particular the special war crimes chamber within the newly reconstituted State Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo. He expressed his appreciation to the international community for supporting this body and hoped that the United States and others would follow through on their promises for generous financial contributions. In addition to improving the legal capacity to try war criminals, Meron praised the Sarajevo court for the training it will provide to lawyers and judges in the area and "the message of democracy and the rule of law that will be triggered by such a court." Because of the fragility of the social system in Bosnia-Herzegovina, every bench of the Sarajevo court will have two international judges and only one local judge. He expressed his desire that, over time, the social environment will change to allow the composition to be reversed to give more significant representation to local judges. When asked whether cases could be transferred to war crimes chambers and courts elsewhere in the region other than the Sarajevo court, Judge Meron said he did not believe it feasible at the moment. At the same time, he argued, "War crimes trials have the greatest resonance when they take place very close to the theater of crime, the place where the crimes have been committed, where the victims or their families still live." He said, therefore, that it was his hope to have "more and more trials conducted in the area." Given the approaching of Security Council deadlines, Judge Meron also discussed some procedural changes the ICTY has adopted in its completion strategy. He described several internal initiatives made by the court attempting to improve efficiency. The tribunal has reformed its procedures for interlocutor appeals to reduce the number of interruptions in the trial and has restricted prosecutorial evidence that judges deem duplicative or unnecessary. Its ability to finish working in a timely fashion, he said, also depends on the choices the prosecutor makes on future indictments. In response to a question from the audience, Judge Meron commented about the tribunal's sentencing procedures. The tribunal has at times been accused of meting out sentences that are not commensurate with the gravity of the crime committed. Others have accused the tribunal of passing sentences for some defendants that were much greater than sentences for others convicted of similar crimes. Without sentencing guidelines from the Security Council, Judge Meron said, the tribunal has had to create its own common law. He stated though that he had "no reason to believe that as a general proposition our sentencing has not been within the parameters of what I would consider to be just and reasonable." Nevertheless, Judge Meron said, he has formed a working group of several judges to address the sentencing issue because he believes there is no aspect of the tribunal's activities that cannot be improved further. The tribunal, according to Judge Meron, represents an enormous experiment in international cooperation. Starting almost from scratch, the ICTY had to create its own rules of procedure and evidence. This effort, the judge claimed, will have an impact even beyond the specific crimes considered. He concluded, "The sort of judgments that we will leave behind from very detailed problems of definitions of international crimes, on the interpretation of the evidence, on the conflicts of evidence, on how to reconcile the notions of common law and civil law, will prove to be, I think, a very important legacy to us all." This briefing was the latest in a series of United States Helsinki Commission events and other activities this year intended to promote justice in southeastern Europe through improved cooperation with the ICTY. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

  • Commission Hearing Looked Ahead to Maastricht Ministerial

    By Michael Ochs CSCE Staff Advisor The United States Helsinki Commission held a hearing on September 9, 2003 reviewing United States policy toward the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The hearing considered the many security, economic, and humanitarian challenges facing the United States, and how the 55-member nation organization can be best utilized to address these challenges. Testifying for the State Department were A. Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, and Lorne W. Craner, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and Helsinki Commission Member. In his opening statement, Helsinki Commission Chairman, Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) emphasized the important role the OSCE plays in promoting American security abroad. "The explicit and implicit connection between security and human rights, the fulcrum of the Helsinki process," he said, "has been at the center of U.S. thinking and policy since the day almost exactly two years ago when religious fanatics flew airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon." At the same time, he bemoaned the lack of democratic progress throughout much of the former USSR. Particularly in Central Asia, he said, "It becomes more and more difficult to harbor expectations that the future will be better or much different than the past or even the present." Helsinki Commission Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) expressed his appreciation to the State Department and executive branch for their willingness to work with the Commission over the years. Mr. Cardin particularly lauded the work of Ambassador Stephan M. Minikes, head of the U.S. Mission to the OSCE, whose efforts, he said, helped to form a unified agenda with Congress in the OSCE. He also expressed his appreciation to the State Department, later echoed by Chairman Smith, for arranging a visit by the Commission to Guantanamo Bay that allowed Commissioners to respond to concerns raised by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly regarding humanitarian standards for detainees. In her remarks, Assistant Secretary Jones noted two particular OSCE successes during the past year that were the result of U.S. efforts: the Vienna Anti-Semitism Conference and the new, annual Security Review Conference. She also identified the adoption of the Anti-Trafficking Action Plan as a positive development. Secretary Jones listed several priorities for the OSCE Maastricht Ministerial, including progress on Russia's Istanbul commitments; mandating the 2004 Berlin Anti-Semitism Conference; and, addressing the pressing problems, discussed at the Security Review Conference, of travel document security and Man Portable Air Defense systems (MANPADs). Secretary Jones identified several broad areas where the OSCE particularly serves U.S. interests: human rights and democracy promotion; conflict prevention and conflict resolution; and trans-national issues, such as human trafficking, anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia, the rights of the Roma, refugees, and internally displaced persons. The United States, she said, also hoped to enhance the OSCE's police training capabilities "not only to step up anti-crime capabilities, but to deal with the human rights concerns that are related to the way police deal with civil society." Assistant Secretary Craner began on a positive note, identifying encouraging signs throughout the region. "In a majority of the OSCE countries," he said, "we see growing and increasingly vibrant civil society groups advocating for peaceful change. The rule of law is being bolstered as countries move the administration of prisons under the auspices of the ministry of justice, and guards receive training to respect international standards." He added, however, that there are also areas of both stagnation and backsliding in the OSCE region, all the more troubling given the numerous regional successes. "It is most disheartening," he said, "for the people of those countries who see other nations which have emerged from the Soviet empire now joining NATO and the EU and enjoying the fruits of democracy. Meanwhile, some governments remain authoritarian or unwilling to move beyond the old struggles and practices." Secretary Craner noted troubling signs for democratization efforts throughout the former Soviet Union. Central Asian states, he said, had made little progress. Upcoming presidential elections in Ukraine would seriously affect U.S. attitudes toward that country's suitability for integration into Euro-Atlantic and European institutions. The Russian parliamentary elections in December are showing some troubling signs, while holding legitimate presidential elections in Chechnya would be extremely difficult, given the security situation there. He said, however, that such elections could potentially contribute to the end of that conflict. Chairman Smith noted his pleasure that the sanctions list, established by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 which he sponsored, which groups countries into three tiers based on their action on the issue of human trafficking would be released the week of the hearing. He also welcomed the U.S. military's initiatives against trafficking in South Korea and hoped for similar progress in the Balkans. Secretary Craner agreed that countries were taking the sanctions law seriously, and both witnesses stated that the U.S. and British militaries were taking strong action on trafficking issues. Smith and Jones emphasized that the pressure was not off countries that made it out of the bottom tier. On the former Yugoslavia, Assistant Secretary Jones described gradual progress at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and improved cooperation from the government in Belgrade. "The list [of war criminals] is being reduced," she said, "but it is not done yet." Commissioner Cardin, however, noted that the patience of the international community was coming to an end. Both agreed that the political leadership in Serbia seems to want to do the right thing, but needs help from the United States to reinforce their efforts. On issues of property restitution, Secretary Jones assured the Commissioners that when she travels to pertinent countries, the issue is always on the agenda and explained that the United States has had considerable success convincing governments to take action on a bilateral basis. She also agreed with Representative Cardin that poverty and corruption make democratic development more difficult. She said that the United States would try to attack the issue through the OSCE by working hard on corruption. Commissioner Cardin brought attention to the United States' efforts in the OSCE's Parliamentary Assembly to create a mechanism extending Helsinki principles to the OSCE's Mediterranean Partners. Assistant Secretaries Jones and Craner said that the administration supported the goal but was uncertain whether the best way to accomplish it was directly through the OSCE or through a new, OSCE-like institution. Chairman Smith then focused on the importance of "naming names" in the OSCE. He said that "one of the most vital aspects of the Helsinki process was specifically naming names" and "holding people to account," but he noted a curious reluctance to do so in the last ten years. Assistant Secretary Craner stated that the United States had indeed "named names" with regard to the situation in Belarus. The United States sponsored a resolution at the UN Commission on Human Rights putting Belarus in a category with countries like Turkmenistan and North Korea. Assistant Secretary Jones admitted that it was difficult to influence President Lukashenka of Belarus but said there were still elements of civil society in Belarus, activists in the Belarusian body politic, and free media that needed outside moral support. Finally, Chairman Smith raised the issues of Chechnya and missing persons in the Balkans. Assistant Secretary Jones said that Chechnya was on the agenda for the Camp David summit between Bush and Putin in late September . She also indicated that the OSCE was negotiating with Russia to define a role for the organization in that conflict, ideally getting a mission back on the ground. On the Balkans, Secretary Craner said that the United States was actively pressing governments bilaterally and through the OSCE to account for the fate of missing persons. He also highlighted the United States' support for the International Commission for Missing Persons, which is engaged in the painstakingly slow process of DNA identification. Lastly, Secretary Jones assured the Commissioners that the United States was not merely paying lip service to the concerns of minorities in Kosovo. She said, "It is a tough issue, but it nevertheless is a critical one in our policy of standards before status." The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Intern Kevin Angle contributed to this article.

  • Frank Assessment Presented on State of Rights in Russia

    By John Finerty CSCE Staff Advisor The United States Helsinki Commission held a staff-level briefing on November 13, 2003 with Tanya Lokshina, Executive Director of the Moscow Helsinki Group, to discuss the status of human rights and democratic development in the Russian Federation. Ms. Lokshina was accompanied by Maureen Greenwood, Advocacy Director for Europe, the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International USA and Dr. Sarah E. Mendelson, Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ms. Lokshina opened the meeting by noting the human rights community in Russia is greatly concerned about the arrest of former YUKOS chief executive Mikhail Khodorkovsky, reportedly Russia's richest man arrested on tax evasion and fraud charges after contributing money to political opposition parties. The case, she said, proves beyond doubt that the Russian state is out to get any independent voice. Khodorkovsky is different from other politicians, she stated. While his fortune may have had questionable origins ("fraud and tax evasion are prevalent everywhere") Khodorkovsky's current corporate policy of transparency is not useful to a corrupt government bureaucracy. He also supported opposition forces in the Duma, ranging from free-market, pro-reform parties to the Communists. "The action against Yukos sent a clear signal to other investors," Lokshina continued. "Do not be independent. Do not support transparent dealings with parties or civil society initiatives.... Now the rest of the business community is terrified to follow suit." Regarding freedom of the media, Lokshina said there is no level of media not controlled by the state. Even non-state television channels are controlled by managers who are themselves controlled by the state. There is also little independent print media in Russia. Ms. Lokshina, who had been in Grozny for the Chechen presidential elections, called the exercise a combination of comedy and tragedy. In the face of overwhelming indifference of the population and empty voting stations, the official statistics were not to be believed, she maintained. On election day, Lokshina had not seen any voters except in special places arranged for foreign journalists. She also saw precinct protocols where 100% of the eligible voters had supposedly cast 100% of their ballots in favor of incumbent President Kadyrov - a virtual impossibility, given an inevitable percentage of disqualified (i.e., defaced or incorrectly filled out) ballots. To be sure, any serious competition for Kadyrov had been eased off the ballot long before election day. Ms. Lokshina also saw the recent gubernatorial elections in St. Petersburg--with the heavy-handed use of "administrative resources" by the pro-Putin apparat playing a major role--as a harbinger of future elections throughout Russia. Parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held on December 7, with presidential elections expected in March 2004. The three experts agreed that the recent Constitutional Court decision annulling the restrictive law on election coverage of candidates and election "propaganda" was a positive, albeit tardy, step. Ms. Lokshina said one of the worst problems is the arbitrary law enforcement, and that "Everything that happens in Chechnya also happens in the rest of Russia. It is merely magnified in Chechnya." Personnel from police forces all over Russia serve time in Chechnya, and they bring back to their home towns the arbitrariness and impunity learned there. For example, the individuals who arrested Khodorkovsky stormed in wearing security service uniforms. It was later learned they were not security service employees, but ordinary police. Similarly, the recent sweep of the Open Society Institute premises in Moscow was reminiscent of security sweeps in Chechnya. Sarah Mendelson of CSIS pointed out that aside from political parties, the Federal Security Service (FSB) is the least supported institution among the populace. Ms. Lokshina stressed that Russian human rights organizations need support from the West. In many ways, it feels like Russia is going back to Soviet realities. The difference, though, is that instead of being treated like an enemy, Russia, despite abuses, is now being treated like a civilized state, which, she says, is dangerous. When President Bush calls President Putin his friend, she said, it sends a clear message that the United States supports what is happening in Russia. America used to critique what is happening in Chechnya, for example. Russia, Lokshina contends, is becoming a threat to its own citizens and the world community at large. Uncritical Western support is counter to its own interests, she remarked. Asked about reports of widespread public apathy in Russia, Dr. Mendelson said there is certainly a great deal of apathy, but there is a certain line over which the state cannot go. Ms. Lokshina added that some of the apathy has to do with lack of knowledge and heavy media control. For instance, it is frequently reported that Russians are not opposed to some level of censorship. In reality, though, this does not mean they do not want to know what is going on in Chechnya. What they want is to get rid of scams and con games ("chernukha"), i.e. "citizens would rather the government had control of the media than Boris Berezovsky." Ms. Greenwood raised the issue of the situation of the Meshketian Turks living in tenuous circumstances in southern Russia. She appreciated U.S. initiatives on the subject but urged more follow-through regarding the possibility of granting refugee status to Meskhetian Turks desirous of emigrating. Greenwood also noted that not only have Meskhetian Turks experienced discrimination and harassment in southern Russia, but NGOs working on their behalf are now under pressure from local authorities. Ms. Greenwood asked that the United States maintain the pressure to prevent Russia from forcing internally displaced persons (IDPs) back into Chechnya. She said international pressure had succeeded in stopping Russia from overtly closing the remaining camps, but there remains subtle, psychological coercion. In response to an inquiry about the state of freedom of thought within the academic community, Mendelson related several instances of FSB harassment of academics. "In Moscow," she commented, "it simply feels like there is less oxygen. You cannot breathe." Ms. Lokshina contends that the situation in the provinces is even worse. Asked about specific policy recommendations, Lokshina favored a strong statement from the United States against the anti-democratic trends and continued U.S. assistance programs for civil society and human rights in Russia. Mendelson added that the United States has made a strategic investment in Russian democracy and civil society, but this investment is under funded and it is too early to "graduate" Russia from such programs. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Intern Jason Ekk contributed to this article.

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