By Clifford Bond and Robert Hand Helsinki Commission Staff In early December 2008, Helsinki Commission staff visited Kosovo to review the changing mandates of a wide range of international actors in Kosovo. The visit coincided with the European Union’s deployment of a Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, known as EULEX, which took place successfully but revealed the potential for regional instability. The Commission staff delegation met with a variety of international and local actors in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital. It traveled to the Visoki Decani, a monastery of the Serbian Orthodox Church where it met with church representatives, and to the nearby town of Peja/Pec where it met with field representatives of the International Civilian Office (ICO) and the OSCE. The delegation also visited both sides of the divided northern city of Mitrovica where it visited displacement camps and the rebuilt neighborhood for the city’s Romani population in addition to other meetings. The International Community Kosovo asserted its independent statehood in February 2008, in the context of the plan put forward by former Finnish President, UN official, and Nobel laureate Martti Ahtisaari. In so doing, Kosovo’s leadership pledged to implement the plan in full, which means accepting international supervision and providing decentralized authority and numerous rights and privileges to the Serb and, to a lesser extent, other minority communities. The Ahtisaari plan, however, assumes agreement by all parties, but Serbia, backed by Russia at the United Nations, refuses to accept the loss of what it considers still to be its province. The United States and most European countries have recognized Kosovo’s independence, but a few European Union members remain either reluctant or strongly against doing so, either due to ties with Serbia or fear of separatist movements within their own borders. Spain was frequently singled out as the one country that not only opposes Kosovo’s independence but seems intent on undermining its recognition by others. Combined with the widespread need for consensus decision-making, most of the international community’s field missions must, to one degree or another, act neutrally on questions of status, to the detriment of their effectiveness and the enormous frustration of Kosovar Albanians who desire that Kosovo’s independence be respected. The EULEX deployment brought these differing perspectives to the fore. In order to obtain an EU-wide agreement, a UN blessing and the acquiescence of Belgrade and local Serbs under Belgrade’s control, a compromise effort known as the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s “6-point plan” was put forward that prompted angry protest among the Kosovar Albanian majority and an official rejection from Pristina. Posters throughout the city proclaimed EULEX to be “Made in Serbia”. After several delays and despite continued ambiguity regarding which government was the actual host, the Mission deployed on December 9 throughout Kosovo, not just in areas under Pristina’s control. That the deployment proceeded smoothly and peacefully was viewed as a success, although ambiguities purposefully placed in its mandate to allow both Albanians and Serbs to maintain their positions, as well as the lack of political oversight and coordination among EULEX’s three areas of responsibility (police, courts and customs), likely mean that EULEX will face additional tests of its resolve in the future. For now, the most noteworthy result of the deployment is the anticipated end of inefficient UNMiK operations, which have come to symbolize the holding pattern in which Kosovo has found itself since 1999. The deployment could also signal a more cooperative tone among Kosovo’s Serbs. In northern Mitrovica and contiguous areas bordering Serbia, there are signs that Belgrade may no longer support more militant and corrupt Kosovo Serb leaders. In the enclaves to the south, where the majority of Kosovo Serbs live, there may also be more room for local accommodation and inter-ethnic cooperation, with questions of status put to the side. Following Serbian elections in May that strengthened pro-democratic and pro-European forces in society, Belgrade seems to want at least more transparency and accountability in the “parallel institutions” it has so far financed, and it may try to reduce its subsidies. It also seems to want to avoid violence, especially any violence that could be blamed on the Serb side. It is unclear how far it will push to assert control and responsibility in light of UNMiK’s dwindling role, or whether it will allow EULEX and eventually the ICO to fill the void. Unfortunately, divisions within the European Union almost invite continued Serbian intransigence. Without being given a clear choice between trying to hold onto Kosovo and achieving European integration, the Serbian Government still plays the “Kosovo card,” which garners popular support at home without any apparent repercussions. The situation on the Kosovar Albanian side is a bit clearer. Despite internal political posturing, there is really little difference within this community when it comes to defending Kosovo’s independence. The deliberations that led the EULEX deployment pushed the Kosovo government about as far as it could go. While the achievement of independence has so far made the Ahtisaari plan worth embracing, many of its provisions relating to Serb communities have been no easy sell, especially in the many localities where nationalism and intolerance continue to prevail. When governments of European countries which have recognized Kosovo’s independence nevertheless treat it as something less than an independent and sovereign state, the Kosovars are naturally outraged and increasingly distrustful. This could be countered somewhat by the establishment of embassies in the capitals of those countries who have thus far recognized Kosovo, particularly in Europe, staffed by competent diplomats in order to ensure that the Kosovo point-of-view is made clear to policy-makers. The United States should also counter European diplomatic tendencies to placate traditional regional powers and treat the new states of Europe as second-class states. In the meantime, as those in government may try to adhere to their Ahtisaari commitments, those in opposition have also been able to capitalize on the situation. This poses a challenge to Kosovo’s shaky democratic institutions, which are still very much in transition. Some have expressed concern that the further development of democratic capacities could be thwarted by the need to meet unpopular international demands. While EULEX moves forward and UNMiK winds down, other international players need to find their role. As one analyst commented, the international community has lost the coherence of its structure and has become a confusing maze to local parties. The International Civilian Office is perhaps the most important, yet vulnerable, of the current players. A creation of the Ahtisaari plan, it is by definition not status neutral, and has a relatively strong mandate to supervise post-status Kosovo. Serb opposition to cooperation with the ICO makes this difficult, but the hesitancy of the status-neutral players to cooperate, coordinate and support the ICO will severely weaken its effectiveness to Kosovo’s long-term detriment. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, the organization’s largest, is facing even more difficult times. Once known for its solid monitoring of events throughout Kosovo and for developing democratic capacity, the early threat of Belgrade and Moscow to close the Mission cast a shadow over its future and a considerable portion of its personnel have moved to the ICO or otherwise left the OSCE in Kosovo. Mission leadership has also been controversial; while this may have stabilized with a new Head of Mission, the OSCE lost some serious ground. Most interlocutors felt that the Mission is a bit oversized, and needs to focus on core areas such as promoting free media, human rights and inter-ethnic dialogue, where the OSCE has genuine expertise and credibility. KFOR, the NATO-led peacekeeping force, seems to be the one constant of the international presence that garners unquestioned respect and seems prepared to handle whatever instability may lie ahead. It is the acknowledged last resort for providing security, but its presence helps ensure a security baseline that will deter provocations and enhance confidence at the local level. KFOR representatives seem confident that lessons were learned from the violence of 2004 and that greater flexibility across lines of operations, more consistent rules for engagement and an unwillingness to let the particulars of status from getting in its way will be effective in keeping the peace in Kosovo. A Need for Dialogue Many of the problems which exist among both the Kosovar Albanian majority and the Kosovo Serb minority could be resolved through greater dialogue, both within Kosovo and between Belgrade and Pristina. There is some effort to achieve this through civic organizations and religious institutions, as well as business contacts. There is also some interaction in technical areas such as regarding missing persons from the 1998-99 conflict, or in the reconstruction of churches and other religious sites damaged or destroyed in the March 2004 riots. Unfortunately, a suitable venue for direct contact between Belgrade and Pristina needs to be found. Pristina is ready, at least in principle, but Belgrade is not. One area where the Kosovo authorities could act more swiftly, without precondition, and likely to their own long-term benefit, is the resolution of outstanding property claims. The resolution of property claims is a major hindrance to the return of displaced persons, and it holds up legal usage of property even when a return is unlikely. In some cases at least, displaced Serbs and others may only wish to get their property back so they can sell it. While there may be solid reasons for wanting to encourage displaced persons to return to Kosovo -- and some efforts to do this were underway in December – ultimately each individual needs only the opportunity to make a free choice. To do this, those with outstanding property claims need to have their cases resolved. The issue of property claims came up repeatedly in meetings, and seems a greater issue than security and freedom of movement at present. Some hope the EULEX deployment could provide a second chance for property restitutions and returns. Both sides, but especially some Kosovo leaders who formerly fought with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), could probably also help facilitate the resolution of more missing persons cases, of which just under 2,000 remain. While there has been success in bringing government representatives and surviving family members together under international auspices, local efforts to help locate grave sites appear to be half-hearted, at best. It is unlikely that progress in this area will enhance community reconciliation efforts in any major way, but a positive signal to do more could lead to a broadening of dialogue on other issues. Ultimately, this remains a humanitarian issue that deserves additional effort no matter what. At present, Kosovo authorities seem committed to implementing the Ahtsaari plan in its entirety. Relevant laws have been passed, and those involved in developing local self-government seem committed to implementation. The real test, of course, will come when the Kosovo Serbs decide to respond and engage and are able to do so without worry of retribution from Belgrade. One local analyst noted that developing the necessary trust between the two sides will be a process, and should be taken one step at a time rather than pushed. The Plight of Roma in the North A continual concern to the Helsinki Commission has been the plight of displaced Roma in northern Mitrovica, most of whom fled their original neighborhood, or mahalla, which was destroyed in 1999. Growing criticism of the conditions in the camps, particularly the health hazards caused by lead contamination, finally convinced the international community in 2005 first to establish a temporary relocation facility that was safer and to make a concentrated effort to rebuild housing where the original mahalla in the south was located. Romani families resisted the move, due to warranted lack of trust in the international community and a lack of awareness of how severe the health threat really was. Local Serbian leaders as well as Romani community leaders living elsewhere in Europe, however, originally also did much to discourage the move, both benefiting from a situation in which successful returns did not take place. Commission staff visited the last of the original camps, Cesmin Lug, as well as the new camp adjacent to it, a former KFOR base known as Osterode. They also visited the original mahalla, which had additional apartment buildings and some private houses constructed since the last Commission visit in May 2007. Despite the availability of housing, residents of the camps continue to resist moving, despite continued concerns about health conditions. Local Serbian leaders, who now want the land where Osterode is located, seem no longer to be discouraging the move, and Roma living abroad likewise seem to have less influence on the situation. Security for Roma in the south, once a concern, seems less so now. Those who remain in the camps seem primarily motivated by a continued distrust of the international community as well as lingering hopes for a better offer. The inability of the local economy to provide income, particularly in the south, also plays a significant role, as does the desire to keep children in Serb-run schools, despite being segregated into separate classes. Meanwhile, there is increasing pressure from foreign governments to prioritize the resettling of Kosovo Roma they intend to deport, rather than those displaced in Kosovo and living in camps. It is clear that, while there has been some progress on this issue, a limited set of additional options will need to be considered to resolve the situation, including the possibility of permanent resettlement in the north.

By Cliff Bond, Senior Advisor (Note: The author, a member of the Helsinki Commission staff, was made available to the international community's High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina to serve as an envoy on issues relating to Srebrenica. This article reports on his experiences and his thoughts about the future of this community.) As I conclude my one-year mandate as Envoy in Srebrenica, I wanted to share some thoughts about this community and Bosnia’s future. The commemoration of the thirteenth anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide on July 11 was marked by a solemn ceremony and the burial of more than three hundred victims at the Srebrenica-Potocari Cemetery and Memorial Center. The remains of these victims had recently been identified through DNA-testing by the International Commission on Missing Persons. That ceremony and the continued search to find and identify the victims of genocide underscore the importance of the local and international authorities working constructively together to provide support to Srebrenica. The end of my mandate is not the end of international engagement there. The Office of the High Representative and the American Embassy in particular will remain active on the ground. Much more needs to be done, but I believe over the past year Srebrenica has begun to move in a positive direction. Of course, Srebrenica will remain a sensitive and potent factor in the political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Political leaders acted wisely in early May to adopt a one-time amendment of the election law so as to permit Srebrenica’s pre-war residents to vote in the municipality at the October local elections. Because of changes in voter registration procedures many former residents, who now live outside the community, would not have been able to cast an absentee ballot. This would have assured a victory and control in the municipality to Bosnian Serb parties. This is an outcome that many saw as an unacceptable confirmation of the war-time policies of ethnic cleansing and genocide. The change in the election law is an appropriate step; it empowers Srebrenica’s survivors, and rightly so. Political parties must now respond by nominating competent candidates for municipal office – people who can work to unite Srebrenica’s citizens. Amending the election law is not in itself a long-term solution to the political challenges facing Srebrenica, nor does it create enduring conditions for Serbs and Bosniaks to feel that they have a common future in this municipality. One idea that has been discussed by local authorities is a change in the municipal statute - not to give Srebrenica “special legal status” outside the Republika Srpska (RS), but to introduce procedures for consensus decision-making in the work of the municipal assembly. This can be done in ways that conform to existing law. While such a change may be difficult to adopt during an election period, it deserves further consideration. Srebrenica’s problems can only be addressed on the basis of dialogue; they cannot be addressed through confrontation. In an important step, local community leaders, with the support of the RS government, have been discussing the establishment of a Dialogue Center in Srebrenica. Such a Center could serve as a permanent, independent forum for inter-ethnic communication and attempts at reconciliation. The idea should receive international support. Srebrenica’s authorities are currently searching for an NGO that can assist them in developing a concept and strategy for establishing the Center. Last September the state-level Council of Ministers approved an $8.3 million package of infrastructure and other support for the municipality. Unfortunately, there were delays in its implementation. These were related to the limited capabilities of the municipality to carry out project design and other required technical procedures on these projects. The package is finally being realized. As these difficulties are overcome and as these monies are spent effectively, there is a prospect of further funding by the Council of Ministers. The RS and the Federation, the two sub-entities recognized in the Dayton Peace Accords, are also considering additional investment in the community. Srebrenica’s future can best be secured through economic development. International donors must continue to coordinate their assistance efforts and ensure that these programs have a visible impact that addresses the community’s priorities. The key to creating more economic opportunity in Srebrenica is private investment and job creation. I am happy to report that USAID has appointed a full-time business consultant, resident in Srebrenica, who will work with the municipality to promote new business and follow up on the Investment Conference that was organized last November for the municipality. Developing the region’s natural resources, particularly the mineral waters of the Crni Guber Spa, and promoting cross border trade in agriculture should be priorities. This is why we are working to open a border crossing at Skelani on the Drina River for seasonal trade in agricultural goods. This would make Srebrenica a bridge to wider economic cooperation with Serbia and the Balkans. Srebrenica’s future also depends on the provision of justice. The apprehension of Radovan Karadzic by Serb authorities earlier this week is an important step. Hopefully, he will be rendered to the Hague Tribunal in the very near future. The delay in his capture and the failure of local and regional authorities to apprehend other indicted war criminals, such as Ratko Mladic, and the late start in investigating persons on the so-called “Srebrenica List,” a purported list of RS police and military officials present in Srebrenica in July 1995, will continue to hamper efforts at reconciliation in Bosnia and throughout the region. This is why the Peace Implementation Council, the body supervising implementation of the Dayton Accords, has insisted that Bosnia at last develop an effective National War Crimes Strategy that sets clear standards and priorities for investigating and prosecuting war crimes. We, both local and international authorities, have common responsibility to accomplish these steps as quickly as possible. Together we can help the residents of Srebrenica confront the past and in doing so help them to embrace the future.

By Ronald McNamara, International Policy Director Making an appearance on February 13th before the Helsinki Commission, early in Finland’s 2008 chairmanship of the OSCE, Minister for Foreign Affairs Ilkka Kanerva addressed a wide range of issues facing the Vienna-based organization and its 56 participating States. Kanerva, having served in parliament since 1975, the year in which the Helsinki Final Act was signed in the Finnish capital, stressed the unique contribution of parliamentarians in their role embodying “the aspirations of our peoples and to voice their concerns in all OSCE countries.” Chairman Alcee L. Hastings, President Emeritus of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, expressed appreciation for recognition of the parliamentary dimension of the Helsinki Process. Minister Kanerva noted, “The starting point of the Finnish Chairmanship is that the OSCE is a value-based organization that actively promotes our common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. We stress the full implementation of the human rights commitments by the participating States.” Chairman Hastings welcomed the emphasis on implementation especially given the mandate of the Helsinki Commission to monitor compliance with the common commitments accepted by all participating States regardless of when they joined the Helsinki Process. “We fully support and welcome Finland’s calls for greater effort by participating States to implement our common political commitments. Implementation is key, as the late President Gerald Ford underscored in his remarks in Finlandia Hall when he signed the Helsinki Accords on behalf of the United States. I am also mindful that all participating States, including this country, are obligated to translate words on paper into action and I welcome the scrutiny of others when our own policies and practices come up short,” said Hastings. Hastings and Kanerva had a lengthy exchange regarding developments in Kosovo and their implications for Balkans as well as the possibility of sustained OSCE engagement in the region. Kanerva, who had just returned from a visit to Belgrade and Priština, observed that the OSCE has played an important role in Kosovo -- in establishing and consolidating local institutions, in promoting democratization, the rule of law, as well as human and minority rights. “Because the OSCE has remained “status-neutral,” it has retained a unique ability to work with all ethnic communities in promoting stability and democratic development. It is my firm belief that the OSCE work in Kosovo is and will be beneficial to all Kosovars,” concluded the Minister. He continued, “The outcome of the status process could have a negative impact on the OSCE's engagement in Kosovo. You are well aware that the OSCE participating States remain deeply divided over the issue. This disagreement could lead to the current Mission’s termination. It would be a grave mistake for the OSCE and the entire international community if we were to leave it at that.” Chairman Hastings, who visited both Priština and the northern area around Mitrovitsa last June, remarked, “My overall concern comes again from personal experience. The OSCE mission in Kosovo complemented by the tremendous activities that the KFOR forces deployed to keep the peace there is one of, in my judgment, the most successful OSCE missions, capable of working with the various factions in that area. I always ask the question: if there was no OSCE mission or had not been there in recent years, what would be the situation on the ground there today? And how much closer would the parties be to arriving at a resolution of what is, by anybody's standards, a substantial conflict? Minister Kanerva stressed, “I am determined to ensure continued OSCE engagement in Kosovo regardless of the status process. I am aware of the fact that any participating State has the possibility to use a veto and to end the mandate of the present mission - the mission which at the moment comprises 800 people and which has an immense effect on the viability of the civil society. Should this happen, I am prepared to immediately start the negotiations on a revised mandate for the OSCE mission. I am convinced that all participating States agree on the need for continued OSCE engagement in Kosovo.” Regarding conflicts elsewhere in the OSCE region, Kanerva remarked, “The Finnish chairmanship has put the so-called frozen or protracted conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh at the top of our agenda. I will personally visit all of these regions. I have already nominated also a special envoy to survey the progress in the process. One of the first things I have already done was to visit Ukraine and Moldova, to examine possibilities to kick start the stalled negotiation on the Transdnistria conflict. The Government of Moldova and the leadership for Transdnistria indicate their willingness to reengage and I have tasked my special envoy to see what can be done to take the process forward. We have knowledge of the difficulties in front of us. But we can't give up.” Minister Kanerva announced his intention to visit the South Caucasus nations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Chairman Hastings asked Kanerva to raise concerns relating to media freedom in Azerbaijan, the subject of a Commission hearing late last year, and provided a list of specific cases. Numerous other human rights concerns were also discussed from combating anti-Semitism and trafficking in humans as well as promoting democracy. In prepared remarks, Co-Chairman Benjamin L. Cardin stressed the importance of sustained OSCE engagement in efforts to fight anti-Semitism. “In recent weeks we have convened a series of hearings to assess the ongoing work of the OSCE in this regard and have heard from experts. These sessions have confirmed the importance of maintaining a distinct focus on anti-Semitism, and resisting attempts by some to reduce the attention under some kinds of generic tolerance rubric. It has also become clear that the personal representatives need some form of meaningful support mechanism. Perhaps some arrangement could be put in place by the troika of past, present, and future OSCE chairs, to ensure continuity,” remarked Cardin. Similar concerns were echoed in a statement by Ranking Minority Member Christopher H. Smith, “I appeal to you, in your term as Chairman-in-Office, not to allow the OSCE to give in to this fatigue and indifference! Anti-Semitism remains what it has always been, a unique evil, a distinct form of intolerance, the oldest form of religious bigotry, and a malignant disease of the heart that has often led to murder. It continues to threaten our Jewish brothers and sisters, and so the OSCE must redouble its efforts in the fight against the scourge of anti-Semitism. Smith, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President’s Special Representative on Human Trafficking welcomed the commitment of the Finnish chairmanship to give priority attention to OSCE efforts to prevent human trafficking, with particular attention to child victims. Russia’s troubling attempts to restrict the scope and size of OSCE election observations missions was also raised. Minister Kanerva expressed disappointment that, despite a concerted effort by OSCE, an acceptable solution could not be worked out to enable the deployment of an observation mission to Russia for the March 2nd presidential elections. He outlined his views regarding observation of the entire election process. “It means candidate and voter registration, electoral campaign, media coverage, complaints and appeals. The ODIHR must continue to be in a position to determine the length and size of observation missions on professional grounds in order to produce meaningful assessments and recommendations benefiting the observed country.” Having headed monitoring missions to Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine, and most recently Georgia, Chairman Hastings called for a timely invitation for OSCE to observe the upcoming November U.S. elections. Kanerva thanked Hastings for his leadership of the mission to Georgia in early January and underscored the importance of close cooperation between ODIHR and the OSCE PA. Turning to Afghanistan, an OSCE Partner for Cooperation country, the Chairman welcomed the role played by Finnish forces in the northern part of that country. Minister Kanerva reported that active discussions were underway among OSCE countries regarding the kinds of initiatives that might be undertaken to assist Afghanistan pursuant to a general decision agreed to by the Madrid OSCE Ministerial Council last November. Priority attention is being given to strengthening border security and management, including along the 750 mile border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. “At the same time we are discussing whether the OSCE might eventually become active on Afghan territory,” said Kanerva. Before concluding the hearing, the Chairman-in-Office and Chairman Hastings touched on ways to enhance cooperation among the OSCE participating States and strengthen the organization. Hastings acknowledged the complex task of managing the OSCE given the diversity of countries and diverging views among some on fundamental aspects of the organization and its mission. The two agreed on the importance of engagement with Russia. One possibility raised by Chairman Hastings was the assembling of a “Council of Elder Statesmen” along the lines proposed by the Hamburg-based Centre for OSCE Research in its working paper, “Identifying the Cutting Edge: The Future Impact of the OSCE.” In an innovative move, the Finnish chairmanship has expanded the Troika – past, present, and future chairs – to include others slated to assume leadership of OSCE in future years. At the Madrid OSCE Ministerial Council agreement was reached on chairmanships for Greece in 2009, Kazakhstan in 2010 and Lithuania in 2011. “I have invited my colleagues from the future chairmanships of Kazakhstan and Lithuania,” Kanerva reported, “to meet with the current Troika countries Spain, Finland and Greece to develop ideas for longer-term priorities. I am convinced there are many issues where the "Quintet" can add value and lead to more coherent OSCE action in the next few years.” Minister Kanerva concluded, “The Helsinki Commission embodies the longstanding engagement of the United States with the OSCE and the values that underpin it. The OSCE can only work with the full engagement of its participating States. The United States has always played a key role, and must continue to do so, if we are to achieve the ambitious goals we have set for our Organization.”

By Janice Helwig and Winsome Packer, Staff Advisors The OSCE participating States concluded the year with a meeting of the Ministerial Council on November 29-30, 2007. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns headed the U.S. delegation. Helsinki Commission Chairman Alcee L. Hastings also participated. Overall Dynamics Tensions remained high within the OSCE in the lead up to the Madrid Ministerial, reducing expectations for any ambitious new initiatives which would need to garner the consensus of all 56 participating States. The high-level meeting in the Spanish capital capped off a year punctuated by fundamental disagreements in the security as well as human dimensions. Russia had made a concerted effort to gain control over OSCE election observation activities and reports, introducing a proposal to effectively subordinate every step of the observation process to consensus, including agreement by the country to be observed on the assessment. Along with Belarus and Turkmenistan, they similarly sought to institute burdensome bureaucratic obstacles to curtail NGO participation in OSCE activities. As in the past, the Russians insisted that there was a need for far reaching reform of the OSCE itself. Additionally, the Kremlin had threatened to “suspend” its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Other highly charged issues included Kazakhstan’s longstanding bid to chair the OSCE and the future of Kosovo and the expiring mandate for the OSCE Mission (OMIK) there. Several participating States, including the United States, were reticent about Astana’s leadership aspiration given gaps in its implementation of OSCE commitments, particularly those on democracy and human rights. Meanwhile, Serbia and Russia were threatening to close OMIK if the Kosovars were to unilaterally declare independence. Despite these potentials pitfalls, negotiations at the Ministerial overall proceeded constructively. Although consensus was not reached on some issues, decisions were ultimately taken on several priority issues following protracted debate, including the Kazakhstan chairmanship and an initiative to strengthen OSCE involvement with Afghanistan. As happened at the 2002 Porto Ministerial, the Madrid meeting had to be suspended while negotiations continued on the margins past the scheduled closing. Earlier in the day, Russia had reneged on its agreement to the decision on OSCE engagement with Afghanistan (which was important to the United States), most likely in retaliation to the U.S. blocking a Russian-sponsored draft decision on OSCE election monitoring. Because agreement on several other decisions was tied to the decision on Afghanistan, consensus on other decisions was at risk. In the end, the Afghanistan and the other decisions were agreed to in the late afternoon, almost five hours after the Ministerial had been scheduled to close. At the closing session at which the decisions were adopted, there was a flurry of interpretive statements as a result of the compromises made to reach consensus. Main issues Kazakhstan’s Chairmanship Bid – The decision on upcoming chairmanships of the OSCE was a focus of numerous bilateral meetings and negotiations. Since 2003, Kazakhstan had expressed its desire to lead the Vienna-based OSCE, possibly in 2009. Some – mainly countries belonging to the CIS – insisted that Kazakhstan deserved the leadership position simply based on its membership in the Organization and argued that Western countries were discriminating against a former Soviet State with their opposition. Others had hoped to prompt Kazakhstan to improve its rights record. In the end, an agreement was reached on future chairmanships: Greece in 2009, Kazakhstan in 2010, and Lithuania in 2011. Kazakhstan made it clear in its statement to the Ministerial that it would uphold long-held tenets of the human dimension such as the autonomy of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), as well as participation of NGOs in OSCE meetings. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe – During various CFE side meetings, the U.S. and Russia skirmished over the Russian Federation’s decision to suspend participation in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe on December 12, 2007. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Daniel Fried, led negotiations aimed at addressing Russian concerns and convincing Moscow not to suspend its participation in the Treaty, to no avail. In particular, the Russians had called for abolishment of flank restrictions, arguing that these requirements constrain their effectiveness in addressing terrorism within their territory. The lifting of the flank agreement would allow the Russians to increase their military forces in the Caucasus region of Russia without limits. Russia had also pressed for discarding the requirement in the original CFE agreement which set collective ceilings limiting the equipment/personnel each alliance (NATO/Warsaw PACT) could have in the "Atlantic to the Urals" area and in any given signatory country. Ratification of the Adaptation Agreement would do away with the collective ceilings, recognizing that the Warsaw Pact no longer exists, and permitting Russia to move personnel and equipment more freely in Russia. However, Russia wants assurance that the 20,000 tanks ceiling for the NATO in Europe will remain in place as new members join the alliance. Russia also took issue with the linkage of the allies’ ratification of the Adapted CFE to Russia’s fulfillment of the related Istanbul Commitments to withdraw its armed forces from Georgian and Moldovan territories. Russian Federation negotiator, Anatoly Antonov rejected calls to transfer of the Gadauta military base to Georgian control without agreement from Georgian authorities to permit Russia to maintain a “peacekeeping” force there. He also objected to U.S. demands for inspections at Gadauta and called for the Baltic States to ratify the Adapted CFE. Georgia emphatically objected to any consideration to “legitimize” the presence of Russian forces on Georgian territory. It became apparent that the Russians had presumed that their decision to suspend the CFE would gain them more leverage in negotiations with NATO allies. However, the allies remained united in their opposition to reopening the treaty to negotiations. Many present took Russia’s announcement of suspension of the CFE Treaty on the final day of the Ministerial to indicate that Russia had not been serious about trying to reach an agreement in Madrid. The future of Kosovo and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) was another focus, although more in statements by the Ministers than in negotiations. There was an attempt to get a declaration on Kosovo that would have included support for the continuation of OMIK regardless of the outcome of the status of Kosovo, but the proposed text was blocked by Russia and Serbia. Many countries, including the U.S., urged the unconditional continuation of OMIK in their statements to the Ministerial Council. NGOs were able to attend the Ministerial as at similar meetings in the past, although the invitation to do so came at a late date and so reduced the level of participation. Preserving this aspect of the Council meeting was particularly important as Russia, Belarus, and Turkmenistan had been questioning procedures for NGO participation in other OSCE meetings and blocked a draft Ministerial decision on Human Rights Defenders. Nonetheless, some NGOs did face access problems and had trouble getting into the conference center on the first day, although the opening plenary was supposed to be open to them. Helsinki Commission Chairman Congressman Alcee Hastings and Department of State Assistant Secretary for Europe Dan Fried held meetings with some NGOs in order to show their support. Increasing OSCE involvement with partner country Afghanistan was supported by the United States There also was wide support for the decision among countries at the Madrid meeting, though Russia and France were unconvinced that the OSCE should be working outside the territory of participating States. In the end, there was consensus on OSCE activities related to border management, with the caveat that most of the activities would take place in OSCE counties bordering Afghanistan. An effort to adopt a draft convention giving legal personality to the OSCE and providing privileges and immunities for OSCE personnel was, for the moment at least, scuttled by Russia. The idea of providing a legal framework for OSCE activities has kicked around for years, especially after the establishment of OSCE institutions and missions. Over the past year, negotiations had produced an arguably viable draft convention, which a number of participating States hoped would be adopted in Madrid and opened for signature. Although Russia ostensibly supports the draft treaty, it has now conditioned acceptance of the treaty on the simultaneous adoption of an OSCE “charter.” For the United States and some other countries, this linkage was a deal-breaker since drafting a charter opens the door to re-writing the fundamental principles of the OSCE.

By Janice Helwig, Staff Advisor Helsinki Commission staff recently visited the OSCE Mission Bosnia and Herzegovina to see how its work has adjusted to the evolving situation in the country. Mission Mandate: Activities and Priorities The mandate of the Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina was established by the December 1995 OSCE Ministerial Council in Budapest in response to taskings given to the OSCE by the Dayton Peace Agreement. It focused on elections, human rights monitoring, and facilitating the monitoring of arms control and confidence- and security-building arrangements. In 1996, the Permanent Council expanded the mandate to include democracy building. Although the mandate has not formally changed since 1996, the focus and work of the OSCE Mission has adapted with the changing situation in the country, and the Mission continues to play an active and effective role in the post-conflict rehabilitation of the country. The Mission’s work on elections, security and confidence building measures, and sub-regional arms control is largely finished. The conduct of elections has been turned over to Bosnian authorities, and most of the work under Dayton Annex 1b, Articles II and IV, has been completed. While some activities have decreased, work on human rights monitoring and education has increased. As refugees have returned and as war crimes trials have begun throughout the country, the Mission has established programs to monitor potential discrimination against returnees in economic and social rights, and is monitoring war crimes trials at all levels. The Mission’s work to promote desegregated education and to foster good governance at the local level is bearing fruit. Some schools have been unified; others now hold joint activities and classes. Many municipal governments are working on a five-module good governance training program. One of the OSCE Mission’s advantages continues to be its presence throughout the country. The mission currently consists of the headquarters office in Sarajevo, three regional centers (RC), and 20 field offices (FO). The Mission’s field offices are one of its key advantages over others organizations. The relationships built with local authorities and communities are the basis for OSCE’s effectiveness and often used by other organizations and Embassies not resident throughout the country. The Mission currently focuses its work through four Departments: Democratization, Education, Human Rights, and Security Cooperation. Each Department conducts several programs, which are standardized and implemented throughout the country by staff of the field offices. Democratization Programs The work of the Democratization Department focuses on developing efficient and transparent government institutions, building parliamentary capacity, and supporting civil society. A major component is UGOVOR, a country-wide local government project launched in March 2005. As other international organizations are becoming more involved with public administration reform, the Mission is shifting to building ties among municipal governments and developing civil society. In addition, the Mission works in small municipalities where other international organizations are not. OGOVOR is a five-module training program to improve regulatory elements of municipal governance and promote greater transparency and accountability. The five modules are: access to information; ethics for elected officials; participatory strategic planning; harmonization of municipal statutes; and partnership between civil society and municipal governments. Education Programs In July 2002, at the request of the Office of the High Representative and with the concurrence of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the OSCE Mission assumed responsibility for coordination of the work of the international community on education. The first aim was to ensure that textbooks and classes were non-political, non-divisive, and free from derogatory propaganda concerning other ethnic and religious groups. New textbooks are being distributed this year, and most lessons are now free from intolerant bias. Nevertheless, most schools in Bosnia remain divided – they are either two schools under one roof, divided by ethnicity, or one-ethnicity schools. Parents, particularly returnees, generally support segregation, and authorities argue that classes must be separated into the three languages of the country, each of which also has its own curriculum for history and geography. Such segregation fosters children’s perception that they should not mix with individuals from the other groups and does little to promote reconciliation. Moreover, politicians – particularly at the local level – sometimes use education to build nationalist credentials in the hopes of gaining votes. The Mission is working to desegregate schools as much as possible. Some schools have been integrated – such as the Mostar Gymnasium which began unified classes in the fall of 2006 – and others have begun holding joint classes on certain subjects such as computer technology. One focus is building civil society input to school reform through the creation of and support for parent and student councils, as well as teachers’ forums. The Mission recently published a manual for student councils in secondary schools. The OSCE also works with municipal, entity, and State authorities on education reform, including legislative and curriculum reform. Human Rights Programs Until recently, the Mission’s human rights work had focused on property rights and restitution, in line with the need at that time to follow cases as refugees and IDPs return to reclaim their property. As returnees have settled in, the Mission has turned to monitoring potential discrimination against returnees and other vulnerable groups by local authorities. The Mission has also been monitoring trials since the introduction of a new legal system three years ago; this work is increasing as the number of war crimes trials increases in Bosnian courts. The Mission monitors how local authorities provide basic economic and social support – such as health care, housing, and pensions - to vulnerable groups, including returnees, Roma, and disabled persons, in order to address any patterns of discrimination that emerge. Trial monitoring is aimed at ensuring fair trials, particularly war crimes trials, and at identifying shortcomings in the Bosnian judicial system and resolving them. There is a special unit which monitors 11bis trials transferred by the ICTY to Bosnian courts. The Mission also does significant work with Roma communities. For example, in one municipality alone, the OSCE has raised the number of Roma children in school from 8 to almost 90. Security Cooperation Programs Programs under the Security Cooperation Department originally focused on implementation of Dayton Peace Agreement Annex 1b, Articles II and IV. Work on Article II was completed in 2004 with the signing of the Agreement on the Termination of Article II on 28 September. Although some work continues under Article IV, military reform and troop reductions have resulted in significantly fewer inspections. UNDP has taken the lead in reducing small arms and light weapons (SALW. Currently, the work of the Department focuses on institution building and parliamentary capacity-building. The Department recently completed a pilot training course for various levels of government officials on the government’s new security policy concept. The Department also conducts training on the OSCE Code of Conduct on Political-Military Aspects of Security. The parliamentary capacity building program began in 2002 and works with defense and intelligence committees. It organizes trainings, visits to other countries, and strengthening of oversight capabilities.