Against a backdrop of savage conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nagorno Karabakh, and Georgia, attendant refugee crises throughout the region, and a wave of sometimes violent racism and xenophobia even in long-established European democracies, the participating states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met in Warsaw, Poland in 1993 for the first biannual Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues As specified by the 1992 Helsinki Document, the meeting included a thorough exchange of views on the implementation of Human Dimension commitments, consideration of ways and means of improving implementation, and an evaluation of the procedures for monitoring compliance with commitments. The dramatic unfolding over the course of the meeting of the showdown within the Russian government-- culminating in the shelling of the Russian Parliament building by government troops-- served as a sober reminder to participants of the vulnerability of democracy in transition and the importance of shoring up Human Dimension compliance.

Budapest, Hungary, was the first stop of the Helsinki Commission delegation led by Commission CoChairman Senator Dennis DeConcini to Hungary, Greece, Macedonia, and Croatia. While in Hungary, the delegation planned to discuss a variety of domestic, bilateral, and regional issues with President Arpad Goncz, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, and other high-level Hungarian officials. Chief among them were questions regarding the ongoing crisis in the former Yugoslavia; the delegation hoped to gain perspective on the regional ramifications of the crisis, and to learn more about Hungary's needs, concerns, and recommendations. Also critical was discussion of the specter of anti-Semitism and intolerance in Hungary, as manifested by the outspoken Vice President of the ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum Istvan Csurka; the delegation wished to express its strong condemnation of Csurka's divisive and exclusivist version of nationalism. Hungary's relations with the soon-to-be-independent Slovakia were also on the agenda, as well as the ongoing controversy over the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Dam. The Commission delegation travelled to Macedonia to meet with government leaders and private citizens, including representatives of ethnic communities, with the goal of discussing questions related to Macedonia's recognition by the international community, and to observe the economic, political and social impact of the denial of that recognition to date. The delegation also wanted to examine the possibilities for violence and conflict in Macedonia due to the ongoing conflict in nearby Bosnia-Herzegovina and repression in neighboring Kosovo, and to hear Macedonian insights on this conflict and repression. Related to all the above, and central to the Commission delegation's concerns, was the degree of democratic development in Macedonia, especially in regard to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The delegation travelled to Macedonia via Thessaloniki, Greece. Taking advantage of this transit, a further objective of the delegation was to hear the views of Greek officials on issues related to Macedonia, and the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia in general. Finally, the Commission delegation wished to visit refugees from the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina to gain information on the circumstances leading to their presence in Macedonia, as well as to observe the quality of their treatment as refugees in that country. The Commission delegation's main interest in travelling to Croatia was to examine the situation for Bosnian refugees residing there as winter approached and to hear their reports of what was happening in BosniaHerzegovina. More generally, the delegation wanted to obtain a more detailed picture of the situation in the region as a whole as the fighting raged on. This included developments within Croatia itself, such as the situation regarding displaced persons and in the United Nations Protected Areas, as well as Croatia's role in the Bosnian conflict. Finally, the delegation had an interest in seeing the newly created U.S. Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) unit at Pleso Airport outside Zagreb.    

The Helsinki Commission was urged by several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to make a contribution to the public debate on Northern Ireland. Human rights reports by well-respected NGOs such as Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch have documented persistent human rights abuses by security and paramilitary forces. Serious questions have been raised about the administration of justice as well. And to this day, issues of social and economic justice dominate the political dialogue between the two communities of Northern Ireland. Prior to its visit, the Commission was warned that, given its complex realities and historic passions, Northern Ireland often defies understanding. Nevertheless, the delegation, which in. addition to Senator DeConcini, included Commission Deputy Staff Directors Jane Fisher and Mary Sue Hafner, as well as, Mary Hawkins of Senator DeConcini's personal staff, came away with a better perception of what drives this conflict. The delegation began its fact-finding trip on the premise that any evaluation of the situation in Northern Ireland must consider not only traditional human rights violations, bu he erosion of a democratic system by terrorist activity. Indeed, the delegation viewed errorist acts by paramilitary forces from both communities as one of the worst recurring auses of human rights violations. At the same time, the delegation agreed the root causes of that terrorism should also be examined. As local religious leaders admonished, "an valuation of Northern Ireland based upon CSCE standards and principles must addres he dangers it confronts.'' This view reflected the competing interests that challening Northern Ireland today: on the one hand, efforts by one of the world's oldest democracies to promote and protect human rights and the rule of law; on the other, the need to combat a vicious terrorist movement that has taken thousands of lives.

On August 2, 1992, Croatia held elections for the position of President of the Republic as well as for seats in the House of Representatives, one of two chambers in Croatia's "Sabor," or Assembly. These were the second multi-party elections in Croatia since 1990, when alternative political parties first competed for power. They were, however, the first since Croatia proclaimed itself an independent state in 1991, and achieved international recognition as such in 1992, following the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. Incumbent Franjo Tudjman easily won a first-round victory among a field of eight presidential candidates. His party, the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), also won just over half of the parliamentary seats allocated in proportion to votes for the lists of 17 parties, and a very large number of the seats designated for particular electoral districts. This result allows the HDZ to form a new government alone rather than in coalition with other parties. A shift to the far right, which many feared, did not materialize. Despite a number of open questions, the election results likely reflect the legitimate choice of Croatia's voting population. At the same time, the elections demonstrated disappointingly little democratic progress in Croatia since 1990. Detracting most from the elections was the lack of serious effort by the authorities to instill confidence in the electoral system, followed by the perceived political motivation in scheduling them in August. The elections also revealed some shortcomings on the part of the opposition, including a lack of coordinated effort to ensure that they were conducted freely and fairly. Croatia has a western-oriented, well educated and sophisticated society which provide a basis for democratic government. Decades of communist rule and a fierce nationalism linked to Croatia's search for independence have, at the same time, unleashed societal trends contrary to democratic development. The context in which these elections took place was also complicated by the conflict in Croatia that began in earnest in July 1991 as militants among the alienated ethnic-Serb population of Croatia, with the encouragement of the Serbian leadership in Belgrade and the help of the Yugoslav military, demonstrated violently their opposition to the republic's independence. After severe human casualties, population displacement and destruction, the conflict generally ended in January 1992 with a U.N. negotiated ceasefire that included the deployment of U.N. protection forces on much of Croatia's territory A new constitution and growing stability argued for holding new elections. Despite opposition complaints that August was not an appropriate time for elections, President Tudjman scheduled them with the likely calculation that his party stood its best chances in a quick election before growing economic hardship and pressure for genuine democratization replaced the joys of independence and renewed peace. During the campaign period, 29 political parties fielded candidates. They faced no major difficulties in organizing rallies and distributing their literature to the public. At the same time, the Croatian media was only moderately free, with television and radio broadcasts much less so than newspapers and journals. Only toward the end of the campaign did the media seem to open up fully The stated objective in organizing the elections was to be fair and impartial to all contending parties. At the same time, the electoral procedures were not as fully satisfactory as they easily could have been, raising suspicions of an intent to manipulate the results. However, opposition political parties considered the process sufficiently fair for them to compete. They also had the opportunity to have observers present at polling stations and election commissions on election day. According to a constitutional law on the matter, Croatia's national minorities enjoy certain rights regarding their representation in governmental bodies. Ethnic Serbs, the only large minority with some 12 percent of the population, were guaranteed a greater number of seats in the new Sabor than all other minorities combined, but, unlike the smaller minorities, no elections were held in which ethnic Serbs alone could chose their representatives. This was viewed as discriminatory treatment of the Serbian minority, despite apparently small Serbian participation in the elections. Balloting on election day was orderly, despite the enormous complications caused by the conflict and questions of citizenship and voter eligibility in a newly independent country. There were few complaints in regard to the way in which the voting and counting were carried out, although several isolated problems were reported and the security of ballots cast by voters abroad was a constant concern. Despite these faults, holding elections might well have been a watershed for Croatia. Problems in that country's democratic development were given closer scrutiny, and public concerns can now shift from the recent past to future prospects. The winners could view their easy win as a mandate for continuing current policies, largely viewed as nationalistic and insufficiently democratic. However, the far right's poor performance could lessen pressure on the HDZ to show its nationalist colors and permit greater democratic development. The behavior of HDZ leaders to date favors the status quo in the short run, but domestic and international pressure could both encourage more significant democratic reform than has been seen thus far.

In accordance with the mandate of the Vienna Concluding Document, the 38 states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met in Moscow from September 10 through October 4, 1991, for the third meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (CHD, or CDH from the French acronym) of the CSCE. The first meeting of the Conference was held in Paris from May 20 through June 23, 1989, and the second was held in Copenhagen from June 5 through 29, 1990. The meetings of the CHD address the full range of human rights and humanitarian concerns associated with the Helsinki process.