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The OSCE at a Crossroads
An Interview with Professor P. Terrence Hopmann
Thursday, October 12, 2017

Dr. Terry Hopmann is one of few American academics who has followed the Helsinki Process as it developed over four decades from a multilateral conference of 35 countries dealing with Cold War divisions – the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe – to a regional organization of 57 countries confronting a broad range of challenges across its security, economic and human dimensions – today’s Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

As well-acquainted with the intricacies of its institutional development as the diplomats who negotiated them, Hopmann also considers the Helsinki Process and its importance in the context of the broader development of European affairs and the U.S.-Russian relationship.  In his current capacity as Professor of International Relations and Conflict Management at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), based in Washington, DC, Hopmann not only introduces the OSCE to graduate students preparing for a career in international relations but also invites them to contribute to the intensive study of OSCE-related hot spots, including through field visits to areas such as Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Focusing especially on security issues, Dr. Hopmann frequently interacts with the Helsinki Commission, both at OSCE-organized meetings in Europe and at Commission-organized briefings and hearings in Washington. In light of the numerous challenges the OSCE currently faces, including Russia’s markedly aggressive behavior and fears of an eroding U.S. commitment to European security and cooperation, Helsinki Commission staff recently sought Hopmann out to discuss the utility of the Helsinki Process in the past, and the interplay of U.S., Russian and European interests through the OSCE today and into the future.

The OSCE’s Value

Hopmann asserts in no uncertain terms that “OSCE membership is very beneficial for the United States.”  The organization has made major contributions to defusing conflicts and increasing military transparency, Hopmann believes; he also underlines the need to keep in mind the organization’s role in the defense of human rights.

“The OSCE’s defense of national sovereignty, minority rights, and other important socio-political freedoms, together help prevent or at least de-escalate conflict, and make escalation harder. We see this precise action with regards to Ukraine right now. There’s a lot of value in that,” he notes.

“The OSCE remains important for the U.S. in promoting its interests abroad, and at relatively low cost,” Hopmann adds.  “Still, the OSCE needs more support. The United States has struggled to engage with multilateral organizations and this represents a major issue. Without permanent and knowledgeable diplomatic representation and without the guarantee of adequate funding and resources, the OSCE’s capacity to act is severely hindered, and we play a role in that. Furthermore, the fact that we do not have a permanent representative there at the moment devalues the OSCE in ways that are dangerous.”

Hopmann calls for the United States to continue to “support the OSCE institutions and missions, help its fellow member states in their work at the OSCE, and not forget its commitment to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, nor lose sight of their significance.”

In the past, the Helsinki Process made important contributions to stability and peace in Europe, Hopmann believes. The confidence-building measures developed through the Helsinki Process of the mid-1970s, in particular, “initiated the practice of international observation and greater transparency. As a result, states could now better distinguish military maneuvers and exercises from preparations for a surprise attack. In many ways this was the most important breakthrough during the Cold War, greatly reducing the risk for surprise attack from the Soviet Union. This anxiety was a root cause of the Cold War and animated the conduct of both Western and Eastern powers. Of course, there were the ideological arguments that influenced the political landscape, but in Europe, the fear of Soviet aggression was immense.” At the time these confidence-building measures were negotiated, the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was still a vivid, recent memory.

Hopmann also acknowledges the value of the other, non-military baskets of issues discussed in the Helsinki context.

“The human rights basket was also important, though not as immediate,” he observes. “For the negotiators, this basket was less about human rights, but more about the promotion of human interaction. It was, effectively, an agreement to begin encouraging cultural and educational exchange.  In the shorter term, the first basket [on political-military issues] was critical, but in the longer term, the third basket [on human rights] became more important - particularly after the 1986 Stockholm agreement updated the CSBMs that were at the heart of Helsinki’s Basket 1. Then, following the Vienna Review Conference that concluded in early 1989, suddenly people were guaranteed the right to enter and leave their own country. Here, we see the first breach in the Iron Curtain when Hungary allowed people to cross freely into Austria – it didn’t all fall at once in 1989, rather it was a gradual process that started with a CSCE set of expanded principles. “

Hopmann considers the institutional development of the European security architecture in the post-Cold War period to have in many ways played out to the OSCE’s disadvantage.  Although initially successful in the 1990s with the deployment of field missions, successive U.S. administrations have missed an opportunity by viewing the OSCE as an organization principally relating to human rights concerns, rather than political-military security.

“We missed the idea that NATO and the OSCE are not mutually exclusive,” he says “While we’ve contributed a lot to the OSCE, NATO remains the priority for policy makers in Washington. We have yet to realize how closely and effectively they can and should be working together. I believe this is our biggest foreign policy mistake since the end of the Cold War. It is the most effective way to bring Russia to the negotiating table and it is far easier to work with them in Vienna than the UN. The OSCE remains a security institution, like NATO, and as long as we value using all diplomatic measures to resolve conflict before using military force, we’re making a mistake by underutilizing the OSCE.”

A growing European Union has not necessarily helped, Hopmann believes. 

“The development of the E.U. has somewhat complicated the operation of the OSCE. Through the creation of its own common foreign and security policy and other initiatives, Brussels has duplicated OSCE institutions, but without the participation of the United States and Russia. Thus, the E.U. alone simply isn’t as effective,” he observes. “There is a lot of overlap between the two bodies and this begets structural and bureaucratic blockages that prevent action, especially when E.U. and OSCE representatives diverge or try to do the same thing independently. So, like OSCE-NATO relations, the E.U.’s relationship with the OSCE is occasionally marked by competition that hurts both parties’ effectiveness.”

The View from Kremlin Walls

Many of the earlier successes of the Helsinki Process were enabled by a very different leadership in Moscow than that we see today, Hopmann suggests. Under the late-Soviet leadership and Russian President Yeltsin, “there was a real interest to engage more with the West. They were, generally speaking, in support of Helsinki and didn’t view it as a threat to Russian interests,” he says. “That strongly contrasts with Putin. Putin has a totally different worldview and perceives the OSCE’s interests as inimical to Russian national priorities. We now find a much stronger, more belligerent Russia that no longer trusts the OSCE to help protect its interests, as it once did.” 

This dynamic creates a real danger that Russia could turn away from the OSCE completely.  “The Kremlin could decide to leave as a result of domestic pressure or as a result of frustration with the West and its criticism. The Russians feel that they are attacked on all sides in the OSCE and obviously derive no joy from it,” Hopmann notes.   

He therefore warns against outright rejection of all Russian concerns in the OSCE area, for instance as regards ensuring the protection of Russian-speaking populations in neighboring states. 

“It is paramount that, in the spirit of Helsinki, we ensure Russian minorities are treated equally and fairly, to avoid perceived provocations by the West that might serve as a pretext for Russia to intervene. He suggests the closure of earlier OSCE missions in the Baltic states might have been perceived by Moscow, rightly or wrongly, as evidence that the OSCE was no longer responding to Russian concerns.

Russia’s military occupation and subsequent illegal annexation of Crimea might have been averted, Hopmann asserts, had its view of the OSCE not evolved so dramatically from the first post-Cold War decade to the second.  While objecting to Kosovo’s bid for statehood based on core OSCE commitments regarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, even a decade ago Moscow was willing to engage diplomatically to resolve the issue. In the case of Crimea in 2014, it was not.

“They prioritized military force over diplomacy – the precise kind of behavior the OSCE was designed to discourage,” Hopmann states.  He predicts that “while this decision may have been tactically effective, it will hurt Russia in the long run. The OSCE is designed to deal with these situations and it has the institutional framework to do so effectively – Russia failed to take advantage of the OSCE and we’re all now paying the price.”

Still, Moscow recognizes that the OSCE is still valuable to Russian interests, according to Hopmann: “Russia wields a lot of influence in the OSCE because of their effective veto power under the consensus rule – indeed, the Kremlin recognizes the sway it carries in it and recognizes the OSCE as the place where it can effectively and discreetly negotiate with both the U.S. and the E.U. Ultimately, the OSCE is designed precisely to facilitate this kind of diplomatic interaction, and it meshes more closely with Putin’s view of how diplomacy should be conducted than the U.N. I believe it is for this reason that the Russians have been willing to work with the OSCE on some issues, including the conflict in Ukraine.”

Effectively engaging Russia at the OSCE will remain a challenge, Hopmann adds, suggesting that a multilateral format may be useful. 

“The most important question we face is how to continue the discussion and being firm with Russia when it blatantly violates OSCE norms as it did in Ukraine, without going overboard with our criticisms,” he says. “There are some countries, like Austria, Finland and Switzerland that are simply better at dealing with Russia, due to their past or current neutrality. Russia prefers to deal through them and likely finds it easier to appear to cooperate with them than working directly with the U.S.”

On the OSCE’s Role in Conflicts

The OSCE is demonstrating clear added-value in conflict areas today, according to Hopmann, including in and around Ukraine, and as regards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

Hopmann praised the OSCE as having “played a key role in ensuring the [Ukraine] conflict does not escalate and cause more destruction. Indeed, within the limits of its mandate and available resource, the OSCE has done admirable work; however, this scope is limited and much remains to be done. Thus, the best thing the U.S. can do is to continue to support the OSCE’s mission and the Minsk process. It’s not ideal, but there’s no better option.” 

Frustration over the OSCE’s inability to overcome the absence of political will to prevent or stop the conflict altogether should not overshadow its success in ascertaining the facts on the ground and galvanizing a defense of key principles guiding international behavior, he believes. 

Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, Hopmann suggests that the OSCE has moderated what could otherwise be a much more intense conflict. 

“The presence of the OSCE has helped already,” he says. “Its presence helped diffuse the four day war last year and prevented it from becoming a more violent conflict. Still, there is significant risk that the conflict will escalate and this highlights the importance of OSCE and the role it may play in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh question.”

Hopmann believes that an alignment of U.S.-Russian interests in Nagorno-Karabakh, even if partial, may be helpful here.  “The OSCE absolutely has the mandate and ability to negotiate such a deal and to organize peace-keeping initiatives to ensure the conflict does not start up again. That being said, this process will be long, complicated, and expensive,” he predicts.

The Future

Hopmann concedes that the OSCE will remain beset for the foreseeable future with challenges largely emanating from the consensus-based decision-making process, over which any one country (including Russia) effectively has a veto. 

However, he remains convinced that “that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t continue dialogue. In fact, we must continue dialogue. Many people remain committed to the OSCE and its values, including some Russian diplomats – though they’re keeping a low profile at the moment. This bodes well not only for change in the OSCE, but also for Russia. Change is not impossible, and keeping the dialogue channels open is of incredible importance. Without them, when the chance to encourage positive change does appear, we will not be able to capitalize on it. We worked together immediately after the Cold War to diffuse East-West tensions and ensure a peaceful Europe. There is no reason we cannot do that again.”

Professor Hopmann was interviewed by Bob Hand and Alex Tiersky, Helsinki Commission Staff.

Hopmann’s History with the Helsinki Process

Dr. Hopmann’s academic focus on the OSCE started in 1974, while he was a professor at the University of Minnesota on sabbatical with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Geneva, Switzerland. 

Although his initial focus was on other international disarmament efforts, he was swept up in the work of what has been called the “stage two” of the original negotiations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that was being conducted in Geneva at the time.   

“I interviewed many of the negotiators from most of the participating States and completed a project on the drafting process specifically on the “Decalogue” (10 Principles Guiding Relation Between States) and the security basket,” he says.  “Academically, I had been focusing on NATO-Warsaw Pact relations in times of conflict and of détente, and how they reconciled security and cooperation.”

Now teaching a generation of students not born during the Cold War, Hopmann said it is hard sometimes to communicate “the level of anxiety and imminent threat that we perceived” living during the height of the confrontation.  And when conveying the relevance today of the work of the OSCE, he views simplistic comparisons between the Putin regime and its Soviet predecessors as unhelpful. 

Putin “is far more in line with tsarist conceptions of Russia and imperium,” he observes, adopting the realpolitik view of 19th century international politics rather than the sense of ideological and class struggle that predominated in the 20th century.

Hopmann often visits Vienna, Austria, where the OSCE Permanent Council meets, and is a regular contributor and member of the editorial board to the OSCE Yearbook published by the Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy) at the University of Hamburg in Germany.  He has also served as a public member of the U.S. Delegations to the OSCE Review Conference that preceded the November 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul, Turkey.

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    During this reporting period, the most-significant development affecting implementation of commitments undertaken at the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was the beginning on October 4 in Belgrade of the first CSCE follow-up meeting. President Carter's appointment of the distinguished American jurist and diplomat, Arthur J. Goldberg, as Chairman of the US delegation and Ambassador-at-large for CSCE demonstrates the importance which the President attaches to the CSCE process and to the Belgrade meeting in particular. This meeting provides the first opportunity to conduct a full review of the understandings contained in the CSCE Final Act, signed by 35 heads of state at Helsinki in August 1975. It also offers a forum to set forth clearly the President's personal commitment to a dialogue on humanitarian matters as one of the fundamental aspects of detente. Ambassador Goldberg leads a delegation which includes all of the Congressional members of the CSCE Commission as well as members of the Commission staff, a number of distinguished public members from business, academia, the labor movement and other walks of life, plus representatives of several government departments and agencies. In preparing for the Belgrade conference, the United States delega-t tion called upon the resources of other government departments and, with the assistance of the CSCE Commission, heard the views of numerous private organizations whose interests are affected by provisions of the Final Act. As a result, Ambassador Goldberg entered the Belgrade meeting with the broad support of the American people for his important task. On instructions approved personally by the President, all delegation members are working to assure that the Belgrade discussions result in an honest and candid review of areas where progress has been made and of areas where greater efforts are needed, especially in the vital field of human rights. The Administration shares the view expressed in the report issued by the CSCE Commission on the second anniversary of the Helsinki Summit that the Final Act offers significant potential for improvement of relations between East and West. We also agree that much of that potential is yet to be realized. The Belgrade meeting has offered a unique opportunity to give new impetus to the longterm process initiated with signature of the Final Act and to ensure that the great potential represented by this process is not left to dissipate. The Belgrade meeting is a new venture in the history of East- West relations. It is not a negotiation as such, and it does not look toward a new agreement or to changes in the Helsinki Final Act. Its task is to conduct an exchange of views on experience gained during the past two years and to examine means of deepening coopera- tion in the future. The experience gained in the course of this exchange will be one of the most important results of the meeting. Based on this experience, the participants should be better able to pursue implementation both in their own countries and in their mutual relations in years to come.

  • Implementation of the Final Act: Findings and Recommendations Two Years After Helsinki

    In December 1976, at the conclusion of an 18-day study mission in Europe, five members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe reported that the "potential" of the 1975 Helsinki accords "for improving East-West relations over the long term is far more significant than their initial impact." Eight months of inquiry later-on the second anniversary of the signing of the Final Act-the Commission remains confident of the constructive "potential" of the 35-nation agreement. It finds, however, that much of the potential is yet to be realized. The potential has been dramatized by the popular response in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to the Helsinki accord provisions on human rights, eased conditions for travel and family reunification and freer flow of information. The impact of the Final Act on private individuals -- thanks to its immediate and widespread publication in the Warsaw Pact states -- has been great. Its publication stimulated significant expectations of change in governmental conduct. Those expectations, however, have been dashed in some instances, realized only partially in many others. Signatories have been obliged by a variety of political considerations to move cautiously, if at all, to tailor their foreign or domestic conduct to the specifications endorsed at the Helsinki summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Having "declare[d] their determination to act in accordance with the provisions contained" in the Final Act,2 the participating states have -- with a few significant exceptions -- generally continued to act with limited regard for the undertakings they gave one another on August 1, 1975. The Final Act was meant to give an impulse toward a common code of European and North Atlantic diplomatic and civil conduct. Both an expression of and a political stimulus to the process of international detente, the Final Act is also, quite specifically, a framework for relaxation of East-West tensions and the promotion of more stable relations between different and differing social systems. As a nonbinding declaration of intentions (not a treaty), however, it could do no more than define aspirations and outline the manner in which they were to be met. The record of its implementation is the test of its impact. The record of the first 2 years has been more productive than the Commission expected, though far short of the high promises which the language of the Final Act holds forth. Signatory nations have treated the document seriously, though respect for some of its provisionsparticularly in the area of human rights -- has not matched either the commitments given nor the hopes those pledges aroused. The Helsinki accord has not brought dramatic changes in East-West relations, but history may note it as more than a small step toward peace and a stability based on something more than mutual fear. Two years is a relatively short time in which to alter the long standing practices of sovereign nations, either in regard to one another or to their citizenries. In measuring the achievements of the Helsinki accord, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance cautioned the Commission, "I do not think that one can take a look at it in this moment alone and say it has either been a success or a failure. I think what you have now is a mixture of things. We have some slight movement forward in certain areas; we have no movement in others; and we have retrogression in others. But I think that a process has been started. . . and that we must stay with that process and continue to press what we believe to be correct." The Commission concurs in stressing the value of a process which has made it possible for the officials and private citizens of the 35 signatories to engage one another in discussions and exchanges made legitimate and significant by the Final Act. At the international level, the conference of the participating states in Belgrade this year creates the first opportunity to evaluate jointly the progress that has and has not been made and to impart fresh momentum to the process which the Final Act set in motion. The conferees at Belgrade, however, have little reason for self-congratulation. As they review the record of implementation. they must conclude-as this Commission does-that the distance to be covered toward the Final Act's goal of "peace, security and justice and the continuing development of friendly relations and cooperation" is far greater than the very limited advances already achieved. No participant in the Belgrade meeting can convincingly claim for his nation a perfect record of compliance with all Final Act principles and provisions. All too often the intentions the signatories expressed have been ignored in practice. On occasion-and, in some instances, systematically-the letter and spirit of the Helsinki accord have been violated. The burden of responsibility for failures of omission and commission in human rights and humanitarian matters does fall more heavily on the countries of the Warsaw Pact than on the other 28 si-natories, either individually or in various groupings. It must be recognized that the Final Act, by the nature of its provisions, calls for more action by the Soviet Union and its East European allies to alter existing practices than it requires of the Western signatories. It would be a mistake, however, to consider all Warsaw Pact states as having entirely common policies in this regard. There is a degree of East European govern- ment concern over human rights to which Western observers are sometimes insensitive. A relatively open society has little difficulty honoring commitments such as those of the Final Act signatories -- to ease travel, contact, and flow of information across frontiers. The adjustment -- though it has not yet been fully made in the visa-issuing practices of France, Great Britain, and the United States, for instance -- need not be politically wrenching. Rapid, full compliance would, however, be unsettling to the traditions and attitudes of the Communist nations. Yet even where gestures of compliance have been made, they have been dilatory and largely cosmetic. Progress, in summary, has been inadequate. Measured against either the hopes voiced at the Helsinki summit or the need for smoother and more stable relations among the signatories, the implementation of the Final Act has fallen short.

  • IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS VOL. IV - REPORTS ON SOVIET REPRESSION AND THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE

    In light of first anniversary of the creation of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, this hearing focused on the work and the plight of courageous individuals who utilized the Helsinki accords as instruments for advancing international respect for human rights. In particular, the hearing delved into the case of Anatoly Shcharansky, one of the most courageous spokesmen of human rights in the U.S.S.R., faces treason charges as groundless as they are ominous. The Soviet decision to hold a show trial for Shcharansky with phony evidence and counterfeit witnesses combined with the earlier arrest of members of Helsinki monitoring groups in Russia, Ukraine, and most recently, in Georgia, were in violation of the Helsinki accords.

  • Implementation of the Helsinki Accords Vol. III – Information Flow, And Cultural And Educational Exchanges

    In this hearing, Commissioner Dante Fascell and others discussed the impact that the Helsinki Accords had on easing and expanding the flow of ideas and information across ideological and international frontiers. The rationale for this hearing, which consisted of three mornings of testimony, was that, while the Commission has had a long and storied history of hearing and discussing the movement of people, one goal of the Helsinki Accords is to diminish the obstacles that keep the views of others out, which are also the borders that restrict freedom of movement for people.

  • Implementation of the Helsinki Accords Vol I - Human Rights and Contacts

    This hearing focused on the implementation of the Helsinki Accords and explored proposals for advancing compliance.  The Commissioners and witnesses discussed how the accords could better East-West relations. They discussed how the framework of the Helsinki accords helps provide protection against armed intervention in internal affairs, or the threat of such intervention.  The Commissioners heard testimonies from those working on human rights in Warsaw Pact countries and from many American citizens seeking reunification with relatives in Warsaw Pact countries.

  • Implementation of the Helsinki Accords Vol.I - Human Rights & Contacts

    Hon. Dante Fascell, Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presided over this hearing on the implementation of the Helsinki Accords. This hearing focused on the Commisison's consideration of the provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords dealing with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and with freer movement of people and information. The purpose was to define what the Commission knew of implementation of the accords and of their violations, to explore proposals for advancing compliance, and to seek advice on the role the accords played bettering East-West relations. Hon. Fascell was joined by Leonard Garment, former U.S. Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and Vladimir Bukovsky, former Soviet political prisoner.

  • East-West Economic Cooperation-Basket II-Helsinki Final Act

    Our immediate business is to look at Basket IT, whose scope is greater than mere questions of trade and commerce, because in many ways politics is economics. Basket IT was designed to enhance economic cooperation among CSCE states in a way to loosen restraints inhibiting dealings between the Soviet bloc and the West. The hearing will offer suggestions on resolving problems of trade with eastern CSCE states; and how the U.S. Government deals with Basket II problems and how it can improve the overall trade picture by exploiting Basket II provisions in order to bolster East-West trade initiatives.

  • Report of the Study Mission to Europe

    Study Mission of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe visited 18 signatories of the Helsinki Final Act between November 5 and November 23, 1976. The purpose of the Mission was to gather information about the current status of implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki accords and to establish contacts with key European political and governmental officials as well as private individuals and organizations concerned with various aspects of the implementation process. The CSCE Study Mission was composed of Rep. Dante B. Fascell, D-Fla. (Commission chairman); Sen. Claiborne Pell, D-R.I. (co-chairman); Rep. Jonathan Bingham, D-N.Y.; Rep. Millicent Fenwick, R-N.J.; and Rep. Paul Simon, D-Ill. Travelling individually, Commissioners and staff aides met with government officials and parliamentarians in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,' Norway, the Holy See, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia, as well as with experts at NATO, the European Community, the Council of Europe, UNESCO, the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration, the OECD, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The Mission regrets that it could not confer with all signatory countries at this time and intends to do so in the future. The limited time available precluded visits to some countries. The Warsaw Pact countries, however, refused to permit the Commissioners to visit their countries, an action which runs counter to the very spirit of Helsinki. Additionally, the Study Mission met with half a dozen private refugee organizations, a number of recent Soviet exiles, more than 30 businessmen and organizations active in East-West trade, a cross section of journalists specializing in Eastern European affairs, and more than 20 individuals and private institutions conducting research on Helsinki implementation questions. Commission members Mansfield Sprague and James G. Poor from the Departments of Commerce and Defense, respectively, attended the initial and final joint Study Mission sessions in Brussels and London, and Commissioner Monroe Leigh of the Department of State attended the Brussels meetings.

  • Helsinki Final Act (Long Version)

    The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which opened at Helsinki on 3 July 1973 and continued at Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975, was concluded at Helsinki on 1 August 1975 by the High Representatives of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia. During the opening and closing stages of the Conference the participants were addressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as their guest of honour. The Director-General of UNESCO and the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe addressed the Conference during its second stage. During the meetings of the second stage of the Conference, contributions were received, and statements heard, from the following non-participating Mediterranean States on various agenda items: the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Israel, the Kingdom of Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia.

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