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statement
Business Climate in Ukraine
Thursday, November 20, 2003Mr. President, as Co-Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I have closely followed developments in Ukraine including aspects of the human, security and economic dimensions. My desire is that Ukraine consolidates its independence by strengthening democratic institutions, including the judiciary, and undertaking reforms to improve the business climate essential to attracting much-needed foreign investment. Twelve years after independence, the people of Ukraine deserve to enjoy the fruits of freedom and prosperity, but obstacles remain. Bringing Ukraine more fully into Europe is both essential to the country's long-term economic success and important for European security. Accelerating Ukraine's movement toward Europe is timely and needed. While high-ranking Ukrainian officials pay lip service to such integration, the jury is still out as to whether they are prepared to take the bold steps that will be required to advance such integration. An important barometer for the future will be the extent to which the country's moves to confront the corruption and crime that retard the process of democratization and economic liberalization and erode Ukraine's security and independence. While those at the top say the right things, there is justified skepticism as to their sincerity. This is certainly the case concerning Ukraine's current President, Leonid Kuchma. The controversies surrounding Kuchma undercut his credibility with respect to the issue of combating corruption. Nevertheless, this should not detract from the urgency of tackling corruption in the lead up to the presidential elections to select Kuchma's successor in 2004. Meanwhile, those serious about rooting out corruption and corrupt officials should take a hard look at the handling, or more accurately, the mishandling, of Ukrainian and foreign owned businesses. For example, United States-owned businesses have been victimized through expropriations, asset thefts, extortion and the like perpetrated or abetted by corrupt officials and courts in Ukraine. While new cases continue to occur, longstanding cases remain unresolved with investors unable to obtain the relief to which they are entitled under Ukrainian and international law. Although the State Department has made repeated representations about these cases at senior levels of the Kuchma administration, Kyiv rebuffed repeated requests to resolve them in accordance with the law. At the same time it refuses to punish the perpetrators of the criminal acts or take corrective measures to prevent similar cases from arising. If the victims are to ever achieve a measure of justice, it is essential that U.S. officials raise these cases at every appropriate opportunity. In one especially egregious and illustrative case, well-connected individuals in Ukraine were able to orchestrate the seizure of all the assets of a successful pharmaceutical joint venture which was half owned by United States investors. When, 6 years after the theft the Ukrainian appeals courts finally dismissed the spurious claims to the assets on grounds that they were based entirely on forged and falsely fabricated documents, senior Ukrainian officials launched into action. Within weeks of these judicial decisions, the Ukrainian President reportedly convened a meeting of senior officials, including the cognizant senior judges and his own senior law enforcement and national security cabinet level officers, at which he made clear that he did not want the stolen assets restored to their rightful American owners. The courts quickly complied, without explanation, and in disregard of the copious evidence before them, the judges reversed the decisions taken just two months earlier and held in favor of the claimants. Several months later longstanding criminal charges against the same individuals were dropped. The circumstances surrounding this case and others involving United States investors are indicative of the far reaching scope of corruption and the rule of law deficit in Ukraine today. While the matter was repeatedly raised by the State Department several years ago, I am concerned that the Ukrainian side might assume that the matter is a closed case. I urge officials at the Departments of State and Commerce to disabuse Ukrainian Government officials of such an impression. If the Kuchma administration is serious about rooting out corruption and advancing democracy and the rule of law, these cases provide a good starting point. Only time will tell if they are up to the challenge.
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statement
80th Anniversary of the Turkish Republic
Thursday, October 30, 2003Mr. Speaker, this week the Turkish Republic, an original participating State of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, will mark its 80th anniversary. The Turkish Government, led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is working hard toward membership in the European Union. The accession of Turkey to the Union would recognize the important reforms that have already been adopted and accelerate the reform process. The various constitutional reform packages in recent years have addressed, or begun to address, many longstanding human rights concerns. As Chairman of the Helsinki Commission I am pleased to note that much needed change is beginning to take place. For example, the crucial issue of torture is finally receiving the attention necessary to prevent such abuse and address the legacy of this endemic scourge. Perpetrators of torture are facing punishment by a new generation of state prosecutors. For the first time, police who have committed acts of torture are being brought to justice. However the ongoing use of torture in southeast Turkey in the guise of anti-terrorism is an outrage that Turkey must bring to a halt. It is not enough to pass these reforms or to hold a few show trials. No, all transgressors must be arrested and tried. There must be a zero tolerance policy in place on torture. Other issues of concern have also benefited from the reform package process. For example, religious communities with "foundation'' status may now acquire real property, as well as construct new churches and mosques and other structures for religious use. However, there is a considerable gap between the law and its application. Also, while the problem of allowing the return of internally displaced persons who fled the internal conflict with the PKK terrorist organization remains. Renewed efforts to address this problem are promising, such as inviting the UN Rapporteur on IDPs to visit and the possibility that Turkey may host an international conference on internally displaced persons. While Turkey still has a long way to go to successfully eradicate human trafficking in its borders, the government has taken some positive steps. While I am pleased Turkey has expanded its cooperation with source countries to improve its victim protection efforts, I want to encourage continued improvement to wipe out this modern day slavery. Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, other serious concerns remain. While Turkey works to bring its laws and regulations into conformity with the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession and works toward fulfilling human rights commitments as an OSCE participating State, actions taken by police and other government authorities raise doubts as to the sincerity of these reforms. The imprisonment this month of Nurcihan and Nurulhak Saatcioglu for attending demonstrations four years ago protesting the prohibition against head scarves in public institutions, is deeply troubling. The fact that the government denies women who choose this religious expression the ability to attend state-run universities and work in public buildings, including schools and hospitals, is counterproductive and an encroachment of their right to freedom of expression. Similarly, authorities severely curb the public sharing of religious belief by either Muslims or Christians with the intent to persuade the listener to another point of view. These limitations on religious clothing and speech stifle freedom of religion and expression and are contrary to Turkey's OSCE commitments. At a fundamental level, the inability of religious groups to maintain property holdings is problematic, as the Office of Foundations has closed and seized properties of non-Muslim religious groups for contrived and spurious reasons. Groups most affected by this policy are the Syrian Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic and Greek Orthodox churches, which have also experienced problems when seeking to repair and maintain existing buildings or purchase new ones. I hope the application of the aforementioned reforms will rectify this problem. The most notable property issue concerns the continued closure of the Orthodox Theological School of Halki on the island of Heybeli in the Sea of Marmara. Considering the reportedly promising conversations between the church and government, I urge Turkey to return full control to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and allow religious training to resume, in keeping with relevant OSCE commitments. Furthermore, religious groups not envisioned by the Lausanne Treaty have no legal route for purchasing property and building facilities, since the new legal provisions affect only communities with the official status of a "foundation.'' As no process exists for these other groups to obtain foundation status, they are forced to meet in private apartments. This lack of official status has real consequences, since provincial governorships and the Ministry of Interior have initiated efforts to close these meeting places, leaving the smaller Protestant groups and Jehovah's Witnesses without any options. Churches and their leaders in Diyarbakir, Mersin, Iskenderun and other towns all face troubling government prosecutions and threats of closure. I urge Turkey to create a transparent and straightforward process to grant religious groups so desiring official recognition, so that they too can enjoy the right to establish and freely maintain accessible places of worship of assembly. The continued incarceration of four Kurdish former parliamentarians: Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan and Selim Sadak is particularly disturbing. Convicted in 1994, they have won their appeal to the European Court of Human Rights and were granted a retrial under recent Government of Turkey legal reforms. The retrial began March 28, and at each of the eight sessions, most recently October 17, the court has refused to release the defendants. Their continued imprisonment is an outrage. Mr. Speaker, on the 80th anniversary of the Turkish Republic, the initial legal reforms put in place by the government display Turkey's--or at least the legislators in Ankara's--apparent willingness to address much needed reforms in human rights practices. But actions speak louder than words. We need to see implementation of these reforms seriously carried out before we can rest assured that Turkey has met minimal OSCE human rights commitments. As Turkey strives to enter the European Union, I applaud the efforts that have been made to date and urge Ankara to intensify the reform process.
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briefing
Democracy and Human Rights in the Mediterranean Partner States of the OSCE: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia
Friday, October 03, 2003Ronald J. McNamara , Deputy Chief of Staff at the Commission, held this briefing in advance of a series of meetings that took place a week later in Rome in conjunction with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Since its inception, the OSCE has included a Mediterranean dimension - Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia are currently designated as Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation, a special status similar to that of observer status in other multilateral organizations. Lebanon, Libya, and Syria had status in the OSCE through the mid-1990s. Joined by panellists Joe Stork, Karen Hanrahan, and Frank Smyth, McNamara highlighted the Mediterranean Partners’ disregard for the OSCE’s human dimension. The Panelist commented upon democracy and human rights violations within the members of the Mediteranean Partners, including media restrictions, freedoms of religion and speech, torture, trafficking, anti-Semitism, due process, and minority rights and torture.
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statement
Murder of Ukrainian Heorhiy Gongadze Still Unsolved After 3 Years
Tuesday, September 16, 2003Mr. Speaker, the murder of Ukrainian investigative journalist Heorhiy Gongadze remains unsolved--three years after he was murdered. On September 16, 2000, Gongadze, editor of "Ukrainska Pravda," an Internet news publication critical of high-level corruption in Ukraine, disappeared. Ukrainian President Kuchma and a number of high-ranking officials have been implicated in his disappearance and the circumstances leading to his murder. Audio recordings exist that contain conversations between Kuchma and other senior government officials discussing the desirability of Gongadze's elimination. Over the last three years, the Ukrainian authorities' handling, or more accurately, mishandling of this case has been characterized by obfuscation and stonewalling. Last month, a prime suspect in the case, former senior militiaman Ihor Honcharov, who allegedly headed a gang of ex-police accused of several kidnappings and murders, died in police custody under mysterious circumstances. His posthumous letters--which give a detailed account of events surrounding Gongadze's death and which name names--are now being investigated by the Prosecutor General's office. A few days ago, Prosecutor General Svyatoslav Piskun indicated that some facts in the letters have proved to be true. Reportedly, warrants have been issued for two suspects in the killing. Mr. Speaker, a credible investigation of this case by Ukrainian authorities is long overdue. At the same time, it is important to stress that not only those who committed the actual crime, but those who ordered it--no matter who they may be--need to be brought to justice. Unfortunately, the Gongadze case is not an isolated one. The murder, and deaths in suspicious car accidents, of journalists and opposition figures, have become commonplace. Earlier this year, Ukraine's Ombudsman Nina Karpachova asserted that journalism remains among the most dangerous professions in Ukraine, with 36 media employees having been killed over the past ten years, and many more have been beaten, including several within the last few months. This past July, Volodymyr Yefremov, a journalist critical of president Kuchma who worked with the press freedom group Institute of Mass Information (11/41), died in a suspect car accident. Just two weeks ago, Ivan Havdyda, who was head of the Ternopil region branch of the democratic opposition "Our Ukraine," was found murdered in Kyiv under questionable circumstances. Over the last three years, the Helsinki Commission, Members of the House and Senate, Department of State, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other international institutions repeatedly have raised the Gongadze murder case and urged the Ukrainian authorities to undertake a serious investigation into the this case. The response from Ukrainian officials has done nothing but cast doubt about the Ukrainian Government's commitment to the rule of law. Last year--just to cite one example--Ukrainian authorities blocked FBI experts from examining evidence gathered during the initial investigation, even after promising to accept U.S. technical assistance in the matter. I also hope that the Ukrainian parliament will take determined action in encouraging governmental accountability for solving the Gongadze and other murders, and bringing those involved to justice. The lack of a resolution of the Gongadze and other cases of those who have perished under suspicious circumstances has tarnished the credibility of the Ukrainian authorities in dealing with fundamental human rights. Mr. Speaker, as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission and in the strongest possible terms, I once again urge Ukrainian authorities to take seriously the many enduring concerns regarding the circumstances that led to Heorhiy Gongadze's murder and the subsequent investigation.
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hearing
The Dutch Leadership of the OSCE
Wednesday, September 03, 2003The United States Helsinki Commission held a hearing on the Dutch leadership of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) featuring the testimony of His Excellency Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Foreign Minister of The Netherlands and Chair-in-Office of the OSCE. The hearing reviewed the work of the OSCE under the Dutch Chairmanship. Specific issues discussed were the ongoing conflict in Chechnya, the deteriorating situation in Belarus, OSCE efforts to combat anti-Semitism and human trafficking, as well as promoting respect for human rights and democratic values in the participating States.
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article
OSCE Holds First Annual Security Review Conference
Wednesday, August 06, 2003By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe organized a two-day Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) on June 25 and 26, 2003, in Vienna, Austria. The U.S. proposal to hold this conference was approved in December 2002 by the OSCE's Foreign Ministers' meeting in Porto, Portugal. The conference's goal was to provide increased emphasis and profile to hard security questions from agreements in conventional arms control and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) to police-related activities and combating terrorism. In this sense, the ASRC differs from OSCE's Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting held under the auspices of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, which more narrowly focuses on CSBM implementation. The meeting consisted of opening and closing plenary sessions, and four working groups devoted to a) preventing and combating terrorism; b) comprehensive security; c) security risks and challenges across the OSCE region; and d) conflict prevention and crisis management. U.S. Priorities for the Implementation Review Leading up to the conference, Helsinki Commission Co-Chairs Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO) urged the U.S. Department of State to conduct a thorough implementation review which focused on the need for the participating States to comply with their security-related OSCE commitments. Russian military operations in Chechnya and the Caucasus, democratic political control over the military, security forces and intelligence services, so-called "frozen conflicts" like those in Moldova and the Caucasus, combating terrorism, money laundering and non-proliferation were subjects of particular concern noted by the co-chairs. Conference keynote speaker Adam Rotfeld, Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, stressed that the biggest threat to the OSCE was the support by criminal and dictatorial regimes for terrorists. The organization needed to give particular focus on the Caucasus and Central Asian countries in an effort to meet this threat by building institutions and establishing the rule of law. It was also suggested that OSCE look beyond its traditional areas and include the partners countries in its activities, wherever possible. Greece, speaking for the EU, noted the OSCE's value to provide early warning, post-conflict rehabilitation, and conflict management. The EU urged that very high priority be given to human trafficking, termed "the piracy of today." Germany stressed the need to strengthen the police and border management in troubled regions. Ambassador Cofer Black, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's Senior Advisor for Counter Terrorism, urged the OSCE to focus on concrete and achievable steps to fight the financing of terrorism and press all 55 participating States to become parties to the 12 UN Conventions on Terrorism. Black recommended that the OSCE be used to strengthen travel and document security with a goal of including bio-metric data (based on the physical composure of an individual's hand or retina) in the travel documents of individuals from all participating States and sharing information on lost and stolen passports. Several delegations cited the need to do more to restrict illicit weapons trade and cited the Bishkek and Bucharest documents as blueprints for practical action. The need to limit the availability of man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) was cited by several delegations. The United States noted that, in preparing for the December OSCE Maastricht Ministerial, particular focus should be given to the priorities cited in the 2003 G-8 Action Plan which includes steps to control proliferation of MANPADS, increased security of sea transport and more effective travel documentation. These priorities were stressed by the new OSCE Special Representative for Counter Terrorism, Brian Wu, who suggested that the area of biological weaponry might need particular attention and asked if more emphasis might be placed on non-banking sources when looking into the financing of terrorism. In the working session on conflict prevention and crisis management, delegations acknowledged OSCE's lack of a "big stick" and the need to work closely with organizations and governments who had such instruments. Nevertheless, the OSCE has a good "tool box" for a variety of actions and is using it for actions such as the destruction of arms stockpiles in Georgia, police training in Kosovo, and facilitating the withdrawal of Russian troops and arms from Moldova. The Representative on Freedom of the Media noted the importance of monitoring hate speech, creating public awareness of arms trafficking and protecting journalists in conflict areas. Most delegations agreed that the OSCE had neither the mandate nor the resources to be a peacekeeping organization, but Russia emphasized it did not share this view and recommended that possibilities for joint action be discussed by OSCE with NATO and the EU. Macedonia hailed the success of the OSCE Mission in helping to manage its internal conflict. The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and the work of the Forum on Security Cooperation on small arms and light weapons are positively assessed as a contribution to the larger effort of arms control and conflict risk reduction in Europe. Limits on how much further some of these efforts could be developed, however, were questioned, and there was resistance to actual revision of some of the agreements already reached. In the past year, the OSCE has begun to look at new security risks and challenges across the region. Organized crime, including arms trafficking, was frequently highlighted as something which needed additional cooperative efforts to combat. Among the most important developments are OSCE efforts to assist countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus to improve their police services, drawing on experience gained in southeastern Europe. Throughout the meeting there was a pronounced tendency to be long on generalities and short on specifics. For example, it was noted that only 38 percent of the 55 participating States have become parties to all 12 United Nations conventions and protocols on combating terrorism, a clear OSCE commitment, yet the countries which have not were never named nor asked to explain their implementation records. Indeed, one OSCE insider concluded that the discussion on implementation of commitments to combat terrorism was not much advanced from the discussion which surrounded the earlier negotiation of those commitments. An Ambassador went as far as to remark during a plenary session that some previous statements were little more than "preemptive self-justification." Critics of the ASRC, however, should keep in mind this was the first review conference of its kind. Certainly the implementation review meetings for the human and economic dimensions of the OSCE have had to evolve and adapt over the years. For the security dimension though, calling participating States to account for instances of non-compliance has not similarly developed. As U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Stephan M. Minikes asserted in his closing statement, "This first Annual Security Review Conference has accomplished what we realistically expected it would. We must recognize that this is the first time that this conference has been held. There will be matters to work out over time. But the fact that we have made a start is very significant and together with our partners from other European and Euro-Atlantic security organizations there is much to do to follow up." Looking Ahead There are several ways in which the ASRC could be improved next year. The Annual Security Review Conference could go beyond its sole focus on OSCE tools and issues and devote specific time to actions taken by the participating States themselves. The benefit of such a review would justify the conference being lengthened by at least one day. As Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton testified at a Helsinki Commission hearing in May, "Heretofore, we have not seen the OSCE as being as much a possible vehicle to help get the kind of [non-proliferation] compliance we want. And that's why I think it's worth exploring." Perhaps more critical to the dialogue would be the opening of the ASRC to a wider audience. The OSCE's other review meetings are already open, not just to observation by those outside government but to participation by NGOs as well. In a letter to the State Department, Helsinki Commission Co-Chairmen Rep. Smith and Senator Campbell urged greater openness and transparency. They were told, however, that for the first ASRC non-inclusion of non-governmental organizations was intended to promote greater dialogue and a more critical review. Only national delegations, OSCE institutions and other European-based international organizations were invited to participate in the inaugural conference. The modalities for the conference did state that "security-related scientific institutes or 'think tanks' of international standing would be considered to be invited as keynote speakers or otherwise be represented as members of national delegations." However, the effort to do so seemed fairly limited and the "greater dialogue" and "more critical review" was not fully realized. The OSCE could do much more to draw on the wealth of expertise among security-related institutions in the United States and elsewhere. If some view the kind of NGO participation seen at other implementation meetings as not conducive to a productive meeting on security issues, at least greater use of public members on national delegations and greater use of expert analysis and insight could be pursued. Short of participation, allowing public observation would permit others a chance to see more clearly how the OSCE and its participating States address security in Europe, and opportunities to engage one-on-one with government officials in the corridors and side events. The State Department has indicated a willingness to look at possible NGO inclusion for future ASRC meetings. Finally, the development of the ASRC should be considered in the broader context of maintaining the balance among the dimensions of the OSCE which has been one of its traditional strengths. Giving balancing to the OSCE's activities was the primary justification for the ASRC. But the level of activity ultimately needs to be based on the need to promote balanced progress in the actual implementation of OSCE commitments. One very positive aspect of the review conference was the deferral of other OSCE activity in Vienna during the meeting which permitted delegates to focus their attention exclusively toward the ASRC. In the past, this has not been the case for human dimension and economic review meetings, which have had to compete with a plethora of meetings, diminishing the focus and participation of some delegations. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.
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article
Helsinki Commissioners Press Belgrade to Apprehend Indicted War Criminals, Cooperate with Hague Tribunal
Monday, July 07, 2003By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor On June 16, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell certified that Serbia and Montenegro met U.S. criteria set forth in section 578 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution. These criteria include Serbia and Montenegro’s level of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Without certification, certain bilateral assistance to Serbia would have been withheld. Leading Members of the United States Helsinki Commission have long been concerned with the level of cooperation by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro with ICTY and have consistently urged the authorities in Belgrade to do more. Concerned Commissioners have sought to increase attention paid to developments in Serbia in the aftermath of the March assassination of reformist Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. There is a general sense among Commission leaders that while Belgrade’s cooperation with the Tribunal has been improving, it still remains insufficient. In the lead up to the June 15th certification deadline, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) participated in a Commission public briefing featuring Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal. As of the May 15th briefing, Del Ponte characterized cooperation from Belgrade as uncertain, underscoring that movement comes only when it is seen as politically beneficial for the Serbian Government. She noted some cooperation in accessing documents; however, for more than a year, the prosecution has pushed for the transfer of 155 Serbian documents in connection with the Milosevic trial without success. Del Ponte expressed concern over the failure to detain wanted fugitives – particularly Veselin Sljivancanin, indicted for the 1991 Vukovar massacre in Croatia, and Ratko Mladic and five others wanted in connection with the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “Mladic is a great mystery because we know where Mladic is,” she asserted. “We passed this information to the Serbian Government in Belgrade, and nothing happened.” Del Ponte stressed that if law and order is to prevail criminal justice must be credible. Failure to bring together all those accused to trial frustrates the progress of the Tribunal and forces the witnesses to present repeatedly their own horrific accounts each time a separate case is brought to trial. She also assessed cooperation with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo during the course of the briefing. In a letter dated May 23, five Members of the Helsinki Commission urged Secretary of State Colin Powell to utilize the time prior to the certification deadline to press authorities in Belgrade to take the steps necessary to meet the certification requirements. The Commissioners recognized the significant strides Serbia has made in cooperation with the Tribunal, but underscored that “a failure to apprehend Mladic and other notorious war criminals soon would be a serious setback to the cause of reform and recovery at home and further delay Serbia’s integration in Europe.” The letter was signed by Co-Chairmen Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), and Commissioners Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD). The United States Helsinki Commission held a second briefing on June 4, detailing Serbia and Montenegro’s cooperation with the Tribunal, and the prospects for human rights and democratic development in Serbia since the lifting of the state of emergency imposed after Djindjic’s assassination. Helsinki Commission Senior Advisor Donald Kursch opened the briefing, welcoming the tough measures authorities in Belgrade have taken in the wake of Mr. Djindjic’s murder to crack down on criminal elements. Nina Bang-Jensen, Executive Director and General Counsel for the Coalition for International Justice, described Serbia’s actual cooperation with the Court as “very limited, begrudging, and only under pressure.” After last year’s certification, Serbia’s government promised a consistent pattern of cooperation, but only three surrenders and one arrest have followed. Bang-Jensen cited the failure to apprehend nineteen Bosnian Serb and Serbian indicted suspects, either living within Serbia or frequently crossing into Serbia, as an indication that the current government is inclined to protect the old regime. Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, recommended that the United States look not only at Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY, but to its overall level of commitment to rule of law. Following Djindjic’s assassination in March, the Serbian Government imposed a state of emergency to crack down on organized crime. It is estimated that more than 10,000 people were held incommunicado for up to two months under this guise. International monitors were denied access to detainees until recently, and Andersen noted that released detainees reported widespread abuse. Despite increasing pressure from the international community on Serbia’s domestic courts to shoulder greater responsibility for holding war criminals accountable, only four domestic trials were held this year. There is also no indication of upcoming trials or of a permanent commitment to such a process. Trials that have proceeded suffered from a lack of witness protection, poor case preparation by prosecutors, and problems facilitating witnesses traveling from other areas of the former Yugoslavia. James Fisfis, Resident Program Officer for Serbia at the International Republican Institute, remained optimistic. Fisfis presented the results of an IRI survey suggesting that 56 percent of Serbian citizens believe the country is now on the right track, up from 38 percent before the assassination. Sixty-four percent of Serbian respondents currently support cooperation with The Hague, seeing it as a necessary measure toward gaining international acceptance. The data suggest a window of opportunity exists for pressure to reform to have an impact. Ivan Vujacic, Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro to the United States, acknowledged that “more can be done and more will be done” in cooperation with the Tribunal, but focused on the progress made over the last two and half years, which he described as “remarkable.” In particular, he pointed to the recent arrests of three “pillars of Milosevic’s rule”: Miroslav Radic, Franko Simatovic, and Jovica Stanisic. Ambassador Vujacic said that the Serbian Government was highly committed to protecting human rights. He stated that during the war “the ultimate human right, the right to life was taken from the victims in atrocities defined as war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Vujacic promised that all indictees in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro will be arrested and transferred to The Hague. A second Helsinki Commission letter to Secretary of State Powell dated June 12th, declared that certification could not be justified at the time. The letter concluded: “To certify would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy goals supporting international justice and successful and complete democratic change in Serbia.” The letter reiterated that the Serbian authorities had yet to arrest and transfer Mladic and other indictees who are most likely in Serbia, and even this did not define the full cooperation with the Tribunal desired. Commission Members warned that if certification occurred while the required conditions remained unmet, the United States’ ability to affect change in Serbia would be diminished, making it more difficult for Serbia’s political leadership to undertake necessary reforms. Some Commission Members view the June 13 arrest of the indicted war crimes suspect Veselin Sljivancanin by the Belgrade authorities as an important positive step toward increased cooperation with the ICTY. However, continued failure to apprehend Mladic and other leading indictees remains a serious cause of concern that places barriers to Serbia and Montenegro’s full re-integration into the international community. In a press release announcing certification, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher asserted that the Secretary’s decision to certify does not indicate that Serbia has fulfilled its commitment. “We have made clear ... that the United States expects further actions to be taken in order to meet those obligations,” Boucher said, “including by arresting and transferring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.” The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Intern Kristin Poore contributed to this article.
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article
Helsinki Commission Members Press Belgrade to Apprend Indicted War Criminals, Cooperate with Hague Tribunal
Monday, July 07, 2003By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor On June 16, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell certified that Serbia and Montenegro met U.S. criteria set forth in section 578 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution. These criteria include Serbia and Montenegro’s level of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Without certification, certain bilateral assistance to Serbia would have been withheld. Leading Members of the United States Helsinki Commission have long been concerned with the level of cooperation by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro with ICTY and have consistently urged the authorities in Belgrade to do more. Concerned Commissioners have sought to increase attention paid to developments in Serbia in the aftermath of the March assassination of reformist Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. There is a general sense among Commission leaders that while Belgrade’s cooperation with the Tribunal has been improving, it still remains insufficient. In the lead up to the June 15th certification deadline, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) participated in a Commission public briefing featuring Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal. As of the May 15th briefing, Del Ponte characterized cooperation from Belgrade as uncertain, underscoring that movement comes only when it is seen as politically beneficial for the Serbian Government. She noted some cooperation in accessing documents; however, for more than a year, the prosecution has pushed for the transfer of 155 Serbian documents in connection with the Milosevic trial without success. Del Ponte expressed concern over the failure to detain wanted fugitives – particularly Veselin Sljivancanin, indicted for the 1991 Vukovar massacre in Croatia, and Ratko Mladic and five others wanted in connection with the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “Mladic is a great mystery because we know where Mladic is,” she asserted. “We passed this information to the Serbian Government in Belgrade, and nothing happened.” Del Ponte stressed that if law and order is to prevail criminal justice must be credible. Failure to bring together all those accused to trial frustrates the progress of the Tribunal and forces the witnesses to present repeatedly their own horrific accounts each time a separate case is brought to trial. She also assessed cooperation with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo during the course of the briefing. In a letter dated May 23, five Members of the Helsinki Commission urged Secretary of State Colin Powell to utilize the time prior to the certification deadline to press authorities in Belgrade to take the steps necessary to meet the certification requirements. The Commissioners recognized the significant strides Serbia has made in cooperation with the Tribunal, but underscored that “a failure to apprehend Mladic and other notorious war criminals soon would be a serious setback to the cause of reform and recovery at home and further delay Serbia’s integration in Europe.” The letter was signed by Co-Chairmen Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), and Commissioners Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD). The United States Helsinki Commission held a second briefing on June 4, detailing Serbia and Montenegro’s cooperation with the Tribunal, and the prospects for human rights and democratic development in Serbia since the lifting of the state of emergency imposed after Djindjic’s assassination. Helsinki Commission Senior Advisor Donald Kursch opened the briefing, welcoming the tough measures authorities in Belgrade have taken in the wake of Mr. Djindjic’s murder to crack down on criminal elements. Nina Bang-Jensen, Executive Director and General Counsel for the Coalition for International Justice, described Serbia’s actual cooperation with the Court as “very limited, begrudging, and only under pressure.” After last year’s certification, Serbia’s government promised a consistent pattern of cooperation, but only three surrenders and one arrest have followed. Bang-Jensen cited the failure to apprehend nineteen Bosnian Serb and Serbian indicted suspects, either living within Serbia or frequently crossing into Serbia, as an indication that the current government is inclined to protect the old regime. Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, recommended that the United States look not only at Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY, but to its overall level of commitment to rule of law. Following Djindjic’s assassination in March, the Serbian Government imposed a state of emergency to crack down on organized crime. It is estimated that more than 10,000 people were held incommunicado for up to two months under this guise. International monitors were denied access to detainees until recently, and Andersen noted that released detainees reported widespread abuse. Despite increasing pressure from the international community on Serbia’s domestic courts to shoulder greater responsibility for holding war criminals accountable, only four domestic trials were held this year. There is also no indication of upcoming trials or of a permanent commitment to such a process. Trials that have proceeded suffered from a lack of witness protection, poor case preparation by prosecutors, and problems facilitating witnesses traveling from other areas of the former Yugoslavia. James Fisfis, Resident Program Officer for Serbia at the International Republican Institute, remained optimistic. Fisfis presented the results of an IRI survey suggesting that 56 percent of Serbian citizens believe the country is now on the right track, up from 38 percent before the assassination. Sixty-four percent of Serbian respondents currently support cooperation with The Hague, seeing it as a necessary measure toward gaining international acceptance. The data suggest a window of opportunity exists for pressure to reform to have an impact. Ivan Vujacic, Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro to the United States, acknowledged that “more can be done and more will be done” in cooperation with the Tribunal, but focused on the progress made over the last two and half years, which he described as “remarkable.” In particular, he pointed to the recent arrests of three “pillars of Milosevic’s rule”: Miroslav Radic, Franko Simatovic, and Jovica Stanisic. Ambassador Vujacic said that the Serbian Government was highly committed to protecting human rights. He stated that during the war “the ultimate human right, the right to life was taken from the victims in atrocities defined as war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Vujacic promised that all indictees in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro will be arrested and transferred to The Hague. A second Helsinki Commission letter to Secretary of State Powell dated June 12th, declared that certification could not be justified at the time. The letter concluded: “To certify would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy goals supporting international justice and successful and complete democratic change in Serbia.” The letter reiterated that the Serbian authorities had yet to arrest and transfer Mladic and other indictees who are most likely in Serbia, and even this did not define the full cooperation with the Tribunal desired. Commission Members warned that if certification occurred while the required conditions remained unmet, the United States’ ability to affect change in Serbia would be diminished, making it more difficult for Serbia’s political leadership to undertake necessary reforms. Some Commission Members view the June 13 arrest of the indicted war crimes suspect Veselin Sljivancanin by the Belgrade authorities as an important positive step toward increased cooperation with the ICTY. However, continued failure to apprehend Mladic and other leading indictees remains a serious cause of concern that places barriers to Serbia and Montenegro’s full re-integration into the international community. In a press release announcing certification, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher asserted that the Secretary’s decision to certify does not indicate that Serbia has fulfilled its commitment. “We have made clear ... that the United States expects further actions to be taken in order to meet those obligations,” Boucher said, “including by arresting and transferring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.” The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.
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statement
Combating Torture and Assisting Victims of Torture
Thursday, June 26, 2003Mr. President, I rise to address the barbaric practices that constitute torture as we mark the United Nations Day in Support of the Victims of Torture. Astonishingly, an estimated 500,000 victims of torture live in the United States today, including many in my home State of Colorado. The United States has provided vital leadership in the campaign to prevent torture around the world. The United States must not equivocate on this most basic of human rights. While the United States has consistently spoken out forcefully against the use of torture around the world, serious questions have been raised suggesting U.S. complicity in torture as part of the war against terrorism. This prompted me to join other members of the Helsinki Commission in writing to the White House recently urging an investigation of "serious allegations that the United States is using torture, both directly and indirectly, during interrogations of those suspected of terrorism." Against this backdrop, I urge the administration to issue a forthright statement on torture. In his State of the Union Address, President Bush described the horrific forms of torture employed by the Hussein regime and concluded, "If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning." Even as experts document the scope of torture in Iraq, there must be no doubt concerning U.S. policy and practice. As Cochairman of the Helsinki Commission, I am particularly concerned that torture remains a tolerated if not promoted practice by come countries, even within the membership of the 55-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE. In some places, like Uzbekistan, members of the political opposition or religious minorities are especially likely to be the victims of torture. Tragically, two more people there have joined the long list of those who have died in custody amid credible allegations of abuse and torture, just weeks after the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development hosted a prestigious meeting in Tashkent, and days after the Secretary of State determined Uzbekistan is eligible for continued U.S. assistance. Moreover, the shortsighted practice of making martyrs out of Islamic extremists may have exactly the opposite effect the government claims to be seeking in its efforts to combat terrorism. In Georgia, torture and abuse comes hand in hand with police corruption. In the most recent State Department Country Report on human rights in Georgia, the Department stated: "[s]ecurity forces continued to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse detainees.... NGOs also blamed several deaths in custody on physical abuse, torture, or inhumane and life-threatening prison conditions." Even President Shevardnadze has, in the past, acknowledged the prevalence of abuse against detainees and prisoners. I welcome a new initiative of the OSCE Mission in Georgia to combat torture, but I would also note that antitorture initiatives have come and gone in Georgia with little to show for it. Without real political will, I am afraid this latest initiative may end up like the others. In Turkey--a country which has been given particular attention by the Helsinki Commission--even the doctors who treat the victims of torture have become targets themselves. Their offices have been raided, records seized, and even some doctors have been arrested and tortured. Moreover, the patients of these doctors, all of whom have already suffered at the hands of the authorities, have often been rearrested, retortured and recharged based on their testimonies given to the medical authorities. As a result of these practices, Turkey has been repeatedly sanctioned by the European Court of Human Rights. The Turkish nongovernmental organization, the Human Rights Foundation, appears to be making some headway in defending these doctors. Last year, Turkey's Grand National Assembly has passed significant legislation with severe penalties for those convicted of torture. A major effort still needs to be made to conform the application of the law in the regional courts of Turkey with the intent of the parliamentarians. The Helsinki Commission will continue to monitor developments in Turkey and the implementation of this law. In the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Charter, the participating States committed themselves to "eradicating torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the OSCE area. To this end, we will promote legislation to provide procedural and substantive safeguards and remedies to combat these practices. We will assist victims and cooperate with relevant international organizations and nongovernmental organizations, as appropriate." Clearly a strategy to confront and combat torture must emphasize prevention of torture, prosecution of those who commit torture, and assistance for the victims of torture. As we mark the United Nations Day in Support of the Victims of Torture, I note the good work being done by the Rocky Mountain Survivors Center, located in Denver. The center is part of a nationwide network committed to assisting the victims of torture living in the United States.
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statement
H.R. 2620: Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
Thursday, June 26, 2003Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, which is intended to improve the United States’ efforts in combating the scourge of human trafficking. I am very pleased to have Congressmen Lantos, Ranking Member of the International Relations Committee, Congressman Pitts and Congresswoman Slaughter, join me as original cosponsors. According to a recently released U.S. Government estimate, 800,000 to 900,000 women, children and men fall victim to international trafficking each year and end up prisoners of slavery-like practices in the commercial sex industry, domestic servitude, sweatshops, and agricultural farms, among other destinations. In October 2000, we adopted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), P.L. 106-386. As a result of that law, the U.S. Government allocated $68.2 million last year to combat trafficking in human beings. In the past two years, federal prosecutors initiated prosecutions of 79 traffickers--three times as many as in the two previous years. Nearly 400 survivors of trafficking in the United States have received assistance, facilitated by the Department of Health and Human Services, to begin recovering from their trauma and to rebuild their shattered lives. Thanks to the efforts of the State Department, USAID, and the spotlight put on the issue through the annual Trafficking in Persons Report, governments worldwide have also begun taking significant actions against human trafficking. Despite these substantive inroads, people continue to be bought and sold in modern day slavery. Victims continue to face obstacles in the process of securing needed assistance. We are not yet addressing trafficking in persons as an organized crime activity. We have not yet aggressively targeted sex tourism as a factor contributing to the demand for trafficked persons in prostitution, and more specialized research is needed. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) would address these and other areas of concern, would authorize funding to continue our government’s efforts against trafficking, and would build upon the experience of implementing the TVPA to refine U.S. laws and practices to better fulfill the intent of that law. Specifically, the TVPRA would enhance the prevention of human trafficking by: Requiring that U.S. Government contracts relating to international affairs contain clauses authorizing termination by the United States if the contractor engages in human trafficking or procures commercial sexual services while the contract is in force; Promoting innovative trafficking prevention initiatives, such as border interdiction programs; Requiring airlines to inform passengers about U.S. laws against sex tourism. The TVPRA would enhance protections for trafficking victims by: Allowing Federal, State or local law enforcement authorities to certify, for the purpose of receiving benefits, that a victim of trafficking has cooperated in the investigation or prosecution of trafficking crimes; Allowing trafficking victims to sue their traffickers in U.S. courts; Eliminating the requirement that a victim of trafficking between the ages of 15 and 18 must cooperate with the investigation and prosecution of his or her trafficker in order to be eligible for a T-visa; Allowing benefits and services available to victims of trafficking to be available for their family members legally entitled to join them in United States; and Providing for the confidentiality of T-visa applications. The TVPRA would enhance prosecution of trafficking-related crimes by: Permitting federal anti-trafficking statutes to be used to prosecute acts of trafficking involving foreign commerce or occurring in the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States; Making human trafficking crimes predicate offenses for RICO charges; and Encouraging the use of International Law Enforcement Academies to train foreign law enforcement authorities, prosecutors and members of the judiciary regarding human trafficking. The TVPRA would improve the U.S. Government’s response to trafficking by: Encouraging critical research initiatives; Mandating a report on federal agencies’ implementation of the TVPA; Designating that the Director of the State Department Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking shall have the rank of Ambassador-at-Large; and Prohibiting the use of funds to promote, support, or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution. The TVPRA would reauthorize appropriations for each of FY 2004 and 2005: $4 million to the Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking; $15 million to the Department of Health and Human Services; To the Secretary of State, $15 million for assistance for victims in other countries; $15 million for programs to improve law enforcement and prosecution; and $15 million for trafficking prevention initiatives; $300,000 to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe for trafficking prevention and legal reform programs; $15 million to the Department of Justice for assistance to victims in the United States and $250,000 for anti-trafficking training activities at the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs); $15 million to the President for foreign victim assistance (prevention activities); $15 million for assistance to foreign countries to meet the minimum standards to combat trafficking; $300,000 for research; and $250,000 for anti-trafficking training activities at the ILEAs; and $10 million to the Department of Labor. Mr. Speaker, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 enjoyed broad, bi-partisan support in both Houses of Congress. We are making progress in our battle against modern day slavery, but clearly there is still much work to be done by government authorities, by civil society, by our faith communities, and by all men and women of good will. As lawmakers, we have the opportunity to make our contribution to this endeavor. I strongly urge my colleagues to support this commonsense reauthorization bill to support and enhance the good work which has been undertaken.
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statement
International Day in Support of the Victims of Torture
Wednesday, June 25, 2003Mr. Speaker, as Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I find myself dealing with the issue of torture many times over during the course of any given year--torture committed by Russian forces in Chechnya, systematic police abuse of Roma in Greece, prisoners tortured to death in Uzbekistan, to give just a few recent examples. Unfortunately, torture remains the weapon of choice by many oppressive regimes, systematically used to silence political opposition, punish religious minorities, or target those who are ethnically or racially different from those in power. But on the occasion of the United Nations' Day in Support of the Victims of Torture, I'd like to reflect on the steps that can be taken to help prevent torture from occurring in the first place. Torture is prohibited by a multitude of international instruments, including documents of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Moreover, it is absolute and nonderogable under any circumstances, even wartime. The challenge, then, is to translate this commitment into practice. Amnesty International has issued a number of recommendations to help end torture. They are remarkably straightforward and easy to grasp: officials at the highest level should condemn torture; governments should ensure access to prisoners; secret detentions should be prohibited; and confessions obtained through torture should be excluded from evidence in the courtroom. I believe the implementation of these fundamental principles would have a significant impact in reducing torture. At the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's Annual Session two years ago, I introduced a resolution, passed by the Assembly, that built on these basic concepts. While we work to eradicate torture, we must not forget those who have already become its victims. Along with Representative TOM LANTOS, I have introduced H.R. 1813, legislation to re-authorize the Torture Victims Relief Act and the list of cosponsors is growing. The Senate companion bill, S. 854 was introduced by Senator COLEMAN. This reauthorization will continue funding for centers here in the United States that help provide treatment for the estimated half million survivors, most of whom came to this country as refugees. It will also provide funds, distributed through the Agency for International Development or the U.N. Voluntary Fund for the Victims of Torture, for treatment centers abroad. While life for torture survivors can never be the same, treatment can provide victims the hope of becoming stable and productive members of their communities. I urge my colleagues in the House to join in supporting this measure as a tangible support of the victims of torture.
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statement
Torture Deaths in Uzbekistan Reveal Lack of Progress
Tuesday, June 24, 2003Mr. Speaker, in March 2002, the United States and Uzbekistan signed a declaration proclaiming a "Strategic Partnership" between our countries. This former Soviet republic, with the largest population of the five Central Asian countries, has played an important role in assisting the United States after 9/11, and I am grateful for that. At the same time, as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I have deep concerns about the human rights situation in Uzbekistan, where no political opposition, no freedom of speech nor freedom of association are permitted. As a result of this situation, Congress has conditioned the release of financial assistance to Uzbekistan upon a determination by the Secretary of State that Tashkent is making "substantial and continuing progress" in meeting commitments specified in the March 2002 bilateral declaration, including in the field of human rights. The Secretary has twice--on August 26, 2002 and May 14, 2003--made such a determination. Regrettably, there has been no "substantial and continuing progress" in the field of human rights in Uzbekistan. True, a human rights group has been registered, censorship has formally been lifted, and there have been amnesties, but these are largely token deliverables meant to give the appearance of progress. Uzbekistan has also admitted the U.N.'s Special Rapporteur on Torture. But all these gestures are more cosmetic than substantial. In fact, the U.N. Special Rapporteur concluded that torture is "systematic" in Uzbekistan. Instead of claiming credit for allowing him into the country at all, President Karimov should renounce this barbaric practice and Tashkent should take urgent measures to prevent and punish acts of torture. Unfortunately, thus far President Karimov has refused to take even the simple step of acknowledging and renouncing torture. More to the point, just after the Secretary's most recent determination last month, Orif Ershanov and Otamaza Gafaro joined the unconscionably long list of individuals who have died as a result of torture or other abuse inflicted by Uzbek officials. Once again, Uzbek officials maintain that these most recent deaths in custody were the result of "natural causes." But the country's deplorable record undermines the credibility of such assertions. Frankly, I am surprised by Tashkent's claims; last year, there were two cases when Uzbek policemen who tortured prisoners, in some cases to death, received long prison terms. Their sentences constituted a sad form of progress in Uzbekistan, allowing observers to hope that law enforcement officials would have reason to fear serious consequences for mistreating people in their care. The latest assertions about "natural causes" signal clear regression to old positions that damage Uzbekistan's government and should be an embarrassment to the United States. Particularly with respect to torture, Tashkent should immediately take several steps to demonstrate to the international community a serious commitment to make meaningful progress. First, the Government of Uzbekistan should provide immediate access, organized by the OSCE, for independent medical experts to examine the bodies of Ershanov and Gafaro. Unfortunately, we have received indications that Uzbekistan is balking at admitting independent forensic specialists. Furthermore, Tashkent should establish a system of access for independent experts to investigate all cases of alleged torture and should act on the recommendations of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture. It is equally important that Uzbekistan unconditionally release those who have been jailed because of their political opposition or religious affiliation. I have repeatedly urged Uzbek officials, including President Karimov during his visit to Washington in March of last year, to release the writer Mamadali Makhmudov, for example. One of the Bekjanov brothers has indeed been freed, but two of his siblings remain in prison, and we have received reports from family members of their declining health. As the most recent deaths in custody demonstrate, fears that such prisoners may die from their mistreatment during incarceration are well founded. Mr. Speaker, improved relations are in the interest of both Uzbekistan and the United States. But closer, deeper ties will not be built on the graves of Uzbekistan's citizens who have been tortured to death. I hope, Mr. Speaker, that I will soon be able to report back to my colleagues that President Karimov has taken meaningful steps to confront torture and bring a measure of justice to its victims.
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article
Human Rights in Chechnya Focus of Helsinki Commission Briefing
Monday, June 02, 2003By John Finerty, CSCE Staff Advisor The United States Helsinki Commission held a briefing April 24, 2003 on the critical human rights and humanitarian situation in war-torn Chechnya, Russian Federation. The panelists of the briefing were Eliza Moussaeva, Director of the Ingushetia office of the Memorial Human Rights Center, and Bela Tsugaeva, Information Manager of World Vision, Ingushetia. The Commission guests were accompanied by Maureen Greenwood, Advocacy Director for Europe and Eurasia, Amnesty International, USA. Helsinki Commission Deputy Chief of Staff Ron McNamara opened the briefing. “Despite concerted efforts by the Russian leadership to portray the situation in Chechnya as approaching normal, the pattern of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of OSCE commitments by Russian forces continues,” McNamara said. “From reports of credible and courageous human rights activists such as our panelists, it is clear that the most egregious violations of international humanitarian law anywhere in the OSCE region are occurring in Chechnya today.” Ms. Moussaeva said that, as of late, Russian forces no longer conduct sweep operations (“zachistki”) in search of rebels, but now rely on night raids by masked personnel. In the three months from January to March, there were 119 abductions by federal forces engaged in such operations, according to Moussaeva, who added that during the same period last year, there were 82 abductions marking an increase in such activity by Federation forces. This shift in tactics has made it more difficult for families to trace their abducted relatives, whereas previously relatives generally knew which units had conducted the sweeps. Now, units and identities of the raiders are unknown, as well as the location of detainees. Officially, 2,800 persons are missing. Memorial believes the actual number to be significantly higher. Mass graves are a common find. In January, one mass grave was found in which the exact number of corpses could not be ascertained, because the bodies had been blown up by grenades to hide traces of torture and abuse. Authorities claim these individuals were abducted by Chechen rebel forces; yet some family members, who were able to identify their relatives by the clothing on the bodies, say that these individuals were actually taken by federal forces. According to Moussaeva, Moscow’s highly-touted March 23rd constitutional referendum has not marked an improvement in Chechen life on the ground. On one single day after the referendum, Memorial received reports of several cases of individuals abducted by federal forces. On the same day, a bus exploded, killing nine. Ms. Moussaeva asked, “So we have the question, why did we need that referendum if it didn’t change the situation for the better, if it didn’t bring us stability?” Regarding an OSCE presence in Chechnya, Moussaeva said, “We hope that they would have the opportunity to open in Chechnya again, and it will be a great help for us. The OSCE had a very positive experience and a good image after the first war.” Ms. Tsugaeva spoke about the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to information compiled by the Danish Refugee Council, there are some 92,000 IDPs in the neighboring republic of Ingushetia, which has a population of only 350,000. Fifteen thousand of the IDPs live in five large tent camps, 27,000 in other structures such as industrial plants or farms, and 50,000 in private accommodations, for which most have to pay rent. Most individuals lack basic necessities and have been asked by Ingushetia to leave, yet they have nowhere to go. Refugees in this region have also been subjected to efforts by federal officials to drive them away. Seventy percent of aid comes mainly from international NGOs, and the remainder from the UN. Bread distribution to these people is vital but irregular. Most international NGOs have been unable to open offices in Chechnya due to the security situation, meaning only the most needy, such as children and the elderly, can be provided for. Many land mines scattered throughout parts of the country formerly occupied by military forces are an additional cause for concern. According to official statistics, there were over 5,000 victims of landmine explosions in 2002. Despite the work of international NGOs such as the Handicap International Organization, most of these victims do not have access to adequate medical care and are in one way or another incapacitated for life. Ms. Moussaeva stated that an office established by the Putin government to monitor the human rights situation in Chechnya was ineffectual and merely for show. Of more than 29,000 complaints of harassment by federal forces filed by individuals, only 550 had been investigated. Ms. Greenwood commended the Helsinki Commission for its letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell urging the U.S. delegation at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva to push for a strong resolution to the conflict in Geneva. The recently concluded 58th Meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights failed by a vote of 15-21 to adopt a U.S.-supported resolution expressing “deep concern” about reported human rights violations in Chechnya. “Amnesty would like to thank co-signers Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Representative Christopher Smith, Senator Gordon Smith, Representative Steny Hoyer, Representative Robert Aderholt and Representative Ben Cardin,” Greenwood said. Furthermore, Greenwood expressed Amnesty International’s concern regarding the targeting of civilians on both sides of the conflict. Chechen rebel forces have engaged in abductions, hostage taking, and assassinations. Russians have used tactics such as extra-judicial executions, rape, and torture. Amnesty International profiles a few prominent cases, but these represent hundreds of other cases of human rights abuses. Ms. Greenwood presented Amnesty International’s recommendations for the United States Government, including: pressuring the Russian Government not to close tent camps for IDPs; encouraging the US Government to maintain funding levels of the Freedom Support Act for pro-human rights and democracy NGOs in the Russian Federation; demanding access to Chechnya for international journalists and observers; and, supporting the establishment of a human rights tribunal in the Council of Europe. Amnesty International’s recommendations for the Russian Government included providing accountability for previous abuses and ending violations of human rights law. Finally, Amnesty International called upon Chechen rebels to abide by international law, and stop the kidnaping and killings. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission intern Sean Callagy contributed to this article.
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statement
The Continuing Plight of Roma in Greece
Monday, May 19, 2003Mr. Speaker, the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) and Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM) have just published a report on the human rights situation of Roma in Greece. “Cleaning Operations: Excluding Roma in Greece” documents the plight of the inhabitants of the Romani settlement of Aspropyrgos, outside Athens, and details the problems of Roma across the country. Illustrated with stark scenes of bulldozed homes and marginalized and neglected Romani communities, a picture disturbing in more ways than one has been painted. In particular, the report supports the accusation that the Government of Greece has used preparations for the 2004 Olympics as justification for the campaign to uproot Roma. Ironically, Greece currently holds the presidency of the European Union. The Helsinki Commission, which I co-chair, held hearings in 1998, 2000, and in 2002 focused on the human rights problems faced by Roma with the intent of raising the awareness of these problems amongst the governments of the OSCE participating States. The plight of the Roma has also been addressed in specific hearings or briefings covering Greece, Russia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Romania, as well as the OSCE process. Members of the Commission have also sent several letters to Greek leaders in recent years addressing longstanding human rights concerns in the Hellenic Republic, including those affecting the Romani community. These expressions of concern have specifically addressed forced evacuations of Roma from numerous villages, the abusive application of the use of national identity cards issued to Roma, the inability of Roma children to have access to schools on a non-discriminatory basis and other matters of blatant racial discrimination. This newly released report on Roma clearly indicates that the Greek Government has failed to properly address many of these ongoing concerns. At a June 2002 Commission hearing on Greece, in fact, I raised the specter of an intensified campaign targeting Roma to obtain land for use as venues for the 2004 Olympics. This campaign is well documented in this report. Notwithstanding the assertions of Greek officials at the Commission hearing that “everything is done (concerning the relocation) in consultation with, and with the consent of, the Roma involved,” numerous non-governmental organizations have raised such issues with Athens. Greek human rights activists have stepped forward. As an original signatory to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, Greece has accepted numerous commitments pertaining to the treatment of Roma and joined in condemning discrimination against Roma, a provision found in the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit Document. Regrettably, the Greek Government has failed to fulfill these commitments, as documented in the new ERRC/GHM report on Roma in Greece. The ERRC and GHM conducted intensive field missions that revealed several patterns of human rights abuse against Roma in Greece: cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment of Roma in housing; police violence against Roma; exclusion of Roma from the educational system; and, barriers to access to health care and other social support services for Roma. Based on the facts in this report and the discussions I have had over the years in my leadership capacity with the Helsinki Commission, I urge the Government of Greece to take corrective measures, without delay, along the lines recommended by the ERRC and the GHM: 1. Facilitate access to Greek citizenship for those Roma residing in Greece who are stateless and provide the necessary legal documents (such as identity cards) to all Roma. 2. Use all appropriate means to guarantee protection against forced evictions outside the rule of law and without due process. 3. Bring to justice public officials and private individuals responsible for forced evictions of Roma in breach of Greek law. 4. Carry out thorough and timely investigations into all alleged instances of police abuse. 5. Undertake effective measures to ensure that local authorities register all persons factually residing in a given municipality, without regard to ethnicity. 6. Ensure that Romani schoolchildren have equal access to education in a desegregated school environment. 7. Without delay, adopt comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, as called for in the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit Document. 8. Conduct public information campaigns on human rights and remedies available to victims of human rights abuse, and distribute in both the Greek and Romani languages. 9. Conduct comprehensive human rights and anti-racism training for national and local administrators, members of the police force, and the judiciary. 10. At the highest levels, speak out against racial discrimination against Roma and others, and make clear that racism will not be tolerated. The Helsinki Commission will continue to monitor the situation of Roma in the Hellenic Republic with the aim of encouraging the Government of Greece to implement commitments it has agreed to within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Commission will also work to ensure that the plight of Roma in Greece is raised at the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting to be held this fall in Warsaw.
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statement
The Troubled Media Environment in Ukraine
Tuesday, April 29, 2003Mr. President, later this week individuals around the world will mark World Press Freedom Day. The functioning of free and independent media is tied closely to the exercise of many other fundamental freedoms as well as to the future of any democratic society. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which I co-chair, is responsible for monitoring press freedom in the 55 participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE. Recently, I reported to the Senate on the deplorable conditions for independent media in the Republic of Belarus. Today, I will address the situation of journalists and media outlets in Ukraine. Several discouraging reports have come out recently concerning the medic environment in Ukraine. These reports merit attention, especially within the context of critical presidential elections scheduled to take place in Ukraine next year. The State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in Ukraine for 2002 summarizes media freedoms as follows: "Authorities interfered with the news media by intimidating journalists, issuing written and oral instructions about events to cover and not to cover, and pressuring them into applying self-censorship. Nevertheless a wide range of opinion was available in newspapers, periodicals, and Internet news sources." Current negative trends and restrictive practices with respect to media freedom in Ukraine are sources of concern, especially given that country's leadership claims concerning integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Lack of compliance with international human rights standards, including OSCE commitments, on freedom of expression undermines that process. Moreover, an independent media free from governmental pressure is an essential factor in ensuring a level playing field in the upcoming 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine. In her April 18, 2003 annual report to the Ukrainian parliament, Ombudsman Nina Karpachova asserted that journalism remains among the most dangerous professions in Ukraine, with 36 media employees having been killed over the past ten years, while beatings, intimidation of media employees, freezing of bank accounts of media outlets, and confiscation of entire print runs of newspapers and other publications have become commonplace in Ukraine. The murder of prominent journalist Heorhiy Gongadze--who disappeared in September 2000--remains unsolved. Ukrainian President Kuchma and a number of high-ranking officials have been implicated in his disappearance and the circumstances leading to his murder. The Ukrainian authorities' handling, or more accurately mishandling of this case, has been characterized by obfuscation and stonewalling. Not surprisingly, lack of transparency illustrated by the Gongadze case has fueled the debilitating problem of widespread corruption reaching the highest levels of the Government of Ukraine. Audio recordings exist that contain conversations between Kuchma and other senior government officials discussing the desirability of Gongadze's elimination. Some of these have been passed to the U.S. Department of Justice as part of a larger set of recordings of Kuchma's conversations implicating him and his cronies in numerous scandals. Together with Commission Co-Chairman Rep. Chris Smith, I recently wrote to the Department of Justice requesting technical assistance to determine whether the recordings in which the Gongadze matter is discussed are genuine. A credible and transparent investigation of this case by Ukrainian authorities is long overdue and the perpetrators--no matter who they may be--need to be brought to justice. The case of Ihor Alexandrov, a director of a regional television station, who was beaten in July 2001 and subsequently died also remains unsolved. Serious questions remain about the way in which that case was handled by the authorities. A Human Rights Watch report, “Negotiating the News: Informal State Censorship of Ukrainian Television,” issued in March, details the use of explicit directives or temnyky, lists of topics, which have been sent to editors from Kuchma's Presidential Administration on what subjects to cover and in what manner. The report correctly notes that these temnyky have eroded freedom of expression in Ukraine, as "editors and journalists feel obligated to comply with temnyky instructions due to economic and political pressures and fear repercussions for non-cooperation." To their credit, the independent media are struggling to counter attempts by the central authorities to control their reporting and coverage of issues and events. Another troubling feature of the media environment has been the control exerted by various oligarchs with close links to the government who own major media outlets. There is growing evidence that backers of the current Prime Minister and other political figures have been buying out previously independent news sources, including websites, and either firing reporters or telling them to cease criticism of the government of find new jobs. Last December, Ukraine's parliament held hearings on "Society, Mass Media, Authority: Freedom of Speech and Censorship in Ukraine." Journalists' testimony confirmed the existence of censorship, including temnyky, as well as various instruments of harassment and intimidation. Tax inspections, various legal actions or license withdrawals have all been used as mechanisms by the authorities to pressure media outlets that have not towed the line or have supported opposition parties. As a result of these hearings, the parliament, on April 3rd, voted 252 to one to approve a law defining and banning state censorship in the Ukrainian media. This is a welcome step. However, given the power of the presidential administration, the law's implementation remains an open question at best, particularly in the lead up to the 2004 elections in Ukraine. I urge our Ukrainian parliamentary colleagues to continue to actively press their government to comply with Ukraine's commitments to fundamental freedoms freely agreed to as a signatory to the Helsinki Final Act. I also urge the Ukrainian authorities, including the constitutional "guarantor", to end their campaign to stifle independent reporting and viewpoints in the media. Good news from Ukraine will come not from the spin doctors of the presidential administration, but when independent media and journalists can pursue their responsibilities free of harassment, intimidation, and fear.
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briefing
The Critical Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation in Chechnya
Thursday, April 24, 2003This briefing followed a defeat, by a vote of 15-21 at the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, of a U.S.–supported resolution expressing “deep concern” about reported human rights violation in Chechnya. The developments in Chechnya since the outbreak of the war in 1994 were briefly surveyed, while the focus of discussion was largely on the human dimension of the situation and the dangers faced by average Chechen civilians. Witnesses testifying at the hearing – including Eliza Moussaeva, Director of the Ingushetia Office of the Memorial Human Rights Center; Bela Tsugaeva, Information Manager of World Vision; and Maureen Greenwood, Advocacy Director for the Europe and Eurasia division of Amnesty International – addressed the dismal state of human rights in Chechnya and the issue of international assistance, which was less effective than it could have been due to government accountability issues. The lack of infrastructure and security guarantees was additional topics of discussion.
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statement
The Referendum in Chechnya
Thursday, March 27, 2003Mr. Speaker, last Sunday, while the world's eyes were focused on the momentous events taking place in Iraq, a constitutional referendum was held in the war-torn region of Chechnya. The referendum was held as part of the Russian Government's attempt to “normalize” the situation in that tortured part of Russia's North Caucasus. For the last ten years, Chechnya has been the scene of a bloody war between armed Chechen rebels and Russian military forces. Hostilities were precipitated in late 1994 when, in the wake of Chechnya's attempt to secede from the Russian Federation, Russian military forces launched a full-scale assault on the Chechen capital of Grozny. There was a restive peace from 1996 until the summer of 1999, when the armed clashes erupted anew. The roots of this conflict go back to Tsarist conquests in the 19th century and Stalin's brutal deportation of the Chechen people to Central Asia during World War II. Unfortunately, certain radical Islamic militant elements linked to international terrorism have become involved on the Chechen side, though the State Department has stressed that not all Chechens are terrorists. Despite Moscow's repeated claims that heavy-handed Russian tactics in Chechnya are part of the war against global terrorism, the situation is far more complex. Many Chechens have taken up arms against what they believe is a repressive colonial power and wish to see Chechnya as an independent state that will be able to make the critical choice regarding the future of its people. As is so frequently the case, the civilian population has suffered terribly from the war. While both sides are guilty of violations of international humanitarian law, the Russian military and special operations units have been responsible for numerous and well-documented instances of gratuitous, brutal and mass violence against the civilian population. During my years in the leadership of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Commission has conducted eight hearings and briefings on Chechnya. Witnesses, including a nurse who was present in a Chechen town where some of the worst atrocities by Russian forces took place, have described the appalling fate of the civilian population. According to the U.S. State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001, “The indiscriminate use of force by government troops in the Chechen conflict resulted in widespread civilian casualties and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons, the majority of whom sought refuge in the neighboring republic of Ingushetia. Attempts by government forces to regain control over Chechnya were accompanied by the indiscriminate use of air power and artillery. There were numerous reports of attacks by government forces on civilian targets, including the bombing of schools and residential areas.” The report continues: “Command and control among military and special police units often appeared to be weak, and a climate of lawlessness, corruption, and impunity flourished, which fostered individual acts by government forces of violence and looting against civilians.” Among the examples of such lawlessness and impunity in the Country Reports were “...reports of mass graves and 'dumping grounds' for victims allegedly executed by Russian forces in Chechnya” and “cleansing” operations directed against guerrillas but resulting in deaths and the disappearance of non-combatants. The State Department points out that Chechen forces also committed serious abuses: “According to unconfirmed reports, rebels killed civilians who would not assist them, used civilians as human shields, forced civilians to build fortifications, and prevented refugees from fleeing Chechnya. In several cases, elderly Russian civilians were killed for no apparent reason other than their ethnicity.” Against this unsettling backdrop, with an estimated 100,000 internally displaced persons living in refugee camps in neighboring Ingushetia, and under the guns of approximately 80,000 Russian soldiers in Chechnya, the Chechen people have reportedly voted overwhelmingly for the proposed new constitution. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that a genuine assessment of the public will would have been determined under such circumstances. I would ask the same question I asked in a Helsinki Commission press release over a month ago: “Are we supposed to believe that this referendum will stabilize Chechnya while armed conflict between the Russian military and Chechen fighters continue to produce death and destruction?'” The well-respected Russian human rights group, Memorial, has charged that Chechens were pressured to vote with the threat of losing their pensions or humanitarian aid. A joint assessment mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe stated that “no group has been able to campaign officially against the referendum in the mass media or distribute literature arguing against the referendum,” although some opposition opinions were voiced in the media. Incidentally, in the concluding communique of the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit, the Russian Government agreed that all sides should seek a political solution to the conflict, and avail themselves of the assistance of the OSCE. This commitment was seriously undermined when the Russian government evicted the OSCE Assistance Mission to Chechnya at the end of last year. Mr. Speaker, the Bush Administration has stated that “...we hope [the referendum] can be the basis for a political solution to that tragic conflict.” I find that rather optimistic. The Russian Government might better instruct its military to stop terrorizing the civilian population, prosecute human rights violators and rebuild Chechnya. Then perhaps it would not have to hold referenda in Chechnya under armed guard.
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statement
Belarus Democracy Act 2003
Tuesday, March 25, 2003Mr. President, as Co-Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I have closely monitored developments in the Republic of Belarus and informed my Senate colleagues of disturbing trends in that nation. I have met with members of the fledgling democratic opposition who, at great personal risk, dare to speak out against the repressive regime led by Alexander Lukashenka. I have met with the courageous wives whose husbands disappeared because they stood up to the regime and would not be silent. Against the backdrop of this climate of fear, the powers of the state have been brought to bear against independent journalists, trade unionists, and other voices of dissent. Increasingly, Belarus has been driven into self-imposed isolation under Lukashenka devoid of legitimate leadership or accountability. A little over a year ago I addressed the Senate to voice concern over reported arms deals between the regime and rouge states, including Iraq. It appears that such sales have taken on greater importance as the Belarusian economy spirals downward. Mr. President, while some might be tempted to dismiss Belarus as an anomaly, the stakes are too high and the costs too great to ignore. Accordingly, today, I am introducing the Belarus Democracy Act of 2003, which is designed to help put an end to repression and human rights violations in Belarus and to promote Belarus’ entry into a democratic Euro-Atlantic community of nations. As a participating State in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Belarus has accepted a series of norms in the areas of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As Europe’s last dictator, Lukashenka continues to brashly trample the fundamental rights of his own people and their culture. As I alluded to earlier, independent media, non-governmental organizations, trade unions and the democratic opposition have had to operate under extremely difficult conditions, often facing serious mistreatment and an orchestrated campaign of harassment. Despite the repressions there are courageous individuals who support democracy have not been silenced. Two weeks ago, for example, Alexander Yarashuk, the leader of the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions, called on Lukashenka to immediately cease backing Saddam. Moreover, just last week, on March 12, thousands gathered peacefully in a central Minsk square to protest deteriorating economic and social conditions in Belarus. Four of the rally’s organizers – Andrei Sannikov, Ludmila Gryaznova, Dmitry Bondarenko and Leonid Malakhov – were given 15 day jail sentences for “participation in unauthorized mass actions.” Despite calls for change within Belarus, and considerable prodding from the international community, Lukashenka has shown no desire to deviate from his path of authoritarianism and personal profit at the expense of his own people. A few months ago, Lukashenka, who effectively controls the Belarusian parliament, signed into laws a new, repressive religion law. Local elections held earlier this month followed the pattern of Belarus’ 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential elections – they were a joke. Control of election commissions, denials of registration for opposition candidates, “early voting” and outright falsifications were the norm. Mr. President, the Belarus Democracy Act of 2003 would authorize additional assistance for democracy-building activities such as support for NGOs, independent media, including radio and television broadcasting to Belarus, and international exchanges. It also encourages free and fair parliamentary elections, which have been notably absent in Belarus. This bill would also deny high-ranking officials of the Lukashenka regime entry into the United States. Additionally, strategic exports to the Belarusian Government would be prohibited, as well as U.S. Government financing, except for humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products. The U.S. executive directors of the international financial institutions would be encouraged to vote against financial assistance to the Government of Belarus except for loans and assistance for humanitarian needs. The bill would also require reports from the President concerning the sale of delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies from Belarus to rogue states, including Iraq and North Korea. I am very pleased that the Ranking Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Biden, is an original cosponsor of this measure. His support will ensure that we proceed on a bipartisan basis as we work to ensure the timely adoption and implementation of this legislation. Mr. President, the goal of the Belarus Democracy Act is to assist Belarus in becoming a genuine European state, in which respect for human rights and democracy is the norm and in which the long-suffering Belarusian people are able to overcome the legacy of dictatorship – past and present. Adoption and implementation of the Belarus Democracy Act will offer a ray of hope that the current period of political, economic and social stagnation will indeed end. The people of Belarus deserve a chance for a brighter future free of repression and fear. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Belarus Democracy Act be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: S. 700 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the "Belarus Democracy Act of 2003''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States supports the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law in the Republic of Belarus consistent with its commitments as a participating state of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (2) The United States has a vital interest in the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus and its integration into the European community of democracies. (3) The last parliamentary election in Belarus deemed to be free and fair by the international community was conducted in 1995 from which emerged the 13th Supreme Soviet whose democratically and constitutionally derived authorities and powers have been usurped by the authoritarian regime of Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenka. (4) In November 1996, Lukashenka orchestrated an illegal and unconstitutional referendum that enabled him to impose a new constitution, abolish the duly-elected parliament, the 13th Supreme Soviet, install a largely powerless National Assembly, and extend his term of office to 2001. (5) In May 1999, democratic forces in Belarus challenged Lukashenka's unconstitutional extension of his presidential term by staging alternative presidential elections which were met with repression. (6) Democratic forces in Belarus have organized peaceful demonstrations against the Lukashenka regime in cities and towns throughout Belarus which led to beatings, mass arrests, and extended incarcerations. (7) Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, and Yuri Zakharenka, who have been leaders and supporters of the democratic forces in Belarus, and Dmitry Zavadsky, a journalist known for his critical reporting in Belarus, have disappeared and are presumed dead. (8) Former Belarus Government officials have come forward with credible allegations and evidence that top officials of the Lukashenka regime were involved in the disappearances. (9) The Lukashenka regime systematically harasses and represses the independent media and independent trade unions, imprisons independent journalists, and actively suppresses freedom of speech and expression. (10) The Lukashenka regime harasses the autocephalic Belarusian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish community, the Hindu Lights of Kalyasa community, evangelical Protestant churches (such as Baptist and Pentecostal groups), and other minority religious groups. (11) The Law on Religious Freedom and Religious Organizations, passed by the National Assembly and signed by Lukashenka on October 31, 2002, establishes one of the most repressive legal regimes in the OSCE region, severely limiting religious freedom and placing excessively burdensome government controls on religious practice. (12) The United States, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly, and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly have not recognized the National Assembly. (13) The parliamentary elections of October 15, 2000, conducted in the absence of a democratic election law, were illegitimate, unconstitutional, and plagued by violent human rights abuses committed by the Lukashenka regime, and have been determined by the OSCE to be nondemocratic. (14) The presidential election of September 9, 2001, was determined by the OSCE and other observers to be fundamentally unfair, to have failed to meet OSCE commitments for democratic elections formulated in the 1990 Copenhagen Document, and to have featured significant and abusive misconduct by the Lukashenka regime, including-- (A) the harassment, arrest, and imprisonment of opposition members; (B) the denial of equal and fair access by opposition candidates to state-controlled media; (C) the seizure of equipment and property of independent nongovernmental organizations and press organizations, and the harassment of their staff and management; (D) voting and vote counting procedures that were not transparent; and (E) a campaign of intimidation directed against opposition activists, domestic election observation organizations, and opposition and independent media, and a libelous media campaign against international observers. SEC. 3. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN BELARUS. (a) PURPOSES OF ASSISTANCE.--Assistance under this section shall be available for the following purposes: (1) To assist the people of the Republic of Belarus in regaining their freedom and to enable them to join the European community of democracies. (2) To encourage free and fair presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in Belarus, conducted in a manner consistent with internationally accepted standards and under the supervision of internationally recognized observers. (3) To assist in restoring and strengthening institutions of democratic governance in Belarus. (b) AUTHORIZATION FOR ASSISTANCE.--To carry out the purposes set forth in subsection (a), the President is authorized to furnish assistance and other support for the activities described in subsection (c), to be provided primarily for indigenous groups in Belarus that are committed to the support of democratic processes in Belarus. (c) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.--Activities that may be supported by assistance under subsection (b) include-- (1) the observation of elections and the promotion of free and fair electoral processes; (2) the development of democratic political parties; (3) radio and television broadcasting to and within Belarus; (4) the development of nongovernmental organizations promoting democracy and supporting human rights; (5) the development of independent media working within Belarus and from locations outside Belarus, and supported by non-state-controlled printing facilities; (6) international exchanges and advanced professional training programs for leaders and members of the democratic forces in matters central to the development of civil society; and (7) other activities consistent with the purposes of this Act. (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out this section $40,000,000 for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. (2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended. SEC. 4. RADIO BROADCASTING TO BELARUS. (a) PURPOSE.--It is the purpose of this section to authorize increased support for United States Government and surrogate radio broadcasting to the Republic of Belarus that will facilitate the unhindered dissemination of information in Belarus. (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--In addition to such sums as are otherwise authorized to be appropriated, there is authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for each fiscal year for Voice of America and RFE/RL, Incorporated for radio broadcasting to the people of Belarus in languages spoken in Belarus. (c) REPORT ON RADIO BROADCASTING TO AND IN BELARUS.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how funds appropriated and allocated pursuant to the authorizations of appropriations under subsection (b) and section 3(d) will be used to provide AM and FM broadcasting that covers the territory of Belarus and delivers independent and uncensored programming. SEC. 5. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS. (a) APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.--The sanctions described in subsections (c) and (d), and any sanction imposed under subsection (e) or (f), shall apply with respect to the Republic of Belarus until the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Belarus has made significant progress in meeting the conditions described in subsection (b). (b) CONDITIONS.--The conditions referred to in subsection (a) are the following: (1) The release of individuals in Belarus who have been jailed based on political or religious beliefs. (2) The withdrawal of politically motivated legal charges against all opposition figures and independent journalists in Belarus. (3) A full accounting of the disappearances of opposition leaders and journalists in Belarus, including Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, Yuri Zakharenka, and Dmitry Zavadsky, and the prosecution of the individuals who are responsible for their disappearances. (4) The cessation of all forms of harassment and repression against the independent media, independent trade unions, nongovernmental organizations, religious organizations (including their leadership and members), and the political opposition in Belarus. (5) The implementation of free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in Belarus consistent with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) standards on democratic elections and in cooperation with relevant OSCE institutions. (c) PROHIBITION ON STRATEGIC EXPORTS TO BELARUS.-- (1) PROHIBITION.--No computers, computer software, goods, or technology intended to manufacture or service computers, or any other related goods or technology, may be exported to Belarus for use by the Government of Belarus, or by its military, police, prison system, or national security agencies. The prohibition in the preceding sentence shall not apply with respect to the export of goods or technology for democracy-building or humanitarian purposes. (2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the issuance of licenses to ensure the safety of civil aviation and safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft of United States origin or to ensure the safety of ocean-going maritime traffic in international waters. (d) PROHIBITION ON LOANS AND INVESTMENT.-- (1) UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FINANCING.--No loan, credit guarantee, insurance, financing, or other similar financial assistance may be extended by any agency of the United States Government (including the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) to the Government of Belarus, except with respect to the provision of humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products. (2) TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY.--No funds available to the Trade and Development Agency may be available for activities of the Agency in or for Belarus. (e) DENIAL OF ENTRY INTO UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN BELARUS OFFICIALS.-- (1) DENIAL OF ENTRY.--It is the sense of Congress that, in addition to the sanctions provided for in subsections (c) and (d), the President should use the authority under section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)) to deny the entry into the United States of any alien who-- (A) holds a position in the senior leadership of the Government of Belarus; or (B) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person described in subparagraph (A). (2) SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS DEFINED.--In this subsection, the term ``senior leadership of the Government of Belarus'' includes-- (A) the President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, government ministers, Chairmen of State Committees, and members of the Presidential Administration of Belarus; (B) any official of the Government of Belarus who is personally and substantially involved in the suppression of freedom in Belarus, including judges and prosecutors; and (C) any other individual determined by the Secretary of State (or the Secretary's designee) to be personally and substantially involved in the formulation or execution of the policies of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus that are in contradiction of internationally recognized human rights standards. (f) MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.--It is the sense of Congress that, in addition to the sanctions provided for in subsections (c) and (d), the Secretary of the Treasury should instruct the United States Executive Director of each international financial institution to which the United States is a member to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any extension by those institutions of any financial assistance (including any technical assistance or grant) of any kind to the Government of Belarus, except for loans and assistance that serve humanitarian needs. (g) WAIVER.--The President may waive the application of any sanction described in this section with respect to Belarus if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that it is important to the national interests of the United States to do so. SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION. It is the sense of Congress that the President should continue to seek to coordinate with other countries, particularly European countries, a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to further the purposes of this Act, including, as appropriate, encouraging other countries to take measures with respect to the Republic of Belarus that are similar to measures provided for in this Act. SEC. 7. ANNUAL REPORTS. (a) REPORTS.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every year thereafter, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes, with respect to the preceding 12-month period, the following: (1) The sale or delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies from the Republic of Belarus to any country, the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)), has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. (2) An identification of each country described in paragraph (1) and a detailed description of the weapons or weapons-related technologies involved in the sale. (3) An identification of the goods, services, credits, or other consideration received by Belarus in exchange for the weapons or weapons-related technologies. (4) The personal assets and wealth of Aleksandr Lukashenka and other senior leadership of the Government of Belarus. (b) FORM.--A report transmitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex. SEC. 8. DECLARATION OF POLICY. Congress hereby-- (1) expresses its support to those in the Republic of Belarus seeking-- (A) to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and to consolidate the independence and sovereignty of Belarus; and (B) to promote the integration of Belarus into the European community of democracies; (2) expresses its grave concern about the disappearances of Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, Yuri Zakharenka, and Dmitry Zavadsky; (3) calls upon the Lukashenka regime in Belarus to cease its persecution of political opponents or independent journalists and to release those individuals who have been imprisoned for opposing his regime or for exercising their right to freedom of speech; (4) calls upon the Lukashenka regime to end the pattern of clear, gross, and uncorrected violations of relevant human dimension commitments of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and to respect the basic freedoms of speech, expression, assembly, association, language, culture, and religion or belief; (5) calls upon the Government of the Russian Federation to use its influence to encourage democratic development in Belarus so that Belarus can become a democratic, prosperous, sovereign, and independent state that is integrated into Europe; (6) calls upon the Government of Belarus to resolve the continuing constitutional and political crisis in Belarus through-- (A) free, fair, and transparent presidential and parliamentary elections in Belarus, as called for by the OSCE; (B) respect for human rights in Belarus; (C) an end to the current climate of fear in Belarus; (D) meaningful access by the opposition to state media in Belarus; (E) modification of the electoral code of Belarus in keeping with OSCE commitments; (F) engagement in genuine talks with the opposition in Belarus; and (G) modifications of the constitution of Belarus to allow for genuine authority for the parliament; and (7) commends the democratic opposition in Belarus for their commitment to freedom, their courage in the face of the repression of the Lukashenka regime, and the emergence of a pluralist civil society in Belarus--the foundation for the development of democratic political structures. SEC. 9. DEFINITION. In this Act, the term "appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (1) the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
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statement
Assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic
Wednesday, March 12, 2003Mr. Speaker, I rise today with a heavy heart to condemn in the strongest possible terms the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. As a Member of Congress, I express my condolences to the government of Serbia and Montenegro and to the family of the late Prime Minister. Mr. Djindjic was one of the driving forces behind the extradition of Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague for war crimes, and also favored increased political and economic cooperation with the West. Mr. Speaker, I think it is our responsibility to encourage the government of Serbia and Montenegro to hold all of those responsible for the assassination accountable and to continue their work for economic reform and full cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal, including the turning over of those indictees who still remain at large and cooperation on the witnesses and the information that is needed. Again, Mr. Speaker, we offer our condolences to the family.
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statement
In Memory of Zoran Djindjic
Wednesday, March 12, 2003Mr. Speaker, we learned today of the assassination in Belgrade of the Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic. This is a true tragedy, not only for family and friends of Mr. Djindjic but for all the people of Serbia and, indeed, for all who struggle for human rights and democratic development. Zoran Djindjic became a leader during difficult times in his country. He chose to stand in opposition to Slobodan Milosevic and his regime. That certainly was not the easiest course, and it took courage. Zoran Djindjic also had determination and, after repeated setbacks and obstacles, he played a key role in ousting Milosevic from power in 2000. He subsequently became, as Prime Minister of Serbia, a force for reform, recognizing that Serbia needed to cast off not only the yoke of Milosevic's rule but also Milosevic's legacy of nationalist hatred, organized crime, corruption and greed. Transferring Milosevic to The Hague in 2001 to face charges for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide perhaps best symbolized Djlndjic's continued courage and determination to conquer the sinister forces which seized his country. Zoran Djindjic was still battling resistance to reform in Serbia when his life was taken by the vicious act of cold-blooded assassins. These will undoubtedly be turbulent times for Belgrade, for Serbia, and for Montenegro which is just embarking on a new relationship with Serbia. This tragedy may have reverberations throughout the region, particularly in Bosnia and in Kosovo. It is my hope and prayer, Mr. Speaker, that the people of Serbia will respond to this crime with a loud and united cry: ``Enough is enough.'' In the past, they have seen the lives of journalist Slavko Curuvija and politician Ivan Stambolic snuffed out for their advocacy of a civilized Serbia, in which human rights and the rule of law are respected. Similarly Djindjic, too, was advocating such noble objectives. The very decent people of Serbia deserve a society which respects human rights and upholds the rule of law. That is what the leaders of Serbia must now provide without further hesitation or delay. I take heart in knowing that Djindjic had many colleagues who shared his vision of a reformed Serbia. My deepest condolences go to the family of Zoran Djindjic. I hope that the incredible grief they must now feel will be tempered by the pride they should feel in his accomplishments and service to his country.
Title
Helsinki Commission Efforts Reflected in Istanbul Charter
WASHINGTON - “As Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I am particularly pleased that the Istanbul Charter and Declaration approved by the 54 participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) today, includes a number of specific initiatives advanced by the Commission. They address trafficking in human beings, particularly women and children; corruption; eradication of torture; and protection of Roma. Members of the Commission had been fighting for advancements on these pressing issues for several years,” said Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ).
A 17-member U.S. delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in July in St. Petersburg, Russia, paved the way for these advances by building a wider and stronger consensus for them. The Istanbul Declaration suggests some progress on Chechnya, another issue to which the Commission has given priority. But questions remain whether Russia is really interested in finding a political solution.
With regard to Chechnya, Chairman Smith calls on Russia to “cease immediately and without precondition its use of massive and indiscriminate force against civilians. The use of such force has led to an enormous humanitarian tragedy, one that every day looks more comparable in humanitarian destruction to the terror that Serbian leader Milosevic unleashed on the civilians of Kosovo. Those in Chechnya responsible for the scores who have been kidnaped or unaccounted for should immediately release the victims and provide an accounting for all who are missing.”
“Although Russia made promises in Istanbul about seeking a political solution to the conflict in Chechnya and allowing the OSCE to play a role in this,” Smith continued. “Early post-Summit reports from Moscow suggest the sincerity of these pledges is already in doubt. According to press reports, senior figures in Moscow refer to President Yeltsin’s ‘rigid’ position in Istanbul and say ‘no new orders’ have been given. Russia should make a good faith effort to find a political solution, with assistance from the OSCE. Not to do so and to continue Moscow’s brutal attacks would condemn many thousands more innocent people to tragic consequences.”
“I was disappointed that the documents do not build on OSCE commitments in the field of religious liberty at a time when there is increasing intolerance toward minority faith communities in much of the OSCE region, including Western Europe,” Smith continued, “Similarly, I am disheartened at the failure of efforts to set a standard for the removal of criminal defamation from the law books of OSCE States. Such an effort was seen as unacceptable by several countries. But we will not retreat.”
Members of the Commission have been particularly active in supporting concrete steps to combat trafficking of human beings, the subject of a June 28 hearing. The U.S. Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in St. Petersburg, Russia, in July introduced an anti-trafficking initiative that was unanimously approved by the Assembly. The introduction of this issue into the Istanbul Charter and Declaration also has been received with broad approval, which will help spur serious efforts in the OSCE States to stop this modern form of slavery.
Commission Co-Chairman Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO) especially welcomed the high-level recognition of the problems posed by corruption in the OSCE region. “Corruption has implications well beyond the economic dimension, undermining the core OSCE values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Rampant corruption in many of the economies in transition pose a great threat to their ability to develop as democracies and create prosperous private market economies. These problems likewise afflict the United States and other advanced countries. Thus this issue is ripe for a much higher level of international attention. I would add that corruption has cost U.S. business firms billions of dollars in lost contracts abroad with direct implications for our economy here at home. The comprehensive nature and membership of the OSCE make it ideally suited to play a leading role in combating corruption in a region of vital interest to the United States," Campbell concluded.
Campbell served as Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the St. Petersburg Assembly and spearheaded calls for the OSCE to play an active role in combating corruption and organized crime. A Commission hearing in July on “Corruption and Bribery in the OSCE Region” highlighted the multidimensional aspects of the problem. The Commission has conducted hearings this year on the use of torture in countries of the OSCE, especially in Turkey, a NATO ally. Efforts by several Members of the Commission to stop the export of torture equipment by U.S. companies to Turkey's Government followed a 1998 congressional fact-finding mission to Turkey which included interaction with families of torture victims, and a March hearing.
In many OSCE participating States, safeguards—such as due process of law and independent judicial oversight of police and security forces—to prevent torture and prosecute and punish those responsible are weak or non-existent. Abuses of prisoners and detainees occur with alarming frequency throughout the NIS; arrest of those responsible is rare. Last year, Russia’s Human Rights Ombudsman reported that torture was widespread. In Uzbekistan, political activists and religious believers have been tortured in custody, to extract confessions. In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, oppositionists have been targets for similar abuse. In Central Europe and the former Yugoslavia, there have been many incidents of police brutality against Roma. Torture is widespread in Turkey, but Ankara's recently stated policy of zero tolerance and their plans for additional legal reforms and human rights education are welcomed.
Some 400,000 victims of torture worldwide have made their way to the United States, recognized as a global leader in supporting the rehabilitation of victims of torture. The November 19 Charter for European Security includes a clear commitment of OSCE states to eradicate torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. The Heads of State have further pledged to promote legislation to provide safeguards and legal remedies to combat torture and assist victims.
Members of the Commission hoped to expand the language to further protect minority religious believers, many of whom are currently under legal attack in a number of the OSCE States. Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestants, for example, are having a difficult time in much of the former Soviet Union and in countries like France and Austria in obtaining legal standing in the courts, and in buying property. The bulldozing of the only Seventh Day Adventist church in Turkmenistan last weekend is a shocking reminder of the frightening threats to religious freedom in some areas of the OSCE region.
Summit leaders acknowledged that Roma are subjected to violence and discrimination, as well as other manifestations of racism. There is no clearer manifestation of the racism Roma face than the wall recently erected in the Czech city of Usti nad Labem. The United States has commended the Czech Government and Parliament for opposing the wall, which is incompatible with a democratic society. This wall deserves the same fate as the Berlin wall, and now. A number of countries have no comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, and Roma have often faced unremedied discrimination in the workplace, housing, education, the military, and public places. Therefore, in addition to acknowledging the violence and discrimination Roma face, the November 19 Declaration calls for the adoption of anti-discrimination legislation to promote respect for the rights of Roma.
The Commission will actively work to build on the progress at the Summit to add impulse and content to the work of the OSCE on the issues of on trafficking, corruption, torture, and Roma. The Commission will also make stronger efforts to develop more support among OSCE states for expanding protections to minority religions and faiths, and bringing an end to the infamous criminal defamation laws that, in some countries, are used to squelch voices of freedom. Members of the Commission do not underestimate the exertions required to achieve these goals. In this regard it especially looks forward to close cooperation with NGOs and other OSCE states that shared the Commission’s priorities.