As Moscow initiated a full-scale military assault on Ukraine early Thursday morning, launching airstrikes and artillery at military installations across the country and sending troops into major cities, officials in Washington rushed to determine how best to punish Russian President Vladimir Putin. ​​”Putin is the aggressor. Putin chose this war. Now he and his country will bear the consequences,” President Biden said Thursday, noting that the sanctions had been designed to maximize the long-term impact on Russia’s economy. Biden announced new limitations on what can be exported to Russia, “blocks” on four additional Russian banks, including state-owned banks VTB and Sberbank, and further sanctions on Russian elites. The sanctions also target the children of Nikolai Patrushev, an intelligence official with close ties to Putin, and Igor Sechin, head of the Russian oil company Rosneft. Despite weeks of negotiations, members of Congress failed to come up with a bipartisan sanctions package in the month leading up to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Lawmakers from both sides of the aisle said Thursday that they would support robust sanctions proposed by the White House and are calling for more comprehensive sanctions legislation when Congress returns next week. “The United States and our allies must now totally isolate Russia from the global economy. This includes sanctions on all Russian oligarchs—those who actually hold Putin’s cash—and Russia’s financial and energy sectors, as well as the removal of Russian institutions from the SWIFT system,” Sen. Ben Cardin told National Journal. The U.S., the European Union, and the United Kingdom issued sanctions against Russia earlier this week following Moscow’s recognition of the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, two regions in Eastern Ukraine that Russian proxy forces have controlled for the past eight years. Experts noted that the European Union’s sanctions were much tougher than many expected, while British Prime Minister Boris Johnson was slammed for failing to issue robust sanctions measures. Washington’s preliminary sanctions package was deemed limited but effective, as Biden left ample room to issue more-crippling sanctions as the situation escalates. “What we’re seeing is the EU is tougher than the U.S.,” said Anders Aslund, an economist specializing in the Russian economy. “The British sanctions were a joke. The EU and the U.S. were working in concert, and Boris Johnson was clowning around.” The U.S. on Tuesday sanctioned two Russian state-owned financial institutions, VEB, a bank described as Putin’s slush fund, and Promsvyazbank, an institution primarily used by Russia’s military. VEB has an office in New York that will be forced to close. Washington also slapped sanctions on three individuals tied to Putin’s inner circle—Denis Bortnikov, Peter Fradkov, and Vladimir Kiriyenko—and placed restrictions on Russia’s sovereign debt. Meanwhile, Biden announced he would lift the White House’s waivers on sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. That controversial energy project would have brought Russian natural gas directly into Germany, bypassing Ukraine. Lawmakers from both sides of the aisle applauded the president’s decision. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who had previously resisted making public statements about the pipeline, said German regulators would not certify the project. That move will cost Russia billions of dollars. The European Union sanctioned hundreds of individuals, including Russia’s defense minister and the 351 Russian parliamentarians who voted to recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. Brussels also targeted several people associated with Russian state-owned media, including RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan, a move Washington is not expected to replicate due to the U.S. deference to First Amendment rights. These individuals are now subject to asset freezes and visa bans in Europe. Neither the U.S. nor the EU issued export controls in the first round of sanctions, however. The international community has several options when it comes to sanctioning Russia. One of these is to sanction specific financial institutions operated by people close to Putin, like Gazprombank, Sberbank, and Alfa Bank—which were all targeted Thursday. Another is to issue export controls on items such as semiconductors, which would cut Russia off from Western technology used for military development, and luxury goods. “We’re going to stunt the ability to finance and grow the Russian military. ... We’re going to impair their ability to compete in the high-tech 21st-century economy,” Biden said Thursday. Targeting more individuals close to Putin, or even Putin himself, is also on the table. Sanctions targeting specific sectors of the economy, like energy or metals, and the oligarchs who run those industries could also be painful for Russia. Still, they risk producing a blowback effect on Western economies. Experts expect the U.S. and its allies will continue to ramp up sanctions as events on the ground unfold. But decoupling Russia from the global economy will be difficult. “I think given how severe this invasion is, they’ll start with a pretty high-level implementation to begin with and leave themselves some room to maneuver,” said Fritz Lodge, a principal with the Scowcroft Group specializing in international economic policy. “But Russia is not Iran. This is the 11th-largest economy in the world," Lodge added. "It’s deeply connected to the rest of the global economy. It’s a major commodities exporter—not just energy, but it is also the largest wheat exporter in the world and a significant exporter of fertilizers, chemicals, and industrial additives. There will be painful side effects for European economies and the U.S. with these sanctions.” Russia, furthermore, has amassed significant foreign-exchange reserves estimated to be worth a little over $600 billion and has already reduced its reliance on foreign investment. Both moves will insulate Russia from international sanctions for at least a few months. “You can think of Putin as a geopolitical doomsday prepper,” Lodge said. “If he’s taking these actions, then he’s priced in the fact that it would incur these sanctions.” Many experts have called into question whether sanctions have the power to change Putin’s calculus. International sanctions issued in response to Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula failed to stop the country from intimidating and ultimately attacking its neighbor, and made only a small dent in Putin’s popularity. Often, the impact of sanctions takes a long time to materialize, experts note. “Sanctions are not a magic bullet,” said Daniel Fried, who was the State Department’s sanctions coordinator when Russia seized Crimea in 2014. “Sanctions can work, but the timeline for them working might mean that the Ukrainian people suffer horribly. We often overestimate what we can achieve in the short run and underestimate what we can achieve in the longer run. But the Ukrainians are living in the window of short-term war. ” Still, Aslund noted that Putin has frequently expressed displeasure when people close to him are sanctioned, arguing that prohibitions on Russians spending money in Europe amount to human-rights violations. “He’s very sensitive, really a bleeding heart when it comes to his friends,” Aslund said.

Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) sits down with Yahoo Finance Live to talk about past geopolitical aggressions from Russian President Vladimir Putin, carefully applying sanctions on Russia, the energy sector, additional COVID-19 relief funds, inflation, and the federal gas tax. Video Transcript AKIKO FUJITA: Well, we are continuing to follow the latest developments from the Russia-Ukraine border. Several reports of increased shelling there with pro-Russian rebels ordering the evacuation of civilians. Amid those heightened tensions, President Biden is expected to speak this afternoon at 4:00 PM Eastern after he holds a call with NATO allies. And of course, we're going to bring that to you live right here on Yahoo Finance. Let's bring in Senator Ben Cardin of Maryland, who's also on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator, it's good to talk to you today. I think a lot of people trying to make sense of the headlines that we've gotten this week. Is diplomacy going to take its course? Is Russia-- is a Russian invasion of Ukraine inevitable? Talk to me about what you're hearing and what your biggest concerns are. BEN CARDIN: Well, first, it's good to be with you. Look, the circumstances are extremely dangerous right now. When you take a look at what Mr. Putin has done, the provocative actions he just recently took in Eastern Ukraine, the number of troops that he has on the border fully prepared to do a full incursion into Ukraine, and his past history, what he did in Georgia, what he's done-- this is part of his playbook, to use misinformation and to use everything he possibly can to bring down a country. And he wants to bring down an independent Ukraine. So it's a very, very dangerous situation. What will come next, only Mr. Putin knows. We certainly will not give up on diplomacy if Mr. Putin wants a diplomatic answer. But to now, every indication is that he is determined to use force to bring down the Ukrainian government. AKIKO FUJITA: You and your colleagues in the Senate have called for sanctions or increased sanctions against Russia. And I realize Republican senators have put forward their own sanctions as well. To what extent can these sanctions really have teeth in curtailing Vladimir Putin from scaling back some of those ambitions you just highlighted? BEN CARDIN: Well, to be clear, Democrats, Republicans, House and Senate, are fully behind President Biden and our European allies to make it clear that Mr. Putin will pay a very, very, very heavy price if he does further incursions into Ukraine. There's no dispute about that. We are fully behind the president in that regard. There's many of us who think that Mr. Putin already deserves to have additional sanctions imposed, but that would also, we think, give the president some additional leverage in his conversations with Mr. Putin. But that's more of a strategy issue, rather than our resolve that do everything we can to prevent the incursion. If it happens, the president will have our full support to impose the most serious sanctions, both on sectorial economy, as well as individuals. AKIKO FUJITA: We had your colleague, Senator Jon Tester, on earlier this week, who said, look, I'm all for sanctions, but we also need to be mindful of the economic impact this could have on our allies over in Europe, specifically on energy. How do you view that? Especially if we're talking about something like Nord Stream 2, I mean, number one, what power does the US have in halting that? And how do you think about the consequences for a country like Germany if that is halted, especially given their reliance on natural gas coming in from Russia? BEN CARDIN: Well, Senator Tester is mentioning some important points. But our number one priority is the security of Europe. And if Mr. Putin can overtake a sovereign country by the use of force without consequences, that does not bode well for the future security of Europe or other parts of the world by the use of force to try to change borders. That will have a much more devastating impact on future economies as well as the safety of Europe. So that has to be our primary concern. These sanctions on the energy sector, particularly, we need to long-term have a more secure Europe on energy sources. We know that. But in the short-term, we have to make sure that energy is not used as a weapon, as Mr. Putin is trying to do. That only will lead to bad results. So for all these reasons, we have to stay resolved and resolute in our force to say that we will impose the heaviest possible sanctions if there are further incursions into Russia. AKIKO FUJITA: Let's talk about more domestic issues. You have been, for some time here, calling for additional funds here to combat COVID-19. I know there was a request in from the Health and Human Services Department that called for $30 billion in additional funds. Given how much was spent on this most recent wave for Omicron, where do those discussions stand right now? And how are you thinking about that, number one, in terms of additional budgets that are needed on the health care side to fight the virus, and then the amount of money that could potentially go to small businesses that are still hurting in a big way? BEN CARDIN: Well, we have some unfunded programs now that need to be completely funded. And that is the Restaurant Revitalization Fund. We made certain commitments. The money, it was not adequate. We need to replenish those funds. That should be done as soon as possible. I hope we can get it done in early March. In regards to additional COVID needs, there's clearly a need in our health resources to make sure that we can stay ahead of the next variant. And there's likely to be another variant. So we have to have the funds necessary to do all of the preparation, including vaccination preparations, the therapeutic drugs, protective equipment, testing. All that will require additional resources. And as they're needed, we have to make those resources available. And then we hope we're at near the end of the tunnel in regards to this COVID point, the impact it has on our economy. But if it continues, then we have to be prepared again to step forward, as we did in the past, to make sure that our economy can continue even during a pandemic. AKIKO FUJITA: You talk about the challenges in the economy. Certainly a lot of Americans feeling the pinch from price pressures and inflation now hitting a 40-year high. That has certainly hurt this administration, at least, in the eye of the public. And I wonder where you stand especially on a potential holiday on the federal gas tax. That's something that has been raised by other Democratic lawmakers. The cynical take would be to what extent that can really bring down prices and how much of this is motivated politically. Where do you stand on that? And should there be a bit of a reprieve, given how far up gas taxes have run? BEN CARDIN: Well, I understand that we have to deal with the short-term pressures that American families are sustaining, so I recognize that. But the deal with the causes for inflation, we really do need to deal with the labor force to have more people able to work. And that means in the Build Back Better agenda, affordable child care is critically important. We've got to protect our supply chains as one of the principal reasons why we seeing a shortage of goods, and therefore an increase in price. And that means pass the legislation that is passed by both the House and Senate that needs to be reconciled that would make America more products produced here in our own country. They are the two things I think we can do the most to protect against the impact of higher costs. But we recognize that American families are hurting, and that's why we want to deal with more affordable housing, more affordable educational costs. We want to deal with the cost centers that are affecting American families. AKIKO FUJITA: Specifically on the federal gas tax, though, would you support a suspension? BEN CARDIN: Well, it depends. We have to make sure that there's adequate resources to carry out our infrastructure and our transportation programs. It's not just as simple as a holiday. It's a question of how we're going to adequately fund the needs that are critically important. You know, the transit needs, the road needs, broadband, all these are important services that the American people need, and we have to make sure we can continue to carry out those programs. AKIKO FUJITA: Well, Senator Ben Cardin, we always enjoy having you on the show. I hope to have you back on again soon. Maryland Senator Ben Cardin there joining us today from Baltimore. Coming up, existing home sales--

On February 16, Helsinki Commission Chairman Sen. Ben Cardin (MD) spoke about Russian aggression toward Ukraine with David Westin on Bloomberg's Balance of Power. "You cannot believe anything that Mr. Putin says," he said. "We understand what he is saying for public relations purposes, but to date we have not seen any major withdrawal of troops from the border. Russia did everything necessary to start an invasion. The troops are lined up; the so support personnel are there. So, we are still at a very high-tension level. Obviously, we would do everything we can on the diplomatic front, so that we could avoid what Russia is doing, but they need to have an off ramp and we don’t know whether Mr. Putin wants an off ramp or not."

ZHANGJIAKOU, China (AP) — Legal troubles for the coach and others in Russian figure skater Kamila Valieva’s orbit could emerge in the United States even after her doping case from the Beijing Games has been resolved. Anti-doping experts say the episode falls under the scope of a recently enacted U.S. law that criminalizes doping schemes in events involving American athletes. The law calls for fines of up to $1 million and prison sentences of up to 10 years for those who participate in doping programs that influence international sports. “Doctors and coaches who give performance-enhancing drugs to athletes are directly liable” under the new law, said one of its authors, attorney Jim Walden. “They are at risk of jail, steep fines, and forfeiture. And I suspect the FBI is already hot on this trail.” On Monday, The Court of Arbitration for Sport cleared Valieva to compete in the women’s competition this week. Still unresolved is what to do about the gold medal the Russians won — with Valieva as the headliner — in last week’s mixed team competition. Because Valieva is 15, and considered a “protected person” under global anti-doping rules, the sanctions against her could be light. That does not exempt her entourage from possible anti-doping penalties beyond the possible stripping of the medal from the Russian team. Walden and others expect those same people to come under investigation by U.S. law-enforcement, as well. “The latest Russian doping scandal in Beijing is exactly why we passed the Rodchenkov Anti-Doping Act. Doping is corruption,” said Sen Ben Cardin, D-Maryland, who is involved in anti-doping issues. Walden represents the bill’s namesake, Grigory Rodchenkov, the Russian lab director who blew the whistle on the complex, widespread Russian doping scheme designed to help the country win medals at the 2014 Sochi Games and elsewhere. Rodchenkov now lives in hiding. The Rodchenkov Act wasn’t designed to go after athletes. It targets coaches, doctors and other members of an athlete’s entourage who are accused of arranging doping programs in any event that involves U.S. athletes, sponsors or broadcasters. The bill, supported by Walden, the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency and others, passed by unanimous consent through both houses of Congress and was signed into law in December 2020. It was considered a remarkable achievement considering the polarization in U.S. politics. Officials at the White House drug control office in both the Trump and Biden administrations have been critical of global anti-doping regulators. They threatened to withhold funding from the World Anti-Doping Agency, but recently paid their remaining dues despite some major concerns. The law’s first test came last month when federal officials charged a doctor of providing drugs to an “Athlete A,” who The Associated Press identified as Nigerian sprinter Blessing Okagbare. The IOC and WADA lobbied against parts of the bill. Their main argument was that it gave U.S. law enforcement too much leverage in policing anti-doping cases that occur outside its own borders. This case — a Russian who was found to have doped on Dec. 25 at a national championship — appears, at first glance, to fit that profile. WADA said it took six weeks for officials to receive the test from a lab in Sweden because Russia’s anti-doping agency (RUSADA) failed to flag it as a priority. That Valieva was allowed to compete at the Olympics turns it into an international episode. WADA said in a statement that it was “disappointed in the ruling,” and that it, too, would “look into” Valieva’s support personnel. Russia’s anti-doping agency has also begun an investigation. But critics of WADA and the IOC argue the bill was passed because the international anti-doping system has proven it can’t police its own. They point to the sanctions handed to Russia over the past eight years as Exhibit A. Part of those sanctions resulted in years’ worth of suspensions and reforms for RUSADA, which is overseeing this case. Critics contend the case involving Valieva might not have erupted had the country — whose athletes are competing in Beijing under the banner of “Russian Olympic Committee” due to the sanctions — been penalized appropriately. “If I were a betting man, I’d say there’s a 95% chance that this is a good case for” the law, said Rob Koehler, the head of the advocacy group Global Athlete. Though there are harsh penalties under the law, it’s hard to imagine U.S. authorities would ever get their hands on Russians if they were indicted. Still, an indictment would have an impact. It could curtail their ability to travel or coach outside of Russia, since the United States has extradition deals with dozens of countries across the globe. Valieva tested positive for the banned heart medication trimetazidine. “We need more facts, but you can envision a case like this under Rodchenkov,” USADA CEO Travis Tygart said. “This drug doesn’t just show up out of nowhere. Assuming the facts play out that someone was involved in giving it to her to enhance performance, it fits like a glove.”

At a February 3 Helsinki Commission hearing on Russian aggression toward Ukraine, William B. Taylor, an expert on Russia and former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, told Commissioners,  "I believe President Putin will blink. I think Presidents Biden and Zelensky are staring him down successfully. Putin appears, for now, to be seeking negotiations. He has complained about but has not rejected the responses from the United States and NATO to his demands."

Europe begins the new year on the brink of major war. Russia has amassed more than 100,000 troops and heavy equipment along Ukraine’s border and issued an ultimatum to the West demanding it trade Ukraine’s sovereignty in exchange for its peace. Such demands are a strategic nonstarter, but the seriousness of the Kremlin’s threats appear all too real. To stop this war before it begins, muddling through is not an option; this demands immediate and bold action. Russia claims its 100,000-plus troops at Ukraine’s doorstep is a response to NATO enlargement and its infrastructure in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. These arguments are unconvincing. The Kremlin has used NATO as a straw man for its grievances, yet Russian disquiet has little to do with NATO itself, which has no immediate plans to expand anywhere near Russia and would not threaten Russia if it did. Although the United States and its European partners have provided material and technical military assistance to Ukraine, it has not changed the region’s balance of power. Instead, Russia’s demands evince anxiety over global status and the possibility that its borderlands may be able to escape from its grip. In particular, Ukraine has the size and industrial capacity to make it a credible economic and military power regardless of whether it joins NATO. For Russia, a strong and hostile Ukraine is intolerable, even though Russian aggression husbanded Ukraine’s pro-West turn. By supporting Donbass separatism and annexing Crimea, the Kremlin stoked patriotism in Ukraine, lanced Ukraine’s most Russia-friendly population, and earned Kyiv’s hostility. Ukraine is not the only country for which this applies, but it may be the most significant given its size, geography, and symbolic position in official Russian neoimperial mythology. War should be avoided at all reasonable costs. Another invasion would risk tens of millions of lives and further undermine Europe’s increasingly fragile security. The United States and Europe should be willing to negotiate in good faith to avoid wider conflict—so long as Ukraine, Georgia, and Eastern Europe’s sovereignty are preserved. However, acceding to Russia’s maximalist demands would strip Ukraine of its already battered sovereignty and invite a new Iron Curtain over Europe—consigning many millions of people to generations of domination and conflict. History and international relations theory may offer some guidance in this crisis. In the runup to the Peloponnesian War between the sprawling Athenian league and Sparta’s opposing empire, Athens faced a dilemma between its ally Corcyra and Corinth, a powerful member of the Spartan alliance. As chronicled by classical historian Donald Kagan in his On the Origins of War: And the Preservation of Peace, Corcyra called on Athens for protection, but Athens was anxious to intervene lest it precipitate a ruinous great-power war with Sparta, which was increasingly fearful that Athens, the rising force in Greece, would eclipse Spartan power. Yet Athens worried that abandoning Corcyra would undermine its alliances and invite Spartan aggression. As a compromise, Athens deployed a mere 10 ships out of its vast 400-ship fleet to join the Corcyraeans in the hopes that it would be enough to deter Corinth’s advancing 150-ship armada. However, as Kagan notes, Athens’s symbolic deployment was not strong enough to deter Corinth—much less defeat it—but too aggressive to completely assuage Spartan fears about Athenian ambitions. In the ensuing Battle of Sybota, the Corinthian armada destroyed the combined Corcyraean-Athenian fleet, launching a spiral of events that led to the devastating Peloponnesian War. As the United States deliberates with its partners and allies to craft countermeasures against Kremlin aggression, the West should avoid its own 10-ship trap. In some ways, NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit decision is an example, where the alliance promised eventual membership to Georgia and Ukraine without a concrete pathway. This compromise left Georgia and Ukraine vulnerable while stoking the Kremlin’s strategic anxieties. The recently departed Columbia University political scientist Robert Jervis considered such problems in his international relations theory classic Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Jervis weighed deterrence against a “spiral” model, which posited that counterescalating in response to perceived escalation could provoke the opposite of the intended response. An attempt at deterrence could instead be viewed as further provocation. While deterrence preaches strength and resolution, the spiral model generally counsels conciliation. However, Jervis theorized that while the deterrence and spiral models are often presented as opposing, generalizable theories, their usefulness varies with the circumstances. He surmised that deterrence is applicable between two powers with genuinely incompatible positions, and the spiral model best applies to disputes between status quo powers where their perceived incompatibility is mostly illusory. One exercise Jervis suggests is to interrogate evidence that the second power is not engaged in revisionist aggression. In this case, a charitable reading of Russian actions suggests that Russia’s grievances are oriented to the security situation on its borders—the “belt of Russia’s vital interests.” In this interpretation, Russia’s historical influence along its borders need not be a cause for alarm on its own, much less for war. Indeed, if arms limitations and codes of conduct represent an acceptable compromise to defuse the present crisis without sacrificing the freedom or sovereignty of the states on Russia’s border, this is worth pursuing. However, which vital interests necessitate Russian dominion over its periphery? Although Russia’s perceptions of insecurity may be real, it is demonstrably not materially insecure, with a large, full-spectrum, and sophisticated military that is arguably the most powerful in Europe. Russia’s neighbors are far weaker, Western states largely disarmed after the Soviet Union’s dissolution, and remnant Allied forces remained in Western Europe in compliance with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, even as Russia has significantly militarized. And Russia’s economic fortunes are far better served by peace and integration with the West, not conflict. However, the stability and integrity of European security architecture as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act remain fundamental to U.S. national security. Any countenance of the Kremlin’s broader abrogation of that framework and the restoration of a new Yalta Conference would reverse decades of peace and prosperity—and likely drive continental militarization that would only compound Russian security anxieties and conflict. It appears the West and the Russian regime’s positions are indeed incompatible. In response, the United States and its allies must be wary of the 10-ship trap. Although caution is often a virtue in national security and foreign policymaking, a moderate response to the enormity and notoriety of Russia’s belligerence would likely neither protect Ukraine nor satisfy Russian imperial appetites. Broad economic sanctions on their own are likely to be sufficient to forestall an invasion; and token, light deployments behind NATO’s high walls while Ukraine burns will inflame Kremlin paranoia without arresting or appreciably punishing Russian militarism. Negotiations and diplomacy should be given the time to work, and any kind of durable solution is unlikely to completely satisfy either party. However, the United States and its allies should undergird these talks with serious and significant measures to prevent another, greater war in Ukraine before it begins. As in Corcyra, half measures are unlikely to ameliorate the crisis and may only exacerbate them. What, then, do full measures look like? The critical factors here are speed and plausibility: steps that not only can be taken quickly but that Russia will believe Washington will carry through. Although economic sanctions have been broadly regarded as useful tools in this regard, most measures being envisioned are likely already baked into Russian calculations or may not have an immediate effect. In addition, the United States—and Europe, if it is willing—should significantly curtail Russian energy imports and aim to wean Russian hydrocarbons from European markets entirely—perhaps even going so far as to employ Defense Production Act authorities to stockpile and potentially surge liquefied natural gas and other fuel alternatives to Central and Eastern Europe. Boosting other energy sources on a strategic scale could also accompany this approach. Moscow must be convinced that military aggression will only dramatically increase and complicate what it believes are its existing security vulnerabilities. Toward that end, the United States and Europe could begin studying withdrawal from the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and planning can begin in earnest for repositioning heavy forces in Europe in the event of a wider Russian war. NATO can signal that new European applications for NATO membership would be welcomed and expediently ratified (perhaps even pre-ratified in some form), particularly from Sweden and Finland, should Russia go through with its militaristic gambit. Washington could also consider scenarios to provide aspirants—Ukraine, Georgia, and potentially the Nordics—with bilateral treaty guarantees prior to NATO accession. In Corcyra, the compromise of 10 Athenian ships only served to anger Corinth and Sparta as well as fed beliefs that war was not only necessary but an urgent enterprise. Against the colossal coercive symbolism and military reality posed by the Russian buildup—and the even greater weight of the Kremlin’s demands—the United States and Europe should prepare responses to match the moment. Michael Hikari Cecire is a senior policy advisor at the U.S. Helsinki Commission.