Title

Hastings and Wicker Condemn Recent Arrest of Ivan Golunov

Monday, June 10, 2019

WASHINGTON—Following the recent arrest of investigative journalist Ivan Golunov by Russian authorities, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Alcee L. Hastings (FL-20) and Co-Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker (MS) issued the following statement:

“Journalism remains a dangerous profession in Russia, especially for reporters like Ivan Golunov who investigate corruption at the highest levels of government. His arrest proves once more that Russian authorities don’t simply fail to protect investigative journalists; they actively seek to muzzle them by alleging criminal behavior and even resorting to brute physical force.”

Golunov, of the Latvia-based Russian news outlet Meduza, was arrested on drug charges on June 6 in Moscow—a common tactic used by Russian authorities to target journalists and dissidents.  In the hours after his arrest, he was denied numerous rights enshrined in Russian statutes, including a phone call to friends and family, an attorney, and a meal.  He also allegedly was beaten while in custody, and faces up to 20 years in prison.

According to the 2019 World Press Freedom Index, Russia ranks 149 out of 180 countries in media freedom based on an evaluation of pluralism, independence of the media, quality of the legislative framework, and safety of journalists.

Media contact: 
Name: 
Stacy Hope
Email: 
csce[dot]press[at]mail[dot]house[dot]gov
Phone: 
202.225.1901
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From our point of view, this runs somewhat counter to the assumption that the post-communist generation would yearn for still greater freedom and be less pugnacious. It is necessary that we find a way to come to grips with these divergent views of the recent past as we look to the future. So it’s understandable that today, Russians proudly proclaim that “Russia is back.” This is certainly true, and in no small measure due to high energy prices. Nor is it surprising that a great country with vast human and material resources should rebound from even the disruptions of the last 20 years. What troubles me and many others is what kind of Russia has returned to a leading role on the world stage. Russian officials maintain that their democracy is developing in its own way and in accordance with its own traditions. They accuse the United States of unilateralism in foreign affairs and of seeking to impose the American form of democratic governance on Russia and the rest of the world and hypocritically meddling in the affairs of others. To be sure, our attempts to spread the undeniable benefits of the American experience have not always been distinguished by cultural sensitivity. But I get nervous when I hear the phrase “according to our own traditions and national mentality.” No rational person expects Ivan Ivanov to be a carbon copy of John Johnson. However, there are certain basic shared assumptions about what democratic governance entails: freedom of religion; freedom of speech; freedom of assembly; rule of law; a reasonable distribution of power between the branches of government; an independent judiciary; etc. I would also note that reference to one’s “traditions” as a method of denying rights to others is not solely a Russian phenomenon. 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There is a long list of such crimes, which have largely gone unsolved. Obviously, the Fourth Estate is being told to shut its mouth, if it wants to keep its head. Furthermore, I am troubled by the government’s attempts to rein in civil society, at least those elements that the Kremlin views as threatening. Many of you may have read about the judge who recently fined members of a local human rights group for meeting in a school with foreign visitors without notifying the authorities – a mentality that smacks frighteningly of the Soviet era. Russian officials often get irritated when they hear the terms “managed democracy” or “sham democracy.” But I see in Russia a system that attempts to carefully control politics, in which the public has been removed from the political process while the state’s well-connected individuals have taken charge of the country’s most profitable giant companies. And it is hard for me to see how or when this system will open up again. One way the system could open up is through legitimate presidential elections in 2008, when President Putin is expected to retire. But to judge by the current difficulties reported by “outsiders” testing the waters in Russia, there is no reason to expect that opposition candidates can count on an equal playing field. The rise of “illiberal democracy” at home is also reflected in Russia’s behavior abroad. For example, Moscow’s unrelenting pressure on Georgia and Moldova has tarnished Russia’s reputation as a conscientious upholder of international law. Especially worrying for Europe are possible interruptions in oil and gas supplies, as has happened during Russia’s disputes with its neighbors. Not surprisingly, Washington and other capitals – even Minsk – are wondering whether Russia can be a reliable supplier of the energy on which our economies depend. Of course, Russia should be able to enjoy the benefits of its energy resources, which account for fully one-quarter of its GDP. But what will benefit Russia, as well as transit and consumer countries, would be more transparency and predictability in energy supply. Think of Russia moving toward a Canadian or Norwegian model instead of an OPEC model. This would entail the promotion of free-market policies in the energy sector. It would mean the protection of property rights, which ensure fair competition, backed up by a commitment to the rule of law that give these rights some meaning. Such transparency and predictability will help ensure that Russia can rationally exploit its resources and that consuming countries can sleep easy – and warm – at night. And Russia’s leaders must understand that other states have become hypersensitive to the possibility that the Kremlin will exploit its control of hydrocarbons for political gain and draw the appropriate conclusions. Yet I often wonder if they do. Sometimes it seems that oil has simply gone to people’s heads in Moscow. As a senior member of the Intelligence Committee, I am well aware of the gravity of the terrorist threat facing this country as well as Russia. I understand the need for us to work together to confront this danger to the whole world. But the legitimate struggle against terrorism cannot be an excuse for gross violations of international humanitarian law and norms – Chechnya comes to mind in this context. Before moving on to Central Asia, I would just emphasize my sincere belief that we best advance our interests with Russia in an atmosphere of mutual respect and not of mutual recrimination. Knee-jerk Russia bashing may be emotionally satisfying for some and may help bolster budgets for others, but it does little to promote our goals and, in fact, closes many doors for dialogue and understanding. On the other hand, being best friends should not be the measure of successful bilateral relations. We need to focus our efforts more on bolstering Russia’s nascent democratic institutions rather than on the rapidly changing faces of the Russian elite. I would also add that I support granting Permanent Normal Trade Relations to Russia. Russia has complied with our law. We spend millions of dollars promoting rule of law abroad, but we seem unable or too preoccupied to comply with our own legislation and retire this Cold War relic. Let me now turn to Central Asia. Over the last 15 years, we have seen the rise of the familiar “super-president,” the controlled parliament, the supine judiciary and the media under pressure, while the families and cronies of rulers prosper. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, no political opposition has been permitted. Turkmenistan – which is still a one-party state today – has been one of the most repressive countries in the world, virtually a post-Soviet North Korea, with a similar cult of personality. In Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, opposition is tolerated but tightly controlled; there is very little opposition representation in their parliaments. Only Kyrgyzstan has bucked the Central Asian trend to some degree. Former President Akaev did not control the political arena as his counterparts did and civil society was much stronger than elsewhere in the region. So it was not surprising that if an opposition-led protest movement in the region had any chance of toppling a government, it would be in Kyrgyzstan. All this was true even before the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia. But that historic event, followed by Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and the March 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, upset the rulers of most former Soviet states. Central Asian leaders, especially Uzbekistan’s President Karimov, have moved to preempt similar uprisings in their countries by undercutting opposition activists, NGOs – including foreign ones, like Freedom House and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty – and human rights groups. In this campaign they have received backing from Moscow, which has warned of sinister U.S. plots of regime change. Indeed, Moscow unfortunately seems to see democratization as a key weapon in a zero-sum competition for influence with the United States. Russia viewed the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan not only as unwelcome achievements of democracy but as a new, historic Western “incursion” into its own sphere of influence. Its apparent strategy is to build alliances with repressive rulers, while dismissing Western disapproval of their authoritarianism as geo-politically motivated. In fact, an anti-revolutionary alliance of states has emerged, embracing most post-Soviet republics and China as well. And these efforts have borne fruit – since Kyrgyzstan, the wave has receded, at least for now. This situation puts U.S. policymakers in a tough spot. Even before September 11, Washington had struggled to find ways to move Central Asian rulers towards more political openness. But they had already concluded that even if relations with the Americans were not very close, the U.S. interest in security, energy and providing a strategic alternative to Russia meant that Washington might criticize flawed elections or human rights problems but would not level serious sanctions or cut off ties. After September 11, the countries of Central Asia saw the opportunity for closer relations with the United States, which was happy to accommodate them in the name of fighting terrorism. An agreement on strategic cooperation was struck with Uzbekistan. We opened military bases there and in Kyrgyzstan. The Tajiks and even Turkmenistan cooperated in overflights and assistance corridors to Afghanistan. Today, economic concerns have come to equal security priorities: with the price of a barrel of oil down to about $60 from a high in the mid-70s and Kazakhstan’s oil and Turkmenistan’s gas beckoning, how do we influence Central Asia’s leaders to liberalize their political systems? It doesn’t look like they want to and they seem to think they don’t have to. There are no easy answers to this question. Obviously, we cannot compel them to democratize or observe their human rights commitments. We have 150,000 troops in Iraq but we can’t ensure basic order, much less build a democratic state there at this time. Even in the 1990s, when Russia was much weaker and poorer than it is today, our leverage was limited. Today, I have the sense that our criticism has the opposite effect on Russian officials. The countries of Central Asia don’t have issues of superpower rivalry with the United States, and they do want to have good relations with us, which facilitates dialogue with them about democratization and human rights. Still, those in power want to remain there – it is their highest priority and they will resist systemic reforms that could threaten their position. You might infer from this overview that I am a pessimist. Not at all. No black man who grew up during the halcyon days of the segregated south and became a judge and then a Congressman while a black woman from the segregated south is Secretary of State can be a pessimist. But I have become more realistic and pragmatic. Let me share with you some conclusions I have drawn. First, democratic transformations take much longer than we would like. The experience of the former Soviet Union proves that the collapse of communism is necessary but not sufficient. We should understand we are in this for the long haul. Second, repressive leaders often maintain that their people are not ready for democracy. I think, however, that publics are much more ready than governments. People in Russia and Central Asia, who have experienced or witnessed enough disruption for several lifetimes, understandably value stability and predictability. But that does not mean they do not want the basic gifts of democracy and human rights. Everyone wants a say in his or her own government and to be treated with respect. When circumstances permit, those desires, I believe, will come to the fore. Third, we in the West saw the so-called color revolutions as a glorious exercise in popular sovereignty, as people peacefully went to the streets to oust corrupt, unresponsive regimes. But we sometimes forget that revolutions are evidence of failed politics. They reflect a crisis in the relations between state and society when people have no satisfactory methods of influencing policy or seeking redress of grievances, such as recourse to the courts for the impartial administration of justice. So while I welcome the Rose, Orange, and Tulip revolutions, I regret their necessity. Slow, steady progress towards democratic governance would be better for all concerned. It is this goal we should work for, through the building of institutions that promote the rule of law and civil society. Fourth, in the absence of established institutions, the ruler’s character remains critical in such highly personalized political systems. It was clear, for example, that while President Niyazov lived, there was no chance of reform in Turkmenistan. The notion may not be popular among some scholars today, but his long reign clearly demonstrates the power of individuals to shape history, certainly for ill and I hope, for good. Fifth, succession can spark unexpected events and accelerate or slow down institution-building. I suspect the death of President Niyazov in December has got the other Central Asian leaders thinking. They are not young men and they have some serious inheritance issues to consider. Nowhere has there been established any tested method for peacefully transferring power at the top. In Kyrgyzstan, a head of state has been removed, but presidential succession has come to be associated with street politics as much as constitutional requirements. In the other countries…well, we will have to see. But barring dramatic headlines, the first important such decision will come in Uzbekistan. President Karimov’s term runs out this year. He will have to decide whether to step down or resort to some ploy to remain in office. I believe that if he chooses the latter course, he will damage his reputation still further and make instability more likely. Whatever happens, however, I strongly believe that all of Central Asia will be watching how President Putin handles his own succession problem. If he steps down, some may be more inclined to follow his example. Sixth, we must not turn our backs on the region and its people. I know Uzbekistan is a repressive state and I share the widespread revulsion at the slaughter in Andijon, but does it help us not to be engaged with President Karimov? Have we gained anything by these frozen relations – quite apart from the loss of our base at K-2, has democracy advanced in Uzbekistan while we criticize him from afar? At the same time, Tashkent must understand we cannot turn a blind eye to atrocities. I have supported the European Union’s serious effort to restore ties with Uzbekistan based on human rights progress, but I would welcome a good faith gesture from Tashkent. For example, Umida Niyazova, a human rights activist who used to work for Freedom House and Human Rights Watch, is in jail. I call on President Karimov to release her immediately. As for Turkmenistan, President Niyazov’s death offers no guarantees of liberalization. But at least there is reason now to hope for a more rational leadership that will focus on the public good, not the president’s ego. I see mixed messages coming out of Ashgabat. On the one hand, the new president has pledged to broaden internet access and has restored the tenth grade and physical education to the school curriculum. That doesn’t sound like much but when you start from such a low base, it can seem like a huge improvement. I expect that gradually, the more bizarre aspects of President Niyazov’s misrule will disappear. But I hope to see much more – the release of people jailed on political grounds and the beginnings of political pluralism. I expect to travel to Ashgabat to discuss with the new Turkmen leaders the prospects for systemic democratization. We need to engage with them in a process of consultation and give and take. Let me conclude by mentioning a few things we should not do, starting with not shooting ourselves in the foot. I have in mind the Voice of America. As many of you probably know, the American Administration has called for major cuts in VOA broadcasting, including closing down the Uzbek and Georgian Services and ending radio programs while retaining television transmission in Russian and Ukrainian. This, ladies and gentlemen, seems to me to be the height of folly. As I have argued here, the democratic transition in the former Soviet Union is far from secure. VOA broadcasts are one of the most effective, biggest-bang-for-the-buck tools in our arsenal to propagate democratic ideals. And in this connection, I want to associate myself with remarks made on Thursday by my good friend Tom Lantos, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in a hearing on U.S. assistance. Like him, I simply cannot comprehend why we should now cut our funding for democracy promotion – especially to the tune of 40 percent. He called for more aid to NGOs that try, under ever worsening conditions, to promote freedom in Russia. I am in full solidarity with him and together with likeminded Members of Congress, we hope to roll back the VOA cuts and increase assistance for democracy promotion. The same applies to funding for the OSCE, which the budgeters also want to slash. Please be assured that I will fight this. Paula, I’ve gone on for quite some time. I hope I haven’t overstayed my welcome. Thank you once again for inviting me. Let me end here and I look forward to hearing from the other speakers.

  • Human Rights Abuses in Turkmenistan

    Mr. Speaker, as Co-Chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission and Vice Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, today I introduce this resolution on systemic human rights violations in Turkmenistan. Freedom House recently ranked Turkmenistan as one of the most repressive countries in the world. Along with cosponsors Representative Joseph R. Pitts and Representative Mike McIntyre, we seek to put the Government of Turkmenistan on notice that these policies must change and that the Congress expects improvements in human rights observance and democratization. The human rights situation in Turkmenistan remains abysmal. According to the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “Turkmenistan is an authoritarian state dominated by president-for-life Saparmurat Niyazov. . . . The government continued to commit serious abuses and its human rights record remained extremely poor.” Turkmenistan is a one-party state with all three branches of government controlled by President Niyazov, who was made “president-for-life'' by the rubber-stamp People's Council in 2003. No opposition is allowed and the state promotes a cult of personality around President Niyazov, the self-proclaimed “Turkmenbashi”--the father of all Turkmen. His likeness is on every public building and the currency. Authorities require that his self-styled spiritual guidebook, the Rukhnama, be taught in all schools and places of work. There are consistent reports of security officials physically abusing, torturing and forcing confessions from individuals involved in political opposition or human rights advocacy. The regime also continues the dreadful Soviet practice of using psychiatric hospitals to jail dissidents. In August, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent Ogulsapar Muradova and two Turkmenistan Helsinki Foundation members were sentenced to 6 and 7 years of imprisonment, respectively, for their involvement in a documentary about Turkmenistan. Sadly, Muradova died while in custody just three weeks later. The resolution therefore urges President Niyazov to, among other things, conduct a thorough investigation into the death of Muradova, free all political/religious prisoners, provide ICRC access to all Turkmen prisons, and allow peaceful political opposition parties to operate freely. The resolution also lays out recommended steps for U.S. action, should the government not improve respect for democratization, freedom of movement, human rights and religious freedoms. The abuses don't end with repressive actions against dissidents and reporters. Niyazov is also reportedly diverting billions of dollars of state funds into his personal off-shore accounts. The “father of all Turkmen” is pillaging his country and jeopardizing the future of its citizens. Consequently, the resolution urges the Government of Turkmenistan to “end the diversion of state funds into President Niyazov's personal offshore accounts, and adopt international best practices as laid forth by the International Monetary Fund regarding the disclosure and management of oil and gas revenues.'' In addition, the resolution urges the U.S. Government to encourage companies dealing in Turkmen gas to increase transparency, and to encourage the European Union and other countries not to enter into trade agreements with Turkmenistan until the “government demonstrates a commitment to implementing basic norms of fiscal transparency.” To further demonstrate the level of Congressional concern regarding the misappropriation of state resources, the resolution recommends the U.S. Government issue “a report on the personal assets and wealth of President Niyazov." In closing, Mr. Speaker, the purpose of this resolution is to bring to the attention of the Congress and the world the appalling human rights record of the Government of Turkmenistan. The resolution is timely, as the European Parliament will soon consider an enhanced trade relationship with Turkmenistan. I hope this resolution will be a catalyst for change and that President Niyazov will initiate serious and far-reaching reforms.

  • Protecting Children: The Battle Against Child Pornography and Other Forms of Sexual Exploitation

    This hearing discussed the proliferation of child pornography and other crimes against children through trafficking, prostitution, and sex tourism. Annually, thousands of American children, at least half of which are boys, have been the victims of pornography and many subjected to violence in the process. Often, those guilty of such crimes have been parents, relatives, or acquaintances of these victims. Victims of pornography have been disproportionately affected by depression and suicide and such victims have committed these crimes themselves, perpetuating this cycle.  Global criminal networks that profit from this activity have developed.   In the 1990s, the Commission began efforts to fight child pornography, and in the second half of the 1990s the Trafficking Victims Protection Act was passed. This strengthened the case more comprehensive actions against child pornography and other forms of sexual exploitation.

  • Freedom of the Media Revisited at Vienna Meeting; Ethics Codes Discussed

    By Chadwick R. Gore, Staff Advisor The Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Freedom of the Media: Protection of Journalists and Access to Information was held July 13 and 14 in Vienna, Austria. The meeting was sponsored by OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Miklós Haraszti and supported by the Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Ambassador Christian Strohal. An estimated 82 delegates from participating States and 102 representatives of civil society participated. The attendees discussed concerns about government restrictions on access to government information, codes of conduct for media professionals, and threats to the safety of journalists. Haraszti and Strohal initially focused on current government-imposed restrictions on access to government information and the effect of such limits on the public. Specific concern was voiced about recent increases in the use of old laws to impose punitive damages on journalists who publish leaked information.  It is worth noting that for years government officials from participating States with such “dormant” speech laws have argued that concerns about provisions remaining on the books were unnecessary since these laws were never used. Now many of these laws are being applied, resulting in numerous cases of administrative harassment of the media in numerous participating States in violation of OSCE commitments. Citing violations of commitments guaranteeing the freedoms of access to information, assembly and association, as well as onerous NGO registration requirements that impair democracy and security, Haraszti cited Belarusian customs officials taking one month to clear a carload of OSCE publications for entry into Belarus. In her keynote, Agnes Callamard, Executive Director of Article XIX, contrasted the two main justifications for restricting access to information usually given by States: national security concerns and blocking hate speech. She argued “restriction of freedom of expression or access to information in the name of national security is an extremely short-sighted view—in fact, denial of information is far more likely to result in social tensions and conflicts.”  In short, she dismissed legitimate national security needs, going so far as to advocate that anyone who disclosed classified information should benefit from a public interest defense even if disclosure of the information would cause harm. Callamard then went on to discuss hate speech, reflecting on the environment surrounding the Danish cartoon controversy. She argued that these concerns reflected “insecurity” across and between societies, describing the background to the cartoon events as one of global insecurity: terrorism and the war on terror, the war in Iraq, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and images of Western soldiers on Iraqi soil, Israeli tanks in Palestinian cities, escalation of intolerance and discrimination, etc. Some attendees were amazed at her failure to recognize the attacks of 9/11, terrorist beheadings on TV, the bombings in Madrid, London and Bali, the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, and more.  Her presentation was a thinly-veiled anti-United States, anti-Israel commentary. Turning to hate speech more broadly, Callamard argued that hate speech regulations constitute a legitimate and potentially necessary restriction to freedom of expression. Yet, she said, the appropriate answer to hate speech is not more speech, but also policies and action which “tackles the causes of inequality in all its forms.”  She recommended that an effective government response to such expression that “vilifies” others requires a sustained commitment on the part of governments to promote equality of opportunity, to protect and promote linguistic, ethnic, cultural and religious rights, and to implement public education programs about tolerance and pluralism. Many were struck by her conclusion that proscribing speech for national security concerns is not justifiable, while regulation of so-called hate speech is both justifiable and necessary for massive social engineering. While discussing access to government information, the discussion turned to the right of the media to protect news sources. Speakers noted that, while nearly all participating States have such laws, they vary as to the type and extent of protection accorded to journalists. While most agreed that laws providing for strong protection of sources are necessary to ensure freedom of information, many thought journalists should not be allowed to publish whatever they want; they remain liable, legally and ethically, for what they write.  Regarding access to information, the application of laws restricting access to information has proven to be very controversial. Predictably most States praised their own systems. Notably, Russia reflected a very positive review of the situation of the media and journalists in Russia, and offered Russia's “civilized development of the market” as a model for others. This was rather odd given the decline of independent media and the expansion of government control in the Russian Federation. A highlight of the meeting was a session dedicated to the “cartoon crisis.”  Jehad Momani, former Editor-in-Chief of the Jordanian newspaper Shihan, argued the cartoons were “used in several ways in different countries to gain political points” without regard for the possible consequences as he believed publication of the cartoons was a violation of the freedom of expression and an attack on others’ rights.  He argued that others stand up “against any offensive expression in writ[ing] or in [pictures] or in any way against any religion or faith.” For this reason, Momani sharply criticized the terrorists who tortured and killed a journalist from Al Arabia TV, saying that the murder “offended us as human beings more than any illustrations or statements.” Momani’s view was supported by Ambassador Orhun, the Chair-in-Office’s Personal Representative on Discrimination against Muslims. Orhun saw the cartoons as part of a larger problem of “overly selective, one-sided, simplistic and clichéd” reporting on Muslims in the West. He emphasized the need for increased restrictions to freedom of expression, stressing that you cannot have freedom without responsibility.  These restrictions should, however, be self-imposed by the media itself: “self-regulatory ethical systems should be established, or if they exist, should be strengthened.” This view was not shared by the U.S. Delegation and others. However, most other speakers pointed to the impossibility of legislating tolerance. Patrick Chappatte, cartoonist for the International Herald Tribune, observed that, to the contrary, there is no responsibility without freedom. He argued we must first ensure freedom of the press while encouraging responsible use of that freedom. As to voluntary professional standards, Johann Fritz, Director of the International Press Institute, noted that there have been numerous initiatives over the past 50 years by international, governmental and media organizations to regulate press ethics, all of which were unworkable in practice. This is why many media outlets have chosen to elaborate regional or sectoral professional standards.  However, he cautioned that self-regulation must be decided upon by the media itself.  In several countries around the world, media councils are veiled legal bodies limiting the freedom of the press in a way which the state cannot do or does not want to do. Ali Dilem, cartoonist for the Algerian daily Liberté, presented a lengthy animated program that showed what can be published and is controlled.  He also demonstrated a few instances where he voluntarily withheld publication of cartoons which he felt would cause either political unrest or offend the public. This was much more than a set speech and such presentations will hopefully be more frequent in the future. The application of administrative measures such as excessive licensing or registration procedures to control the press was discussed at length. Ioana Avadani, Executive Director of the Centre for Independent Journalism in Bucharest, pointed out that while most countries have adequate media legislation, implementation is lagging or is often applied in a discriminatory manner. She cited the case of Turkey, which uses a law which forbids “insulting the Turkish identity” to silence certain opinions.  Azer Hasret, Director of the Central Asian and Southern Caucasian Freedom of Expression Network, made a presentation on violations of freedom of the media, including administrative measures and physical repression, in the countries covered by his network. There was a lively exchange between a representative of the Kazakh newspaper Respublika and an official from the Kazakh Ministry of Culture and Information.  The individual from Respublika painted a bleak picture of the media situation in Kazakhstan, asserting serious and sustained administrative harassment; the official denied the accusations, claiming that the new media law does not impinge on media freedom in any way. Belgian Ambassador de Crombrugghe commented that media form an important link between civil society and government; therefore it is even more important that they act responsibly.  In the view of the Belgian Chairmanship, voluntary professional standards can promote increased professionalism, accuracy and adherence to ethical standards among journalists, without in any way endangering the freedom of expression and opinion. De Crombrugghe also highlighted the importance of media development initiatives and noted that the Belgians will begin consultations on possible OSCE initiatives in this area.   During the closing session, the United States delegation forewarned the participating States about the potential loss of liberty when rushing to regulate speech in an environment of trying not to offend others, such as the period immediately following the publication of the Danish cartoons.  It was emphasized that such lost liberties are difficult to regain.

  • The Second Anniversary of the Beslan Massacre

    Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my sympathy over the terrible tragedy that took place just over two years ago in the southern Russian city of Beslan. This nightmare began on September 1, 2004, the first day of school when over 1000 students, parents, and teachers were forced by terrorists at gunpoint into a gymnasium rigged with explosives. These young students and others were held hostage for three days without access to food or water while the sick and wounded were denied access to medical treatment. In the end, nearly 400 people lost their lives, including 186 children, and over 700 people were wounded in the savage and senseless acts of violence that occurred in Beslan. Words alone cannot adequately convey the heartache and sorrow over this barbaric act of terrorism. Having an entire Russian school taken hostage by terrorists was shocking. As the world watched, hoping against hope that this would somehow be resolved peacefully, it was horrible to learn on September 3rd that there had been massive loss of innocent lives in the early afternoon of that day.  Mr. Speaker, we continue to grieve for those children and their families and join with other Americans in solidarity with the Russian people on this somber second anniversary of the Beslan massacre.  As Americans we know what it is like to watch--helplessly and in horror--as merciless acts of terrorism are committed against innocent people. We will never forget the tremendous outpouring of sympathy from the people of Russia following the tragic events of September 11, 2001. This support was much appreciated by our wounded nation and helped us through the dark days in the immediate aftermath of the senseless violence of that fateful day. As both our nations mourn the losses of September 3rd and September 11th, let us find hope in the countless stories of humanitarian acts that surrounded those horrible events. Colleagues, let us remember the heroism of our first responders, the valor of our troops, and the generosity of our communities in their collective response to these tragedies. May the God of mercy grant His peace to all those who continue to suffer from the violence of those tragic days.

  • President Niyazov Intensifies Repression in Turkmenistan

    Mr. Speaker, as Co-Chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, I want to bring to the attention of the Congress a number of alarming arrests recently made by the Government of Turkmenistan.  Last month between June 16-18, three human rights defenders were detained by Turkmen security forces and have been held for over a month. Considering Turkmenistan’s abysmal human rights record, I greatly fear for their safety as they are certainly at risk of torture.  Amankurban Amanklychev, Ogulsapar Muradova, and Sapardurdy Khajiev are affiliated with the Turkmenistan Helsinki Foundation, a non-governmental organization that monitors human rights in Turkmenistan.  In addition, Ms. Muradova has served as a journalist for Radio Liberty, a private communications service funded by the Congress through the Broadcasting Board of Governors.  Apparently Turkmen authorities arrested these three individuals because of their connection to a documentary about President Saparmurat Niyazov’s cult of personality and their use of hidden video equipment in making this film.  The three now face the trumped-up charges of illegal weapons possession and allegations of “espionage.” Given the absence of any media or speech freedoms in Turkmenistan, the government’s allegations are simply not credible, and the detentions are unjustifiable.  Human rights organizations report that the detainees are being abused.  Most troubling are allegations of psychotropic drugs being administered to Amanklychev and Muradova in an effort to force their confession to “subversive activities.”  The reports concerning psychotropic drugs are quite believable, as Turkmenistan is known to use these drugs in psychiatric hospitals to punish individuals.  In April, 54 members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives wrote to President Niyazov, urging the unconditional release of a prisoner of conscience held in a psychiatric hospital.  While that individual was released, soon thereafter Congress learned of an almost identical case: 69-year-old Kakabay Tedzhenov.  He has been held in incommunicado detention in a psychiatric hospital since January 2006 for peacefully protesting government policies. Considering that just three months ago a significant number of Senators and Members of the House wrote President Niyazov about this barbaric practice, I am particularly disappointed that the Turkmen President continues to allow the misuse of psychiatric institutions as prisons for political dissidents and that Mr. Tedzhenov remains jailed. With Ms. Muradova’s ties to Radio Liberty and the Congress, as well as the letter from 54 Members of Congress to Niyazov regarding the use of psychiatric hospitals, the continuation of these inexcusable actions will affect the relations between Turkmenistan and the U.S. Congress. Mr. Speaker, I am urging President Niyazov to ensure the immediate and unconditional release of Amankurban Amanklychev, Ogulsapar Muradova, and Sapardurdy Khajiev, as well as Kakabay Tedzhenov.

  • Kazakhstan's Candidacy for OSCE Chairmanship

    Mr. Speaker, next week, Kassymzhomart Tokaev, the Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, will be visiting Washington. Given Kazakhstan's growing strategic and economic significance, his agenda with U.S. Government officials and Congress is likely to be broad-ranging. But a key focus of Minister Tokaev's discussions will certainly be Kazakhstan's bid to serve in 2009 as Chair-in-Office of the 56-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Kazakhstan has been avidly pursuing this prestigious leadership post since 2003. The consensus decision must be made by this fall, in time for the December OSCE Ministerial Meeting. While I support the idea of Central Asian leadership of the OSCE, my purpose today is to point out the very serious problems with Kazakhstan's candidacy. As many of my colleagues on the Helsinki Commission have concluded, awarding Kazakhstan the political leadership of OSCE in 2009 would be unwarranted and potentially dangerous for the Organization. President Nursultan Nazarbaev, in his opening statement at a recent OSCE meeting in Almaty, even admitted: "We do not...have established democratic principles." Therefore, allowing Kazakhstan to assume the chairmanship by default is not acceptable. Kazakhstan's chairmanship bid must be deferred until the country substantially implements its OSCE commitments, especially those on human rights and democratization. Defenders of Kazakhstan's candidacy have pointed to the country's economic reforms and relative freedom, compared to the rest of Central Asia. I concur that Kazakhstan is far ahead of the police states of Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan. But that is no great achievement. Surpassing the worst of the worst does not confer an automatic right to hold the chairmanship of the OSCE which is dedicated to upholding human rights and promoting democracy. It has long been the State Department's position "that any Chair of the OSCE must be in substantial compliance with all OSCE commitments." Over several years now, high-level U.S. Government officials have provided Nazarbaev and other Kazakh officials clear, concrete indicators of the progress necessary before serious consideration could be given to U.S. support for Kazakhstan's Chair-in-Office bid. Yet long-promised political reforms in Kazakhstan have not materialized and the human rights climate remains poor, as documented in the State Department's annual reports. Kazakhstan's oil riches, strategic location and cooperation with the United States in antiterrorism programs cannot conceal the fact that the country remains an authoritarian state. President Nazarbaev has manipulated constitutional referendums and falsified elections to stay in power, while his relatives and friends have gained monopoly positions in the most profitable sectors of the economy. Independent and opposition media have been consistently harassed and pressured, and opposition politicians have been excluded from elections, or worse. Such was the state of affairs before last December's presidential election, which was widely seen as a "make-or-break" moment for Kazakhstan. Unfortunately, the government failed to uphold its international commitments before, during and following the election. Despite repeated pledges from Nazarbaev to hold a free and fair contest, the OSCE observation mission stated the election "did not meet a number of OSCE commitments" due to "restrictions on campaigning, harassment of campaign staff and persistent and numerous cases of intimidation by the authorities" which "limited the possibility for a meaningful competition." The election was a serious blow to Kazakhstan's chances to chair the OSCE. The recent establishment of the State Commission on the Development and Realization of the Programme of Political Reforms comes after the major elections, too late to have any definitive liberalizing effects. In addition, a string of events has accentuated the disturbing gap between OSCE commitments and Kazakhstan's implementation. Last November, opposition politician and former Mayor of Almaty Zamanbek Nurkadilov was found dead in his home. According to Kazakh authorities, he shot himself three times, twice in the chest and once in the head. The official version of his death is, kindly put, implausible in the extreme. In February, opposition politician Altynbek Sarsenbaev, along with his driver and unarmed bodyguard, was shot in an apple orchard outside Almaty. The official investigation has placed the blame for this brazen crime on Erzhan Utembaev, head of the administration of the Senate, who allegedly engaged the services of some security officers. It is fair to say that this explanation for Sarsenbaev's death has failed to satisfy many observers. What is indisputable, however, is that anyone involved in opposition politics in Kazakhstan risks, in the worst case scenario, not merely electoral defeat but murder. Furthermore, Kazakh officials have backed Russian plans to eviscerate the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which, among other important democracy promoting activities, undertakes the OSCE's election observation missions. This would pose a grave threat to the OSCE as an institution and as the most credible election monitoring organization in the world. Recent statements and actions by local Kazakh authorities against a Hare Krishna community outside of Almaty and actions to penalize minority religious communities for unregistered religious practice run counter to OSCE norms and Kazakhstan's stated commitment to inter-religious tolerance. On March 20, President Nazarbaev praised Uzbek President Islam Karimov's handling of unrest in Andijon in May 2005. Praise for the Andijon massacre that left hundreds dead in Uzbekistan, and which moved the OSCE, the U.S. Government and international organizations to call for an independent, impartial investigation, are hardly the "reforms" one expects of a country that hopes to chair the OSCE. The forced repatriation of Uzbek refugees to Uzbekistan was equally alarming. Just today, Kazakhstan's upper house passed a highly restrictive media law that has been criticized by the OSCE's Representative on the Media and the U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan. It is hoped that President Nazarbaev will not sign this problematic bill into law. Mr. Speaker, in light of these circumstances, Kazakhstan's bid to chair the OSCE in 2009 cannot be supported. I strongly believe that backing Kazakhstan's candidacy would cause more difficulties than will result from Astana's disappointment over not winning this prize. None of this means that we should not strive to develop the best possible relations with Kazakhstan, on a mutually beneficial basis. There are many areas of current and potential cooperation between our countries, including Kazakhstan's entry into the WTO, energy, military security and anti-terrorism. Nor does my inability to support Kazakhstan's candidacy for the OSCE Chairmanship in 2009 mean that I do not hope to be able to back a future bid. Nothing would please me more than to report to this Chamber that Kazakhstan has met its commitments on democratization and human rights and richly deserves to lead the OSCE. A Kazakh chairmanship would also move the Organization eastward in the symbolic sense, bridging what has become an uncomfortable gap between the former Soviet republics and Europe. But that moment has not yet come, Mr. Speaker. I would encourage the Kazakh leaders to avail themselves of the opportunity of additional time to constructively engage the OSCE. Working to ensure that the Organization succeeds would aid Kazakhstan's bid for a future chairmanship, while expressing sour grapes over a denial can only add to the impression that Kazakhstan is not ready for a leadership role. The OSCE Chairmanship represents acknowledgement of progress already made, not a stimulus to future, unproven progress. Urging the Kazakhs to defer their bid would leave the door open for Astana, should demonstrable reforms on human rights and democratization be forthcoming. That progress was promised by President Nazarbaev, when he signed the Helsinki Accords as his country joined the OSCE in 1992.

  • Belgium’s Chairmanship of the OSCE

    The Belgian Government assumed Chairmanship of the OSCE in January 2006.  The first half of 2006 saw a number of developments within, and adjacent to, the OSCE region that formed the focus of the hearing.  Among the issues addressed were developments in Central Asia and neighboring Afghanistan, the emergence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the political situation in the Caucasus, and human rights trends in the Russian Federation.  Commissioners also focused on OSCE democracy-promotion work, with a special emphasis on election monitoring, programs to combat anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance, and initiatives aimed at promoting greater international cooperation to curtail human trafficking and child pornography.

  • Advancing the Human Dimension in the OSCE: The Role of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

    This hearing, led by the Helsinki Chairman the Hon. the Hon. Sam Brownback, Co-Chairman the Hon. Christopher H. Smith Office, and ranking member the Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, examined the role that Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has played over the last fifteen years. ODIHR’s role in advancing human rights and the development of democracy in the OSCE participating States was noted and agreed to be particularly important. ODIHR is engaged throughout Western Europe and the former Soviet Union in the fields of democratic development, human rights, tolerance and non-discrimination, and promotion of the rule of law and has set the international standard for election observation. Within the hearing, the challenges that ODIHR faces were examined, specifically those instigated by the Russian Federation, Belarus and a small minority of the OSCE participating states seeking to undermine the organization under the guise of reform.  ODIHR has earned an international reputation for its leadership, professionalism, and excellence in the area of election observation.  That being said, ODIHR’s mission is much broader, encompassing a wide range of human rights activities aimed at closing the gap between commitments on paper and the reality on the ground in signatory countries.    

  • Thirtieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Moscow Helsinki Group

    Mr. President, last Friday, May 12, marked the 30th anniversary of the oldest active Russian human rights organization, the Moscow Helsinki Group. The creation of the Moscow Helsinki Group was announced on May 12, 1976, at a press conference called by Academician Andrei Sakharov, who later won the Nobel Peace Prize for his defense of human rights and his commitment to world peace. Formally named the “Public Group to Assist in the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act in the USSR,” its members sought to monitor the Soviet Government’s implementation of the historic Helsinki Accords.  At the initiative of Professor Yuri Orlov, a physicist by profession and a veteran human rights activist, the group joined together 11 committed individuals to collect and publicize information on Soviet violations of the human rights provisions enshrined in the Helsinki Accords. The group monitored fundamental rights and freedoms, including freedom of movement and freedom of religion, as well as the basic rights of minorities. The group documented evidence of systemic human rights abuses and provided reports of Helsinki violations to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the embassies of Helsinki signatory countries in Moscow. Additionally, these reports were widely distributed to Western correspondents. All together, the Moscow Helsinki Group published 195 numbered reports, along with numerous other documents, some of the cooperative initiatives with other human rights organizations. These reports played a critical role in documenting the Soviet Union’s failure to adhere to many of its Helsinki commitments. The example set by the Moscow Helsinki Group inspired human rights activists elsewhere in the USSR. Helsinki monitoring groups were founded in Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, and Armenia, and affiliated groups were also established to combat psychiatric abuse for political purposes and to defend religious liberty in Lithuania. As time went on, more brave individuals joined the Moscow Helsinki Group in its pursuit of truth and accountability. However, regrettably, the Soviet Government had no intention of tolerating the “assistance” provided by the Moscow Helsinki Group in monitoring the Soviet Union’s adherence to Helsinki commitments. The state-controlled Soviet press launched a campaign of slander against the group. By early 1977, the group’s founders, Dr. Yuri Orlov and Alexander Ginzburg, a longtime activist who had earlier produced the celebrated ‘‘White Book’’ on the trial of writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, had been arrested on political charges. Cyberneticist Anatoly “Natan” Sharansky and retired geologist Malva Landa were arrested shortly thereafter. Orlov was sentenced to 7 years in a labor camp and 5 years in internal exile. Ginzburg received 8 years labor camp and 3 years internal exile. Sharansky was sentenced to a total of 13 years in labor camp and prison, and Landa received 2 years internal exile.   Other members followed this path into the “Gulag” or were forced to emigrate. By 1981, KGB pressure had left only three members of the Moscow Helsinki Group at liberty in the Soviet Union, and they were forced to announce the “suspension” of their work. In 1984, one of those three, Dr. Elena Bonner, joined her husband, Dr. Sakharov, in forced internal exile in the closed city of Gorky.  Tragically, in December 1986, just as the Soviet political system was showing the signs of the exhaustion that would eventually lead to its collapse, Moscow Helsinki Group member Anatoly Marchenko died during a hunger strike at Chistopol Prison. Just over 2 months later, hundreds of known political and religious prisoners were freed from the Soviet prison system. With the advent of Glasnost, the Moscow Helsinki Group was formally reestablished in July 1989 by a handful of Helsinki veterans, and several new members joined their cause. Today, the Moscow Helsinki Group continues to work to defend human rights in post-Soviet Russia. And while there have been dramatic changes in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the lure of authoritarianism still has a strong appeal for some in today’s Russia. Mr. President, on the occasion of its 30th anniversary, I congratulate the members and former members of the Moscow Helsinki Group, many of whom, sadly, are no longer with us, for their courage and fortitude in the struggle against tyranny. I wish the group continued success as they work to advance democracy, defend human rights, and promote a vigorous civil society.

  • Thirtieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Moscow Helsinki Group

    Mr. Speaker, as Ranking Member of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Helsinki Commission, I note that tomorrow marks one of the major events in the struggle for human rights around the globe. Thirty years ago a courageous band of human rights defenders in the Soviet Union founded the “Moscow Helsinki Group,” dedicated to monitoring Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Final Act, an historic agreement containing important provisions on human rights.   When General Secretary Brezhnev signed the Helsinki Final Act, or the Helsinki Accords, on August 1, 1975 on behalf of the USSR, Soviet officials believed that they had gained an important foreign policy victory.  Indeed, there were some provisions that Soviet diplomats had sought assiduously during the negotiations among the thirty-five nations of Europe and the United States and Canada. However, the West, for its part, had insisted on certain provisions in the area of human rights and humanitarian affairs, including the right of citizens “to know their rights and to act upon them.”    With this commitment in mind, Professor Yuri Orlov, a Soviet physicist who had been involved in the defense of human rights in the Soviet Union previously, called upon several of his similarly-minded colleagues to join together in an organization to press publicly for implementation of the Helsinki Accords in their country.  Eleven brave individuals answered the call, and on May 12, 1976, at a press conference called by famed human rights campaigner and peace activist Dr. Andrei Sakharov, the creation of the “Public Group to Assist in the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act,” or as it became later known, the “Moscow Helsinki Group” was announced.   The Moscow Helsinki Group committed itself to collecting information about implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the Soviet Union and publishing reports on their findings. During the first six years of its activity, they produced almost two hundred specific reports, as well as other announcements and appeals.  More activists joined with the passing months. Similar Helsinki monitoring groups were established elsewhere in the USSR, including in Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia and Armenia. Other groups focused on specific human rights issues such as psychiatric abuse or religious liberty joined the movement. The Moscow Group became an important source of information for individuals and groups seeking assistance in the area of human rights.  Naturally, the Soviet leadership rejected such “assistance” and undertook to suppress the Moscow Helsinki Group. Members were fired from their jobs, “persuaded” to emigrate, castigated in the press, and subjected to KGB searches and interrogations. When such reprisals proved mostly ineffective, members were charged with political crimes and given lengthy sentences in labor camps of the Soviet gulag, usually with an additional term of “internal exile,” forced resettlement, typically somewhere in Siberia or the Soviet Far East.  Ten years after the founding of the Moscow Helsinki Group, fourteen members had been sentenced to a total of sixty nine years in labor camp or prison, and fifty years internal exile.  Anatoly Marchenko, a founding member and veteran dissident, died during a hunger strike at Chistopol Prison in December 1986.  By 1982, the Moscow Helsinki Group had been forced to suspend its activities in the face of intense KGB repression.  But while Moscow had rid itself of some troublesome dissidents, the spirit of Helsinki was not so easily quashed. Ludmilla Alekseyeva, an exiled member of the group, testified in the U.S. Congress in October 1985 that “for victims of human rights abuses in the Eastern bloc, Helsinki remains the main source of hope...and a rallying point in their struggle for freedom and peace.” Just a little over four year after she spoke those words, the Berlin Wall fell.  The Moscow Helsinki Group was re-established in 1989.  Reinvigorated through the work of new and veteran members, it is one of the most respected human rights organizations in the Russian Federation today. Alexeyeva, who returned to Russia in the early 1990s, following the demise of the Soviet Union, serves as chair of the group.          Mr. Speaker, we would do well to heed the wise words of Andrei Sakharov when he noted, “The whole point of the Helsinki Accords is mutual monitoring, not mutual evasion of difficult problems.” A key to the ultimate success of the Helsinki Process has been the involvement of civil society, courageous human rights defenders like those who established the Moscow Group, willing to speak out on behalf of others.  I remain deeply concerned over human rights trends in Russia, especially the adoption of regressive laws affecting fundamental human rights and freedoms.  I join my colleagues on the Helsinki Commission in congratulating the Moscow Helsinki Group on the occasion of its 30th anniversary of dedicated service in the defense of fundamental freedoms and liberty.

  • Thirtieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Moscow Helsinki Group

    Mr. Speaker, seventeen years ago, my dear friend and colleague, Rep. Frank Wolf, and I traveled to the Soviet Union, to visit the notorious Perm Labor Camp No. 37, located in the shadows of the Ural Mountains.  There were three camps in the Perm labor camp complex that had been set up specifically in 1972 for political prisoners and others whom Moscow considered “especially dangerous.“ Fortunately, by the time of our visit many of the incarcerated had been released and by 1991 the camp had emptied out completely in the closing chapter of the USSR. As Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I can vividly recall that glimpse into life in the Soviet Gulag, both a memorable and sobering experience. I mention that trip because Friday of this week, May 12th, will mark the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Moscow Helsinki Group, a leading human rights organization devoted to monitoring the Kremlin’s adherence to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The Helsinki Final Act was signed by the United States, Canada and thirty-three European countries, including the Soviet Union. While much of this document was focused on military security, economics and trade, there were important provisions on human rights and humanitarian issues, such as freedom of conscience and family reunification, which the Soviet Government and the other signatories promised to uphold.  At a May 12, 1976, Moscow press conference organized by Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Dr. Andrei Sakharov, the Moscow Helsinki Group announced that it would collect information and publish reports on implementation of the Helsinki Accords by the As might be expected, the Soviet Government did not welcome this initiative.  Members were threatened by the KGB, imprisoned, exiled or forced to emigrate. The Soviet press went into full-scale attack mode, accusing the Moscow Helsinki Group of being subversive and charging that some members were on the payroll of foreign intelligence services. I might mention that a thinly veiled version of this canard against the group was recently resurrected by a representative of the KGB’s successor, the FSB, on national television.      Arrests of members of the Moscow Group began within a year of its founding. In 1978, Dr. Orlov himself was sentenced to seven years labor camp and five years internal exile. In 1986, he was brought back to Moscow, put on a plane and deported to the United States in exchange for a Soviet spy.  Other Moscow Helsinki Group members found themselves at the notorious Perm Labor Camp complex that I mentioned earlier. For his criticism of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Dr. Sakharov was exiled to the closed city of Gorky beginning in January 1980.  His wife and Moscow Helsinki Group member, Dr. Elena Bonner, joined him there in 1984 after having been convicted of “anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.” Founding member Anatoly Marchenko died while on a hunger strike at Chistopol Prison in December 1986,   By the end of 1982, less than seven years after the group’s founding, it appeared that the KGB and the Soviet Government had triumphed over the small band of idealists who pressed their leaders to live up to the promises made at Helsinki. With only three members at liberty and those under intense KGB pressure, the Moscow Helsinki Group was forced to suspend its activities. By 1986, only one member of the group, Naum Meiman, continued to meet with foreign visitors and Western correspondents.  Meiman’s wife, Irina, died of brain cancer after waiting years for Soviet authorities to give her permission to leave the Soviet Union for specialized treatment abroad, a reminder of the personal costs to human rights activists and their families under a cruel regime.       But the Helsinki spirit lived on. In the West, supporters and sympathizers demonstrated on behalf on imprisoned Helsinki Monitors. The cases of imprisoned or exiled Helsinki Monitors were often raised at diplomatic meetings between the United States and the Soviet authorities. In the Soviet Union itself, enlightened leaders began to understand that repressive governments may squelch the voices of dissenters for a time, but their message will heard by other means. And on February 14, 1987, less than five years after the Moscow Helsinki group was forced to suspend its activities, a small item in “Izvestiya” announced the possibility of certain prisoners being released from labor camp. It was the beginning of the end for the repressive Soviet system.        In July 1989, the Moscow Helsinki Group was reestablished by several longtime human rights activists: Larisa Bogoraz, Sergey Kovalev, Viatcheslav Bakhmin, Alexey Smirnov, Lev Timofeev, and Boris Zolotukhin. Today, Ludmilla Alexeyeva, who had been exiled to the United States by Soviet authorities for her earlier work, now chairs this respected organization. Mr. Speaker, thirty years after its founding and fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the re-established Moscow Helsinki Group remains active in speaking out in defense of human rights, civil society, and rule of law in Russia. I congratulate the members of the Moscow Helsinki Group for their achievements in the past and pledge my support for their vital ongoing work.

  • Statement on Human Rights in Central Asia at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

    First, let me thank the organizers of this conference for inviting me to speak.  I applaud the co-sponsors for putting together this timely and sober gathering to mark the one-year anniversary of the Andijon events. I won’t bother talking to this audience about the human rights situation in Central Asia.  The State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices routinely characterize the human rights observance in each country as “poor.”   Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) here today probably consider that too lenient, and I agree with them.   It’s not surprising that countries which emerged from 70 years of communism should have difficulties creating rule of law states.  But after 15 years of independence we should be seeing some separation of powers and a strong civil society.  Instead, we see “super-presidents,” who have overwhelmed legislatures and judicial systems.  Several have been in power for about 20 years, after rigged or canceled elections.  “Royal families” control the most lucrative sectors of the economy and the media. Of course, newspapers in Kazakhstan have more leeway than in Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan.  But even in Kazakhstan, reports on presidential misdeeds are taboo.    Only in Kyrgyzstan do we see a freer media and hope of more in the future.  And only in Kyrgyzstan is the president’s relationship with the other branches of power not yet set in a pattern of executive branch dominance.  Yet a Tulip Revolution was necessary last year to bring about change in Kyrgyzstan, which raises serious questions about prospects for evolutionary development toward democracy in Central Asia.   This brings us to Uzbekistan.  No Central Asian country worked harder during the last 15 years to develop good strategic relations with Washington and to counterbalance residual Russian influence. But the country’s terrible human rights record complicated the development of a closer relationship.  President Islam Karimov allows no opposition, torture is pervasive, for years human rights groups were unregistered, and Tashkent has waged war against Muslims who wanted to practice their faith outside state-approved channels.    Now, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is a terrorist group affiliated with al-Qaeda, and Hizb-ut-Tahrir is virulently anti-Western and anti-Semitic.  But Karimov’s exclusive reliance on repression only exacerbates matters and has probably supplied cadres for radical and terrorist organizations.   After September 11, 2001, we needed Uzbekistan’s cooperation and Karimov was delighted to help.  Uzbekistan gave us a military base and the March 2002 agreement on strategic cooperation was signed in Washington.  We agreed to support Uzbekistan, and Uzbekistan pledged to move towards democracy. But Karimov only implemented the democratization commitments just enough for Tashkent and Washington to point to “progress.” Gradually, frustration grew on both sides.  It was just a matter of time before the arrangement collapsed.   People often date the breakdown of U.S.-Uzbek relations to the events that happened in Andijon on May 12 and 13, 2005. We did not condone the violent takeover of government buildings in that city.  But we condemned the indiscriminate shootings in the square that followed and when we called for an independent, international investigation, Karimov balked.    As we all know, he began to move against U.S. NGOs.  Few remain in Uzbekistan today.  Then we were unceremoniously booted out of the K-2 base.  But ties had actually soured long before, because Karimov saw the Stars and Stripes behind the Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyz revolutions. Most alarming for Tashkent was the Tulip Revolution which proved that “people power” was possible in Central Asia.    Like President Putin, Central Asian leaders insist that a sinister hand, based in Washington but using American NGOs working in the region, plotted the downfall of Eduard Shevardnadze, Leonid Kuchma and Askar Akaev -- and is now gunning for them.  So a split has developed in Central Asia.  Kyrgyzstan, though plagued by criminality and sometimes seemingly chaotic, is better off than with the previous corrupt regime and well disposed towards the U.S.    Uzbekistan’s Karimov sees us as his greatest strategic danger; he has cracked down even harder and state-run media accuse us of trying to enslave Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are suspicious of our allegedly revolutionary goals but still want to maintain good ties – as long as they are not threatened by civil society.  And Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan surely assume that we want their oil and gas too much to stir the pot. What can we do about this?  How can we try to make things better, especially keeping in mind that U.S. influence is limited?   This week I will be re-introducing my Central Asia bill, to help ensure that the United States is doing everything possible to encourage these governments to respect human rights and democratization.  The act will also bring greater consistency to U.S. policy, creating a framework to guide our bilateral relations in Central Asia.   The Central Asia Democracy and Human Rights Promotion Act supports the President’s freedom agenda by providing $118 million in assistance for human rights and democracy training and $15 million for increased Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America broadcasting.    The new Act will also establish a certification mechanism for the distribution of assistance to each government. The Secretary of State will determine whether each has made “significant improvements in the protection of human rights.”  This system will have a national security waiver and is modeled on the current system in Foreign Ops appropriations for Kazakhstan and expanded for all five countries.   In addition, considering the forced return of Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the new Act will require the Secretary of State to report on whether any government is “forcibly returning Uzbeks or other refugees who have fled violence and political persecution.” This is modeled on language regarding Kyrgyzstan in Foreign Ops appropriations and expanded for all five countries.    Notably, my new legislation will create a sanctions section for Uzbekistan.  First, the bill concretizes into law the limitations already in place in Foreign Ops appropriations. The limitation prevents funding to the Uzbek Government unless the Secretary of State determines the government is “making substantial and continuing progress” towards respect for human rights and that the Uzbek Government begins a “credible international investigation” of Andijon.   In addition, the new Act mirrors European Union sanctions by establishing a visa ban and an export ban on munitions.  The sanctions section also establishes an asset freeze for Uzbek officials, their family members, and their associates implicated in the Andijon massacre or involved in other gross violations of human rights.   Ladies and gentlemen, it is hard to promote democratization in strategically important countries whose leaders want to keep all real power in their own hands. Our task is especially complicated by the fact that Russia – which has re-emerged as a major international player, thanks to sky-high oil prices – is working hard to undermine our efforts.  But I think the measures which I’ve outlined here in brief offer a good chance of achieving our goals.   Thank you for your attention.  I look forward to hearing the other participants’ views and your comments.   

  • Tools for Combating Anti-Semitism: Police Training and Holocaust Education

    The Helsinki Commission held a briefing on Holocaust education tools and law enforcement training programs undertaken by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Co-Chairman Smith cited the vicious murder of Ilan Halimi as a reminder of the need to redouble efforts to combat anti-Semitism and to speak out when manifestations of related hatred occur.  The briefing highlighted specific programs which promote awareness of the Holocaust and provide law enforcement professionals with the tools to investigate and prosecute hate-inspired crimes.   Paul Goldenberg, a Special Advisor to ODIHR who designed the law enforcement training program which assists police to recognize and respond to hate crimes, stressed that law enforcement professionals must be recognized as an integral part of the solution.  Dr. Kathrin Meyer addressed the challenges presented by contemporary forms of anti-Semitism and highlights ways to address the subject in the classroom. Other witnesses – including Rabbi Andrew Baker, Director of International Jewish Affairs for the American Jewish Committee; Stacy Burdett, Associate Director of Government and National Affairs, Anti-Defamation League; and Liebe Geft, Director, Simon Wiesenthal Center’s Museum of Tolerance also presented testimony at this briefing.

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