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  • Putin’s Regime Is Descending Into Stalinism

    Vladimir Kara-Murza is a pro-democracy opposition leader in Russia — and my friend. He was arrested in April of last year for “discrediting the armed forces” of Russia. His arrest was apparently triggered by a visit he made to Arizona the previous month during which he simply told the truth. “The entire world sees what [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s regime is doing to Ukraine,” Kara-Murza told members of Arizona’s state legislature. “It bombs civilian areas, hospitals and schools.” In the months that followed his arrest, the Kremlin piled on. He was also charged with using the funds of an “undesirable organization” — the Washington, D.C. -based NGO “Free Russia Foundation” — to convene a conference in support of Russian political prisoners in Moscow in October 2021. Simultaneously, he was accused of “high treason” because he testified before the Helsinki Commission and the NATO Parliamentary assembly, and for allegedly “consulting foreign special services” for $30,000 a month. On Monday, Kara-Murza was sentenced to 25 years in a “strict regime” prison colony. This is likely the longest sentence ever meted out for political activity in post-Soviet Russia, where the maximum term for murder is 15 years and the punishment for rape is the same. His sentence combines penalties for all these “crimes”: seven years for the first, three for the second, and 15 years (apparently “reduced” from eighteen) for the third. This punishment is much harsher than the ones to which the regime’s vengeance has lately subjected members of the opposition. The two other leading opponents of the Kremlin, Alexei Navalny and Ilya Yashin, were sentenced to nine years and eight-and-a-half years respectively. Heightened repression is always a sign of fear. Could Kara-Murza’s punishment have had something to do with the fact that Navalny was sentenced a year ago and Yashin last December, when the war in Ukraine may not have looked to the Kremlin as much of an endless bloody slog as it appears today? And also when its prosecution of the war, while dealing with harsh Western sanctions, was not as much fraught with the possibility of popular discontent over gradual impoverishment and casualties in the hundreds of thousands? It seems that the reason the sentence is so harsh is to scare civil society and preclude any chance of organized resistance. Even in the post-Stalin Soviet Union, the authorities generally avoided charging dissidents with crimes like “high treason,” most often espionage. (The 1977 case of the Jewish refusenik Anatoly Sharansky was an exception.) As Kara-Murza, whom the Kremlin almost certainly tried to poison twice before, pointed out to the kangaroo court this week, his sentence harkens back not just to Soviet times but to the 1930s Stalinist purges of “enemies of the people.” Kara-Murza is a Cambridge-trained historian, and he was right. Putin’s regime is descending into Stalinism. Sustained by indiscriminate ruthlessness, such regimes do not “evolve”— witness North Korea or Cuba. They can only be destroyed either by an invasion, like Pol Pot’s Cambodia or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, or exploded from within by a miraculous leader like Mikhail Gorbachev. Neither outcome is likely in Russia so long as Putin lives. And so the struggle is very personal now between the two Vladimirs, Putin and Kara-Murza, even biological: Only Putin’s death can free my friend Vladimir. Putin is 70, Kara-Murza is 41. But the effective age gap will narrow steadily as Kara-Murza’s jailers will undoubtedly begin grinding him down from day one. Yet Kara-Murza was defiant and hopeful even as his sentence came down. “I know that the day will come when the darkness over our country will be gone,” he said in his final statement before the court. “When the war will be called a war, and the usurper [in the Kremlin] will be called a usurper; when those who have ignited this war will be called criminals instead of those who tried to stop it... And then our people will open their eyes and shudder at the sight of the horrific crimes committed in their names.” Even in the post-Stalin Soviet Union, the authorities generally avoided charging dissidents with crimes like “high treason,” most often espionage. (The 1977 case of the Jewish refusenik Anatoly Sharansky was an exception.) As Kara-Murza, whom the Kremlin almost certainly tried to poison twice before, pointed out to the kangaroo court this week, his sentence harkens back not just to Soviet times but to the 1930s Stalinist purges of “enemies of the people.” Kara-Murza is a Cambridge-trained historian, and he was right. Putin’s regime is descending into Stalinism. Sustained by indiscriminate ruthlessness, such regimes do not “evolve”— witness North Korea or Cuba. They can only be destroyed either by an invasion, like Pol Pot’s Cambodia or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, or exploded from within by a miraculous leader like Mikhail Gorbachev. Neither outcome is likely in Russia so long as Putin lives. And so the struggle is very personal now between the two Vladimirs, Putin and Kara-Murza, even biological: Only Putin’s death can free my friend Vladimir. Putin is 70, Kara-Murza is 41. But the effective age gap will narrow steadily as Kara-Murza’s jailers will undoubtedly begin grinding him down from day one. Yet Kara-Murza was defiant and hopeful even as his sentence came down. “I know that the day will come when the darkness over our country will be gone,” he said in his final statement before the court. “When the war will be called a war, and the usurper [in the Kremlin] will be called a usurper; when those who have ignited this war will be called criminals instead of those who tried to stop it... And then our people will open their eyes and shudder at the sight of the horrific crimes committed in their names.”

  • Wagner Group must be designated as foreign terrorist organization

    On Jan. 26, the State Department announced further sanctions against the Wagner Group and a number of Wagner-related entities. The Treasury Department designated Wagner as a transnational criminal organization for an ongoing pattern of serious criminal activity, including mass executions, rape, child abductions, and physical abuse in the Central African Republic, or CAR, and Mali. It also sanctioned Wagner for the violent targeting of women and children, abductions, forced displacements, and attacks on schools, hospitals and religious sites in CAR. In December, Secretary of State Antony Blinken designated Wagner as an Entity of Particular Concern under the International Religious Freedom Act for its indiscriminate targeting and killing of members of minority religious groups in CAR, and the Commerce Department restricted Wagner Group’s access to certain foreign-produced items (primarily but not exclusively weapons and munitions) that use U.S. technology. Wagner was first sanctioned by the Treasury Department in 2017 for its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. These sanctions are a step forward in dealing with the international carnage that Wagner has wrought since its creation in 2014. They have serious limitations, however, because all require a nexus with the United States. While they limit financial transactions with U.S. persons and entities, and U.S. citizens are subject to criminal prosecution for violations of these sanctions, they do not touch upon Wagner’s interaction with the rest of the world. If the Biden administration wants to impose maximum pressure on Wagner, it will designate it as a foreign terrorist organization, or FTO. This would bring into full force America’s material support to terrorism statutes and would put anyone, anywhere in the world, who provides support to Wagner at the same legal risk as someone who provides material support to the Islamic State or al Qaeda. Instead, Wagner has been subject to the same sanctions under a variety of names: as an arm of the Russian military; as a suppressor of religious freedom; and now as a transnational criminal organization. None of these invokes the material support to terrorism statutes, and therefore none significantly hinder Wagner’s foreign operations. Wagner is a terrorist problem, not a criminal problem — a distinction with a difference. Its use of terror against civilians in Syria and Africa is to further the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals as well as for its own material gain. Wagner has secured natural gas resources in Syria and mineral resources in Africa, which helps the Kremlin avoid international sanctions and finance its war in Ukraine. It props up dictators while its terror tactics destabilize large swaths of Africa’s Sahel region by increasing support for local insurgent groups. Sudan’s 2021 military coup, which overthrew a transitional civilian government, was instigated in part to allow Wagner’s gold smuggling to Russia to continue. These are the acts of a terrorist organization, not a criminal gang. One of the lessons of 9/11 is that terrorism must be treated as the global threat it is, not merely as a law enforcement problem. Hezbollah counterfeits U.S. currency and al Qaeda smuggles drugs with the Taliban, but they are designated as FTOs because their terror supports political goals that threaten the security of the United States, its allies and its partners. For the secretary of state to designate an entity as an FTO, it must be foreign and engage in terrorism, and the terrorism must threaten the security of the United States or its nationals. Wagner meets these criteria; since it emulates the Islamic State in its actions, it should be treated in the same manner. The administration may believe that an FTO designation would force it to list Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, or SST, since Wagner is its agent. However, nothing in U.S. law would compel the secretary to make such a designation. We have argued elsewhere that declaring Russia an SST would be counterproductive by severing lines of communication necessary to end the war in Ukraine. The use of material support to terrorism statutes to destroy Wagner’s utility to the Kremlin and end its gold smuggling operations would pressure the Kremlin by removing a valuable asset. This approach is gathering support in Congress. Earlier this year, the Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries (HARM) Act was introduced in both the House and Senate with bipartisan support. This act would direct the secretary of state to designate Wagner and its affiliates as an FTO, bringing the full power of U.S. law into play against Wagner on a global basis. But we need not wait for the bill’s passage to take action. We encourage the secretary to act under the authorities that already exist so that U.S. sanctions against Wagner will include the most powerful legal tools that allow us to sanction Wagner and its supporters as we have sanctioned al Qaeda.

  • Wagner Group must be designated as foreign terrorist organization

    On Jan. 26, the State Department announced further sanctions against the Wagner Group and a number of Wagner-related entities. The Treasury Department designated Wagner as a transnational criminal organization for an ongoing pattern of serious criminal activity, including mass executions, rape, child abductions, and physical abuse in the Central African Republic, or CAR, and Mali. It also sanctioned Wagner for the violent targeting of women and children, abductions, forced displacements, and attacks on schools, hospitals and religious sites in CAR. In December, Secretary of State Antony Blinken designated Wagner as an Entity of Particular Concern under the International Religious Freedom Act for its indiscriminate targeting and killing of members of minority religious groups in CAR, and the Commerce Department restricted Wagner Group’s access to certain foreign-produced items (primarily but not exclusively weapons and munitions) that use U.S. technology. Wagner was first sanctioned by the Treasury Department in 2017 for its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. These sanctions are a step forward in dealing with the international carnage that Wagner has wrought since its creation in 2014. They have serious limitations, however, because all require a nexus with the United States. While they limit financial transactions with U.S. persons and entities, and U.S. citizens are subject to criminal prosecution for violations of these sanctions, they do not touch upon Wagner’s interaction with the rest of the world. If the Biden administration wants to impose maximum pressure on Wagner, it will designate it as a foreign terrorist organization, or FTO. This would bring into full force America’s material support to terrorism statutes and would put anyone, anywhere in the world, who provides support to Wagner at the same legal risk as someone who provides material support to the Islamic State or al Qaeda. Instead, Wagner has been subject to the same sanctions under a variety of names: as an arm of the Russian military; as a suppressor of religious freedom; and now as a transnational criminal organization. None of these invokes the material support to terrorism statutes, and therefore none significantly hinder Wagner’s foreign operations. Wagner is a terrorist problem, not a criminal problem — a distinction with a difference. Its use of terror against civilians in Syria and Africa is to further the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals as well as for its own material gain. Wagner has secured natural gas resources in Syria and mineral resources in Africa, which helps the Kremlin avoid international sanctions and finance its war in Ukraine. It props up dictators while its terror tactics destabilize large swaths of Africa’s Sahel region by increasing support for local insurgent groups. Sudan’s 2021 military coup, which overthrew a transitional civilian government, was instigated in part to allow Wagner’s gold smuggling to Russia to continue. These are the acts of a terrorist organization, not a criminal gang. One of the lessons of 9/11 is that terrorism must be treated as the global threat it is, not merely as a law enforcement problem. Hezbollah counterfeits U.S. currency and al Qaeda smuggles drugs with the Taliban, but they are designated as FTOs because their terror supports political goals that threaten the security of the United States, its allies and its partners. For the secretary of state to designate an entity as an FTO, it must be foreign and engage in terrorism, and the terrorism must threaten the security of the United States or its nationals. Wagner meets these criteria; since it emulates the Islamic State in its actions, it should be treated in the same manner. The administration may believe that an FTO designation would force it to list Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, or SST, since Wagner is its agent. However, nothing in U.S. law would compel the secretary to make such a designation. We have argued elsewhere that declaring Russia an SST would be counterproductive by severing lines of communication necessary to end the war in Ukraine. The use of material support to terrorism statutes to destroy Wagner’s utility to the Kremlin and end its gold smuggling operations would pressure the Kremlin by removing a valuable asset. This approach is gathering support in Congress. Earlier this year, the Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries (HARM) Act was introduced in both the House and Senate with bipartisan support. This act would direct the secretary of state to designate Wagner and its affiliates as an FTO, bringing the full power of U.S. law into play against Wagner on a global basis. But we need not wait for the bill’s passage to take action. We encourage the secretary to act under the authorities that already exist so that U.S. sanctions against Wagner will include the most powerful legal tools that allow us to sanction Wagner and its supporters as we have sanctioned al Qaeda.

  • Wagner Group must be designated as foreign terrorist organization

    On Jan. 26, the State Department announced further sanctions against the Wagner Group and a number of Wagner-related entities. The Treasury Department designated Wagner as a transnational criminal organization for an ongoing pattern of serious criminal activity, including mass executions, rape, child abductions, and physical abuse in the Central African Republic, or CAR, and Mali. It also sanctioned Wagner for the violent targeting of women and children, abductions, forced displacements, and attacks on schools, hospitals and religious sites in CAR. In December, Secretary of State Antony Blinken designated Wagner as an Entity of Particular Concern under the International Religious Freedom Act for its indiscriminate targeting and killing of members of minority religious groups in CAR, and the Commerce Department restricted Wagner Group’s access to certain foreign-produced items (primarily but not exclusively weapons and munitions) that use U.S. technology. Wagner was first sanctioned by the Treasury Department in 2017 for its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. These sanctions are a step forward in dealing with the international carnage that Wagner has wrought since its creation in 2014. They have serious limitations, however, because all require a nexus with the United States. While they limit financial transactions with U.S. persons and entities, and U.S. citizens are subject to criminal prosecution for violations of these sanctions, they do not touch upon Wagner’s interaction with the rest of the world. If the Biden administration wants to impose maximum pressure on Wagner, it will designate it as a foreign terrorist organization, or FTO. This would bring into full force America’s material support to terrorism statutes and would put anyone, anywhere in the world, who provides support to Wagner at the same legal risk as someone who provides material support to the Islamic State or al Qaeda. Instead, Wagner has been subject to the same sanctions under a variety of names: as an arm of the Russian military; as a suppressor of religious freedom; and now as a transnational criminal organization. None of these invokes the material support to terrorism statutes, and therefore none significantly hinder Wagner’s foreign operations. Wagner is a terrorist problem, not a criminal problem — a distinction with a difference. Its use of terror against civilians in Syria and Africa is to further the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals as well as for its own material gain. Wagner has secured natural gas resources in Syria and mineral resources in Africa, which helps the Kremlin avoid international sanctions and finance its war in Ukraine. It props up dictators while its terror tactics destabilize large swaths of Africa’s Sahel region by increasing support for local insurgent groups. Sudan’s 2021 military coup, which overthrew a transitional civilian government, was instigated in part to allow Wagner’s gold smuggling to Russia to continue. These are the acts of a terrorist organization, not a criminal gang. One of the lessons of 9/11 is that terrorism must be treated as the global threat it is, not merely as a law enforcement problem. Hezbollah counterfeits U.S. currency and al Qaeda smuggles drugs with the Taliban, but they are designated as FTOs because their terror supports political goals that threaten the security of the United States, its allies and its partners. For the secretary of state to designate an entity as an FTO, it must be foreign and engage in terrorism, and the terrorism must threaten the security of the United States or its nationals. Wagner meets these criteria; since it emulates the Islamic State in its actions, it should be treated in the same manner. The administration may believe that an FTO designation would force it to list Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, or SST, since Wagner is its agent. However, nothing in U.S. law would compel the secretary to make such a designation. We have argued elsewhere that declaring Russia an SST would be counterproductive by severing lines of communication necessary to end the war in Ukraine. The use of material support to terrorism statutes to destroy Wagner’s utility to the Kremlin and end its gold smuggling operations would pressure the Kremlin by removing a valuable asset. This approach is gathering support in Congress. Earlier this year, the Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries (HARM) Act was introduced in both the House and Senate with bipartisan support. This act would direct the secretary of state to designate Wagner and its affiliates as an FTO, bringing the full power of U.S. law into play against Wagner on a global basis. But we need not wait for the bill’s passage to take action. We encourage the secretary to act under the authorities that already exist so that U.S. sanctions against Wagner will include the most powerful legal tools that allow us to sanction Wagner and its supporters as we have sanctioned al Qaeda.

  • Wagner Group must be designated as foreign terrorist organization

    On Jan. 26, the State Department announced further sanctions against the Wagner Group and a number of Wagner-related entities. The Treasury Department designated Wagner as a transnational criminal organization for an ongoing pattern of serious criminal activity, including mass executions, rape, child abductions, and physical abuse in the Central African Republic, or CAR, and Mali. It also sanctioned Wagner for the violent targeting of women and children, abductions, forced displacements, and attacks on schools, hospitals and religious sites in CAR. In December, Secretary of State Antony Blinken designated Wagner as an Entity of Particular Concern under the International Religious Freedom Act for its indiscriminate targeting and killing of members of minority religious groups in CAR, and the Commerce Department restricted Wagner Group’s access to certain foreign-produced items (primarily but not exclusively weapons and munitions) that use U.S. technology. Wagner was first sanctioned by the Treasury Department in 2017 for its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. These sanctions are a step forward in dealing with the international carnage that Wagner has wrought since its creation in 2014. They have serious limitations, however, because all require a nexus with the United States. While they limit financial transactions with U.S. persons and entities, and U.S. citizens are subject to criminal prosecution for violations of these sanctions, they do not touch upon Wagner’s interaction with the rest of the world. If the Biden administration wants to impose maximum pressure on Wagner, it will designate it as a foreign terrorist organization, or FTO. This would bring into full force America’s material support to terrorism statutes and would put anyone, anywhere in the world, who provides support to Wagner at the same legal risk as someone who provides material support to the Islamic State or al Qaeda. Instead, Wagner has been subject to the same sanctions under a variety of names: as an arm of the Russian military; as a suppressor of religious freedom; and now as a transnational criminal organization. None of these invokes the material support to terrorism statutes, and therefore none significantly hinder Wagner’s foreign operations. Wagner is a terrorist problem, not a criminal problem — a distinction with a difference. Its use of terror against civilians in Syria and Africa is to further the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals as well as for its own material gain. Wagner has secured natural gas resources in Syria and mineral resources in Africa, which helps the Kremlin avoid international sanctions and finance its war in Ukraine. It props up dictators while its terror tactics destabilize large swaths of Africa’s Sahel region by increasing support for local insurgent groups. Sudan’s 2021 military coup, which overthrew a transitional civilian government, was instigated in part to allow Wagner’s gold smuggling to Russia to continue. These are the acts of a terrorist organization, not a criminal gang. One of the lessons of 9/11 is that terrorism must be treated as the global threat it is, not merely as a law enforcement problem. Hezbollah counterfeits U.S. currency and al Qaeda smuggles drugs with the Taliban, but they are designated as FTOs because their terror supports political goals that threaten the security of the United States, its allies and its partners. For the secretary of state to designate an entity as an FTO, it must be foreign and engage in terrorism, and the terrorism must threaten the security of the United States or its nationals. Wagner meets these criteria; since it emulates the Islamic State in its actions, it should be treated in the same manner. The administration may believe that an FTO designation would force it to list Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, or SST, since Wagner is its agent. However, nothing in U.S. law would compel the secretary to make such a designation. We have argued elsewhere that declaring Russia an SST would be counterproductive by severing lines of communication necessary to end the war in Ukraine. The use of material support to terrorism statutes to destroy Wagner’s utility to the Kremlin and end its gold smuggling operations would pressure the Kremlin by removing a valuable asset. This approach is gathering support in Congress. Earlier this year, the Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries (HARM) Act was introduced in both the House and Senate with bipartisan support. This act would direct the secretary of state to designate Wagner and its affiliates as an FTO, bringing the full power of U.S. law into play against Wagner on a global basis. But we need not wait for the bill’s passage to take action. We encourage the secretary to act under the authorities that already exist so that U.S. sanctions against Wagner will include the most powerful legal tools that allow us to sanction Wagner and its supporters as we have sanctioned al Qaeda.

  • Wagner Group must be designated as foreign terrorist organization

    On Jan. 26, the State Department announced further sanctions against the Wagner Group and a number of Wagner-related entities. The Treasury Department designated Wagner as a transnational criminal organization for an ongoing pattern of serious criminal activity, including mass executions, rape, child abductions, and physical abuse in the Central African Republic, or CAR, and Mali. It also sanctioned Wagner for the violent targeting of women and children, abductions, forced displacements, and attacks on schools, hospitals and religious sites in CAR. In December, Secretary of State Antony Blinken designated Wagner as an Entity of Particular Concern under the International Religious Freedom Act for its indiscriminate targeting and killing of members of minority religious groups in CAR, and the Commerce Department restricted Wagner Group’s access to certain foreign-produced items (primarily but not exclusively weapons and munitions) that use U.S. technology. Wagner was first sanctioned by the Treasury Department in 2017 for its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. These sanctions are a step forward in dealing with the international carnage that Wagner has wrought since its creation in 2014. They have serious limitations, however, because all require a nexus with the United States. While they limit financial transactions with U.S. persons and entities, and U.S. citizens are subject to criminal prosecution for violations of these sanctions, they do not touch upon Wagner’s interaction with the rest of the world. If the Biden administration wants to impose maximum pressure on Wagner, it will designate it as a foreign terrorist organization, or FTO. This would bring into full force America’s material support to terrorism statutes and would put anyone, anywhere in the world, who provides support to Wagner at the same legal risk as someone who provides material support to the Islamic State or al Qaeda. Instead, Wagner has been subject to the same sanctions under a variety of names: as an arm of the Russian military; as a suppressor of religious freedom; and now as a transnational criminal organization. None of these invokes the material support to terrorism statutes, and therefore none significantly hinder Wagner’s foreign operations. Wagner is a terrorist problem, not a criminal problem — a distinction with a difference. Its use of terror against civilians in Syria and Africa is to further the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals as well as for its own material gain. Wagner has secured natural gas resources in Syria and mineral resources in Africa, which helps the Kremlin avoid international sanctions and finance its war in Ukraine. It props up dictators while its terror tactics destabilize large swaths of Africa’s Sahel region by increasing support for local insurgent groups. Sudan’s 2021 military coup, which overthrew a transitional civilian government, was instigated in part to allow Wagner’s gold smuggling to Russia to continue. These are the acts of a terrorist organization, not a criminal gang. One of the lessons of 9/11 is that terrorism must be treated as the global threat it is, not merely as a law enforcement problem. Hezbollah counterfeits U.S. currency and al Qaeda smuggles drugs with the Taliban, but they are designated as FTOs because their terror supports political goals that threaten the security of the United States, its allies and its partners. For the secretary of state to designate an entity as an FTO, it must be foreign and engage in terrorism, and the terrorism must threaten the security of the United States or its nationals. Wagner meets these criteria; since it emulates the Islamic State in its actions, it should be treated in the same manner. The administration may believe that an FTO designation would force it to list Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, or SST, since Wagner is its agent. However, nothing in U.S. law would compel the secretary to make such a designation. We have argued elsewhere that declaring Russia an SST would be counterproductive by severing lines of communication necessary to end the war in Ukraine. The use of material support to terrorism statutes to destroy Wagner’s utility to the Kremlin and end its gold smuggling operations would pressure the Kremlin by removing a valuable asset. This approach is gathering support in Congress. Earlier this year, the Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries (HARM) Act was introduced in both the House and Senate with bipartisan support. This act would direct the secretary of state to designate Wagner and its affiliates as an FTO, bringing the full power of U.S. law into play against Wagner on a global basis. But we need not wait for the bill’s passage to take action. We encourage the secretary to act under the authorities that already exist so that U.S. sanctions against Wagner will include the most powerful legal tools that allow us to sanction Wagner and its supporters as we have sanctioned al Qaeda.

  • Funding for Ukraine is far from unchecked charity

    That a large sum of U.S. funding supports Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression is well understood. What few people know is that the Pentagon, State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have teamed up to create a comprehensive monitoring process to ensure that funding is used effectively and transparently. The process appears to be working.  On March 1, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul (R-Texas) summed up what he saw on an official oversight trip that took him to Poland and Ukraine: “To date, no significant acts of fraud or misuse involving U.S. assistance have occurred.” Rep. Lisa McClain (R-Mich.) of the House Armed Services Committee reached a similar conclusion after her own visit to the front. She said, “[When you] actually see the inventory of weapons that we are sending and just how they are getting from Point A to Point B and how we’re tracking them … that, I can assure you, raised my level of confidence. There is a saying, ‘One look is worth 1,000 reports.’”    While the Ukraine mission commands significant bipartisan support, lawmakers want to be confident, ahead of additional funding votes, that the executive branch is being a good steward of taxpayer dollars. At an open House Armed Services Committee hearing on Feb. 28, lawmakers heard from military and civilian officials, including Pentagon Inspector General Robert Storch, about how the department accounts for weapons and related support.   Storch described several elements of the oversight mission that ensure due diligence: approximately 20 ongoing and planned audits; a criminal investigative service unit detecting and preventing fraud; forward deployment of personnel into the region to oversee assistance before weapons cross into Ukraine; and identification of potential oversight obstacles.   Storch and his colleagues regularly report back to lawmakers and executive branch leaders. Armed Services Committee Chairman Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) explained that lawmakers receive monthly classified briefings from the department, in addition to congressionally mandated written reports.   The risk of arms being diverted by Ukrainians was raised by members. Storch explained that based on a combination of inventory reviews, access to tracking data, and in-person site visits by personnel from the Office of Defense Cooperation at the embassy in Kyiv, U.S. officials have seen “no signs of diversion or that the Ukrainians are not following procedures.” The only contentious exchange on the issue occurred when a reported claim of weapons diversion raised by a member during questioning turned out to be sourced to an uncorroborated article published by Global Times, a Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece known for peddling disinformation.   Storch also noted at the hearing the importance of working across federal departments given that assistance for Ukraine includes non-defense spending. To that end, the inspectors general from the Defense Department, State Department and USAID formed an interagency working group that, as of January, was running 64 ongoing and planned oversight projects and had completed 14 others. These projects cover a range of activities, including end-use monitoring of weapons, audits of contracts, and safeguards for direct funding assistance for the Ukrainian government.   Even with these measures in place, key congressional leaders are not complacent. McCaul and his upper chamber counterpart, Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Sen. Jim Risch (R-Idaho), have pressed the case on oversight of funding that is delivered through non-U.S. government actors such as aid organizations and international financial institutions. A December 2022 letter to the Government Accountability Office from the two lead Republicans overseeing the State Department and USAID outlined requests for information and sharp questions meant to generate greater transparency.   Republican leaders also have helped to correct the record on funding details. Some Republican members opposed to supporting Ukraine have emphasized the statement that the U.S. has “sent over $113 billion in foreign aid to Ukraine.” That claim conjures up an image of unlimited sums being shipped into Kyiv, but it is missing critical context for how assistance for Ukraine works in practice.  The lead Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), has written that “40 percent of U.S. aid for Ukraine, or about $44 billion, is being spent here at home on our defense industrial base and readiness.” Far from being foreign aid handouts, this funding is a critical investment in an overlooked aspect of U.S. national defense and the workers and innovation that support it. And the broader package is far from charity: It is helping a partner to defend its sovereign territory and cripple a key American adversary’s military without putting Americans in combat.  None of this is to say the administration has been immune from critique for its Ukraine policy.  Indeed, both Republicans and Democrats in Congress have pushed the administration to enhance its support for Ukraine. Wicker aptly calls this position “more, better and faster,” referring to the quantity, quality and delivery speed of weapons for Ukraine’s defense.  The oversight process itself also has room to grow. The inspectors general for Defense, State and USAID are making the case for having a greater, regular presence inside Ukraine for auditing purposes given the difficulties of evaluating programs remotely. Reps. Jason Crown (D-Colo.) and Mike Waltz (R-Fla.), both stalwart defenders of support for Ukraine, recently encouraged the administration to enable just that.  Sooner or later, Congress will have its say. On Feb. 28, Assistant Secretary of Defense Celeste Wallander told House appropriators that the administration could not rule out asking Congress for supplemental Ukraine funding in the coming months before the end of the fiscal year. That is, existing funds meant to last through September 2023 may be spent more quickly than anticipated. Congress then would need to act to sustain key Ukraine-related assistance programs.  Ongoing oversight of assistance will not satisfy members of Congress advocating to end all U.S. support for Ukraine. But lawmakers who want to hold Moscow accountable while using taxpayer dollars wisely demonstrate that support for Ukraine and robust oversight can be complementary — and in the United States’ national interest.   

  • Congress wants to label Wagner group as a terrorist organization. Why is Biden opposed?

    A fight is brewing between Congress and President Biden over whether to designate as a terrorist organization the private Russian military company Wagner, which is on the front lines of aggression against Ukraine and accused of heinous atrocities there and across the world. While the Biden administration has sanctioned the Wagner group as a global criminal organization, lawmakers are pushing the State Department to go further by imposing the foreign terrorist designation.  The split underscores a long-running tension: Congress has criticized the Biden administration as slow-walking its support for Ukraine, while the administration says it is managing a delicate escalation ladder and safeguarding against potential, negative blowback. “We’ve seen that again and again in terms of this support for the Ukrainians and this war, where Congress has been out ahead of the White House,” Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told The Hill. “It’s been true since Russia invaded Ukraine. I remember in 2014 supporting lethal weapons for Ukraine, and the White House refused to support that. I don’t see this as unusual. I hope the administration and the State Department comes on board.” Shaheen is a sponsor, along with six other Democratic and Republican senators, of legislation called the Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries (HARM) Act, which would force the State Department to label Wagner as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Supporters of the FTO designation say it imposes significantly more costs on Wagner compared to its current label as a transnational criminal organization. The FTO designation would increase U.S. resources to target and disrupt Wagner’s activities, serve as a strong deterrent against people or governments doing business with the group and open new pathways for legal action.  “This would be a game changer,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), ranking member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and one of the co-sponsors of the bill.  The National Security Council and the State Department did not respond to questions from The Hill over its specific issues with labeling Wagner an FTO.  Complications with Wagner FTO label But a congressional aide, requesting anonymity to discuss sensitive conversations, told The Hill that the administration opposes the legislation over concerns it could impede U.S. efforts to convince and work with African nations to end their associations with or dependency on Wagner. Expert analyses have tied the Wagner group’s activities to countries including Sudan, Libya, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Chad. The private security company is often used as a supplement force for those countries’ weak militaries.  “[The State Department] is concerned that if suddenly the FTO designation lands on Wagner, that those governments, where there’s various officials that deal with them [Wagner], that they would all, immediately be blocked from travel to the United States and have their assets seized for coming into contact with the FTO. So that’s the nature of their concern,” the aide said. “They claim they’re not opposed to it on Ukraine grounds, but they’re opposed to it on Africa grounds.”  But supporters of the HARM bill say passing the legislation sends an important political signal while also giving the president authority to delay carrying out the letter of the law. The bill text includes an authority for the president to waive the sanctions requirements over national security concerns. “The messaging that comes from passing a bill like this, I think, is valuable and we would want that. I think it can have both worlds,” the aide said. And supporters of the FTO designation say that the Wagner group, in particular, fulfills criteria separate from the transnational criminal organization label. Wagner’s close ties to the Kremlin make it more than just a criminal organization operating for profit, as opposed to other transnational criminal groups like drug cartels in Central and South America. Wagner is “ostensibly a private outfit, but actually functions as an arm proxy of the Kremlin,” Justyna Gudzowska, a former Treasury sanctions official, testified to lawmakers Thursday during a hearing of the Helsinki Commission.  Gudzowska, the director of illicit financing at the investigative and policy organization The Sentry, said that the organization has tracked Wagner spending money in the Central African Republican on “sophisticated Hollywood-style propaganda glorifying Russia.” This “makes it clear that the group is not there just for economic spoils, but also to project Russian power abroad,” she told lawmakers.  Still, Gudzowska also warned that an FTO designation on Wagner could harm humanitarian groups working in these countries, another unintended consequence of such a designation, and called for lawmakers to ensure such issues “are properly mitigated.” What has Wagner allegedly done? The alleged atrocities committed by the Wagner group make up a long list and are difficult to stomach. In Ukraine, the Wagner group is accused of employing the tactic of human wave attacks to overwhelm front-line positions, throwing bodies to be killed.  Wagner forces are also accused of carrying out the rape, torture and massacre of civilians in Bucha, Ukraine, in March 2022. In countries in Africa, Gudzowska testified bluntly that “Wagner targets civilians,” and said that Wagner forces and Wagner-trained Central African soldiers use terror as a weapon against the civilian population. “They have committed mass rape, torture, forced disappearance and dislocation, and they have killed thousands of civilians,” Gudzowska said. Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who is focused on Wagner atrocities in Africa and has talked with officials in Ukraine about the group’s atrocities, said he is supportive of labeling the group as an FTO but is not committed to any one piece of legislation. “I am trying to make sure that I understand what the consequences might be,” he told The Hill. “But I think this is something we need to move on.” A move to change Russia’s status Supporters of the FTO designation also hope it lays the groundwork for labeling Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, a move the Biden administration has also resisted over concerns for unintended consequences, like making it harder to move grain out of Ukraine while it is under a Russian naval blockade.  Graham had earlier tried to work with the administration on legislation to label Russia as an “aggressor state,” in a compromise over the state sponsor of terrorism designation, but that fell apart. “I’ve worked with the administration — how can you say Russia’s committing crimes against humanity and you won’t label them a state sponsor of terrorism?” Graham told The Hill.  “I don’t like this crime of aggression crap, I want to go to what they are, a state sponsor of terrorism.”  He continued that he is focused on designating Wagner an FTO, followed by becoming “a real vocal, unrelenting force to get Russia labeled as a state sponsor of terrorism.” Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), co-sponsor of the HARM Act and co-sponsor of the “Aggressor” legislation with Graham, agreed that designating Wagner an FTO “could help lead to” designating Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism. Blumenthal expressed confidence that the HARM Act would be brought to the Senate floor for a vote in a “week or two,” and suggested it could bypass the normal committee procedure, although his colleagues didn’t entirely agree.  “I don’t know about not going through committee, but I don’t think it will have much problem getting through there either,” Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), co-sponsor of the bill and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where the bill has been referred.  “I think Wagner at this point is the definition of a Foreign Terrorist Organization and they just happen to operate for profit.” Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he supported designating Wagner an FTO but said he had not seen the legislation.   The congressional aide who spoke with The Hill said that the legislation is unlikely to move quickly, facing a difficult, uphill battle by nature of Senate procedures – between challenges to getting it on the calendar for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in general, and the chance the Banking Committee may exercise jurisdiction because of the sanctions piece of the legislation. “Also, marking something up in the committee or passing it on the Senate floor does not immediately mean it’s a law that would be implemented,” the aide said. “And particularly because the administration doesn’t want it, it could disappear, in the dark of night, on a [National Defense Authorization Act] discussion next December.” Graham, however, was upbeat and said Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) appeared to be on board. Schumer’s office did not return a request for comment.  “I talked to Sen. Schumer, he said he thought it was a good idea … I think Sen. Schumer is going to make it happen,” he said.  

  • Why is Georgia in turmoil over a "foreign agents" law?

    TBILISI, March 9 (Reuters) - Ruling lawmakers in the South Caucasus country of Georgia on Thursday scrapped plans to introduce what critics called a Russian-inspired "foreign agents" law after two days of intense street protests in the capital Tbilisi. Here is a guide to what's going on: WHAT IS THE PROPOSED 'FOREIGN AGENTS' LAW? - Individuals, civil society organisations and media outlets that receive 20% of their funding from abroad would have been required to register as an "agent of foreign influence" with the Georgian Justice Ministry. - Rights groups say the "foreign agent" tag is a designed to make it easier for the government to discredit its opponents. WHY WAS IT INTRODUCED? - Government officials said the proposals were necessary to root out "foreign influence" and "spies", and that Georgians have the right to know who funds non-government organisations (NGOs). - Parliamentary leaders have also said the bills would help unmask critics of the influential Georgian Orthodox Church. - It says it is modelled on the U.S. 1938 "Foreign Agents Registration Act", which primarily covers lobbyists and organisations directly working for or under the control of foreign governments. WHAT DID CRITICS SAY? - Opponents said the legislation was inspired by a 2012 Russian law that has been used extensively to crack down on dissent for the past decade. Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili, a former French diplomat who wants to steer the country closer to Europe, said she would veto it - though parliament could have overruled her. - Some 400 Georgian NGOs signed a letter saying the bill was "an attack on Georgian values" that would "hinder Georgia's progress towards EU membership". - Human Rights Watch said it "would have a serious chilling effect on groups and individuals working to protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law". - Georgian lawmakers brawled during a hearing on the bill this week, and tens of thousands of people protested, chanting "no to the Russian law". HOW DID THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REACT? - EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said the bill went against EU values and Georgia's aim of joining the bloc, and its adoption "may have serious repercussions on our relations." - The U.S. Helsinki Commission, a U.S. government agency, said the law demonstrated "the present government's increasing embrace of Russia". - The State Department said Washington was "deeply troubled" by the bill. Washington has rejected comparisons with its own legislation. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF RUSSIA? - Georgian society is strongly anti-Moscow following years of conflict over the status of two Russian-backed breakaway regions, which flared into war in 2008. The two countries have no formal diplomatic relations. - Opponents say the ruling Georgian Dream party, however, has close relations with the Kremlin. Its founder Bidzina Ivanishvili is Georgia's richest man, having amassed his fortune in Russia during the chaotic privatisations of the 1990s. - The Kremlin said on Thursday it had nothing to do with events in Georgia, rejected claims the laws were inspired by Russia, and expressed concern about the unrest. - "The Kremlin didn't inspire anything there, the Kremlin has absolutely nothing to do with it. ... If I understand it correctly, one version was very similar to an equivalent law in the United States," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said. - Tbilisi has not imposed sanctions on Moscow over the war in Ukraine, despite large-scale protests in the country calling for a tougher line against Russia's invasion. WHAT ABOUT EUROPE? - Opinion polls routinely show that a majority of Georgians are pro-European. - Georgia applied for EU "candidate status" last March, alongside Ukraine and Moldova. But Brussels rebuffed Tbilisi's bid, citing concerns over the rule of law and judicial independence, among other factors. - Critics say the ruling party is merely paying lip service to the idea of EU membership. - The EU's delegation to Georgia praised the decision to withdraw the bill, calling on the country's political leaders to resume pro-EU reforms. HAS THE LAW BEEN KILLED? - On Thursday, the government said it was putting the law's passage through parliament on hold. - It attacked the "radical opposition" and a "machine of lies that presented the bill in a negative light". - It said it would launch a public consultation period to "better explain to the public what the bill was for and why it is important". - On Tuesday, lawmakers had sent the bills to the Venice Commission, a Council of Europe body that advises countries on the impact draft laws have on the functioning of democracy and human rights, and said they would await feedback. - The opposition has called for a new protest starting at 7 p.m. (1500 GMT) on Thursday, demanding that the government formally denounce the plans and release all those detained during the demonstrations.

  • CSCE Senior Policy Advisor Michael Hikari Cecire on Georgian Dream’s Chance to Turn It Around

    It’s clearly an attack on Georgia’s EuroAtlantic choice, an attack on Georgia’s democracy, an attack on Georgia’s strategic partnerships with the West, and an attack on the Georgia and US bilateral relationship. It’s also quite self-evidently, an expression of deference to Moscow and an alignment with Russian interests in the region, – CSCE Senior Policy Advisor Michael Hikari Cecire tells RFE/RL’s Georgian Service of the controversial law that was set to be imposed this week. “Legislation like this is so painfully undemocratic,” he notes. “What it does is signal the ruling party’s willingness to undermine and attack all elements, all institutional edifices, of the remnants of Georgia democracy. It’s not just the law itself which is abysmal, it’s really an assault on the last redoubt of independent thought in Georgian society, and that’s civil society and the media. It also signals a willingness to turn the power of the state against any other forms of independent or democratic expression.” Michael Hikari Cecire joined the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), where he focuses on the South Caucasus and Black Sea regional affairs, as a senior policy advisor, in 2021. Previously, he was an analyst at the Congressional Research Service, before that serving as a policy advisor, strategic researcher, and Eurasia regional analyst supporting the Department of Defense and other US government agencies. We sat down with him to discuss the foreign agents bills the Georgian Dream ruling party were set to put into force this week. The interview took place before the party offered to withdraw the bills following 48 hours of protest and rioting. One of the arguments we’ve heard for those supporting these bills is the very same argument that Russia used back in 2012 to introduce a similar legislation: “Well, if the US has it, why can’t we?” What do you think of these comparisons? Does the US having FARA justify Georgia doing what it’s doing? What is clear is that the Georgian Dream political leadership isn’t even bothering to offer their own independent, even bad faith, arguments for this law. They are just aping Russian arguments that were made about their law, and Azerbaijani arguments about their derivative law, demonstrating their fealty to Moscow and a lack of independent thought even to create their own separate narrative. It’s very sad to watch that play out. I don’t think most Georgians are buying it, though, because it’s so blatant and so unoriginal. And for the record, I think it is worth saying that this has nothing to do with FARA, which is a very narrow bit of legislation and really only covers those who are working for and on behalf of foreign governments and foreign political parties. It’s really speaking to lobbyists in particular, to represent these interests, and has nothing to do for the most part with civil society or the media. There is a sense in society that, should this law pass, it would merely be the start of a path to somewhere bad. Where does that path lead? Crossing that line is an opening to other sorts of law or actions that can really radically transform Georgia from an imperfect but vibrant and pluralistic democracy, into a fully autocratic and perhaps even authoritarian country, and one in league with Russia. And as such, because Russia has no allies and only vassals, essentially a tributary to Moscow. We have to make it clear where we stand. And we stand with the Georgian people. We stand with Georgia’s democracy If all your nominal partners in the West, and all of those whose counsel you should be heeding domestically, are telling you not to do it, then that means your partnership and your source of counsel is coming from elsewhere. And that elsewhere is quite evidently Russia. The rationale for this is unclear, and there are a number of potential reasons this may be the case, but none of them are good, and none of them are satisfactory in terms of why Georgia should be going down this route. What can or should the West do about it? I think that we need to do what we are doing, which is to make it very clear that this is an attack on not just our relationship, and not just on the will of the Georgian people, but also an abrupt and deliberate shift into Moscow’s column. It’s clear to me that they don’t care very much about the health or maintenance of Georgia’s democracy, per se, or even about Western integration, and this is also something that could make a lot of things that we previously never would have entertained suddenly possible, such as the elimination of a lot of support for Georgia’s participation in western forums and the travel, prestige and attention that comes with it. It also means potentially that certain people are going to start for the first time genuinely entertaining the thought of what individual sanctions might be considered and on whom they should be levied. The democracy support is not going to end. It may have to change, but it’s not going to end. But you know, the way we support other elements in Georgia, particularly the way we support the state as a whole, may not be justifiable if the state is captured by a party that has become openly pro-Russian. Sanctions would mark a genuine change from the words, however critical, we’ve been hearing for years now, to a whole new phase of actually doing something. What would those actions be? And had the West done it years ago, could this have been prevented? I’ve been very open about the fact that I was not comfortable with sanctions in the past. In the past, sanctions were not the right move, because it seemed to feed into the worst paranoid tendencies of the Georgian Dream leadership; the idea that we are actively trying to undermine them and overthrow them. A lot of those perceptions led us to where we are today. In the past, I was not supportive of sanctions, but actions do have consequences, and this descent into full and open alignment with Moscow is an attack on Georgia’s democracy, and it represents a point we cannot hope for something better to come out of; we can’t hope that carrots and incentives can turn things around by themselves. Instead, we have to make it clear where we stand. And we stand with the Georgian people. We stand with Georgia’s democracy. I think that certain sanctions might be considered- not in the sense that “we are going to do it because we want to,” but to make it very clear that a line has been crossed, or is going to be crossed, beyond which only dark things exist. We certainly shouldn’t be writing off an entire party if they’re genuinely willing to return to their democratic obligations There is this idea that the US has been trying to overthrow Georgian Dream, which is patently false. And there’s this idea that there have even been shadow sanctions related to this Credit Suisse business, which is also patently false. We haven’t done anything. In fact, we’ve been remarkably nuanced and remarkably restrained, in many respects. Would those sanctions include individual sanctions on the big elephant in the room that might well be behind all of this? Everything would be looked at. Absolutely. But one thing that’s important to say is that nothing is irreversible. And as bad as things are, they don’t need to go further. And there is a path back to friendship, cooperation. Even with Georgian Dream? If they are able to demonstrate a genuine willingness to come back and not take this authoritarian term, then why not? But they have to make that part clear; we have to really see it. Under those conditions, the US and Georgia still have a potentially very bright future, and there is a possibility of great bilateral relations. We can go back to that. That’s my hope, but the ball is in their court. Does this not remind you of the West’s incessant attempts to find mutual ground with Putin over the years? No, because I think Russia has never not been an empire. And Russia, in every political expression, has been a violent and poorly oriented empire. In Georgian Dream, there’s clearly a difference in its sliding into subservience to Moscow. But it wasn’t all that long ago that we had a very productive and good relationship with the Georgian Dream government, when Margvelashvili was president and Kvirikashvili was prime minister. It wasn’t perfect, but no country that we work with is perfect. Not even our own. So I don’t think there’s anything necessarily inherent. It’s the same with the UNM – it’s not necessarily an authoritarian party because they took an authoritarian turn at some point. They also did a lot of good, and we also had a great relationship with them at times. We have to be open minded, and we certainly shouldn’t be writing off an entire party if they’re genuinely willing to return to their democratic obligations. But until that happens, it’s all rather academic, unfortunately.

  • What is the trajectory of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic future?

    Over the past few years, there has been a notable trend toward democratic backsliding in Georgia. Previously recognized as one of the most democratic leaning states that emerged from the rubble of the Soviet Union, domestic political battles have elicited some non-democratic practices. Once clearly on track toward a Western orientation, the Georgian government’s response to Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine one year ago has wavered. Sadly, the ruling coalition in Georgia’s parliament is now attempting to pass a “foreign agent law” directly modelled on the same infamous law in Russia. The proposed law would require organizations that receive more than 20% of their funding from overseas as “foreign agents.” The international friends of Georgia have expressed consternation in recent years over Tbilisi’s democratic backsliding, evidenced perhaps most importantly when the European Union offered EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, but not Georgia, in 2022. All of this raises questions about the direction Georgia is headed. What does the proposed legislation mean for Georgia and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations? How can the US and other Western partners respond? The Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center hosts a discussion on what this proposed bill would mean for Georgia future. A conversation with: Michael Hikari Cecire Senior Policy Advisor US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Amb. Daniel Fried Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow Atlantic Council Amb. Shota Gvineria Nonresident Fellow Economic Policy Research Center David Kramer Executive Director George W. Bush Institute Laura Linderman Nonresident Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center Atlantic Council

  • Russia’s Biggest Weapon (and China, too) is Fossil Fuel-Generated Energy

    The capacity of a modern economy to produce food and goods for its citizens, and weapons and fuel for its military to project power, are the undeniable twin pillars of global power. Both depend on reasonably priced and readily available energy.  Almost 80% of America’s energy is supplied by oil, gas and coal. Only 20% comes from other sources such as hydropower, nuclear, wind and solar. Even the greenest of economies will need fossil fuel backup when the wind doesn’t blow and the sun doesn’t shine. Wind and solar provide 5% of our total consumption and only 2% of the energy to power some 290 million vehicles. In other words, Americans literally run and fight on fossil fuels.  Russia, despite an economy smaller than Italy’s, has shown it could defy all international norms and invade a neighboring country because it has abundant energy. Weapons, and more weapons. First it was Javelins, then Howitzers, then HIMARS, then anti-missile and drone capability, then longer range ATACMS, then better tanks, now F-16s. Who can tell what the next weapon will be needed to defend against Russian aggression?  Russia has its weapons, too, and they are being paid for by the sale of oil, gas, coal, and fossil fuel-derived products like petrochemicals, fertilizers, etc. Russian missiles, planes, drones, tanks and artillery that shed Ukrainian blood and destroy homes, hospitals and electric-power stations are bought with Russia’s fossil fuel revenues. Energy is Russia’s greatest weapon as it makes possible all the others. Only with such revenues can Russia continue its devastation of Ukraine. A new Russian offensive is brewing, and it too will be financed by its energy revenues.  Russians from Putin on down are talking about a much longer war because they have the revenues to support one and they don’t have to worry about a citizen-taxpayer revolt or getting reelected.  While the U.S. and Europe have restricted their purchases and consumption of Russian energy, it is sold elsewhere. That energy sells at a discount, but Russia is still earning hundreds of billions of dollars from energy sales and thus able to continue its war for as long as Putin wants. In spite of sanctions, Russia sold over $350 worth of fossil fuels in 2022. In the meantime, Germany keeps its fracking ban.  To achieve peace in Europe and avoid potential wars elsewhere, one would think that America and the West would be increasing their own supply of oil, gas and coal and driving down prices on the global market. Such an initiative would also give fence-sitting countries like India and Brazil in the “Global South” alternative sources to substitute for Russian products.  One would also think that the West would understand that its ability to replenish weapons and ammunition being sent to Ukraine and resist aggression, anywhere, like Taiwan for example, is based on production, shipment and fueling with fossil fuels and decidedly not on wind and solar. There will never be an electric tank! And why not drive down the price that Russia receives for its energy while providing the economic and military security derived from fossil fuels? The answer from Europe and now America has been an emphatic “no”. Apparently, addressing the “climate crisis” takes priority over national defense, stopping Russian aggression in Europe, and securing reliable, affordable energy to run modern industrial economies.  The alternative - simultaneously furthering the technology of renewables like wind and solar while building up fossil fuels within an “all of the above” approach is anathema to those who believe religiously that climate change is an existential threat. Ironically, the same people are happy to substitute U.S. fossil fuels with oil from dictatorships like Venezuela, Iran and Saudi Arabia. They don’t seem concerned that wind, solar and battery supply chains run mostly through Communist China.  An “all of the above” energy strategy would make it harder for Russia to finance its war, save Ukrainian lives and mitigate their suffering. It would show that America was willing to challenge Russia’s energy dominance now and into the future.  Sadly, the very opposite is happening. The U.S. is killing energy transport pipelines, curtailing permitting of refineries and natural gas export facilities, suppressing oil and gas leases and worst of all, stifling longer-term investment in the industry. Driven by an all-encompassing determination to limit CO2 emissions, Europe, and now America, have declared war of fossil fuels. Meanwhile, Russia and China burn oil, gas and coal and emit greenhouse gasses at levels that dwarf the West’s.  Governments in Europe and now in America have utterly failed to see that by suppressing fossil fuels, they are ceding enormous power to countries like Russia, and Iran, China who use those very fossil fuels as a way to strengthen themselves and threaten others.  Energy has been weaponized and the West is in full energy-disarmament mode. The West is forfeiting its ability to gain peace through strength with energy being the all-encompassing weapon in national and alliance arsenals.  The Russian people have experienced far greater suffering when total war was being waged on their own territory and millions perished. This time, the Russian people don’t feel the brunt of the war so the pressure to end it is limited and Russia’s vast fossil fuel revenues are available to continue it, perhaps for years.  It is doubtful that that support for Ukraine from potentially fickle Western democracies could last that long. National economies and nations’ militaries still run on fossil fuels. There is no substitute for fossil fuel dominance, even on a longer-term horizon. To believe and act otherwise is suicidal. It’s the real “existential threat”. Don Ritter holds a Science Doctorate from MIT, was a National Academy of Sciences Fellow in the USSR and speaks fluent Russian, served fourteen years on the House of Representatives’ Energy and Commerce and Science and Technology Committees, served as Ranking Member on the Congressional Helsinki Commission, was the founding Co-Chair of the Baltic States-Ukraine Caucus, and created and led the National Environmental Policy Institute after leaving Congress. He is a founder and President & CEO Emeritus of the Afghan American Chamber of Commerce and  a Trustee of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation (VOC) where he Co-Chairs the Museum Capital Campaign.  

  • Lawmakers Question Pentagon on Ukraine Funds, Signaling Fresh Concerns

    WASHINGTON — Republicans in Congress sharply questioned senior Pentagon officials on Tuesday about the tens of billions of dollars in military and other aid the United States has sent to Ukraine, casting fresh doubt on whether they would embrace future spending as Democrats pleaded for a cleareyed assessment of how much more money would be needed. The exchanges at two House committee hearings, coming just days after the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, highlighted how concerns about the high cost of sending weapons to Kyiv have intensified on Capitol Hill. The growing doubts have threatened what has been a strong bipartisan consensus in favor of the aid, and could make it more difficult for the Biden administration to win congressional approval of funds to replenish its military assistance accounts. The funding inflection point could come as soon as this summer, months earlier than previously expected. The hearings also illustrated how members of both parties, despite expressing confidence that a majority in Congress remains committed to supporting Ukraine, are concerned that a determined minority — including right-wing Republicans who eschew U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts and liberal antiwar Democrats — may weaken that resolve if the war continues to drag on. “We’re all concerned about accountability,” Representative Joe Wilson, Republican of South Carolina, who has supported Ukraine funding ventures in the past, said during a House Armed Services Committee hearing. “Please, let’s get this publicized so the American people can trust what the expenditures are.” Tensions were on display Tuesday as Representative Andrew Clyde, a Georgia Republican and an outspoken critic of funding for Ukraine, quizzed a top Defense Department official about allegations of lost and diverted weapons, whistle-blowers and fraud. “Accountability of the weapons shipped in is absolutely paramount, especially the most sensitive weapons, to ensure they are being used for their intended purposes and not diverted for nefarious purposes,” Mr. Clyde told Robert P. Storch, the Pentagon’s inspector general. Mr. Storch and other Pentagon officials testified that there had been no substantiated instances of sensitive weapons being diverted for improper purposes, but his statements did not silence the critics. Mr. Clyde’s questions nonetheless were striking since he does not have a seat on the Armed Services Committee. He was invited to participate by its chairman, Representative Mike D. Rogers of Alabama, a staunch supporter of supplying military assistance to Ukraine. Mr. Rogers offered Mr. Clyde the bulk of his question time for the grilling, after noting that the record-setting levels of military assistance required “an unprecedented level of oversight by Congress.” Pledges to send tanks, the grinding nature of the war on the ground and a steady clamor from certain corners of Congress to greenlight advanced systems for Ukraine have threatened to drain war funds at a faster clip than appropriators anticipated last December, when lawmakers approved about $45 billion in military and other assistance, projecting it would last until the end of September. The steep price tag of the war has prompted Congress to issue a battery of oversight requirements for information about how the money has been spent. Some of those details have been provided to lawmakers, but few have reached the public. The accelerating spending and dearth of detailed information have fueled the resolve of several naysayers, who doubled down this week on a campaign to cast the Ukraine assistance program as a failed boondoggle, with the apparent tacit blessing of party leaders. “You cannot testify that we have complied with the end-use monitoring requirements at all times during this conflict, can you?” insisted Representative Matt Gaetz, Republican of Florida, accusing Mr. Storch of dodging. Democrats, too, voiced concerns on Tuesday, pleading with Pentagon leaders to be straight with them about how much more money lawmakers could expect to be asked to approve for Ukraine. “How many more times do you think Congress needs to provide aid?” Representative Ro Khanna, Democrat of California, asked Colin H. Kahl, the under secretary of defense for policy, during his appearance before the Armed Services panel. “What do you think, at the end, is the end game?” The questioning was mirrored by some Democrats on the House Appropriations panel that oversees military spending posed similar questions to Celeste Wallander, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. “How much bigger would the bill be?” asked Representative Ed Case, Democrat of Hawaii, expressing concern about the administration’s successive requests for more aid. “We have to at least anticipate that possibility that we would see a higher bill next year.” Pentagon leaders were reluctant to commit to either a figure or a timeline upon which they would be seeking additional funds, saying that the vagaries of the war made it impossible to commit to a schedule. “I don’t have a sense of whether it would be higher or reduced; I just know that we are planning for the kind of effective deterrent force that Ukraine will need,” Ms. Wallander said. Mr. Kahl suggested that the demands of some lawmakers to step up military assistance to Ukraine could further complicate the Biden administration’s efforts to keep the war effort supplied. In the past week, the bipartisan group of House members calling on President Biden to supply Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets has more than tripled. On Tuesday, Representative Chrissy Houlahan, Democrat of Pennsylvania, a member of the group and a former Air Force officer, implored Mr. Kahl to explain why programs to train Ukrainian pilots to operate the systems had not commenced. Mr. Kahl insisted that doing so would not save time, estimating that it would take about 18 months to train Ukrainian pilots to use the F-16 jets, which was also the Pentagon’s shortest projected time frame for sending them. “It doesn’t make sense to start training them on a system they may never get,” he said, noting that while F-16s were a priority for Ukraine, “it’s not one of their top three priorities.” He also said that even sending older models of F-16s would be costly, totaling $2 billion to $3 billion for about 36 planes, which would fall short of the 50 to 80 that the Pentagon estimates Ukraine would need to update its existing air force. “That would consume a huge portion of the remaining security assistance that we have for this fiscal year,” Mr. Kahl noted, ticking through the numbers. “These are the trade-offs we are making in real time.”

  • Ukraine shuns OSCE gathering in Vienna over Russian presence

    VIENNA (AP) — A meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s parliamentary assembly got underway Thursday without the Ukrainian delegation, which described the presence of Russian lawmakers as “an affront.” The two-day meeting of the normally low-profile assembly is coinciding with the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The attendance of the Russian lawmakers has overshadowed the event. Austria granted them visas even though they are under European Union sanctions and despite protests from 20 countries including Britain, France and Canada. Austria’s government said that as host nation it was obliged to grant visas to representatives from all OSCE member nations. Ukraine said its delegates wouldn’t attend if the Russians were present, as did Lithuania. The Vienna-based OSCE, whose 57 members include both Ukraine and Russia, was created during the Cold War as a platform for dialogue between East and West. The group has a wide-ranging mission, including peace, human rights, arms control and other security issues. Austria had a “duty not to slam the door on diplomacy,” Wolfgang Sobotka, the speaker of the Austrian parliament said. “The OSCE, with its inclusive approach and comprehensive security concept, can and above all should be part of a solution to this conflict.” “I do sympathize with the fact that some members find it unbearable to sit in the same room as the aggressors,” the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s president, Margareta Cederfelt, told the opening session. “But for those present today, this is your opportunity to stand up for Ukraine and to confront the lies from the aggressors.” A Slovak delegate read out a statement from the Ukrainian delegation that said “the presence of these warmongers in Vienna is an affront to everything that the OSCE stands for.” “They are not here for genuine dialogue nor for cooperation,” it added. “They are here to spread their propaganda ... they are here to try and justify the war crimes they have committed and desecrate the principles of international law and human decency.” During the session, some delegates walked out as Russian lawmakers spoke. Later Thursday, the head of the U.S. delegation, Sen. Ben Cardin, told reporters in Vienna that the delegation supported excluding the Russians from the meeting. “We strongly believe that the Russian parliamentarians, all of whom have been sanctioned by the United States, the six that are here, should not have been permitted visas to come to this meeting,” Cardin said. The Democratic senator from Maryland said he thought Ukraine’s supporters nonetheless “have strongly isolated Russia at this meeting.” “The debate that took place this morning and will continue through tomorrow has made it clear that Russia must be held accountable for the atrocities that they have committed,” Cardin added. The head of the Ukrainian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly, Mykyta Poturaiev, said during a joint press conference with Cardin that his country has drafted an amendment stating that any OSCE country that starts a war against another member should be suspended from the group. Referring to Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine, Poturaiev said: “Let’s not forget that in Ukraine they’re killing every day the elderly, men, women, children, kids, newly born and even unborn, because a lot of Ukrainian pregnant women were killed together with their unborn children.” ___ Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

  • U.S. Delegation To OSCE Meeting Urges Step Toward Boycott Of Russian Participation

    The U.S. delegation to the parliamentary assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has urged the assembly to host its meetings in OSCE states that are prepared to block Russia's participation, vowing not to allow Russia’s "reprehensible propaganda to go unchallenged" at the OSCE or in any other international forum. "The world must hold Russia accountable for its aggression and for the war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide it is committing against the people of Ukraine," the delegation said on February 23 in a statement. The statement also pledged "sustained and steadfast" support for Ukraine on the eve of the one-year anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of the country. “We will continue to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes to restore Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty over its 1991 borders," the U.S. delegation said. The parliamentary assembly OSCE kicked off a two-day meeting earlier in Vienna amid harsh criticism of Russia's war in Ukraine and a boycott by Ukraine's delegation. Austria granted visas to several Russian delegates to attend the meeting as it started on February 23, despite calls by dozens of countries for Moscow's envoys to be banned from the Vienna-based OSCE, prompting widespread criticism, including from senior U.S. lawmakers. Ukraine and Lithuania are boycotting the gathering of representatives from the 57-member pan-European security body, which started one day before the anniversary of Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine that started the deadliest and most devastating conflict in Europe since World War II. It was the first time that members of the Russian State Duma have journeyed to the European Union in an official capacity since being sanctioned for supporting the war, notably by voting in favor of seizing the four Ukrainian territories of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya. The Russian delegates have faced harsh criticism from the outset, as a Slovak member delivered a statement on behalf of the boycotting Ukrainian delegation. "They [the Russian delegates] are not here for genuine dialogue nor for cooperation. They are here to spread their propaganda," the Ukrainian statement read, adding, "They are here to try and justify the war crimes they have committed and desecrate the principles of international law and human decency." The assembly's president, Swedish lawmaker Margareta Cederfelt, added to the criticism, saying in her opening remarks, "Today some parliamentarians are aiding and abetting the crime of aggression." Cederfelt said she felt sympathy for "the fact that some members find it unbearable to sit in the same room as the aggressors." But she called on participants to use the two-day gathering as "your opportunity to stand up for Ukraine and to confront the lies from the aggressors." Austria's decision to allow the Russian delegation into the country triggered protests despite Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg's explanation that it was his country's diplomatic obligation to allow participants from member states to attend the meeting. The previous two meetings of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly -- in July in Birmingham, England, and in the Polish capital, Warsaw, in November -- were held without Moscow's participation as both times the Russian delegation was denied visas. Representative Steve Cohen (Democrat-Tennessee), a member of the U.S. Helsinki Commission leadership who is attending the Vienna meeting, acknowledged Austria's reasoning behind the move to allow the Russians in, but told RFE/RL on February 22 that the visas should not have been granted. "Russia has violated every part of the reasons for this meeting to happen at all. And I think when a country goes that far, that maybe that they shouldn't be permitted." In a separate interview with RFE/RL on February 22, Joe Wilson, a Republican Congressman who heads the Helsinki Commission, said allowing Russia to attend the meeting sends "the wrong message to the world." The OSCE, the post-Cold War successor of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, is involved in issues such as arms control, promotion of human rights, media freedom, and the monitoring of free and fair elections.

  • Two Senior U.S. Lawmakers Chide Austria For Granting Visas To Russian Deputies For OSCE Meeting

    PRAGUE -- Two senior U.S. lawmakers say Austria erred by issuing visas to the Russian delegation -- all of whom are under European Union sanctions due to Moscow's invasion of Ukraine -- for this week's meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna, but it's unlikely a massive boycott of the meeting by the group's 57 nations will occur. Austria stirred a controversy ahead of the February 23-24 gathering when it said it would grant travel documents to 18 Russian deputies to attend the winter session of the OSCE's Parliamentary Assembly, which coincides with the first anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops. The move, which Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg said had to be taken as his country was obliged by diplomatic protocol to allow participants from member countries to attend the meeting, immediately raised the ire of many in the OSCE. Ukraine and Lithuania have said they will boycott the meeting and almost half of the OSCE's member nations -- including the United States -- had called for Austria not to issue visas to the Russian lawmakers, with some threatening to avoid the meeting as well. "I don't think it [granting the visas] should have happened," Steve Cohen, a Democratic Party congressman from Tennessee and a member of the U.S. Helsinki Commission leadership that will attend the Vienna meeting, told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in an interview on February 22. While acknowledging Austria's reasoning behind the decision, Cohen said: "Nevertheless, Russia has violated every part of the reasons for this meeting to happen at all. And I think when a country goes that far, then maybe they shouldn't be permitted." In a separate interview with RFE/RL on February 22, Joe Wilson, a Republican Congressman who heads Washington's Helsinki Commission leadership, said allowing Russia to attend the meeting sends "the wrong message to the world." If the Russian delegation does show up in the Austrian capital this week, it will be the first time members of the Russian State Duma have been in the European Union in an official capacity since being sanctioned for supporting the war, notably by voting in favor of seizing the four Ukrainian territories of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has met twice since the invasion -- in July in Birmingham, England, and in the Polish capital, Warsaw, in November -- but both times the Russian delegation was denied visas. The Helsinki Commission has noted that the United States and the EU have sanctioned "every member of the Russian delegation for having explicitly endorsed Vladimir Putin's war of aggression on Ukraine and his claim to have annexed vast swathes of Ukrainian territory." Since the invasion of Ukraine, the OSCE has been careful not to completely sever ties with Moscow. Since Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe in March, the OSCE is the only major pan-European political organization that Moscow remains a member of.  

  • Q&A | US-Georgia Relations: Going Strong Despite Incendiary Rhetoric?

    On February 9, Georgian Defense Minister Juansher Burchuladze visited the U.S. and met with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who announced that Georgia had been approved for the risk-assessed payment schedule making it easier for Georgia to acquire critical military capabilities. The Defense Secretary stressed the importance of defense partnership between the U.S. and Georgia. He also emphasized that Georgia’s participation in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group “helps us all strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and to bolster the rules-based international order that keeps us all secure. And that’s crucial as Ukraine fights bravely against Russia’s unprovoked and unjust invasion.” This announcement comes in the midst of the consistent unfriendly rhetoric on the ruling Georgian Dream’s part accusing U.S. and EU of wanting to drag Georgia into the Russia-Ukraine war. In this vein, GD Chair Kobakhidze recently announced that Russia has a military “advantage” both overall and at the current stage of its campaign in Ukraine. He suggested that because of this “advantage,” the “global party of war” wants to see Georgia drawn into hostilities. He said he was careful not to name the names to that “global party” not to spoil inter-state relations, but “you know who I mean.” We asked foreign relations experts what to make of these two contradictory trends – the ongoing strategic partnership and hostile “global party of war” rhetoric, how does the U.S. reconcile them in dealing with Georgia, and what it could do differently? Michael Cecire, Senior Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE The reality is that bilateral relations between the United States and Georgia continue to be largely, on the institutional level, quite excellent. In Georgia, U.S. agencies find willing, enthusiastic, and competent partners, including in coordinating on regional security and countering Russian aggression. In that sense, SECDEF Austin is entirely correct, and echoes a reality-based sentiment that is not hard to find throughout U.S. government agencies that partner with their Georgian counterparts. And even more broadly, Defense Minister Burchuladze as well as (and particularly) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are forceful and articulate advocates for the bilateral relationship in Washington and international forums.  At the same time, Mr. Kobakhidze’s escalating statements, and that of other certain GD principals and their proxies, are purposefully divergent and deliberately incendiary not in spite of strong U.S.-Georgia institutional cooperation but because of it. If it weren’t on such a grave subject, the implications of the “war party” rhetoric would be mildly hilarious: that somehow the U.S. or the Ukrainian military — the same one holding its own against Russia and often besting them despite its material disadvantages — is just waiting anxiously for Georgia to enter the war and save them. The absurdity is overwhelming if you give it anything more than a half-second of consideration. But the point isn’t to offer a logical analysis but to set a kind of classic disinformation trap for U.S. and Western policymakers that works precisely because of how patently ridiculous the premise is.  So far, the United States has allowed itself to compartmentalize its relationship between the institutional on the one hand, the one SECDEF Austin refers to, and the political — for which our senior-most representative in Tbilisi, Ambassador Kelly Degnan, has borne the brunt, unfortunately. For a time, this was a defensible approach with the expectation that the former was enduring and the latter was an unfortunate but temporary phenomenon, but as anti-West attacks have escalated and accelerated, I expect this approach to shift to underline the opportunity cost that the Georgian government — and the Georgian people as a result — is accruing through these mixed and unfriendly messages, while doing nothing to enhance its security. One needn’t look far in the Caucasus to find other regimes where accepting Russia’s embrace has only led to more pain and less independence. Laura Linderman, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center The US and Georgian governments have had and continue to have quite good operational cooperation, coordination, and information sharing. I would argue that it is precisely because of this excellent “behind the scenes” cooperation that Georgian government officials, such as Georgian Dream chair Irakli Kobakhidze in this case, feel the need to make incendiary and unwelcome comments about the United States and its government, Embassy, and Ambassador. I would speculate Mr. Kobakhidze and others may feel the need to signal to their northern neighbor that they are not that cozy with the United States, despite the operational reality. While so far, the Georgian dream has been able to continue this “behind the scenes” cooperation and public “denigration” dynamic for some months without obvious public consequences, it cannot continue to walk this line indefinitely. Indeed, comments about US Ambassador Kelly Degnan have been especially vitriolic and damaging. I would expect or assume that privately the United States government is and will continue to indicate to the Georgian government that such statements will have an impact on operational relations, aid, and other forms of collaboration. A more contentious relationship with the United States will, by extension, have an impact on Georgia’s security. Sergi Kapanadze, Founder, GRASS The U.S. could be a lot more effective in pressing Georgia’s Government to curb anti-Western rhetoric and policies. Unfortunately, not all instruments are used to this end. The U.S. only tries to use carrots, starting with simple photo opportunities and ending with financial and military assistance. However, for the US interest to be credible, Washington needs to add some sticks as well. A simple threat of individual sanctions or high-level statements about the concrete problems that Georgian democracy faces could sometimes do the job. In other cases, tying democratic conditionalities to foreign assistance, including from the IMF and World Bank could do the job. But what is never going to help, is when Washington stays mute when the Georgian Dream rejects the ambassadorial nominee, allows Tbilisi to demonize US Ambassador, or totally disregard US championed judiciary and other reforms.

  • Russia's Appetite May Extend Beyond Ukraine

    Russia's revanchist and imperial ambitions may not stop at Ukraine. Unless Russian forces are defeated in Ukraine or withdrawn by new Kremlin rulers, Moscow might assault other post-Soviet neighbors. The West may face limits on the extent to which it could help them thwart such attacks. As repression has climbed under President Vladimir Putin and Russia has become more autocratic, Russian behavior has become more imperial and revanchist, not least in Ukraine, a conflict that will be one year old on Feb. 24. But Moscow's expansive ambitions may go well beyond it. In 2005, Putin called the Soviet collapse “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” In 2008, then-Prime Minister Putin told President George W. Bush, “Ukraine is not even a country.” Soon Russia invaded Georgia and asserted “privileged interests” in the wider region. In 2014 and on a larger scale in 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. In 2022, Putin claimed that prior to President Nursultan Nazarbayev's reign, “Kazakhs never had statehood.” In 2016, Putin claimed that Russia's border “has no end.” No wonder neighbors worry. They have reason to fear where Putin's Russia might strike next, especially if revanchist rulers remain in the Kremlin or the invaders prevail in Ukraine. Where might new Russian threats emerge? The Baltics: Alleging a mission to protect Russians anywhere, Moscow might try to seize Estonia with its ethnic Russian enclave of Narva, or Latvia, where ethnic Russians are a quarter of the population. Russia could seek to invade Lithuania, a neighbor that is not friendly toward Russia lodged between hyper-armed Kaliningrad and Belarus. Since the Baltics lack geographic depth, the Kremlin might think Russian forces could take them before NATO reinforcements arrived and defeat any attempt to recover them. Belarus: Likely shocked by the widespread street protests in 2020, the Kremlin could seek to deepen subservience by absorbing Belarus. Putin might be angry that despite having a friendly dictator, Belarus refuses to send troops to Ukraine or host a Russian air base. The Kremlin might calculate that it could oust President Alexander Lukashenko and take control of or annex Belarus without Western intervention. Moscow might worry about sparking more protests. Moldova: In February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned that democratic Moldova could become the “next Ukraine.” Russian troops already occupy separatist Transnistria. Unless Russia seized southern Ukraine up to the Moldovan border, it might see risks in mounting a larger invasion against a country linked to the West and bordering on NATO stalwart Romania. Georgia: If Russia seized the Black Sea coastline remaining under the control of Georgia, it would control seaborne access for goods flowing to and from China, Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The Kremlin might view democratic Georgia, despite ties to the West, as far from most of Europe and vulnerable. Kazakhstan: Russian forces could attempt to invade the northern regions of Kazakhstan that host significant Slavic minorities. Russian revanchists have long called for incorporation of these areas, as did the late Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. The Kremlin might view the West as unable to do much to help faraway Kazakhstan repel an invasion. Peacekeepers from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization intervened to help quell protests in Kazakhstan last year. Caspian energy: Russia could seek to capture Caspian energy assets in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Unlike other possible land grabs, the Kremlin might think this one would be a financial boon. A Russian naval armada in the Caspian Sea could strike coastal targets and help protect energy assets from collateral damage. The Kremlin would expect strong Western political opposition and tougher sanctions. But despite huge Western investments in Caspian energy, the Kremlin might not expect large-scale military intervention so far from NATO's main sources of power. No question, for Russia's revanchists and imperialists, Ukraine is the main game. But they may want more. And they might think the West's unprecedented military support for Ukraine will not be replicated elsewhere. The war has shown the value of sustained, low-cost training by NATO allies of Ukrainian troops, such as how to fight in decentralized and agile ways. Georgian forces have also benefitted. The allies might promote regional security by training more forces from friendly post-Soviet countries. The fate of Russia's neighbors may hinge in great part on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Especially if the Kremlin managed to portray the war as a success, it might be emboldened to employ force against other neighbors. This is one reason why the West has strong interests in a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine and an end to revanchist rule in Russia. The West might be bolder about asserting the latter interest. William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. He was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia, and senior adviser at the U.S. Helsinki Commission. This commentary originally appeared on The Hill on February 16, 2023. Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.

  • U.S. lawmakers want terrorist designation for Russia's Wagner Group

    WASHINGTON, (Reuters) - A group of Democratic and Republican senators said on Wednesday they would try again to pass legislation that would require the State Department to designate Russian mercenary company Wagner Group as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). Led by Democrat Ben Cardin and Republican Roger Wicker, the senators said they had reintroduced the Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries (HARM) act - which was introduced but not passed before the end of the previous Congress - seeking to hold Wagner accountable for human rights violations by adding it to the FTO blacklist. Cardin and Wicker are co-chairs of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, a government agency that promotes human rights. Washington has been targeting Wagner for some time. The Treasury Department last month designated Wagner, which is fighting on the Russian side in some of the most intense battles of the Ukraine war, as a transnational criminal organization responsible for widespread human rights abuses

  • Neutral Austria under pressure to get tougher on Russia

    VIENNA (AP) — Austria has come under heavy criticism for granting visas that will allow sanctioned Russian lawmakers to attend a Vienna meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The issue highlights the delicate balancing act the European country has engaged in while trying to maintain its longstanding position of military neutrality during the war in Ukraine. The Austrian government has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine almost a year ago but also stressed the need to maintain diplomatic relations with Moscow. Austria hosts several U.N. agencies and international organizations such as the OSCE, which was established during the Cold War as a forum for dialogue between East and West. Russia is one of the 57 nations in North America, Europe and Asia that participate in the Vienna-based organization. Moscow plans to send delegates to the Feb. 23-24 meeting of the OSCE’s parliamentary assembly, including 15 Russian lawmakers who are under European Union sanctions. Among them are Deputy Duma Chairman Pyotr Tolstoy and fellow parliament member Leonid Slutsky. In a letter to Austria’s chancellor, foreign minister and other officials, 81 OSCE delegates from 20 countries, including France, Canada, Britain, Poland and Ukraine, called upon the Austrian government to prohibit the participation of the sanctioned Russians. “It is important to remember that Russian parliamentarians are an integral part of the power system and complicit in the crimes Russia commits every day in Ukraine,” read the letter, which was seen by The Associated Press. “They have no place in an institution tasked with promoting sincere dialogue and opposition to the war.” The U.S. delegates to the Parliamentary Assembly were not among the letter’s signatories. U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Michael Carpenter told reporters Friday that the Russian delegates “are not people who deserve to be able to travel to Western countries.” However, Carpenter added that it was “up to the Austrian government to determine whether they are going to grant visas or not.” Austrian officials haven’t commented on the letter. On Feb. 5, Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg defended Austria’s decision to allow the sanctioned Russians to enter the country, arguing it was important to keep channels of communication with Moscow open despite the “brutal Russian attack against Ukraine.” The Austrian Foreign Ministry also insisted that as host to the OSCE headquarters in Vienna, it is legally obliged to grant visas to representatives of participating nations who want to take part in meetings there. Austria, which became a European Union member in 1995, has criticized Moscow and joined the sanctions the EU imposed against Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. But unlike Finland and Sweden, which decided to abandon their non-aligned stances in May by applying to join NATO, Austria remains committed to the military neutrality it adopted in 1955. The Austrian government has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine but no weapons. Chancellor Karl Nehammer became the first and so far only EU leader to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin face-to-face after the war started. Nehammer traveled to Moscow in April 2022 in a fruitless attempt to persuade the Russian leader to end the invasion. Support remains strong for Austrian neutrality among the public and political establishment. “I believe that Austrian neutrality can still play a positive role today,” saysid Ralph Janik, an expert in international law and researcher at the Sigmund Freud private university in Vienna. “The alternative would be to join NATO, but every single Austrian politician is very well aware that this is not supported by the majority of the Austrian public.” Austria, which was annexed by Nazi Germany in the run-up to World War II, declared neutrality after the war under pressure from Western allies and the Soviet Union. It sought a role as a mediator between East and West and developed ties with Moscow during and after the Cold War. In 1968, Austria became the first Western European country to import gas from the Soviet Union, and its dependence on Russian energy increased in the following decades. Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 80% of Austria’s natural gas came from Russia. It has since reduced the share to just over 20% by turning to Norwegian gas, according to Austria’s regulator for electricity and gas. The Austrian banking system is also closely connected to Russia. Austria’s second-largest bank, the Raiffeisenbank International, earned more than half of its profits in 2022 from Russia. The bank has come under intense pressure for continuing its business in Russia despite Moscow’s war against Ukraine, and is currently evaluating strategic options, including an exit from Russia. Vienna is also known to be a playground for spies, including from Russia, due to its lenient espionage laws. Despite its initial reluctance, Austria has expelled eight Russian diplomats who are believed to have been engaged in spying since the start of the Russian war against Ukraine. While there are no signs of a shift away from Austrian neutrality, some have called for the policy to be reassessed following the Ukraine war. Werner Fasslabend, a former Austrian defense minister from the conservative People’s Party, is among the few prominent voices arguing in favor of the country renouncing neutrality and joining NATO. With the end of Cold War and Austria’s accession to the EU, Austrian neutrality has “lost its function,” said Fasslabend, the director of the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy. As a NATO member, Austria would “be in a better position to shape European security policy and will gain greater security,” he added, admitting that it was unlikely to happen given it would require changing the constitution by a two-thirds majority in the Austrian parliament. “This majority is not within sight,” Fasslabend said. Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

  • Let’s Radar! Blue/Yellow Ukraine USA Announces Radar Systems Continuing Crowdfunding Campaign for Ukraine

    Let’s Radar! Blue/Yellow Ukraine USA Announces Radar Systems Continuing Crowdfunding Campaign for Ukraine Friends of Blue Yellow Ukraine USA NFP, Inc PRESS RELEASE:  February 11, 2023 Blue/Yellow (USA (501(c)3) and Lithuania), along with 3 other NGOs have launched a campaign, ending 2/24, to purchase advanced multifunctional tactical radar systems able to detect small objects as well as missiles, for Ukraine: RADAROM!/Let’s Radar! Nearly $8M have been raised in under 10 days. That's 8-10 systems, which have a radius of 60 m. Many more are needed. Chicago, IL February 11, 2023 --( PR.com )-- Last year, Lithuanians raised ca. $6M within three days for a Bayraktar drone for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This year Lithuanian National Radio and Television (LRT), along with the organizations Blue/Yellow (USA and Lithuania), Laisvės TV (Freedom Television), 1K Fondas (1K Fund), and Stiprūs Kartu (Strong Together), launched a campaign to purchase multifunctional tactical radar systems for Ukraine: “RADAROM!” (Let’s radar!). Lithuanian private donors and businesses raised nearly $8M during the first week of the campaign which began on 1/30 and culminates on 2/24, the date of the full-scale brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine, with a concert to support Ukraine. Ukraine has been working with old Soviet-produced radars not designed to detect and/or track small and low-flying objects. Russian missiles and drones pose a lethal threat to Ukrainian defenders and civilians. Modern technology has provided for sophisticated systems with advanced detection, communication and networking ability, appropriate for this current type of warfare. These new radars are unique in that they can detect all types, sizes, and speeds of objects moving in the sky. They allow for alerts so that protective action can be taken in time, for energy grids, water provision systems, or to evacuate targeted populations before a missile hits. Given the expected spring offensive by Russia, they are a critical game changer in preventing more needless deaths of Ukrainian citizens, and the continued destruction of their country. Radar prices range between $500K to $1.5M. Donations have reached nearly $8M since 1/30. In addition to individual donations, over 70 businesses have also actively participated in the campaign. These donations will allow for the purchase of 6-7 systems as of today, and hopefully 10 systems or more by February 24. The first system is expected in Ukraine this month. US-based donations are critical to this effort; radar systems are proactive, allowing many thousands of lives to be saved and critical infrastructure protected. A free and democratic Ukraine is key to a stable world. US residents and citizens can donate at the Blue/Yellow USA (501(c)3) website: www.foblueyellowukraineusa.org. Others can donate at www.radarom.lt. About Blue/Yellow Blue/Yellow for Ukraine (Lithuania) and Blue/Yellow USA (Friends of Blue/Yellow for Ukraine USA NFP, Inc, 501(c)(3)) have provided over $40 million in direct aid to Ukrainians, from civilians to defense forces, working with various actors from the state to other NGOs, since their founding (LT in 2014 and USA in 2019). We testified as one of four witnessing organizations at the US Helsinki Commission’s Congressional hearing on Crowdsourcing Victory for Ukraine. We are included in the top ten organizations worldwide aiding Ukraine by Forbes. Blue/Yellow for Ukraine LT is led by Director Jonas Öhman. The US organization is headed by MD Rima Ziuraitis. Öhman has received numerous awards for B/Y’s work in Ukraine from the EU Parliament, armed forces units, ministries and the Presidents of Ukraine and Lithuania. He is the only foreigner awarded the medal for “The Defense of Avdiivka.” He is former Swedish military, a filmmaker, journalist, and humanitarian activist for democracy and freedom. To learn more or donate, visit www.foblueyellowukraineusa.org, our Facebook and Instagram pages www.facebook.com/FOBlueYellowUkraineUSAorg, and follow us on Twitter @BlueYellowUKR. Contact Information: Friends of Blue Yellow Ukraine USA NFP, Inc Ausra Tallat-Kelpsa Di Raimondo 630-770-6551 Contact via Email foblueyellowukraineusa.org Read the full story here: Let’s Radar! Blue/Yellow Ukraine USA Announces Radar Systems Continuing Crowdfunding Campaign for Ukraine Press Release Distributed by PR.com

  • The Case for Supporting Ukraine Is Strong. But the Biden Administration Isn’t Making It

    President Biden has poorly explained why supporting Ukraine is in America’s interests. There are better arguments to make. Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is nearing its first anniversary, and the United States should be proud that our support has empowered Kyiv to push back against the Kremlin. But the Biden administration still has not clearly articulated why continued American leadership is needed and why the only acceptable outcome is victory for Ukraine. As a result, after one year of fighting, and as we face domestic issues such as inflation, crime, and an open southern border, the American people are asking questions about U.S. support for Ukraine. This is understandable. There is, however, a persuasive case for continued American aid to Ukraine. But we have to make that case. Public diplomacy starts at home. A few weeks before Secretary of State George Marshall went to Harvard to unveil the Marshall Plan in June 1947, his deputy, Dean Acheson, made a speech of his own in my home state of Mississippi. Acheson recognized that it was not just the Harvard faculty club whose opinion mattered — William F. Buckley’s first 2,000 names in the Boston phone book would also have a say. At Delta State University, Acheson argued that American engagement in Europe was “necessary for our national security.” In 1984, President Reagan made a similar point in Gulfport, Miss., at the height of the Cold War. He pointed out the need to strengthen our defense-industrial base, naval fleet, and ammunition stocks, saying, we can “never again allow America to let her guard down.” President Biden has not acted or spoken with the same strength and candor. Before February 24, 2022, he suggested that Russia might get away with “minor incursions” into Ukraine. The messaging most Americans heard from the White House last summer was “Putin’s price hike” — an attempt to dismiss concerns about the president’s failed energy policies. Instead of the president, Congress has led the charge at every step, both in explaining this effort to the American people and in provisioning Ukraine. The administration’s recent timidity in providing Ukraine with a handful of tanks allowed Europeans to hide behind the U.S. for months, rather than provide Ukraine what it needs in time to make a difference for the coming spring offensive. That hesitation was in keeping with endless debates we have seen about equipment like HIMARS and drones. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians are fighting courageously, but with one hand tied behind their backs. Recently, I took to the Senate floor to make the case for more, better, and faster advanced weapons deliveries to Ukraine. I offered four clear reasons why continuing to support Ukraine is in America’s national interest. The argument needs to be based on more than vague appeals to the rules-based international order, which persuade few outside the Beltway. First, Ukraine matters to the United States because the security of Europe is closely tied to our own security and prosperity. When Vladimir Putin says that he seeks the “collapse of Western hegemony,” he means the power of the U.S. and of our allies. Second, this is a good investment for us. Reporting indicates that the U.S. contribution to Ukraine as a percent of our own GDP so far has been less than that of Canada, the United Kingdom, and every Baltic country, at a clip of just 0.2 percent. The result of these relatively modest investments is that Russia’s military is significantly weakened and Moscow can no longer carry out a near-term invasion of any nation in the NATO alliance. Further, 40 percent of U.S. aid for Ukraine, or about $44 billion, is being spent here at home on our defense-industrial base and readiness. Third, the United States is leading a transformation in Europe’s security architecture that will make it far less likely that American service members will be put in danger in the future. For years, American force planners have agonized over hard choices about how to assist in Europe’s defenses. These choices have been made all the more challenging as a result of the “free rider” problem in NATO defense spending. With our allies committing to rearming, we may soon see that dilemma in our strategy for the European continent subside. Fourth, victory in Ukraine will help deter the Chinese Communist Party in the Indo-Pacific. General Secretary Xi Jinping is watching the other side of Eurasia closely, with an eye toward Taiwan. As Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida has stated, “Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow.” Last month, our allies in Tokyo committed to double their defense spending as a percent of GDP to 2 percent. Beyond those key reasons, it is important to understand that a long war for Ukraine would cost even more and favors Putin. Providing Ukraine with needed arms, including ATACMS, long-range missiles, and advanced drones like the Grey Eagle and Reaper could tip the balance in their favor and diminish the odds of a protracted conflict by better positioning Kyiv to end the war on the right terms. As we consider additional support, political leaders also owe the American people oversight of how their hard-earned taxpayer dollars are being spent. Twenty reviews of Ukraine assistance have been completed, with another 64 reviews ongoing or planned. As ranking member on the Senate Armed Services committee, I will continue that oversight. American support for Ukraine should not be taken for granted, in Kyiv or in Washington. It will be earned by legislators who persuade voters at civic clubs, at churches and faith institutions, and in conversations at local grocery stores, face to face. I will continue to have those tough discussions in Tupelo, Olive Branch, Jackson, Gulfport, and everywhere in-between. I invite my colleagues in Congress and in the administration to do the same across the country. The American people deserve no less.  

  • Hilltop View: Enhancing Cooperation as a U.S. Helsinki Commission Detailee

    Most Foreign Service officers (FSOs) associate details to Capitol Hill with Pearson Fellowships, which enable FSOs to gain invaluable legislative branch experience by working in a Congressional Office. Less well known is the senior advisor position at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a.k.a. the “Helsinki Commission.”   CSCE is a unique institution. It was established by Congress in 1976 to implement the 1975 “Helsinki Final Act,” a seminal document addressing traditional security and economic concerns while stipulating fundamental commitments to human rights were integral to a comprehensive view of security in Europe. Among its initial signatories were 35 countries in Europe and Eurasia, including the Soviet Union, as well as the United States and Canada. “Helsinki” or the “spirit of Helsinki” was widely seen as the first thaw in the Cold War. Helsinki monitor groups sprang up throughout the Soviet Union and in Warsaw Pact satellites to hold governments accountable for endemic violations of human rights commitments.   Demitra Pappas, senior advisor to the U.S. Helsinki Commission, attends a side event at the Warsaw Human Dimension Conference, Sept. 28, 2022. Photo by Mahvish S. Khan   During a Congressional delegation visit to the Soviet Union in 1975, New Jersey Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick was so moved by her discussions with dissidents and Jewish refuseniks that she introduced legislation establishing a bipartisan Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Fenwick took this bold step over the strenuous opposition of the Kissinger-era Department of State, which saw the legislation as usurping executive branch authority and objected to human rights-centered diplomacy. CSCE was empowered to monitor adherence to Helsinki Final Act commitments, giving Congress a larger role to play in foreign policy. Today, the Helsinki Commission—comprised of nine senators and nine representatives from both parties as well as three executive branch commissioners (from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce)—continues its strong advocacy for human rights, security, and economic cooperation among the 57 participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the institutional successor of the post-Helsinki Final Act Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.   CSCE has a symbiotic relationship with the Department, with both a commission staffer embedded in the U.S. Mission to the OSCE (USOSCE) in Vienna and, since its inception, a senior FSO detailed to the commission’s professional staff to enhance cooperation between the legislative and executive branches. The Department’s Senior Advisor to the Helsinki Commission Demitra Pappas came to the latter position in September directly from USOSCE where she had been the arms control counselor, representing the United States in OSCE’s main political-military body, the Forum for Security Cooperation. In her new capacity, Pappas serves as a conduit between the Department and the Helsinki Commission, maintaining that vital link with Congress, which includes Helsinki Commission staff joining U.S. delegations to OSCE multilateral meetings. As with the Helsinki Commission, Russia’s war on Ukraine became OSCE’s singular focus in the lead up to the February 24 full-scale war, and has remained so in the past year.    From left: Co-chair Representative and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Representative for Political Prisoners Steve Cohen looks on as Yegvenia Kara-Kurza, wife of imprisoned Russian activist Vladimir Kara-Murza, speaks at the Warsaw Human Dimension Conference during a side event on political prisoners, Oct. 3, 2022. Photo courtesy of the U.S. Helsinki Commission   The detail to the Helsinki Commission position provides FSOs with up close experience and exposure to events such as the Ukraine war. For Pappas, the journey began from her first day, as a regular stream of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other frontline actors, as well as Ukrainian officials, sought out the commission staff to tell their stories. At Pappas’ first congressional hearing, CSCE called a single witness, “Taira,” a Ukrainian medic captured by Russian forces in Mariupol last spring who provided a harrowing firsthand account of the fall of the city and her subsequent detention and torture. At an OSCE human rights meeting in Warsaw in September, the commission organized a side event on political prisoners with the Ukrainian NGO “Center for Civil Liberties,” which was subsequently awarded the Nobel Peace prize  along with the Russian NGO Memorial and Belarusian activist Ales Bialiatsky. Another commission side event in Warsaw on “De-colonizing Russia” focused on the national minorities that Russia now exploits as cannon fodder in the Ukraine war. That particular subject deeply rankled Kremlin propagandists and Russian officials, who accused the commission of seeking to dismember Russia.   This was not the first time CSCE drew the Kremlin’s ire. The commission authored the iconic Magnitsky Act, and many of the staff are persona non grata in Russia.   Pappas says her CSCE colleagues do not shy away from pushing the often self-imposed limits of U.S. policy. “For an FSO, it is refreshing to think outside the bureaucratic box and not be beholden to the interagency clearance process.” Currently, commission staff convene hearings and briefings on all aspects of the war in Ukraine and draft related legislation as well as articles and reports. While the commission chair—Sen. Ben Cardin—will revert to the House in the new Congress, the commission will continue to serve as a bipartisan bulwark of solidarity for Ukraine.   U.S. Helsinki Commission Representative to the U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Shannon Simrell poses next to Ukrainian Parliamentarian Oleksii Goncharenko at an event hosted by the U.S. delegation at the Warsaw Human Dimension Conference, Sept. 28, 2022. Photo by Mahvish S. Khan   Engaging in “parliamentary diplomacy” through Congressional delegations to meetings of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) is another important aspect of CSCE’s work. The PA convenes annual meetings in participating States and issues political declarations on States’ adherence to Helsinki commitments. OSCE PA has provided a platform of solidarity with Ukraine by building relationships among like-minded parliamentarians, with more flexibility than the consensus-based OSCE to denounce what are decried as Russia’s “clear, gross and uncorrected” violations of the Helsinki Final Act. CSCE Commissioner Rep. Steve Cohen was named OSCE PA’s first special representative on political prisoners and uses the commission’s megaphone to advocate for their release.  Commission staff, as well as commissioners and Department advisors, also regularly serve as election observers in other OSCE participating States. During the November midterm election, the United States received the largest ever OSCE PA election observation mission with representatives from 40 countries.  Pappas reflected on the singular nature of this detail position. “This position is a unique opportunity within the Department for a Foreign Service officer to acquire knowledge of the legislative branch, and its activist role in defense of human rights and international security, as well as to experience diplomatic relations amongst legislative representatives from different countries, and observe foreign elections up close,” she said. Demitra Pappas is the senior advisor at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

  • Bipartisan reps introduce bill to designate Russia’s Wagner Group as foreign terrorists

    A bipartisan group of House lawmakers introduced legislation on Wednesday to designate Russian mercenary company Wagner Group as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). The Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries (HARM) Act, sponsored by nine members of the lower chamber, would require the State Department to designate the Wagner Group an FTO within 90 days of becoming law. The lawmakers cited the paramilitary company’s history of human rights violations in Africa and ongoing deployment of private soldiers in Ukraine to fight with Russia, adding that the Wagner Group has received weapons from North Korea, a U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism. “Where the Wagner Group operates, atrocities follow,” said Rep. Steve Cohen (D-Tenn.) in a statement. “The HARM Act will identify Putin’s private mercenary group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and let the world know that its activities are both malign and illegal.” The Biden administration designated the Wagner Group as a transnational criminal organization last week and announced countries and entities supporting it would run afoul of the U.S. government. But an FTO designation would authorize the U.S. to slap criminal penalties on entities supporting Wagner Group, according to the lawmakers sponsoring the HARM Act. Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) said in a statement the Biden administration’s designation “does not go far enough” against Wagner, adding it should use the FTO label to “expose them in their true state as a murderous, criminal enterprise.” “The Wagner Group has been engaging in nefarious atrocities around the globe, all at the behest of war criminal Putin and his cronies,” Wilson said. Legislation to designate the Wagner Group an FTO was also introduced last year in both the House and Senate. There was a standoff between the Biden administration and some U.S. lawmakers last year over designating Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism. The administration said the designation, which comes with a raft of restrictions and penalties, could do more harm than good for Ukraine. Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, formed the Wagner Group in 2014. The mercenary outfit has since meddled in conflicts across the world, from Africa to Syria and now Ukraine, where Wagner forces are fighting alongside Russian soldiers in the eastern Donetsk region. DOJ disrupts global ransomware gangTop FDA safety official resigns In November, the European Parliament passed a resolution urging the European Council to adopt a measure that would place Wagner Group on an EU terrorist list. Rep. Ruben Gallego (D-Ariz.), who is vying for a Senate seat in 2024, also sponsored the HARM Act and called for “rebuking mercenary terrorist organizations like the Wagner Group.” “While Ukrainians stand up for freedom and democracy, the Wagner Group stands with authoritarian regimes like Russia,” Gallego said in a statement. “Declaring them a Foreign Terrorist Organization is a commonsense step to hold them accountable for their atrocities in Ukraine and across the globe.”

  • The Crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh Highlights Russia’s Waning Global Influence

    Mariam Abrahamyan is a hard woman to get in touch with. She appears on the screen for just a few moments before the picture freezes and she drops off the video call. “Sorry,” she says after phoning back a minute later, “our power went out again and the internet went down.” For more than a month now, the 30-year-old Armenian mother of three has been cut off from the rest of the world by a near-total blockade on the only road in or out of Nagorno-Karabakh—a disputed territory nestled between Armenia and Azerbaijan—that she and her family call home. Regular supplies of food and medicine have been stopped by Azerbaijan, and locals say supermarket shelves are empty and pharmacies are running out of essential prescriptions, while officials warn a famine could now be on the cards. “We didn’t think it would last this long,” Abrahamyan says. “But what’s really frightening is not knowing when it will end. We made the decision to stay here, and I dread the day one of my children might turn around and ask why we chose to live in a place like this.” Nagorno-Karabakh has already seen two wars within Abrahamyan’s lifetime. In the 1990s, as the Soviet Union unraveled, erstwhile members Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a series of fierce battles over the mountainous region, with hundreds of thousands of ethnic Azeris displaced from the region, and thousands killed on both sides. Nagorno-Karabakh is located inside Azerbaijan’s internationally-recognized borders, but locked behind a line of landmines and defensive positions, and for three decades it was accessible only from Armenia. Governed as the unrecognized Republic of Artsakh, its officials point to two referendums held in 1991 and 2006 as proof that those living there have chosen independence. But in 2020, Azerbaijani troops launched an offensive to retake Nagorno-Karabakh, conquering swathes of territory and leaving Karabakh Armenians in control of just their de facto capital, Stepanakert, and the surrounding area. Only a Moscow-brokered ceasefire ended the war, putting the sole highway linking Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia—known as the Lachin Corridor—under the control of a 1,500-strong Russian peacekeeping contingent, with Azerbaijani troops stationed behind the wire fence on both sides of the road. Yet with Russia bogged down in Ukraine, there are fears the battle-scarred Nagorno-Karabakh could see conflict once again as Moscow fails to step in. Road to nowhere On the morning of Dec. 12, a group of self-described Azerbaijani eco-protesters pushed past the Russian peacekeepers and set up camp on the Lachin Corridor, stopping traffic. They allege Karabakh-Armenians have been using the road to export illegally-mined gold at the expense of the environment, while importing landmines and other military hardware as the Russians watch on. Now, officials say the Russian peacekeeping convoys and a smattering of Red Cross relief vehicles are the only ones that are able to pass—nowhere near enough to replace the 400 tons of goods that used to arrive daily from Armenia. “We don’t see much of the Russians,” Adnan Huseyn, one of the Azerbaijani organizers of the sit-in says. “During the first few days, we had eye-to-eye contact with the peacekeepers, but there were no problems. We watched the World Cup together, which was actually nice. Most of the time they kept quiet.” While Huseyn’s group insists it is moving aside for humanitarian convoys and denies it is staging a blockade, Armenia alleges they were sent by Azerbaijan in order to spark a crisis and lay the ground for “ethnic cleansing” of the region. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, whose government has repeatedly cracked down on political protests at home, has described the demonstrators as the pride of the nation, while observers have been quick to point out few have any prior record of environmental activism. Tom de Waal, a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and author of several books on the conflict, has argued that the protesters had “evidently been sent there by the government in Baku,” and Western nations including the U.S. have called on Azerbaijan to unblock the road. Now, anger is building as the humanitarian situation grows dire and Russia appears reluctant to force a reopening of the road. “Armenia is a firm supporter of the Russian peacekeepers,” the country’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said in December, as it became clear the protesters were there to stay. “But it is unacceptable for us that they are becoming a silent witness to the depopulation of Nagorno-Karabakh.” Broken promises In Stepanakert, propaganda posters of the Russian peacekeepers hang in shop windows, looking out over the rows of empty shelves. “Karabakh, live in peace,” one reads. For many ethnic Armenians in the breakaway region, Russian is a native language on par with Armenian, and Moscow has long been seen as a close ally. But since the 2020 war, many locals say their existence feels more precarious than ever and that Azerbaijan is intent on asserting control over their unrecognized state. In a poll published by the Caucasus Research Resource Center in January, fewer than half of 400 Karabakh-Armenian respondents said independence would help settle the conflict in the disputed territory. Almost one in four said they would prefer to be annexed by Moscow and given special status as part of the Russian Federation—slightly more than the number that back unification with Armenia. “I’m not political,” says Abrahamyan. “I only know that the Russians have a duty to protect us, and they’re not doing that.” On Dec. 24, a delegation of Karabakh-Armenians marched to the peacekeepers’ checkpoint on the Lachin Corridor, where the Azerbaijanis have been staging their sit-in, to demand the road be reopened. “The Russian officer there told us to go home and not to worry,” says Marut Vanyan, a 39-year-old blogger from Stepanakert who joined the group. “He told us the road would be reopened within two days, like it was before. That never happened.” According to Vanyan, one of the protest organizers told the peacekeepers that locals were losing trust in them and, if the worst comes to the worst, they would take their families and leave—with Moscow losing its foothold in the region. Three days later, dozens of men, women, and children walked to the gates of the peacekeeping headquarters to demand answers. “Putin, keep your word,” read one sign carried by a young boy. Guards told the crowd that they were unable to get hold of their commander, Major General Andrey Volkov, and he was the only one who could answer their questions. Many Karabakh-Armenians now fear a protracted blockade or another Azerbaijani military offensive could see them forced to flee their homes for good. Man from Moscow? Azerbaijan has long accused Armenia of being a Russian puppet state, pointing to Yerevan’s membership of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and the close economic ties between the two countries. At the same time, just two days before Moscow’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine, Aliyev himself traveled to meet with President Vladimir Putin and sign a deal upgrading their relations to alliance level. But the standoff between the two sides has only worsened in recent weeks after an enigmatic Russian-Armenian oligarch, Ruben Vardanyan, announced he was moving to Nagorno-Karabakh in September. The Yerevan-born billionaire was initially coy about seeking political office but, two months later, was suddenly appointed State Minister of the unrecognized Republic of Artsakh, making him effectively the most powerful man in Stepanakert overnight. Since then, talks with Azerbaijan have broken down, with Aliyev accusing Vardanyan of having been “sent from Moscow with a very clear agenda.” Officials in Baku point to the fact that he has been sanctioned by Ukraine as proof of his close ties to the Russian state. Kyiv says his business interests “undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine.” Speaking via video link from his office in the blockaded region, Vardanyan rejects those charges. “People don’t understand when someone like me decides to give up his family and his lifestyle,” he says with a half-smile. “I decided it is the right time to be with my people and [the Armenian] nation.” The 54-year-old banking magnate is careful to avoid directly criticizing the role of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, but firmly denies Moscow has any undue influence over the region. “I can’t just pick up the phone and call Vladimir Putin,” he laughs, “the peacekeepers are only 2,000 people standing between the Armenian population and the sizable Azerbaijani army. It’s tough, and it’s clear Russia’s attention isn’t here—it’s in the West, given Ukraine.” Crisis in the Kremlin “For Putin, conquering Ukraine has become an all-encompassing issue and there’s little interest at the top for anything else,” says Jade McGlynn, a researcher at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. “Moscow’s quest to increase its influence has left it a diminished and less formidable power in the South Caucasus. Putin may not see that, but the Foreign Ministry does—it’s just being sidelined. Junior diplomats are in despair.” While Karabakh-Armenians fear their calls for help are falling on deaf ears, others are questioning whether Moscow was ever a reliable security guarantor in the first place. “Russia is exploiting the conflict to further its own interests. Ultimately, its strategy is about maintaining an imperial grip on the region,” says Michael Cecire, a senior policy advisor at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a U.S. government agency. From Yerevan, Pashinyan is now calling on the international community as a whole to step up and put an end to the humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, arguing a U.N. peacekeeping mission should take over if the Russians cannot fulfill their commitments. The U.S., along with the U.K. and a number of European nations, have expressed concern over the situation, while France has emerged as a leading ally for Armenia, tabling an unsuccessful motion condemning Baku at the U.N. Security Council. On Tuesday, RFERL reported that the E.U. has now agreed to send a monitoring mission to Armenia for as long as two years, in a sign that Brussels is concerned about the prospect of new clashes along the internationally-recognized border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While the civilian team will not enter Nagorno-Karabakh, the move has been interpreted as a sign that the West is stepping up to fill the power vacuum left by Russia. But Elin Suleymanov, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Britain, says that no outside power will be able to impose a solution to the standoff over the region. “Armenia’s problem is structural dependency—and now they’re looking to the West and hoping France will be their big daddy.” For Vardanyan, confined to the blockaded region he moved to just months ago, the outside world feels a very long way away, and he warns the Karabakh-Armenians can’t expect to depend on anyone but themselves. “It’s like a Russian fairytale—there’s a hero standing in front of a crossroads,” he says. “One way, you lose your independence, another, you lose your home. The third way is to fight. We don’t want war, but of these three options we have to make a choice, even if it is dangerous and you can lose your life. We need to be ready for this.”

  • How first transgender war correspondent is now fighting with Ukraine

    On a summer day in Zolochiv, Ukraine, a rocket dropped from the sky and exploded into a building across the street from journalist Sarah Ashton-Cirillo, who caught the blast on cellphone video. The artillery, one of many seen in the country for weeks, didn't just crater the sidewalk. It also led Ashton-Cirillo – the world's first openly transgender war correspondent – to be hit with a new perspective.  "There was this crazy shift in my perception of where my place was in the war," she said. "My mind had undergone a metamorphosis because it was not anymore me covering the war, I was basically living the war. ... I had become very conflicted regarding my feelings as to where I belonged." In Ukraine she had seen bodies of injured or killed civilians, moved food supplies for the military effort and befriended many a servicemember, all of which caused her to reflect on her work and eventually turn from photographing and writing about gunfire to being a part of it. Now a member of the Ukrainian armed forces, first as a combat medic and now focusing on hybrid warfare, the 45-year-old Las Vegas native is unshakable in the cause for Ukrainian freedom. "If I knew now what I knew nine months ago, I'm not certain I would have chosen this path," she said. "But because I did choose this path, the only way to go is forward, focused on mission, focused on my convictions and values as to why I'm doing this." A story of pivotal moments Ashton-Cirillo had covered the consequences of war before, reporting from the Syria-Turkey border on the refugee crisis during the country's civil war in 2015. With hesitation but no regret, she moved forward into the war zone in Ukraine. "When I went ahead and saw that the invasion had happened, I basically thought to myself: Am I really going to do this?" she said.  Even before entering Ukraine, Ashton-Cirillo faced expected obstacles getting into the country as a transgender woman. She intentionally flew into Berlin on her origin flight with an awareness that the city might be more progressive about her gender identity not matching the photo and details on her passport. At the Ukrainian border, she brought press clippings to prove her identity, fearful of being barred from the country. But in less than an hour, she heard all she needed: "Welcome to Ukraine." 'I was basically living the war' Initially without a combat helmet, a chest protector or press plates, she made a spur-of-the-moment decision to enter the city of Kharkiv, further into a dangerous area of the war zone. Ashton-Cirillo said that at the time, the risks of her decision weren't something she could process, but she now knows the choice was pivotal for her future. In Kharkiv and later Zolochiv, she witnessed bombings and rockets cratering buildings, hid in bomb shelters with Ukrainians, and shared photos, videos and dispatches of it all on her Twitter account.  Working as a freelancer for LGBTQ Nation, she largely focused on the effect of the war on LGBTQ Ukrainians, including Russian military forces targeting LGBTQ civilians in Ukraine and the expression of LGBTQ acceptance among Ukrainians through the arts. She grew closer with members of the Ukrainian forces and served as an army volunteer to deliver food supplies. In Zolochiv, the village's mayor even appointed her an official outreach coordinator so she could advocate for aid to its citizens. How war gave Ashton-Cirillo a changed perspective The gradual shift in Ashton-Cirillo's place in the war, from the professional to the personal, led her to consider what steps would be required for her to join the Ukrainian military. By August, Ashton-Cirillo was working so closely with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, she stopped reporting for LGBTQ Nation to avoid a conflict of interest. She began to write policy papers and analysis for units of the Ukrainian government, all the while considering how she could become more involved in the war effort. Il'ko Bozhko, former press officer for the Operation Command East for Ukraine and close friend of Ashton-Cirillo, said he shared his own experience and motivations behind joining the armed forces with her as she made the decision and went with her to formally apply to serve. "We had many conversations about it. It wasn't a spur-of-the-moment decision for her," Bozhko said.  She enlisted with the armed forces in October. 'The whole gender thing' In her time as a reporter and now as a servicemember, Ashton-Cirillo says, she experienced next to no pushback to her gender identity from Ukrainians, whose country has made slow but gradual progress in LGBTQ inclusivity. The country, like many in Eastern Europe, has a long history of oppression of sexuality and expansive gender expression. But in recent years it has become somewhat of a haven for those seeking gay nightlife and a marginally more accepting environment. Being LGBTQ is legal in Ukraine, but same-sex marriage is not. Ashton-Cirillo said she has seen progress in LGBTQ acceptance in the country because of the equity created by war and doesn't believe it will be reversed. As for how being transgender comes into play for her in her unit on a daily basis, Ashton-Cirillo called her gender identity a "non-issue" for those around her in Ukraine. "It didn't register as any big deal that I'm a trans soldier and in Ukraine," she said. "It turned out to be the easiest part of my time there. ... You are judged on your character, you are judged on your courage, and you are judged on your belief in freedom and your loyalty to Ukraine. I mean, nothing else matters." A unexpected role: Liaison between the US and Ukraine Initially, Ashton-Cirillo also didn't fully grasp the informal role she'd be playing as a sort of liaison between the U.S. and the Ukrainian Armed Forces because of her enlistment. When returning to the U.S. for the first time in December, she made two trips to Capitol Hill to speak with more than a dozen legislative offices, including members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission. Politicians regardless of party or perspective on the LGBTQ community have trusted her to deliver an unvarnished message from the other side, she said. "Where we are right now, in this moment, the Ukrainian government entrusted an American soldier to represent them in Washington, D.C., in the middle of a war," she said. "And oh, yeah, she's transgender." Ashton-Cirillo hasn't entirely abandoned writing. She is writing about her perspective on the war as a contributing columnist for media website Resolute Square. After the war, Ashton-Cirillo hopes to work on veterans rights in the U.S. or elsewhere with her knowledge of the challenges of reintegrating into life after a war zone. "It's easier to fight a world war against Russia as a transgender female than it used to be in the United States, trying to have to live a life where my gender identity is the No. 1 thing that comes up no matter what."

  • Standing with Russia, or staying silent, protects genocide

    This month, in a unanimous vote, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed Senate Resolution 713, which correctly identifies and designates Russian atrocities in Ukraine as genocide. Led by Ranking Member Sen. Jim Risch (R-Idaho) and Helsinki Commission Chairman Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.), the resolution looks poised to pass the Senate, sending a clear message to the world where the United States stands during this moment of supreme moral urgency. This resolution, and its companion in the House, brings clarity and attention to Russia’s genocide in Ukraine. Every day seems to bring fresh, compounding evidence of Russia’s genocidal intent and patterns of action — mass graves and torture chambers that seem to pockmark every liberated territory; homes, schools, hospitals and kindergartens repeatedly and deliberately targeted by Russian firepower; civilians, including children and infants, kidnapped and herded into Russian so-called “filtration” concentration camps, where they are sorted for either Russification or the gulag or worse; and flagrant attacks against refugee and humanitarian convoys.  If you care to look, these images repeat themselves throughout Ukraine, and it is as safe a bet as any that newly liberated areas will bear the blistering scars of this genocide. Sure enough, mass graves and torture chambers have been identified in recently liberated Mykolaiv and Kherson, including an archipelago of torture sites specifically for children. This is the apogee of depravity. The physical evidence is shocking enough, but the Russian government’s very public embrace of a campaign of terror and genocide is incredible to behold. The summer before the invasion, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin penned, by his own hand, a 7,000-word ahistorical screed denying the existence of Ukraine as a state and a nation, highlighting his eliminationist agenda for all the world to see. And even since then, Russian government figures at every level have repeated this noxious and ridiculous denial of Ukrainian nationality, deliberately dehumanizing and mass violence-encouraging rhetoric about “denazification,” and outright, even gleeful, calls for mass killing and destruction. The official state mouthpiece, RIA Novosti, even published in April a detailed plan laying out the intended destruction of the Ukrainian nation. What is striking about this genocide is perhaps the clarity and openness by which it has been prosecuted. And the pattern of action is startlingly predictable; not just in Ukraine, but also in Russia’s past colonial wars in Syria, Georgia and Chechnya, where ethnic cleansing, deliberate and widespread targeting of civilians, torture and rape were employed widely and purposefully as rote tools of Russian warfare. So, what can we do about it? For one, we can and should give Ukraine every tool that it needs to win its war against Russia’s genocidal war of imperial conquest. The faster Russia loses — and lose it must — the faster its genocidal program is halted. But also crucially, Congress, the U.S. government, and the world must be willing to call this genocide for what it is. In June, our co-chairman, Rep. Steve Cohen (D-Tenn.), and Ranking Member Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) introduced House Resolution 1205, which later would be introduced in the Senate as S. Res.713. Both resolutions draw on the definition of genocide in the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, to which the U.S. and Russia are both parties and which is codified in U.S. law.  The bill text illustrates how, as is well documented, Russia’s actions in Ukraine exhibits both genocidal intent and pattern of action along all of the Convention’s five acts in Article 2: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Only one must be in evidence for genocide to exist. But what can a nonbinding resolution do? In this case, speaking out is more than some mere symbol. Ukraine’s war for its homeland is being won not because of Ukrainian material superiority, but because of the justness of its cause and the morale of its people. For the United States to officially recognize the extent of Russia’s horrors is tremendously meaningful to Ukraine and Ukrainians who still, despite their victories, endure the unendurable. Around the world, such a designation also demonstrates that we do not tolerate such heinous crimes. Calling out Russia’s genocide demonstrates the gravity of the stakes not only for Ukraine and Europe, but for global peace and stability. It can marshal further support for Kyiv, help sap Moscow’s fraying relationships, and further isolate this repugnant, totalitarian regime in the Kremlin. If you stand with Russia, or stand silent, you protect genocide. And here at home, these bipartisan, bicameral resolutions can help signal to the American people the true stakes in Ukraine. That Europe’s security, and the principles that undergird it, is a bulwark for freedom around the world and under great threat by a regime that purposefully and unflinchingly engages in genocide for its own imperial, corrupt ends. It is important to emphasize, too, that the 1948 Genocide Convention is about not only punishing genocide, but preventing it, and if we are to be true to our collective commitment to “never again,” we must act now. Of course, the ongoing legal investigations remain important and authoritative. But in the interest of prevention, a political declaration and congressional action is not only justifiable but essential. Congress, particularly Reps. Cohen and Wilson in the House, and Sens. Risch and Cardin in the Senate, should be applauded for their leadership. And the Senate, particularly Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), should be credited for bringing this resolution to fruition. Hopefully the House will do the same, in this Congress or the next, inspire the whole world to speak out as well — just as we were inspired by similar legislative actions in Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Canada and Ireland.  Michael Hikari Cecire is a senior policy adviser at the U.S. Helsinki Commission. Follow him on Twitter @mhikaric. https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3780873-standing-with-russia-or-staying-silent-protects-genocide/

  • Congress Wants to Boot Russia From U.N. Security Council

    Two U.S. lawmakers heading up an independent U.S. government human rights watchdog have introduced a resolution that calls on President Joe Biden to boot Russia from the United Nations Security Council, just days before the Kremlin’s flagging full-scale invasion of Ukraine is set to hit its 10-month mark.  The bipartisan Helsinki Commission, which called on U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to protest Russia’s standing as a permanent Security Council member in October, wants Congress to argue that Russia’s war has violated the “purposes and principles of the United Nations” and asks U.S. government agencies to take steps to limit Russia’s privileges at the U.N., though it gives the administration some free rein to determine how it might act.   In the congressional resolution shared with Foreign Policy, Reps. Steve Cohen and Joe Wilson said that Russia had committed “flagrant violations” of the U.N. Charter that call into question its right to hold a Security Council seat, including the illegal annexation vote in four Ukrainian oblasts, the perpetration of atrocities in Ukrainian cities such as Bucha, nuclear saber-rattling, and creating risks to the world’s food supply.  Ukraine has also advocated for Russia to be removed from the council, though experts remain skeptical that such efforts will work. The U.N.’s governing charter doesn’t contain any provisions for removing a permanent member of the Security Council. While countries can be removed from the United Nations altogether, doing so would require a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly, including the consent of the council itself. “Russia would have to agree to it, and it’s just not going to happen,” said Louis Charbonneau, U.N. director with Human Rights Watch. China is also unlikely to agree to such a precedent.  Though House resolutions are not binding law, the move solidifies thinking both on Capitol Hill and within the Biden administration about how to curb Russian influence in Turtle Bay. The resolution pushes forward a previous effort from the Helsinki Commission—which was created in 1975 as part of a U.S. law that solidified the brief detente between the United States and the Soviet Union—calling on the State Department to initiate a process to strip Russia’s seat on the top U.N. body. One idea, backed by the commission as well as some legal scholars, seeks to challenge Russia’s status as the heir of the Soviet Union’s seat at the Security Council. As one of the initial signatories of the treaty that founded the Soviet Union, alongside Russia and Belarus, Kyiv could make a convincing claim to be the only successor state of the Soviet Union not to have flagrantly violated the principles of the U.N. Charter and issue credentials for one of its own diplomats to take the seat. As deciding on credentials is a procedural matter, it would only require nine of the 15 members of the council to vote in support of Ukraine, Thomas Grant, a senior research fellow at the University of Cambridge, has noted.  The feasibility of such a plan remains a subject of debate. And three decades after Russia took over the Soviet Union’s seat, challenging such precedent could also prove to be an uphill battle. “You’re looking at three decades of recognition of Russia in this place,” Charbonneau said.  But Russia’s long-standing intransigence, along with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, has gotten both the United States and Ukraine to begin thinking about alternatives to diminish Moscow’s influence. Speaking at the U.N. General Assembly in September, Biden called for reforms of the Security Council, including the possibility of adding more permanent and nonpermanent members, such as for countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. The United States also succeeded on Wednesday in ousting Iran from a United Nations panel on women’s rights.

  • Ukrainian official rips Russia for ‘kidnapping’ more than 13,000 children

    A Ukrainian official slammed Russia for “kidnapping” more than 13,000 Ukrainian children amid its invasion of the country “under the guise of an alleged evacuation,” during a hearing held by the U.S. Helsinki Commission on Wednesday.  Nikolay Kuleba, the commissioner for children’s rights in the Ukrainian president’s office and co-founder of the Alliance for Ukraine Without Orphans, said Russia has deported 13,124 children during the war, citing a government portal.  He also noted that Russian state media had reported a “horrifying number of 712,000 deported Ukranian children.”  “The occupiers are kidnapping Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation,” he told lawmakers, accusing Russia of facilitating the deportations by simplifying their adoption process and bribing Russian citizens to adopt displaced Ukrainian children.   “To encourage ordinary Russian to adopt forcibly removed children they offer a one-time payment of maternity capital and state aide,” Kuleba said, adding adoptive parents were paid $300 per year for each child, and about $2,000 a year for children with disabilities. He also noted the Ukrainian children were not being deported into border territories but to areas of Russia further away from the border.   “The Russian authorities made a conscious decision to resettle deported children into the territories thousands of kilometers away from Ukraine,” he said.    Kuleba also claimed that Russian adopters were allowed to change an adopted Ukrainian child’s name and date of birth. “This means that it will be very difficult for us to personally find and identify our children in the future,” he said.   Kuleba said that there were several reasons Russia was stealing Ukrainian children, including making up for the demographic losses caused by Russian casualties in the invasion. He also said the Kremlin was pushing propaganda that Russians are saving the children from Ukrainian Nazis.   James Gordon, founder of The Center for Mind-Body Medicine, told the commission that roughly 60 percent of Ukrainian children had been displaced from their homes since the conflict with Russia began, and that these children were highly distressed.  “Every child in Ukraine and all Ukrainian children who have left, are experiencing some level of distress,” Gordon said.  In addition to kidnapping, Kuleba said he had recently received reports from the Ukrainian Parliament’s Commissioner for Human Rights that Russians were torturing Ukranian children, “and have even set up separate torture chambers for this.” The Hill reached out to the Russian Embassy for a response to Kuleba’s claims.

  • Leaders warn social media ‘a ticking time bomb’ for antisemitism

    U.S. Ambassador Deborah Lipstadt, who is special envoy to combat antisemitism, on Tuesday called the rise of anti-Jewish tropes on the internet and social media “a ticking time bomb,” during a hearing held by the U.S. Helsinki Commission.  Lipstadt’s comments come just a day after President Biden’s announcement that his administration would establish a task force to coordinate government efforts to address antisemitism and other forms of religiously motivated bigotry.   Her comments also come just a few weeks after rapper Ye, formerly known as Kanye West, delivered an antisemitic rant on Infowars in which he stated that he liked Adolf Hitler.  Witness Rabbi Andrew Baker, much like Lipstadt, emphasized the dangers of how easily antisemitism can spread online during the hearing.  “Today antisemitism moves effortlessly around the world via the internet and social media. It infects groups and individuals who then carry out attacks on Jewish targets,” said Baker.  Though Lipstadt said that it was important to recognize the dangers social media presents in making antisemitic content more easily accessible, she was cautious not to blame social media for the recent rise in antisemitism in the U.S.   “I’m not sure we have an internet or social media problem, we have an antisemitism problem,” said Lipstadt. “I like to talk about or compare social media to a knife, a knife in the hands of a murderous person can take a life, a knife in the hands of a surgeon can save a life.” Lipstadt also made clear during the hearing that she wasn’t calling for more censorship or content moderation, but for more public condemnation of hate speech.   “The United States will always uphold free protections of speech in our Constitution, but having said that, we also have to condemn hate speech,” said Lipstadt. “We cannot legislate it out of existence, but we can certainly condemn it. Freedom of expression doesn’t mean we have to sit idly by.”  Baker also said that content moderation wouldn’t be able to solve the problem of antisemitism spreading online.  “Content monitors are no match for algorithms designed to push grievance as the basic business model,” said Baker. “We must find new ways to bring this under control.”   “We know that it spreads immediately, exhaustively, through social media, and that is a real fight we’re all up against.”   Lipstadt said that one of the best ways to fight against the rise of antisemitism online and in general was for high-profile individuals to decry antisemitism whenever and wherever they see it.  “Leaders have to speak out,” said Lipstadt. “Political leaders, religious leaders, celebrities, opinion makers, they have to speak out and say this is wrong.”  “So, I think the public profile people speaking out and saying this is unacceptable, is extremely important.”  Committee Chairman Ben Cardin (D-Md.) reiterated this point and said that he was proud that so many of his colleagues denounced former President Trump’s dinner at Mar-a-Lago with Ye and white supremacist Nick Fuentes.   “Leaders must put a spotlight on any type of antisemitic activities and be willing to condemn it. We saw just the opposite at Mar-a-Lago when the former president had dinner with Kanye West, a known antisemite, and Nick Fuentes, a white supremacist,” said Cardin.    

  • Cardin convenes antisemitism working group with administration, lawmakers, outside groups

    Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD) convened a cross-government working group on antisemitism on Capitol Hill this week, including lawmakers and representatives of multiple executive branch agencies, seeking to promote better collaboration across the federal government to combat antisemitism. The meeting was organized under the auspices of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), which Cardin chairs. Attendees included: Sens. Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) and Jacky Rosen (D-NV); Rep. Marc Veasey (D-TX); Melissa Rogers, the special assistant to the president and executive director of the White House Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships; State Department Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism Deborah Lipstadt; Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Kristen Clarke; Brian Turner, the FBI executive assistant director of the Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch; and Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy and Plans Robert Silvers. Representatives from the United States Holocaust Memorial Council, Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish Committee also attended. According to a readout issued by Cardin’s office, “there was clear consensus, based on data from law enforcement and polling that the number of antisemitic incidents has been rising at an alarming rate.” The meeting was focused on improving communication within the government and with civil society organizations, “and attendees expressed a willingness to make that happen,” the summary states. “It was vital at this time, with so many blatant antisemitic incidents and public celebrity rants, that we bring together this group of professionals who are dealing with this issue daily,” Cardin said. “We can and should be doing more. A unified, national strategy on countering antisemitism is needed. While finding the proper balance between protecting free speech and protecting Americans from harm, we need to up our game, rebuild coalitions with other groups that have been the target of hate-based violence, and institutionalize coordination that counters antisemitism wherever it is found.” Veasey, a member of the Helsinki Commission and a co-chair of the House Bipartisan Task force for Combating Antisemitism, said in a statement to JI that the meeting was especially relevant “in the wake of former President Trump’s meetings with white nationalists.” “It’s imperative that we continue to discuss this issue consistently, and we must not allow antisemitism to become mainstream or a partisan issue,” he continued. Veasey said the group had “discussed support for President Biden’s recent comments regarding a whole-of-society approach towards combatting antisemitism and better coordination across governments and agencies.” Rosen told JI, “We have a responsibility to do everything we can to combat antisemitism in all of its forms, and I was glad to be a part of this conversation as we work to develop a unified strategy to tackle the alarming rise of antisemitic incidents.” George Selim, ADL’s senior vice president for national affairs, represented the group in the meeting. “ADL is grateful for the steps Congress and the Administration have already taken to combat antisemitism, but greater coordination across departments and a more intentional national strategy are necessary to address this threat,” Selim said. “We appreciate Senator Cardin taking the important step of convening a roundtable discussion with relevant federal agencies to discuss best practices, including focusing on interagency and NGO coordination, and welcomed the opportunity to share proposed initiatives from ADL’s COMBAT Plan to fight antisemitism.” In a statement, AJC said the meeting “was a critical convening of government and civil society at a time when antisemitism — which, at its roots is a threat to our democracy — has become more mainstream in America.” “AJC is appreciative of the strong efforts already taken by Congress and the Biden administration. We continue to advocate for a whole-of-government approach to tackle this current surge in Jew hate,” the statement continued.

  • It’s Time to Throw NATO’s Door Wide Open

    NATO was meant to be a harbor for the weak and imperiled. It should be again. June’s NATO summit in Madrid was by every account a historic event. In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine andbroader belligerence against Europe, NATO unveiled a muscular new strategic concept and invited Finland and Swedento join the alliance—an epochal moment for the two traditionally neutral countries and a major statement for thealliance’s “open door” policy. Yet looming over all of this are the uncertain fates of the two countries most suffering from Russian aggression: Ukraine and Georgia. Both nations were promised membership in the alliance during the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, yet bothremain outside of it. Now, the enormous human and material toll of Russia’s genocidal, neo-imperial war in Ukraine hasput NATO’s extended and unfulfi lled promises into sharp, indelible relief. Obscured by ambiguous technicalities, the alliance’s failure to provide Ukraine and Georgia with a concrete pathway to membership was clearly an unintentional but predictable invitation to Russian aggression. As Ukrainians desperately defend their homeland and count civilians and their children among those killed, the moraland strategic poverty of Ukraine’s deferred accession is laid bare. NATO and its members must now reckon with thewages of a passive approach and rethink the alliance’s founding purpose. The bloc was never meant as an exclusive country club of the rich and strong but rather a harbor for the weak and imperiled. It should be again. In April, while observing the Hungarian parliamentary elections, I saw for myself the heartrending humanitarian crisis on Ukraine’s borders with Hungary and Slovakia. I saw children who had traveled great distances with their families, clutching the meager mementos of home; I met Ukrainians who traveled back and forth across the borders, bringing supplies from the European Union into western Ukrainian cities; and I saw the humanity of volunteers giving some measure of comfort and welcome to weary refugees who had, at long last, reached the promise of safety at the European Union’s frontiers. But what I didn’t see were any great barriers or edifices of geography to suggest the line where, on one side, NATO would risk nuclear war in the people’s defense and on the other side—in Ukraine—it would not. In the United States and Europe, discussions about the borders between NATO and the rest of Europe are treated like immutable features of geography or acts of god, as though certain states and people are afforded divine predestination into the Euro-Atlantic’s rarefied elect. Decisions in the run-up to the war to withhold crucial assistance or provide security guarantees were often justified based on Ukraine’s non-membership in NATO, even though concrete pathways into the alliance have never been offered despite the 2008 declaration. The idea that Ukraine and Georgia were somehow unready or unable to meet NATO’s technical criteria has always been a problematic argument. At no point has NATO established hard, technical benchmarks for membership—clear, achievable standards for entry—and doing so might have risked Ukraine and Georgia passing muster, potentially embarrassing the countries that were categorically opposed to their accession. Realistically, NATO enlargement has always been a political decision. More recent fixations on technical “readiness” and process were introduced after the Cold War to amplify NATO’s turn from a Cold War bulwark to a carrier of Euro-Atlantic values and to manage booming Eastern European demand for membership. But today, Moscow’s threat to Europe’s peace is all too apparent again—and devastatingly so in Ukraine as well as in Georgia. In response, NATO should change with the strategic landscape—not with “retrenchment,” in which it builds its walls higher while Ukraine and other threatened partners burn, but with aggressive enlargement. NATO is generally considered something of a walled garden—a protected redoubt of relative peace, prosperity, and predictability. However, this reputation elides the seismic strategic revolution that founding and early expansion represented. Firmly in the nuclear age and facing Soviet expansionism after two horrific continental wars in the first half of the 20th century, the United States sought to create structures to arrest Europe’s ruinous cycles of great-power war. Against thevery real risk of Soviet imperialism and a potential third World War, NATO created a protected sanctuary around Europe’s most threatened, impoverished, and war-torn countries. “I am sure,” then-U.S. President Harry Truman said just a year before NATO’s founding, “that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them.” To create the rules-based paradise of modern Europe, the United States and its closest allies drew a line in the face of Soviet expansionism and said: No further. Despite war weariness and the steep task of reconstruction, the North Atlantic founders pooled their military power and political determination as well as risked a third World War in Europe’s defense. The countries that joined were hardly all first-rate military powers, economic dynamos, or stable democracies—manywere politically unstable, militarily sapped, and economically broken. Several, such as Portugal and Spain, were military dictatorships. The principal continental combatants in World War II—Germany, France, and Italy—were quite literally ruined by the war and took decades to recover. Yet the United States and the other original NATO members didn’t quibble interminably over the vagaries of a threatened partner’s democratic credentials or its uptake of various technical or military reforms, and they generally accepted European states that sought Washington’s protection and a Western orientation. This wasn’t because of Western indifference to democracy but rather a recognition that democratization under the shadow of an imminent Soviet threat was essentially impossible and that a country swallowed by Moscow’s imperial agenda had no chance of true self-determination—much less democracy. Speaking of NATO’s purpose, then-U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson described it as “designed to contribute to thestability and well-being of the member nations by removing the haunting sense of insecurity” posed by Soviet expansionism. It took time, but the strategy paid off. Under NATO and the United States’ nuclear umbrella, great-power war was avoided, Europe democratized and prospered, and the Soviet Union and its brand of colonialism was dismantled, freeing tens of millions of people. With Russia again in the throes of despotism and expansionist militarism, the conditions that accompanied NATO’s founding are all too familiar. Russian aggression in the heart of Europe is an incontrovertible reality—as Ukraine’s blood-soaked lands so clearly attest—and there is no reason to believe or expect Moscow to stop until and unless it is stopped. NATO must meet the moment. Dithering over peacetime technicalities defi es NATO’s original purpose to secure Europefrom the specter of Moscow’s violently imperial agenda. This is not a return to the Cold War, but it is no less a civilizational struggle against a military dictatorship in Moscow. This threat is particularly plain and present for the millions of Ukrainians and Georgians who have had no choice but to suffer on the wrong side of the geopolitical train tracks. NATO should return to its roots and fling open its doors to all those in Europe at risk of Russia’s predations. How can this be done? NATO decisions, including membership, require consensus. Transitioning to a wartime open door policy will require a major shift in thinking. For one, the United States, as the ultimate underwriter of NATO’s military might, should take steps to provide robust security assistance and assurances to threatened partners—such as those promises it has given Finland and Sweden until their accession is complete—and encourage other like-minded allies to do the same. Similarly, NATO handwringing over outstanding territorial disputes—almost always created or supported by Moscow—should officially become a nonissue. Russia should not be rewarded for cultivating and backing violent separatist movements that inoculate the parent countries from NATO accession. If anything, Russian meddling and aggression evinces the necessity of NATO’s protection. This is simple in principle but admittedly difficult in policy amid hot war. How can Ukraine join NATO without triggering a global conflict? First, the United States and its allies can all do more to ensure that Ukraine has military dominance overits own territory and win its war of independence. Mystifying gaps that undermine Western sanctions policies demand attention—such as continued European dependence on Russian energy, U.S. imports of Russian steel, and the growing role of China and other countries in the Middle East, Eurasia, and Asia (including friends and partners) to bypass or ease the impact of international trade sanctions. Likewise, U.S. hesitance over delivering heavy arms and munitions to Ukraine must end. The delivery of U.S. artillery and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) platforms have completely changed the momentum of the conflict in recent weeks; more longer-range munitions and Western fast-jet capabilities could help Ukraine expand the initiative against Russia’s high-mass but low-morale attacking force. Second, the United States could consider extending its nuclear umbrella over Ukraine to erase Russia’s nuclear advantage and any temptation it may have to use nuclear weapons as Russian conventional losses mount. Doing so would only be a stronger and clearer statement of current U.S. policy that Russia’s use of weapons of mass destruction against Ukraine would be “completely unacceptable” and “entail severe consequences,” as U.S. President Joe Biden has already said. Against such a horrifying possibility, the West could stand to be much clearer on the evident downsides of such a strategy, which would itself violate Russian nuclear doctrine. And third, the United States can and should have discussions about certain security guarantees for free areas of Ukraine, such as via the provision of the most advanced Western arms or direct Western air defense coverage. For Georgia, and even for a country like Moldova should it so choose, it is even clearer: Provide support and security guarantees over non-occupied regions. Finally, democratic principles should remain a core requirement for NATO. Although the exigencies of the moment maynot allow the luxury of waiting for perfect democratization to develop before entry, NATO can and should create more robust and independent internal mechanisms to monitor and highlight vulnerabilities, advise and assist all members with undertaking difficult reforms, and hold members accountable for sustained and significant democratic backsliding. As Ukraine’s brave people fight for survival and every inch of their homeland against Russia’s overwhelming and genocidal war, it is impossible not to wonder what might have been had NATO understood in 2008 in Bucharest or in 2014 in Wales what horrors could have been prevented if Ukraine had been spirited into the alliance, along with Georgia. Ukraine will win this war, and Russia will lose—but in many ways, it is already too late for Ukraine and Georgia, having been so thoroughly and persistently victimized by Russian aggression. Yet each moment they are left to fend for themselves only compounds the error—and the shame.

  • US Soldier Who Voluntarily Fought in Ukraine Says Hardest Days of War to Come

    A U.S. Army veteran who independently and voluntarily fought in Ukraine warned on Thursday that the hardest days of fighting the war are still to come, as the Russian military tightens its control over territory in the eastern part of the country.  Retired U.S. Army Staff Sgt. James Vasquez, who has returned from combat in the country but plans to go back, told the congressional Helsinki Commission during a briefing that while the Ukrainian military is better off now with increased foreign support, the most difficult fighting lay ahead for soldiers. “We have much more support now, and we have the weapons and gear that we need to be able to fight properly,” Vasquez said to the panel. “The fight’s harder than it was when I left. And that was hard fighting when I left.”  Vasquez shared moving and oftentimes difficult details of his time in Ukraine at the hearing, alongside retired U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Col. Rip Rawlings, who is providing logistical support to the Ukrainian military through he and Vasquez’ foundation, Ripley’s Heroes. Vasquez, who has gained a social media following through the videos he shares from the battle’s front lines, said he has “pretty much sold everything I owned” so he can return to the fight in Ukraine. Vasquez explained the evolution of Ukrainian combatants that he witnessed, saying when he arrived the soldiers were fighting “primitively” but then saw them turn into battle-tested warriors. “I was fighting with guys who had a red T-shirt on and sneakers,” said Vasquez. “We were going into battle with white Toyota Camrys with Javelin (missiles) in the back.” But as the fighters have grown more sophisticated, and weapons and gear has rolled in from other countries, Vasquez and Rawlings both warned that the fighting situation was fragile and said Ukraine needs continued support from allies. “We need more, they need more (weapons),” Rawlings said. “We are at a very tenuous and fragile point. This war could go in any direction, very unfortunately.” Rawlings also urged lawmakers to amend export controls that do not allow Americans to send certain military equipment, including certain body armor, to Ukraine. “It is the largest single obstacle that we face,” Rawlings said. “The biggest issue that we have is that a U.S. citizen can go purchase a set of level three body armor, but you cannot purchase it and give it to a Ukrainian.” Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) lauded the veterans for their decision to volunteer in the Ukrainian conflict at the briefing.  “Foreign fighters have actually come in to heroically volunteer and are enduring intense combat conditions and witnessing the gross human rights violations perpetrated by (Vladimir) Putin.”

  • Switzerland, Playground of Russian Oligarchs, Emerges as Sanctions Weak Link

    ZUG, Switzerland—After Switzerland said in February it was joining European Union sanctions against Russian oligarchs, this quiet Alpine getaway seemed like an obvious place to hunt for targets. The streets are clustered with the offices of companies founded by Russia’s wealthiest men, along with the headquarters for landmark natural-gas pipelines Nord Stream 1 and 2 and the energy-trading department of Gazprom PJSC. So many Russian billionaires have homes or businesses here that the local opposition party had begun taking sightseers on an Oligarch’s Tour. Swiss newspapers nicknamed Zug “Little Moscow” and joked that local leaders wanted to build a Kremlin wall around the town. It didn’t seem so easy to the six local officials charged with helping implement sanctions. Working from a fifth-floor conference room, the team had a hard time identifying homes or local businesses officially owned by any of the hundreds of Russian oligarchs on the Swiss government’s list of sanctioned people. They struggled with Cyrillic names and often couldn’t make sense of the 300-page list, said Heinz Tännler, the financial director for the Canton, or state, of Zug. They also struggled with the implications for the local economy, added Mr. Tännler, who worries that sanctions have jeopardized his canton’s reputation as a safe place for foreign investment. “This is a very difficult time, especially for the Canton of Zug,” he said. In the end, the officials found exactly one company out of the roughly 30,000 registered in Zug that they believed was owned or controlled by a sanctioned individual. Zug’s slow start is emblematic of the country as a whole. Switzerland has pledged to punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. So far, that promise hasn’t triggered much action against Russian companies doing business there, bolstering concerns in world capitals that the Alpine financial hub isn’t doing enough to forestall the Kremlin and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s allies. Eighty percent of Russia’s commodities are traded through Switzerland, mostly through Zug and the lakeside city of Geneva. Swiss banks manage an estimated $150 billion for Russian clients, according to the country’s banking association. Thirty-two of the oligarchs closest to Mr. Putin have property, bank accounts or businesses in Switzerland, according to Zurich-based transparency group Public Eye. In the four months since Swiss authorities began sanctions, $6.8 billion in Russian financial assets have been frozen, alongside 15 homes and properties, according to the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, or SECO. By contrast, EU countries have collectively frozen $14 billion in alleged oligarch assets spanning funds, boats, helicopters and real estate, in addition to over $20 billion in Russian central-bank reserves. EU countries have also blocked around $200 billion in financial transactions. Authorities on the U.K. island of Jersey alone froze over $7 billion in assets they said are linked to oligarch Roman Abramovich, who didn’t respond to requests for comment. U.S. senators have privately petitioned Swiss officials to do more to locate Russian money and property. “Instead of enabling Russia’s abuse of the global financial system, they should stand against it,” said Sen. Roger Wicker (R., Miss.), chair of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation, which promotes human rights, military security and economic cooperation. Switzerland’s government has rejected that kind of criticism, stressing that its adoption of EU sanctions marks a historic shift and that it is doing everything possible to hunt down blacklisted assets. “It is clear that the sheer volume of the sanctions against Russia and Belarus, as well as the speed with which they were adopted, creates certain challenges for implementing authorities, in Switzerland and elsewhere,” said a SECO spokeswoman. Western sanctions have increasingly been used to squeeze Russia since 2014, when it annexed Crimea. Since then, Mr. Putin and a tight circle of allies have been exploiting gaps in the global financial system to evade blacklists and hide wealth overseas. Despite Switzerland’s status as a global financial hub, the country’s regulators are hamstrung by limited resources—SECO had just 10 officials fully dedicated to sanctions until recently, when the government hired five more. Their work is also frustrated by an old structural problem: The business of registering companies remains a hive of secrecy, making it difficult to identify ultimate ownership of assets, according to Western diplomats. Swiss bankers and transparency campaigners say billions of dollars of Russian clients’ assets have been transferred to the names of spouses and children in recent years—a phenomenon that accelerated in the run-up to the war, they say. The Gateway The Putin regime’s presence in Zug can be traced to the early days of his presidency, and a ceremony in the canton’s sprawling art nouveau palace, Theatre Casino. While Russia’s military was bombing the restive republic of Chechnya, Mr. Putin was awarded the 2002 “Zug Peace Prize” by the Nuclear Disarmament Forum, an organization of influential local businessmen that has since disbanded. The meeting, attended by business and political leaders close to the Kremlin and serenaded by the Russian National Orchestra, heralded the flourishing of Russian commodity trading in the town, according to local politicians. Many oligarchs have businesses in Zug that remain untouched by sanctions. They include Mr. Abramovich, the largest shareholder of Evraz PLC, a Russian steelmaker and mining company that has a trading arm in the canton. Evraz was sanctioned in the U.K., where it traded on the London Stock Exchange, but hasn’t been sanctioned in Switzerland or the EU, even though Mr. Abramovich has. Not far from Zug, in Winterthur, is the headquarters of Sulzer AG , an engineering company that is 48.8%-owned by Russian billionaire Viktor Vekselberg, who is sanctioned by the U.S. and the U.K. When Poland sanctioned Sulzer’s operations, the Swiss embassy in Warsaw unsuccessfully lobbied the Polish government to reverse the move, according to a Polish government official and the Swiss department of foreign affairs. Sulzer said Poland’s decision was wrong given that Mr. Vekselberg is just a minority shareholder and neither owns nor controls the company. Sulzer isn’t sanctioned anywhere else, a spokesman said. Representatives for Mr. Abramovich and Evraz didn’t reply to requests for comment. The SECO spokeswoman said the agency is in close contact with the U.K. authorities about sanctions, but “is not bound by their assessment.” A spokesman for the department of foreign affairs said that under Swiss law the government can assist Swiss companies abroad, and that sanctioning Sulzer’s Polish subsidiaries threatened jobs and hurt Sulzer clients. U.S. and European officials say they are counting on the Swiss government to find which companies and homes in Switzerland belong to sanctioned Russian oligarchs and freeze them. Switzerland’s history of financial secrecy, enshrined in its law, can make it exceedingly difficult to identify who owns what. Under Swiss legal precedent, lawyers can still open a company on behalf of a client and claim attorney-client privilege to block authorities from uncovering that person’s identity. That, officials say, hinders them from finding more companies whose accounts should be frozen under sanctions. It is also an obstacle for banks with small compliance teams. Swiss business registries don’t require firms to list true owners, which are often hidden by opaque companies in Switzerland held by trusts in financial havens, a loophole exploited by businessmen from Russia and elsewhere eager to mask the true ownership of their assets, according to Swiss opposition politicians and advocates for financial reform. “A Swiss lawyer hides the name of the beneficial owner in his vault, and there’s no way the Swiss authorities can get to the name,” said Mark Pieth, a former head of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s bribery division now at the Basel Institute on Governance. “The government has deliberately tied its own hands behind its back.” EuroChem Trusts came into play earlier this year when Switzerland, following the EU’s lead, sanctioned Andrey Melnichenko, one of Russia’s richest oligarchs and a longtime Swiss resident. On March 9, the EU added Mr. Melnichenko’s name—No. 721—to its blacklist, describing him as part of the “closest circle of Vladimir Putin ” and involved in businesses vital to the government. It mentioned a meeting he attended in Moscow with Mr. Putin in the first hours of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, along with 35 other oligarchs. In Italy, police seized his sailing yacht, the world’s largest. Left untouched was EuroChem AG, a company founded by Mr. Melnichenko in 2001 that grew into one of the world’s top producers of fertilizer, with revenue last year of $10.2 billion. Based in a small glass tower in Zug nicknamed the Dallas Building, the company is deeply entwined in the supply chains of Europe’s largest chemical giants. The day before the sanctions were announced, the tycoon disclaimed his interest in a Cyprus trust that held the company, according to a document signed by EuroChem’s chief financial officer. That left Mr. Melnichenko’s wife, Aleksandra, a former Serbian pop star, as the trust’s sole beneficiary. “Given that Mr. Melnichenko no longer owns, holds or controls any funds and economic resources of EuroChem Group…neither EuroChem Group nor any member of EuroChem Group are subject to EU asset freeze measures,” stated a document viewed by The Wall Street Journal. EuroChem lawyers also wrote to SECO that the company wouldn’t provide economic resources to Mr. Melnichenko or pay dividends to his wife. On March 28, SECO rendered its judgment: EuroChem didn’t need to have its assets or bank accounts frozen. Officials in Zug followed suit. Mr. Tännler, the canton’s financial director, bridled at criticism that local officials aren’t looking hard enough. “I think people know that we did a good job, that we did what we can do,” he said. He washed his hands of the EuroChem decision. “SECO made a determination that EuroChem is clean,” Mr. Tännler said. The European Commission in June countered that decision, ruling that Ms. Melnichenko was unduly benefitting from her husband and should be sanctioned. Switzerland then followed suit, blacklisting her but leaving EuroChem untouched. Credit Suisse, which needs to answer to tougher U.S. regulators because of its U.S. dollar business, has frozen the accounts EuroChem held at the bank. A spokesman for the couple said Mr. Melnichenko considers the sanctions against him unjust. “The formal justifications are nonsense,” said the spokesman, who denied that Mr. Melnichenko is a member of Mr. Putin’s inner circle or provides substantial revenue to the Russian government. Ms. Melnichenko has appealed to the Council of the European Union, saying the sanctions against her have complicated EuroChem’s ability to sell fertilizer, “leading to the famine and death of millions of people.”

  • Declare Putin’s War Genocide

    A bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers introduced a resolution characterizing Russia’s actions in Ukraine as an act of genocide on Friday.  A draft of the resolution, seen by Foreign Policy, argues that atrocities committed by Russian troops in Ukraine, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians, the direct targeting of maternity hospitals and medical facilities, and the forcible transfer of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to Russia and Russian-held territory meet the criteria laid out in Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  Congressional resolutions are commonly used by lawmakers to express strongly held sentiments by members of the House of Representatives or Senate. Although the resolution is not legally binding, it sends a strong message of condemnation of Russia’s actions and indicates ongoing efforts by members of Congress to provide continued support to Ukraine beyond military aid.  In April, U.S. President Joe Biden characterized Russian atrocities in Ukraine as an act of genocide. “We’ll let the lawyers decide internationally whether or not it qualifies, but it sure seems that way to me,” he said, speaking to reporters in Iowa. Biden’s remarks were echoed by the Canadian and British prime ministers while French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declined to use the term, underscoring long-standing differences within the international community as to what constitutes genocide.  As a crime, genocide is distinct from other mass atrocities, and it is defined in the United Nation Genocide Convention as “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.” Since 1989, the U.S. State Department has recognized eight genocides, most recently declaring attacks on the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar as genocide. U.S. designations of genocide can take years of gathering and analyzing evidence, and senior Biden administration officials noted that the president’s remarks in April did not constitute a formal U.S. policy shift. Arguing that events in Ukraine could constitute genocide, the resolution points to statements made in Russian state media and by senior officials, including by Russian President Vladimir Putin, that undermine Ukrainian statehood and sovereignty; the congressional resolution alleges that the atrocities were carried out with a specific purpose. Proving that the crimes are carried out with deliberate genocidal intent can often be difficult to prove in law.  A number of Russian soldiers and units—which were accused of committing war crimes in the Kyiv suburb of Bucha, specifically torture, rape, and summary executions of civilians—were awarded in April by Putin, who designated the 64th Motor Rifle Brigade as Guards and praised them for their “mass heroism and valor, tenacity, and courage.” The resolution is set to be introduced by Democratic Rep. Steve Cohen and is expected to be co-sponsored by a bipartisan group of House members who sit on the Helsinki Commission, an independent U.S. government agency tasked with promoting human rights and security in Europe. In April, the commission wrote to the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to endorse a declaration passed by the Ukrainian parliament characterizing Russia’s actions as genocide and urging the assembly to pass a similar resolution.

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