U.S. Helsinki Commission Delegation to Romania, Macedonia, Kosovo, and ViennaThursday, April 01, 1993
The Commissions Delegation's visit to Romania, the first since April 1990, had two main objectives. The first was to assess, though meetings with a broad spectrum of non-governmental and official actors, Romania's current level of democratic and market reform. The second was in recognition of Romania's critical role in the effort to enforce U.N. sanctions against Serbia and Macedonia, and the broader political strategic role of Romania in the Balkans. The delegation also traveled to Macedonia to complete the itinerary of a visit to the area in November 1992, which had to be cut short because of inclement weather conditions. Indeed, the signs of the oncoming winter which the Commission saw at that time led it to raise concern over the deteriorating condition which Macedonia and the tens of thousands of Bosnian refugees residing there faced. The April 1993 visit afforded a useful opportunity to see firsthand the extent to which the country had satisfactorily coped with these deteriorating conditions and the prospects generally for the stability and democratization of an independent Macedonia. The delegation then visited Kosovo to observe firsthand the volatile situation there. The situation is a matter of considerable international concern given the chances for the war in nearby Bosnia-Herzegovina to have a spillover effect in which the tension exist between the Serbian authorities and th majority Albanian population could erupt into violence, either by intent or by spontaneous incident. The delegation wanted to hear the views of the authorities as well as of the leaders of the Albanian community, and to raise its concerns, particularly to the authorities regarding human rights. Finally, the delegation wanted to learn about the activities of the CSCE mission of Long-Duration based in Kosovo to monitor developments in the area and to ease tension in society. The delegation finished its trip in Vienna, Austria to meet with the U.S. delegation to the CSCE. Vienna is becoming the CSCE's operational center, with the Conflict Prevention Center, which provided logistical support to the missions as well as the ongoing arms control and security forum, the Forum on Security Cooperation (FSC), and regular meeting of the participating States.
Report: Beyond the CSCE's Institutional DevelopmentFriday, December 18, 1992
Although some early proposals conceived of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as an international institution with headquarters, secretariat, and treaty, the CSCE emerged from Helsinki in 1975 as an, amorphous process, moving from conference to conference with no fixed address or schedule. For fifteen years, its reView conferences and experts meetings succeeded in focusing, attention on a range of inter-related problems ftom human rights to the environment to threatening military maneuvers, operating, oa the principle that these and other elements, of security could not, be treated separately. However, the end of the bipolar security "system'' that had characterized the Europe in which CSCE was created led many of its participants to look to the CSCE as a , new over-arching "system" within which its members could improve both their security and cooperation. As such, they pleaded for more structure and permanence for its activities, as well as a larger role for it in addressing the challenges of the time. The Paris Summit of November 1990 endowed the CSCE with its first permanent institutions:, the CSCE Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Center, and Office of Free Elections, later expanded to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. These three institutions, minimally funded and staffed, were created to give the CSCE process some visible permanence and to assist the regular political consultations set up at the same time. The consultations process envisioned meetings of CSCE heads of state or government every two years; foreign minsters annually, plus possible meetings of other ministers; and senior officials three to four times per year. The CSCE Secretariat was set up in Prague to organize these meetings; the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna to give institutional support to risk reduction efforts; and the Office of Free Elections in Warsaw to assist the transition to democracy across the continent. In April 1991, parliamentarians from the participating States took up proposals from the summit and formed a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, to meet once a year to further security and cooperation in Europe, reviewing CSCE implementation and activities.
Helsinki Document: The Challenges of ChangeTuesday, December 01, 1992
The Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe returned to the birthplace of the Helsinki process, to give new impetus to our common endeavor through the Helsinki Summit Declaration.
The Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation on EuropeThursday, July 09, 1992
The end of the Cold War posed new challenges to the CSCE, with increasing intensities of ethnic conflict raging around the Yugoslav region. The European Community was struggling with uncertainty under a less-than-effective presidency, and a questionable state of unity following the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty; thus, a need was felt for a US presence in Europe. This record of the Helsinki Follow-Up meeting in 1992 shows that the even reaffirmed, but did not complete, the CSCE's transition from process to structure. The network of CSCE bodies and work methods described in the beginning sections of the Helsinki Decisions was greatly developed and clarified from its Paris genesis. Some effort was also made to integrate existing structures and past practices. Notably, the CSCE took as its central concept for the future the US-proposed theme "managing change." While the United States put this forward as a response to percieved European negativism and tendancy to paint the future in apocalyptic colors, requiring only conflict-orientated responses, it was also telling that the United States and others were ready to see the CSCE as a key instrument for the management of inevitable change, rather than looking past the CSCE in efforts to maintain the status quo.
Report: the Oslo Seminar of Experts on Democratic InstitutionsTuesday, November 05, 1991
From November 4-15, the CSCE Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions met in Oslo, Norway, pursuant to a mandate contained in the 1991 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Accordingly, experts discussed means and ways for "consolidating and strengthening viable democratic institutions." During the course of the Seminar, participants met in three closed study groups in which they considered constitutional and electoral frameworks, as well as comparative human rights legislation. In this context, numerous experts participated in the Oslo Seminar, contributing expositions on the differences among their various democratic traditions and often describing their national experiences in these areas. In addition, contacts among experts, non*governmental organizations, and government representatives in the margins of the meeting contributed to the overall work of the Seminar.
The Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCETuesday, September 10, 1991
In accordance with the mandate of the Vienna Concluding Document, the 38 states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met in Moscow from September 10 through October 4, 1991, for the third meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (CHD, or CDH from the French acronym) of the CSCE. The first meeting of the Conference was held in Paris from May 20 through June 23, 1989, and the second was held in Copenhagen from June 5 through 29, 1990. The meetings of the CHD address the full range of human rights and humanitarian concerns associated with the Helsinki process.
Geneva Meeting on National Minorities and Moscow Meeting on the Human DimensionWednesday, July 31, 1991
The hearing will focus on two important CSCE meetings, the Geneva Experts Meeting on National Minorities. The Geneva meeting which recently ended was mandated to discuss national minorities, the meeting had three components: exchange of views on practical experience; review of the implementation of relevant CSCE commitments; and consideration of new measures. The distinguished speaker will outline the major points of the Geneva meeting and how the United States can best utilize its success while moving towards the upcoming human dimension meeting in Moscow.
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY, STABILITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND COOPERATION IN AFRICATuesday, July 30, 1991
This hearing focused on successes of the Helsinki process in guiding Eastern Europe towards democratic governance and how a similar framework could work in Africa. The joint hearing emphasized the need for expedient action for the continent or risk unmanageable stagnating crises. Many former oppressive regimes in Eastern Europe draw parallels to similar governing system in the African continent, such systems lack rule based institutions, political enfranchisement, and civil protections. The Commissioners and the distinguished panelists discuss what measures African countries are taking in their democratization process and what the additional actions should be.
Democratic Developments in AlbaniaWednesday, May 22, 1991
Beginning at the Copenhagen Human Dimension Meeting in June 1990, Albania has been granted observer status at CSCE meetings. Albania would like to move beyond its current observer status and become a full participant in the process. The Commission delegation had stated when it left after its first visit that it needed to see significant improvements in Albania s human rights performance before we could support Albania’s membership in the CSCE. There is no question that the situation has remarkably improved as of last year, a fact which we on the Helsinki Commission have welcomed and have even complimented the existing government for moving in what we consider the right direction. A key question now, in addition to that of CSCE membership, is how the United States can best develop these bilateral relations to the benefit of democracy in Albania.
Final Resolution Concerning the Establishment of the CSCE Parliamentary AssemblyMonday, April 01, 1991
The delegations of the Parliaments of countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, meeting in Madrid, on April 2nd and 3rd 1991 --- Considering the provisions of the Paris Charter for a New Europe which, in recognition of the important role that parliamentarians can play in the CSCE process, calls for the establishment of a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly.
The Charter of Paris for a New EuropeMonday, November 19, 1990
We, the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, havae assembled in Paris at a time of profound change and historic expectations. The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and co-operation. Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past. The courage of men and women, the strength of the will of the peoples and the power of ideas of the Helsinki Final Act have opened a new era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe. Ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and expectations our peoples have cherished for decades: steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our countries. The Ten Principles of the Final Act will guide us towards this ambitious future, just as they have lighted our way towards better relations for the past fifteen years. Full implementation of all CSCE commitments must form the basis for the initiatives we are now taking to enable our nations to live in accordance with their aspirations.
Copenhagen Meeting on the Human DimensionWednesday, July 18, 1990
This Hearing was convened by Chairman Dennis DeConcini and Co-Chairman Steny H. Hoyer to address the Human Dimension of the of the Helsinki Final Act. In attendance were Ambassador Max Kampelmann, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Copenhagen CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension, Prof. Thomas Buergenthal, public member of the U.S. Delegation, and Prof. Hurst Hannum, public member of the U.S. Delegation. Those in attendence discussed the state of human rights in the OSCE region and various humanitarian causes that should be emphasized in the coming sessions.
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCEWednesday, June 20, 1990
The participating States welcome with great satisfaction the fundamental political changes that have occurred in Europe since the first Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE in Paris in 1989. They note that the CSCE process has contributed significantly to bringing about these changes and that these developments in turn have greatly advanced the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the other CSCE documents. They recognize that pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, the development of human contacts and the resolution of other issues of a related humanitarian character. They therefore welcome the commitment expressed by all participating States to the ideals of democracy and political pluralism as well as their common determination to build democratic societies based on free elections and the rule of law. At the Copenhagen Meeting the participating States held a review of the implementation of their commitments in the field of the human dimension. They considered that the degree of compliance with the commitments contained in the relevant provisions of the CSCE documents had shown a fundamental improvement since the Paris Meeting. They also expressed the view, however, that further steps are required for the full realization of their commitments relating to the human dimension. The participating States express their conviction that full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace, security, justice, and cooperation that they seek to establish in Europe. They therefore reaffirm their commitment to implement fully all provisions of the Final Act and of the other CSCE documents relating to the human dimension and undertake to build on the progress they have made. They recognize that cooperation among themselves, as well as the active involvement of persons, groups, organizations, and institutions, will be essential to ensure continuing progress towards their shared objectives.
Soviet Involvement in AfghanistanThursday, May 03, 1990
The purpose of this hearing, which Sen. Dennis DeConcini and Rep. Steny Hoyer presided over, was to examine what was happening in Afghanistan at the time, specifically in relation to the U.S.S.R. At the time of this hearing, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had ceased, and Moscow had expended financial, military, and human resources that had cost the country dearly, towards a war that had grown to be overwhelmingly with the Soviet populace, no less. Likewise, the Soviet conflict with Afghanistan had serious repercussions for the Soviet economy, which was why it was surprising that, even after the war, the U.S.S.R. had continued to spend significant capital to prop up the government in Kabul. Another issue was where U.S. aid was going and whether or not it was being properly spent.
Sofia CSCE Meeting on the Protection of the EnvironmentThursday, September 28, 1989
The purpose of this hearing, which Sen. Dennis DeConcini and Rep. Steny H. Hoyer chaired, was to examine the first meeting in CSCE history devoted exclusively to the environment. The hearing predated the Sofia Meeting itself, whose purpose was to address environmental problems that recognize no borders and threaten every individual’s right to a peaceful and secure life. Unfortunately, the Sofia Meeting had been marred by the Bulgarian government’s lack of tolerance in its treatment of its Turkish and Muslim minorities, specifically the Bulgarian government’s campaign to assimilate Turkish minorities, which constituted a serious violation of human rights. Needless to say, then, intersectionality existed and continues to exist among environmental issues and the Helsinki process’s other top priorities.
CODEL DeConcini - Trip Report on Turkey and PolandTuesday, August 01, 1989
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, more commonly known as the Helsinki Commission, was established by law in 1976 to monitor and report on compliance with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The Helsinki Final Act, as well as successor agreements, includes provisions regarding military security; trade, economic issues, and the environment; and human rights and humanitarian concerns. Thirty-two European countries participate in the Helsinki process, plus the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union. The Helsinki Commission is currently chaired by Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) and co chaired by Representative Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), and has 18 members from the Senate and House, as well as one each from the Departments of Commerce, State, and Defense. In accordance with its legislative mandate, the Commission undertakes a variety of activities aimed at monitoring and reporting on all three sections (known as baskets) of the Helsinki Accords. These activities include the solicitation of expert testimony before Congress, providing to Congress and the public reports on implementation of the Helsinki Accords, and the publication of human rights documents issued by independent monitoring groups. In addition, the Chairman and Co-Chairman of the Commission lead delegations to participating States and to meetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In undertaking a trip to Poland at this time, the Helsinki Commission had two main objectives. First, the Commission hoped to evaluate the status of human rights reform in the wake of the quantitative and qualitative changes which had taken place in Poland since the Commission's trip to Poland in April 1988 and in light of the new opportunities for reform created by the Round-Table Agreement of April 1989. Second, the delegation was interested in establishing direct contact with those segments of the National Assembly which were democratically elected.3 During the course of the trip, the delegation visited Gdansk, Warsaw. and Krakow. Meetings were held with senior leaders from key political groups, memhers of the Polish parliament, independent human rights advocates, opposition journalists, and environmental activists.
Paris Human Dimension Meeting: Human Rights in the Helsinki ProcessTuesday, July 18, 1989
This hearing, chaired by Commissioner Steny Hoyer, took place after the first meeting of three 4-week meetings of the Conference of the Human Dimension. These meetings were a function of the Conference on the Security and Cooperation in Europe the first of which took place on June 23, with the 35 member states of the OSCE in attendance. On the U.S.’s part, the goal was to seek greater implementation of the human rights and human contacts provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The atendees discussed the Vienna Concluding Document of January 1989, continued Soviet and East European violations of the rights of national minorities and religious believers and restrictions on the rights of free assembly, association, expression, and noncompliance with human contacts provisions, and fostering greater respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The London Information Forum of the CSCE - Compilation of SpeechesTuesday, April 18, 1989
The London Information Forum was the first non-military follow-up activity to be held within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe following the conclusion of the Vienna CSCE Review Meeting. The forum's aims, as mandated by the Vienna document, included examination of the circulation of, access to and exchange of information; cooperation in the field of information; and the improvement of working conditions for journalists. The London Information Forum addressed fundamental human rights questions: the right to free expression and free choice of information sources. At issue were not only new initiatives in the exchange of information, but also improved compliance with existing CSCE commitments.
Conclusion of the Vienna Meeting and implications for U.S. PolicyThursday, February 23, 1989
The general tenor of East-West relations has changed considerably in recent years. Some changes give cause for hope, others reinforce longstanding doubts. The Helsinki process in general, and the Vienna Meeting in particular, have contributed to this dynamic period, and rightly so, for change is what the Helsinki process is all about, the changing relationships between governments, their citizens, as well as between states. The Vienna Concluding Document itself contains more precise provisions than any previous CSCE document. Particularly noteworthy are those texts concerning religious freedoms, the rights of national minorities, freedoms of movement, the environment, and information. The document, like those which preceded it, will be used as a standard against which to measure the behavior of the participating States. For it is a demonstration of commitment which will give the document its true meaning.
Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-Up MeetingThursday, January 05, 1989
The representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia met in Vienna from 4 November 1986 to 19 January 1989 in accordance with the provisions of the Final Act relating to the Follow-Up to the conference, as well as on the basis of the other relevant CSCE documents. The representatives of the participating States reaffirmed their commitment to the CSCE process and underlined its essential role in increasing confidence, in opening up new ways for cooperation, in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and thus strengthening international security.
Dr. Terry Hopmann is one of few American academics who has followed the Helsinki Process as it developed over four decades from a multilateral conference of 35 countries dealing with Cold War divisions – the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe – to a regional organization of 57 countries confronting a broad range of challenges across its security, economic and human dimensions – today’s Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
As well-acquainted with the intricacies of its institutional development as the diplomats who negotiated them, Hopmann also considers the Helsinki Process and its importance in the context of the broader development of European affairs and the U.S.-Russian relationship. In his current capacity as Professor of International Relations and Conflict Management at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), based in Washington, DC, Hopmann not only introduces the OSCE to graduate students preparing for a career in international relations but also invites them to contribute to the intensive study of OSCE-related hot spots, including through field visits to areas such as Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Focusing especially on security issues, Dr. Hopmann frequently interacts with the Helsinki Commission, both at OSCE-organized meetings in Europe and at Commission-organized briefings and hearings in Washington. In light of the numerous challenges the OSCE currently faces, including Russia’s markedly aggressive behavior and fears of an eroding U.S. commitment to European security and cooperation, Helsinki Commission staff recently sought Hopmann out to discuss the utility of the Helsinki Process in the past, and the interplay of U.S., Russian and European interests through the OSCE today and into the future.
The OSCE’s Value
Hopmann asserts in no uncertain terms that “OSCE membership is very beneficial for the United States.” The organization has made major contributions to defusing conflicts and increasing military transparency, Hopmann believes; he also underlines the need to keep in mind the organization’s role in the defense of human rights.
“The OSCE’s defense of national sovereignty, minority rights, and other important socio-political freedoms, together help prevent or at least de-escalate conflict, and make escalation harder. We see this precise action with regards to Ukraine right now. There’s a lot of value in that,” he notes.
“The OSCE remains important for the U.S. in promoting its interests abroad, and at relatively low cost,” Hopmann adds. “Still, the OSCE needs more support. The United States has struggled to engage with multilateral organizations and this represents a major issue. Without permanent and knowledgeable diplomatic representation and without the guarantee of adequate funding and resources, the OSCE’s capacity to act is severely hindered, and we play a role in that. Furthermore, the fact that we do not have a permanent representative there at the moment devalues the OSCE in ways that are dangerous.”
Hopmann calls for the United States to continue to “support the OSCE institutions and missions, help its fellow member states in their work at the OSCE, and not forget its commitment to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, nor lose sight of their significance.”
In the past, the Helsinki Process made important contributions to stability and peace in Europe, Hopmann believes. The confidence-building measures developed through the Helsinki Process of the mid-1970s, in particular, “initiated the practice of international observation and greater transparency. As a result, states could now better distinguish military maneuvers and exercises from preparations for a surprise attack. In many ways this was the most important breakthrough during the Cold War, greatly reducing the risk for surprise attack from the Soviet Union. This anxiety was a root cause of the Cold War and animated the conduct of both Western and Eastern powers. Of course, there were the ideological arguments that influenced the political landscape, but in Europe, the fear of Soviet aggression was immense.” At the time these confidence-building measures were negotiated, the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was still a vivid, recent memory.
Hopmann also acknowledges the value of the other, non-military baskets of issues discussed in the Helsinki context.
“The human rights basket was also important, though not as immediate,” he observes. “For the negotiators, this basket was less about human rights, but more about the promotion of human interaction. It was, effectively, an agreement to begin encouraging cultural and educational exchange. In the shorter term, the first basket [on political-military issues] was critical, but in the longer term, the third basket [on human rights] became more important - particularly after the 1986 Stockholm agreement updated the CSBMs that were at the heart of Helsinki’s Basket 1. Then, following the Vienna Review Conference that concluded in early 1989, suddenly people were guaranteed the right to enter and leave their own country. Here, we see the first breach in the Iron Curtain when Hungary allowed people to cross freely into Austria – it didn’t all fall at once in 1989, rather it was a gradual process that started with a CSCE set of expanded principles. “
Hopmann considers the institutional development of the European security architecture in the post-Cold War period to have in many ways played out to the OSCE’s disadvantage. Although initially successful in the 1990s with the deployment of field missions, successive U.S. administrations have missed an opportunity by viewing the OSCE as an organization principally relating to human rights concerns, rather than political-military security.
“We missed the idea that NATO and the OSCE are not mutually exclusive,” he says “While we’ve contributed a lot to the OSCE, NATO remains the priority for policy makers in Washington. We have yet to realize how closely and effectively they can and should be working together. I believe this is our biggest foreign policy mistake since the end of the Cold War. It is the most effective way to bring Russia to the negotiating table and it is far easier to work with them in Vienna than the UN. The OSCE remains a security institution, like NATO, and as long as we value using all diplomatic measures to resolve conflict before using military force, we’re making a mistake by underutilizing the OSCE.”
A growing European Union has not necessarily helped, Hopmann believes.
“The development of the E.U. has somewhat complicated the operation of the OSCE. Through the creation of its own common foreign and security policy and other initiatives, Brussels has duplicated OSCE institutions, but without the participation of the United States and Russia. Thus, the E.U. alone simply isn’t as effective,” he observes. “There is a lot of overlap between the two bodies and this begets structural and bureaucratic blockages that prevent action, especially when E.U. and OSCE representatives diverge or try to do the same thing independently. So, like OSCE-NATO relations, the E.U.’s relationship with the OSCE is occasionally marked by competition that hurts both parties’ effectiveness.”
The View from Kremlin Walls
Many of the earlier successes of the Helsinki Process were enabled by a very different leadership in Moscow than that we see today, Hopmann suggests. Under the late-Soviet leadership and Russian President Yeltsin, “there was a real interest to engage more with the West. They were, generally speaking, in support of Helsinki and didn’t view it as a threat to Russian interests,” he says. “That strongly contrasts with Putin. Putin has a totally different worldview and perceives the OSCE’s interests as inimical to Russian national priorities. We now find a much stronger, more belligerent Russia that no longer trusts the OSCE to help protect its interests, as it once did.”
This dynamic creates a real danger that Russia could turn away from the OSCE completely. “The Kremlin could decide to leave as a result of domestic pressure or as a result of frustration with the West and its criticism. The Russians feel that they are attacked on all sides in the OSCE and obviously derive no joy from it,” Hopmann notes.
He therefore warns against outright rejection of all Russian concerns in the OSCE area, for instance as regards ensuring the protection of Russian-speaking populations in neighboring states.
“It is paramount that, in the spirit of Helsinki, we ensure Russian minorities are treated equally and fairly, to avoid perceived provocations by the West that might serve as a pretext for Russia to intervene. He suggests the closure of earlier OSCE missions in the Baltic states might have been perceived by Moscow, rightly or wrongly, as evidence that the OSCE was no longer responding to Russian concerns.
Russia’s military occupation and subsequent illegal annexation of Crimea might have been averted, Hopmann asserts, had its view of the OSCE not evolved so dramatically from the first post-Cold War decade to the second. While objecting to Kosovo’s bid for statehood based on core OSCE commitments regarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, even a decade ago Moscow was willing to engage diplomatically to resolve the issue. In the case of Crimea in 2014, it was not.
“They prioritized military force over diplomacy – the precise kind of behavior the OSCE was designed to discourage,” Hopmann states. He predicts that “while this decision may have been tactically effective, it will hurt Russia in the long run. The OSCE is designed to deal with these situations and it has the institutional framework to do so effectively – Russia failed to take advantage of the OSCE and we’re all now paying the price.”
Still, Moscow recognizes that the OSCE is still valuable to Russian interests, according to Hopmann: “Russia wields a lot of influence in the OSCE because of their effective veto power under the consensus rule – indeed, the Kremlin recognizes the sway it carries in it and recognizes the OSCE as the place where it can effectively and discreetly negotiate with both the U.S. and the E.U. Ultimately, the OSCE is designed precisely to facilitate this kind of diplomatic interaction, and it meshes more closely with Putin’s view of how diplomacy should be conducted than the U.N. I believe it is for this reason that the Russians have been willing to work with the OSCE on some issues, including the conflict in Ukraine.”
Effectively engaging Russia at the OSCE will remain a challenge, Hopmann adds, suggesting that a multilateral format may be useful.
“The most important question we face is how to continue the discussion and being firm with Russia when it blatantly violates OSCE norms as it did in Ukraine, without going overboard with our criticisms,” he says. “There are some countries, like Austria, Finland and Switzerland that are simply better at dealing with Russia, due to their past or current neutrality. Russia prefers to deal through them and likely finds it easier to appear to cooperate with them than working directly with the U.S.”
On the OSCE’s Role in Conflicts
The OSCE is demonstrating clear added-value in conflict areas today, according to Hopmann, including in and around Ukraine, and as regards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Hopmann praised the OSCE as having “played a key role in ensuring the [Ukraine] conflict does not escalate and cause more destruction. Indeed, within the limits of its mandate and available resource, the OSCE has done admirable work; however, this scope is limited and much remains to be done. Thus, the best thing the U.S. can do is to continue to support the OSCE’s mission and the Minsk process. It’s not ideal, but there’s no better option.”
Frustration over the OSCE’s inability to overcome the absence of political will to prevent or stop the conflict altogether should not overshadow its success in ascertaining the facts on the ground and galvanizing a defense of key principles guiding international behavior, he believes.
Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, Hopmann suggests that the OSCE has moderated what could otherwise be a much more intense conflict.
“The presence of the OSCE has helped already,” he says. “Its presence helped diffuse the four day war last year and prevented it from becoming a more violent conflict. Still, there is significant risk that the conflict will escalate and this highlights the importance of OSCE and the role it may play in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh question.”
Hopmann believes that an alignment of U.S.-Russian interests in Nagorno-Karabakh, even if partial, may be helpful here. “The OSCE absolutely has the mandate and ability to negotiate such a deal and to organize peace-keeping initiatives to ensure the conflict does not start up again. That being said, this process will be long, complicated, and expensive,” he predicts.
Hopmann concedes that the OSCE will remain beset for the foreseeable future with challenges largely emanating from the consensus-based decision-making process, over which any one country (including Russia) effectively has a veto.
However, he remains convinced that “that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t continue dialogue. In fact, we must continue dialogue. Many people remain committed to the OSCE and its values, including some Russian diplomats – though they’re keeping a low profile at the moment. This bodes well not only for change in the OSCE, but also for Russia. Change is not impossible, and keeping the dialogue channels open is of incredible importance. Without them, when the chance to encourage positive change does appear, we will not be able to capitalize on it. We worked together immediately after the Cold War to diffuse East-West tensions and ensure a peaceful Europe. There is no reason we cannot do that again.”
Professor Hopmann was interviewed by Bob Hand and Alex Tiersky, Helsinki Commission Staff.
Dr. Hopmann’s academic focus on the OSCE started in 1974, while he was a professor at the University of Minnesota on sabbatical with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Geneva, Switzerland.
Although his initial focus was on other international disarmament efforts, he was swept up in the work of what has been called the “stage two” of the original negotiations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that was being conducted in Geneva at the time.
“I interviewed many of the negotiators from most of the participating States and completed a project on the drafting process specifically on the “Decalogue” (10 Principles Guiding Relation Between States) and the security basket,” he says. “Academically, I had been focusing on NATO-Warsaw Pact relations in times of conflict and of détente, and how they reconciled security and cooperation.”
Now teaching a generation of students not born during the Cold War, Hopmann said it is hard sometimes to communicate “the level of anxiety and imminent threat that we perceived” living during the height of the confrontation. And when conveying the relevance today of the work of the OSCE, he views simplistic comparisons between the Putin regime and its Soviet predecessors as unhelpful.
Putin “is far more in line with tsarist conceptions of Russia and imperium,” he observes, adopting the realpolitik view of 19th century international politics rather than the sense of ideological and class struggle that predominated in the 20th century.
Hopmann often visits Vienna, Austria, where the OSCE Permanent Council meets, and is a regular contributor and member of the editorial board to the OSCE Yearbook published by the Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy) at the University of Hamburg in Germany. He has also served as a public member of the U.S. Delegations to the OSCE Review Conference that preceded the November 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul, Turkey.