In Memory of Zoran Djindjic

In Memory of Zoran Djindjic

Hon.
Christopher H. Smith
United States
House of Representatives
108th Congress Congress
First Session Session
Wednesday, March 12, 2003

Mr. Speaker, we learned today of the assassination in Belgrade of the Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic.

 

This is a true tragedy, not only for family and friends of Mr. Djindjic but for all the people of Serbia and, indeed, for all who struggle for human rights and democratic development.

 

Zoran Djindjic became a leader during difficult times in his country. He chose to stand in opposition to Slobodan Milosevic and his regime. That certainly was not the easiest course, and it took courage. Zoran Djindjic also had determination and, after repeated setbacks and obstacles, he played a key role in ousting Milosevic from power in 2000. He subsequently became, as Prime Minister of Serbia, a force for reform, recognizing that Serbia needed to cast off not only the yoke of Milosevic's rule but also Milosevic's legacy of nationalist hatred, organized crime, corruption and greed. Transferring Milosevic to The Hague in 2001 to face charges for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide perhaps best symbolized Djlndjic's continued courage and determination to conquer the sinister forces which seized his country.

 

Zoran Djindjic was still battling resistance to reform in Serbia when his life was taken by the vicious act of cold-blooded assassins.

 

These will undoubtedly be turbulent times for Belgrade, for Serbia, and for Montenegro which is just embarking on a new relationship with Serbia. This tragedy may have reverberations throughout the region, particularly in Bosnia and in Kosovo.

 

It is my hope and prayer, Mr. Speaker, that the people of Serbia will respond to this crime with a loud and united cry: ``Enough is enough.'' In the past, they have seen the lives of journalist Slavko Curuvija and politician Ivan Stambolic snuffed out for their advocacy of a civilized Serbia, in which human rights and the rule of law are respected.

 

Similarly Djindjic, too, was advocating such noble objectives. The very decent people of Serbia deserve a society which respects human rights and upholds the rule of law. That is what the leaders of Serbia must now provide without further hesitation or delay. I take heart in knowing that Djindjic had many colleagues who shared his vision of a reformed Serbia.

 

My deepest condolences go to the family of Zoran Djindjic. I hope that the incredible grief they must now feel will be tempered by the pride they should feel in his accomplishments and service to his country.

Leadership: 
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Azerbaijan and Georgia Dr. Lynch estimated that in the South Caucasus there are currently some 250,000 displaced individuals from the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts in Georgia and over 572,000 displaced from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan. Although political solutions would provide the best opportunity for these groups to return home, the frozen nature of the conflicts makes that a remote possibility. In addition, Lynch asserted that the Georgian and Azeri Governments have failed to provide alternative integration opportunities, thereby maintaining the displaced as "political pawns." In Azerbaijan, only about ten percent of IDPs live in camps. The rest have settled in abandoned hotels, railway cars, or underground dugouts, all of which represent serious health hazards from air and water quality to the risk of structural collapse. The lucky few provided with government-funded housing find themselves located far from jobs and on unirrigated land unsuitable for farming. Nevertheless, Dr. Lynch maintains that Azerbaijan is full of potential; it is an oil-rich country with a highly literate population. "The answer to Azerbaijan's trouble is not found only in resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict," he asserted, "Azerbaijan must protect itself from corruption and use all of its resources to look to the future." In Georgia, the living conditions for IDPs are just as harsh, but with the added difficulty of only sporadic food aid. There is also a severe lack of even basic healthcare accessible to IDPs and virtually no psychosocial assistance. What healthcare is available is often too expensive for the displaced, resulting in many IDPs dying from curable ailments. Dr. Lynch declared that both Azerbaijan and Georgia must develop long-term solutions for their displaced populations, but they must also allow relief aid to arrive unhindered. In particular, Georgia must lift the import tax it imposed on humanitarian goods, which is currently blocking effective aid distribution, and both countries must work to create economic opportunities for IDPs. She further urged governments to be transparent in their plans, thereby encouraging continued participation of the international community. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

  • Displaced Persons Facing Serious Obstacles in Russia

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Despite international attention, including a letter initiated last fall by the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, the Russian Government continues to pressure IDPs to return, and in some cases limits the ability of NGOs to provide assistance.   My concern for the safety of Chechen IDPs is well founded, as authorities in the past year closed three IDP camps, two near the village of Znamenskoye in northern Chechnya and the Aki-Yurt camp in Ingushetia, effectively forcing the residents back to Grozny. Reports of violence and human rights violations by both Russian military units and Chechen rebels in Chechnya are disturbing. The ongoing chaos in that war-torn region has kept UNHCR from certifying Chechnya as a safe return destination, which is supported by the fact that many international aid agencies have limited or suspended their operations out of concern for the safety of aid workers.   Despite this lack of security, the United Nations estimates that more than 38,000 IDPs from Ingushetia returned to Chechnya last year, with many complaining of government coercion. While no camp has been closed since December 2002, Doctors Without Borders reports that government officials threaten to cut off assistance in Ingushetia and block future aid in Chechnya for those refusing to leave immediately. The stationing of Russian troops near IDP camps and the limiting of assistance from international agencies to camp residents represent pressure tactics to “encourage” the return of IDPs to Chechnya.   Clearly, the Russian Government is not respecting the fundamental right of individuals to seek safe refuge. As a participating State of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Russian Federation has committed to facilitate sustainable solutions to the plight of IDPs and the voluntary return of such individuals in dignity and safety. I urge President Putin to intervene to ensure that Russian policy and practice are consistent with these OSCE commitments and that no IDPs be effectively forced to return to their homes in Chechnya until the conditions have been created for their return. To do otherwise would place the lives of tens of thousands of innocent Russian citizens at risk.   The second situation I want to briefly highlight concerns the plight of Meskhetian Turks in the Krasnodar Krai region of the Russian Federation. Also known as Ahiska Turks or Meskhetians, Meskhetian Turks were forced to relocate twice within the past 50 years, first from Soviet Georgia in November 1944 to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan. In 1989, approximately 90,000 Meskhetian Turks fled ethnic conflicts in Uzbekistan to all parts of the Soviet Union, with the largest concentration today found in Krasnodar Krai. Numbering approximately 13,000, these displaced individuals find themselves in a virtual no man's land, denied citizenship and permanent residency permits, as well as many other fundamental rights.   Due to loopholes in the Russian citizenship law and the improper application of this law by Krasnodar Krai authorities, Meskhetian Turks must register as “guests” every 45 days, may not legally register the purchase of a house or car, and their marriages and deaths are not officially recorded. Most are denied education above high school, as well. The Krasnodar regional legislature enacted a series of laws in 2002 in an attempt to pressure the Meskhetian Turks to leave. Corresponding with the expiration of the temporary registration held by most Krasnodar Meskhetian Turks, the laws reportedly cancelled leases on land or denied lease renewals for the 2002 crop season. Furthermore, chauvinistic local authorities have not intervened to prevent local Cossack paramilitary units from repeatedly victimizing Krasnodar Meskhetian Turks through public harassment, robbery, and vandalism. In late May, a mob of around 50 people attacked Meskhetian Turks and other non-Russian-looking individuals in two villages, injuring 30 people and hospitalizing six.   By not granting citizenship or providing permanent residency status, current Russian policy enables the discriminatory practices subjugating the rights of Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai to continue. Mr. Speaker, President Putin cited the problems of citizenship and stateless persons in his annual State of the Federation address earlier this year. The Russian President pointed out the complexities and uncertainties faced by stateless persons in Russia. I urge him and Members of the State Duma to rectify the status of Meskhetian Turks and other stateless persons. Meanwhile, the Kremlin should intervene to ensure that Krasnodar Krai officials desist in their discriminatory treatment of the Meskhetian Turks until their status is normalized, as well as guarantee the prosecution of violent criminals.  

  • S. Res. 202, Expressing the Sense of the Senate Regarding the Genocidal Ukraine Famine of 1932-33

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RES. 202   Whereas 2003 marks the 70th anniversary of the Ukraine Famine, a manmade disaster that resulted in the deaths of millions of innocent Ukrainian men, women, and children and annihilated an estimated 25 percent of the rural population of that country;   Whereas it has been documented that large numbers of inhabitants of Ukraine and the then largely ethnically Ukrainian North Caucasus Territory starved to death in the famine of 1932-33, which was caused by forced collectivization and grain seizures by the Soviet regime;   Whereas the United States Government's Commission on the Ukraine Famine concluded that former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and his associates committed genocide against Ukrainians in 1932-33, using food as a political weapon to achieve the aim of suppressing any Ukrainian expression of political and cultural identity and self-determination;   Whereas, as a result, millions of rural Ukrainians starved amid some of the world's most fertile farmland, while Soviet authorities prevented them from traveling to areas where food was more available;   Whereas requisition brigades, acting on Stalin's orders to fulfill the impossibly high grain quotas, seized the 1932 crop, often taking away the last scraps of food from starving families and children and killing those who resisted;   Whereas Stalin, knowing of the resulting starvation, intensified the extraction from Ukraine of agricultural produce, worsening the situation and deepening the loss of life;   Whereas, during the Ukraine Famine, the Soviet Government exported grain to western countries and rejected international offers to assist the starving population;   Whereas the Ukraine Famine was not a result of natural causes, but was instead the consequence of calculated, ruthless policies that were designed to destroy the political, cultural, and human rights of the Ukrainian people;   Whereas the Soviet Union engaged in a massive cover-up of the Ukraine Famine, and journalists, including some foreign correspondents, cooperated with the campaign of denial and deception; and   Whereas, 70 years later, much of the world is still unaware of the genocidal Ukraine Famine: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that–   (1) the millions of innocent victims of the Soviet-engineered Ukraine Famine of 1932-33 should be solemnly remembered and honored on the 70th anniversary of the famine;   (2) the 70th anniversary of the Ukraine Famine should serve as a stark reminder of the brutality of the totalitarian, imperialistic Soviet regime under which respect for human rights was a mockery and the rule of law a sham;   (3) the Senate condemns the callous disregard for human life, human rights, and manifestations of national identity that characterized the Stalinist policies that caused the Ukrainian Famine;   (4) the manmade Ukraine famine of 1932-33 was an act of genocide as defined by the United Nations Genocide Convention;   (5) the Senate supports the efforts of the Government of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) to publicly acknowledge and call greater international attention to the Ukraine Famine; and   (6) an independent, democratic Ukraine, in which respect for the dignity of human beings is the cornerstone, offers the best guarantee that atrocities such as the Ukraine Famine never beset the Ukrainian people again.   HON. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL OF COLORADO   Mr. President, I rise to submit a Senate Resolution regarding the genocidal Ukraine Famine of 1932-33. The resolution commemorates the millions of innocent victims of this Soviet-engineered famine and supports the efforts of the Ukrainian Government and Parliament to publicly acknowledge and call greater international attention to one of the 20th century's most appalling atrocities.   This year marks the 70th anniversary of Stalin's man-made famine, one of the most heinous crimes in a century notable for events that demonstrated the cruelty of totalitarian regimes. Seventy years ago, a famine in Soviet-dominated Ukraine, and bordering ethnically-Ukrainian territory in Russia, resulted in the deaths of millions of Ukrainians––estimates range from between four and ten million. In his seminal book on the Ukraine Famine, Harvest of Sorrow, British historian Robert Conquest writes, “A quarter of the rural population, men, women, and children, lay dead or dying, the rest in various stages of debilitation with no strength to bury their families or neighbors.” Conquest and many others, including eyewitnesses and recently opened archives, chronicle the devastating human suffering of this man-made famine.   The Ukraine Famine was not the result of drought or some other natural calamity, but of Soviet dictator Stalin's utterly inhumane, coldly calculated policy to suppress the Ukrainian people and destroy their human, cultural, and political rights. It was the result of purposeful starvation. Communist requisition brigades, acting on Stalin's orders to fulfill impossibly high grain quotas, took away the last scraps of food from starving families, including children, often killing those who resisted. Millions of rural Ukrainians slowing starved amid some of the world's most fertile farmland, while stockpiles of expropriated grain rotted by the tons. Meanwhile, the Soviet Government was exporting grain to the West, rejecting international offers to assist the starving population, and preventing starving Ukrainians from leaving the affected areas in search of food elsewhere. The Stalinist regime––and, for that matter subsequent Soviet leaders––engaged in a massive cover-up of denying the Ukraine Famine. Regrettably, they were aided and abetted in this campaign of denial and deception by some Western journalists, including Americans.   The final report of the Congressionally-created Commission on the Ukraine Famine concluded in 1988 that “Joseph Stalin and those around him committed genocide against Ukrainians in 1932-33.” James Mace, who was staff director of the Commission, recently wrote: “For Stalin to have completely centralized power in his hands, he found it necessary to physically destroy the second largest Soviet republic, meaning the annihilation of the Ukrainian peasantry, Ukrainian intelligentsia, Ukrainian language, and history as understood by the people; to do away with Ukraine and things Ukrainian as such. The calculation was very simple, very primitive: no people, therefore, no separate country, and thus no problem. Such a policy is genocide in the classic sense of the word.”   It is vital that the world not forget the Ukraine Famine, honor its victims, and reiterate our support for Ukraine's independence and democratic development as the best assurance that atrocities such as the famine become truly unimaginable. I urge colleagues to join me in commemorating this genocide perpetrated against the Ukrainian people.

  • Helsinki Commissioners Press Belgrade to Apprehend Indicted War Criminals, Cooperate with Hague Tribunal

    By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor On June 16, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell certified that Serbia and Montenegro met U.S. criteria set forth in section 578 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution. These criteria include Serbia and Montenegro’s level of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Without certification, certain bilateral assistance to Serbia would have been withheld. Leading Members of the United States Helsinki Commission have long been concerned with the level of cooperation by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro with ICTY and have consistently urged the authorities in Belgrade to do more. Concerned Commissioners have sought to increase attention paid to developments in Serbia in the aftermath of the March assassination of reformist Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. There is a general sense among Commission leaders that while Belgrade’s cooperation with the Tribunal has been improving, it still remains insufficient. In the lead up to the June 15th certification deadline, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) participated in a Commission public briefing featuring Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal. As of the May 15th briefing, Del Ponte characterized cooperation from Belgrade as uncertain, underscoring that movement comes only when it is seen as politically beneficial for the Serbian Government. She noted some cooperation in accessing documents; however, for more than a year, the prosecution has pushed for the transfer of 155 Serbian documents in connection with the Milosevic trial without success. Del Ponte expressed concern over the failure to detain wanted fugitives – particularly Veselin Sljivancanin, indicted for the 1991 Vukovar massacre in Croatia, and Ratko Mladic and five others wanted in connection with the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “Mladic is a great mystery because we know where Mladic is,” she asserted. “We passed this information to the Serbian Government in Belgrade, and nothing happened.” Del Ponte stressed that if law and order is to prevail criminal justice must be credible. Failure to bring together all those accused to trial frustrates the progress of the Tribunal and forces the witnesses to present repeatedly their own horrific accounts each time a separate case is brought to trial. She also assessed cooperation with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo during the course of the briefing. In a letter dated May 23, five Members of the Helsinki Commission urged Secretary of State Colin Powell to utilize the time prior to the certification deadline to press authorities in Belgrade to take the steps necessary to meet the certification requirements. The Commissioners recognized the significant strides Serbia has made in cooperation with the Tribunal, but underscored that “a failure to apprehend Mladic and other notorious war criminals soon would be a serious setback to the cause of reform and recovery at home and further delay Serbia’s integration in Europe.” The letter was signed by Co-Chairmen Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), and Commissioners Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD). The United States Helsinki Commission held a second briefing on June 4, detailing Serbia and Montenegro’s cooperation with the Tribunal, and the prospects for human rights and democratic development in Serbia since the lifting of the state of emergency imposed after Djindjic’s assassination. Helsinki Commission Senior Advisor Donald Kursch opened the briefing, welcoming the tough measures authorities in Belgrade have taken in the wake of Mr. Djindjic’s murder to crack down on criminal elements. Nina Bang-Jensen, Executive Director and General Counsel for the Coalition for International Justice, described Serbia’s actual cooperation with the Court as “very limited, begrudging, and only under pressure.” After last year’s certification, Serbia’s government promised a consistent pattern of cooperation, but only three surrenders and one arrest have followed. Bang-Jensen cited the failure to apprehend nineteen Bosnian Serb and Serbian indicted suspects, either living within Serbia or frequently crossing into Serbia, as an indication that the current government is inclined to protect the old regime. Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, recommended that the United States look not only at Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY, but to its overall level of commitment to rule of law. Following Djindjic’s assassination in March, the Serbian Government imposed a state of emergency to crack down on organized crime. It is estimated that more than 10,000 people were held incommunicado for up to two months under this guise. International monitors were denied access to detainees until recently, and Andersen noted that released detainees reported widespread abuse. Despite increasing pressure from the international community on Serbia’s domestic courts to shoulder greater responsibility for holding war criminals accountable, only four domestic trials were held this year. There is also no indication of upcoming trials or of a permanent commitment to such a process. Trials that have proceeded suffered from a lack of witness protection, poor case preparation by prosecutors, and problems facilitating witnesses traveling from other areas of the former Yugoslavia. James Fisfis, Resident Program Officer for Serbia at the International Republican Institute, remained optimistic. Fisfis presented the results of an IRI survey suggesting that 56 percent of Serbian citizens believe the country is now on the right track, up from 38 percent before the assassination. Sixty-four percent of Serbian respondents currently support cooperation with The Hague, seeing it as a necessary measure toward gaining international acceptance. The data suggest a window of opportunity exists for pressure to reform to have an impact. Ivan Vujacic, Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro to the United States, acknowledged that “more can be done and more will be done” in cooperation with the Tribunal, but focused on the progress made over the last two and half years, which he described as “remarkable.” In particular, he pointed to the recent arrests of three “pillars of Milosevic’s rule”: Miroslav Radic, Franko Simatovic, and Jovica Stanisic. Ambassador Vujacic said that the Serbian Government was highly committed to protecting human rights. He stated that during the war “the ultimate human right, the right to life was taken from the victims in atrocities defined as war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Vujacic promised that all indictees in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro will be arrested and transferred to The Hague. A second Helsinki Commission letter to Secretary of State Powell dated June 12th, declared that certification could not be justified at the time. The letter concluded: “To certify would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy goals supporting international justice and successful and complete democratic change in Serbia.” The letter reiterated that the Serbian authorities had yet to arrest and transfer Mladic and other indictees who are most likely in Serbia, and even this did not define the full cooperation with the Tribunal desired. Commission Members warned that if certification occurred while the required conditions remained unmet, the United States’ ability to affect change in Serbia would be diminished, making it more difficult for Serbia’s political leadership to undertake necessary reforms. Some Commission Members view the June 13 arrest of the indicted war crimes suspect Veselin Sljivancanin by the Belgrade authorities as an important positive step toward increased cooperation with the ICTY. However, continued failure to apprehend Mladic and other leading indictees remains a serious cause of concern that places barriers to Serbia and Montenegro’s full re-integration into the international community. In a press release announcing certification, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher asserted that the Secretary’s decision to certify does not indicate that Serbia has fulfilled its commitment. “We have made clear ... that the United States expects further actions to be taken in order to meet those obligations,” Boucher said, “including by arresting and transferring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.” The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Intern Kristin Poore contributed to this article.

  • Helsinki Commission Members Press Belgrade to Apprend Indicted War Criminals, Cooperate with Hague Tribunal

    By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor   On June 16, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell certified that Serbia and Montenegro met U.S. criteria set forth in section 578 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution. These criteria include Serbia and Montenegro’s level of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Without certification, certain bilateral assistance to Serbia would have been withheld. Leading Members of the United States Helsinki Commission have long been concerned with the level of cooperation by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro with ICTY and have consistently urged the authorities in Belgrade to do more. Concerned Commissioners have sought to increase attention paid to developments in Serbia in the aftermath of the March assassination of reformist Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. There is a general sense among Commission leaders that while Belgrade’s cooperation with the Tribunal has been improving, it still remains insufficient. In the lead up to the June 15th certification deadline, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) participated in a Commission public briefing featuring Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal. As of the May 15th briefing, Del Ponte characterized cooperation from Belgrade as uncertain, underscoring that movement comes only when it is seen as politically beneficial for the Serbian Government. She noted some cooperation in accessing documents; however, for more than a year, the prosecution has pushed for the transfer of 155 Serbian documents in connection with the Milosevic trial without success. Del Ponte expressed concern over the failure to detain wanted fugitives – particularly Veselin Sljivancanin, indicted for the 1991 Vukovar massacre in Croatia, and Ratko Mladic and five others wanted in connection with the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “Mladic is a great mystery because we know where Mladic is,” she asserted. “We passed this information to the Serbian Government in Belgrade, and nothing happened.” Del Ponte stressed that if law and order is to prevail criminal justice must be credible. Failure to bring together all those accused to trial frustrates the progress of the Tribunal and forces the witnesses to present repeatedly their own horrific accounts each time a separate case is brought to trial. She also assessed cooperation with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo during the course of the briefing. In a letter dated May 23, five Members of the Helsinki Commission urged Secretary of State Colin Powell to utilize the time prior to the certification deadline to press authorities in Belgrade to take the steps necessary to meet the certification requirements. The Commissioners recognized the significant strides Serbia has made in cooperation with the Tribunal, but underscored that “a failure to apprehend Mladic and other notorious war criminals soon would be a serious setback to the cause of reform and recovery at home and further delay Serbia’s integration in Europe.” The letter was signed by Co-Chairmen Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), and Commissioners Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD). The United States Helsinki Commission held a second briefing on June 4, detailing Serbia and Montenegro’s cooperation with the Tribunal, and the prospects for human rights and democratic development in Serbia since the lifting of the state of emergency imposed after Djindjic’s assassination. Helsinki Commission Senior Advisor Donald Kursch opened the briefing, welcoming the tough measures authorities in Belgrade have taken in the wake of Mr. Djindjic’s murder to crack down on criminal elements. Nina Bang-Jensen, Executive Director and General Counsel for the Coalition for International Justice, described Serbia’s actual cooperation with the Court as “very limited, begrudging, and only under pressure.” After last year’s certification, Serbia’s government promised a consistent pattern of cooperation, but only three surrenders and one arrest have followed. Bang-Jensen cited the failure to apprehend nineteen Bosnian Serb and Serbian indicted suspects, either living within Serbia or frequently crossing into Serbia, as an indication that the current government is inclined to protect the old regime. Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, recommended that the United States look not only at Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY, but to its overall level of commitment to rule of law. Following Djindjic’s assassination in March, the Serbian Government imposed a state of emergency to crack down on organized crime. It is estimated that more than 10,000 people were held incommunicado for up to two months under this guise. International monitors were denied access to detainees until recently, and Andersen noted that released detainees reported widespread abuse. Despite increasing pressure from the international community on Serbia’s domestic courts to shoulder greater responsibility for holding war criminals accountable, only four domestic trials were held this year. There is also no indication of upcoming trials or of a permanent commitment to such a process. Trials that have proceeded suffered from a lack of witness protection, poor case preparation by prosecutors, and problems facilitating witnesses traveling from other areas of the former Yugoslavia. James Fisfis, Resident Program Officer for Serbia at the International Republican Institute, remained optimistic. Fisfis presented the results of an IRI survey suggesting that 56 percent of Serbian citizens believe the country is now on the right track, up from 38 percent before the assassination. Sixty-four percent of Serbian respondents currently support cooperation with The Hague, seeing it as a necessary measure toward gaining international acceptance. The data suggest a window of opportunity exists for pressure to reform to have an impact. Ivan Vujacic, Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro to the United States, acknowledged that “more can be done and more will be done” in cooperation with the Tribunal, but focused on the progress made over the last two and half years, which he described as “remarkable.” In particular, he pointed to the recent arrests of three “pillars of Milosevic’s rule”: Miroslav Radic, Franko Simatovic, and Jovica Stanisic. Ambassador Vujacic said that the Serbian Government was highly committed to protecting human rights. He stated that during the war “the ultimate human right, the right to life was taken from the victims in atrocities defined as war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Vujacic promised that all indictees in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro will be arrested and transferred to The Hague. A second Helsinki Commission letter to Secretary of State Powell dated June 12th, declared that certification could not be justified at the time. The letter concluded: “To certify would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy goals supporting international justice and successful and complete democratic change in Serbia.” The letter reiterated that the Serbian authorities had yet to arrest and transfer Mladic and other indictees who are most likely in Serbia, and even this did not define the full cooperation with the Tribunal desired. Commission Members warned that if certification occurred while the required conditions remained unmet, the United States’ ability to affect change in Serbia would be diminished, making it more difficult for Serbia’s political leadership to undertake necessary reforms. Some Commission Members view the June 13 arrest of the indicted war crimes suspect Veselin Sljivancanin by the Belgrade authorities as an important positive step toward increased cooperation with the ICTY. However, continued failure to apprehend Mladic and other leading indictees remains a serious cause of concern that places barriers to Serbia and Montenegro’s full re-integration into the international community. In a press release announcing certification, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher asserted that the Secretary’s decision to certify does not indicate that Serbia has fulfilled its commitment. “We have made clear ... that the United States expects further actions to be taken in order to meet those obligations,” Boucher said, “including by arresting and transferring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.” The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

  • Certification of Assistance to Serbia

    Mr. Speaker, the U.S. Department of State last week made its determination to certify compliance by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro with the terms of section 578 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 108-7). This section conditions certain bilateral assistance to Serbia on progress in three areas, although by far the most critical being cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.   I agree with the Department’s assessment that progress has been made, especially since March. In particular, I welcomed action earlier this month by the Serbian authorities to apprehend Veselin Svjilancanin, indicted by the Tribunal for the 1991 massacre near Vukovar in Croatia. Although there was resistance, this action was a success and signaled what is perhaps a new determination by Belgrade to transfer all remaining indictees. Having been in Vukovar, along with my good friend and colleague Mr. Wolf, just before the city fell to Serb forces, I am glad to see all three indicted by the Tribunal for this crime will be tried in The Hague.   Nevertheless, Mr. Speaker, I am concerned that the Department’s determination was the wrong one to make. While progress has been made, it remains insufficient. Still at large and believed to have been in Serbia are several other persons, including Ratko Mladic and others, Ljubisa Beara, Vujadin Popovic, Ljubomir Borovcanin, Vinko Pandurevic and Drago Nikolic, indicted by the Tribunal for their connection to the1995 Srebrenica massacre in which thousands of innocent people were executed.   I am concerned, deeply concerned, that these individuals will continue to evade justice while officials in Belgrade may get the impression they have done enough. Clearly, they have not. Mr. Speaker, I would urge Serbian authorities to take the action necessary to remove "cooperation with the Tribunal" as an outstanding issue in our bilateral relationship. In doing so, they will also continue to help Serbia emerge from Slobodan Milosevic’s legacy of nationalist hatred.   In the meantime, Mr. Speaker, I also urge the State Department to use remaining levers to encourage not just better, but full, cooperation with the Tribunal, which Secretary Powell had assured Mr. Cardin and myself in correspondence was a position we all shared. The crimes which occurred were too severe and too horrendous to allow those responsible to escape justice.

  • Repression Spreading in Belarus

    Mr. Speaker, Europe's last dictator, Belarus' Alyaksandr Lukashenka, appears determined to ignore the voices of the people of Belarus calling for basic respect for human rights and democratic principles a decade after that country gained its independence and joined the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).   As Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I am disturbed by recent developments which demonstrate the growing repression in Belarus. There have been further restrictions imposed on the independent media, with the recent suspension of independent newspapers Navinki and Ekho. Just a few days ago, the publication Predprinimatelskaya Gazeta was suspended for three months. The offices of the trade union paper Solidarnost have been sealed by the authorities. Still other publications have received warnings that could lead to their closure. These actions were preceded by the three-month suspension of two prominent independent newspapers--Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta and BDG--For Internal Use Only.   The Lukashenka regime is also targeting schools. The National Humanities Lyceum, a highly respected high school promoting study of the Belarusian language and culture, is under fire, with its acting head to be replaced by a reportedly non-Belarusian-speaking official. Why? Because professors at the school support democracy and the Belarusian language and culture which ironically is anathema to the Belarusian strongman. Mr. Speaker, what kind of leader actively suppresses his nation's language and culture?   Moreover, a new crackdown on Pentecostal home meetings in western Belarus is underway, with fines being handed down on church members who permit their homes to be used for prayer meetings--a result of last year's restrictive religion law.   Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also facing increasing scrutiny, often for truly spurious reasons such as minor mistakes in registration documents. Several, including Ratusha, Varuta and the Youth Christian Social Union, are under threat of liquidation. Just a few days ago, the Homel regional court ordered the closure of the area's largest NGO, Civic Initiatives. The intensified campaign against NGOs and the independent media are widely regarded among domestic and international observers as a concerted attack on active and independent civil society structures.   Repressive actions against individuals continue as well. Recently, 18-year-old ZUBR activist Tatiana Elovaya was sentenced to 10 days imprisonment for manifesting her support in an April 3 demonstration outside the U.S. Embassy for the campaign to liberate Iraq. Several others, including 19-year-old Lyubov Kuchinskaya had served 10-day sentences earlier. Unfortunately, these are just some recent examples of a longstanding pattern of the Lukashenka regime's flouting of its OSCE commitments and continued disregard for the four OSCE criteria set forth three years ago by the Parliamentary Troika for Belarus.   Despite steps by the OSCE community, including the re-opening of the OSCE Office in Miensk (albeit under a more limited mandate), the seating of the National Assembly and the lifting of a visa ban, not only have reciprocal steps not been taken by the Belarusian authorities but the situation has indeed deteriorated further.   Earlier this year, I introduced H.R. 854, the Belarus Democracy Act, designed to assist the people of Belarus in regaining their freedom and enable them to join the European community of democracies. Key provisions of this Act also have been incorporated into the Foreign Relations Reauthorization bill. Mr. Speaker, the Lukashenka regime's continuing suppression of the longsuffering Belarusian people underscores the need for the Belarus Democracy Act and other efforts--including within the OSCE--to restore respect for human rights and institutions of democratic governance.

  • Democracy, Human Rights and Justice in Serbia Today

    Donald Kursch, Senior Advisor at the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, moderated this briefing that discussed, among other things, the trajectory of democratic institutions in Serbia. This briefing was held in the wake of the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic, after which the authorities in Belgrade undertook tough measures to crack down on the criminal elements that had continued to be a barrier to Serbia and Montenegro’s full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community’s institutions. More restrictive measures against crime in Serbia and Montenegro had underscored the progress already made by democratic forces in overcoming the estrangement between the two countries and the West.

  • Human Rights in Chechnya Focus of Helsinki Commission Briefing

    By John Finerty, CSCE Staff Advisor The United States Helsinki Commission held a briefing April 24, 2003 on the critical human rights and humanitarian situation in war-torn Chechnya, Russian Federation. The panelists of the briefing were Eliza Moussaeva, Director of the Ingushetia office of the Memorial Human Rights Center, and Bela Tsugaeva, Information Manager of World Vision, Ingushetia. The Commission guests were accompanied by Maureen Greenwood, Advocacy Director for Europe and Eurasia, Amnesty International, USA. Helsinki Commission Deputy Chief of Staff Ron McNamara opened the briefing. “Despite concerted efforts by the Russian leadership to portray the situation in Chechnya as approaching normal, the pattern of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of OSCE commitments by Russian forces continues,” McNamara said. “From reports of credible and courageous human rights activists such as our panelists, it is clear that the most egregious violations of international humanitarian law anywhere in the OSCE region are occurring in Chechnya today.” Ms. Moussaeva said that, as of late, Russian forces no longer conduct sweep operations (“zachistki”) in search of rebels, but now rely on night raids by masked personnel. In the three months from January to March, there were 119 abductions by federal forces engaged in such operations, according to Moussaeva, who added that during the same period last year, there were 82 abductions marking an increase in such activity by Federation forces. This shift in tactics has made it more difficult for families to trace their abducted relatives, whereas previously relatives generally knew which units had conducted the sweeps. Now, units and identities of the raiders are unknown, as well as the location of detainees. Officially, 2,800 persons are missing. Memorial believes the actual number to be significantly higher. Mass graves are a common find. In January, one mass grave was found in which the exact number of corpses could not be ascertained, because the bodies had been blown up by grenades to hide traces of torture and abuse. Authorities claim these individuals were abducted by Chechen rebel forces; yet some family members, who were able to identify their relatives by the clothing on the bodies, say that these individuals were actually taken by federal forces. According to Moussaeva, Moscow’s highly-touted March 23rd constitutional referendum has not marked an improvement in Chechen life on the ground. On one single day after the referendum, Memorial received reports of several cases of individuals abducted by federal forces. On the same day, a bus exploded, killing nine. Ms. Moussaeva asked, “So we have the question, why did we need that referendum if it didn’t change the situation for the better, if it didn’t bring us stability?” Regarding an OSCE presence in Chechnya, Moussaeva said, “We hope that they would have the opportunity to open in Chechnya again, and it will be a great help for us. The OSCE had a very positive experience and a good image after the first war.” Ms. Tsugaeva spoke about the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to information compiled by the Danish Refugee Council, there are some 92,000 IDPs in the neighboring republic of Ingushetia, which has a population of only 350,000. Fifteen thousand of the IDPs live in five large tent camps, 27,000 in other structures such as industrial plants or farms, and 50,000 in private accommodations, for which most have to pay rent. Most individuals lack basic necessities and have been asked by Ingushetia to leave, yet they have nowhere to go. Refugees in this region have also been subjected to efforts by federal officials to drive them away. Seventy percent of aid comes mainly from international NGOs, and the remainder from the UN. Bread distribution to these people is vital but irregular. Most international NGOs have been unable to open offices in Chechnya due to the security situation, meaning only the most needy, such as children and the elderly, can be provided for. Many land mines scattered throughout parts of the country formerly occupied by military forces are an additional cause for concern. According to official statistics, there were over 5,000 victims of landmine explosions in 2002. Despite the work of international NGOs such as the Handicap International Organization, most of these victims do not have access to adequate medical care and are in one way or another incapacitated for life. Ms. Moussaeva stated that an office established by the Putin government to monitor the human rights situation in Chechnya was ineffectual and merely for show. Of more than 29,000 complaints of harassment by federal forces filed by individuals, only 550 had been investigated. Ms. Greenwood commended the Helsinki Commission for its letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell urging the U.S. delegation at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva to push for a strong resolution to the conflict in Geneva. The recently concluded 58th Meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights failed by a vote of 15-21 to adopt a U.S.-supported resolution expressing “deep concern” about reported human rights violations in Chechnya. “Amnesty would like to thank co-signers Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Representative Christopher Smith, Senator Gordon Smith, Representative Steny Hoyer, Representative Robert Aderholt and Representative Ben Cardin,” Greenwood said. Furthermore, Greenwood expressed Amnesty International’s concern regarding the targeting of civilians on both sides of the conflict. Chechen rebel forces have engaged in abductions, hostage taking, and assassinations. Russians have used tactics such as extra-judicial executions, rape, and torture. Amnesty International profiles a few prominent cases, but these represent hundreds of other cases of human rights abuses. Ms. Greenwood presented Amnesty International’s recommendations for the United States Government, including: pressuring the Russian Government not to close tent camps for IDPs; encouraging the US Government to maintain funding levels of the Freedom Support Act for pro-human rights and democracy NGOs in the Russian Federation; demanding access to Chechnya for international journalists and observers; and, supporting the establishment of a human rights tribunal in the Council of Europe. Amnesty International’s recommendations for the Russian Government included providing accountability for previous abuses and ending violations of human rights law. Finally, Amnesty International called upon Chechen rebels to abide by international law, and stop the kidnaping and killings. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission intern Sean Callagy contributed to this article.

  • The Continuing Plight of Roma in Greece

    Mr. Speaker, the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) and Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM) have just published a report on the human rights situation of Roma in Greece. “Cleaning Operations: Excluding Roma in Greece” documents the plight of the inhabitants of the Romani settlement of Aspropyrgos, outside Athens, and details the problems of Roma across the country. Illustrated with stark scenes of bulldozed homes and marginalized and neglected Romani communities, a picture disturbing in more ways than one has been painted.   In particular, the report supports the accusation that the Government of Greece has used preparations for the 2004 Olympics as justification for the campaign to uproot Roma. Ironically, Greece currently holds the presidency of the European Union.   The Helsinki Commission, which I co-chair, held hearings in 1998, 2000, and in 2002 focused on the human rights problems faced by Roma with the intent of raising the awareness of these problems amongst the governments of the OSCE participating States. The plight of the Roma has also been addressed in specific hearings or briefings covering Greece, Russia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Romania, as well as the OSCE process.   Members of the Commission have also sent several letters to Greek leaders in recent years addressing longstanding human rights concerns in the Hellenic Republic, including those affecting the Romani community. These expressions of concern have specifically addressed forced evacuations of Roma from numerous villages, the abusive application of the use of national identity cards issued to Roma, the inability of Roma children to have access to schools on a non-discriminatory basis and other matters of blatant racial discrimination.   This newly released report on Roma clearly indicates that the Greek Government has failed to properly address many of these ongoing concerns. At a June 2002 Commission hearing on Greece, in fact, I raised the specter of an intensified campaign targeting Roma to obtain land for use as venues for the 2004 Olympics. This campaign is well documented in this report.   Notwithstanding the assertions of Greek officials at the Commission hearing that “everything is done (concerning the relocation) in consultation with, and with the consent of, the Roma involved,” numerous non-governmental organizations have raised such issues with Athens. Greek human rights activists have stepped forward.   As an original signatory to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, Greece has accepted numerous commitments pertaining to the treatment of Roma and joined in condemning discrimination against Roma, a provision found in the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit Document. Regrettably, the Greek Government has failed to fulfill these commitments, as documented in the new ERRC/GHM report on Roma in Greece.   The ERRC and GHM conducted intensive field missions that revealed several patterns of human rights abuse against Roma in Greece: cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment of Roma in housing; police violence against Roma; exclusion of Roma from the educational system; and, barriers to access to health care and other social support services for Roma.   Based on the facts in this report and the discussions I have had over the years in my leadership capacity with the Helsinki Commission, I urge the Government of Greece to take corrective measures, without delay, along the lines recommended by the ERRC and the GHM:   1. Facilitate access to Greek citizenship for those Roma residing in Greece who are stateless and provide the necessary legal documents (such as identity cards) to all Roma.   2. Use all appropriate means to guarantee protection against forced evictions outside the rule of law and without due process.   3. Bring to justice public officials and private individuals responsible for forced evictions of Roma in breach of Greek law.   4. Carry out thorough and timely investigations into all alleged instances of police abuse.   5. Undertake effective measures to ensure that local authorities register all persons factually residing in a given municipality, without regard to ethnicity.   6. Ensure that Romani schoolchildren have equal access to education in a desegregated school environment.   7. Without delay, adopt comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, as called for in the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit Document.   8. Conduct public information campaigns on human rights and remedies available to victims of human rights abuse, and distribute in both the Greek and Romani languages.   9. Conduct comprehensive human rights and anti-racism training for national and local administrators, members of the police force, and the judiciary.   10. At the highest levels, speak out against racial discrimination against Roma and others, and make clear that racism will not be tolerated.   The Helsinki Commission will continue to monitor the situation of Roma in the Hellenic Republic with the aim of encouraging the Government of Greece to implement commitments it has agreed to within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Commission will also work to ensure that the plight of Roma in Greece is raised at the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting to be held this fall in Warsaw.

  • The Troubled Media Environment in Ukraine

    Mr. President, later this week individuals around the world will mark World Press Freedom Day. The functioning of free and independent media is tied closely to the exercise of many other fundamental freedoms as well as to the future of any democratic society. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which I co-chair, is responsible for monitoring press freedom in the 55 participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE. Recently, I reported to the Senate on the deplorable conditions for independent media in the Republic of Belarus. Today, I will address the situation of journalists and media outlets in Ukraine.   Several discouraging reports have come out recently concerning the medic environment in Ukraine. These reports merit attention, especially within the context of critical presidential elections scheduled to take place in Ukraine next year. The State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in Ukraine for 2002 summarizes media freedoms as follows: "Authorities interfered with the news media by intimidating journalists, issuing written and oral instructions about events to cover and not to cover, and pressuring them into applying self-censorship. Nevertheless a wide range of opinion was available in newspapers, periodicals, and Internet news sources."   Current negative trends and restrictive practices with respect to media freedom in Ukraine are sources of concern, especially given that country's leadership claims concerning integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Lack of compliance with international human rights standards, including OSCE commitments, on freedom of expression undermines that process. Moreover, an independent media free from governmental pressure is an essential factor in ensuring a level playing field in the upcoming 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine.   In her April 18, 2003 annual report to the Ukrainian parliament, Ombudsman Nina Karpachova asserted that journalism remains among the most dangerous professions in Ukraine, with 36 media employees having been killed over the past ten years, while beatings, intimidation of media employees, freezing of bank accounts of media outlets, and confiscation of entire print runs of newspapers and other publications have become commonplace in Ukraine.   The murder of prominent journalist Heorhiy Gongadze--who disappeared in September 2000--remains unsolved. Ukrainian President Kuchma and a number of high-ranking officials have been implicated in his disappearance and the circumstances leading to his murder. The Ukrainian authorities' handling, or more accurately mishandling of this case, has been characterized by obfuscation and stonewalling. Not surprisingly, lack of transparency illustrated by the Gongadze case has fueled the debilitating problem of widespread corruption reaching the highest levels of the Government of Ukraine.   Audio recordings exist that contain conversations between Kuchma and other senior government officials discussing the desirability of Gongadze's elimination. Some of these have been passed to the U.S. Department of Justice as part of a larger set of recordings of Kuchma's conversations implicating him and his cronies in numerous scandals. Together with Commission Co-Chairman Rep. Chris Smith, I recently wrote to the Department of Justice requesting technical assistance to determine whether the recordings in which the Gongadze matter is discussed are genuine. A credible and transparent investigation of this case by Ukrainian authorities is long overdue and the perpetrators--no matter who they may be--need to be brought to justice.   The case of Ihor Alexandrov, a director of a regional television station, who was beaten in July 2001 and subsequently died also remains unsolved. Serious questions remain about the way in which that case was handled by the authorities.   A Human Rights Watch report, “Negotiating the News: Informal State Censorship of Ukrainian Television,” issued in March, details the use of explicit directives or temnyky, lists of topics, which have been sent to editors from Kuchma's Presidential Administration on what subjects to cover and in what manner. The report correctly notes that these temnyky have eroded freedom of expression in Ukraine, as "editors and journalists feel obligated to comply with temnyky instructions due to economic and political pressures and fear repercussions for non-cooperation." To their credit, the independent media are struggling to counter attempts by the central authorities to control their reporting and coverage of issues and events.   Another troubling feature of the media environment has been the control exerted by various oligarchs with close links to the government who own major media outlets. There is growing evidence that backers of the current Prime Minister and other political figures have been buying out previously independent news sources, including websites, and either firing reporters or telling them to cease criticism of the government of find new jobs.   Last December, Ukraine's parliament held hearings on "Society, Mass Media, Authority: Freedom of Speech and Censorship in Ukraine." Journalists' testimony confirmed the existence of censorship, including temnyky, as well as various instruments of harassment and intimidation. Tax inspections, various legal actions or license withdrawals have all been used as mechanisms by the authorities to pressure media outlets that have not towed the line or have supported opposition parties.   As a result of these hearings, the parliament, on April 3rd, voted 252 to one to approve a law defining and banning state censorship in the Ukrainian media. This is a welcome step. However, given the power of the presidential administration, the law's implementation remains an open question at best, particularly in the lead up to the 2004 elections in Ukraine.   I urge our Ukrainian parliamentary colleagues to continue to actively press their government to comply with Ukraine's commitments to fundamental freedoms freely agreed to as a signatory to the Helsinki Final Act. I also urge the Ukrainian authorities, including the constitutional "guarantor", to end their campaign to stifle independent reporting and viewpoints in the media. Good news from Ukraine will come not from the spin doctors of the presidential administration, but when independent media and journalists can pursue their responsibilities free of harassment, intimidation, and fear.

  • The Critical Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation in Chechnya

    This briefing followed a defeat, by a vote of 15-21 at the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, of a U.S.–supported resolution expressing “deep concern” about reported human rights violation in Chechnya.  The developments in Chechnya since the outbreak of the war in 1994 were briefly surveyed, while the focus of discussion was largely on the human dimension of the situation and the dangers faced by average Chechen civilians. Witnesses testifying at the hearing – including Eliza Moussaeva, Director of the Ingushetia Office of the Memorial Human Rights Center; Bela Tsugaeva, Information Manager of World Vision; and Maureen Greenwood, Advocacy Director for the Europe and Eurasia division of Amnesty International – addressed the dismal state of human rights in Chechnya and the issue of international assistance, which was less effective than it could have been due to government accountability issues. The lack of infrastructure and security guarantees was additional topics of discussion.

  • The Referendum in Chechnya

    Mr. Speaker, last Sunday, while the world's eyes were focused on the momentous events taking place in Iraq, a constitutional referendum was held in the war-torn region of Chechnya. The referendum was held as part of the Russian Government's attempt to “normalize” the situation in that tortured part of Russia's North Caucasus.   For the last ten years, Chechnya has been the scene of a bloody war between armed Chechen rebels and Russian military forces. Hostilities were precipitated in late 1994 when, in the wake of Chechnya's attempt to secede from the Russian Federation, Russian military forces launched a full-scale assault on the Chechen capital of Grozny. There was a restive peace from 1996 until the summer of 1999, when the armed clashes erupted anew. The roots of this conflict go back to Tsarist conquests in the 19th century and Stalin's brutal deportation of the Chechen people to Central Asia during World War II. Unfortunately, certain radical Islamic militant elements linked to international terrorism have become involved on the Chechen side, though the State Department has stressed that not all Chechens are terrorists.   Despite Moscow's repeated claims that heavy-handed Russian tactics in Chechnya are part of the war against global terrorism, the situation is far more complex. Many Chechens have taken up arms against what they believe is a repressive colonial power and wish to see Chechnya as an independent state that will be able to make the critical choice regarding the future of its people. As is so frequently the case, the civilian population has suffered terribly from the war. While both sides are guilty of violations of international humanitarian law, the Russian military and special operations units have been responsible for numerous and well-documented instances of gratuitous, brutal and mass violence against the civilian population.   During my years in the leadership of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Commission has conducted eight hearings and briefings on Chechnya. Witnesses, including a nurse who was present in a Chechen town where some of the worst atrocities by Russian forces took place, have described the appalling fate of the civilian population.   According to the U.S. State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001, “The indiscriminate use of force by government troops in the Chechen conflict resulted in widespread civilian casualties and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons, the majority of whom sought refuge in the neighboring republic of Ingushetia. Attempts by government forces to regain control over Chechnya were accompanied by the indiscriminate use of air power and artillery. There were numerous reports of attacks by government forces on civilian targets, including the bombing of schools and residential areas.” The report continues: “Command and control among military and special police units often appeared to be weak, and a climate of lawlessness, corruption, and impunity flourished, which fostered individual acts by government forces of violence and looting against civilians.” Among the examples of such lawlessness and impunity in the Country Reports were “...reports of mass graves and 'dumping grounds' for victims allegedly executed by Russian forces in Chechnya” and “cleansing” operations directed against guerrillas but resulting in deaths and the disappearance of non-combatants.   The State Department points out that Chechen forces also committed serious abuses: “According to unconfirmed reports, rebels killed civilians who would not assist them, used civilians as human shields, forced civilians to build fortifications, and prevented refugees from fleeing Chechnya. In several cases, elderly Russian civilians were killed for no apparent reason other than their ethnicity.”   Against this unsettling backdrop, with an estimated 100,000 internally displaced persons living in refugee camps in neighboring Ingushetia, and under the guns of approximately 80,000 Russian soldiers in Chechnya, the Chechen people have reportedly voted overwhelmingly for the proposed new constitution. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that a genuine assessment of the public will would have been determined under such circumstances. I would ask the same question I asked in a Helsinki Commission press release over a month ago: “Are we supposed to believe that this referendum will stabilize Chechnya while armed conflict between the Russian military and Chechen fighters continue to produce death and destruction?'”   The well-respected Russian human rights group, Memorial, has charged that Chechens were pressured to vote with the threat of losing their pensions or humanitarian aid. A joint assessment mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe stated that “no group has been able to campaign officially against the referendum in the mass media or distribute literature arguing against the referendum,” although some opposition opinions were voiced in the media. Incidentally, in the concluding communique of the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit, the Russian Government agreed that all sides should seek a political solution to the conflict, and avail themselves of the assistance of the OSCE. This commitment was seriously undermined when the Russian government evicted the OSCE Assistance Mission to Chechnya at the end of last year.   Mr. Speaker, the Bush Administration has stated that “...we hope [the referendum] can be the basis for a political solution to that tragic conflict.” I find that rather optimistic. The Russian Government might better instruct its military to stop terrorizing the civilian population, prosecute human rights violators and rebuild Chechnya. Then perhaps it would not have to hold referenda in Chechnya under armed guard.

  • Belarus Democracy Act 2003

    Mr. President, as Co-Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I have closely monitored developments in the Republic of Belarus and informed my Senate colleagues of disturbing trends in that nation. I have met with members of the fledgling democratic opposition who, at great personal risk, dare to speak out against the repressive regime led by Alexander Lukashenka. I have met with the courageous wives whose husbands disappeared because they stood up to the regime and would not be silent. Against the backdrop of this climate of fear, the powers of the state have been brought to bear against independent journalists, trade unionists, and other voices of dissent. Increasingly, Belarus has been driven into self-imposed isolation under Lukashenka devoid of legitimate leadership or accountability. A little over a year ago I addressed the Senate to voice concern over reported arms deals between the regime and rouge states, including Iraq. It appears that such sales have taken on greater importance as the Belarusian economy spirals downward. Mr. President, while some might be tempted to dismiss Belarus as an anomaly, the stakes are too high and the costs too great to ignore. Accordingly, today, I am introducing the Belarus Democracy Act of 2003, which is designed to help put an end to repression and human rights violations in Belarus and to promote Belarus’ entry into a democratic Euro-Atlantic community of nations. As a participating State in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Belarus has accepted a series of norms in the areas of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As Europe’s last dictator, Lukashenka continues to brashly trample the fundamental rights of his own people and their culture. As I alluded to earlier, independent media, non-governmental organizations, trade unions and the democratic opposition have had to operate under extremely difficult conditions, often facing serious mistreatment and an orchestrated campaign of harassment. Despite the repressions there are courageous individuals who support democracy have not been silenced. Two weeks ago, for example, Alexander Yarashuk, the leader of the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions, called on Lukashenka to immediately cease backing Saddam. Moreover, just last week, on March 12, thousands gathered peacefully in a central Minsk square to protest deteriorating economic and social conditions in Belarus. Four of the rally’s organizers – Andrei Sannikov, Ludmila Gryaznova, Dmitry Bondarenko and Leonid Malakhov – were given 15 day jail sentences for “participation in unauthorized mass actions.” Despite calls for change within Belarus, and considerable prodding from the international community, Lukashenka has shown no desire to deviate from his path of authoritarianism and personal profit at the expense of his own people. A few months ago, Lukashenka, who effectively controls the Belarusian parliament, signed into laws a new, repressive religion law. Local elections held earlier this month followed the pattern of Belarus’ 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential elections – they were a joke. Control of election commissions, denials of registration for opposition candidates, “early voting” and outright falsifications were the norm. Mr. President, the Belarus Democracy Act of 2003 would authorize additional assistance for democracy-building activities such as support for NGOs, independent media, including radio and television broadcasting to Belarus, and international exchanges. It also encourages free and fair parliamentary elections, which have been notably absent in Belarus. This bill would also deny high-ranking officials of the Lukashenka regime entry into the United States. Additionally, strategic exports to the Belarusian Government would be prohibited, as well as U.S. Government financing, except for humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products. The U.S. executive directors of the international financial institutions would be encouraged to vote against financial assistance to the Government of Belarus except for loans and assistance for humanitarian needs. The bill would also require reports from the President concerning the sale of delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies from Belarus to rogue states, including Iraq and North Korea. I am very pleased that the Ranking Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Biden, is an original cosponsor of this measure. His support will ensure that we proceed on a bipartisan basis as we work to ensure the timely adoption and implementation of this legislation. Mr. President, the goal of the Belarus Democracy Act is to assist Belarus in becoming a genuine European state, in which respect for human rights and democracy is the norm and in which the long-suffering Belarusian people are able to overcome the legacy of dictatorship – past and present. Adoption and implementation of the Belarus Democracy Act will offer a ray of hope that the current period of political, economic and social stagnation will indeed end. The people of Belarus deserve a chance for a brighter future free of repression and fear. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Belarus Democracy Act be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: S. 700 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the "Belarus Democracy Act of 2003''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States supports the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law in the Republic of Belarus consistent with its commitments as a participating state of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (2) The United States has a vital interest in the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus and its integration into the European community of democracies. (3) The last parliamentary election in Belarus deemed to be free and fair by the international community was conducted in 1995 from which emerged the 13th Supreme Soviet whose democratically and constitutionally derived authorities and powers have been usurped by the authoritarian regime of Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenka. (4) In November 1996, Lukashenka orchestrated an illegal and unconstitutional referendum that enabled him to impose a new constitution, abolish the duly-elected parliament, the 13th Supreme Soviet, install a largely powerless National Assembly, and extend his term of office to 2001. (5) In May 1999, democratic forces in Belarus challenged Lukashenka's unconstitutional extension of his presidential term by staging alternative presidential elections which were met with repression. (6) Democratic forces in Belarus have organized peaceful demonstrations against the Lukashenka regime in cities and towns throughout Belarus which led to beatings, mass arrests, and extended incarcerations. (7) Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, and Yuri Zakharenka, who have been leaders and supporters of the democratic forces in Belarus, and Dmitry Zavadsky, a journalist known for his critical reporting in Belarus, have disappeared and are presumed dead. (8) Former Belarus Government officials have come forward with credible allegations and evidence that top officials of the Lukashenka regime were involved in the disappearances. (9) The Lukashenka regime systematically harasses and represses the independent media and independent trade unions, imprisons independent journalists, and actively suppresses freedom of speech and expression. (10) The Lukashenka regime harasses the autocephalic Belarusian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish community, the Hindu Lights of Kalyasa community, evangelical Protestant churches (such as Baptist and Pentecostal groups), and other minority religious groups. (11) The Law on Religious Freedom and Religious Organizations, passed by the National Assembly and signed by Lukashenka on October 31, 2002, establishes one of the most repressive legal regimes in the OSCE region, severely limiting religious freedom and placing excessively burdensome government controls on religious practice. (12) The United States, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly, and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly have not recognized the National Assembly. (13) The parliamentary elections of October 15, 2000, conducted in the absence of a democratic election law, were illegitimate, unconstitutional, and plagued by violent human rights abuses committed by the Lukashenka regime, and have been determined by the OSCE to be nondemocratic. (14) The presidential election of September 9, 2001, was determined by the OSCE and other observers to be fundamentally unfair, to have failed to meet OSCE commitments for democratic elections formulated in the 1990 Copenhagen Document, and to have featured significant and abusive misconduct by the Lukashenka regime, including-- (A) the harassment, arrest, and imprisonment of opposition members; (B) the denial of equal and fair access by opposition candidates to state-controlled media; (C) the seizure of equipment and property of independent nongovernmental organizations and press organizations, and the harassment of their staff and management; (D) voting and vote counting procedures that were not transparent; and (E) a campaign of intimidation directed against opposition activists, domestic election observation organizations, and opposition and independent media, and a libelous media campaign against international observers. SEC. 3. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN BELARUS. (a) PURPOSES OF ASSISTANCE.--Assistance under this section shall be available for the following purposes: (1) To assist the people of the Republic of Belarus in regaining their freedom and to enable them to join the European community of democracies. (2) To encourage free and fair presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in Belarus, conducted in a manner consistent with internationally accepted standards and under the supervision of internationally recognized observers. (3) To assist in restoring and strengthening institutions of democratic governance in Belarus. (b) AUTHORIZATION FOR ASSISTANCE.--To carry out the purposes set forth in subsection (a), the President is authorized to furnish assistance and other support for the activities described in subsection (c), to be provided primarily for indigenous groups in Belarus that are committed to the support of democratic processes in Belarus. (c) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.--Activities that may be supported by assistance under subsection (b) include-- (1) the observation of elections and the promotion of free and fair electoral processes; (2) the development of democratic political parties; (3) radio and television broadcasting to and within Belarus; (4) the development of nongovernmental organizations promoting democracy and supporting human rights; (5) the development of independent media working within Belarus and from locations outside Belarus, and supported by non-state-controlled printing facilities; (6) international exchanges and advanced professional training programs for leaders and members of the democratic forces in matters central to the development of civil society; and (7) other activities consistent with the purposes of this Act. (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out this section $40,000,000 for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. (2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended. SEC. 4. RADIO BROADCASTING TO BELARUS. (a) PURPOSE.--It is the purpose of this section to authorize increased support for United States Government and surrogate radio broadcasting to the Republic of Belarus that will facilitate the unhindered dissemination of information in Belarus. (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--In addition to such sums as are otherwise authorized to be appropriated, there is authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for each fiscal year for Voice of America and RFE/RL, Incorporated for radio broadcasting to the people of Belarus in languages spoken in Belarus. (c) REPORT ON RADIO BROADCASTING TO AND IN BELARUS.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how funds appropriated and allocated pursuant to the authorizations of appropriations under subsection (b) and section 3(d) will be used to provide AM and FM broadcasting that covers the territory of Belarus and delivers independent and uncensored programming. SEC. 5. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS. (a) APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.--The sanctions described in subsections (c) and (d), and any sanction imposed under subsection (e) or (f), shall apply with respect to the Republic of Belarus until the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Belarus has made significant progress in meeting the conditions described in subsection (b). (b) CONDITIONS.--The conditions referred to in subsection (a) are the following: (1) The release of individuals in Belarus who have been jailed based on political or religious beliefs. (2) The withdrawal of politically motivated legal charges against all opposition figures and independent journalists in Belarus. (3) A full accounting of the disappearances of opposition leaders and journalists in Belarus, including Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, Yuri Zakharenka, and Dmitry Zavadsky, and the prosecution of the individuals who are responsible for their disappearances. (4) The cessation of all forms of harassment and repression against the independent media, independent trade unions, nongovernmental organizations, religious organizations (including their leadership and members), and the political opposition in Belarus. (5) The implementation of free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in Belarus consistent with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) standards on democratic elections and in cooperation with relevant OSCE institutions. (c) PROHIBITION ON STRATEGIC EXPORTS TO BELARUS.-- (1) PROHIBITION.--No computers, computer software, goods, or technology intended to manufacture or service computers, or any other related goods or technology, may be exported to Belarus for use by the Government of Belarus, or by its military, police, prison system, or national security agencies. The prohibition in the preceding sentence shall not apply with respect to the export of goods or technology for democracy-building or humanitarian purposes. (2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the issuance of licenses to ensure the safety of civil aviation and safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft of United States origin or to ensure the safety of ocean-going maritime traffic in international waters. (d) PROHIBITION ON LOANS AND INVESTMENT.-- (1) UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FINANCING.--No loan, credit guarantee, insurance, financing, or other similar financial assistance may be extended by any agency of the United States Government (including the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) to the Government of Belarus, except with respect to the provision of humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products. (2) TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY.--No funds available to the Trade and Development Agency may be available for activities of the Agency in or for Belarus. (e) DENIAL OF ENTRY INTO UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN BELARUS OFFICIALS.-- (1) DENIAL OF ENTRY.--It is the sense of Congress that, in addition to the sanctions provided for in subsections (c) and (d), the President should use the authority under section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)) to deny the entry into the United States of any alien who-- (A) holds a position in the senior leadership of the Government of Belarus; or (B) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person described in subparagraph (A). (2) SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS DEFINED.--In this subsection, the term ``senior leadership of the Government of Belarus'' includes-- (A) the President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, government ministers, Chairmen of State Committees, and members of the Presidential Administration of Belarus; (B) any official of the Government of Belarus who is personally and substantially involved in the suppression of freedom in Belarus, including judges and prosecutors; and (C) any other individual determined by the Secretary of State (or the Secretary's designee) to be personally and substantially involved in the formulation or execution of the policies of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus that are in contradiction of internationally recognized human rights standards. (f) MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.--It is the sense of Congress that, in addition to the sanctions provided for in subsections (c) and (d), the Secretary of the Treasury should instruct the United States Executive Director of each international financial institution to which the United States is a member to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any extension by those institutions of any financial assistance (including any technical assistance or grant) of any kind to the Government of Belarus, except for loans and assistance that serve humanitarian needs. (g) WAIVER.--The President may waive the application of any sanction described in this section with respect to Belarus if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that it is important to the national interests of the United States to do so. SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION. It is the sense of Congress that the President should continue to seek to coordinate with other countries, particularly European countries, a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to further the purposes of this Act, including, as appropriate, encouraging other countries to take measures with respect to the Republic of Belarus that are similar to measures provided for in this Act. SEC. 7. ANNUAL REPORTS. (a) REPORTS.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every year thereafter, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes, with respect to the preceding 12-month period, the following: (1) The sale or delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies from the Republic of Belarus to any country, the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)), has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. (2) An identification of each country described in paragraph (1) and a detailed description of the weapons or weapons-related technologies involved in the sale. (3) An identification of the goods, services, credits, or other consideration received by Belarus in exchange for the weapons or weapons-related technologies. (4) The personal assets and wealth of Aleksandr Lukashenka and other senior leadership of the Government of Belarus. (b) FORM.--A report transmitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex. SEC. 8. DECLARATION OF POLICY. Congress hereby-- (1) expresses its support to those in the Republic of Belarus seeking-- (A) to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and to consolidate the independence and sovereignty of Belarus; and (B) to promote the integration of Belarus into the European community of democracies; (2) expresses its grave concern about the disappearances of Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, Yuri Zakharenka, and Dmitry Zavadsky; (3) calls upon the Lukashenka regime in Belarus to cease its persecution of political opponents or independent journalists and to release those individuals who have been imprisoned for opposing his regime or for exercising their right to freedom of speech; (4) calls upon the Lukashenka regime to end the pattern of clear, gross, and uncorrected violations of relevant human dimension commitments of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and to respect the basic freedoms of speech, expression, assembly, association, language, culture, and religion or belief; (5) calls upon the Government of the Russian Federation to use its influence to encourage democratic development in Belarus so that Belarus can become a democratic, prosperous, sovereign, and independent state that is integrated into Europe; (6) calls upon the Government of Belarus to resolve the continuing constitutional and political crisis in Belarus through-- (A) free, fair, and transparent presidential and parliamentary elections in Belarus, as called for by the OSCE; (B) respect for human rights in Belarus; (C) an end to the current climate of fear in Belarus; (D) meaningful access by the opposition to state media in Belarus; (E) modification of the electoral code of Belarus in keeping with OSCE commitments; (F) engagement in genuine talks with the opposition in Belarus; and (G) modifications of the constitution of Belarus to allow for genuine authority for the parliament; and (7) commends the democratic opposition in Belarus for their commitment to freedom, their courage in the face of the repression of the Lukashenka regime, and the emergence of a pluralist civil society in Belarus--the foundation for the development of democratic political structures. SEC. 9. DEFINITION. In this Act, the term "appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (1) the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. 

  • Mourning the Assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic

    Mr. Speaker, I want to join the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) in his comments about Mr. Djindjic, the Prime Minister of Serbia. Serbia in the 1990s, like Iraq has gone through, was under the heel of a despot who was vicious and who in my opinion was a war criminal. When the United States acted to displace the Milosevic regime and ultimately Milosevic was voted out of office because we went into Kosovo, it was Mr. Djindjic who showed the courage and the moral commitment to ensure that Mr. Milosevic would be transferred to The Hague to answer for his crimes. That trial currently is going on. It is going on because Mr. Djindjic had the courage to facilitate the transfer out of Serbia to The Hague of the alleged war criminal Slobodan Milosevic.   He has now been assassinated. We do not know yet who the perpetrator of that assassination is. Suffice it to say, we have lost someone whose courage and commitment to freedom and human rights was an important aspect for his country and for the international community. We are a lesser international community for his loss.

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