Soviet Involvement in the Polish EconomyThursday, April 01, 1982
Commissioner Dante B. Fascell chaired this hearing, the purpose of which was to review the record of Soviet involvement in the planning, direction, and operation of the Polish economy. Before the time of this hearing, Soviet involvement in the Polish economy had been the source of much speculation. More specifically, Poland’s economy was functioning poorly, but it was debated whether the fault of this lay more with Poland itself or more with the U.S.S.R. What was hoped to be achieved in the hearing, then, was to shed light on the issue of how Soviet involvement affected the Polish economy, specifically based on the personal experience of one of Poland’s leading economists and a former government official, Ambassador Zdzislaw Rurarz.
Soviet Violation of Helsinki Final Act: Invasion of AfghanistanWednesday, July 22, 1981
Attendees at this hearing, over which Commissioner Dante B. Fascell presided, discussed the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union, an invasion that ran counter to international law due to Afghanistan’s status as sovereign and independent. The set of agreements that the Soviet Union signed on to in 1975 with 34 other countries (i.e. the Helsinki Final Act) incorporated rights inherent in a country’s sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force, the rights of peoples to self-determination, and acceptance of international conduct principles. In short, the Soviet Union’s invasion and attempted occupation of Afghanistan had struck at the very heart of these principles, and its invasion had severely damaged the international climate and greatly damaged East-West relations.
A Thematic Survey of the Documents of the Moscow Helsinki GroupTuesday, May 12, 1981
The Moscow Public Group to Promote Observance of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR (better known as the Moscow Helsinki Group) announced its formation at a press conference for Western journalists on May 12, 1976. The first statement of the Moscow Helsinki Group publicized the names and addresses of the founding members: Professor Yuri Orlov, Group leader; and founding members Lyudmila Alekseeva, Elena Bonner, Aleksandr Ginzburg, Petro Grigorenko, Malva Landa, Anatoly Marchenko, Vitaly Rubin and Anatoly Shcharansky. (Later, ten other human rights activists joined the Moscow Helsinki Group: Sofya Kalistratova, Ivan Kovalev, Naum Meiman, Yuri Mnyukh, Viktor Nekipelov, Tatiana Osipova, Feliks Serebrov, Vladimir Slepak, Leonard Ternovsky and Yuri Yarym-Agaev.) Believing that human needs and open information are directly related to international security, the Group seeks to inform the CSCE states and public opinion about violations in the USSR of the humanitarian provisions of the Final Act. The Moscow Helsinki Group hopes that the information it provides will be considered at those international meetings (the Belgrade Conference, the Madrid Conference and similar future meetings) which are envisioned in the Final Act, under the section "Followup to the Conference," to examine the fulfillment of obligations under the Helsinki Accords. The Group called itself the Group to Promote the observance of the Helsinki Accords to stress its loyalty to the authorities and its desire to cooperate if they revealed a conscientious attitude towards their Helsinki human rights obligations. The Group members called on other CSCE signatories to create similar citizens groups, since violations of the Final Act human rights provisions are possible in any country.
Fifth Anniversary of the Formation of the Ukrainian Helsinki GroupMonday, February 16, 1981
On November 9, 1976, 10 brave men and women in Kiev organized a citizens' group to examine how the Soviet Government was living up to its Helsinki human rights pledges. Tragically, however, far from greeting this new civic endeavor, the Kremlin, in a savage campaign of official reprisal, singled out the Ukrainian Helsinki Group for especially harsh treatment. By 1981, 30 group activists were in Soviet camps, prisons, and places of exile. The four witnesses at the Helsinki Commission hearing provided expert testimony on Ukraine and the Helsinki process, and their fates gave an insight into the radically different ways in which our Government and that of the Soviet Union reacted to citizen interest in the Helsinki process.
Implementation of the Final Act: Findings and Recommendations Five Years After HelsinkiFriday, August 01, 1980
This report and its findings and recommendations are drawn from material compiled during the Commission's continuing study of Final Act implementation -- with special emphasis on the period since the last report in August 1977. Directed by law to give "particular regard" to the provisions of the Final Act section (Basket III) on Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields, the Commission is: "Further authorized and directed to monitor and encourage the developoment of programs and activities of the United States government and private organizations with a view toward taking advantage of the provisions of the Final Act to expand East-West economic cooperation and a greater interchange of people and ideas between East and West." Guided by its mandate, the Commission has concentrated its attention in this report primarily on the compliance records of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies where, with rare exceptions, the level of implementation in many areas has remained appallingly low and, in some cases, has even regressed. By comparison, Western CSCE states generally have maintained relatively high standards of implementation in all areas of the Final Act and, in particular, in those areas such as human rights where the Eastern record has been most dismal. Therefore, in examining the impact of the Final Act -- actions reflecting compliance with or violations of its articles -- the Commission, in this report, has directed the bulk of its research to those nations whose records under the Helsinki Accords stand the greatest need for improvement.
Review of Implementation of Basket II of the Helsinki Final ActThursday, March 06, 1980
This hearing, which Commissioner Jonathan B. Bingham chaired, was a joint meeting of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. These organizations held this hearing after the establishment of a new strategy by the U.S. in its relations with the Soviet Union. More specifically, the month before this hearing, the CSCE adopted a resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the arrest and exile of Andrei Sakharov as blatant violations of the Helsinki Final Act. Commissioner Millicent Fenwick, who was also one of the sponsors of legislation creating the CSCE, proposed this resolution. Likewise, the resolution called on the signatory states of the Final Act to join in such protest and undertake such sanctions against the former U.S.S.R. as may be available to them. The hearing itself, then, focused on the current status and prospects of U.S. commercial and economic relationships with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern European countries, implementation of Basket II, efforts to promote better implementation, and the impact the Soviet violation of the Helsinki accords in Afghanistan would have on the Madrid Review Session and the CSCE process as a whole.
Profiles: Helsinki MonitorsMonday, December 10, 1979
In May of 1976, a group of Soviet citizens dedicated themselves to promoting compliance by their government with the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Collecting and disseminating information on violations of those provisions, these human rights activists thereby expressed their stated conviction that "the issues of humanitarianism and free information have a direct relationship to the problem of international security." Respect for human rights in the USSR, they held, is a precondition for the development of a solid East-West detente. After hearing about the work of the Helsinki Groups on foreign radio broadcasts, many ordinary Soviet citizens began sending the Group information on human rights violations in various areas of the USSR. In this way, the Groups became catalysts, drawing together the disparate strands of Soviet dissent. Group reports reflect these varied concerns: conditions in labor camps and psychiatric hospitals; the problems of religious and ethnic minorities; emigration difficulties; and denials of economic rights. The CSCE Commission translates and compiles these Group documents in its series of "Reports of the Helsinki Accord Monitors in the Soviet Union." Encouraged by the success of the first Helsinki Group in Moscow, other such groups were organized in the Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, and Georgia. In Moscow, two allied groups were formed to deal with more specific issues: the Working Commission on the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, and the Christian Committee to Defend the Rights of Believers. In recognition of the sacrifice, dedication, and successful work of all these groups, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe nominated all their members for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 and 1979. During the past two years, other allied groups have emerged: the Initiative Group for the Defense of the Rights of Invalids in the USSR; the Group for the Legal Struggle and Investigation of Facts about the Persecution of Believers in the USSR of the All-Union Church of the Faithful and Free Seventh-Day Adventists; and the Catholic Committee to Defense the Rights of Believers in the USSR. With the addition of these new committees, an even broader spectrum of human rights issues and interests in the Soviet Union is now represented. At the present time, there are 66 men and women in the Helsinki Monitoring Groups in Moscow, Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia and Armenia. Currently, 26 people have joined the Christian, Catholic and Adventist Committees, the Working Con-miission on Psychiatric Abuse and the Initiative Group for Invalids. For this compilation of biographical information on the present members, the Commission is indebted to the following for their assistance: ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLICATIONS Amnesty International, Bulletin d'Information, Comite pour I'application des accords d'Helsinki en Georgie, Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, ELTA Information Service, Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee, Keston College, Khronika Press, Lithuanian-American Community of the U.S.A., Inc., Lithuanian Catholic Religious Aid, National Conference on Soviet Jewry, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Smoloskyp, Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry, the Ukrainian National Information Service, the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, Washington Street Research Center. INDIVIDUALS Mr. Victor Abdalov, Mrs. Lyudmila Alekseeva, Gen. and Mrs. Pyotr Grigorenko, Ms. Dina Kaminskaya, Mr. Ambartsum Khlagatyan, Mr. Michael Meerson, Rev. Aleksandr Shmeiman, Mr. Konstantin Simis, Ms. Veronika Stein, Mr. Valentin Turchin, and Ms. Lydia Voronina, Ms. Yulya Zaks.
Fulfilling our Promises: The United States and the Helsinki Final Act (1)Thursday, November 01, 1979
The Commission has three main purposes in preparing this report. First, it hopes to demonstrate the good faith of the U.S. in assessing its Helsinki implementation record in light of criticisms from other CSCE countries and domestic critics. Second, the Commission hopes to stimulate honest implementation evaluations by other CSCE states and thus to lay the groundwork for real progress prior to the next review meeting at Madrid in 1980. Finally, the Commission hopes to encourage improved compliance by the United States. Although the Commission agrees with President Carter that the U.S. record is very good, additional discussion and interaction between responsible government agencies and interested private organizations in a necessary prerequisite to greater progress. This report follows the structures of the Final Act by discussing, in order, each major section or "basket" of the Act. Basket I deals with questions relating to security in Europe which includes Human Rights; Basket II, economic and scientific cooperation; Basket III, cooperation in humanitarian and other fields. Click to read Part 2.
Fulfilling our Promises: The United States and the Helsinki Final Act (2)Thursday, November 01, 1979
The Commission has three main purposes in preparing this report. First, it hopes to demonstrate the good faith of the U.S. in assessing its Helsinki implementation record in light of criticisms from other CSCE countries and domestic critics. Second, the Commission hopes to stimulate honest implementation evaluations by other CSCE states and thus to lay the groundwork for real progress prior to the next review meeting at Madrid in 1980. Finally, the Commission hopes to encourage improved compliance by the United States. Although the Commission agrees with President Carter that the U.S. record is very good, additional discussion and interaction between responsible government agencies and interested private organizations in a necessary prerequisite to greater progress. This report follows the structures of the Final Act by discussing, in order, each major section or "basket" of the Act. Basket I deals with questions relating to security in Europe which includes Human Rights; Basket II, economic and scientific cooperation; Basket III, cooperation in humanitarian and other fields.
Implementation of The Helsinki Accords Vol. XI – Religious Persecution In U.S.S.R. & HR Violations in UkraineThursday, June 07, 1979
The first part of this hearing, led by Commissioner Dante B. Fascell, focused largely on the imprisonment of Russian Pastor Georgi Vins, who had spent eight of the last thirteen years in prison simply due to his occupation. Repression of this Baptist minister exemplified such repression of other Baptist clergymen by the U.S.S.R., whose denomination in the country dated back to the early 1900s. However, in 1965, the Soviet Baptist movement split into the recognized and legitimated all-union Council of Evangelical Christians, and the dissident reform Baptists, making the latter the first Soviet dissident human rights group. The second portion of the hearing discussed Ukrainian political retribution and dissidents, exemplified by the cases of witnesses who had all been political prisoners in the Eastern European country.
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords Vol. IX – U.S. Visa PoliciesThursday, April 05, 1979
This briefing discussed how the Helsinki Accord’s provisions on the free flow of people apply to the United States. The briefing followed President Carter’s commitment to embody the principles outlined in the Helsinki Final Act. Representatives from U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of State and the Department of Justice, and interested civil society organizations testified about their experiences with the current visa regime. The witnesses were asked to make recommendations about the advisability of changing U.S. law to align with the freedom of movement provisions in the Helsinki Accords.
Reports of the Helsinki Accords Monitors in the Soviet UnionWednesday, November 01, 1978
This volume is the third compilation of selected documents emerging from the Helsinki accord monitoring groups in the Soviet Union published by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In a sampling of reports written between late 1976 and the summer of 1978, it is intended, as in the previous compilations, to illustrate the broad range of human rights concerns of the various monitoring groups whose common goal is the furthering of Final Act implementation in their own country. Efforts to promote CSCE compliance in the Soviet Union began in May of 1976 when 11 human rights activists in Moscow, led by Yuri Orlov, formed the first Public Group to Promote Observance of the Helsinki Agreements. Inspired by its example, other Helsinki groups were formed in Kiev, Vilnius, Yerevan and Tbilisi. Additional independent organizations with more narrowly defined focus, such as the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights and the Working Commission on the Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, also emerged. Today, more than 50 group members, representing a broad spectrum of religious, ethnic and professional affiliations, are actively documenting human rights violations and engaged in promoting implementation of the Helsinki accord. While maintaining their individual identities, Soviet monitoring groups have frequently collaborated in their efforts to promote human rights. When the Lithuanian and Ukrainian groups were formed, for example, the Moscow group sponsored a joint news conference to publicize their creation. The Christian Committee, composed of four members of the Russian Orthodox Church, has written appeals on behalf of Adventists, Jews and Baptists. On occasion, two or more groups have issued joint declarations and other documents. Ordinary Soviet citizens, learning of the Helsinki groups via Western radio broadcasts, have traveled thousands of miles from remote regions in order to present documented evidence on human rights violations. Similarly, monitoring group members have journeyed great distances to conduct interviews and related research. Representatives of the Moscow group, for example, were sent to the northern Caucasus and to distant Nakhodka to visit Pentecostal communities desiring to emigrate. The representative documents of the Soviet Helsinki monitoring groups reproduced here address a wide range of human rights concerns: repressions of group members, violations of the rights of ethnic minorities, difficulties of emigration from the USSR, problems of religious believers and difficulties of current and former political prisoners. Economic concerns are also treated in several documents in the compilation. The Soviet monitoring groups carry out their work in an extremely repressive environment. Although 20 members of these organizations have been arrested and imprisoned, many new members have joined. Frequently, documents have been confiscated by the KGB. During a search of Orlov's apartment in Moscow, for example, material documenting persecution of parents advocating religious practices for their children was removed. In another case, Aleksandr Ginzburg's residence was searched and information on the health of seriously ill political prisoners was seized. The documents of the Soviet Helsinki monitors are truly a testament to their strength, courage and dedication. Their long-range goal -- the achievement of a humane society based on respect for law -- has yet to be realized. But already they have attained a moral victory in gaining the attention and respect of private and governmental groups throughout the world.
Helsinki Commission Annual Report - 1978Wednesday, October 11, 1978
Created in 1976 as an independent agency to monitor and encourage compliance with the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Commission has carried out its responsiblities in a variety of ways during the 95th Congress. Primary focus of Commission activity during the past two years was on the Belgrade CSCE review conference which met from June 1977 to March 1978 to review implementation by all signatories of the military and security, economic and scientific, humanitarian and other goals of the Helsinki Final Act. The Commission was instrumental in formulating U.S. policy for the Belgrade meeting and then played an important and active role as part of the U.S. delegation to the review conference. It has also been active in planning for and staffing official U.S. delegations to a subsequent meeting of scientific experts in Bonn, as well as other conferences within the CSCE process. In addition to carrying out its monitoring and informational responsibilities in major international fora, the Commission has been extremely active on a day-to-day basis in promoting implementation of the Helsinki accords. Extensive and continuing hearings during the last two years have provided an important source of information on the state of Helsinki Final Act implementation, particularly in the human rights area. Human rights, especially family reunification, was also the subject of a large number of Commission meetings and staff interviews during the 95th Congress. As a result, the Commission has been able to provide a regular flow of reports and information to the Congress, press and public on human rights and other issues involving Helsinki Final Act implementation. The Commission has a unique role in policy formulation and coordination on CSCE; during the past two years, Commissioners and staff held extensive meetings with officials of the Executive Branch to review and initiate CSCE policy issues. In addition, periodic consultations were held with officials of the other signatory governments. It is likely that this process will intensify and expand in anticipation of the next major review conference at Madrid in 1980.
Implementation Of The Helsinki Accords Vol. VI – Soviet Law And Helsinki MonitorsTuesday, June 06, 1978
This briefing discussed the repression against human rights activists in the Soviet Union. Chairman Fascell and Commissioner Leahy oversaw the testimony of several American lawyers representing imprisoned members of the Moscow-Helsinki Group detailing the abuses committed against their clients. Numerous documents from Soviet citizens were also submitted to the record documenting the Soviet authorities’ violations of the Helsinki Accords’ human rights provisions.
Soviet Law and the Helsinki MonitorsTuesday, June 06, 1978
Between February 3, 1977 and June 1, 1978, twenty Soviet citizens active in the defense of human rights in five different Republics were arrested and imprisoned; two others, traveling abroad on Soviet passports, were stripped of their citizenship and denied the right to return to the USSR. All are members of the Public Groups to Promote Observance of the Helsinki Agreement in the USSR (the Soviet Helsinki Watch) or, in the case of two men, of its subsidiary Working Commission to Investigate the Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Purposes. The twenty-one men and one woman are being punished under a variety of different criminal charges. Their "crime," however, is identical: political dissent, expressed in the non-violent, open effort to spur Soviet authorities to implement the human rights and humanitarian undertakings of the August 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Accord.) The following study by the staff of the U. S. Commission on . Security and Cooperation in Europe examines the workings of Soviet law and criminal procedure as applied in these cases of political dissent. It discusses the guarantees of Soviet law, including international covenants ratified by the USSR, against arbitrary arrest and unfair trial and compares those to the practices used against the Helsinki Watchers. From the study it is evident that those guarantees -- both substantive and procedural -- have been repeatedly violated in the persecution and prosecution of the twenty-two human rights activists. The violations uncovered range from improper conduct of pre-arrest house searches through illegally prolonged pre-trial detention to unlawful denial of the rights of the defense at the trial. This pattern of official conduct toward free, but dissenting political expression is not new in the Soviet Union. In the treatment of the Soviet Helsinki Watch, however, it has been systematic and can be termed, without question, a gross and intentional violation of both the pledges in the Final Act and the safeguards promised by the Soviet Constitution, Criminal Codes and Codes of Criminal Procedure.
The Belgrade Followup Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: A Report and AppraisalWednesday, May 17, 1978
For some 5 months -- between October 4, 1977, and March 9, 1978 -- delegates of the 35 nations that signed the 1975 Helsinki accord met in Belgrade to determine how well the commitments set out in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe had been kept. From their work, a new ingredient in East-West diplomacy emerged: The recognition of human rights as an integral aspect of detente. This is an important step on the road toward making Europe a place where human rights are universally respected in all countries, even though it carries no guarantees of speedy remedies for existing abuses. Although the Belgrade meeting examined new proposals, drafted a concluding document and scheduled the next review meeting, the main work of the Belgrade meeting was a line-by-line review of the Final Act. This complex document contained provisions for regulating the political relations between the states of Europe, for easing military tensions among them, and for improving trade, commerce and the flow of people and ideas between East and West. But the elements that caught the imaginations and enthusiasm of ordinary citizens were those guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms and promoting policies among governments which would enhance their consistent observance. To understand the advance made at Belgrade and the limits on it, it is necessary to remember that CSCE decisions of the 35 countries can only be arrived at unanimously; each nation can reject any proposal or document by merely denying consensus. Moreover, the discussions at Belgrade were closed to the public and not transcribed, except for 2 weeks of formal, on-the-record speeches at the start and end of the meeting. Given these circumstances, Belgrade was more what therapists would call an "encounter session" than what jurists would regard as a tribunal. It was better suited for exchanges of views and arguments than for the issuance of formal findings or decrees. The United States and its allies-along with many of the neutral and nonalined countries-sought to make the review of Final Act implementation the touchstone of the Belgrade meeting. For the United States, the most urgent and important matters centered on questions of human rights, for it was here that performance was most glaringly deficient. The working sessions at Belgrade demonstrated the determination of Western and neutral signatories to record specific criticisms of Eastern implementation of the Helsinki Final Act.
The Belgrade CSCE Meeting - U.S. Delegation Statements, Oct. 6 to Dec. 22Saturday, October 01, 1977
During this reporting period, the most-significant development affecting implementation of commitments undertaken at the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was the beginning on October 4 in Belgrade of the first CSCE follow-up meeting. President Carter's appointment of the distinguished American jurist and diplomat, Arthur J. Goldberg, as Chairman of the US delegation and Ambassador-at-large for CSCE demonstrates the importance which the President attaches to the CSCE process and to the Belgrade meeting in particular. This meeting provides the first opportunity to conduct a full review of the understandings contained in the CSCE Final Act, signed by 35 heads of state at Helsinki in August 1975. It also offers a forum to set forth clearly the President's personal commitment to a dialogue on humanitarian matters as one of the fundamental aspects of detente. Ambassador Goldberg leads a delegation which includes all of the Congressional members of the CSCE Commission as well as members of the Commission staff, a number of distinguished public members from business, academia, the labor movement and other walks of life, plus representatives of several government departments and agencies. In preparing for the Belgrade conference, the United States delega-t tion called upon the resources of other government departments and, with the assistance of the CSCE Commission, heard the views of numerous private organizations whose interests are affected by provisions of the Final Act. As a result, Ambassador Goldberg entered the Belgrade meeting with the broad support of the American people for his important task. On instructions approved personally by the President, all delegation members are working to assure that the Belgrade discussions result in an honest and candid review of areas where progress has been made and of areas where greater efforts are needed, especially in the vital field of human rights. The Administration shares the view expressed in the report issued by the CSCE Commission on the second anniversary of the Helsinki Summit that the Final Act offers significant potential for improvement of relations between East and West. We also agree that much of that potential is yet to be realized. The Belgrade meeting has offered a unique opportunity to give new impetus to the longterm process initiated with signature of the Final Act and to ensure that the great potential represented by this process is not left to dissipate. The Belgrade meeting is a new venture in the history of East- West relations. It is not a negotiation as such, and it does not look toward a new agreement or to changes in the Helsinki Final Act. Its task is to conduct an exchange of views on experience gained during the past two years and to examine means of deepening coopera- tion in the future. The experience gained in the course of this exchange will be one of the most important results of the meeting. Based on this experience, the participants should be better able to pursue implementation both in their own countries and in their mutual relations in years to come.
Implementation of the Final Act: Findings and Recommendations Two Years After HelsinkiFriday, September 23, 1977
In December 1976, at the conclusion of an 18-day study mission in Europe, five members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe reported that the "potential" of the 1975 Helsinki accords "for improving East-West relations over the long term is far more significant than their initial impact." Eight months of inquiry later-on the second anniversary of the signing of the Final Act-the Commission remains confident of the constructive "potential" of the 35-nation agreement. It finds, however, that much of the potential is yet to be realized. The potential has been dramatized by the popular response in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to the Helsinki accord provisions on human rights, eased conditions for travel and family reunification and freer flow of information. The impact of the Final Act on private individuals -- thanks to its immediate and widespread publication in the Warsaw Pact states -- has been great. Its publication stimulated significant expectations of change in governmental conduct. Those expectations, however, have been dashed in some instances, realized only partially in many others. Signatories have been obliged by a variety of political considerations to move cautiously, if at all, to tailor their foreign or domestic conduct to the specifications endorsed at the Helsinki summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Having "declare[d] their determination to act in accordance with the provisions contained" in the Final Act,2 the participating states have -- with a few significant exceptions -- generally continued to act with limited regard for the undertakings they gave one another on August 1, 1975. The Final Act was meant to give an impulse toward a common code of European and North Atlantic diplomatic and civil conduct. Both an expression of and a political stimulus to the process of international detente, the Final Act is also, quite specifically, a framework for relaxation of East-West tensions and the promotion of more stable relations between different and differing social systems. As a nonbinding declaration of intentions (not a treaty), however, it could do no more than define aspirations and outline the manner in which they were to be met. The record of its implementation is the test of its impact. The record of the first 2 years has been more productive than the Commission expected, though far short of the high promises which the language of the Final Act holds forth. Signatory nations have treated the document seriously, though respect for some of its provisionsparticularly in the area of human rights -- has not matched either the commitments given nor the hopes those pledges aroused. The Helsinki accord has not brought dramatic changes in East-West relations, but history may note it as more than a small step toward peace and a stability based on something more than mutual fear. Two years is a relatively short time in which to alter the long standing practices of sovereign nations, either in regard to one another or to their citizenries. In measuring the achievements of the Helsinki accord, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance cautioned the Commission, "I do not think that one can take a look at it in this moment alone and say it has either been a success or a failure. I think what you have now is a mixture of things. We have some slight movement forward in certain areas; we have no movement in others; and we have retrogression in others. But I think that a process has been started. . . and that we must stay with that process and continue to press what we believe to be correct." The Commission concurs in stressing the value of a process which has made it possible for the officials and private citizens of the 35 signatories to engage one another in discussions and exchanges made legitimate and significant by the Final Act. At the international level, the conference of the participating states in Belgrade this year creates the first opportunity to evaluate jointly the progress that has and has not been made and to impart fresh momentum to the process which the Final Act set in motion. The conferees at Belgrade, however, have little reason for self-congratulation. As they review the record of implementation. they must conclude-as this Commission does-that the distance to be covered toward the Final Act's goal of "peace, security and justice and the continuing development of friendly relations and cooperation" is far greater than the very limited advances already achieved. No participant in the Belgrade meeting can convincingly claim for his nation a perfect record of compliance with all Final Act principles and provisions. All too often the intentions the signatories expressed have been ignored in practice. On occasion-and, in some instances, systematically-the letter and spirit of the Helsinki accord have been violated. The burden of responsibility for failures of omission and commission in human rights and humanitarian matters does fall more heavily on the countries of the Warsaw Pact than on the other 28 si-natories, either individually or in various groupings. It must be recognized that the Final Act, by the nature of its provisions, calls for more action by the Soviet Union and its East European allies to alter existing practices than it requires of the Western signatories. It would be a mistake, however, to consider all Warsaw Pact states as having entirely common policies in this regard. There is a degree of East European govern- ment concern over human rights to which Western observers are sometimes insensitive. A relatively open society has little difficulty honoring commitments such as those of the Final Act signatories -- to ease travel, contact, and flow of information across frontiers. The adjustment -- though it has not yet been fully made in the visa-issuing practices of France, Great Britain, and the United States, for instance -- need not be politically wrenching. Rapid, full compliance would, however, be unsettling to the traditions and attitudes of the Communist nations. Yet even where gestures of compliance have been made, they have been dilatory and largely cosmetic. Progress, in summary, has been inadequate. Measured against either the hopes voiced at the Helsinki summit or the need for smoother and more stable relations among the signatories, the implementation of the Final Act has fallen short.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS VOL. IV - REPORTS ON SOVIET REPRESSION AND THE BELGRADE CONFERENCESunday, June 05, 1977
In light of first anniversary of the creation of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, this hearing focused on the work and the plight of courageous individuals who utilized the Helsinki accords as instruments for advancing international respect for human rights. In particular, the hearing delved into the case of Anatoly Shcharansky, one of the most courageous spokesmen of human rights in the U.S.S.R., faces treason charges as groundless as they are ominous. The Soviet decision to hold a show trial for Shcharansky with phony evidence and counterfeit witnesses combined with the earlier arrest of members of Helsinki monitoring groups in Russia, Ukraine, and most recently, in Georgia, were in violation of the Helsinki accords.
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords Vol. III – Information Flow, And Cultural And Educational ExchangesTuesday, May 17, 1977
In this hearing, Commissioner Dante Fascell and others discussed the impact that the Helsinki Accords had on easing and expanding the flow of ideas and information across ideological and international frontiers. The rationale for this hearing, which consisted of three mornings of testimony, was that, while the Commission has had a long and storied history of hearing and discussing the movement of people, one goal of the Helsinki Accords is to diminish the obstacles that keep the views of others out, which are also the borders that restrict freedom of movement for people.
Mr. President, today I introduce the International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001. This legislation addresses the growing problem of official and unofficial corruption abroad. This bill is based on S. 1514, which I introduced in the 106th Congress.
Endemic corruption around the world negatively impacts both the United States and the citizens of countries where corruption is tolerated. Overseas corruption directly hurts U.S. businesses as they endeavor to expand internationally. U.S. workers are affected when corruption closes doors to our exports. In addition, the honest and hardworking citizens of countries stricken with corruption suffer as they are compelled to pay bribes to officials and other people in positions of power just to get the permits and licenses they need to get things done. The trade barrier created by corruption also limits the purchasing choices available to these people. Finally, many leading U.S. companies that are eager to invest and build factories overseas to produce consumer goods for consumption in those countries, often wisely choose not to do so because they are not willing to deal with the corruption they would encounter. Overall, honest and hardworking people living all around the world suffer as productive output is unjustly harmed.
As the Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, known as the Helsinki Commission, I am working to address the problem of corruption. In the 106th Congress, I chaired a Commission hearing that focused on the issues of bribery and corruption in the region of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, an area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. During this hearing, the Commission heard that, in economic terms, rampant corruption and organized crime in this vast region has cost U.S. businesses billions of dollars in lost contracts with direct implications for our economy.
In addition, two years ago while attending the annual session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in St. Petersburg, Russia, I had an opportunity to sit down with U.S. business representatives and learned, first-hand, about the many obstacles they face.
Ironically, in some of the biggest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance--countries like Russia and Ukraine--the climate is either not conducive or outright hostile to American business.
The time has come to stop providing aid as usual to those countries which line up to receive our assistance, only to turn around and fleece U.S. businesses conducting legitimate operations in these countries. For this reason, I am introducing the International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001 to require the State Department to submit a report and the President to certify by March 1 of each year that countries which are receiving U.S. foreign aid are, in fact, conducive to American businesses and investors. If a country is found to be hostile to American businesses, aid from the United States would be cut off. The certification would be specifically based on whether a country is making progress in, and is committed to, economic reform aimed at eliminating corruption.
In fact, monitoring and measuring corruption, and the corresponding overall economic freedom, is nothing new. The Heritage Foundation regularly produces a comprehensive report entitled the “Index of Economic Freedom.” This year's 2001 report ranks 155 countries on the basis of 10 criteria, including “government intervention, foreign investment and black market.” While corruption is not identified individually in this report, you can bet there is a strong negative correlation between overall economic freedom and corruption. The more economic freedom you have, the less corruption you will have. It should be no surprise that the countries with the lowest levels of economic freedom are the very same countries that suffer from economic stagnation year after year. We owe it to the good people trapped in corrupt political systems to do what we can to help root out and get rid of this corruption.
Under this bill, if the President certifies that a country's business climate is not conducive for U.S. businesses, that country will, in effect, be put on probation. The country would continue to receive U.S. foreign aid through that end of the fiscal year, but aid would be cut off on the first day of the next fiscal year unless the President certifies the country is making significant progress in implementing the specified economic indicators and is committed to recognizing the involvement of U.S. business.
My bill also includes the customary waiver authority where the national interests of the United States are at stake. For countries certified as hostile to or not conducive for U.S. business, aid can continue if the President determines it is in the national security interest of the United States. However, the determination expires after six months unless the President determines its continuation is important to our national security interest.
I also included a provision which would allow aid to continue to meet urgent humanitarian needs, including food, medicine, disaster and refugee relief, to support democratic political reform and rule of law activities, and to create private sector and non-governmental organizations that are independent of government control, or to develop a free market economic system.
Instead of jumping on the bandwagon to pump millions of additional American tax dollars into countries which are hostile to U.S. businesses and investors, we should be working to root out the kinds of bribery and corruption that have an overall chilling effect on much needed foreign investment. Left unchecked, such corruption will continue to undermine fledgling democracies worldwide and further impede moves toward a genuine free market economy. I believe the legislation I am introducing today is a critical step this direction, and I urge my colleagues to support its passage.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001”.
SEC. 2. LIMITATIONS ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.
(a) REPORT AND CERTIFICATION.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than March 1 of each year, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees a certification described in paragraph (2) and a report for each country that received foreign assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 during the fiscal year. The report shall describe the extent to which each such country is making progress with respect to the following economic indicators:
(A) Implementation of comprehensive economic reform, based on market principles, private ownership, equitable treatment of foreign private investment, adoption of a legal and policy framework necessary for such reform, protection of intellectual property rights, and respect for contracts.
(B) Elimination of corrupt trade practices by private persons and government officials.
(C) Moving toward integration into the world economy.
(2) CERTIFICATION.--The certification described in this paragraph means a certification as to whether, based on the economic indicators described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of paragraph (1), each country is--
(A) conducive to United States business;
(B) not conducive to United States business; or
(C) hostile to United States business.
(b) LIMITATIONS ON ASSISTANCE.--
(1) COUNTRIES HOSTILE TO UNITED STATES BUSINESS.--
(A) GENERAL LIMITATION.--Beginning on the date the certification described in subsection (a) is submitted--
(i) none of the funds made available for assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (including unobligated balances of prior appropriations) may be made available for the government of a country that is certified as hostile to United States business pursuant to such subsection (a); and
(ii) the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank to vote against any loan or other utilization of the funds of such institution to or by any country with respect to which a certification described in clause (i) has been made.
(B) DURATION OF LIMITATIONS.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the limitations described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall apply with respect to a country that is certified as hostile to United States business pursuant to subsection (a) until the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the country is making significant progress in implementing the economic indicators described in subsection (a)(1) and is no longer hostile to United States business.
(2) COUNTRIES NOT CONDUCIVE TO UNITED STATES BUSINESS.--
(A) PROBATIONARY PERIOD.--A country that is certified as not conducive to United States business pursuant to subsection (a), shall be considered to be on probation beginning on the date of such certification.
(B) REQUIRED IMPROVEMENT.--Unless the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the country is making significant progress in implementing the economic indicators described in subsection (a) and is committed to being conducive to United States business, beginning on the first day of the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which a country is certified as not conducive to United States business pursuant to subsection (a)(2)--
(i) none of the funds made available for assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (including unobligated balances of prior appropriations) may be made available for the government of such country; and
(ii) the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank to vote against any loan or other utilization of the funds of such institution to or by any country with respect to which a certification described in subparagraph (A) has been made.
(C) DURATION OF LIMITATIONS.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the limitations described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (B) shall apply with respect to a country that is certified as not conducive to United States business pursuant to subsection (a) until the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the country is making significant progress in implementing the economic indicators described in subsection (a)(1) and is conducive to United States business.
(1) NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST.--Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect to a country described in subsection (b) (1) or (2) if the President determines with respect to such country that making such funds available is important to the national security interest of the United States. Any such determination shall cease to be effective 6 months after being made unless the President determines that its continuation is important to the national security interest of the United States.
(2) OTHER EXCEPTIONS.--Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect to--
(A) assistance to meet urgent humanitarian needs (including providing food, medicine, disaster, and refugee relief);
(B) democratic political reform and rule of law activities;
(C) the creation of private sector and nongovernmental organizations that are independent of government control; and
(D) the development of a free market economic system.
SEC. 3. TOLL-FREE NUMBER.
The Secretary of Commerce shall make available a toll-free telephone number for reporting by members of the public and United States businesses on the progress that countries receiving foreign assistance are making in implementing the economic indicators described in section 2(a)(1). The information obtained from the toll-free telephone reporting shall be included in the report required by section 2(a).
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES.--The term “appropriate committees” means the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK.--The term “multilateral development bank” means the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.