-
statement
Serbian Democratization of 2000
Monday, September 25, 2000Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding me this time and for his work in helping to bring this legislation to the floor today. Mr. Speaker, as we wait to see if opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica will be allowed to secure the election, which by all accounts he seems to have secured and won, it is important for this Congress to support those seeking democratic change in Serbia as well as those undertaking democratic change in Montenegro. This bill does just that. Introduced by myself and several other cosponsors in February of 1999, and updated in light of events since that time, the bill before us today includes language to which the Senate has already agreed by unanimous consent. The State Department has been thoroughly consulted, and its requested changes as well have been incorporated into the text. Throughout there has been a bipartisan effort to craft this legislation. In short, the bill authorizes the provision of democratic assistance to those in Serbia who are struggling for change. It also calls for maintaining sanctions on Serbia until such time that democratic change is indeed underway, allowing at the same time the flexibility to respond quickly to positive developments if and when they occur. Reflective of another resolution, H. Con. Res. 118, which I introduced last year, the bill supports the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to bring those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including Slobodan Milosevic, to justice. The reasons for this bill are clear, Mr. Speaker. In addition to news accounts and presentations in other committees and other venues, the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, has held numerous hearings on the efforts of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic to stomp out democracy and to stay in power. The Commission has held three hearings specifically on this issue and one additional hearing specifically on the threat Milosevic presents to Montenegro. Of course, in the many, many hearings the commission has held on Bosnia and Kosovo over the years, witnesses testify to the role of Milosevic in instigating, if not orchestrating, conflict and war. Mr. Speaker, the regime of Milosevic has resorted to increasingly repressive measures, as we all know, to stay in power in light of the elections that were held yesterday in the Yugoslav Federation, of which Serbia and Montenegro are a part. Journalist Miroslav Filipovic received, for example, a 7-year sentence for reporting the truth about Yugoslav and Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. The very courageous Natasa Kandic, of the Humanitarian Law Fund, faces similar charges for documenting these atrocities. Ivan Stambolic, an early mentor but now a leading and credible critic of Slobodon Milosevic, was literally abducted from the streets of Belgrade. Authorities have raided the headquarters of the Center For Free Elections and Democracy, a civic, domestic monitoring organization; and members of the student movement Otpor regularly face arrest, detention and physical harassment. Political opposition candidates have been similarly threatened, harassed, and physically attacked. As news reports regularly indicate, Milosevic may also be considering violent action to bring Montenegro, which has embarked on a democratic path and distanced itself from Belgrade, back under his control. Signs that he is instigating trouble there are certainly evident. It is too early for the results of the elections to be known fully. However, this bill allows us the flexibility to react to those results. Assistance for transition is authorized, allowing a quick reaction to positive developments. Sanctions can also be eased, if needed. On the other hand, few hold hope that Milosevic will simply relinquish power. A struggle for democracy may only now just be starting and not ending. The human rights violations I have highlighted, Mr. Speaker, are also mere examples of deeply rooted institutionalized repression. Universities and the media are restricted by Draconian laws from encouraging the free debate of ideas upon which societies thrive. National laws and the federal constitution have been drafted and redrafted to orchestrate the continued power of Slobodan Milosevic. The military has been purged, as we all know, of many high-ranking professionals unwilling to do Milosevic's dirty work, and the place is a virtual military force of its own designed to tackle internal enemies who are in fact trying to save Serbia from this tyrant. Paramilitary groups merge with criminal gangs in the pervasive corruption which now exists. Sophisticated and constant propaganda has been designed over the last decade to warp the minds of the people into believing this regime has defended the interests of Serbs in Serbia and throughout former Yugoslavia. As a result, even if a democratic change were to begin in Serbia, which we all hope and pray for, the assistance authorized in this bill is needed to overcome the legacy of Milosevic. His influence over the decade has been so strong that it will take considerable effort to bring Serbia back to where it should be. Bringing democratic change to Serbia and supporting the change already taking place in Montenegro is without question in the U.S. national interest. We may differ in our positions regarding the decision to use American forces in the Balkans either for peacekeeping or peacemaking. Nothing, however, could better create the conditions for regional stability which would allow our forces to come home with their mission accomplished than a Serbia on the road to democratic recovery. There is, however, an even stronger interest. Indeed, there is a fundamental right of the people of Serbia themselves to democratic governance. They deserve to have the same rights and freedoms, as well as the opportunity for a prosperous future that is enjoyed by so many other Europeans and by our fellow Americans. The people of America, of Europe, the people of Serbia all have a strong mutual interest in ending Milosevic's reign of hatred and thuggery. This bill advances that cause.
-
publication
U.S. Statements at the 1999 OSCE Review Conference
Friday, September 01, 2000In February 1999, officials from 90 governments, including representatives from many OSCE participating States, visited Washington for the First Global Forum on Fighting Corruption among justice and security officials. Participants concluded that their governments must cooperate more closely if they were to succeed in promoting public integrity and controlling corruption among their officials. OSCE efforts served as an example to others when the international community gathered in the Netherlands in 2001 for the Second Global Forum on Fighting Corruption.
-
statement
25th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act
Thursday, July 27, 2000Mr. Speaker, next Tuesday marks the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, which organized what has become known as the Helsinki or OSCE process, a critical venue in which the United States has sought to advance human rights, democracy and the rule of law. With its language on human rights, the Helsinki Final Act granted human rights of a fundamental principle in regulating international relations. The Final Act's emphasis on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is rooted in the recognition that the declarations of such rights affirms the inherent dignity of men and women, and are not privileges bestowed at the whim of the state. The commitments are worth reading again. Among the many pages, allow me to quote from several of the documents: In the Helsinki Final Act, the participating States commit to `respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.' In the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the participating states declared, `Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings, are inalienable and are guaranteed by law. Their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of government.' In the 1991 Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, the participating States `categorically and irrevocably declare[d] that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the States concerned.' In the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the participating States committed themselves `to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations.' The 1999 Istanbul Charter for European Security and Istanbul Summit Declaration notes the particular challenges of ending violence against women and children as well as sexual exploitation and all forms of trafficking in human beings, strengthening efforts to combat corruption, eradicating torture, reinforcing efforts to end discrimination against Roma and Sinti, and promoting democracy and respect for human rights in Serbia. Equally important, the standards of Helsinki, which served as a valuable lever in pressing human rights issues also provided encouragement and sustenance to courageous individuals who dared to challenge repressive communist regimes. Many of these brave men and women, members of the Helsinki Monitoring and affiliated Groups in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia, and similar groups in Poland and Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, Soviet Jewish emigration activists, members of repressed Christian denominations and others, paid a high price in the loss of personal freedom and, in some instances, their lives, for their active support of principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. Pressure by governments through the Helsinki process at various Helsinki fora, thoroughly reviewing compliance with Helsinki commitments and raising issues with Helsinki signatory governments which violated their freely undertaken human rights commitments, helped make it possible for the people of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to regain their freedom and independence. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the OSCE region has changed dramatically. In many of the States, we have witnessed widespread and significant transformations and a consolidation of the core OSCE values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Unfortunately, in others, there has been little if any progress, and in some, armed conflicts have resulted in hundreds of thousands having been killed and in the grotesque violation of human rights. Mr. Speaker, this milestone anniversary presents the President an appropriate opportunity to issue a proclamation in recognition of the obligations we and the other OSCE States have committed to uphold. It is important to keep in mind that all of the agreements of the Helsinki process have been adopted by consensus and consequently, each participating State is equally bound by each document. In addition to committing ourselves of the faithful implementation of the OSCE principles, the President should encourage other OSCE signatories as all of us have recognized that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic principles, economic liberty, and the implementation of related commitments continue to be vital elements in promoting a new era of democracy and genuine security and cooperation in the OSCE region. Each participating State of the OSCE bears primary responsibility for raising violations of the Helsinki Final Act and the other OSCE documents. In the twenty-five years since this historic process was initiated in Helsinki, there have been many successes, but the task is far from complete. Mr. Speaker, we can look at OSCE's past with pride and its future with hope, keeping in mind President Ford's concluding comments at the signing of the Helsinki Final Act: `History will judge this conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow, not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep.'
-
hearing
Milosevic’s Crackdown in Serbia and Threat to Montenegro
Thursday, July 27, 2000At this hearing, with Commissioners Chris Smith (NJ-04) and Benjamin Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO) in attendance, witnesses testified on the atrocities committed by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Foremost on people’s minds was the conviction and sentence of years in prison of a Serbian journalist for committing “espionage” after he wrote about Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. More broadly, the hearing examined Milosevic’s efforts to perpetuate his power by forcing changes to the Yugoslav constitution and cracking down on forces in Serbia. Also in attendance were Branislav Carak of the Serbian Independent Trade Union; Stojan Cerovic, fellow at the U.S. Institute of peace; Dr. David Dasic, head of the Trade Mission of the Republic of Montenegro; and Bogdan Ivanisevic, researcher at Human Rights Watch.
-
statement
Azerbaijan's Parliamentary Elections
Wednesday, July 26, 2000Mr. Speaker, today I introduce a resolution calling on the Government of Azerbaijan to hold free and fair parliamentary elections this November. After a series of elections marred by irregularities, the upcoming election will help define the country's political orientation and its international reputation. Is Azerbaijan developing towards Western-style electoral democracy or mired in the Soviet pattern of controlled voting results? The answer to that question is important for the United States, which has significant strategic and economic interests in Azerbaijan. At age 77, Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliev is the most experienced politician in the former Soviet space. Since returning to power in 1993, he has created a semi-authoritarian political system that features highly centralized, hands-on presidential rule, with constant positive coverage in the state-run media. President Aliev controls all branches of government and the state's instruments of coercion. His implicit bargain with Azerbaijan's citizens offers stability in return for unquestioned predominance. While Azerbaijan's constitution enshrines separation of powers, neither the legislature, judiciary, press, nor opposition parties may challenge President Aliev's hold on power. Indeed, in an interview published in last Sunday's New York Times, he openly said, `I will always be president here.' Opposition parties function, publish newspapers and have some representation in parliament. But they have no access to state media, which portray them negatively, and their opportunities to influence the political process, let alone actual decision-making, are carefully restricted. With respect to elections, Azerbaijan's record has been poor. The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) monitored the 1995 and 1998 parliamentary and presidential elections, and concluded that they did not meet OSCE standards. Council of Europe observers harshly criticized the first round of the local elections in December 1999, though they noted some improvements in the second round. These flawed elections have exacerbated the deep distrust between the government and opposition parties. On May 25, the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, held hearings on the upcoming election, in which Azerbaijani Government representatives and opposition leaders participated. At that time, the main bone of contention between them was the composition of the Central Election Commission. During the hearing, a government spokesman announced that Baku was prepared to let government and opposition members veto the other side's nominees for the Commission posts set aside for independents, a major step forward. In fact, that assurance subsequently turned out to be not entirely reliable when the hard bargaining began in Baku, with the mediation of the ODIHR. Nevertheless, the agreement eventually reached did give opposition parties an opportunity to block decisions taken by the pro-presidential majority and was acclaimed by ODIHR as a fair and necessary compromise. Since then, unfortunately, the process has collapsed. Azerbaijan's parliament passed an election law on July 5 that did not include amendments recommended by the ODIHR to bring the legislation into accord with OSCE standards. The law excludes an opposition party registered in February 2000 from fielding a party list; other problematic aspects include territorial and local election commissions which are effectively under government control, the restriction of voters' rights to sign petitions nominating more than one candidate or party, and the right of domestic observers to monitor the election. President Aliev claims that he proposed modifications to the election law but parliament refused to accept them. This assertion, considering his hold on the legislature, where a loyal, pro-presidential party controls over 80 percent of the seats, is simply not plausible. In any case, if he did not approve of the law, he could have vetoed it. Instead, he signed it. On July 7, the ODIHR issued a press release `deploring' shortcomings in the election law. Opposition parties refused to participate in the work of the Central Election Commission unless the law is changed. In response, parliament amended the Central Election Commission law, depriving the opposition of the ability to block decisions. On July 20, 12 political parties, among them the leading opposition parties, warned that if parliament refuses to amend the election law, they will boycott the November ballot. Most recently, the State Department issued a statement on July 24, regretting the recent actions of Azerbaijan's parliament and urging the government and parliament in Baku to work with ODIHR, the opposition and non-governmental organizations to amend the election law in accordance with OSCE standards. Mr. Speaker, this turn of events is extremely disappointing. The last thing Azerbaijan needs is another election boycott by opposition parties. The consequences would include a parliament of dubious legitimacy, deepened distrust and societal polarization, and a movement away from electoral politics to street politics, which could threaten the country's stability. November's election offers a historic opportunity to consolidate Azerbaijani society. It is essential for the future development of Azerbaijan's democracy and for the legitimacy of its leadership that the election be free and fair and the results be accepted by society as a whole. This resolution calls on the Administration to remind President Aliev of the pledge he made in August 1997 to hold free and fair elections, and urges Azerbaijan's Government and parliament to accept ODIHR's recommendations on the election law, so that it will meet international standards. I hope my colleagues will join me, Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Pitts and Mr. Cardin in this effort, and we welcome their support.
-
briefing
Religious Liberty: The Legal Framework in Selected OSCE Countries
Wednesday, July 19, 2000At the briefing, an in-depth study examining the religious liberties laws and constitutional provisions of twelve countries: Austria, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, the United States, and Uzbekistan formally released by the Helsinki Commission was discussed. The project was inspired by the agreement of OSCE participating States to “ensure that their laws, regulations, practices and policies conform with their obligation under international law and are brought into harmony with the provisions of the Declaration on Principles and other OSCE commitments.” Various panelists addressed the issue of governments continuing to impose restrictions on individual religious liberties, despite a prior agreement to curtail anti-religious laws and governmental practices designed to prevent people from practicing or expressing their religious beliefs. Legal specialists from the Law Library of Congress emphasized a “frightening” trend in France to limit an individual’s right to freely express religious views or participate in religious activities, a Greek policy requiring one’s religious affiliation to be listed on government-issued identification cards, and Turkish raids on Protestant groups as examples of the violations of religious liberty that continue to plague these selected OSCE countries.
-
statement
Tenth Anniversary of Ukraine Sovereignty Declaration
Thursday, July 13, 2000Mr. Speaker, ten years ago, on July 16th 1990, the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of the Ukrainian S.S.R. adopted a far-reaching Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine. The overwhelming vote of 355 for and four against was a critical and demonstrative step towards independence, as Ukraine was at that time a republic of the Soviet Union. The Declaration, inspired by the democratic movement Rukh whose key members were veterans of the Helsinki movement seeking greater rights and freedoms, proclaimed Ukraine's state sovereignty and stressed the Republic's intention of controlling its own affairs. Ukraine and its people were identified as the sole source of state authority in the republic, and they alone were to determine their own destiny. The Declaration asserted the primacy of Ukraine's legislation over Soviet laws and established the right of Ukraine to create its own currency and national bank, raise its own army, maintain relations with foreign countries, collect tariffs, and erect borders. Through this Declaration, Ukraine announced its intention not to use, possess, or acquire nuclear weapons. Going beyond Soviet leader Gorbachev's vision of a `renewed' Soviet federation, the Declaration asserted Ukraine's sovereignty vis-a-vis Moscow, a move that only a few years earlier would have been met with the harshest of sanctions. The Declaration's assurances on the protection of individual rights and freedoms for all of the people of Ukraine, including national and religious minorities, were extremely important and viewed as an integral aspect of the building of a sovereign Ukraine. The Declaration itself was the outcome of emerging democratic processes in Ukraine. Elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the first in which non-communists were permitted on the ballot, had been held only a few months earlier, in March 1990; one-third of the new members elected were representatives of the democratic opposition. Even the Communist majority voted for the Declaration, reflecting the reality that the Soviet Empire was steadily unraveling. A year later, on August 24, 1991, the same Ukrainian parliament declared Ukraine's independence, and in December of that year, on the heels of a referendum in Ukraine in which over 90 percent voted for independence, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Mr. Speaker, since the adoption of the Declaration ten years ago Ukraine has witnessed momentous transformations. Independent Ukraine has developed from what was, for all practical purposes, a colony of the Soviet empire into a viable, peaceful state with a commitment to ensuring democracy and prosperity for its citizens. It has emerged as a responsible and constructive actor in the international arena which enjoys good relations with all its neighbors and a strategic partnership with the United States. Obviously, the heavy legacy of communism and Soviet misrule has not yet disappeared, as illustrated by stifling corruption, and inadequate progress in rule of law and economic reforms. However, the defeat of the communists in last November's presidential elections, and the appointment of genuinely reformist Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko have given grounds for renewed optimism, which is supported by evidence of growth in some sectors of the economy. Mr. Speaker, now is the time for the Ukrainian people to strengthen and ensure independence by redoubling their efforts to build democracy and a market economy, thereby keeping faith with the ideals and goals of the historic 1990 Declaration on Sovereignty.
-
briefing
Torture in the OSCE Region
Wednesday, June 21, 2000In advance of the 2000 commemoration of the United Nations Day in Support of the Victims of Torture, the Helsinki Commission held a briefing to focus on the continuing problem of torture in the OSCE region. In spite of these efforts and the efforts of our Commission, including introducing and working for passage of two bills, the Torture Victims Relief Act and the Reauthorization of the Torture Victims Relief Act, torture continues to be a persistent problem in every OSCE country including the United States. This briefing considered two specific problem areas, Chechnya and Turkey, as well as efforts to prevent torture and to treat torture survivors. Witnesses testifying at the briefing – including Dr. Inge Genefke, International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims; Maureen Greenwood, Advocacy Director for Europe and the Middle East, Amnesty International; and Douglas Johnson, Executive Director of the Center for the Victims of Torture – highlighted statistics about the number of torture victims in Turkey and Chechnya and related violations of individual rights.
-
hearing
Elections, Democratization, and Human Rights in Azerbaijan
Thursday, May 25, 2000The hearing will outline recent developments in Azerbaijani elections. Azerbaijan government officials announced Thursday that Azerbaijan’s government has accepted proposals to agree with the opposition about independent members of the Central Election Commission in advance of the November parliamentary election. The announcement was made during a hearing of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Azerbaijan’s Ambassador Hafiz Pashayev, accompanied by several experts who arrived from Baku for the hearing, said that negotiations between the sides, with the active mediation of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), would continue about the Central Election Commission and the election law. How these electoral developments effect Azerbaijan will be outlined.
-
publication
Report on the Presidential Election in Georgia
Thursday, April 20, 2000On April 9, 2000, Georgia held a presidential election. According to the Central Election Commission, turnout was almost 76 percent. Incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze won reelection with about 80 percent of the vote. Former Communist Party boss Jumber Patiashvili came in second, with 16.6 percent. The other candidates on the ballot were largely irrelevant. Though Shevardnadzes victory was anticipated, it remained unclear until election eve whom he would defeat. Batumi Alliance leader Aslan Abashidze, boss of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria, had announced last year plans to mount a presidential race, but many expected him to drop out, as he had no real chance of winning. By threatening a boycott, Abashidze won concessions from the CUG on the election law, but his overall strategy collapsed when his Batumi Alliance colleague, Jumber Patiashvili, announced plans to run against Shevardnadze no matter what. One day before the election, Abashidze withdrew, leaving Patiashvili as Shevardnadzes only serious contender. The OSCEs Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights election observation mission began its assessment by stating that considerable progress is necessary for Georgia to fully meet its commitments as a participating state of the OSCE. Among the problems in the election, ODIHR noted, inter alia, the authorities support for the incumbent, the failure of state media to provide balanced reportage, and the dominant role of the CUG in election commissions at all levels. While voting was generally conducted calmly, the counting and tabulation procedures lacked uniformity and, at times, transparency. The ODIHR also observed ballot stuffing and protocol tampering. Shevardnadzes prospects for resolving the conflict in Abkhazia are bleak and he has little reason to expect help from Russia. Since the beginning of Russias latest campaign against Chechnya, Moscow has accused Tbilisi of allowing or abetting the transit of Chechen fighters through Georgian territory. These allegations also aim to pressure Georgia in negotiations about the withdrawal of Russias four military bases. High-level Russian political and military figures have made it plain that Moscow will try to retain the bases and will reassert its interests in the region to counter gains by Western countries, especially the United States. Tbilisi will need help from the United States in resisting a newly aggressive Moscow. Eduard Shevardnadze has long enjoyed good relations with Washington, which gratefully remembers his contribution as Soviet Foreign Minister to ending the Cold War peacefully. The United States has provided substantial assistance to Georgia and backed Shevardnadze morally as well. Presumably the congratulations tendered at the beginning of the State Departments April 10 statement reflected appreciation for his past services, rather than acceptance at face value of the elections results. President Clinton noted the elections shortcomings in a post-election letter to Shevardnadze, reiterated Washingtons longstanding exhortation to attack corruption, and pressed him to implement urgent economic changes.
-
hearing
The Deterioration of Freedom of the Media in OSCE Countries
Tuesday, April 04, 2000The stated purpose of this hearing, presided over by Rep. Christopher Smith (NJ-04) was to draw attention to the deteriorating status of free speech and press throughout the OSCE region, raise alarm about this deterioration, and call upon OSCE participating states to recommit themselves to these freedoms. Such an impetus was drawn from how members of the press were mistreated in foreign countries. For example, 34 journalists were killed in the OSCE region in the year of 1999.
-
hearing
The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption On Democratic and Economic Reform
Thursday, March 23, 2000Commissioners Christopher Smith and Ben Nighthorse Campbell, along with others, discussed just how detrimental organized crime and corruption are on society. More specifically, organized crime negatively impact democracy’s expansion, the promotion of civil society, and security in the OSCE region, as well as economic development, particularly in southeast Europe and Central Asia. This is relevant to the United States because it has a strategic interest in promoting democratic reform and stability in the former U.S.S.R. and Central Asia. Countries in this region assist U.S. businesses exploring market opportunities, and the U.S. provides a good bit of bilateral assistance to these countries. The Helsinki Commission has pressed for greater OSCE involvement in efforts to combat corruption.
-
statement
Change in Croatia
Tuesday, February 15, 2000Mr. Speaker, in October of last year, I expressed concerns in this Chamber on the condition of democracy in Croatia. At that time, the leadership of Croatia was resisting the transition towards free elections, stalling the construction of democratic institutions, flaunting the rule of law, and squashing ethnic diversity. Those that held power were maintaining it in two significant ways. The first was through the manipulation of the political system to their advantage, including, in particular, efforts to control the media and the unwillingness to allow free and fair elections. Second, there was heavy reliance on nationalist passions for support. Zagreb's policies swayed the loyalties of Croats in neighboring Bosnia and made it difficult for the displaced Serb population to return to the country. Since last October, things have changed drastically and for the better. In the Parliamentary election of January 3, the desire of the people for change was manifested as the party that had ruled since the fall of communism was defeated by an opposition coalition led by the new Prime Minister, Ivica Racan. Meanwhile, in a special presidential election on February 7 to succeed the late Franjo Tudjman, Stipe Mesic won on promises of reform, of a more democratic political system with diminished power for the presidency, of greater cooperation with The Hague in the prosecution of war criminals, of progress in the implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia, and of the return of Croatia's displaced Serb population. These changes have been universally applauded, specifically by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during her visit to Croatia on February 2. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I join the Secretary of State in commending the new policies of Croatia's leaders, and I complement our able Ambassador to Croatia, William Montgomery, for his role in pressing for democratic change. Mr. Speaker, it is good that Croatia's new leadership is talking about substantial reform. However, we must be sure that it is not just talk. We must be sure to encourage Croatia to move closer towards full freedom, true justice, and greater prosperity for all of her citizens, regardless of ethnicity. We must continue to press for the surrender to The Hague of those indicted for war crimes. As we do, we must be ready to support Croatia, even as we have been ready to criticize Croatia's shortcomings in the past. Recent violence in southeastern Europe underscores the need for true democracy in the region. In closing, I congratulate Croatia's new leadership and its promise of progress. Now that reform is on the horizon, I am hopeful that Croatia will soon be an integrated partner in European affairs.
-
publication
Report on Ukraine's Presidential Elections: October and November 1999
Monday, December 20, 1999On November 14, President Leonid Kuchma was re-elected for another 5-years term as President of Ukraine, beating Communist Party candidate Petro Symonenko, with 56.3 percent of the votes to Symonenko's 37.8 percent. More than 27 million people, nearly 75 percent of the electorate, turned out to vote. Nearly one million people, or 3.5% of the voters, selected the option of voting for neither candidate. Despite the economic decline and widespread corruption that were hallmarks of his first term, voters chose to re-elect Kuchma, principally out of fear of a return of communism, and certainly not due to any enthusiastic embrace of his economic policies. While there were violations of Ukraine's elections law and OSCE commitments on democratic elections, especially during the second round, these did not have a decisive affect on the outcome, given Kuchma's substantial margin of victory (over five millions votes). The elections were observed by some 500 international observers, with the largest contingent by far coming from the OSCE, and some 16.000 domestic observers. While the West welcomed the Ukrainian people's rejection of communism and any plans to reinvent the Soviet Union or Russian empire, the lack of economic reforms, as well as inappropriate governmental involvement in the election campaign, dampened Western exuberance over Kuchma's election victory. Following his victory, President Kuchma claimed a mandate and promised to work resolutely for economic reforms. This, however, needs to be weighed against his dismal economic record and the questionable resumes of some of his major campaign supporters. Western governments, including the United States, almost immediately reiterated their commitment to assisting Ukraine's transition to democracy and a market economy. At the same time, these governments are waiting to see if the reality will match the rhetoric of reform.
-
statement
Democratization and Human Rights in Central Asia
Thursday, November 11, 1999Mr. Speaker, I am disappointed that the House schedule did not permit consideration of my resolution, H. Con. Res. 204, which has been co-sponsored by Representative Hoyer, Representative Forbes and Representative McKinney. The resolution voices concern about serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in most states of Central Asia, in particular, substantial noncompliance with OSCE commitments on democratization and the holding of free and fair elections. Among the countries of the former Soviet Union, only in Ukraine and Moldova have sitting presidents lost an election and peacefully left office. We will yet see what happens in Russia, where President Yeltsin has launched another war in Chechnya. It may be too much, given the historical differences between our respective societies, to hope the post-Soviet states could find among their political leaders a George Washington, who could have been king but chose not to be, and who chose to leave office after two terms. But it is not too much to hope that other post-Soviet leaders might emulate Ukraine's former President Leonid Kravchuk or Moldova's former President Mircea Snegur, not to mention Lithuania's Algirdas Brazauskas, who all allowed a peaceful transfer of power. Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, Central Asian leaders give every indication of intending to remain in office for life. Their desire for unlimited and permanent power means that they cannot implement all OSCE commitments on democracy, the rule of law and human rights, as doing so would create a level playing field for challengers and allow the media to shine the light on presidential misdeeds and high-level corruption. The result has been an entire region in the OSCE space where fundamental OSCE freedoms are ignored while leaders entrench themselves and their families in power and wealth. To give credit where it is due, the situation is least bad in Kyrgyzstan. President Akaev, a physicist, is the only Central Asian leader who was not previously the head of his republic's Communist Party. One can actually meet members of parliament who strongly criticize President Akaev and the legislature itself is not a rubber stamp body. Moreover, print media, though under serious pressure from the executive branch, exhibit diversity of views and opposition parties function. Still, in 1995, two contenders in the presidential election were disqualified before the vote. Parliamentary and presidential elections are approaching in 2000. Kyrgyzstan's OSCE partners will be watching carefully to see whether they are free and fair. Until the mid-1990s, Kazakstan seemed a relatively reformist country, where various political parties could function and the media enjoyed some freedom. But President Nazarbaev dissolved two parliaments and single-mindedly sought to accumulate sole power. In the last few years, the regime has become ever more authoritarian. President Nazarbaev has concentrated all power in his hands, subordinating to himself all other branches and institutions of government. A constitutional amendment passed in October 1999 conveniently removed the age limit of 65 to be president. The OSCE judged last January's presidential elections, from which a leading opposition contender was barred as far short of OSCE standards. Last month's parliamentary election, according to the OSCE, was “severely marred by widespread, pervasive and illegal interference by executive authorities in the electoral process.” In response, President Nazarbaev has attacked the OSCE, comparing it to the Soviet Communist Party's Politburo for trying to “tell Kazakstan what to do.” Tajikistan has suffered the saddest fate of all the Central Asian countries; a civil war that killed scores of thousands. In 1997, the warring sides finally ceased hostilities and reached agreement about power-sharing, which permitted a bit of hopefulness about prospects for normal development and democratization. It seems, however, that the accord will not ensure stability. Tajikistan's Central Election Commission refused to register two opposition candidates for the November 6 presidential election. The sole alternative candidate registered has refused to accept the results of the election, which, according to official figures, current President Emomaly Rakhmonov won with 97 percent of the vote, in a 98 percent turnout. Those numbers, Mr. Speaker, say it all. The OSCE properly declined to send observers. Benighted Turkmenistan practically beggars description. This country, which has been blessed with large quantities of natural gas, has a political system that combines the worst traits of Soviet communism with a personality cult seen today in countries like Iraq or North Korea. No dissidence of any kind is permitted and the population enjoys no human rights. While his impoverished people barely manage to get by, President Niyazov builds garish presidential palaces and monuments to himself. The only registered political party in Turkmenistan is the Democratic Party, headed by President Niyazov. In late October he said the people of his country would not be ready for the stresses and choices of a democratic society until 2010, adding that independent media are “disruptive.” On December 12, Turkmenistan is holding parliamentary “elections,” which the OSCE will not bother to observe. Finally, we come to Uzbekistan. The Helsinki Commission, which I chair, held hearings on democratization and human rights in Uzbekistan on October 18. Despite the best efforts of Uzbekistan's Ambassador Safaev to convince us that democratization is proceeding apace in his country, the testimony of all the other witnesses confirmed the widely held view that after Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan is the most repressive country in Central Asia. No opposition political activity is allowed and media present only the government's point of view. Christian denominations have faced official harassment. Since 1997, a massive government campaign has been underway against independent Muslim believers. In February of this year, explosions rocked Tashkent, which the government described as an assassination attempt by Islamic radicals allied with an exiled opposition leader. Apart from elections, a key indicator of progress towards democratization is the state of media freedom. On October 25-27, an International Conference on Mass Media in Central Asia took place in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Not surprisingly, Turkmenistan did not allow anyone to attend. The other participants adopted a declaration noting that democratization has slowed in almost all Central Asian states, while authoritarian regimes have grown stronger, limiting the scope for genuine media freedom as governments influence the media through economic means. I strongly agree with these sentiments. The concentration of media outlets in pro-regime hands, the ongoing assault on independent and opposition media and the circumscription of the media's legally-sanctioned subject matter pose a great danger to the development of democracy in Central Asia. Official statistics about how many media outlets have been privatized cover up an alarming tendency towards government monopolization of information sources. This effectively makes it impossible for citizens to receive unbiased information, which is vital if people are to hold their governments accountable. Mr. Speaker, it is clear that in Central Asia, the overall level of democratization and human rights observance is poor. Central Asian leaders make decisions in a region far from Western Europe, close to China, Iran and Afghanistan, and they often assert that “human rights are only for the West” or the building democracy “takes time.” But delaying steps towards democracy is very risky in the multi-ethnic, multi-religious region of Central Asia, where many people are highly educated and have expectations of faster change. If it does not come, tensions and conflicts could emerge that could endanger security for everyone. To lessen these risks, continuous pressure will be needed on these countries to move faster on democracy. Even as the United States pursues other interests, we should give top priority to democracy and respect for human rights, or we may live to regret not doing so.
-
statement
Central Asia: The “Black Hole” of Human Rights
Thursday, October 21, 1999Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce a resolution on the disturbing state of democratization and human rights in Central Asia. As is evident from many sources, including the State Department's annual reports on human rights, non-governmental organizations, both in the region and the West, and the work of the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, Central Asia has become the “black hole” of human rights in the OSCE space. True, not all Central Asia countries are equal offenders. Kyrgyzstan has not joined its neighbors in eliminating all opposition, tightly censoring the media and concentrating all power in the hands of the president, though there are tendencies in that direction, and upcoming elections in 2000 may bring out the worst in President Akaev. But elsewhere, the promise of the early 1990's, when the five Central Asian countries along with all former Soviet republics were admitted to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, has not been realized. Throughout the region, super-presidents pay lip service to OSCE commitments and to their own constitutional provisions on separation of powers, while dominating the legislative and judicial branches, crushing or thwarting any opposition challenges to their factual monopoly of power, and along with their families and favored few, enjoying the benefits of their countries' wealth. Indeed, though some see the main problem of Central Asia through the prism of real or alleged Islamic fundamentalism, the Soviet legacy, or poverty, I am convinced that the essence of the problem is more simple and depressing: presidents determined to remain in office for life must necessarily develop repressive political systems. To justify their campaign to control society, Central Asian leaders constantly point to their own national traditions and argue that democracy must be built slowly. Some Western analysts, I am sorry to say, have bought this idea, in some cases, quite literally, by acting as highly paid consultants to oil companies and other business concerns. But, Mr. Speaker, building democracy is an act of political will above all. You have to want to do it. If you don't, all the excuses in the world and all the state institutions formed in Central Asia ostensibly to promote human rights will remain simply window dressing. Moreover, the much-vaunted stability offered by such systems is shaky. The refusal of leaders to allow turnover at the top or newcomers to enter the game means that outsiders have no stake in the political process and can imagine coming to power or merely sharing in the wealth only be extra-constitutional methods. For some of those facing the prospect of permanent exclusion, especially as living standards continue to fall, the temptation to resort to any means possible to change the rules of the game, may be overwhelming. Most people, however, will simply opt out of the political system in disillusionment and despair. Against this general context, without doubt, the most repressive countries are Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan's President Niyazov, in particular, has created a virtual North Korea in post-Soviet space, complete with his own bizarre cult of personality. Turkmenistan is the only country in the former Soviet bloc that remains a one-party state. Uzbekistan, on the other hand, has five parties but all of them are government-created and controlled. Under President Islam Karimov, no opposition parties or movements have been allowed to function since 1992. In both countries, communist-era controls on the media remain in place. The state, like its Soviet predecessor, prevents society from influencing policy or expressing its views and keeps the population intimidated through omnipresent secret police forces. Neither country observes the most fundamental human rights, including freedom of religion, or permits any electoral challenges to its all-powerful president. Kazakstan's President Nursultan Nazarbaev has played a more clever game. Pressed by the OSCE and Western capitals, he has formally permitted opposition parties to function, and they did take part in the October 10 parliamentary election. But once again, a major opposition figure was not able to participate, and OSCE/ODIHR monitors, citing many shortcomings, have criticized the election as flawed. In general, the ability of opposition and society to influence policymaking is marginal at best. At the same time, independent and opposition media have been bought, coopted or intimidated out of existence or into cooperation with the authorities, and those few that remain are under severe pressure. Tajikistan suffered a devastating civil war in the early 1990's. In 1997, war-weariness and a military stalemate led the disputants to a peace accord and a power-sharing agreement. But though the arrangement had promise, it now seems to be falling apart, as opposition contenders for the presidency have been excluded from the race and the major opposition organization has decided to suspend participation in the work of the National Reconciliation Commission. Mr. Speaker, along with large-scale ethnic conflicts like Kosovo or Bosnia, and unresolved low-level conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, I believe the systemic flouting of OSCE commitments on democratization and human rights in Central Asia is the single greatest problem facing the OSCE. For that reason, I am introducing this resolution expressing concern about the general trends in the region, to show Central Asian presidents that we are not taken in by their facade, and to encourage the disheartened people of Central Asia that the United States stands for democracy. The resolution calls on Central Asian countries to come into compliance with OSCE commitments on democracy and human rights , and encourages the Administration to raise with other OSCE states the implications for OSCE participation of countries that engage in gross and uncorrected violation of freely accepted commitments on human rights . Mr. Speaker, I hope my colleagues will join me, Mr. Hoyer, and Mr. Forbes in this effort and we welcome their support.
-
publication
Report on Georgia's Parliamentary Elections: October 1999
Wednesday, October 20, 1999On October 31, 1999, Georgia held its third parliamentary election since gaining independence in 1991. President Eduard Shevardnadzes ruling party, the Citizens Union of Georgia, scored a convincing victory. According to the Central Election Commission, in the first round, the CUG won 41.85 percent of the party list voting, or 85 seats, along with 35 single districts. The opposition Batumi Alliance, led by Ajarian strongman Aslan Abashidze, came in second, with 25.65 percent of the vote and seven districts, gaining 51 seats. Industry Will Save Georgia was the only other party to break the sevenpercent threshold for parliamentary representation, managing 7.8 percent and 14 seats. In second-round voting on November 14, the CUG increased its lead, picking up ten more seats, and then won another two in a November 28 third round, for a total of 132. The Batumi Alliances final tally was 59. Overall, the CUG has an absolute majority in Georgias 235-seat legislature, improving on the position it held from 1995-1999. The outcome did not indicate how tense the race had been between the CUG and the leftist, proRussian Batumi Alliance. A win by the latter threatened to move Georgia into Russias orbit and away from market reforms. The election also offered a foretaste of next years presidential contest, when Abashidze runs against Shevardnazde. With such high stakes and relations so confrontational between the contending forces, charges of widespread fraud dogged the elections. Of the Central Election Commissions 19 members, only 13 signed the document announcing the results. Nevertheless, OSCEs observation mission called the first round of the election a step towards compliance with OSCE commitments, adding that most of the worst violations occurred in Ajaria. OSCEs verdict after the November 14 second round was more critical, noting violence at some polling stations and vote rigging and intimidation at others. OSCEs initial cautiously positive judgement, however, allowed Eduard Shevardnadze to claim that democratization is proceeding in Georgia and that the countrys admission to the Council of Europe was well deserved.
-
statement
Ukraine on the Eve of Elections
Wednesday, September 22, 1999Mr. Speaker, Ukraine's presidential elections will be held in a little over a month, on October 31. These elections will be an important indicator in charting Ukraine's course over the next 4 years. The stakes are high. Will Ukraine continue to move, even if at a slow and inconsistent pace, in the direction of the supremacy of law over politics, a market economy, and integration with the Euro-Atlantic community? Or will Ukraine regress in the direction of the closed economic and political system that existed during Soviet times? Clearly, the outcome of the elections will have significant implications for United States policy toward Ukraine. Despite the many internal and external positive changes that have occurred in Ukraine since its independence in 1991, including progress in creating a democratic, tolerant society and the significant role played in the stability and security of Europe, Ukraine still has a long way to go in building a sustainable democracy underpinned by the rule of law. Specifically, Ukraine needs to improve its judiciary and criminal justice system, reduce bureaucratic arbitrariness and rid itself of the stifling menace of corruption. Indeed, corruption is exacting a huge toll on Ukrainian institutions, eroding confidence in government and support for economic reforms, and discouraging domestic and foreign investment. Mr. Speaker, I am concerned about reports of violations in the conduct of the election campaign, including in the signature-gathering process and inappropriate meddling by officials, especially on the local level. I am also troubled by governmental actions against the free media, including the recent seizure of bank accounts of STB independent television and the suspension of four independent television stations in Crimea. The harassment of the print and electronic media is inconsistent with OSCE commitments. It undermines Ukraine's overall positive reputation with respect to human rights and democracy, including its generally positive record in previous elections. The Helsinki Commission, which I chair, was in the forefront of supporting respect for human rights and self-determination in Ukraine during the dark days of Soviet rule. We have viewed, and still view, Ukraine's independence as a milestone in Europe's history. However, in order to consolidate its independence and reinforce internal cohesion, Ukraine needs to speed its transition to democracy and market economy. It needs to work toward greater compliance with OSCE standards and norms. The OSCE Office for Project Coordination in Ukraine can be a useful tool to assist Ukraine in this regard and I hope that the Ukrainian government will take advantage of and benefit from the OSCE presence. Despite frustrations with certain aspects of Ukraine's reality, it is important for both the Congress and the Executive Branch to continue to support an independent, democratic Ukraine, both in terms of policies designed to strengthen United States-Ukraine relations, as well as with assistance designed to genuinely strengthen democratic and free-market development. The key is to be patient, but persistent, in encouraging progress.
-
publication
Report on Armenia's Parliamentary Elections
Wednesday, September 01, 1999On May 30, 1999, Armenia held its second parliamentary election since gaining independence. Twenty-one parties and blocs contested 56 seats set aside for party voting and over 700 individual candidates competed in 75 majoritarian races to fill the legislatures 131 seats. According to official results, turnout was almost 56 percent. The big winner in the election was the Unity bloc, an alliance of the Republican Party, headed by Defense Minister Vazgen Sarkissian, and the Peoples Party of Karen Demirchian, Armenias last Communist leader. OSCE observation missions had criticized Armenias parliamentary and presidential elections in 1995, 1996 and 1998, so Yerevan had to hold better elections to restore its damaged reputation. The May 30 election was also supposed to formalize the shift of power in early 1998, when the governing partythe Armenian National Movement (ANM)collapsed as its leader, Levon Ter-Petrossyan, was forced out and Vazgen Sarkissian came openly to the fore. Though Armenia's May 30 election was a clear improvement over previous elections, concerns persist about overall political trends. Armenia is unique among former Soviet republics in that its president, despite broad constitutional prerogatives, is not the most powerful political actor. Vazgen Sarkissian, as Defense Minister, had already gained a remarkable hold on the military, the executive branch and even the legislature, while also heading a veterans organization that controls most local authorities. Such concentration of authority in the hands of one politician bodes ill for separation of powers and the development of civil society. Even more troubling, Sarkissians record does not inspire confidence in his commitment to democracy. He now has to overcome his reputation and manage his own transition to a democratic statesman. Following the lead of the OSCE, the U.S. State Department noted the improvements over past elections but emphasized the need for further progress to bring Armenias elections up to OSCE standards and raise public trust in the process. With the OSCEs assessment having at least been better than in past elections, Yerevan can hope for the first official visit to Washington of President Kocharian this fall.
-
publication
Kazakstan's Parliamentary Elections
Tuesday, August 10, 1999The Helsinki Commission compiled a report on Kazakstan’s parliamentary election in 1999. It noted that the election did mark some forward movement; the registration of opposition political parties -- specifically the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and Azamat, along with the already registered Communist Party -- promised to give voters an opposition alternative on October 10 and to institutionalize the involvement of opposition parties in Kazakstan’s political life beyond the election. Other positive steps included the CEC’s lowering of the candidates’ deposit, the law’s provision for domestic observers and the sanctioned experiment with exit polling. The accreditation of over 2,500 non-partisan domestic observers throughout Kazakhstan was also a significant development. Even more important was an October 6 live, televised debate, which allowed voters to familiarize themselves with parties and candidates and gave some opposition figures who had not received free air time, such as Communist Party leader Serokbolsyn Abdildin, their only opportunity to campaign on television.
Mr. President, I rise to urge passage of S. Con. Res. 106, a bipartisan resolution calling upon the Government of Ukraine to ensure a democratic, transparent and fair election process for the presidential elections scheduled to be held in late October. This resolution, by encouraging fair, open and transparent elections, is a concrete expression of the commitment of the U.S. Congress to the Ukrainian people. The resolution underscores that an election process and the establishment of a genuinely democratic political system consistent with Ukraine's freely undertaken OSCE commitments is a prerequisite for Ukraine's full integration into the Western community of nations as an equal member, including into NATO. The October elections will be vital in determining Ukraine's course for years to come. They present the Ukrainian authorities with a real opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to OSCE principles and values.
As Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I would point out that Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma recently cosigned a Declaration with Russia and leaders of several other independent former Soviet states criticizing the OSCE for focusing too much attention on human rights and democratization. While disappointing, this diatribe is not surprising given the fact that under President Kuchma's leadership, Ukraine's record in such as media freedoms, elections, the rule of law and corruption has moved in the wrong direction. It is up to the OSCE states, including Ukraine, to implement their freely undertaken OSCE commitments and to take corrective measures if necessary--something I hope the Ukrainian authorities will be mindful of in the run-up to the elections. Ukraine's pre-election environment has already been decidedly problematic and of great concern to the United States and the international community. The pending resolution, S. Con. Res. 106, focuses squarely on key problem areas, including increasing control and manipulation of the media and attempts by national authorities to limit access to international broadcasting, including Radio Liberty.
Among other concerns are the serious obstacles to free assembly and a free and fair political campaign as well as substantial irregularities in several recent elections, most notably, the mayoral election held in April in the western Ukrainian city of Mukacheve. This election was marred by intimidation, violence, fraud and manipulation of the vote count, electoral disruptions and irregularities. According to the most recent report of the nonpartisan Ukrainian nongovernmental Committee of Voters of Ukraine: There was no improvement in the political environment in June compared to April and May. Instead, CVU observed an increase in the number of cases of government pressure on the opposition designed to impede their activities. Potential candidates did not enjoy equal access to the media. The level of criminal interference in the pre-election process remains very high, thus threatening free elections. GPO's PDF S. Con Res. 106 outlines those measures the Ukrainian authorities need to take--consistent with their own laws and international agreements--for a free, fair, open and transparent election process. The Ukrainian authorities at all levels, including the executive, legislative and judicial branches, need to ensure an election process that enables all of the candidates to compete on a level playing field. This includes the various ministries and agencies involved directly or indirectly in the elections process, as well as Ukraine's courts. Ukraine's October presidential elections should be a watershed for the future direction of that country of great potential. Ukrainian authorities need to radically improve the election environment if there is to be hope for these elections to meet OSCE standards. By doing so, they will go a long way in restoring the trust of the citizens of Ukraine and strengthening Ukraine's independence and democracy. Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the resolution be printed in the Record.
S. Con. Res. 106
Whereas the establishment of a democratic, transparent, and fair election process for the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine and of a genuinely democratic political system are prerequisites for that country's full integration into the Western community of nations as an equal member, including into organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Whereas the Government of Ukraine has accepted numerous specific commitments governing the conduct of elections as a participating State of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including provisions of the Copenhagen Document;
Whereas the election on October 31, 2004, of Ukraine's next president will provide an unambiguous test of the extent of the Ukrainian authorities' commitment to implement these standards and build a democratic society based on free elections and the rule of law;
Whereas this election takes place against the backdrop of previous elections that did not fully meet international standards and of disturbing trends in the current pre-election environment;
Whereas it is the duty of government and public authorities at all levels to act in a manner consistent with all laws and regulations governing election procedures and to ensure free and fair elections throughout the entire country, including preventing activities aimed at undermining the free exercise of political rights;
Whereas a genuinely free and fair election requires a period of political campaigning conducted in an environment in which neither administrative action nor violence, intimidation, or detention hinder the parties, political associations, and the candidates from presenting their views and qualifications to the citizenry, including organizing supporters, conducting public meetings and events throughout the country, and enjoying unimpeded access to television, radio, print, and Internet media on a non-discriminatory basis;
Whereas a genuinely free and fair election requires that citizens be guaranteed the right and effective opportunity to exercise their civil and political rights, including the right to vote and the right to seek and acquire information upon which to make an informed vote, free from intimidation, undue influence, attempts at vote buying, threats of political retribution, or other forms of coercion by national or local authorities or others;
Whereas a genuinely free and fair election requires government and public authorities to ensure that candidates and political parties enjoy equal treatment before the law and that government resources are not employed to the advantage of individual candidates or political parties;
Whereas a genuinely free and fair election requires the full transparency of laws and regulations governing elections, multiparty representation on election commissions, and unobstructed access by candidates, political parties, and domestic and international observers to all election procedures, including voting and vote-counting in all areas of the country;
Whereas increasing control and manipulation of the media by national and local officials and others acting at their behest raise grave concerns regarding the commitment of the Ukrainian authorities to free and fair elections;
Whereas efforts by the national authorities to limit access to international broadcasting, including Radio Liberty and the Voice of America, represent an unacceptable infringement on the right of the Ukrainian people to independent information;
Whereas efforts by national and local officials and others acting at their behest to impose obstacles to free assembly, free speech, and a free and fair political campaign have taken place in Donetsk, Sumy, and elsewhere in Ukraine without condemnation or remedial action by the Ukrainian Government;
Whereas numerous substantial irregularities have taken place in recent Ukrainian parliamentary by-elections in the Donetsk region and in mayoral elections in Mukacheve, Romny, and Krasniy Luch; and Whereas the intimidation and violence during the April 18, 2004, mayoral election in Mukacheve, Ukraine, represent a deliberate attack on the democratic process: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That Congress—
(1) acknowledges and welcomes the strong relationship formed between the United States and Ukraine since the restoration of Ukraine's independence in 1991;
(2) recognizes that a precondition for the full integration of Ukraine into the Western community of nations, including as an equal member in institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is its establishment of a genuinely democratic political system;
(3) expresses its strong and continuing support for the efforts of the Ukrainian people to establish a full democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights in Ukraine;
(4) urges the Government of Ukraine to guarantee freedom of association and assembly, including the right of candidates, members of political parties, and others to freely assemble, to organize and conduct public events, and to exercise these and other rights free from intimidation or harassment by local or national officials or others acting at their behest;
(5) urges the Government of Ukraine to meet its Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) commitments on democratic elections and to address issues previously identified by the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE in its final reports on the 2002 parliamentary elections and the 1999 presidential elections, such as illegal interference by public authorities in the campaign and a high degree of bias in the media;
(6) urges the Ukrainian authorities to ensure—
(A) the full transparency of election procedures before, during, and after the 2004 presidential elections;
(B) free access for Ukrainian and international election observers;
(C) multiparty representation on all election commissions;
(D) unimpeded access by all parties and candidates to print, radio, television, and Internet media on a non-discriminatory basis;
(E) freedom of candidates, members of opposition parties, and independent media organizations from intimidation or harassment by government officials at all levels via selective tax audits and other regulatory procedures, and in the case of media, license revocations and libel suits, among other measures;
(F) a transparent process for complaint and appeals through electoral commissions and within the court system that provides timely and effective remedies; and
(G) vigorous prosecution of any individual or organization responsible for violations of election laws or regulations, including the application of appropriate administrative or criminal penalties;
(7) further calls upon the Government of Ukraine to guarantee election monitors from the ODIHR, other participating States of the OSCE, Ukrainian political parties, candidates' representatives, nongovernmental organizations, and other private institutions and organizations, both foreign and domestic, unobstructed access to all aspects of the election process, including unimpeded access to public campaign events, candidates, news media, voting, and post-election tabulation of results and processing of election challenges and complaints; and
(8) pledges its enduring support and assistance to the Ukrainian people's establishment of a fully free and open democratic system, their creation of a prosperous free market economy, their establishment of a secure independence and freedom from coercion, and their country's assumption of its rightful place as a full and equal member of the Western community of democracies.