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hearing
The Conflict in Yugoslavia
Thursday, October 31, 1991The purpose of this hearing was to bring greater clarity to the situation in Yugoslavia and to discuss the effectiveness of the international response to date, especially in the CSCE, and how that response could be made more effective. The hearing witnesses, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs Ralph Johnson and Director of East European Studies at the Wilson Center Dr. John Lampe, gave astute assesments of the situation in the region and commented on policy options before the Congressmembers.
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publication
Congressional Delegation Visit to Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria
Saturday, April 07, 1990The Commission delegation to Yugoslavia had three main goals: (1) to observe the first, free, multi-party elections in post-War Yugoslavia, which took place in Slovenia on April 8; (2) to discuss a variety of human rights concerns; and (3) to examine firsthand the situation in Kosovo province by meeting with both Serbian and Albanian groups. The delegation visited the cities of Ljubljana, Belgrade and Pristina, and Chairman DeConcini made a separate visit to the village of Medjugorje. Meetings were held with federal, republic and provincial officials, as well as with human rights activists, religious figures, representatives of alternative groups and parties, journalists, and other private individuals. Overall, the delegation was able to accomplish these objectives. Moreover, its efforts were immediately followed by several positive developments in Yugoslavia, including the lifting of the state of emergency in Kosovo and the announced release of 108 political prisoners, including Adem Demaqi, a political prisoner with whom the delegation had sought to meet. In addition, the members of the Youth Parliament of Kosovo detained just prior to the Commission's visit were released, and former Kosovo official Azem Vlasi was acquitted in a major political trial. All of these developments addressed concerns specifically raised by the delegation during its visit.
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publication
Vienna Review Meeting of the CSCE - Phase III and IV
Friday, January 01, 1988The main activity of the Vienna Meeting throughout Phases III and IV was the presentation and negotiation of proposals for inclu sion in the concluding document of the meeting. The number (more than 160), complexity and controversial nature of many of these proposals led to the extension of the Vienna Meeting well beyond its target closing date of July 31. These factors, along with other elements such as continuing major shortcomings in the implementa tion of existing commitments, are largely responsible for the continuation of the Vienna Meeting into 1988. The slow pace of progress already evident in Phase II continued through the next phase. Each side defended its own proposals but showed little disposition to begin the process of compromise which could lead to the conclusion of the meeting. The main procedural development during this phase was the appointment of coordinators from the neutral and non-aligned states to guide the work of the drafting groups. This development provided greater order and structure for the proceedings but did little to advance the drafting work or to induce compromises. Other major developments during this phase were the introduction of the long-awaited Western proposal on military security and the tabling of a comprehensive compromise proposed in Basket III by two neutral delegations, Austria and Switzerland. Both proposals were put forth at the very end of the phase and thus did not have much impact until the next phase. The Western (NATO) proposal on military security questions was designed as a response to the Eastern proposal which envisioned two main objectives: another round of negotiations on confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) to build upon the successful Stockholm meeting and the initiation of negotiations on conventional disarmament, both within the same CSCE forum. The Western response to this proposal was delayed primarily because of United States and French differences over the connection between the conventional arms negotiations and the CSCE process, the French arguing that the negotiations should be an integral part of the process and the U.S. insisting that they be independent. The issue was resolved by agreement that the negotiations would be "within the framework of the CSCE," but should remain autonomous.
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publication
List of Organizations Involved in Exchange Programs with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Wednesday, October 01, 1986The Commission developed this report to help interested persons and organizations participate in exchange programs with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe: Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. It lists organizations which conduct exchange programs and other contacts with these countries. The parties to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe declared their intention to expand cooperation in security, economic, humanitarian, information, culture, and education affairs and to respect and put into practice certain basic principles, including those of human rights. The Final Act was signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975, by 35 heads of state or government, including the United States, Canada, and every state in Europe except Albania. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) was created as an independent government agency in 1976 to monitor compliance with the Final Act and to encourage U.S. governmental and private programs to expand East-West economic and cultural cooperation and exchange of people and ideas. In the Final Act, the signatories express the view that cultural exchanges and development of relations in education and science contribute to the strengthening of peace, better mutual under standing, and enrichment of the human personality. In the Com mission's view, exchange programs with the Soviet bloc countries break down barriers and lessen distrust. They help Americans learn about the views and goals of these societies. Such programs help expose the peoples of these countries to the values and goals of our pluralistic society. Critical to such programs is that Americans are given the opportunity to tell the Soviets and their allies on a personal level about their concern for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
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helsinki commission
Podcast: Lost and Found
Only July 11, 1995, more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys from the town of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina were rounded up, gunned down, and buried in mass graves by Bosnian Serb forces, in what was the worst mass killing in Europe since World War II. The brutality of the genocide of Srebrenica was compounded by the deliberate effort by those responsible to hide their crimes. The use of mass graves and the subsequent movement of remains of the murdered using heavy machinery meant that the identification of the victims seemed nearly impossible at the time. Ahead of the 25th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide, Kathryne Bomberger, director general of the International Commission on Missing Persons, discusses how ICMP has helped families of the Srebrenica victims find closure and pursue justice. She also discusses the commission’s evolution from dealing with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia to its work worldwide—including in Syria, Colombia, and elsewhere—today. "Helsinki on the Hill" is series of conversations hosted by the U.S. Helsinki Commission on human rights and comprehensive security in Europe and beyond. The Helsinki Commission, formally known as the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, promotes human rights, military security, and economic cooperation in 57 countries in Europe, Eurasia, and North America. Transcript | Episode 12 | Lost and Found: How the International Commission on Missing Persons Helps Find Closure and Pursue Justice
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helsinki commission
Justice Overseas
Human rights within states are crucial to security among states. Prioritizing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, defending the principles of liberty, and encouraging tolerance within societies must be at the forefront of America's foreign policy agenda. Peace, security, and prosperity cannot be sustained if national governments repress their citizens, stifle their media, or imprison members of the political opposition. Authoritarian regimes become increasingly unstable as citizens chafe under the bonds of persecution and violence, and pose a danger not only to their citizens, but also to neighboring nations. The Helsinki Commission strives to ensure that the protection of human rights and defense of democratic values are central to U.S. foreign policy; that they are applied consistently in U.S. relations with other countries; that violations of Helsinki provisions are given full consideration in U.S. policymaking; and that the United States holds those who repress their citizens accountable for their actions. This includes battling corruption; protecting the fundamental freedoms of all people, especially those who historically have been persecuted and marginalized; promoting the sustainable management of resources; and balancing national security interests with respect for human rights to achieve long-term positive outcomes rather than short-term gains.
Mr. Speaker, ten years ago this month a genocidal conflict was brought to an end in the Balkans. By initialing a "General Framework for Peace" at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, on November 21, 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged from almost four years of that conflict wondering whether it could survive as an independent unitary state and recover from the utter destruction not only of its towns and cities but of its own, multi-ethnic society.
Time dulls our recollection of what the carnage in Bosnia was really about, so I believe it important to recall the nature of this, the most horrific phase of Yugoslavia's violent and bloody demise. Active on the Helsinki Commission which I co-chair today, I took part in many sobering hearings which documented the atrocities and discussed policy responses.
The Bosnian conflict was, in large part, characterized not by opposing military forces but by groups of thugs, armed and orchestrated by the Milosevic regime in Serbia, wreaking havoc on innocent civilians. Tens of thousands were raped or tortured in detention centers and camps established across the country. While figures may vary substantially, the death toll is commonly estimated at about 200,000, while two million people--half the country's population--were displaced. We can well remember the photos of emaciated detainees at Omarska, the live coverage of the shelling and siege of Sarajevo, and the recently released video footage of the execution of captured young men near Srebrenica.
While the decreasing advantages enjoyed by the Serb militants by late 1995 made a settlement possible, the Dayton Agreement did, in fact, help to bring this nightmare to an end. At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that its compromises reflect a failure by the international community, including the United States, to intervene much earlier in the conflict in response to clear violations of international principles and what many, including myself, consider genocide.
The international community repeatedly failed to take decisive action, including the credible threat of the use of force, to compel the brazen Serb militants to stop their aggression. Instead, time was spent deploying peacekeeping forces under United Nations auspices when there was no peace to keep. UNPROFOR's presence thwarted more effective responses, such as lifting the arms embargo which denied the sovereign country of Bosnia and Herzegovina its right, as a member of the United Nations, to defend itself. As town after town, including some declared to be "safe-havens" by the United Nations, fell to the forces of ethnic cleansing, the international community acquiesced to a reality, codified by Dayton, of a country divided into two political entities characterized by an ethnic bias unworthy of 21st century democracy. One entity is a Bosnian Federation forged by the United States in 194 between Bosnia's Muslims or Bosniaks, and Croats. The other entity, Republika Srpska, is dominated by Serbs and represents what the militants among them started the conflict to create.
The compromises accepted at Dayton, influenced by years of international inaction, also have made subsequent implementation difficult, and extremely expensive in terms of personnel, equipment and funds. Many persons indicted for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide evaded justice for years, some to wreak havoc later in Kosovo and elsewhere, and some like Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, remain at large. With the economy destroyed and both organized crime and official corruption rampant, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina became passive and dependent on the international community for their very survival.
Perhaps the greatest flaw in the Dayton Agreement was its heavy reliance on Slobodan Milosevic himself to follow its terms, which he did only under considerable pressure. Betting on the man most responsible for igniting the conflict meant undercutting the development of democratic forces in Serbia which are necessary for the long-term stability of southeastern Europe. Many of us worked hard to correct this flaw in the immediate post-Dayton years, and continue to encourage democratic forces in Serbia to reckon fully with the Milosevic legacy.
Fortunately, along with the eventual ouster of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, we have seen more vigorous and positive action to move ahead in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the past five years. More of the displaced have returned to their original homes than was thought possible when Dayton was negotiated. It hasn't been easy for many who return as members of a minority population, but determination has helped them to prevail. More and more individuals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including Milosevic, have been transferred to The Hague, and, at a recent Helsinki Commission briefing, we learned that Bosnia's own War Crimes Chamber has been established and is ready to conduct sensitive trials in accordance with the rule of law. Srebrenica is being acknowledged as the crime that it was. Defense and police reform are underway, helping to pave the way for Bosnia's further Euro-Atlantic and European integration. The region around Brcko, so brutally contested during the conflict that not even Dayton could determine its status, now provides a model of multiethnic cooperation and economic recovery for the rest of the country. There are now discussions of constitutional reforms which, if adopted, will hopefully make the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina a sum of its citizens and not a balance of its ethnicities.
If the Dayton Agreement succeeded in anything, Mr. Speaker, it was because its detailed provisions and improved implementation have provided the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina with both the parameters of a state and enough time to bring their country back from the abyss. I have increasing confidence that they will succeed in moving from what was admittedly a "General Framework for Peace'' to a solid basis for unity, freedom, prosperity and integration.
In the meantime, the international community has much it still needs to learn and develop. The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina gave new purpose to NATO and enabled it to begin operating out of area. Fifty years after the Holocaust, those who commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide no longer operate with complete impunity. Still, the international community, whether the United States and its allies, regional bodies or the United Nations, remains slow in responding to human suffering, or in recognizing the implications massive human rights violations can have on international security. It too readily accepts the reality of innocent people being attacked, brutalized and killed. Look at the response during the assault on Srebrenica and then at the response to Darfur today; the similarities are strong.
I therefore hope, Mr. Speaker, that Dayton's tenth anniversary is commemorated in a way that includes not only encouragement for Bosnia and Herzegovina to move beyond the agreement's limiting provisions, but encouragement for all policymakers to learn from the lessons of inaction in the face of evil.
