On Jan. 26, the State Department announced further sanctions against the Wagner Group and a number of Wagner-related entities. The Treasury Department designated Wagner as a transnational criminal organization for an ongoing pattern of serious criminal activity, including mass executions, rape, child abductions, and physical abuse in the Central African Republic, or CAR, and Mali. It also sanctioned Wagner for the violent targeting of women and children, abductions, forced displacements, and attacks on schools, hospitals and religious sites in CAR. In December, Secretary of State Antony Blinken designated Wagner as an Entity of Particular Concern under the International Religious Freedom Act for its indiscriminate targeting and killing of members of minority religious groups in CAR, and the Commerce Department restricted Wagner Group’s access to certain foreign-produced items (primarily but not exclusively weapons and munitions) that use U.S. technology. Wagner was first sanctioned by the Treasury Department in 2017 for its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. These sanctions are a step forward in dealing with the international carnage that Wagner has wrought since its creation in 2014. They have serious limitations, however, because all require a nexus with the United States. While they limit financial transactions with U.S. persons and entities, and U.S. citizens are subject to criminal prosecution for violations of these sanctions, they do not touch upon Wagner’s interaction with the rest of the world. If the Biden administration wants to impose maximum pressure on Wagner, it will designate it as a foreign terrorist organization, or FTO. This would bring into full force America’s material support to terrorism statutes and would put anyone, anywhere in the world, who provides support to Wagner at the same legal risk as someone who provides material support to the Islamic State or al Qaeda. Instead, Wagner has been subject to the same sanctions under a variety of names: as an arm of the Russian military; as a suppressor of religious freedom; and now as a transnational criminal organization. None of these invokes the material support to terrorism statutes, and therefore none significantly hinder Wagner’s foreign operations. Wagner is a terrorist problem, not a criminal problem — a distinction with a difference. Its use of terror against civilians in Syria and Africa is to further the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals as well as for its own material gain. Wagner has secured natural gas resources in Syria and mineral resources in Africa, which helps the Kremlin avoid international sanctions and finance its war in Ukraine. It props up dictators while its terror tactics destabilize large swaths of Africa’s Sahel region by increasing support for local insurgent groups. Sudan’s 2021 military coup, which overthrew a transitional civilian government, was instigated in part to allow Wagner’s gold smuggling to Russia to continue. These are the acts of a terrorist organization, not a criminal gang. One of the lessons of 9/11 is that terrorism must be treated as the global threat it is, not merely as a law enforcement problem. Hezbollah counterfeits U.S. currency and al Qaeda smuggles drugs with the Taliban, but they are designated as FTOs because their terror supports political goals that threaten the security of the United States, its allies and its partners. For the secretary of state to designate an entity as an FTO, it must be foreign and engage in terrorism, and the terrorism must threaten the security of the United States or its nationals. Wagner meets these criteria; since it emulates the Islamic State in its actions, it should be treated in the same manner. The administration may believe that an FTO designation would force it to list Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, or SST, since Wagner is its agent. However, nothing in U.S. law would compel the secretary to make such a designation. We have argued elsewhere that declaring Russia an SST would be counterproductive by severing lines of communication necessary to end the war in Ukraine. The use of material support to terrorism statutes to destroy Wagner’s utility to the Kremlin and end its gold smuggling operations would pressure the Kremlin by removing a valuable asset. This approach is gathering support in Congress. Earlier this year, the Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries (HARM) Act was introduced in both the House and Senate with bipartisan support. This act would direct the secretary of state to designate Wagner and its affiliates as an FTO, bringing the full power of U.S. law into play against Wagner on a global basis. But we need not wait for the bill’s passage to take action. We encourage the secretary to act under the authorities that already exist so that U.S. sanctions against Wagner will include the most powerful legal tools that allow us to sanction Wagner and its supporters as we have sanctioned al Qaeda.

On Jan. 26, the State Department announced further sanctions against the Wagner Group and a number of Wagner-related entities. The Treasury Department designated Wagner as a transnational criminal organization for an ongoing pattern of serious criminal activity, including mass executions, rape, child abductions, and physical abuse in the Central African Republic, or CAR, and Mali. It also sanctioned Wagner for the violent targeting of women and children, abductions, forced displacements, and attacks on schools, hospitals and religious sites in CAR. In December, Secretary of State Antony Blinken designated Wagner as an Entity of Particular Concern under the International Religious Freedom Act for its indiscriminate targeting and killing of members of minority religious groups in CAR, and the Commerce Department restricted Wagner Group’s access to certain foreign-produced items (primarily but not exclusively weapons and munitions) that use U.S. technology. Wagner was first sanctioned by the Treasury Department in 2017 for its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. These sanctions are a step forward in dealing with the international carnage that Wagner has wrought since its creation in 2014. They have serious limitations, however, because all require a nexus with the United States. While they limit financial transactions with U.S. persons and entities, and U.S. citizens are subject to criminal prosecution for violations of these sanctions, they do not touch upon Wagner’s interaction with the rest of the world. If the Biden administration wants to impose maximum pressure on Wagner, it will designate it as a foreign terrorist organization, or FTO. This would bring into full force America’s material support to terrorism statutes and would put anyone, anywhere in the world, who provides support to Wagner at the same legal risk as someone who provides material support to the Islamic State or al Qaeda. Instead, Wagner has been subject to the same sanctions under a variety of names: as an arm of the Russian military; as a suppressor of religious freedom; and now as a transnational criminal organization. None of these invokes the material support to terrorism statutes, and therefore none significantly hinder Wagner’s foreign operations. Wagner is a terrorist problem, not a criminal problem — a distinction with a difference. Its use of terror against civilians in Syria and Africa is to further the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals as well as for its own material gain. Wagner has secured natural gas resources in Syria and mineral resources in Africa, which helps the Kremlin avoid international sanctions and finance its war in Ukraine. It props up dictators while its terror tactics destabilize large swaths of Africa’s Sahel region by increasing support for local insurgent groups. Sudan’s 2021 military coup, which overthrew a transitional civilian government, was instigated in part to allow Wagner’s gold smuggling to Russia to continue. These are the acts of a terrorist organization, not a criminal gang. One of the lessons of 9/11 is that terrorism must be treated as the global threat it is, not merely as a law enforcement problem. Hezbollah counterfeits U.S. currency and al Qaeda smuggles drugs with the Taliban, but they are designated as FTOs because their terror supports political goals that threaten the security of the United States, its allies and its partners. For the secretary of state to designate an entity as an FTO, it must be foreign and engage in terrorism, and the terrorism must threaten the security of the United States or its nationals. Wagner meets these criteria; since it emulates the Islamic State in its actions, it should be treated in the same manner. The administration may believe that an FTO designation would force it to list Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, or SST, since Wagner is its agent. However, nothing in U.S. law would compel the secretary to make such a designation. We have argued elsewhere that declaring Russia an SST would be counterproductive by severing lines of communication necessary to end the war in Ukraine. The use of material support to terrorism statutes to destroy Wagner’s utility to the Kremlin and end its gold smuggling operations would pressure the Kremlin by removing a valuable asset. This approach is gathering support in Congress. Earlier this year, the Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries (HARM) Act was introduced in both the House and Senate with bipartisan support. This act would direct the secretary of state to designate Wagner and its affiliates as an FTO, bringing the full power of U.S. law into play against Wagner on a global basis. But we need not wait for the bill’s passage to take action. We encourage the secretary to act under the authorities that already exist so that U.S. sanctions against Wagner will include the most powerful legal tools that allow us to sanction Wagner and its supporters as we have sanctioned al Qaeda.

On Jan. 26, the State Department announced further sanctions against the Wagner Group and a number of Wagner-related entities. The Treasury Department designated Wagner as a transnational criminal organization for an ongoing pattern of serious criminal activity, including mass executions, rape, child abductions, and physical abuse in the Central African Republic, or CAR, and Mali. It also sanctioned Wagner for the violent targeting of women and children, abductions, forced displacements, and attacks on schools, hospitals and religious sites in CAR. In December, Secretary of State Antony Blinken designated Wagner as an Entity of Particular Concern under the International Religious Freedom Act for its indiscriminate targeting and killing of members of minority religious groups in CAR, and the Commerce Department restricted Wagner Group’s access to certain foreign-produced items (primarily but not exclusively weapons and munitions) that use U.S. technology. Wagner was first sanctioned by the Treasury Department in 2017 for its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. These sanctions are a step forward in dealing with the international carnage that Wagner has wrought since its creation in 2014. They have serious limitations, however, because all require a nexus with the United States. While they limit financial transactions with U.S. persons and entities, and U.S. citizens are subject to criminal prosecution for violations of these sanctions, they do not touch upon Wagner’s interaction with the rest of the world. If the Biden administration wants to impose maximum pressure on Wagner, it will designate it as a foreign terrorist organization, or FTO. This would bring into full force America’s material support to terrorism statutes and would put anyone, anywhere in the world, who provides support to Wagner at the same legal risk as someone who provides material support to the Islamic State or al Qaeda. Instead, Wagner has been subject to the same sanctions under a variety of names: as an arm of the Russian military; as a suppressor of religious freedom; and now as a transnational criminal organization. None of these invokes the material support to terrorism statutes, and therefore none significantly hinder Wagner’s foreign operations. Wagner is a terrorist problem, not a criminal problem — a distinction with a difference. Its use of terror against civilians in Syria and Africa is to further the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals as well as for its own material gain. Wagner has secured natural gas resources in Syria and mineral resources in Africa, which helps the Kremlin avoid international sanctions and finance its war in Ukraine. It props up dictators while its terror tactics destabilize large swaths of Africa’s Sahel region by increasing support for local insurgent groups. Sudan’s 2021 military coup, which overthrew a transitional civilian government, was instigated in part to allow Wagner’s gold smuggling to Russia to continue. These are the acts of a terrorist organization, not a criminal gang. One of the lessons of 9/11 is that terrorism must be treated as the global threat it is, not merely as a law enforcement problem. Hezbollah counterfeits U.S. currency and al Qaeda smuggles drugs with the Taliban, but they are designated as FTOs because their terror supports political goals that threaten the security of the United States, its allies and its partners. For the secretary of state to designate an entity as an FTO, it must be foreign and engage in terrorism, and the terrorism must threaten the security of the United States or its nationals. Wagner meets these criteria; since it emulates the Islamic State in its actions, it should be treated in the same manner. The administration may believe that an FTO designation would force it to list Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, or SST, since Wagner is its agent. However, nothing in U.S. law would compel the secretary to make such a designation. We have argued elsewhere that declaring Russia an SST would be counterproductive by severing lines of communication necessary to end the war in Ukraine. The use of material support to terrorism statutes to destroy Wagner’s utility to the Kremlin and end its gold smuggling operations would pressure the Kremlin by removing a valuable asset. This approach is gathering support in Congress. Earlier this year, the Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries (HARM) Act was introduced in both the House and Senate with bipartisan support. This act would direct the secretary of state to designate Wagner and its affiliates as an FTO, bringing the full power of U.S. law into play against Wagner on a global basis. But we need not wait for the bill’s passage to take action. We encourage the secretary to act under the authorities that already exist so that U.S. sanctions against Wagner will include the most powerful legal tools that allow us to sanction Wagner and its supporters as we have sanctioned al Qaeda.

A fight is brewing between Congress and President Biden over whether to designate as a terrorist organization the private Russian military company Wagner, which is on the front lines of aggression against Ukraine and accused of heinous atrocities there and across the world. While the Biden administration has sanctioned the Wagner group as a global criminal organization, lawmakers are pushing the State Department to go further by imposing the foreign terrorist designation.  The split underscores a long-running tension: Congress has criticized the Biden administration as slow-walking its support for Ukraine, while the administration says it is managing a delicate escalation ladder and safeguarding against potential, negative blowback. “We’ve seen that again and again in terms of this support for the Ukrainians and this war, where Congress has been out ahead of the White House,” Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told The Hill. “It’s been true since Russia invaded Ukraine. I remember in 2014 supporting lethal weapons for Ukraine, and the White House refused to support that. I don’t see this as unusual. I hope the administration and the State Department comes on board.” Shaheen is a sponsor, along with six other Democratic and Republican senators, of legislation called the Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries (HARM) Act, which would force the State Department to label Wagner as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Supporters of the FTO designation say it imposes significantly more costs on Wagner compared to its current label as a transnational criminal organization. The FTO designation would increase U.S. resources to target and disrupt Wagner’s activities, serve as a strong deterrent against people or governments doing business with the group and open new pathways for legal action.  “This would be a game changer,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), ranking member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and one of the co-sponsors of the bill.  The National Security Council and the State Department did not respond to questions from The Hill over its specific issues with labeling Wagner an FTO.  Complications with Wagner FTO label But a congressional aide, requesting anonymity to discuss sensitive conversations, told The Hill that the administration opposes the legislation over concerns it could impede U.S. efforts to convince and work with African nations to end their associations with or dependency on Wagner. Expert analyses have tied the Wagner group’s activities to countries including Sudan, Libya, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Chad. The private security company is often used as a supplement force for those countries’ weak militaries.  “[The State Department] is concerned that if suddenly the FTO designation lands on Wagner, that those governments, where there’s various officials that deal with them [Wagner], that they would all, immediately be blocked from travel to the United States and have their assets seized for coming into contact with the FTO. So that’s the nature of their concern,” the aide said. “They claim they’re not opposed to it on Ukraine grounds, but they’re opposed to it on Africa grounds.”  But supporters of the HARM bill say passing the legislation sends an important political signal while also giving the president authority to delay carrying out the letter of the law. The bill text includes an authority for the president to waive the sanctions requirements over national security concerns. “The messaging that comes from passing a bill like this, I think, is valuable and we would want that. I think it can have both worlds,” the aide said. And supporters of the FTO designation say that the Wagner group, in particular, fulfills criteria separate from the transnational criminal organization label. Wagner’s close ties to the Kremlin make it more than just a criminal organization operating for profit, as opposed to other transnational criminal groups like drug cartels in Central and South America. Wagner is “ostensibly a private outfit, but actually functions as an arm proxy of the Kremlin,” Justyna Gudzowska, a former Treasury sanctions official, testified to lawmakers Thursday during a hearing of the Helsinki Commission.  Gudzowska, the director of illicit financing at the investigative and policy organization The Sentry, said that the organization has tracked Wagner spending money in the Central African Republican on “sophisticated Hollywood-style propaganda glorifying Russia.” This “makes it clear that the group is not there just for economic spoils, but also to project Russian power abroad,” she told lawmakers.  Still, Gudzowska also warned that an FTO designation on Wagner could harm humanitarian groups working in these countries, another unintended consequence of such a designation, and called for lawmakers to ensure such issues “are properly mitigated.” What has Wagner allegedly done? The alleged atrocities committed by the Wagner group make up a long list and are difficult to stomach. In Ukraine, the Wagner group is accused of employing the tactic of human wave attacks to overwhelm front-line positions, throwing bodies to be killed.  Wagner forces are also accused of carrying out the rape, torture and massacre of civilians in Bucha, Ukraine, in March 2022. In countries in Africa, Gudzowska testified bluntly that “Wagner targets civilians,” and said that Wagner forces and Wagner-trained Central African soldiers use terror as a weapon against the civilian population. “They have committed mass rape, torture, forced disappearance and dislocation, and they have killed thousands of civilians,” Gudzowska said. Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who is focused on Wagner atrocities in Africa and has talked with officials in Ukraine about the group’s atrocities, said he is supportive of labeling the group as an FTO but is not committed to any one piece of legislation. “I am trying to make sure that I understand what the consequences might be,” he told The Hill. “But I think this is something we need to move on.” A move to change Russia’s status Supporters of the FTO designation also hope it lays the groundwork for labeling Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, a move the Biden administration has also resisted over concerns for unintended consequences, like making it harder to move grain out of Ukraine while it is under a Russian naval blockade.  Graham had earlier tried to work with the administration on legislation to label Russia as an “aggressor state,” in a compromise over the state sponsor of terrorism designation, but that fell apart. “I’ve worked with the administration — how can you say Russia’s committing crimes against humanity and you won’t label them a state sponsor of terrorism?” Graham told The Hill.  “I don’t like this crime of aggression crap, I want to go to what they are, a state sponsor of terrorism.”  He continued that he is focused on designating Wagner an FTO, followed by becoming “a real vocal, unrelenting force to get Russia labeled as a state sponsor of terrorism.” Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), co-sponsor of the HARM Act and co-sponsor of the “Aggressor” legislation with Graham, agreed that designating Wagner an FTO “could help lead to” designating Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism. Blumenthal expressed confidence that the HARM Act would be brought to the Senate floor for a vote in a “week or two,” and suggested it could bypass the normal committee procedure, although his colleagues didn’t entirely agree.  “I don’t know about not going through committee, but I don’t think it will have much problem getting through there either,” Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), co-sponsor of the bill and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where the bill has been referred.  “I think Wagner at this point is the definition of a Foreign Terrorist Organization and they just happen to operate for profit.” Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he supported designating Wagner an FTO but said he had not seen the legislation.   The congressional aide who spoke with The Hill said that the legislation is unlikely to move quickly, facing a difficult, uphill battle by nature of Senate procedures – between challenges to getting it on the calendar for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in general, and the chance the Banking Committee may exercise jurisdiction because of the sanctions piece of the legislation. “Also, marking something up in the committee or passing it on the Senate floor does not immediately mean it’s a law that would be implemented,” the aide said. “And particularly because the administration doesn’t want it, it could disappear, in the dark of night, on a [National Defense Authorization Act] discussion next December.” Graham, however, was upbeat and said Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) appeared to be on board. Schumer’s office did not return a request for comment.  “I talked to Sen. Schumer, he said he thought it was a good idea … I think Sen. Schumer is going to make it happen,” he said.  

It’s clearly an attack on Georgia’s EuroAtlantic choice, an attack on Georgia’s democracy, an attack on Georgia’s strategic partnerships with the West, and an attack on the Georgia and US bilateral relationship. It’s also quite self-evidently, an expression of deference to Moscow and an alignment with Russian interests in the region, – CSCE Senior Policy Advisor Michael Hikari Cecire tells RFE/RL’s Georgian Service of the controversial law that was set to be imposed this week. “Legislation like this is so painfully undemocratic,” he notes. “What it does is signal the ruling party’s willingness to undermine and attack all elements, all institutional edifices, of the remnants of Georgia democracy. It’s not just the law itself which is abysmal, it’s really an assault on the last redoubt of independent thought in Georgian society, and that’s civil society and the media. It also signals a willingness to turn the power of the state against any other forms of independent or democratic expression.” Michael Hikari Cecire joined the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), where he focuses on the South Caucasus and Black Sea regional affairs, as a senior policy advisor, in 2021. Previously, he was an analyst at the Congressional Research Service, before that serving as a policy advisor, strategic researcher, and Eurasia regional analyst supporting the Department of Defense and other US government agencies. We sat down with him to discuss the foreign agents bills the Georgian Dream ruling party were set to put into force this week. The interview took place before the party offered to withdraw the bills following 48 hours of protest and rioting. One of the arguments we’ve heard for those supporting these bills is the very same argument that Russia used back in 2012 to introduce a similar legislation: “Well, if the US has it, why can’t we?” What do you think of these comparisons? Does the US having FARA justify Georgia doing what it’s doing? What is clear is that the Georgian Dream political leadership isn’t even bothering to offer their own independent, even bad faith, arguments for this law. They are just aping Russian arguments that were made about their law, and Azerbaijani arguments about their derivative law, demonstrating their fealty to Moscow and a lack of independent thought even to create their own separate narrative. It’s very sad to watch that play out. I don’t think most Georgians are buying it, though, because it’s so blatant and so unoriginal. And for the record, I think it is worth saying that this has nothing to do with FARA, which is a very narrow bit of legislation and really only covers those who are working for and on behalf of foreign governments and foreign political parties. It’s really speaking to lobbyists in particular, to represent these interests, and has nothing to do for the most part with civil society or the media. There is a sense in society that, should this law pass, it would merely be the start of a path to somewhere bad. Where does that path lead? Crossing that line is an opening to other sorts of law or actions that can really radically transform Georgia from an imperfect but vibrant and pluralistic democracy, into a fully autocratic and perhaps even authoritarian country, and one in league with Russia. And as such, because Russia has no allies and only vassals, essentially a tributary to Moscow. We have to make it clear where we stand. And we stand with the Georgian people. We stand with Georgia’s democracy If all your nominal partners in the West, and all of those whose counsel you should be heeding domestically, are telling you not to do it, then that means your partnership and your source of counsel is coming from elsewhere. And that elsewhere is quite evidently Russia. The rationale for this is unclear, and there are a number of potential reasons this may be the case, but none of them are good, and none of them are satisfactory in terms of why Georgia should be going down this route. What can or should the West do about it? I think that we need to do what we are doing, which is to make it very clear that this is an attack on not just our relationship, and not just on the will of the Georgian people, but also an abrupt and deliberate shift into Moscow’s column. It’s clear to me that they don’t care very much about the health or maintenance of Georgia’s democracy, per se, or even about Western integration, and this is also something that could make a lot of things that we previously never would have entertained suddenly possible, such as the elimination of a lot of support for Georgia’s participation in western forums and the travel, prestige and attention that comes with it. It also means potentially that certain people are going to start for the first time genuinely entertaining the thought of what individual sanctions might be considered and on whom they should be levied. The democracy support is not going to end. It may have to change, but it’s not going to end. But you know, the way we support other elements in Georgia, particularly the way we support the state as a whole, may not be justifiable if the state is captured by a party that has become openly pro-Russian. Sanctions would mark a genuine change from the words, however critical, we’ve been hearing for years now, to a whole new phase of actually doing something. What would those actions be? And had the West done it years ago, could this have been prevented? I’ve been very open about the fact that I was not comfortable with sanctions in the past. In the past, sanctions were not the right move, because it seemed to feed into the worst paranoid tendencies of the Georgian Dream leadership; the idea that we are actively trying to undermine them and overthrow them. A lot of those perceptions led us to where we are today. In the past, I was not supportive of sanctions, but actions do have consequences, and this descent into full and open alignment with Moscow is an attack on Georgia’s democracy, and it represents a point we cannot hope for something better to come out of; we can’t hope that carrots and incentives can turn things around by themselves. Instead, we have to make it clear where we stand. And we stand with the Georgian people. We stand with Georgia’s democracy. I think that certain sanctions might be considered- not in the sense that “we are going to do it because we want to,” but to make it very clear that a line has been crossed, or is going to be crossed, beyond which only dark things exist. We certainly shouldn’t be writing off an entire party if they’re genuinely willing to return to their democratic obligations There is this idea that the US has been trying to overthrow Georgian Dream, which is patently false. And there’s this idea that there have even been shadow sanctions related to this Credit Suisse business, which is also patently false. We haven’t done anything. In fact, we’ve been remarkably nuanced and remarkably restrained, in many respects. Would those sanctions include individual sanctions on the big elephant in the room that might well be behind all of this? Everything would be looked at. Absolutely. But one thing that’s important to say is that nothing is irreversible. And as bad as things are, they don’t need to go further. And there is a path back to friendship, cooperation. Even with Georgian Dream? If they are able to demonstrate a genuine willingness to come back and not take this authoritarian term, then why not? But they have to make that part clear; we have to really see it. Under those conditions, the US and Georgia still have a potentially very bright future, and there is a possibility of great bilateral relations. We can go back to that. That’s my hope, but the ball is in their court. Does this not remind you of the West’s incessant attempts to find mutual ground with Putin over the years? No, because I think Russia has never not been an empire. And Russia, in every political expression, has been a violent and poorly oriented empire. In Georgian Dream, there’s clearly a difference in its sliding into subservience to Moscow. But it wasn’t all that long ago that we had a very productive and good relationship with the Georgian Dream government, when Margvelashvili was president and Kvirikashvili was prime minister. It wasn’t perfect, but no country that we work with is perfect. Not even our own. So I don’t think there’s anything necessarily inherent. It’s the same with the UNM – it’s not necessarily an authoritarian party because they took an authoritarian turn at some point. They also did a lot of good, and we also had a great relationship with them at times. We have to be open minded, and we certainly shouldn’t be writing off an entire party if they’re genuinely willing to return to their democratic obligations. But until that happens, it’s all rather academic, unfortunately.

The capacity of a modern economy to produce food and goods for its citizens, and weapons and fuel for its military to project power, are the undeniable twin pillars of global power. Both depend on reasonably priced and readily available energy.  Almost 80% of America’s energy is supplied by oil, gas and coal. Only 20% comes from other sources such as hydropower, nuclear, wind and solar. Even the greenest of economies will need fossil fuel backup when the wind doesn’t blow and the sun doesn’t shine. Wind and solar provide 5% of our total consumption and only 2% of the energy to power some 290 million vehicles. In other words, Americans literally run and fight on fossil fuels.  Russia, despite an economy smaller than Italy’s, has shown it could defy all international norms and invade a neighboring country because it has abundant energy. Weapons, and more weapons. First it was Javelins, then Howitzers, then HIMARS, then anti-missile and drone capability, then longer range ATACMS, then better tanks, now F-16s. Who can tell what the next weapon will be needed to defend against Russian aggression?  Russia has its weapons, too, and they are being paid for by the sale of oil, gas, coal, and fossil fuel-derived products like petrochemicals, fertilizers, etc. Russian missiles, planes, drones, tanks and artillery that shed Ukrainian blood and destroy homes, hospitals and electric-power stations are bought with Russia’s fossil fuel revenues. Energy is Russia’s greatest weapon as it makes possible all the others. Only with such revenues can Russia continue its devastation of Ukraine. A new Russian offensive is brewing, and it too will be financed by its energy revenues.  Russians from Putin on down are talking about a much longer war because they have the revenues to support one and they don’t have to worry about a citizen-taxpayer revolt or getting reelected.  While the U.S. and Europe have restricted their purchases and consumption of Russian energy, it is sold elsewhere. That energy sells at a discount, but Russia is still earning hundreds of billions of dollars from energy sales and thus able to continue its war for as long as Putin wants. In spite of sanctions, Russia sold over $350 worth of fossil fuels in 2022. In the meantime, Germany keeps its fracking ban.  To achieve peace in Europe and avoid potential wars elsewhere, one would think that America and the West would be increasing their own supply of oil, gas and coal and driving down prices on the global market. Such an initiative would also give fence-sitting countries like India and Brazil in the “Global South” alternative sources to substitute for Russian products.  One would also think that the West would understand that its ability to replenish weapons and ammunition being sent to Ukraine and resist aggression, anywhere, like Taiwan for example, is based on production, shipment and fueling with fossil fuels and decidedly not on wind and solar. There will never be an electric tank! And why not drive down the price that Russia receives for its energy while providing the economic and military security derived from fossil fuels? The answer from Europe and now America has been an emphatic “no”. Apparently, addressing the “climate crisis” takes priority over national defense, stopping Russian aggression in Europe, and securing reliable, affordable energy to run modern industrial economies.  The alternative - simultaneously furthering the technology of renewables like wind and solar while building up fossil fuels within an “all of the above” approach is anathema to those who believe religiously that climate change is an existential threat. Ironically, the same people are happy to substitute U.S. fossil fuels with oil from dictatorships like Venezuela, Iran and Saudi Arabia. They don’t seem concerned that wind, solar and battery supply chains run mostly through Communist China.  An “all of the above” energy strategy would make it harder for Russia to finance its war, save Ukrainian lives and mitigate their suffering. It would show that America was willing to challenge Russia’s energy dominance now and into the future.  Sadly, the very opposite is happening. The U.S. is killing energy transport pipelines, curtailing permitting of refineries and natural gas export facilities, suppressing oil and gas leases and worst of all, stifling longer-term investment in the industry. Driven by an all-encompassing determination to limit CO2 emissions, Europe, and now America, have declared war of fossil fuels. Meanwhile, Russia and China burn oil, gas and coal and emit greenhouse gasses at levels that dwarf the West’s.  Governments in Europe and now in America have utterly failed to see that by suppressing fossil fuels, they are ceding enormous power to countries like Russia, and Iran, China who use those very fossil fuels as a way to strengthen themselves and threaten others.  Energy has been weaponized and the West is in full energy-disarmament mode. The West is forfeiting its ability to gain peace through strength with energy being the all-encompassing weapon in national and alliance arsenals.  The Russian people have experienced far greater suffering when total war was being waged on their own territory and millions perished. This time, the Russian people don’t feel the brunt of the war so the pressure to end it is limited and Russia’s vast fossil fuel revenues are available to continue it, perhaps for years.  It is doubtful that that support for Ukraine from potentially fickle Western democracies could last that long. National economies and nations’ militaries still run on fossil fuels. There is no substitute for fossil fuel dominance, even on a longer-term horizon. To believe and act otherwise is suicidal. It’s the real “existential threat”. Don Ritter holds a Science Doctorate from MIT, was a National Academy of Sciences Fellow in the USSR and speaks fluent Russian, served fourteen years on the House of Representatives’ Energy and Commerce and Science and Technology Committees, served as Ranking Member on the Congressional Helsinki Commission, was the founding Co-Chair of the Baltic States-Ukraine Caucus, and created and led the National Environmental Policy Institute after leaving Congress. He is a founder and President & CEO Emeritus of the Afghan American Chamber of Commerce and  a Trustee of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation (VOC) where he Co-Chairs the Museum Capital Campaign.  

VIENNA (AP) — A meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s parliamentary assembly got underway Thursday without the Ukrainian delegation, which described the presence of Russian lawmakers as “an affront.” The two-day meeting of the normally low-profile assembly is coinciding with the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The attendance of the Russian lawmakers has overshadowed the event. Austria granted them visas even though they are under European Union sanctions and despite protests from 20 countries including Britain, France and Canada. Austria’s government said that as host nation it was obliged to grant visas to representatives from all OSCE member nations. Ukraine said its delegates wouldn’t attend if the Russians were present, as did Lithuania. The Vienna-based OSCE, whose 57 members include both Ukraine and Russia, was created during the Cold War as a platform for dialogue between East and West. The group has a wide-ranging mission, including peace, human rights, arms control and other security issues. Austria had a “duty not to slam the door on diplomacy,” Wolfgang Sobotka, the speaker of the Austrian parliament said. “The OSCE, with its inclusive approach and comprehensive security concept, can and above all should be part of a solution to this conflict.” “I do sympathize with the fact that some members find it unbearable to sit in the same room as the aggressors,” the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s president, Margareta Cederfelt, told the opening session. “But for those present today, this is your opportunity to stand up for Ukraine and to confront the lies from the aggressors.” A Slovak delegate read out a statement from the Ukrainian delegation that said “the presence of these warmongers in Vienna is an affront to everything that the OSCE stands for.” “They are not here for genuine dialogue nor for cooperation,” it added. “They are here to spread their propaganda ... they are here to try and justify the war crimes they have committed and desecrate the principles of international law and human decency.” During the session, some delegates walked out as Russian lawmakers spoke. Later Thursday, the head of the U.S. delegation, Sen. Ben Cardin, told reporters in Vienna that the delegation supported excluding the Russians from the meeting. “We strongly believe that the Russian parliamentarians, all of whom have been sanctioned by the United States, the six that are here, should not have been permitted visas to come to this meeting,” Cardin said. The Democratic senator from Maryland said he thought Ukraine’s supporters nonetheless “have strongly isolated Russia at this meeting.” “The debate that took place this morning and will continue through tomorrow has made it clear that Russia must be held accountable for the atrocities that they have committed,” Cardin added. The head of the Ukrainian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly, Mykyta Poturaiev, said during a joint press conference with Cardin that his country has drafted an amendment stating that any OSCE country that starts a war against another member should be suspended from the group. Referring to Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine, Poturaiev said: “Let’s not forget that in Ukraine they’re killing every day the elderly, men, women, children, kids, newly born and even unborn, because a lot of Ukrainian pregnant women were killed together with their unborn children.” ___ Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

PRAGUE -- Two senior U.S. lawmakers say Austria erred by issuing visas to the Russian delegation -- all of whom are under European Union sanctions due to Moscow's invasion of Ukraine -- for this week's meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna, but it's unlikely a massive boycott of the meeting by the group's 57 nations will occur. Austria stirred a controversy ahead of the February 23-24 gathering when it said it would grant travel documents to 18 Russian deputies to attend the winter session of the OSCE's Parliamentary Assembly, which coincides with the first anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops. The move, which Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg said had to be taken as his country was obliged by diplomatic protocol to allow participants from member countries to attend the meeting, immediately raised the ire of many in the OSCE. Ukraine and Lithuania have said they will boycott the meeting and almost half of the OSCE's member nations -- including the United States -- had called for Austria not to issue visas to the Russian lawmakers, with some threatening to avoid the meeting as well. "I don't think it [granting the visas] should have happened," Steve Cohen, a Democratic Party congressman from Tennessee and a member of the U.S. Helsinki Commission leadership that will attend the Vienna meeting, told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in an interview on February 22. While acknowledging Austria's reasoning behind the decision, Cohen said: "Nevertheless, Russia has violated every part of the reasons for this meeting to happen at all. And I think when a country goes that far, then maybe they shouldn't be permitted." In a separate interview with RFE/RL on February 22, Joe Wilson, a Republican Congressman who heads Washington's Helsinki Commission leadership, said allowing Russia to attend the meeting sends "the wrong message to the world." If the Russian delegation does show up in the Austrian capital this week, it will be the first time members of the Russian State Duma have been in the European Union in an official capacity since being sanctioned for supporting the war, notably by voting in favor of seizing the four Ukrainian territories of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has met twice since the invasion -- in July in Birmingham, England, and in the Polish capital, Warsaw, in November -- but both times the Russian delegation was denied visas. The Helsinki Commission has noted that the United States and the EU have sanctioned "every member of the Russian delegation for having explicitly endorsed Vladimir Putin's war of aggression on Ukraine and his claim to have annexed vast swathes of Ukrainian territory." Since the invasion of Ukraine, the OSCE has been careful not to completely sever ties with Moscow. Since Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe in March, the OSCE is the only major pan-European political organization that Moscow remains a member of.  

Russia's revanchist and imperial ambitions may not stop at Ukraine. Unless Russian forces are defeated in Ukraine or withdrawn by new Kremlin rulers, Moscow might assault other post-Soviet neighbors. The West may face limits on the extent to which it could help them thwart such attacks. As repression has climbed under President Vladimir Putin and Russia has become more autocratic, Russian behavior has become more imperial and revanchist, not least in Ukraine, a conflict that will be one year old on Feb. 24. But Moscow's expansive ambitions may go well beyond it. In 2005, Putin called the Soviet collapse “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” In 2008, then-Prime Minister Putin told President George W. Bush, “Ukraine is not even a country.” Soon Russia invaded Georgia and asserted “privileged interests” in the wider region. In 2014 and on a larger scale in 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. In 2022, Putin claimed that prior to President Nursultan Nazarbayev's reign, “Kazakhs never had statehood.” In 2016, Putin claimed that Russia's border “has no end.” No wonder neighbors worry. They have reason to fear where Putin's Russia might strike next, especially if revanchist rulers remain in the Kremlin or the invaders prevail in Ukraine. Where might new Russian threats emerge? The Baltics: Alleging a mission to protect Russians anywhere, Moscow might try to seize Estonia with its ethnic Russian enclave of Narva, or Latvia, where ethnic Russians are a quarter of the population. Russia could seek to invade Lithuania, a neighbor that is not friendly toward Russia lodged between hyper-armed Kaliningrad and Belarus. Since the Baltics lack geographic depth, the Kremlin might think Russian forces could take them before NATO reinforcements arrived and defeat any attempt to recover them. Belarus: Likely shocked by the widespread street protests in 2020, the Kremlin could seek to deepen subservience by absorbing Belarus. Putin might be angry that despite having a friendly dictator, Belarus refuses to send troops to Ukraine or host a Russian air base. The Kremlin might calculate that it could oust President Alexander Lukashenko and take control of or annex Belarus without Western intervention. Moscow might worry about sparking more protests. Moldova: In February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned that democratic Moldova could become the “next Ukraine.” Russian troops already occupy separatist Transnistria. Unless Russia seized southern Ukraine up to the Moldovan border, it might see risks in mounting a larger invasion against a country linked to the West and bordering on NATO stalwart Romania. Georgia: If Russia seized the Black Sea coastline remaining under the control of Georgia, it would control seaborne access for goods flowing to and from China, Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The Kremlin might view democratic Georgia, despite ties to the West, as far from most of Europe and vulnerable. Kazakhstan: Russian forces could attempt to invade the northern regions of Kazakhstan that host significant Slavic minorities. Russian revanchists have long called for incorporation of these areas, as did the late Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. The Kremlin might view the West as unable to do much to help faraway Kazakhstan repel an invasion. Peacekeepers from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization intervened to help quell protests in Kazakhstan last year. Caspian energy: Russia could seek to capture Caspian energy assets in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Unlike other possible land grabs, the Kremlin might think this one would be a financial boon. A Russian naval armada in the Caspian Sea could strike coastal targets and help protect energy assets from collateral damage. The Kremlin would expect strong Western political opposition and tougher sanctions. But despite huge Western investments in Caspian energy, the Kremlin might not expect large-scale military intervention so far from NATO's main sources of power. No question, for Russia's revanchists and imperialists, Ukraine is the main game. But they may want more. And they might think the West's unprecedented military support for Ukraine will not be replicated elsewhere. The war has shown the value of sustained, low-cost training by NATO allies of Ukrainian troops, such as how to fight in decentralized and agile ways. Georgian forces have also benefitted. The allies might promote regional security by training more forces from friendly post-Soviet countries. The fate of Russia's neighbors may hinge in great part on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Especially if the Kremlin managed to portray the war as a success, it might be emboldened to employ force against other neighbors. This is one reason why the West has strong interests in a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine and an end to revanchist rule in Russia. The West might be bolder about asserting the latter interest. William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. He was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia, and senior adviser at the U.S. Helsinki Commission. This commentary originally appeared on The Hill on February 16, 2023. Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.

VIENNA (AP) — Austria has come under heavy criticism for granting visas that will allow sanctioned Russian lawmakers to attend a Vienna meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The issue highlights the delicate balancing act the European country has engaged in while trying to maintain its longstanding position of military neutrality during the war in Ukraine. The Austrian government has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine almost a year ago but also stressed the need to maintain diplomatic relations with Moscow. Austria hosts several U.N. agencies and international organizations such as the OSCE, which was established during the Cold War as a forum for dialogue between East and West. Russia is one of the 57 nations in North America, Europe and Asia that participate in the Vienna-based organization. Moscow plans to send delegates to the Feb. 23-24 meeting of the OSCE’s parliamentary assembly, including 15 Russian lawmakers who are under European Union sanctions. Among them are Deputy Duma Chairman Pyotr Tolstoy and fellow parliament member Leonid Slutsky. In a letter to Austria’s chancellor, foreign minister and other officials, 81 OSCE delegates from 20 countries, including France, Canada, Britain, Poland and Ukraine, called upon the Austrian government to prohibit the participation of the sanctioned Russians. “It is important to remember that Russian parliamentarians are an integral part of the power system and complicit in the crimes Russia commits every day in Ukraine,” read the letter, which was seen by The Associated Press. “They have no place in an institution tasked with promoting sincere dialogue and opposition to the war.” The U.S. delegates to the Parliamentary Assembly were not among the letter’s signatories. U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Michael Carpenter told reporters Friday that the Russian delegates “are not people who deserve to be able to travel to Western countries.” However, Carpenter added that it was “up to the Austrian government to determine whether they are going to grant visas or not.” Austrian officials haven’t commented on the letter. On Feb. 5, Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg defended Austria’s decision to allow the sanctioned Russians to enter the country, arguing it was important to keep channels of communication with Moscow open despite the “brutal Russian attack against Ukraine.” The Austrian Foreign Ministry also insisted that as host to the OSCE headquarters in Vienna, it is legally obliged to grant visas to representatives of participating nations who want to take part in meetings there. Austria, which became a European Union member in 1995, has criticized Moscow and joined the sanctions the EU imposed against Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. But unlike Finland and Sweden, which decided to abandon their non-aligned stances in May by applying to join NATO, Austria remains committed to the military neutrality it adopted in 1955. The Austrian government has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine but no weapons. Chancellor Karl Nehammer became the first and so far only EU leader to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin face-to-face after the war started. Nehammer traveled to Moscow in April 2022 in a fruitless attempt to persuade the Russian leader to end the invasion. Support remains strong for Austrian neutrality among the public and political establishment. “I believe that Austrian neutrality can still play a positive role today,” saysid Ralph Janik, an expert in international law and researcher at the Sigmund Freud private university in Vienna. “The alternative would be to join NATO, but every single Austrian politician is very well aware that this is not supported by the majority of the Austrian public.” Austria, which was annexed by Nazi Germany in the run-up to World War II, declared neutrality after the war under pressure from Western allies and the Soviet Union. It sought a role as a mediator between East and West and developed ties with Moscow during and after the Cold War. In 1968, Austria became the first Western European country to import gas from the Soviet Union, and its dependence on Russian energy increased in the following decades. Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 80% of Austria’s natural gas came from Russia. It has since reduced the share to just over 20% by turning to Norwegian gas, according to Austria’s regulator for electricity and gas. The Austrian banking system is also closely connected to Russia. Austria’s second-largest bank, the Raiffeisenbank International, earned more than half of its profits in 2022 from Russia. The bank has come under intense pressure for continuing its business in Russia despite Moscow’s war against Ukraine, and is currently evaluating strategic options, including an exit from Russia. Vienna is also known to be a playground for spies, including from Russia, due to its lenient espionage laws. Despite its initial reluctance, Austria has expelled eight Russian diplomats who are believed to have been engaged in spying since the start of the Russian war against Ukraine. While there are no signs of a shift away from Austrian neutrality, some have called for the policy to be reassessed following the Ukraine war. Werner Fasslabend, a former Austrian defense minister from the conservative People’s Party, is among the few prominent voices arguing in favor of the country renouncing neutrality and joining NATO. With the end of Cold War and Austria’s accession to the EU, Austrian neutrality has “lost its function,” said Fasslabend, the director of the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy. As a NATO member, Austria would “be in a better position to shape European security policy and will gain greater security,” he added, admitting that it was unlikely to happen given it would require changing the constitution by a two-thirds majority in the Austrian parliament. “This majority is not within sight,” Fasslabend said. Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

President Biden has poorly explained why supporting Ukraine is in America’s interests. There are better arguments to make. Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is nearing its first anniversary, and the United States should be proud that our support has empowered Kyiv to push back against the Kremlin. But the Biden administration still has not clearly articulated why continued American leadership is needed and why the only acceptable outcome is victory for Ukraine. As a result, after one year of fighting, and as we face domestic issues such as inflation, crime, and an open southern border, the American people are asking questions about U.S. support for Ukraine. This is understandable. There is, however, a persuasive case for continued American aid to Ukraine. But we have to make that case. Public diplomacy starts at home. A few weeks before Secretary of State George Marshall went to Harvard to unveil the Marshall Plan in June 1947, his deputy, Dean Acheson, made a speech of his own in my home state of Mississippi. Acheson recognized that it was not just the Harvard faculty club whose opinion mattered — William F. Buckley’s first 2,000 names in the Boston phone book would also have a say. At Delta State University, Acheson argued that American engagement in Europe was “necessary for our national security.” In 1984, President Reagan made a similar point in Gulfport, Miss., at the height of the Cold War. He pointed out the need to strengthen our defense-industrial base, naval fleet, and ammunition stocks, saying, we can “never again allow America to let her guard down.” President Biden has not acted or spoken with the same strength and candor. Before February 24, 2022, he suggested that Russia might get away with “minor incursions” into Ukraine. The messaging most Americans heard from the White House last summer was “Putin’s price hike” — an attempt to dismiss concerns about the president’s failed energy policies. Instead of the president, Congress has led the charge at every step, both in explaining this effort to the American people and in provisioning Ukraine. The administration’s recent timidity in providing Ukraine with a handful of tanks allowed Europeans to hide behind the U.S. for months, rather than provide Ukraine what it needs in time to make a difference for the coming spring offensive. That hesitation was in keeping with endless debates we have seen about equipment like HIMARS and drones. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians are fighting courageously, but with one hand tied behind their backs. Recently, I took to the Senate floor to make the case for more, better, and faster advanced weapons deliveries to Ukraine. I offered four clear reasons why continuing to support Ukraine is in America’s national interest. The argument needs to be based on more than vague appeals to the rules-based international order, which persuade few outside the Beltway. First, Ukraine matters to the United States because the security of Europe is closely tied to our own security and prosperity. When Vladimir Putin says that he seeks the “collapse of Western hegemony,” he means the power of the U.S. and of our allies. Second, this is a good investment for us. Reporting indicates that the U.S. contribution to Ukraine as a percent of our own GDP so far has been less than that of Canada, the United Kingdom, and every Baltic country, at a clip of just 0.2 percent. The result of these relatively modest investments is that Russia’s military is significantly weakened and Moscow can no longer carry out a near-term invasion of any nation in the NATO alliance. Further, 40 percent of U.S. aid for Ukraine, or about $44 billion, is being spent here at home on our defense-industrial base and readiness. Third, the United States is leading a transformation in Europe’s security architecture that will make it far less likely that American service members will be put in danger in the future. For years, American force planners have agonized over hard choices about how to assist in Europe’s defenses. These choices have been made all the more challenging as a result of the “free rider” problem in NATO defense spending. With our allies committing to rearming, we may soon see that dilemma in our strategy for the European continent subside. Fourth, victory in Ukraine will help deter the Chinese Communist Party in the Indo-Pacific. General Secretary Xi Jinping is watching the other side of Eurasia closely, with an eye toward Taiwan. As Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida has stated, “Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow.” Last month, our allies in Tokyo committed to double their defense spending as a percent of GDP to 2 percent. Beyond those key reasons, it is important to understand that a long war for Ukraine would cost even more and favors Putin. Providing Ukraine with needed arms, including ATACMS, long-range missiles, and advanced drones like the Grey Eagle and Reaper could tip the balance in their favor and diminish the odds of a protracted conflict by better positioning Kyiv to end the war on the right terms. As we consider additional support, political leaders also owe the American people oversight of how their hard-earned taxpayer dollars are being spent. Twenty reviews of Ukraine assistance have been completed, with another 64 reviews ongoing or planned. As ranking member on the Senate Armed Services committee, I will continue that oversight. American support for Ukraine should not be taken for granted, in Kyiv or in Washington. It will be earned by legislators who persuade voters at civic clubs, at churches and faith institutions, and in conversations at local grocery stores, face to face. I will continue to have those tough discussions in Tupelo, Olive Branch, Jackson, Gulfport, and everywhere in-between. I invite my colleagues in Congress and in the administration to do the same across the country. The American people deserve no less.  

A bipartisan group of House lawmakers introduced legislation on Wednesday to designate Russian mercenary company Wagner Group as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). The Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries (HARM) Act, sponsored by nine members of the lower chamber, would require the State Department to designate the Wagner Group an FTO within 90 days of becoming law. The lawmakers cited the paramilitary company’s history of human rights violations in Africa and ongoing deployment of private soldiers in Ukraine to fight with Russia, adding that the Wagner Group has received weapons from North Korea, a U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism. “Where the Wagner Group operates, atrocities follow,” said Rep. Steve Cohen (D-Tenn.) in a statement. “The HARM Act will identify Putin’s private mercenary group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and let the world know that its activities are both malign and illegal.” The Biden administration designated the Wagner Group as a transnational criminal organization last week and announced countries and entities supporting it would run afoul of the U.S. government. But an FTO designation would authorize the U.S. to slap criminal penalties on entities supporting Wagner Group, according to the lawmakers sponsoring the HARM Act. Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) said in a statement the Biden administration’s designation “does not go far enough” against Wagner, adding it should use the FTO label to “expose them in their true state as a murderous, criminal enterprise.” “The Wagner Group has been engaging in nefarious atrocities around the globe, all at the behest of war criminal Putin and his cronies,” Wilson said. Legislation to designate the Wagner Group an FTO was also introduced last year in both the House and Senate. There was a standoff between the Biden administration and some U.S. lawmakers last year over designating Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism. The administration said the designation, which comes with a raft of restrictions and penalties, could do more harm than good for Ukraine. Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, formed the Wagner Group in 2014. The mercenary outfit has since meddled in conflicts across the world, from Africa to Syria and now Ukraine, where Wagner forces are fighting alongside Russian soldiers in the eastern Donetsk region. DOJ disrupts global ransomware gangTop FDA safety official resigns In November, the European Parliament passed a resolution urging the European Council to adopt a measure that would place Wagner Group on an EU terrorist list. Rep. Ruben Gallego (D-Ariz.), who is vying for a Senate seat in 2024, also sponsored the HARM Act and called for “rebuking mercenary terrorist organizations like the Wagner Group.” “While Ukrainians stand up for freedom and democracy, the Wagner Group stands with authoritarian regimes like Russia,” Gallego said in a statement. “Declaring them a Foreign Terrorist Organization is a commonsense step to hold them accountable for their atrocities in Ukraine and across the globe.”

On a summer day in Zolochiv, Ukraine, a rocket dropped from the sky and exploded into a building across the street from journalist Sarah Ashton-Cirillo, who caught the blast on cellphone video. The artillery, one of many seen in the country for weeks, didn't just crater the sidewalk. It also led Ashton-Cirillo – the world's first openly transgender war correspondent – to be hit with a new perspective.  "There was this crazy shift in my perception of where my place was in the war," she said. "My mind had undergone a metamorphosis because it was not anymore me covering the war, I was basically living the war. ... I had become very conflicted regarding my feelings as to where I belonged." In Ukraine she had seen bodies of injured or killed civilians, moved food supplies for the military effort and befriended many a servicemember, all of which caused her to reflect on her work and eventually turn from photographing and writing about gunfire to being a part of it. Now a member of the Ukrainian armed forces, first as a combat medic and now focusing on hybrid warfare, the 45-year-old Las Vegas native is unshakable in the cause for Ukrainian freedom. "If I knew now what I knew nine months ago, I'm not certain I would have chosen this path," she said. "But because I did choose this path, the only way to go is forward, focused on mission, focused on my convictions and values as to why I'm doing this." A story of pivotal moments Ashton-Cirillo had covered the consequences of war before, reporting from the Syria-Turkey border on the refugee crisis during the country's civil war in 2015. With hesitation but no regret, she moved forward into the war zone in Ukraine. "When I went ahead and saw that the invasion had happened, I basically thought to myself: Am I really going to do this?" she said.  Even before entering Ukraine, Ashton-Cirillo faced expected obstacles getting into the country as a transgender woman. She intentionally flew into Berlin on her origin flight with an awareness that the city might be more progressive about her gender identity not matching the photo and details on her passport. At the Ukrainian border, she brought press clippings to prove her identity, fearful of being barred from the country. But in less than an hour, she heard all she needed: "Welcome to Ukraine." 'I was basically living the war' Initially without a combat helmet, a chest protector or press plates, she made a spur-of-the-moment decision to enter the city of Kharkiv, further into a dangerous area of the war zone. Ashton-Cirillo said that at the time, the risks of her decision weren't something she could process, but she now knows the choice was pivotal for her future. In Kharkiv and later Zolochiv, she witnessed bombings and rockets cratering buildings, hid in bomb shelters with Ukrainians, and shared photos, videos and dispatches of it all on her Twitter account.  Working as a freelancer for LGBTQ Nation, she largely focused on the effect of the war on LGBTQ Ukrainians, including Russian military forces targeting LGBTQ civilians in Ukraine and the expression of LGBTQ acceptance among Ukrainians through the arts. She grew closer with members of the Ukrainian forces and served as an army volunteer to deliver food supplies. In Zolochiv, the village's mayor even appointed her an official outreach coordinator so she could advocate for aid to its citizens. How war gave Ashton-Cirillo a changed perspective The gradual shift in Ashton-Cirillo's place in the war, from the professional to the personal, led her to consider what steps would be required for her to join the Ukrainian military. By August, Ashton-Cirillo was working so closely with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, she stopped reporting for LGBTQ Nation to avoid a conflict of interest. She began to write policy papers and analysis for units of the Ukrainian government, all the while considering how she could become more involved in the war effort. Il'ko Bozhko, former press officer for the Operation Command East for Ukraine and close friend of Ashton-Cirillo, said he shared his own experience and motivations behind joining the armed forces with her as she made the decision and went with her to formally apply to serve. "We had many conversations about it. It wasn't a spur-of-the-moment decision for her," Bozhko said.  She enlisted with the armed forces in October. 'The whole gender thing' In her time as a reporter and now as a servicemember, Ashton-Cirillo says, she experienced next to no pushback to her gender identity from Ukrainians, whose country has made slow but gradual progress in LGBTQ inclusivity. The country, like many in Eastern Europe, has a long history of oppression of sexuality and expansive gender expression. But in recent years it has become somewhat of a haven for those seeking gay nightlife and a marginally more accepting environment. Being LGBTQ is legal in Ukraine, but same-sex marriage is not. Ashton-Cirillo said she has seen progress in LGBTQ acceptance in the country because of the equity created by war and doesn't believe it will be reversed. As for how being transgender comes into play for her in her unit on a daily basis, Ashton-Cirillo called her gender identity a "non-issue" for those around her in Ukraine. "It didn't register as any big deal that I'm a trans soldier and in Ukraine," she said. "It turned out to be the easiest part of my time there. ... You are judged on your character, you are judged on your courage, and you are judged on your belief in freedom and your loyalty to Ukraine. I mean, nothing else matters." A unexpected role: Liaison between the US and Ukraine Initially, Ashton-Cirillo also didn't fully grasp the informal role she'd be playing as a sort of liaison between the U.S. and the Ukrainian Armed Forces because of her enlistment. When returning to the U.S. for the first time in December, she made two trips to Capitol Hill to speak with more than a dozen legislative offices, including members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission. Politicians regardless of party or perspective on the LGBTQ community have trusted her to deliver an unvarnished message from the other side, she said. "Where we are right now, in this moment, the Ukrainian government entrusted an American soldier to represent them in Washington, D.C., in the middle of a war," she said. "And oh, yeah, she's transgender." Ashton-Cirillo hasn't entirely abandoned writing. She is writing about her perspective on the war as a contributing columnist for media website Resolute Square. After the war, Ashton-Cirillo hopes to work on veterans rights in the U.S. or elsewhere with her knowledge of the challenges of reintegrating into life after a war zone. "It's easier to fight a world war against Russia as a transgender female than it used to be in the United States, trying to have to live a life where my gender identity is the No. 1 thing that comes up no matter what."

Two U.S. lawmakers heading up an independent U.S. government human rights watchdog have introduced a resolution that calls on President Joe Biden to boot Russia from the United Nations Security Council, just days before the Kremlin’s flagging full-scale invasion of Ukraine is set to hit its 10-month mark.  The bipartisan Helsinki Commission, which called on U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to protest Russia’s standing as a permanent Security Council member in October, wants Congress to argue that Russia’s war has violated the “purposes and principles of the United Nations” and asks U.S. government agencies to take steps to limit Russia’s privileges at the U.N., though it gives the administration some free rein to determine how it might act.   In the congressional resolution shared with Foreign Policy, Reps. Steve Cohen and Joe Wilson said that Russia had committed “flagrant violations” of the U.N. Charter that call into question its right to hold a Security Council seat, including the illegal annexation vote in four Ukrainian oblasts, the perpetration of atrocities in Ukrainian cities such as Bucha, nuclear saber-rattling, and creating risks to the world’s food supply.  Ukraine has also advocated for Russia to be removed from the council, though experts remain skeptical that such efforts will work. The U.N.’s governing charter doesn’t contain any provisions for removing a permanent member of the Security Council. While countries can be removed from the United Nations altogether, doing so would require a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly, including the consent of the council itself. “Russia would have to agree to it, and it’s just not going to happen,” said Louis Charbonneau, U.N. director with Human Rights Watch. China is also unlikely to agree to such a precedent.  Though House resolutions are not binding law, the move solidifies thinking both on Capitol Hill and within the Biden administration about how to curb Russian influence in Turtle Bay. The resolution pushes forward a previous effort from the Helsinki Commission—which was created in 1975 as part of a U.S. law that solidified the brief detente between the United States and the Soviet Union—calling on the State Department to initiate a process to strip Russia’s seat on the top U.N. body. One idea, backed by the commission as well as some legal scholars, seeks to challenge Russia’s status as the heir of the Soviet Union’s seat at the Security Council. As one of the initial signatories of the treaty that founded the Soviet Union, alongside Russia and Belarus, Kyiv could make a convincing claim to be the only successor state of the Soviet Union not to have flagrantly violated the principles of the U.N. Charter and issue credentials for one of its own diplomats to take the seat. As deciding on credentials is a procedural matter, it would only require nine of the 15 members of the council to vote in support of Ukraine, Thomas Grant, a senior research fellow at the University of Cambridge, has noted.  The feasibility of such a plan remains a subject of debate. And three decades after Russia took over the Soviet Union’s seat, challenging such precedent could also prove to be an uphill battle. “You’re looking at three decades of recognition of Russia in this place,” Charbonneau said.  But Russia’s long-standing intransigence, along with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, has gotten both the United States and Ukraine to begin thinking about alternatives to diminish Moscow’s influence. Speaking at the U.N. General Assembly in September, Biden called for reforms of the Security Council, including the possibility of adding more permanent and nonpermanent members, such as for countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. The United States also succeeded on Wednesday in ousting Iran from a United Nations panel on women’s rights.

U.S. Ambassador Deborah Lipstadt, who is special envoy to combat antisemitism, on Tuesday called the rise of anti-Jewish tropes on the internet and social media “a ticking time bomb,” during a hearing held by the U.S. Helsinki Commission.  Lipstadt’s comments come just a day after President Biden’s announcement that his administration would establish a task force to coordinate government efforts to address antisemitism and other forms of religiously motivated bigotry.   Her comments also come just a few weeks after rapper Ye, formerly known as Kanye West, delivered an antisemitic rant on Infowars in which he stated that he liked Adolf Hitler.  Witness Rabbi Andrew Baker, much like Lipstadt, emphasized the dangers of how easily antisemitism can spread online during the hearing.  “Today antisemitism moves effortlessly around the world via the internet and social media. It infects groups and individuals who then carry out attacks on Jewish targets,” said Baker.  Though Lipstadt said that it was important to recognize the dangers social media presents in making antisemitic content more easily accessible, she was cautious not to blame social media for the recent rise in antisemitism in the U.S.   “I’m not sure we have an internet or social media problem, we have an antisemitism problem,” said Lipstadt. “I like to talk about or compare social media to a knife, a knife in the hands of a murderous person can take a life, a knife in the hands of a surgeon can save a life.” Lipstadt also made clear during the hearing that she wasn’t calling for more censorship or content moderation, but for more public condemnation of hate speech.   “The United States will always uphold free protections of speech in our Constitution, but having said that, we also have to condemn hate speech,” said Lipstadt. “We cannot legislate it out of existence, but we can certainly condemn it. Freedom of expression doesn’t mean we have to sit idly by.”  Baker also said that content moderation wouldn’t be able to solve the problem of antisemitism spreading online.  “Content monitors are no match for algorithms designed to push grievance as the basic business model,” said Baker. “We must find new ways to bring this under control.”   “We know that it spreads immediately, exhaustively, through social media, and that is a real fight we’re all up against.”   Lipstadt said that one of the best ways to fight against the rise of antisemitism online and in general was for high-profile individuals to decry antisemitism whenever and wherever they see it.  “Leaders have to speak out,” said Lipstadt. “Political leaders, religious leaders, celebrities, opinion makers, they have to speak out and say this is wrong.”  “So, I think the public profile people speaking out and saying this is unacceptable, is extremely important.”  Committee Chairman Ben Cardin (D-Md.) reiterated this point and said that he was proud that so many of his colleagues denounced former President Trump’s dinner at Mar-a-Lago with Ye and white supremacist Nick Fuentes.   “Leaders must put a spotlight on any type of antisemitic activities and be willing to condemn it. We saw just the opposite at Mar-a-Lago when the former president had dinner with Kanye West, a known antisemite, and Nick Fuentes, a white supremacist,” said Cardin.    

NATO was meant to be a harbor for the weak and imperiled. It should be again. June’s NATO summit in Madrid was by every account a historic event. In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine andbroader belligerence against Europe, NATO unveiled a muscular new strategic concept and invited Finland and Swedento join the alliance—an epochal moment for the two traditionally neutral countries and a major statement for thealliance’s “open door” policy. Yet looming over all of this are the uncertain fates of the two countries most suffering from Russian aggression: Ukraine and Georgia. Both nations were promised membership in the alliance during the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, yet bothremain outside of it. Now, the enormous human and material toll of Russia’s genocidal, neo-imperial war in Ukraine hasput NATO’s extended and unfulfi lled promises into sharp, indelible relief. Obscured by ambiguous technicalities, the alliance’s failure to provide Ukraine and Georgia with a concrete pathway to membership was clearly an unintentional but predictable invitation to Russian aggression. As Ukrainians desperately defend their homeland and count civilians and their children among those killed, the moraland strategic poverty of Ukraine’s deferred accession is laid bare. NATO and its members must now reckon with thewages of a passive approach and rethink the alliance’s founding purpose. The bloc was never meant as an exclusive country club of the rich and strong but rather a harbor for the weak and imperiled. It should be again. In April, while observing the Hungarian parliamentary elections, I saw for myself the heartrending humanitarian crisis on Ukraine’s borders with Hungary and Slovakia. I saw children who had traveled great distances with their families, clutching the meager mementos of home; I met Ukrainians who traveled back and forth across the borders, bringing supplies from the European Union into western Ukrainian cities; and I saw the humanity of volunteers giving some measure of comfort and welcome to weary refugees who had, at long last, reached the promise of safety at the European Union’s frontiers. But what I didn’t see were any great barriers or edifices of geography to suggest the line where, on one side, NATO would risk nuclear war in the people’s defense and on the other side—in Ukraine—it would not. In the United States and Europe, discussions about the borders between NATO and the rest of Europe are treated like immutable features of geography or acts of god, as though certain states and people are afforded divine predestination into the Euro-Atlantic’s rarefied elect. Decisions in the run-up to the war to withhold crucial assistance or provide security guarantees were often justified based on Ukraine’s non-membership in NATO, even though concrete pathways into the alliance have never been offered despite the 2008 declaration. The idea that Ukraine and Georgia were somehow unready or unable to meet NATO’s technical criteria has always been a problematic argument. At no point has NATO established hard, technical benchmarks for membership—clear, achievable standards for entry—and doing so might have risked Ukraine and Georgia passing muster, potentially embarrassing the countries that were categorically opposed to their accession. Realistically, NATO enlargement has always been a political decision. More recent fixations on technical “readiness” and process were introduced after the Cold War to amplify NATO’s turn from a Cold War bulwark to a carrier of Euro-Atlantic values and to manage booming Eastern European demand for membership. But today, Moscow’s threat to Europe’s peace is all too apparent again—and devastatingly so in Ukraine as well as in Georgia. In response, NATO should change with the strategic landscape—not with “retrenchment,” in which it builds its walls higher while Ukraine and other threatened partners burn, but with aggressive enlargement. NATO is generally considered something of a walled garden—a protected redoubt of relative peace, prosperity, and predictability. However, this reputation elides the seismic strategic revolution that founding and early expansion represented. Firmly in the nuclear age and facing Soviet expansionism after two horrific continental wars in the first half of the 20th century, the United States sought to create structures to arrest Europe’s ruinous cycles of great-power war. Against thevery real risk of Soviet imperialism and a potential third World War, NATO created a protected sanctuary around Europe’s most threatened, impoverished, and war-torn countries. “I am sure,” then-U.S. President Harry Truman said just a year before NATO’s founding, “that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them.” To create the rules-based paradise of modern Europe, the United States and its closest allies drew a line in the face of Soviet expansionism and said: No further. Despite war weariness and the steep task of reconstruction, the North Atlantic founders pooled their military power and political determination as well as risked a third World War in Europe’s defense. The countries that joined were hardly all first-rate military powers, economic dynamos, or stable democracies—manywere politically unstable, militarily sapped, and economically broken. Several, such as Portugal and Spain, were military dictatorships. The principal continental combatants in World War II—Germany, France, and Italy—were quite literally ruined by the war and took decades to recover. Yet the United States and the other original NATO members didn’t quibble interminably over the vagaries of a threatened partner’s democratic credentials or its uptake of various technical or military reforms, and they generally accepted European states that sought Washington’s protection and a Western orientation. This wasn’t because of Western indifference to democracy but rather a recognition that democratization under the shadow of an imminent Soviet threat was essentially impossible and that a country swallowed by Moscow’s imperial agenda had no chance of true self-determination—much less democracy. Speaking of NATO’s purpose, then-U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson described it as “designed to contribute to thestability and well-being of the member nations by removing the haunting sense of insecurity” posed by Soviet expansionism. It took time, but the strategy paid off. Under NATO and the United States’ nuclear umbrella, great-power war was avoided, Europe democratized and prospered, and the Soviet Union and its brand of colonialism was dismantled, freeing tens of millions of people. With Russia again in the throes of despotism and expansionist militarism, the conditions that accompanied NATO’s founding are all too familiar. Russian aggression in the heart of Europe is an incontrovertible reality—as Ukraine’s blood-soaked lands so clearly attest—and there is no reason to believe or expect Moscow to stop until and unless it is stopped. NATO must meet the moment. Dithering over peacetime technicalities defi es NATO’s original purpose to secure Europefrom the specter of Moscow’s violently imperial agenda. This is not a return to the Cold War, but it is no less a civilizational struggle against a military dictatorship in Moscow. This threat is particularly plain and present for the millions of Ukrainians and Georgians who have had no choice but to suffer on the wrong side of the geopolitical train tracks. NATO should return to its roots and fling open its doors to all those in Europe at risk of Russia’s predations. How can this be done? NATO decisions, including membership, require consensus. Transitioning to a wartime open door policy will require a major shift in thinking. For one, the United States, as the ultimate underwriter of NATO’s military might, should take steps to provide robust security assistance and assurances to threatened partners—such as those promises it has given Finland and Sweden until their accession is complete—and encourage other like-minded allies to do the same. Similarly, NATO handwringing over outstanding territorial disputes—almost always created or supported by Moscow—should officially become a nonissue. Russia should not be rewarded for cultivating and backing violent separatist movements that inoculate the parent countries from NATO accession. If anything, Russian meddling and aggression evinces the necessity of NATO’s protection. This is simple in principle but admittedly difficult in policy amid hot war. How can Ukraine join NATO without triggering a global conflict? First, the United States and its allies can all do more to ensure that Ukraine has military dominance overits own territory and win its war of independence. Mystifying gaps that undermine Western sanctions policies demand attention—such as continued European dependence on Russian energy, U.S. imports of Russian steel, and the growing role of China and other countries in the Middle East, Eurasia, and Asia (including friends and partners) to bypass or ease the impact of international trade sanctions. Likewise, U.S. hesitance over delivering heavy arms and munitions to Ukraine must end. The delivery of U.S. artillery and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) platforms have completely changed the momentum of the conflict in recent weeks; more longer-range munitions and Western fast-jet capabilities could help Ukraine expand the initiative against Russia’s high-mass but low-morale attacking force. Second, the United States could consider extending its nuclear umbrella over Ukraine to erase Russia’s nuclear advantage and any temptation it may have to use nuclear weapons as Russian conventional losses mount. Doing so would only be a stronger and clearer statement of current U.S. policy that Russia’s use of weapons of mass destruction against Ukraine would be “completely unacceptable” and “entail severe consequences,” as U.S. President Joe Biden has already said. Against such a horrifying possibility, the West could stand to be much clearer on the evident downsides of such a strategy, which would itself violate Russian nuclear doctrine. And third, the United States can and should have discussions about certain security guarantees for free areas of Ukraine, such as via the provision of the most advanced Western arms or direct Western air defense coverage. For Georgia, and even for a country like Moldova should it so choose, it is even clearer: Provide support and security guarantees over non-occupied regions. Finally, democratic principles should remain a core requirement for NATO. Although the exigencies of the moment maynot allow the luxury of waiting for perfect democratization to develop before entry, NATO can and should create more robust and independent internal mechanisms to monitor and highlight vulnerabilities, advise and assist all members with undertaking difficult reforms, and hold members accountable for sustained and significant democratic backsliding. As Ukraine’s brave people fight for survival and every inch of their homeland against Russia’s overwhelming and genocidal war, it is impossible not to wonder what might have been had NATO understood in 2008 in Bucharest or in 2014 in Wales what horrors could have been prevented if Ukraine had been spirited into the alliance, along with Georgia. Ukraine will win this war, and Russia will lose—but in many ways, it is already too late for Ukraine and Georgia, having been so thoroughly and persistently victimized by Russian aggression. Yet each moment they are left to fend for themselves only compounds the error—and the shame.

ZUG, Switzerland—After Switzerland said in February it was joining European Union sanctions against Russian oligarchs, this quiet Alpine getaway seemed like an obvious place to hunt for targets. The streets are clustered with the offices of companies founded by Russia’s wealthiest men, along with the headquarters for landmark natural-gas pipelines Nord Stream 1 and 2 and the energy-trading department of Gazprom PJSC. So many Russian billionaires have homes or businesses here that the local opposition party had begun taking sightseers on an Oligarch’s Tour. Swiss newspapers nicknamed Zug “Little Moscow” and joked that local leaders wanted to build a Kremlin wall around the town. It didn’t seem so easy to the six local officials charged with helping implement sanctions. Working from a fifth-floor conference room, the team had a hard time identifying homes or local businesses officially owned by any of the hundreds of Russian oligarchs on the Swiss government’s list of sanctioned people. They struggled with Cyrillic names and often couldn’t make sense of the 300-page list, said Heinz Tännler, the financial director for the Canton, or state, of Zug. They also struggled with the implications for the local economy, added Mr. Tännler, who worries that sanctions have jeopardized his canton’s reputation as a safe place for foreign investment. “This is a very difficult time, especially for the Canton of Zug,” he said. In the end, the officials found exactly one company out of the roughly 30,000 registered in Zug that they believed was owned or controlled by a sanctioned individual. Zug’s slow start is emblematic of the country as a whole. Switzerland has pledged to punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. So far, that promise hasn’t triggered much action against Russian companies doing business there, bolstering concerns in world capitals that the Alpine financial hub isn’t doing enough to forestall the Kremlin and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s allies. Eighty percent of Russia’s commodities are traded through Switzerland, mostly through Zug and the lakeside city of Geneva. Swiss banks manage an estimated $150 billion for Russian clients, according to the country’s banking association. Thirty-two of the oligarchs closest to Mr. Putin have property, bank accounts or businesses in Switzerland, according to Zurich-based transparency group Public Eye. In the four months since Swiss authorities began sanctions, $6.8 billion in Russian financial assets have been frozen, alongside 15 homes and properties, according to the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, or SECO. By contrast, EU countries have collectively frozen $14 billion in alleged oligarch assets spanning funds, boats, helicopters and real estate, in addition to over $20 billion in Russian central-bank reserves. EU countries have also blocked around $200 billion in financial transactions. Authorities on the U.K. island of Jersey alone froze over $7 billion in assets they said are linked to oligarch Roman Abramovich, who didn’t respond to requests for comment. U.S. senators have privately petitioned Swiss officials to do more to locate Russian money and property. “Instead of enabling Russia’s abuse of the global financial system, they should stand against it,” said Sen. Roger Wicker (R., Miss.), chair of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation, which promotes human rights, military security and economic cooperation. Switzerland’s government has rejected that kind of criticism, stressing that its adoption of EU sanctions marks a historic shift and that it is doing everything possible to hunt down blacklisted assets. “It is clear that the sheer volume of the sanctions against Russia and Belarus, as well as the speed with which they were adopted, creates certain challenges for implementing authorities, in Switzerland and elsewhere,” said a SECO spokeswoman. Western sanctions have increasingly been used to squeeze Russia since 2014, when it annexed Crimea. Since then, Mr. Putin and a tight circle of allies have been exploiting gaps in the global financial system to evade blacklists and hide wealth overseas. Despite Switzerland’s status as a global financial hub, the country’s regulators are hamstrung by limited resources—SECO had just 10 officials fully dedicated to sanctions until recently, when the government hired five more. Their work is also frustrated by an old structural problem: The business of registering companies remains a hive of secrecy, making it difficult to identify ultimate ownership of assets, according to Western diplomats. Swiss bankers and transparency campaigners say billions of dollars of Russian clients’ assets have been transferred to the names of spouses and children in recent years—a phenomenon that accelerated in the run-up to the war, they say. The Gateway The Putin regime’s presence in Zug can be traced to the early days of his presidency, and a ceremony in the canton’s sprawling art nouveau palace, Theatre Casino. While Russia’s military was bombing the restive republic of Chechnya, Mr. Putin was awarded the 2002 “Zug Peace Prize” by the Nuclear Disarmament Forum, an organization of influential local businessmen that has since disbanded. The meeting, attended by business and political leaders close to the Kremlin and serenaded by the Russian National Orchestra, heralded the flourishing of Russian commodity trading in the town, according to local politicians. Many oligarchs have businesses in Zug that remain untouched by sanctions. They include Mr. Abramovich, the largest shareholder of Evraz PLC, a Russian steelmaker and mining company that has a trading arm in the canton. Evraz was sanctioned in the U.K., where it traded on the London Stock Exchange, but hasn’t been sanctioned in Switzerland or the EU, even though Mr. Abramovich has. Not far from Zug, in Winterthur, is the headquarters of Sulzer AG , an engineering company that is 48.8%-owned by Russian billionaire Viktor Vekselberg, who is sanctioned by the U.S. and the U.K. When Poland sanctioned Sulzer’s operations, the Swiss embassy in Warsaw unsuccessfully lobbied the Polish government to reverse the move, according to a Polish government official and the Swiss department of foreign affairs. Sulzer said Poland’s decision was wrong given that Mr. Vekselberg is just a minority shareholder and neither owns nor controls the company. Sulzer isn’t sanctioned anywhere else, a spokesman said. Representatives for Mr. Abramovich and Evraz didn’t reply to requests for comment. The SECO spokeswoman said the agency is in close contact with the U.K. authorities about sanctions, but “is not bound by their assessment.” A spokesman for the department of foreign affairs said that under Swiss law the government can assist Swiss companies abroad, and that sanctioning Sulzer’s Polish subsidiaries threatened jobs and hurt Sulzer clients. U.S. and European officials say they are counting on the Swiss government to find which companies and homes in Switzerland belong to sanctioned Russian oligarchs and freeze them. Switzerland’s history of financial secrecy, enshrined in its law, can make it exceedingly difficult to identify who owns what. Under Swiss legal precedent, lawyers can still open a company on behalf of a client and claim attorney-client privilege to block authorities from uncovering that person’s identity. That, officials say, hinders them from finding more companies whose accounts should be frozen under sanctions. It is also an obstacle for banks with small compliance teams. Swiss business registries don’t require firms to list true owners, which are often hidden by opaque companies in Switzerland held by trusts in financial havens, a loophole exploited by businessmen from Russia and elsewhere eager to mask the true ownership of their assets, according to Swiss opposition politicians and advocates for financial reform. “A Swiss lawyer hides the name of the beneficial owner in his vault, and there’s no way the Swiss authorities can get to the name,” said Mark Pieth, a former head of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s bribery division now at the Basel Institute on Governance. “The government has deliberately tied its own hands behind its back.” EuroChem Trusts came into play earlier this year when Switzerland, following the EU’s lead, sanctioned Andrey Melnichenko, one of Russia’s richest oligarchs and a longtime Swiss resident. On March 9, the EU added Mr. Melnichenko’s name—No. 721—to its blacklist, describing him as part of the “closest circle of Vladimir Putin ” and involved in businesses vital to the government. It mentioned a meeting he attended in Moscow with Mr. Putin in the first hours of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, along with 35 other oligarchs. In Italy, police seized his sailing yacht, the world’s largest. Left untouched was EuroChem AG, a company founded by Mr. Melnichenko in 2001 that grew into one of the world’s top producers of fertilizer, with revenue last year of $10.2 billion. Based in a small glass tower in Zug nicknamed the Dallas Building, the company is deeply entwined in the supply chains of Europe’s largest chemical giants. The day before the sanctions were announced, the tycoon disclaimed his interest in a Cyprus trust that held the company, according to a document signed by EuroChem’s chief financial officer. That left Mr. Melnichenko’s wife, Aleksandra, a former Serbian pop star, as the trust’s sole beneficiary. “Given that Mr. Melnichenko no longer owns, holds or controls any funds and economic resources of EuroChem Group…neither EuroChem Group nor any member of EuroChem Group are subject to EU asset freeze measures,” stated a document viewed by The Wall Street Journal. EuroChem lawyers also wrote to SECO that the company wouldn’t provide economic resources to Mr. Melnichenko or pay dividends to his wife. On March 28, SECO rendered its judgment: EuroChem didn’t need to have its assets or bank accounts frozen. Officials in Zug followed suit. Mr. Tännler, the canton’s financial director, bridled at criticism that local officials aren’t looking hard enough. “I think people know that we did a good job, that we did what we can do,” he said. He washed his hands of the EuroChem decision. “SECO made a determination that EuroChem is clean,” Mr. Tännler said. The European Commission in June countered that decision, ruling that Ms. Melnichenko was unduly benefitting from her husband and should be sanctioned. Switzerland then followed suit, blacklisting her but leaving EuroChem untouched. Credit Suisse, which needs to answer to tougher U.S. regulators because of its U.S. dollar business, has frozen the accounts EuroChem held at the bank. A spokesman for the couple said Mr. Melnichenko considers the sanctions against him unjust. “The formal justifications are nonsense,” said the spokesman, who denied that Mr. Melnichenko is a member of Mr. Putin’s inner circle or provides substantial revenue to the Russian government. Ms. Melnichenko has appealed to the Council of the European Union, saying the sanctions against her have complicated EuroChem’s ability to sell fertilizer, “leading to the famine and death of millions of people.”