Justice at Home
Promoting human rights, good governance, and anti-corruption abroad can only be possible if the United States lives up to its values at home. By signing the Helsinki Final Act, the United States committed to respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, even under the most challenging circumstances. However, like other OSCE participating States, the United States sometimes struggles to foster racial and religious equity, counter hate and discrimination, defend fundamental freedoms, and hold those in positions of authority accountable for their actions. The Helsinki Commission works to ensure that U.S. practices align with the country’s international commitments and that the United States remains responsive to legitimate concerns raised in the OSCE context, including about the death penalty, use of force by law enforcement, racial and religious profiling, and other criminal justice practices; the conduct of elections; and the status and treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere.
Human rights within states are crucial to security among states. Prioritizing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, defending the principles of liberty, and encouraging tolerance within societies must be at the forefront of America's foreign policy agenda. Peace, security, and prosperity cannot be sustained if national governments repress their citizens, stifle their media, or imprison members of the political opposition. Authoritarian regimes become increasingly unstable as citizens chafe under the bonds of persecution and violence, and pose a danger not only to their citizens, but also to neighboring nations. The Helsinki Commission strives to ensure that the protection of human rights and defense of democratic values are central to U.S. foreign policy; that they are applied consistently in U.S. relations with other countries; that violations of Helsinki provisions are given full consideration in U.S. policymaking; and that the United States holds those who repress their citizens accountable for their actions. This includes battling corruption; protecting the fundamental freedoms of all people, especially those who historically have been persecuted and marginalized; promoting the sustainable management of resources; and balancing national security interests with respect for human rights to achieve long-term positive outcomes rather than short-term gains.
OSCE Election Observation
In 1990, OSCE participating States pledged to hold free and fair elections and to invite foreign observers to observe its elections. Elections observation has since been recognized as one of the most transparent and methodical ways to encourage States’ commitment to democratic standards and has become a core element of the OSCE’s efforts to promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. In 2020 alone, the OSCE has been invited to observe elections in nearly 20 OSCE participating States (Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Iceland, Ireland, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Monogolia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and the United States).* History of OSCE Election Observation All OSCE participating States have committed to holding democratic elections that meet the same basic standards: universal access, equality, fairness, freedom, transparency, accountability, and privacy in voter submission. Because violations of these commitments can endanger stability in the OSCE region, as well as within an individual country, OSCE nations also agreed to open their elections to observers from other participating countries. To encourage compliance and confidence in the results of the observation missions, countries agreed to observe elections together under the OSCE umbrella. Since the 1990s, OSCE election observers have been present at more than 300 elections throughout the OSCE region. While some OSCE countries benefit from foreign observation more than others – especially those that formerly had one-party communist systems and little experience with democracy – the OSCE also observes elections in more established and stable democracies, such as the United States, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Even these countries can benefit from consideration of the objective conclusions of those with an outside, comparative perspective. Perhaps more important, observation across the OSCE region removes any sense of stigmatization associated with the repeated hosting of election observation missions as well as any argument against hosting by those political leaders in some countries who continue to resist holding even reasonably free and fair elections. As one of the original 35 members of the OSCE, the United States has participated actively in OSCE election observation missions, both by providing observers for foreign elections as well as by inviting the OSCE to observe every general and midterm election since 2002. Election Observation Methodology ODIHR's election monitoring methodology takes account of the situation before, during, and after an election. All aspects of the electoral process are considered, to include a review of the legal framework; the performance of elections officials; the conduct of campaigns; the media environment and equitable media access; the complaints and appeals process; voting, counting, and tabulation; and the announcement of results. Recently, ODIHR has further expanded its methodology to explore the participation of women and national minorities. Election Observers OSCE election observation missions often are undertaken jointly by the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA). A typical election observation mission comprises around 12 core team members, as well as several dozen long-term observers and several hundred short-term observers. The missions, which combine strong technical expertise and sound political judgement, include ODIHR officials, professional analysts, parliamentarians, and others on loan from OSCE member countries. To ensure that no single country’s point of view is overrepresented, the OSCE limits the number of observers from any one country. No matter where they are from, observers commit to an election observation code of conduct, which limits their role to observing and reporting. Observers have no authority to instruct, assist, or interfere in the voting, counting, tabulation, or other aspects of the electoral process. Election Observation, Reporting, and Recommendations Ahead of the elections, observers receive briefings from the host government, political parties, civil society, and media representatives. Long-term observers also follow pre-election activities including candidate and voter registration, political campaigns, and media coverage. On Election Day, two-person teams of short-term observers fan out across the country to observe the conduct of the election, including opening of polling stations; checking whether ballot boxes are empty and properly sealed; the counting of ballots; the handling of spoiled or unused ballots; and the transmission of polling station results. Observers monitor how voters are processed, the accuracy of voter registries, and whether voters are able to vote in secret and in an environment that is free from intimidation. After the elections, long-term observers note how electoral complaints and appeals are handled. The OSCE election observation mission publishes preliminary findings immediately after the elections, with a final comprehensive report issued a few weeks later. The final report includes in-depth analysis of the election’s political context and legislative framework; election administration; voter and candidate registration; the election campaign; the media; participation of women and national minorities; and the voting, counting, and tabulation processes. Impact The OSCE methodology represents the global standard for quality election observation. By analyzing election-related laws and systems, as well as the effectiveness of their implementation, election observation missions help document whether elections in OSCE countries are free and fair for voters and candidates alike. Its expertise has been shared with other regional organizations, and the OSCE has contributed to observation efforts outside the OSCE region. The Helsinki Commission Contribution The U.S. Helsinki Commission was the first to propose concrete commitments regarding free and fair elections more than a year before they were adopted by the OSCE in June 1990. By that time, Commissioners and staff had already observed the conduct of the first multi-party elections in seven East and Central European countries transitioning from one-party communist states to functioning democracies. As the OSCE developed its institutional capacities in the mid-1990s, the Commission joined the efforts of an increasing number of observer teams from across the OSCE region, which evolved into the well-planned, professional election observation missions of today. Commissioners and staff have observed well over 100 elections since 1990. More broadly speaking, the United States support OSCE observation efforts, to include deployment of civilian, parliamentary, and diplomatic observers abroad, but also supporting OSCE’s observation of domestic elections, with a focus on countries where resistance to democratic change remains the strongest. Learn More Elections: OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Election Observation: OSCE Parliamentary Assembly * Following Needs Assessment Missions designed to assess the situation and determine the scale of a potential observation activity in a particular country, election observation was deemed unnecessary in some cases.
Decoding the OSCE
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the world’s largest regional security organization with 57 participating States representing more than a billion people. Its origins trace back to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which contains a broad range of measures focused on politico-military, economic and environmental, and human aspects designed to enhance comprehensive security and cooperation in the region, and the decades of multilateral diplomacy that followed. The OSCE operates coordinated efforts, adapted to the needs of each participating State, to protect democracy, promote peace, and manage conflict. The organization focuses on creating sustainable change through shared values, and decisions are taken by consensus. Learn more about the OSCE’s operations and institutions below. The Helsinki Process and the OSCE: On August 1, 1975, the leaders of the original 35 OSCE participating States gathered in Helsinki and signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Also known as the Helsinki Accords, the Helsinki Final Act is not a treaty, but rather a politically binding agreement consisting of three main sections informally known as "baskets," adopted on the basis of consensus. The Security Dimension The Economic Dimension The Human Dimension Four Decades of the Helsinki Process: The gatherings following the Final Act became known as the Helsinki Process. The process became a diplomatic front line in the Cold War and a cost-effective diplomatic tool to respond to the new challenges facing Europe during the post-Cold War era. Since its inception over forty years ago, the Helsinki Process and the OSCE continue to provide added value to multilateral efforts enhancing security and cooperation in Europe. OSCE Institutions, Structures, and Meetings: The OSCE sets standards in fields including military security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian concerns. The OSCE also undertakes a variety of preventive diplomacy initiatives designed to prevent, manage and resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The Consensus Rule: The OSCE operates using a consensus decision-making process. Consensus fosters ownership of decisions by all OSCE participating States, enables them to protect key national priorities, and creates an important incentive for countries to participate in the OSCE. It also strengthens the politically binding nature of OSCE commitments. The Moscow Mechanism: The OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism allows for the establishment of a short-term fact-finding mission to address a specific human rights concern in the OSCE region. OSCE Election Observation: Election observation is one of the most transparent and methodical ways to encourage States’ commitment to democratic standards and has become a core element of the OSCE’s efforts to promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Parliamentary Diplomacy of the OSCE: The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) offers opportunities for engagement among parliamentarians from OSCE participating States. The OSCE PA debates current issues related to OSCE commitments; develops and promotes tools to prevent and resolve conflicts; supports democratic development in participating States; and encourages national governments to take full advantage of OSCE capabilities. Non-Governmental Participation in the OSCE: One of the advantages of the OSCE is that it is the only international organization in which NGOs are allowed to participate in human dimension meetings on an equal basis with participating States. NGOs—no matter how small—can raise their concerns directly with governments.
Mr. President, today I introduce the International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001. This legislation addresses the growing problem of official and unofficial corruption abroad. This bill is based on S. 1514, which I introduced in the 106th Congress.
Endemic corruption around the world negatively impacts both the United States and the citizens of countries where corruption is tolerated. Overseas corruption directly hurts U.S. businesses as they endeavor to expand internationally. U.S. workers are affected when corruption closes doors to our exports. In addition, the honest and hardworking citizens of countries stricken with corruption suffer as they are compelled to pay bribes to officials and other people in positions of power just to get the permits and licenses they need to get things done. The trade barrier created by corruption also limits the purchasing choices available to these people. Finally, many leading U.S. companies that are eager to invest and build factories overseas to produce consumer goods for consumption in those countries, often wisely choose not to do so because they are not willing to deal with the corruption they would encounter. Overall, honest and hardworking people living all around the world suffer as productive output is unjustly harmed.
As the Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, known as the Helsinki Commission, I am working to address the problem of corruption. In the 106th Congress, I chaired a Commission hearing that focused on the issues of bribery and corruption in the region of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, an area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. During this hearing, the Commission heard that, in economic terms, rampant corruption and organized crime in this vast region has cost U.S. businesses billions of dollars in lost contracts with direct implications for our economy.
In addition, two years ago while attending the annual session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in St. Petersburg, Russia, I had an opportunity to sit down with U.S. business representatives and learned, first-hand, about the many obstacles they face.
Ironically, in some of the biggest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance--countries like Russia and Ukraine--the climate is either not conducive or outright hostile to American business.
The time has come to stop providing aid as usual to those countries which line up to receive our assistance, only to turn around and fleece U.S. businesses conducting legitimate operations in these countries. For this reason, I am introducing the International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001 to require the State Department to submit a report and the President to certify by March 1 of each year that countries which are receiving U.S. foreign aid are, in fact, conducive to American businesses and investors. If a country is found to be hostile to American businesses, aid from the United States would be cut off. The certification would be specifically based on whether a country is making progress in, and is committed to, economic reform aimed at eliminating corruption.
In fact, monitoring and measuring corruption, and the corresponding overall economic freedom, is nothing new. The Heritage Foundation regularly produces a comprehensive report entitled the “Index of Economic Freedom.” This year's 2001 report ranks 155 countries on the basis of 10 criteria, including “government intervention, foreign investment and black market.” While corruption is not identified individually in this report, you can bet there is a strong negative correlation between overall economic freedom and corruption. The more economic freedom you have, the less corruption you will have. It should be no surprise that the countries with the lowest levels of economic freedom are the very same countries that suffer from economic stagnation year after year. We owe it to the good people trapped in corrupt political systems to do what we can to help root out and get rid of this corruption.
Under this bill, if the President certifies that a country's business climate is not conducive for U.S. businesses, that country will, in effect, be put on probation. The country would continue to receive U.S. foreign aid through that end of the fiscal year, but aid would be cut off on the first day of the next fiscal year unless the President certifies the country is making significant progress in implementing the specified economic indicators and is committed to recognizing the involvement of U.S. business.
My bill also includes the customary waiver authority where the national interests of the United States are at stake. For countries certified as hostile to or not conducive for U.S. business, aid can continue if the President determines it is in the national security interest of the United States. However, the determination expires after six months unless the President determines its continuation is important to our national security interest.
I also included a provision which would allow aid to continue to meet urgent humanitarian needs, including food, medicine, disaster and refugee relief, to support democratic political reform and rule of law activities, and to create private sector and non-governmental organizations that are independent of government control, or to develop a free market economic system.
Instead of jumping on the bandwagon to pump millions of additional American tax dollars into countries which are hostile to U.S. businesses and investors, we should be working to root out the kinds of bribery and corruption that have an overall chilling effect on much needed foreign investment. Left unchecked, such corruption will continue to undermine fledgling democracies worldwide and further impede moves toward a genuine free market economy. I believe the legislation I am introducing today is a critical step this direction, and I urge my colleagues to support its passage.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001”.
SEC. 2. LIMITATIONS ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.
(a) REPORT AND CERTIFICATION.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than March 1 of each year, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees a certification described in paragraph (2) and a report for each country that received foreign assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 during the fiscal year. The report shall describe the extent to which each such country is making progress with respect to the following economic indicators:
(A) Implementation of comprehensive economic reform, based on market principles, private ownership, equitable treatment of foreign private investment, adoption of a legal and policy framework necessary for such reform, protection of intellectual property rights, and respect for contracts.
(B) Elimination of corrupt trade practices by private persons and government officials.
(C) Moving toward integration into the world economy.
(2) CERTIFICATION.--The certification described in this paragraph means a certification as to whether, based on the economic indicators described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of paragraph (1), each country is--
(A) conducive to United States business;
(B) not conducive to United States business; or
(C) hostile to United States business.
(b) LIMITATIONS ON ASSISTANCE.--
(1) COUNTRIES HOSTILE TO UNITED STATES BUSINESS.--
(A) GENERAL LIMITATION.--Beginning on the date the certification described in subsection (a) is submitted--
(i) none of the funds made available for assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (including unobligated balances of prior appropriations) may be made available for the government of a country that is certified as hostile to United States business pursuant to such subsection (a); and
(ii) the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank to vote against any loan or other utilization of the funds of such institution to or by any country with respect to which a certification described in clause (i) has been made.
(B) DURATION OF LIMITATIONS.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the limitations described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall apply with respect to a country that is certified as hostile to United States business pursuant to subsection (a) until the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the country is making significant progress in implementing the economic indicators described in subsection (a)(1) and is no longer hostile to United States business.
(2) COUNTRIES NOT CONDUCIVE TO UNITED STATES BUSINESS.--
(A) PROBATIONARY PERIOD.--A country that is certified as not conducive to United States business pursuant to subsection (a), shall be considered to be on probation beginning on the date of such certification.
(B) REQUIRED IMPROVEMENT.--Unless the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the country is making significant progress in implementing the economic indicators described in subsection (a) and is committed to being conducive to United States business, beginning on the first day of the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which a country is certified as not conducive to United States business pursuant to subsection (a)(2)--
(i) none of the funds made available for assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (including unobligated balances of prior appropriations) may be made available for the government of such country; and
(ii) the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank to vote against any loan or other utilization of the funds of such institution to or by any country with respect to which a certification described in subparagraph (A) has been made.
(C) DURATION OF LIMITATIONS.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the limitations described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (B) shall apply with respect to a country that is certified as not conducive to United States business pursuant to subsection (a) until the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the country is making significant progress in implementing the economic indicators described in subsection (a)(1) and is conducive to United States business.
(1) NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST.--Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect to a country described in subsection (b) (1) or (2) if the President determines with respect to such country that making such funds available is important to the national security interest of the United States. Any such determination shall cease to be effective 6 months after being made unless the President determines that its continuation is important to the national security interest of the United States.
(2) OTHER EXCEPTIONS.--Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect to--
(A) assistance to meet urgent humanitarian needs (including providing food, medicine, disaster, and refugee relief);
(B) democratic political reform and rule of law activities;
(C) the creation of private sector and nongovernmental organizations that are independent of government control; and
(D) the development of a free market economic system.
SEC. 3. TOLL-FREE NUMBER.
The Secretary of Commerce shall make available a toll-free telephone number for reporting by members of the public and United States businesses on the progress that countries receiving foreign assistance are making in implementing the economic indicators described in section 2(a)(1). The information obtained from the toll-free telephone reporting shall be included in the report required by section 2(a).
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES.--The term “appropriate committees” means the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK.--The term “multilateral development bank” means the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.