In early 1996, with little fanfare, the U.N. Security Council quietly and quickly selected Canadian Judge Louise Arbour to succeed Justice Richard Goldstone, the first chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The relative ease with which a replacement was chosen -- in contrast to the prolonged, relatively public, and embarrassing manner in which the Security Council members fought among themselves for nearly a year over the selection of the first prosecutor -- reflects the dramatically changed circumstances in which the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal now finds itself. At the time of Goldstone’s appointment in 1994, most observers of the Yugoslav conflict seemed to fall into one of two categories: those that thought war crimes trials should be held, but did not believe the Tribunal would ever indict anybody above the rank of private (let alone hold an actual trial), and those who believed that the mere discussion of war crimes trials undermined peace negotiations. Under Goldstone’s able stewardship, the Tribunal has developed a full complement of staff, including prosecuting attorneys and investigators; issued more than fifty indictments, including for the two highest ranking Bosnian-Serb political and military leaders and three members of the Yugoslav People’s Army; obtained custody of three men; and begun the Tribunal’s first trial. Goldstone has deftly managed a multitude of political crises, successfully traversed the treacherous waters of the U.N. bureaucracy, and, thus far, helped safeguard the legal integrity and credibility of the Tribunal. All of these factors, combined with the achievement of a tenuous peace agreement in Dayton in November 1995,2 now make the possibility of war crimes trials seem, to many, more real than ever before. This memorandum outlines the basic structure of the Tribunal and the most recent developments with respect to investigations and trials, cooperation by U.N. member states with the Tribunal, and funding.

On December 17, 1995, Russia held an election to the lower chamber of Parliament (Duma). The election was Russia’s second since the breakup of the U.S.S.R., and its first since the December 1993 election that followed the October 1993 destruction of the former Parliament building. Although some analysts had warned of the possible cancellation or postponement of the election, the voting took place without incident or violence. International observers considered the election to be free and fair. According to the Central Election Commission (CEC), about 63 percent of eligible voters cast ballots. The figure was higher than had been anticipated, considering the widely-reported malaise and cynicism in Russian society. The high turnout testifies to the electorate’s continuing involvement in the political process, despite many disappointments and economic hardships, and to the desire for change. Russia’s parliamentary election was a multi-party, multi-candidate contest. Forty-three parties fielded party lists totalling 5,675 candidates. Parties needed 5 percent of the national vote to gain representation in Parliament. In the 225 district races, 2,700 candidates entered the lists, an average of 12 per district. All participating parties received an equal amount of free air time on television, and they could buy more. The big winner in the election was the Communist Party (CPRF), headed by Gennady Zyuganov. According to the official results, the CPRF won 22.3 percent of the proportional vote, plus another 58 seats in single mandate districts. The CPRF appealed to voters who had not benefited from Russia’s experiment with a market economy and were discontented about crime, corruption, and a general sense of "disorder" in post-Soviet Russian society. Zyuganov also advocated the restoration, "by voluntary means," of the Soviet Union. The strong showing by the Communist Party mirrors the electoral revival of communist forces in other former Soviet republics and in Eastern Europe, 3.5 years after Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared in the U.S. Congress that "communism is dead in Russia." Zyuganov has also become the frontrunner in the race to unseat Yeltsin in the June 1996 presidential election.

From November 28 to December 1, 1995, the participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) convened a seminar on the rule of law. The meeting was organized by the Warsaw-based OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Thirty-eight of the 53 fully participating States attended, along with representatives from two Non-Participating Mediterranean States, six international organizations, and 25 non-governmental organizations. Over the course of two days, a number of emerging democracies described the constitutions and other legislative provisions that had been adopted in their countries to provide for the rule of law, at least on paper. Western participants, for their part, generally spoke of the specific and concrete challenges faced in their countries in actually implementing safeguards for the rule of law. In general, the participation of East-Central European and former Soviet countries—most of which attended this meeting—was more active than at the 1991 Oslo meeting, and Western participants, for their part, avoided the West-West bickering that marred the earlier seminar. At the end of the meeting, the rapporteurs produced summaries of the discussions.