Introduction of the International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001

Introduction of the International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001

Hon.
Ben Nighthorse Campbell
United States
Senate
107th Congress Congress
First Session Session
Tuesday, June 05, 2001

Mr. President, today I introduce the International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001. This legislation addresses the growing problem of official and unofficial corruption abroad. This bill is based on S. 1514, which I introduced in the 106th Congress.

Endemic corruption around the world negatively impacts both the United States and the citizens of countries where corruption is tolerated. Overseas corruption directly hurts U.S. businesses as they endeavor to expand internationally. U.S. workers are affected when corruption closes doors to our exports. In addition, the honest and hardworking citizens of countries stricken with corruption suffer as they are compelled to pay bribes to officials and other people in positions of power just to get the permits and licenses they need to get things done. The trade barrier created by corruption also limits the purchasing choices available to these people. Finally, many leading U.S. companies that are eager to invest and build factories overseas to produce consumer goods for consumption in those countries, often wisely choose not to do so because they are not willing to deal with the corruption they would encounter. Overall, honest and hardworking people living all around the world suffer as productive output is unjustly harmed.

As the Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, known as the Helsinki Commission, I am working to address the problem of corruption. In the 106th Congress, I chaired a Commission hearing that focused on the issues of bribery and corruption in the region of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, an area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. During this hearing, the Commission heard that, in economic terms, rampant corruption and organized crime in this vast region has cost U.S. businesses billions of dollars in lost contracts with direct implications for our economy.

In addition, two years ago while attending the annual session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in St. Petersburg, Russia, I had an opportunity to sit down with U.S. business representatives and learned, first-hand, about the many obstacles they face.

Ironically, in some of the biggest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance--countries like Russia and Ukraine--the climate is either not conducive or outright hostile to American business.

The time has come to stop providing aid as usual to those countries which line up to receive our assistance, only to turn around and fleece U.S. businesses conducting legitimate operations in these countries. For this reason, I am introducing the International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001 to require the State Department to submit a report and the President to certify by March 1 of each year that countries which are receiving U.S. foreign aid are, in fact, conducive to American businesses and investors. If a country is found to be hostile to American businesses, aid from the United States would be cut off. The certification would be specifically based on whether a country is making progress in, and is committed to, economic reform aimed at eliminating corruption.

In fact, monitoring and measuring corruption, and the corresponding overall economic freedom, is nothing new. The Heritage Foundation regularly produces a comprehensive report entitled the “Index of Economic Freedom.” This year's 2001 report ranks 155 countries on the basis of 10 criteria, including “government intervention, foreign investment and black market.” While corruption is not identified individually in this report, you can bet there is a strong negative correlation between overall economic freedom and corruption. The more economic freedom you have, the less corruption you will have. It should be no surprise that the countries with the lowest levels of economic freedom are the very same countries that suffer from economic stagnation year after year. We owe it to the good people trapped in corrupt political systems to do what we can to help root out and get rid of this corruption.

Under this bill, if the President certifies that a country's business climate is not conducive for U.S. businesses, that country will, in effect, be put on probation. The country would continue to receive U.S. foreign aid through that end of the fiscal year, but aid would be cut off on the first day of the next fiscal year unless the President certifies the country is making significant progress in implementing the specified economic indicators and is committed to recognizing the involvement of U.S. business.

My bill also includes the customary waiver authority where the national interests of the United States are at stake. For countries certified as hostile to or not conducive for U.S. business, aid can continue if the President determines it is in the national security interest of the United States. However, the determination expires after six months unless the President determines its continuation is important to our national security interest.

I also included a provision which would allow aid to continue to meet urgent humanitarian needs, including food, medicine, disaster and refugee relief, to support democratic political reform and rule of law activities, and to create private sector and non-governmental organizations that are independent of government control, or to develop a free market economic system.

Instead of jumping on the bandwagon to pump millions of additional American tax dollars into countries which are hostile to U.S. businesses and investors, we should be working to root out the kinds of bribery and corruption that have an overall chilling effect on much needed foreign investment. Left unchecked, such corruption will continue to undermine fledgling democracies worldwide and further impede moves toward a genuine free market economy. I believe the legislation I am introducing today is a critical step this direction, and I urge my colleagues to support its passage.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

S. 988

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001”.

SEC. 2. LIMITATIONS ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.

(a) REPORT AND CERTIFICATION.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than March 1 of each year, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees a certification described in paragraph (2) and a report for each country that received foreign assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 during the fiscal year. The report shall describe the extent to which each such country is making progress with respect to the following economic indicators:

(A) Implementation of comprehensive economic reform, based on market principles, private ownership, equitable treatment of foreign private investment, adoption of a legal and policy framework necessary for such reform, protection of intellectual property rights, and respect for contracts.

(B) Elimination of corrupt trade practices by private persons and government officials.

(C) Moving toward integration into the world economy.

(2) CERTIFICATION.--The certification described in this paragraph means a certification as to whether, based on the economic indicators described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of paragraph (1), each country is--

(A) conducive to United States business;

(B) not conducive to United States business; or

(C) hostile to United States business.

(b) LIMITATIONS ON ASSISTANCE.--

(1) COUNTRIES HOSTILE TO UNITED STATES BUSINESS.--

(A) GENERAL LIMITATION.--Beginning on the date the certification described in subsection (a) is submitted--

(i) none of the funds made available for assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (including unobligated balances of prior appropriations) may be made available for the government of a country that is certified as hostile to United States business pursuant to such subsection (a); and

(ii) the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank to vote against any loan or other utilization of the funds of such institution to or by any country with respect to which a certification described in clause (i) has been made.

(B) DURATION OF LIMITATIONS.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the limitations described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall apply with respect to a country that is certified as hostile to United States business pursuant to subsection (a) until the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the country is making significant progress in implementing the economic indicators described in subsection (a)(1) and is no longer hostile to United States business.

(2) COUNTRIES NOT CONDUCIVE TO UNITED STATES BUSINESS.--

(A) PROBATIONARY PERIOD.--A country that is certified as not conducive to United States business pursuant to subsection (a), shall be considered to be on probation beginning on the date of such certification.

(B) REQUIRED IMPROVEMENT.--Unless the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the country is making significant progress in implementing the economic indicators described in subsection (a) and is committed to being conducive to United States business, beginning on the first day of the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which a country is certified as not conducive to United States business pursuant to subsection (a)(2)--

(i) none of the funds made available for assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (including unobligated balances of prior appropriations) may be made available for the government of such country; and

(ii) the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank to vote against any loan or other utilization of the funds of such institution to or by any country with respect to which a certification described in subparagraph (A) has been made.

(C) DURATION OF LIMITATIONS.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the limitations described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (B) shall apply with respect to a country that is certified as not conducive to United States business pursuant to subsection (a) until the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the country is making significant progress in implementing the economic indicators described in subsection (a)(1) and is conducive to United States business.

(c) EXCEPTIONS.--

(1) NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST.--Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect to a country described in subsection (b) (1) or (2) if the President determines with respect to such country that making such funds available is important to the national security interest of the United States. Any such determination shall cease to be effective 6 months after being made unless the President determines that its continuation is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(2) OTHER EXCEPTIONS.--Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect to--

(A) assistance to meet urgent humanitarian needs (including providing food, medicine, disaster, and refugee relief);

(B) democratic political reform and rule of law activities;

(C) the creation of private sector and nongovernmental organizations that are independent of government control; and

(D) the development of a free market economic system.

SEC. 3. TOLL-FREE NUMBER.

The Secretary of Commerce shall make available a toll-free telephone number for reporting by members of the public and United States businesses on the progress that countries receiving foreign assistance are making in implementing the economic indicators described in section 2(a)(1). The information obtained from the toll-free telephone reporting shall be included in the report required by section 2(a).

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES.--The term “appropriate committees” means the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(2) MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK.--The term “multilateral development bank” means the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

  • Related content
  • Related content
Filter Topics Open Close
  • The OSCE at Twenty: Its Relevance to Other Regions - Part 4

    This two day briefing was a response to legislation that called for the CSCE to conduct an analysis of the OSCE’s strengths and weaknesses and to ascertain the feasibility of creating similar institutions in other geographic regions. The briefing was divided into six panels. This fourth panel, entitled “Trade + Democracy = Security & Human Rights?” dealt with Latin America, and was introduced by Senator Bob Graham. Mr. Graham cited three aspects of the Helsinki process with particular relevance in Latin America: the role of NGOs in building civil societ, linkage between security, economics, and human rights; and multilateralization of issues. He believed an OSCE-like process could help counter threats to democratic governments including growing inequality within and between states, unchecked population growth, drug trafficking, and government repression.

  • The OSCE at Twenty: Its Relevance to Other Regions - Part 5

    This two day briefing was a response to legislation that called for the CSCE to conduct an analysis of the OSCE’s strengths and weaknesses and to ascertain the feasibility of creating similar institutions in other geographic regions. The briefing was divided into six panels. This fifth panel focused on the Middle East, and framed the discussion on Middle Eastern security as being closely tied to European security by virtue of their geographic proximity. Ambassador Basheer noted several qualitative differences between Europe and the Middle East in terms of the nature of grievances, which in the Middle East often include complicated territorial issues. He noted that NGOs might play a particularly useful role in mediating such conflicts, especially where parties refuse to engage on a government-to-government level. One notable example of this included Israel’s refusal to engage with regional governments on nuclear weapons proliferation. 

  • The OSCE at Twenty: Its Relevance to Other Regions - Part 6

    This two day briefing was a response to legislation that called for the CSCE to conduct an analysis of the OSCE’s strengths and weaknesses and to ascertain the feasibility of creating similar institutions in other geographic regions. The briefing was divided into six panels. This sixth panel dealt with future prospects for multilateralism. Drawing from conclusions in previous panels, Professor Zartman stressed that the CSCE model could not be a template imposed on other regions without consideration for regional mores and traditions. He argued that there was no “rich culture” of the respect for human rights outside of Europe. Professor Buergenthal, however, believed that multilateralism was in the interest of the vast majority of states, especially smaller ones. International law and consensus-based decision making procedures coupled with wide ranging membership acts as a hedge against power politics, he argued, which works to the benefit of many states. Ultimately, panelists were optimistic about the future of multilateralism, but conceded that the development of new international organizations across the world would have to develop in a manner that was attuned to the region’s specific resources and needs.  

  • The OSCE at Twenty: Its Relevance to Other Regions - Part 1

    This two day briefing was a response to legislation that called for the CSCE to conduct an analysis of the OSCE’s strengths and weaknesses and to ascertain the feasibility of creating similar institutions in other geographic regions. The briefing was divided into six panels. This first panel assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the OSCE model. Helsinki Commission Chairman Chris Smith opened the discussion by pointing to the OSCE’s success in impacting upon multilateral processes in Africa and the Middle East. Most panelists believed that there was a large gap between what the OSCE could do and what its members would allow it to do, especially in areas related to security. As such, they felt that procedural mechanisms were vital to the OSCE because they allowed for the maintenance of equal footing among nations through, among other things, consensus based decision making and rotating chairpersons. An important achievement of the OSCE was, according to the panelists, the linkage between human rights, security, economic, and other issues. They also noted that a key element in the OSCE’s development was the cold war tension, which yielded self-enforcing agreements between states. In this regard, it was pointed out that similar models with non-legally binding provisions might be hard to develop in regions lacking such tension.

  • The OSCE at Twenty: Its Relevance to Other Regions - Part 2

    This two day briefing was a response to legislation that called for the CSCE to conduct an analysis of the OSCE’s strengths and weaknesses and to ascertain the feasibility of creating similar institutions in other geographic regions. The briefing was divided into six panels. This second panel, entitled “Asia: Market Driven Reform or Repression?” was introduced by Congressman Jim Lightfoot. Rep. Lightfoot believed an OSCE-like process should be considered in Asia and that an organization like the Helsinki commission be created to monitor such a process. Other panelists generally agreed that while the OSCE model held some insights for Asia, including an enhanced role for NGOs, it would be difficult to envision its effectiveness in the vast and varied Asia-Pacific region. Mr. T. Kumar of Amnesty International added that it would be helpful to have a more institutionalized role for NGOs, as they have often become victims themselves when confronting rights abuses. On security matters, the panelists agreed that further development of the ASEAN process would be beneficial in maintaining both bilateral and multilateral ties to the U.S. Finally, in the economic sphere, Mr. Kamm of Market Access Ltd. argued that the promotion of human rights has positive implications for productivity, and that it would thus be in the interest of businesses to establish a human rights protection regime.

  • Religious Liberty in the OSCE: Present and Future

    Speaking on behalf of Congressman Christopher H. Smith and Senator Alfonse M. D’Amato, chairman and co-chairman of the Helsinki Committee, the Committee’s Director for International Policy, Samuel G. Wise, addressed the improvements made by the countries of the OSCE in religious liberty since the demise of communism. Observed deficits in this particular subject were also evaluated, including acts of OSCE governments perpetrating religious intolerance and discrimination against people of faith by passing laws favoring certain religions, turning a blind eye to harassment, and establishing bureaucratic roadblocks to prevent religious minorities from practicing their faith. Each panelist – including Dr. Paul Marshall, Senior Fellow of Political Theory for the Institute for Christian Studies; Dr. Khalid Duran, Senior Fellow for the Institute for International Studies; and Micah Naftalin, National Director for the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews – spoke to the overall factors affecting religious freedom in the OSCE, including: respect for other freedoms such as freedom of speech and religion, ethno-cultural tensions, and the relevance of old prejudices. These ideas were presented in the context of moving towards a more comprehensive respect for religious freedom among OSCE member states in the future.

  • Trade and Investment in Central Europe and the NIS

    This briefing was the tenth in a series of briefings covering topics such as U.S. assistance to Central and East Europe and the NIS, and free trade unions. Topics of discussion included the economic aspects of efforts to develop institutional networks between the Central and Eastern European countries and the OSCE and the Western European multilateral structures and the progress that has been made by countries in developing association agreements with the European Union. Witnesses testifying at this briefing – including Harriet Craig Peterson, President of Cornerstone International Group and Thomas Price, Coordinator for OSCE Affairs for the State Department – evaluated regional issues associated with infrastructure, environment, energy, and border procedures that needed to be addressed to produce a smoother flow of goods from an economic perspective.

  • Prosecuting War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: an Update

    This memorandum is part of a continuing series of reports prepared by the staff of the Helsinki Commission on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. In the summer of 1991, Members of Congress and representatives of non-governmental organizations began to call for the establishment of a war crimes tribunal that would hold those responsible for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia personally and individually accountable for their actions. As atrocities mounted over that summer and information about concentration camps became public, these calls began to reverberate at on-going meetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) then being held in Prague, Vienna and Helsinki.

  • Report on the March 5, 1995 Parliamentary Election in Estonia and Status of Non-Citizens

    The election on March 5, 1995, for Estonia'’s national parliament, the Riigikogu, were conducted normally, without any serious violations of the election law or international standards. A seventeen-member delegation of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCEPA) concluded that the election was “free and fair.” The OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) reported that “[the election was] carried out in accordance with the principles contained in the electoral law and there are no major matters which the representatives wish to highlight.” ODIHR has submitted several suggestions to the Riigikogu and the National Electoral Committee for improving technical aspects of the process. Political party structures are noticeably undeveloped in the northeast, and in none of the polling stations were any local observers encountered. Discussions at the National Electoral Commission in Tallinn and with local precinct officials revealed some disagreement about the procedure for admitting local observers, around 700 of whom had registered with the National Electoral Commission prior to the election. In any case, the lack of local observers probably indicated general confidence by the citizenry that the government was capable of holding an orderly and honest election without the need for monitors. Checks with other international observers indicated that the only local observers noted were in Tallinn, and precious few of these.  

  • U.S. Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS: An Assessment

    This briefing discussed the successes achieved and the difficulties encountered on the road to democratic reform and stabilization are reflected throughout Central and Eastern Europe, and evaluated the impact of these factors in the scope and tenor of U.S. assistance programs. Such programs involve assistance to countries throughout the region in democratic institution building, market reform and restructuring, health care improvement, energy efficiency, environmental policy, and housing sector reform. Witnesses testifying at this briefing addressed the relevance of the crisis in Chechnya, continued conflict in the Balkans, and tensions in various parts of East-Central Europe to United States Interests in the region. They focused on the goals of U.S. assistance to the NIS and East-Central Europe and the effectiveness of current programs in furthering those goals.

  • Nagorno-Karabakh

    In this briefing, which CSCE Staff Director Samuel G. Wise chaired, the focus was on the conflict that had then recently transpired between the countries of Armenia and Azerbaijan. More specifically, the two countries had had a territorial dispute regarding the area of Nagorno-Karabakh. This dispute had manifested itself into all-out violence that had claimed around 15 million lives at the time of the briefing, as well as creating well over a million refugees. The briefing was the fifth in a series of briefings and hearings that the Helsinki Commission had held since 1988 regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. Fortunately, also at the time of this briefing, there had been very few armed clashes for a couple of months, and the warring factions had observed an informal cease fire. Actually, just three days prior to the briefing, the Defense Ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh jointly noted the success of the cease fire and looked forward to a more comprehensive resolution of the conflict. With this decrease in violence, attention had shifted to the international diplomatic plane. The CSCE and the Russians had put forward at least somewhat similar cease fire plans, albeit with competition for adherence. The ultimate end of both approaches was a broader agreement about the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and making peace in the region. The purpose of the briefing, then, was to discuss the possible framework of a political settlement.

  • Crime and Corruption in Russia

    The rationale of this briefing, which Commission Staff Director Sam Wise presided over, was that of a marked increase of crime in Russia. At the time of this briefing, crime had become the dominant subject in Russian politics. Unsurprisingly, the extent of crime in Russia had significant implications for its society, specifically for hte viability of the state. In fact, President Yeltsin had called crime the Russian state’s gravest threat. A question that Wise brought up in the briefing was the possibility of criminals taking over the Russian Federation’s government. Another possibility that Wise mentioned was election of authoritarian, repressive leaders who would make Russia safe. Witnesses in the briefing included Dr. Louise Shelly of American University’s Department of Justice, Law and Society, and Stephen Handelman, Associate Fellow at the Harriman Center of Columbia University.

  • Doing Business in Russia and the NIS: Opportunities and Obstacles

    Jane Fisher, Deputy Staff Director of the Helsinki Commission, presided this briefing focused on trade and doing business in the Newly Indipendent States of the former Soviet Union. It was the third in a series of briefings by the Commission on NIS. The Helsinki Accords cover human rights, security, and economic cooperation, and when the countries of the former Soviet Union were making the transition to democracy, the Commission put a greater emphasis on trade and economic cooperation. Russia and the Newly Independent States had a great potential market. They had enormous natural resources, large consumer markets, and a huge potential for trade and investments. Ms. Fisher was joined by a distinguished panel of experts who have been directly involved in business development in the formet Soviet Union: Dr. Richard Rahn, President and Chief executive officer of Novecon; Edward Chow, Director of International Affairs for Chevron Overseas Petroleum; and Joseph Barker, Vice Presidentof Ryland Trading. They described their experiences and shared their views on the opportunities and hazards of doing business in Russia and the NIS.  

  • CSCE Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues

    Against a backdrop of savage conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nagorno Karabakh, and Georgia, attendant refugee crises throughout the region, and a wave of sometimes violent racism and xenophobia even in long-established European democracies, the participating states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met in Warsaw, Poland in 1993 for the first biannual Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues As specified by the 1992 Helsinki Document, the meeting included a thorough exchange of views on the implementation of Human Dimension commitments, consideration of ways and means of improving implementation, and an evaluation of the procedures for monitoring compliance with commitments. The dramatic unfolding over the course of the meeting of the showdown within the Russian government-- culminating in the shelling of the Russian Parliament building by government troops-- served as a sober reminder to participants of the vulnerability of democracy in transition and the importance of shoring up Human Dimension compliance.

  • The CSCE's High Commissioner for National Minorities

    The CSCE created the post of High Commissioner on National Minorities at its July 1992 summit meeting in Helsinki, in response to the emergence of minority-related unrest as one of the main sources of conflict in Europe. Originally proposed by the Netherlands, the proposal received wide support as an innovative approach to national minority problems unleashed by the disappearance of superpower confrontation in Europe. Some of the most innovative aspects of the original proposal for a High Commissioner were substantially watered down in response to individual state's concerns. The High Commissioner may not become involved where armed conflict has already broken out or in areas already under consideration by the CSO, unless the permission of the CSO is given. Communication with or response to communications from organizations or individuals who practice or publicly condone terrorism is prohibited, as is involvement in situations "involving organized acts of terrorism." Former Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel was appointed the first High Commissioner in December 1992; his office began to function in January 1993, with premises donated by the Dutch government and a staff of three diplomats seconded from the Dutch, Polish and Swedish foreign ministries.

  • U.S. Helsinki Commission Delegation to Romania, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Vienna

    The Commissions Delegation's visit to Romania, the first since April 1990, had two main objectives. The first was to assess, though meetings with a broad spectrum of non-governmental and official actors, Romania's current level of democratic and market reform. The second was in recognition of Romania's critical role in the effort to enforce U.N. sanctions against Serbia and Macedonia, and the broader political strategic role of Romania in the Balkans. The delegation also traveled to Macedonia to complete the itinerary of a visit to the area in November 1992, which had to be cut short because of inclement weather conditions. Indeed, the signs of the oncoming winter which the Commission saw at that time led it to raise concern over the deteriorating condition which Macedonia and the tens of thousands of Bosnian refugees residing there faced. The April 1993 visit afforded a useful opportunity to see firsthand the extent to which the country had satisfactorily coped with these deteriorating conditions and the prospects generally for the stability and democratization of an independent Macedonia. The delegation then visited Kosovo to observe firsthand the volatile situation there. The situation is a matter of considerable international concern given the chances for the war in nearby Bosnia-Herzegovina to have a spillover effect in which the tension exist between the Serbian authorities and th majority Albanian population could erupt into violence, either by intent or by spontaneous incident. The delegation wanted to hear the views of the authorities as well as of the leaders of the Albanian community, and to raise its concerns, particularly to the authorities regarding human rights. Finally, the delegation wanted to learn about the activities of the CSCE mission of Long-Duration based in Kosovo to monitor developments in the area and to ease tension in society. The delegation finished its trip in Vienna, Austria to meet with the U.S. delegation to the CSCE. Vienna is becoming the CSCE's operational center, with the Conflict Prevention Center, which provided logistical support to the missions as well as the ongoing arms control and security forum, the Forum on Security Cooperation (FSC), and regular meeting of the participating States.  

  • The Countries of Central Asia: Problems in the Transition to Independence and the Implications

    This was the first Helsinki Commission hearing held on the Central Asian republics. The Commissioners and witnesses discussed five countries' transitions to independence, which were  complicated by the presence of repressive regimes that maintained the old Soviet-style order and economic turmoil. Chairman DeConcini opened the hearing by noting that the presidents of four out of the five new Central Asian countries were former first secretaries of the Communist Party. Dr. Martha Olcott, professor of political science at Colgate University, expressed concern over the rise of extremist ideologies of nationalism and Islam in the region, which were fuelled by economic stagnation. Firuz Kazemzadeh, professor emeritus as Yale University, argued instead that the dominant threat in the region came from the projection of Russian influence. This was corroborated by Micah Naftalin, director of the Union Council for Soviet Jews, who detailed the KGB's role in silencing the press and repressing opposition in Turkmenistan, and the growth and diffusion of anti-semitism from Russia into Central Asia. A final testimony was offered by Adbumannob Pulatov, chairman of the Uzbekistan Society for Human Rights. Pulatov decried the lack of press freedom in Uzbekistan and urged Congress to continue its monetary support of Radio Liberty. In the end, all four witnesses cautioned that human rights concerns often take a back seat to other issues, and that doing so could jeopardize progress in the field.

  • Report: Beyond the CSCE's Institutional Development

    Although some early proposals conceived of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as an international institution with headquarters, secretariat, and treaty, the CSCE emerged from Helsinki in 1975 as an, amorphous process, moving from conference to conference with no fixed address or schedule. For fifteen years, its reView conferences and experts meetings succeeded in focusing, attention on a range of inter-related problems ftom human rights to the environment to threatening military maneuvers, operating, oa the principle that these and other elements, of security could not, be treated separately. However, the end of the bipolar security "system'' that had characterized the Europe in which CSCE was created led many of its participants to look to the CSCE as a , new over-arching "system" within which its members could improve both their security and cooperation. As such, they pleaded for more structure and permanence for its activities, as well as a larger role for it in addressing the challenges of the time. The Paris Summit of November 1990 endowed the CSCE with its first permanent institutions:, the CSCE Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Center, and Office of Free Elections, later expanded to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. These three institutions, minimally funded and staffed, were created to give the CSCE process some visible permanence and to assist the regular political consultations set up at the same time. The consultations process envisioned meetings of CSCE heads of state or government every two years; foreign minsters annually, plus possible meetings of other ministers; and senior officials three to four times per year. The CSCE Secretariat was set up in Prague to organize these meetings; the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna to give institutional support to risk reduction efforts; and the Office of Free Elections in Warsaw to assist the transition to democracy across the continent. In April 1991, parliamentarians from the participating States took up proposals from the summit and formed a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, to meet once a year to further security and cooperation in Europe, reviewing CSCE implementation and activities.

  • Helsinki Document: The Challenges of Change

    The Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe returned to the birthplace of the Helsinki process, to give new impetus to our common endeavor through the Helsinki Summit Declaration. 

  • The Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation on Europe

    The end of the Cold War posed new challenges to the CSCE, with increasing intensities of ethnic conflict raging around the Yugoslav region. The European Community was struggling with uncertainty under a less-than-effective presidency, and a questionable state of unity following the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty; thus, a need was felt for a US presence in Europe. This record of the Helsinki Follow-Up meeting in 1992 shows that the even reaffirmed, but did not complete, the CSCE's transition from process to structure. The network of CSCE bodies and work methods described in the beginning sections of the Helsinki Decisions was greatly developed and clarified from its Paris genesis. Some effort was also made to integrate existing structures and past practices. Notably, the CSCE took as its central concept for the future the US-proposed theme "managing change." While the United States put this forward as a response to percieved European negativism and tendancy to paint the future in apocalyptic colors, requiring only conflict-orientated responses, it was also telling that the United States and others were ready to see the CSCE as a key instrument for the management of inevitable change, rather than looking past the CSCE in efforts to maintain the status quo.

Pages