Title

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The Fight Against Corruption Needs Economists
Foreign Affairs
Josh Rudolph
Monday, May 17, 2021

Combating corruption and kleptocracy has traditionally been an afterthought in U.S. foreign policy: a goal that most policymakers considered laudable but hardly a priority. That attitude is no longer acceptable. In recent years, countries such as China and Russia have “weaponized” corruption, as Philip Zelikow, Eric Edelman, Kristofer Harrison, and Celeste Ward Gventer argued in these pages last year. For the ruling regimes in those countries, they wrote, bribery and graft have “become core instruments of national strategy” through which authoritarian rulers seek to exploit “the relative openness and freedom of democratic countries [that] make them particularly vulnerable to this kind of malign influence.”

Strikingly, one particular form of financial aggression—covert foreign money funneled directly into the political processes of democracies—has increased by a factor of ten since 2014. Over roughly the same period of time, American voters have become highly receptive to narratives about corruption, and politicians across the ideological spectrum now routinely allege that the economy is rigged and deride their opponents as crooked and corrupt. Thus, the needs of U.S. foreign policy and domestic politics have neatly aligned to offer a historic opportunity for a sweeping anticorruption campaign that would institutionalize transparency, resilience, and accountability throughout the United States and in the international financial, diplomatic, and legal systems.

President Joe Biden, his closest foreign policy advisers, and an increasingly active cohort of lawmakers are intent on carrying out precisely that kind of effort. But there is one big problem: leaders in the Treasury Department and some of the officials running international economic policy in the Biden administration are not fully on board. Their reluctance to focus on corruption could severely hinder the mission, because they control the most powerful tools that Washington can bring to the fight.

Follow the Money

No American political figure has done more to frame corruption as a national security issue than Biden. As vice president, he led the U.S. fight against graft abroad and publicly warned in 2015 that, for authoritarian states, “corruption is the new tool of foreign policy.” Writing as a presidential candidate in these pages, Biden promised to issue a policy directive enshrining anticorruption as a core national security interest and pledged to “lead efforts internationally to bring transparency to the global financial system” and to “go after illicit tax havens.” Fighting corruption will be a major focus of the Summit for Democracy that Biden pledged to host in his first year in office.

The foreign policy specialists who have spent years working with Biden are all in sync on this issue. In his first major speech as secretary of state, Antony Blinken prioritized fighting corruption in the contexts of both economic inclusivity and democratic renewal. Blinken has already bestowed honorary awards on anticorruption activists and banned the most powerful oligarch in Ukraine from entering the United States due to corruption; he is now considering naming an anticorruption special envoy. Samantha Power, who heads the United States Agency for International Development, recently wrote that fighting corruption is crucial to restoring U.S. leadership and pledged that doing so would be “a huge priority” at the agency under her leadership. In his first interview after being named the national security adviser, Jake Sullivan said that combating corruption and kleptocracy is one of his highest goals, and the administration’s interim national security strategic guidance mentions corruption half a dozen times.

The leadership at the Treasury Department, however, does not seem nearly as focused on the issue, taking few specific steps to start fighting corruption in the first 100 days of the administration. Until recently, the word “corruption” never appeared in any Treasury speeches, tweets, readouts of calls with foreign officials, or press releases (except for mostly stock language in a few sanctions announcements). In late April, Treasury did release an expression of support for a British anticorruption initiative. But according to one administration official, the White House instructed Treasury to make that statement. When Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen separately addressed international standards against dirty money, rather than calling for a focus on corruption, she emphasized two other priorities: the role of virtual assets such as cryptocurrencies and the financing that enables the proliferation of weapons. At first, Yellen’s inattention to corruption seemed entirely understandable, because she was focused on the public health and economic crises caused by the pandemic. But when she laid out her international agenda in a February letter to the G-20 and in a major speech in April, she did not describe combating corruption and kleptocracy as a priority. Correcting these omissions in a clear and public way should be a top priority for Treasury’s second 100 days.

Dirty Money, Dismal Science

Mobilizing financial regulations and international diplomacy to wage war on corruption and kleptocracy might not come naturally to economists, even accomplished ones such as Yellen and her staffers, because economics has come to be seen as an academic discipline independent of the realities of state power. That is partly because, during the Cold War, Washington’s strategic goals and its economic interests generally converged: in an ideological competition against communism, the spread of free trade and free markets also naturally advanced the geopolitical campaign to win support for liberal democratic capitalism. Hence there was little need for American economists to pay close attention to strategic considerations, because there was not much tension between purely economic interests and U.S. grand strategy.

Since then, however, the nature of authoritarian regimes has evolved, with strategic implications for U.S. policy. Instead of trying to win over the hearts and minds of the masses with communist ideology, the countries that threaten U.S. power today are organized as kleptocracies, stealing from their own people to buy the loyalty of cronies. They hide their ill-gotten gains in Western markets, which presents an Achilles’ heel if financial authorities can manage to find their dirty money.

Unfortunately, this new reality has not yet been taken on board by most economists. In many cases, their views have been shaped by a neoliberal consensus that fails to account for the ways in which deregulation and globalization opened pathways to subvert American democracy and reinforce the power of kleptocracies. Meanwhile, policymakers hoping to shift away from neoliberal dogma have generally not included anticorruption as an element of economic policy. The Biden administration’s vision of a “foreign policy for the middle class,” for example, leaves out fighting corruption. Elsewhere, the administration has cast anticorruption efforts as part of its campaign to revitalize democracy rather than as part of its agenda to set international economic policies that can serve all Americans. And when Yellen has described the costs of corruption, she has focused on its negative effects on growth and poverty in other countries rather than the threat it poses to U.S. national security.

All Aboard

If Biden wants to make progress against corruption, he needs to push his Treasury Department to get with the program. A good first step would be to start preparing a National Corruption Risk Assessment that would expose the financial networks used by oligarchs and kleptocrats. Next month, the department will publish guidance for banks regarding anti–money laundering priorities, and it should use that occasion to emphasize the risks of corruption. And for a broader public audience, a top Treasury official should give a major speech launching a war on corruption, perhaps at the first-ever United Nations session dedicated to corruption, which is scheduled for early June.

Treasury should also develop strong regulations for implementing a law that Congress enacted in January that outlaws anonymous shell companies. According to a number of anticorruption experts who maintain contacts in the administration and who have been imploring senior Treasury officials to prioritize this issue, the department was initially reluctant to designate a senior official to serve as a point person for these regulations. Eventually, public pressure from outside critics and private urging from security and economic officials in the White House led to an appointment. Citing funding constraints, however, Treasury has still not hired outside experts to advise it on enforcing the new law, such as civil society advocates who know which regulations to prioritize, what lobbying pushback to expect, and how to close loopholes through seemingly mundane steps such as updating standard forms.

Fortunately, lawmakers are ramping up pressure on Treasury to get serious about prioritizing anticorruption. On May 3, Representative Tom Malinowski, Democrat from New Jersey, and Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Democrat from Rhode Island, wrote a letter to Yellen to “underscore the crucial role of Treasury in combatting international corruption and kleptocracy and to urge you to take early steps to confront this key national security threat.” Malinowski and Whitehouse argued that “the top policy priority in the fight against dirty money should now become the expansion of [anti–money laundering] obligations to cover financial facilitators and professional service providers that can enable corruption.”

They recommended first regulating private equity firms and hedge funds before moving on to real estate companies, lawyers, accountants, and others who sometimes enable bribery and graft. They also suggested that Treasury should “lead a landmark international agreement to end offshore financial secrecy and illicit tax havens once and for all . . . backed up by concrete commitments around an array of reporting mechanisms.” Malinowski and Whitehouse also called on Yellen to develop a medium-term anti-kleptocracy plan and appoint anticorruption specialists at Treasury. Meanwhile, the Helsinki Commission—an interagency body created by Congress in 1975 to coordinate security policy with Europe—plans to launch a new “counter-kleptocracy caucus” in June to share perspectives and coordinate efforts across political parties and congressional committees.

Congressional attention to this issue is good news. But to live up to Biden’s ambitious vision for fighting corruption, his entire administration needs to match Capitol Hill’s energy. And that means making sure that every department—including Treasury—devotes itself to the effort.

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  • U.S. Helsinki Commission Seminar on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement

    By Alex T. Johnson, Policy Advisor, U.S. Helsinki Commission      Marlene Kaufmann, General Counsel, U.S. Helsinki Commission      Troy C. Ware, Policy Advisor (CBCF Fellow), U.S. Helsinki Commission      Christian Sy, Legislative Assistant, Office of Congressman Alcee L. Hastings United States Representative Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL), Co-Chairman of the United States Helsinki Commission (CSCE) and Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), recently convened the “CSCE Seminar on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement,” July 22 and 23 at the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C. The seminar hosted more than 50 participants from the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as Members of the United States Congress, U.S. government officials, non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives, and special guests. Delegations of the Mediterranean Partner States consisted of parliamentarians and representatives from their Washington-based diplomatic corps. Special guests included representatives of Greece, the current Chair-in-Office of the OSCE, and delegates from Kazakhstan which will chair the OSCE in 2010, staff representation of the OSCE and OSCE PA International Secretariats, as well as representation of the Swedish Presidency of the European Union. Congressman Hastings opened the seminar with words of welcome for the Mediterranean Partners and special guests, and challenged them to use the event for a frank discussion and exchange of ideas on how to strengthen the OSCE’s partnership with its Mediterranean neighbors. He also chaired each session of the two-day event. Presentations were also given on the first day by OSCE PA President João Soares of Portugal, OSCE PA President Emeritus Göran Lennmarker of Sweden, OSCE PA Vice President Jerry Grafstein of Canada, Director of the Office of the OSCE Secretary General Paul Fritch, and Barry Pavel of the National Security Council. Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi and U.S. House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer hosted the delegation for a reception to conclude the first day of proceedings. The second day’s sessions included presentations by Dalia Mogahed of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, Ian Lesser of the German Marshall Fund, OSCE Personal Representative on Mediterranean Affairs Sotiris Roussos and additional contributions by OSCE PA President João Soares. Opening Session The opening session consisted of a panel discussion which began with remarks from Representative Alcee L. Hastings and Senator Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission and OSCE PA Vice President. OSCE PA President João Soares, OSCE PA President Emeritus Göran Lennmarker, and OSCE PA Vice President Jerry Grafstein delivered keynote presentations for this panel. In sum, the presentations established a framework for the proceedings of the seminar by characterizing the historical developments of Mediterranean Partner engagement in the OSCE and identifying key priorities for enhanced engagement with the partners. Representative Hastings stressed the importance of convening the seminar, specifically to return due prominence and functionality to the OSCE Mediterranean Dimension, which he has long advocated in the OSCE PA and during his recent tenure as its president. Hastings noted that similar goals have been recently prioritized by other multilateral institutions. Senator Cardin noted the considerable work of Helsinki Commissioners in the realm of OSCE Mediterranean Partner engagement through Congressional delegation visits to both current and potential partners as well as hearings in Washington. Cardin also emphasized what he sees as an opportunity to strengthen the OSCE’s relationship with its Partners for Cooperation by the addition of new regional partners in both the Mediterranean and in Asia, namely Lebanon, Syria, and Pakistan. President Soares commended the emergence of several formal documents and proposals for empowering the partnership submitted by the Mediterranean Partners. Soares’ remarks centered around the importance of the OSCE as the most qualified international organization to address challenges within the OSCE region and its partners, proven through its successes in Central Asia and the Caucuses. He also emphasized the importance of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly which perpetuates that spirit of dialogue embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, whose principles he asserted will help achieve the goals of the countries of the Mediterranean region. President Emeritus Lennmarker explored how the OSCE, as a key mechanism through which Europe engages its own persisting challenges, could serve as a powerful model for mitigating the tremendous economic, human, and political costs of conflicts in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. The President Emeritus cautioned against protectionism in the region and offered the enhancement of the OSCE Mediterranean Dimension as a vehicle to promote prosperity. The Opening Session concluded with remarks by Vice President Grafstein who urged the creation of regional trade agreements to spur economic growth and promote political stability in the region. Working Meeting on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement OSCE Mediterranean Partner States continue to be actively engaged in the activities of the OSCE and send strong delegations to ministerial level gatherings and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly events. Mediterranean Partners also send delegations to OSCE election monitoring missions and participate in technical exchanges to build capacity. Recent years have seen an increase in opportunities for engagement by the Mediterranean Partners, but there are still a number of challenges to overcome. The working meeting of the seminar sought to explore methods to improve participation by the Mediterranean Partners and expand engagement in OSCE activities. Topics of discussion included prioritizing implementation of OSCE agreements related to the Mediterranean Partner States, identifying uses for the OSCE Partnership Fund, and procedures to increase engagement in the executive structures of the OSCE. Guiding questions for the discussion included: How can we prioritize implementation of the OSCE agreements and initiatives related to Mediterranean Partner States? What should be the priorities for the OSCE Partnership Fund? How can Mediterranean Partner States become more engaged in the executive structures of the OSCE and other tangible partnerships? Paul Fritch of the OSCE Secretariat guided the working meeting by describing the mandate of the OSCE Partners for Cooperation and characterizing the current level of engagement by the Partner States. He identified key considerations and challenges that should be addressed, as well as the successes of Mediterranean Partner Engagement with the OSCE on matters of tolerance, anti-terrorism cooperation, and migration management. Participants made the following recommendations: The Mediterranean Partners must translate their valued relationship with the OSCE into engagement across the entire span of work in all three dimensions of the OSCE – political-security, economic, and human – building on their successful contributions in anti-terrorism cooperation, migration management, and tolerance. The OSCE Partnership Fund should continue to be utilized to inspire ownership of the process of partnership. Specifically, the Fund should foster civil society engagement in the activities of the Mediterranean Partners and be used to promote Partner participation in all activities of the OSCE. The OSCE must build synergy with other regional cooperation mechanisms such as NATO, the European Union, and others, as well as promote cooperative initiatives affiliated with these institutions. The OSCE must clearly negotiate its role and articulate its contributions to the States engaged in the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation. Currently, extensively overlapping mandates with other international initiatives inhibits the potential for tangible achievements of the Partnership. Expectations of engagement from Mediterranean Partners States must be clearly defined, especially the role of parliamentarians. Appropriate measures should then be taken to facilitate further engagement. Inversely, the OSCE must clearly define what it gains from the engagement of the Mediterranean Partners States. Efforts should be made to promote appropriate diplomatic exchanges with the OSCE through a formalized mechanism, internship, or fellowship to offer training to the diplomatic corps and civil service of Mediterranean Partner States regarding the principles of the Helsinki Process, the organization and functions of the OSCE and the potential to use OSCE institutions and mechanisms to promote economic development and political stability. Opportunities for support and consultation from the various institutions and offices of the OSCE should continue to be explored. Such partnerships should include (but are not limited to) engagement with the Office of the Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, ODHIR, Strategic Police Matters Unit, Gender Unit, Office of the Coordinator for Environmental and Economic Activities, Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the Office of the Special Representative on the Freedom of the Media. Increased Mediterranean Partner engagement in the Environmental and Economic Dimension of the OSCE should be further explored, particularly with respect to water security and water management, as well as trade enhancement. Mechanisms to promote regional food security should also be examined. Cooperation among the Mediterranean Partners must be strengthened prior to consideration of additional States for entry as partners of the OSCE; specifically, the Partnership could be utilized for the implementation of confidence building mechanisms. Efforts should be made to galvanize the potential of the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership as a forum to expand political will for reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Session 1: Expert Seminar on Security in the Mediterranean The engagement of OSCE Mediterranean Partners in the activities of the OSCE has largely emphasized opportunities for cooperation and capacity development on hard and soft security matters. The most recent 2008 OSCE Mediterranean Conference in Amman emphasized the importance of increased public diplomacy efforts, further cooperation with civil society in counter-terrorism efforts, and enhanced cooperation with other regional cooperation mechanisms. Barry Pavel of the National Security Council engaged participants on the regional security priorities of the Obama Administration and the outlook for regional initiatives. Points for this discussion included: What developing transnational trends (environmental, economic, demographic, energy/resource scarcity) are of most concern to Mediterranean Partner States from a broad security perspective? What particular challenges and opportunities arise from the blurring between clearly foreign and domestic policy security issues? How can engagement with other regional cooperation mechanisms, such as NATO and the European Union, increase the security of the Mediterranean Partner States? Key recommendations and themes emanating from this session included: President Barack Obama’s Cairo speech was recognized as a noteworthy start to the United States’ relations with the countries of the Middle East. However, quick action is required for the momentum to be maintained. The speech expressed many concerns shared by people in the Arab world. More specifically, the time frame for peace talks is critical for a number of reasons. In January, 2010 the term of the current Palestinian Authority Chairman ends. Moreover, experience has shown that the first year of an American presidency is the time for action. Afterwards, other items on the President’s agenda will demand more attention. Food security, the financial crisis, immigration, and development are priority issues for the region that must not be neglected. Answers must be sought as to why people are risking their lives to leave their countries. The Obama Administration should not reverse course on free trade with the region. Prior U.S. leadership in free trade compelled other nations to engage the Middle East in trade. The OSCE should be used to assist in the peace process and economic development for the region. The U.S. must appoint an ambassador to the OSCE quickly. Europe has a critical role to play. Economic engagement must be stepped up and protectionist urges resisted. The rise of Islamophobia is also a problem Europe must address to promote mutual understanding and security in the Mediterranean Region and beyond. Session 2: Expert Seminar on Current Issues in the Mediterranean: “Youth of the OSCE Mediterranean Partners: Assets, Challenges, and the Way Forward” Youth throughout the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States are often seen as a demographic time bomb, making up a 40-60% of their nation’s population. This session of the seminar emphasized the solidarity of the Mediterranean Partners in addressing the current demographic needs. Dalia Mogahed of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies helped the participants conceptualize the young men and women of the region as its greatest resource and defined strategies for harnessing their energy to promote prosperity. Questions addressed in this session: What are the main assets of this group on which to build? What challenges do they face in contributing to their society? What recommendations does the research suggest will best unleash their potential? Key recommendations and themes emanating from this session included: Conduct studies throughout the OSCE Mediterranean Partner region to further investigate issues relevant to youth and identify challenges and country-specific solutions to providing a quality education, requisite job training, essential computer skills, access to capital for entrepreneurship, student exchanges, and opportunities for dialogue with government leaders while ensuring freedom and democracy. Strengthen the relationships between OSCE Mediterranean Partner States, the Arab League, and organizations that conduct these studies, e.g. the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies and the Bibliotheca Alexandrina in Alexandria, Egypt, and share findings and recommendations in the Arab League’s Annual Report. Address the inadequacies of the education system in each of the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States and make comprehensive reforms to ensure that all graduates have the education necessary to attain jobs that maximize their potential, utilize their assets, allow them to contribute to their societies, and help realize their personal and professional goals. Increase access to job training while reevaluating its role in respect to education. Consult and engage youth in the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States about issues important to them, especially concerning conflict, through youth councils and provide them with opportunities for continuing dialogues with government leaders. Listen to the concerns and recommendations of other countries within the OSCE and around the world concerning issues of mutual interest and share innovative ideas. Consider declaring 2010 a “world year” and hold a youth conference under the auspices of the United Nations to affirm global values. Invest in programs together with the private and public sectors to provide cell phones, computers, and Internet access to communities and schools to increase computer literacy and close the digital divide. Bring computers, computer skills, Internet connectivity, job training, and jobs to rural areas in the Mediterranean. Reduce government and market corruption, as well as nepotism in each of the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States. Simplify the bureaucratic process for entrepreneurship and increase access to capital. Address different levels of freedom and democracy in each of the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States. Continue to collect accurate and useful data that reflects the needs and desires of youth in the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States in order to drive effective policy development by governments and practical engagement with the private sector. Promote student exchange programs for students of all ages to foster understanding, solidarity, and the sharing of ideas between the youth of the OSCE Mediterranean Partner states and the world. Session 3: Expert Seminar on Current Issues in the OSCE Region In recent years, OSCE Mediterranean Partner States have had an opportunity to contribute to ministerial documents and proposals on reform of the OSCE. However, appropriate venues for the Mediterranean Partners to offer their perspectives on challenges, conflicts, and priorities within the OSCE region remain infrequent. Topics explored in this session included: What experiences in security cooperation among the Mediterranean Partners inform current initiatives in the OSCE region? What partnerships and exchanges within the OSCE and beyond can be prioritized to offer expertise from Mediterranean Partners to confront challenges within the OSCE region? Ian Lesser of the German Marshall Fund of the United States facilitated this session to provide an opportunity for Mediterranean Partner delegations to offer their expertise and experience to assist in confronting challenges within the OSCE region. He specifically characterized shared challenges in security between the OSCE region (consistency of capitalization) and Mediterranean Partners, as well as the outlook for their combined geopolitical region. This outlook consisted of future challenges in maritime security, migration, resource conflicts, cascading nuclear and arms proliferation, as well as environmental degradation. The discussion evolved into further exploration of mechanisms for cooperation between the Mediterranean Partners and the OSCE participating States, building on the themes of the Working Meeting on the first day of the seminar. Key recommendations from this session included: Capacity development for institutions facilitating cooperation must be prioritized. Frequent opportunities for dialogue exist within the multiplicity of “Mediterranean” frameworks affiliated with the European Union, NATO, and other international organizations. Capacity development for institutions affiliated with these international organizations should focus on avoiding a duplication of efforts and extensive competition over resources. New institutions for cooperation do not need to be developed. Existing institutions must be utilized in a more rational and effective manner throughout the OSCE region. Increased commercial activity and resource exchanges among the OSCE participating States and with their Mediterranean Partners would promote regional stability. The participating States of the OSCE should recognize the unique expertise of the Mediterranean Partners in thwarting challenges to maritime security and generate alliances and technical exchanges to address piracy and other security concerns. Concluding Session Participants in the CSCE Seminar on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement synthesized their perceptions of the seminar during the final session of the seminar. Conclusions offered by the participants included: The success of cooperative initiatives between the OSCE and the Mediterranean Partners will require greater leadership and agenda development from the Mediterranean Partners. Distinguishing appropriate and distinct roles for the various regional cooperation mechanisms in the Mediterranean region will be contingent on robust participation from the Mediterranean Partner delegations in the meetings and planning discussions of the different entities. More tangible progress toward cooperation will be made between the OSCE and the Mediterranean Partners if events and conferences have a singular focus, rather than attempting to address all aspects of human security. Fewer priorities that are clearly articulated will make conferences more manageable and implementation more effective. A platform should be developed for closer OSCE institution interaction with regional cooperation mechanisms for the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Micro-institutions or taskforces must be developed for the implementation of agreed upon initiatives and recommendations emanating from conferences. U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearing - “Future of the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation” Following the CSCE Seminar on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement, an official hearing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe was convened. This hearing established an official record in the United States Congress for the proceedings of the seminar, with a particular emphasis on how participation mechanisms for OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation can be optimized and improved to promote greater regional cooperation. Ambassador William Hudson, Deputy Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, Mr. Sotiris Roussos, Personal Representative on Mediterranean Affairs to the Greek Chair-in-Office of the OSCE, and the Honorable João Soares, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, all testified before the U.S. Helsinki Commission during this hearing. Commissioners participating included Chairman Benjamin L. Cardin (MD), Co-Chairman Alcee L. Hastings (FL-23), Representative Robert Aderholt (AL-4), Representative Darrel Issa (CA-49), and Representative Mike McIntyre (NC-7). Representative Gwen Moore (WI-4) of the Committee on Financial Services and Committee on Small Business also participated in the hearing. The hearing reiterated the recommendations emanating from the CSCE Seminar on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement within the context of U.S. policy toward the region and priorities of the current leadership of the OSCE and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Witness recommendations included: Recognition of the role of the OSCE and its Mediterranean dimension for its potential to develop capacity for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle East. The activities and events of the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation generate one of the few spaces in which Israeli and Arab officials can convene open dialogue and consistently cooperate. The United States government looks forward to engaging the Mediterranean Partners on the reintegration of Iraq into the community of nations and on ways to resolve tension over oil and gas supply and demand issues in Eastern Europe. The United States government looks forward to further partnership with the Mediterranean Partners on migration, counter-terrorism, economic cooperation, and regional security. The United States government has contributed to the OSCE Partnership Fund to support NGO involvement in Mediterranean Partner events and Mediterranean Partner delegation and government training on human rights work in Warsaw through the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Support for similar efforts should continue. The prospect of a separate Helsinki Process for the Middle East or an Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East has been an idea circulated in recent years, but the use of a consensus process like that of the OSCE might not be optimal for the region. The Mediterranean Partners and other countries in the region have been involved in various regional organizations and processes revolving around similar core issues of the political military environment, the regional economy, and human development. More diverse priorities must be articulated by any division of labor that might be negotiated among international organizations and process. A mechanism or standing committee to facilitate coordination and collaboration among the principal international organization processes and dialogues in the Mediterranean region should be developed to prevent the duplication of initiatives and counter diminishing regional interest. A renewed focus on the environment and the economy in the Mediterranean region through the OSCE framework would help build capacity for cooperation and common ground for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and other Middle East security challenges. The expansion of markets, global communication infrastructure development, and improved educational access within the Mediterranean Partner States present greater opportunities for regional economic cooperation. The Arab-Israeli conflict greatly influences Mediterranean Partner engagement. Thus, regardless of outcome, a prompt response on the request of the Palestinian Authority’s request to join the OSCE Mediterranean Partner should be prioritized. Some believe that inclusion of the Palestinian Authority would expand a paradigm of confidence building and conflict resolution. The visibility of the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership should be enhanced and coupled with an expansion of initiatives to engage young leaders and young diplomats from the Mediterranean region. OSCE Partnership Fund initiatives should be coordinated for tangible results and mutual benefit of OSCE participating States and Mediterranean Partners. The flexibility and capacity for adaptation makes the OSCE one of the best international instruments for conflict resolution and it should be further utilized in the Mediterranean region. OSCE engagement can help advance the role of parliamentarians within Mediterranean Partner States. The OSCE Partnership Fund should be utilized for initiatives to empower women and promote entrepreneurship. Mediterranean Partner delegations should continue to be engaged in OSCE region election observation efforts and consider more frequent reciprocal exchanges. Conclusion The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Seminar on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement achieved its intended purpose of generating a space in which the delegations of the Mediterranean Partner States could frankly engage the current and future leadership of the OSCE and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on ways to enhance participation in events, processes, and initiatives. The seminar also served as a forum for Partner State delegations to discuss potential collaborative opportunities with the U.S. Administration and Members of Congress. Congressman Alcee L. Hastings, Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs and Senator Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman of the Helsinki Commission committed to working with the OSCE and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly leadership and international secretariats to implement the recommendations of the seminar. Congressman Hastings also committed to travelling once again in the coming year to the Mediterranean Partner States to follow up on the discussions of the seminar.

  • Bill Seeks Disclosure of Foreign Payments

    Five US senators have introduced a bill which would require companies with stock traded on US exchanges to report payments to foreign governments for oil, gas, and mineral extraction in their regular Securities and Exchange Commission filings. The measure is designed to prevent governments in countries rich with natural resources from hiding payments they receive from energy and mineral producers to finance corrupt activities, the lawmakers said. “History shows that oil and gas reserves and minerals can be a bane, not a blessing, for poor countries, leading to corruption, wasteful spending, military adventurism, and instability,” said Richard P. Lugar (R-Ind.), ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the bill’s primary sponsor. “Too often, oil money intended for a nation’s poor lines the pockets of the rich or is squandered on showcase projects instead of productive investments,” he continued. Sens. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-Md.), Russell J. Feingold (D-Wis.), Charles E. Schumer (D-NY), and Roger F. Wicker (R-Miss.) cosponsored the measure.

  • Commission Plays Leading Role at Parliamentary Assembly in Lithuania

    By Robert A. Hand, Policy Advisor A bipartisan U.S. delegation traveled to Vilnius, Lithuania June 29 for the 18th Annual Session of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA). The delegation participated fully in the activity of the Assembly’s Standing Committee, the plenary sessions and the Assembly’s three General Committees. Helsinki Commission Chairman Senator Benjamin L. Cardin led the delegation, which included the following commissioners: Co-Chairman Congressman Alcee L. Hastings, Ranking Minority Member Chris Smith, and Senator Roger Wicker, Representatives Louise McIntosh Slaughter, Mike McIntyre, G.K. Butterfield and Robert B. Aderholt. Senate Assistant Majority Leader Dick Durbin, Senator George Voinovich and Representatives Lloyd Doggett, Madeleine Z. Bordallo and Gwen Moore also joined the delegation. Background of the OSCE PA The Parliamentary Assembly was created within the framework of the OSCE as an independent, consultative body consisting of more than 300 parliamentarians from each of the 56 countries, which stretch from the United States and Canada throughout Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Annual Sessions are the chief venue for debating international issues and voting on a declaration addressing human rights, democratic development, rule of law, economic, environmental and security concerns among the participating States and the international community. The United States delegation is allotted 17 seats in the Assembly. Robust Congressional participation has been a hallmark of the Parliamentary Assembly since its inception nearly 20 years ago, ensuring U.S. interests are raised and discussed. 18th Annual Session This year’s Annual Session, hosted by the Parliament (Seimas) of Lithuania from June 29 to July 3, brought together more than 500 participants from 50 of the 56 OSCE participating States under the theme: “The OSCE: Addressing New Security Challenges.” The Standing Committee -- the Assembly’s leadership body (composed of Heads of Delegations from the participating States and the elected officers) -- met prior to the Annual Session. Senator Cardin, as Head of Delegation and an OSCE PA Vice President, represented the United States. Chaired by the OSCE PA President, Portuguese parliamentarian João Soares, the committee heard reports from the Assembly’s Treasurer, German parliamentarian Hans Reidel, and from the Assembly’s Secretary General, R. Spencer Oliver of the United States. The Assembly continues to operate well within its overall budget guidelines and to receive positive assessments from auditors on financial management. The committee unanimously approved the proposed budget for 2009-2010. The Standing Committee also approved several changes in the OSCE PA’s Rules of Procedure, especially related to gender balance and the holding of elections for officers, as well as 24 Supplementary Items or resolutions for consideration in plenary or committee sessions. The committee brought up as an urgent matter a resolution regarding the detention of Iranian citizens employed by the British Embassy in Tehran. Senator Cardin spoke in support of the resolution. With the Standing Committee’s business concluded, Assembly President Soares opened the Inaugural Plenary Session, stressing in his opening remarks the need for OSCE reform. The first session concluded with a discussion of gender issues led by Swedish parliamentarian Tone Tingsgaard that included comments from Rep. Gwen Moore. A Special Plenary Session the next day was scheduled to accommodate the OSCE Chair-in-Office, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis, who had just presided over an informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers in Corfu, Greece, to launch a new, high-level dialogue on European security. Senator Cardin attended the Corfu meeting as a representative of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Following her speech, Bakoyannis engaged in a dialogue with parliamentarians on a number of OSCE issues. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Vygaudas Usackas also addressed the special session. Lithuania will chair the OSCE in 2011. U.S. Member Involvement The U.S. delegation actively participated in the work of the Assembly’s three General Committees – the first committee for Political Affairs and Security; the second for Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and the Environment; and the third on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions. Each committee considered its own draft resolution, prepared by an elected Rapporteur, as well as 23 of the 25 Supplementary Items. Two Supplementary Items, including one by President Soares on Strengthening the OSCE, were considered in plenary session. Representatives Chris Smith, Mike McIntyre, and Gwen Moore each proposed resolutions that were adopted dealing with freedom of expression on the Internet, international cooperation in Afghanistan, and prevention of maternal mortality respectively. Members of the U.S. delegation were also instrumental in garnering support for Supplementary Items introduced by others, co-sponsoring eight resolutions introduced by delegations of other countries. The U.S. delegation was responsible for 26 amendments to either the committee draft resolutions or various Supplementary Items. Chairman Cardin proposed climate-related amendments to a resolution on energy security and suggested the OSCE initiate work with Pakistan in the resolution on Afghanistan. Co-Chairman Hastings worked on numerous human rights and tolerance issues. Other amendments were sponsored by: Sen. Durbin on improving international access to clean water; Sen. Voinovich on combating anti-Semitism; Sen. Wicker on preserving cultural heritage; Rep. Smith on preventing the abuse of children; and Rep. Butterfield on responding to climate change. Bilateral Meetings The U.S. delegation also engaged in a variety of activities associated with the Annual Session, holding bilateral meetings with the delegations of Russia and Georgia focusing on their respective internal political developments and the tension in the Caucasus since Russia invaded Georgia last August and then sought to legitimize breakaway regions. Separate meetings were also held with Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus and other Lithuanian leaders, at which the delegation pressed for new laws to resolve outstanding claims of property seized during the Nazi and Communist eras. The delegation also presented President Adamkus a letter from President Barack Obama on the occasion of the 1000th anniversary of the first written reference to Lithuania. Members of the U.S. delegation attended a working lunch to discuss gender issues, hosted by Swedish parliamentarian Tingsgaard. A variety of social events, including a reception hosted by the British delegation at their embassy, afforded numerous informal opportunities to discuss issues of common concern. U.S. Leadership As a demonstration of active U.S. engagement, a Member of the U.S. Congress has always held some elected or appointed leadership role in the OSCE PA. The Vilnius Annual Session has allowed this to continue at least through July 2012. Chairman Cardin was reelected to a three-year term as one of nine Vice Presidents, a very welcome development given his long record of OSCE engagement going back to his years in the House of Representatives. Rep. Aderholt, who has attended every OSCE PA Annual Session since 2002 and often visits European countries to press human rights issues, was elected Vice Chair of the third General Committee, which handles democracy and human rights. President Soares was reelected for a second term and selected Rep. Smith to serve as a Special Representative on Human Trafficking and asked Co-Chairman Hastings to continue serving as Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs. An unfortunate development in the election of new officers is the absence of a representative of the Russian Federation. Because the United States government may disagree so substantively with current Kremlin policies, the U.S. government has always felt it critical to welcome Russian engagement in the OSCE PA. It was, therefore, a disappointment that the head of the Russian Federation delegation, Alexander Kozlovsky, reversed course and decided not to run for a Vice Presidency seat and more disappointing that a political bloc at the OSCE PA defeated Russian incumbent Natalia Karpovich as rapporteur of the Third Committee. Karpovich had been accommodating of U.S. human rights initiatives in her draft resolution. Vilnius Declaration Participants at the closing plenary session adopted the final Vilnius Declaration -- a lengthy document which reflects the initiatives and input of the U.S. delegation. Among other things, the declaration calls for strengthening the OSCE in order to enhance its legitimacy and political relevance; addresses conventional arms control, disarmament and other security-related issues of current concern in Europe; calls for greater cooperation in the energy sector and better protection of the environment; and stresses the continued importance of democratic development and respect for human rights, especially as they relate to tolerance in society and freedom of expression. The most contentious part of the declaration related to the promotion of human rights and civil liberties twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which included language noting the 70th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. While some of the language may have been provocative, strong Russian objections to the entire text appeared to be motivated by a desire to defend a Stalinist past and minimize its crimes. The Russian delegation’s effort to block passage of this resolution reflects a similar sentiment in Moscow that recently led to the creation of a widely-criticized commission "for counteracting attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia's interests." As a July 9 column for The Economist noted about recent Russian efforts to excuse Stalinism, the “debate in Vilnius makes it a bit harder to maintain that stance.” Some of Russia’s traditional friends and allies in the OSCE PA were noticeably absent from the debate. The Balkans While the Congressional delegation’s work focused heavily on representing the United States at the OSCE PA, the trip afforded an opportunity to advance U.S. interests elsewhere in Europe. While Co-Chairman Hastings traveled to Albania to observe that country’s first parliamentary elections since becoming a NATO member earlier this year, the rest of the delegation visited Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina is still recovering from the conflict in the 1990s and the associated horrors of the Srebrenica genocide and massive ethnic cleansing. The reverberations of the conflict continue to hinder prospects for European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The United States was instrumental in bringing the Bosnian conflict to an end in 1995, especially with the negotiation of the Dayton Agreement, and the United States has invested considerable financial, diplomatic and military resources in the post-conflict period. The visit came one month after Vice President Joe Biden visited Sarajevo with a message of renewed U.S. engagement in the Balkans. While meetings with Bosnian political leaders revealed little willingness to work constructively toward constitutional reform needed for an effective central government, a meeting with English-speaking university students revealed a refreshing desire to overcome ethnic divisions and move the country forward. Belarus Given its proximity to Vilnius, members of the Congressional delegation visited Minsk, the capital of Belarus, to press for greater democracy and respect for human rights in that country. Belarus has remained a repressive state over the years even as its European neighbors have transitioned from being former Soviet or Warsaw Pact states to EU and NATO members or aspirants. Following a delegation meeting with President Alexander Lukashenka, Belarusian authorities released imprisoned American Emanuel Zeltzer, who was convicted of espionage in a closed trial and had numerous health concerns. The delegation also urged for greater progress in meeting the conditions in the Belarus Democracy Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 2004 and reauthorized in 2006. A meeting with political activists provided useful information on the situation for political opposition, non-governmental organizations and independent media. Finally, the delegation pressed Belarus’ officials to allow for an increased U.S. diplomatic presence in the country. In response to expanding U.S. sanctions, Minsk kicked out 30 diplomats last year, including the U.S. ambassador, leaving a staff of five at the U.S. Embassy. During the course of the Vilnius Annual Session, Senator Voinovich also broke away for a brief visit to Riga, Latvia. That visit was among the highest level visits from a U.S. official in three years, and was important for our relations with this NATO ally, which has deployed troops with Americans in Afghanistan without caveat and recently suffered losses which easily impact such a small country. U.S. interests abroad are advanced through active congressional participation in the OSCE PA. The 19th Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly will be held early next July in Oslo, Norway.

  • Cardin Calls for Human Rights to Be Included in U.S.-China Dialogue

    U.S. Senator Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD), Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Helsinki Commission), today released the following statement in response to the inaugural Strategic and Economic Dialogue between the U.S. and China: “The significant dialogue that the United States started this week with China is a positive step in strengthening the relationship between the United States and China. I am pleased the agenda covered crucial issues such as the global economic crisis, climate change, non-proliferation and regional stability.  However, I am disappointed that human rights issues were not given higher priority. “Negotiations on climate change are particularly significant because any global solution must include the intense collaboration and effort of China and the United States, which together produce more than 40 percent of global carbon emissions. Together, we can help create a framework that will make a positive impact on the harmful effects of climate change by holding all nations to a common standard, yet taking the needs of each country into account. “Discussing respect for basic human rights, which are fundamental to both a climate change and economic solution, is also essential. To not press China – undeniably one of our chief partners in tackling global problems – on human rights protections is a missed opportunity. It is our responsibility to champion collective values, especially those that are so essential and connected: basic political rights, labor protections, and freedoms of speech and religion. “The United States must make an unambiguous commitment to human rights – not as a personal belief of any political leader or simply an Administration policy, but as a moral obligation of our country towards international law and universal principles.  I will continue to press President Obama and his administration to unabashedly champion the cause of human rights in China, particularly as our countries collaborate to craft joint solutions for the 21st century.”

  • Helsinki Commission Condemns Murder of Russian Human Rights Activist Natalya Estemirova

    Senator Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD), Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Helsinki Commission), Co-Chairman Congressman Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL) and Ranking Republican Members Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) and Congressman Chris Smith (R-NJ) issued the following statements today upon learning of the killing of Russian human rights activist Natalya Estemirova. “I am saddened and outraged by the kidnapping and killing of Natalya Estemirova, one of the region’s great defenders of human rights. The reports of her abduction in Chechnya and subsequent shooting in the North Caucasus republic of Ingushetia remind us of the urgent need to address human rights concerns throughout Russia. President Medvedev’s condemnation of this murder and his pledge to ‘take all necessary measures’ to solve the crime are welcomed, but his words must translate into a prompt and complete criminal investigation by federal authorities that brings those responsible to justice,” said Chairman Cardin. “I agree with what President Obama recently said in Moscow that history has shown ‘governments which serve their own people survive and thrive; governments which serve their own power do not.’ Murder and intimidation of activists and journalists is both a serious violation of human rights and an affront to any democracy.” “In 2006, Ms. Estemirova met with the staff of the Helsinki Commission as part of our work to shine a light on the abuses in Chechnya. Lawlessness and violence too often define the lives of journalists and activists who are simply pushing the cause of freedom.” said Co-Chairman Hastings. “Ms. Estemirova led a courageous life of denouncing corruption, calling for a fair judicial system, and standing up for human rights. While her killers may have ended her life, they will never silence the voice she brought to these issues.” “President Medvedev has talked about the legal nihilism rampant in his country and has made positive gestures in the direction of reform, yet these killings continue. It is time to see real action and real reform regarding the rule of law and respect for human rights in Russia. The death of Natalya Estemirova must not be in vain,” said Senator Brownback. “Natalya Estemirova gave her life and now her death in the service to the cause of human suffering and justice,” said Congressman Smith, who authored a resolution that passed the House in 2007 to address the large number of unsolved murders of investigative journalists in Russia. “Being a human rights activist or an independent journalist in Russia has become among the most dangerous professions in the world. The Russian government needs to create an environment in which the flagrant slaughter of human rights activists is unacceptable.” The Helsinki Commission has held many hearings and briefings on Russia’s human rights record, including one recently focusing on the North Caucasus.

  • The Medvedev Thaw: Is It Real? Will It Last?

    This hearing discussed U.S. foreign policy towards Russia, focusing on how to improve relations while taking Russia’s compliance with human rights seriously.   The witnesses and Commissioners discussed the implications of Dmitri Medvedev becoming president and Vladimir Putin retaining power as Prime Minister.

  • Dagestan: A New Flashpoint in Russia's North Caucasus

    During this briefing Kyle Parker, policy advisor at the Commission, addressed Dagestan, the largest republic in the North Caucasus, which had joined Chechnya and Ingushetia on Russia’s security concern list. The increase in violence, human rights abuses, radicalization of the population, religious extremism, and a growing insurgency within the legal vacuum in Dagestan had grave implications for the entire southern periphery of Russia and the Caucasus region as a whole. Leading experts from Russia - Svetlana Gannushkina, Alexei Malashenko, and Elena Milashina - addressed the consistent attacks on authorities by armed gunmen, disappearances and murders of local residents and acts of terror, and provided insight into the complex socio-political environment of Dagestan. They highlighted the local authorities’ response, which included adopting counter-insurgency policies and methods reminiscent of the brutality seen in Chechnya and Ingushetia.

  • China, Europe and the United States: Implications for the World

    By Shelly Han, Policy Advisor On December 5 and 6, 2008, Commission staff participated in the Stockholm China Forum in Stockholm, Sweden. This biannual meeting aims to establish a systematic transatlantic dialogue about China and the impact of its rise on the transatlantic alliance. Attendees include government officials, policymakers, academics, journalists, and businesspeople from Europe, China and the United States. The Forum is organized by the German Marshall Fund, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education. Through a series of panel discussions the participants focused on the following issues: What a new U.S. Administration will mean for U.S.-China relations; The current state of EU-China relations; China’s role in the global financial crisis; and China’s relationship with Russia. The backdrop for the Forum was the severe financial crisis impacting all of the major economies. While significant focus is on actions taken by the United States to correct the market slide, it is clear that China is a lynchpin in any solution as well. China is facing significant job losses (some estimate 12-16 million potential unemployed workers over the next 12 months) as their export-led economy slows significantly. And even as China announces a $600 billion stimulus package, it is an open question whether other badly needed reforms will be made in the Chinese economy that will allow the economy to pull through. The Chinese Government’s worry extends beyond the economy. Labor protests appear to be at an all-time high and are expected to increase as more workers are laid-off. Added to that are the difficult social and political pressures that arise from the 226 million migrant laborers concentrated in the city and industrial centers of China. The Forum kicked-off with discussion of the big question on everyone’s mind: How might the incoming Obama Administration change current U.S. policy toward China? There was significant consensus that despite the policy failings of the Bush Administration in Europe and other regions, the one foreign policy bright spot has been the U.S.-China relationship. Given that, it was suggested that there would no sharp breaks in U.S. policy toward China under President Obama. However, three general areas were identified where the Obama Administration was expected to change U.S. behavior that would, in turn, continue to strengthen the overall U.S.-China relationship: (1) the United States will be more consultative and less unilateral; (2) the U.S. will be more engaged in regional concerns; and (3) Obama will terminate practices that have harmed U.S. soft power (Guantanamo detentions, renditions, obstruction of climate change negotiations, etc.). Participants discussed the reasons behind the poor EU-China relationship, which stands out in sharp contrast to the U.S.-China relationship. The EU-China relationship hit a new low just a few days before the Forum when China cancelled participation in the EU-China Summit in France because French President Nicolas Sarkozy planned to meet with the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader. It was noted that bilateral relationships with the major EU Member States (excluding France) are generally better than interaction with the EU. This led one analyst to state that in its interactions with China, the EU was in danger of becoming “less than the sum of its parts” in almost every aspect of concern to the EU Member States. The question of whether Russia and China might band together to create a new axis of power was deemed unlikely. Despite China and Russia’s creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, analysts see too many points of competition and too few opportunities for cooperation in the relationship to create a true partnership. In fact, some analysts suggested that Russia may be reaching out to the European Union as an ally against what the Russian Government sees as a future world stage dominated by the U.S. and China. It is clear that despite its status as a major player in the world economy and the world’s largest carbon emitter, China is not ready to play a leadership role in climate change negotiations. This is partly because China feels it cannot afford to green their economy in the middle of a financial crisis, and also due to the lack of maturity in China’s political system. One analyst noted that China actually has an edge on the U.S. and other Western countries in some environmental technologies and therefore the West should not focus so much attention on tech transfer ideas when discussing climate change remediation, but instead help China find the economic means to implement these technologies. Despite China’s lack of leadership, many of the analysts concluded that China has matured on the world stage and become more sophisticated in its dealings with the West. While it still loudly espouses its key foreign policy tenet of non-interference in internal affairs of other countries, it has stopped using inflammatory terms such as “hegemony” to describe U.S. foreign policy and has sought to work closely with the United States to solve the financial crisis. This is only one step in the right direction, however, and it was noted that many extremely sensitive issues such as treatment of the Tibetans, the status of Taiwan and China’s own political and economic situation could overturn whatever progress has been made.

  • Report on the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Review of the US and Seventh Annual Meeting of the UN Working Group on People of African Descent

    By Mischa E. Thompson, Policy Advisor Moving into the 21st century, racism and discrimination continue to be a problem throughout the fifty-six European, North American, and Central Asian countries that make up the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including in the United States. Recent reports by the OSCE, European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency (2008, 2007), and European Network Against Racism have found that racial minorities and increasingly migrants are the targets of hate crimes and racial/ethnic profiling, in addition to experiencing discrimination in employment, housing, education, and other areas. Political parties espousing anti-migrant and racist positions are also on the rise, with the potential to undermine current efforts to implement tolerance and nondiscrimination initiatives throughout the region. Efforts to address these problems over the years have resulted in the development of multi-lateral instruments to stem the tide of racial discrimination. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) is often considered a premier international instrument in this area. Adopted by the United Nations in 1965 and entering force in 1969, over 173 countries including the United States, have agreed to have their government policies reviewed to determine if they create or perpetuate racial discrimination. ICERD defines racial discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.” According to the treaty, countries are required to amend or repeal laws and regulations deemed to be discriminatory and are allowed to introduce positive measures such as affirmative action when necessary. As such, countries are obligated to protect against inequality and discrimination in the enjoyment of human rights, including in the areas of education, housing, criminal justice, health, voting, labor, etc. While the 1975 Helsinki Final Act requires its members to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms “without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,” no review mechanism comparable to the ICERD currently exists within the OSCE. In recent years, the OSCE participating States have urged ratification of the ICERD (e.g., Copenhagen 1990, Helsinki 1992, Maastricht 2003), adopted complimentary initiatives such as the Annual Hate Crimes Report, and conducted consultations and other activities within the United Nations on relevant initiatives. The ICERD and its implementing committee, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), therefore continue to remain a primary resource in outlining and determining the success of OSCE countries’ efforts to eliminate racial discrimination. For this reason, the 2008 CERD review of the United States and the status of U.S. efforts to combat racial discrimination were widely followed. From February 18 to March 7, 2008 the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) held its seventy-second session in Geneva, Switzerland. The Committee of eighteen independent experts, including a U.S. representative, is charged with periodically reviewing the performance of the 173 countries that have signed and ratified ICERD. During the seventy-second session, the Committee reviewed anti-discrimination efforts undertaken by the Governments of the United States, Fiji, Italy, Belgium, Nicaragua, Moldova, and the Dominican Republic. The United States appeared before the Committee on February 22 and 23 after having submitted a report in April 2007 on its efforts to eliminate racial discrimination after last appearing before the Committee in 2001. Over four hundred U.S. non-government organizations (NGOs) also compiled and submitted a “Shadow Report” to the Committee, which provided supplementary independent information in addition to the government perspective. Twenty-three persons made up the diverse high-level U.S. delegation, headed by Ambassador Warren Tichenor, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations in Geneva. The delegation also included: Grace Chung Becker, Acting Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, and Ralph Boyd, a former member of the U.N. Committee. Other members of the delegation were from the Departments of Interior, Justice, State, Homeland Security, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. For the first time more than one hundred U.S. NGO representatives also attended the session as a “shadow” delegation. The review began with the United States noting the continuing problem and challenges of combating racial discrimination, but disagreeing with the Committee’s views on causes and solutions. Ambassador Tichenor stated that, “the United States supported the elimination of racial discrimination at home and abroad [...] and had made significant progress in improving race relations in the past [and] continued to work actively to eliminate racial and ethnic discrimination. However, challenges still existed, and a great deal of work remained to be done.” The United States then went on to argue that the causes of continuing racial disparities were poverty and other socio-economic variables, including poor choices made by minorities and discriminatory actions by non-state actors, as opposed to institutionalized practices stemming from past unjust government policies (e.g., slavery, segregation). The United States further argued that it should not bare the primary responsibility for addressing racial disparities because it was not solely responsible for creating the current situation. To bolster this argument, the United States also argued that the Committee’s interpretation of the intent of the ICERD was incorrect in terms of the government needing to play the lead role in combating racial discrimination and disparities. (Find excerpts from the U.S. statements at the end of this report.) This line of argument caused the Committee to question whether the United States still possessed the political will to comply with its ICERD commitments. Indeed, much of the proceedings involved Committee members reiterating the commitments ICERD countries have undertaken as signatories, including augmenting laws and regulations which “have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists.” Confusion was expressed as to why the U.S. government had supported efforts to end affirmative action in schools, while simultaneously highlighting the existence of racial disparities in all sectors of U.S. society. Further puzzlement was displayed as to why the United States was arguing against playing a lead role in combating discrimination, while at the same time introducing widely acclaimed new initiatives to combat discrimination such as the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s E-RACE Initiative and National Partnership for Action to End Health Disparities. The Committee also questioned the status of and anticipated plans for other U.S. efforts to address de facto discrimination, manifested by racial profiling, lack of equal access to quality housing, healthcare, and education, the failure to preserve Native American land rights and return Hurricane Katrina victims to their homes. Committee members also expressed disappointment in the United States. Several Committee members noted that they viewed the U.S. civil rights movement and resulting policies to address past inequities such as affirmative action, as models for policies they were considering and/or using in their own countries to address human rights concerns stemming from inequities and historical injustices. In some cases, these policies were developed following consultations with the U.S. government. Indeed, the Colombian Committee member remarked that he had participated in a visit to the United States as part of an Afro-Colombian delegation invited to view U.S. programs to combat racial discrimination. Members of the Committee also requested that the United States participate in the 2009 Durban Review Conference, a follow-up to the 2001 World Conference against Racism, as a means for continuing the conversation on eliminating racial discrimination. The United States responded that it had withdrawn negotiators from the first Durban Conference “because of pervasive anti-Semitism in its discussions” and would make a decision regarding participation at a later date. A summary of the U.S. Review before the Committee and Concluding Observations of the Committee included recommendations to the United States in areas ranging from affirmative action and immigration to voter disenfranchisement and the rights of Native Americans and tribal peoples. This includes a request for an interim report due in February 2009 on how the United States has implemented the Committee’s recommendations regarding: 1) racial profiling and counterterrorism efforts impacting Arab, Muslim, South Asian and others, 2) protecting Western Shoshone lands, 3) efforts to return displaced Hurricane Katrina victims, 4) decreasing minority youth imprisonment rates, and 5) organizing training programs and other initiatives to make government officials and parties at the state and local levels aware of U.S. responsibilities under the ICERD. This last point was repeatedly raised by the civil society shadow delegation. In particular they were concerned by “U.S. exceptionalism” – or the perception that United States tells other nations to abide by international human rights laws, but refuses to comply with those laws itself. The Committee also called for greater consultation and cooperation between the U.S. government and civil society in preparation of its next report due in November 2011 following concerns that civil society was not sufficiently consulted during the drafting of the 2007 report. Also, of relevance in addressing global efforts to eradicate racial discrimination was the seventh annual meeting of the United Nations Working Group on People of African Descent (WGPAD). Formed in April 2002, the Working Group studies and proposes solutions to the problems of racial discrimination faced by people of African descent living in the Diaspora, with a focus on improving their human rights situation. The Working Group met for its seventh Annual Session on January 14 to 18th, where it reviewed its proceedings of the past seven years on thematic issues that impact the experiences of persons of African descent in the following areas: administration of justice, media, equal access to quality education, employment, health, housing, participation in political, economic, and social sectors, racial profiling, and the empowerment of women of African descent. The WGPAD seventh Annual Session focused on the development of recommendations based upon these past sessions as a UN requirement in preparation for the 2009 Durban Review Conference. The United States participated as an Observer at the meeting. The Final Recommendations included calls for countries to: develop and/or adopt national action plans and monitoring bodies to combat racism and assist victims, address racial profiling and other disparities in the criminal justice system, introduce socio-economic data collection methods that include African descendants, counter negative media stereotypes, develop a best practices report and index on racial equality, and create a fund to support NGO participation in future WGPAD activities and meetings. The next WGPAD meeting is scheduled for January 12-14th and will focus on youth. Within the OSCE context, the WGPAD holds special importance as the only multilateral entity focused on the human rights situation of the more than five million persons that make up the African descendant or Black European population. In recent years, partially as a result of their high visibility in European countries, Blacks have increasingly become the targets of hate crimes and experienced discrimination in education, employment, housing, and other sectors. Additionally, Blacks are often the targets of anti-immigrant campaigns, including racial profiling, regardless of their citizenship (see also U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearing The State of (In)visible Black Europe: Race, Rights, and Politics). Initiatives such as the CERD and WGPAD have been critical to maintaining a global focus on countries’ efforts to monitor and combat racial discrimination in line with their human rights commitments. Additionally, they complement OSCE efforts in this area such as this year’s OSCE Supplementary Meetings in Vienna on Roma and national institutions to fight discrimination against minorities and migrants. Because of the role promoting equality and non-discrimination plays in the protection of human rights and ensuring peace and security in the OSCE region, the U.S. Helsinki Commission has also increased its focus in this area.

  • Georgia Rebuilds: After the August Conflict with Russia, Political and Economic Challenges Remain

    By Shelly Han, Winsome Packer, and Kyle Parker From October 14-18, Commission staff traveled to Georgia to assess recovery efforts following the conflict with Russia in early August. Through a series of meetings with Georgian officials, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the U.S. embassy, as well as private companies, Georgian citizens, human rights groups, local and foreign analysts, and non-governmental organizations, the staff learned that tremendous progress has been made in restoring critical infrastructure and returning many internally displaced persons to their homes. However, the political and economic situation in Georgia remains fragile. While the origins of the conflict that began on August 7 are still being debated, what is clear is the tremendous cost politically, economically and socially to Georgia. Human Rights Watch, one of the few NGOs that gained access to South Ossetia immediately after the conflict, estimates that 95 percent of Georgian villages in South Ossetia were razed, and an untold number of houses have been looted and burned. South Ossetians told HRW that the burning of houses was deliberate in order to prevent the return of Georgians. HRW estimates that most of the damage was done by South Ossetian irregulars or foreign “volunteers” - not Russian troops. Russian troops had effective control of the territory but chose not to enforce law and order, making them complicit in these crimes. HRW was not able to corroborate any of the Russian allegations of Georgian atrocities inside South Ossetia, though it has accused Tbilisi of using cluster bombs. HRW has documented instances of excessive use of force by Georgian troops, but is still sorting out the facts surrounding these actions. International Monitoring Efforts Lack Access, Coordination Both the OSCE and the European Union have deployed monitors to Georgia, but have not been granted access to South Ossetia. Representatives of the EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia told Helsinki Commission staff that the monitors were unarmed and not there to provide security. Rather, their stated mission was to observe Georgian and Russian compliance with the August 12 and September 8 peace agreements between Russia and Georgia. There also seemed to be little effort to coordinate the two observation missions. Both the EU and OSCE representatives downplayed questions about a lack of coordination (as reported in Vienna by the OSCE Head of Mission in Georgia). They said that it was a matter of time and process dictating how they proceeded. Economic Cost of Conflict The economic consequences of the conflict for Georgia have been staggering. One of the keys to recovery will be boosting consumer confidence, and also reassuring investors that Georgia is a safe and stable market. Almost 24 percent of Georgia’s GDP comes from foreign direct investment (Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are significant investors) and there are signs that FDI may decrease following the conflict. Out of a pledged $1 billion in aid, the United States is providing $250 million in direct budget support to the Georgian government to help repair infrastructure and build houses for IDPs. Other donors have agreed to provide a further $3.5 billion in aid which, if distributed properly, will help Georgia weather the crisis. Commission staff visited the Black Sea port of Poti. Georgia’s main transit point for imports and exports, the port was bombed during the conflict, resulting in the death of 5 workers and an estimated US$10 million in damages. But by mid-October, commerce was almost back to normal. Georgia’s Coast Guard offices, which had been substantially damaged, were almost completely repaired. The Navy and the Coast Guard lost eight ships during the conflict, but their newer ships were evacuated to the southern port of Batumi and escaped with only minor damage. One of the hardest hit regions was the area surrounding the city of Gori, Georgia’s “breadbasket,” where up to 60 percent of the agriculture was destroyed. The U.S. Agency for International Development is spearheading a wheat seed program to help farmers plant the next crop. Irrigation is also a significant issue, since much of the water was coming from South Ossetia and irrigation canals were damaged. Alternative irrigation sources were being quickly developed to help farmers continue supplying the market. The OSCE, which was implementing extensive economic development projects in South Ossetia, has been forced to cease all programs in that region. Other micro-enterprise development programs, such as trout farms and beekeeping located in the buffer zones around South Ossetia, have been quickly re-started. Another issue that could become a flash-point in the future is the Inguri Dam, a hydroelectric facility that supplies half of Georgia’s electricity needs. The dam itself is on territory that the Georgian government controls, but the facility that provides the electricity is on territory controlled by Abkhaz separatists and their Russian allies. They could theoretically turn off the electricity for many Georgians, but Georgian authorities could counter by shutting down the dam, thus denying the Abkhaz the ability to generate electricity. Cost of Conflict is High for those Displaced from their Homes The situation for internally displaced persons in Georgia is critical. On October 9 Commission staff visited an IDP camp in Gori that was slated to be dismantled later that day. Most of the residents were being returned to their homes in the “buffer zone” adjacent to the South Ossetian border that up until the day prior had been controlled by Russian forces. As the Russians withdrew, the Georgian government was working quickly to return the IDPs to their homes. In fact, international aid agencies believed Tbilisi was moving a bit too quickly, as safety concerns remained – specifically, unexploded ordinance in the buffer zone and reports of possible sabotage. Nevertheless, the IDPs were packing up their meager belongings and preparing to leave. Those who couldn’t do so - those from South Ossetia and Akhalgori - were going to be sent to centers in the Tbilisi area. A number of aid agencies are providing assistance with food and other daily needs. One group, CHF International, provides assistance to IDPs that are living with relatives. These host families - many of whom were barely making ends meet - are stretched to the breaking point. CHF International provides fuel, extra bedding, food, or other aid that a household might need to support extra family members for an extended period of time. The Georgian government has also launched a massive construction effort to build thousands of houses for the “new” IDPs. While this effort was praised by many, it could become a source of discontent among those displaced in previous conflicts and still living in substandard conditions. Georgia Faces a Difficult Road Ahead The effectiveness of international monitoring as a deterrent to future military conflict in Georgia is uncertain. It is clear from discussions with analysts that disagreements on the delineation of the South Ossetian “border,” particularly around the city of Akhalgori, will continue to be a point of contention. As more information becomes available on what actually happened in the lead-up to the conflict in early August, it also raises questions about the effectiveness of these missions as a deterrent. Independent reports suggest that there were nearly 100,000 Russian troops in the vicinity of South Ossetia immediately preceding the fighting and it is now clear that there was a serious breakdown of early warning mechanisms that were designed to prevent this type of conflict scenario. The exact role of the monitors and their geographical range is in dispute. Russian officials continue to argue at the OSCE and other fora that the monitors are there to ensure stability and security. At the same time Russian officials are charging that the EU monitors are failing to maintain adequate security in the areas bordering South Ossetia and Abkhazia and that Georgian military and police forces are engaged in provocations and attacks against South Ossetians and Russian personnel inside South Ossetia. Ironically, the OSCE and EU Missions reported that their monitors still did not have access to South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the Akhalgori district (now administered by Russian and South Ossetian forces). This raises concerns about Russia’s intent in denying monitors access to the regions now under their control, while demanding that the monitors ensure security in these areas. Russo-Georgian relations, which have been tense for years, have reached a nadir in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Georgia and subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov made no attempt to conceal from U.S. Secretary of State Rice that getting rid of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili was a key Moscow aim. As of this writing, however, he remains in office, despite Moscow’s efforts to unseat him and attempts by opposition forces to call him to account. He has so far weathered the political consequences of presiding over a stunning military defeat, the loss of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and having to deal with thousands more displaced people. Responding to pressure from inside and outside the country, Saakashvili has pledged to introduce serious reforms, which would help promote stability within Georgia. How Tbilisi can reestablish normal relations with Moscow is harder to divine.

  • 2008 Human Dimension Implementation Meeting

    The OSCE’s 2008 Human Dimension Implementation Meeting offered an opportunity to review compliance on a full range of human rights and humanitarian commitments of the organization’s participating States. Tolerance issues featured prominently in the discussions, which included calls for sustained efforts to combat anti-Semitism and other forms of discrimination. A U.S. proposal for a high-level conference on tolerance issues in 2009, however, met with only tepid support. Core human rights issues, including freedom of speech and freedom of religion, continued to draw large numbers of speakers. Throughout the discussions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) expressed concern about Kazakhstan’s failure to implement promised reforms and questioned its readiness to serve as OSCE Chair-in-Office in 2010. Greece, slated to assume the chairmanship in January, came under criticism for its treatment of ethnic minorities. As in the past, the United State faced criticism for retaining the death penalty and for its conduct in counter-terrorism operations. Belarusian elections, held on the eve of the HDIM, came in for a round of criticism, while Russia continued to advocate proposals on election observation that would significantly limit the OSCE’s independence in such activities. Finally, discussion of the Russia-Georgia conflict was conspicuous by its near absence, though related human rights and humanitarian concerns will likely receive more prominence in the lead up to and during the December OSCE Ministerial in Helsinki. Background From September 29 to October 10, 2008, the OSCE participating States met in Warsaw, Poland, for the annual(1) Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM). The HDIM is Europe’s largest human rights gathering, convened to discuss compliance by the participating States with the full range of human dimension commitments they have all adopted by consensus. The meeting was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), according to an agenda approved by consensus of all 56 participating States. The HDIM is the only multinational human rights meeting in Europe where representatives of NGOs and government representatives have equal access to the speakers list. Indeed, over half of the statements delivered at this year’s HDIM were made by NGO representatives. Such implementation review meetings are intended to serve as the participating States’ principal venue for public diplomacy and are important vehicles for identifying continued areas of poor human rights performance. Although the HDIM is not tasked with decision-making responsibilities, the meetings can provide impetus for further focus on particular human dimension concerns and help shape priorities for subsequent action. Coming in advance of ministerial meetings that are usually held in December, the HDIMs provide an additional opportunity for consultations among the participating States on human dimension issues that may be addressed by Ministers. (This year, for example, there were discussions on the margins regarding a possible Ministerial resolution on equal access to education for Roma and advancing work in the field of tolerance and non-discrimination, including the possibility of convening a related high-level meeting in 2009.) OSCE rules, adopted by consensus, allow NGOs to have access to human dimension meetings. However, this general rule does not apply to “persons and organizations which resort to the use of violence or publicly condone terrorism or the use of violence.”(2) There are no other grounds for exclusion. The decision as to whether or not a particular individual or NGO runs afoul of this rule is made by the Chairman-in-Office. In recent years, some governments have tried to limit or restrict NGO access at OSCE meetings in an effort to avoid scrutiny and criticism of their records. This year, in the run up to the HDIM, Turkmenistan held the draft agenda for the meeting hostage, refusing to give consensus as part of an effort to block the registration of Turkmenistan NGOs which have previously attended the implementation meetings and criticized Ashgabat. Turkmenistan officials finally relented and allowed the adoption of the HDIM agenda in late July, but did not participate in the Warsaw meeting. Along these lines, the Russian delegation walked out in protest when the NGO “Russian-Chechen Friendship Society” took the floor to speak during a session on freedom of the media. At the 2008 HDIM, senior Department of State participants included Ambassador W. Robert Pearson, Head of Delegation; Ambassador Julie Finley, Head of the U.S. Mission to the OSCE; Ambassador Karen Stewart, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; and Mr. Bruce Turner, Acting Director, Office for European Security and Political Affairs. Mr. Will Inboden, advisor on religious freedom issues, and Mr. Nathan Mick, advisor on Roma issues, served as Public Members. Ms. Felice Gaer, Chair of the U.S. Commission on Religious Freedom, and Mr. Michael Cromartie, Vice Chair, also served as members of the delegation. Helsinki Commission Chief of Staff Fred L. Turner and Senior State Department Advisor Ambassador Clifford Bond also served as members of the U.S. Delegation, along with Helsinki Commission staff members Alex T. Johnson, Ronald J. McNamara, Winsome Packer, Erika B. Schlager, and Dr. Mischa E. Thompson. In comparison with previous HDIMs, the 2008 meeting was relatively subdued – perhaps surprisingly so given that, roughly eight weeks before its opening, Russian tanks had rolled onto Georgian territory. While the full scope of human rights abuses were not known by the time the meeting opened, human rights defenders had already documented serious rights violations, including the targeting of villages in South Ossetia inhabited by ethnic Georgians. Nevertheless, discussion of the Russian-Georgian conflict was largely conspicuous by its near absence. Highlights The annual HDIM agenda provides a soup-to-nuts review of the implementation of core human rights and fundamental freedoms (e.g., freedoms of speech, assembly and association; prevention of torture; right to a fair trial), as well as rule of law, free elections and democracy-building issues. National minorities, Roma, tolerance and non-discrimination are also on the agenda. The United States continued its longstanding practice of naming specific countries and cases of concern. In accordance with OSCE procedures, the agenda included three specially selected topics, each of which was given a full day of review. This year, those subjects were: 1) education and awareness-raising in the promotion of human rights; 2) freedom of religion or belief; and 3) focus on identification, assistance and access to justice for the victims of trafficking. Of the three, the sessions on religious liberty attracted the most speakers with over 50 statements. A large number of side events were also part of the HDIM, organized by non-governmental organizations, OSCE institutions or offices, other international organizations, or participating States. These side events augment implementation review sessions by providing an opportunity to examine specific subjects or countries in greater depth and often with a more lively exchange than in the formal sessions. Along with active participation at these side events, the United States held extensive bilateral meetings with government representatives, as well as with OSCE officials and NGO representatives. At the end of the second week of the HDIM, Human Rights Directors from capitals also held a working meeting to discuss issues of mutual concern, with a special focus on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, on women, peace and security. This year, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom also hosted a reception to honor the OSCE Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief, as well as the tenth anniversary of the U.S. International Religious Freedom Act and the 60th anniversary of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Greece, scheduled to assume the chairmanship of the OSCE starting in January 2009, came under particular criticism for its treatment of minorities. Unlike the highly emotional reactions of senior Greek diplomats in Warsaw two years ago, the delegation this year responded to critics by circulating position papers elaborating the Greek government’s views. Greece also responded to U.S. criticism regarding the application of Sharia law to Muslim women in Thrace by stating that Greece is prepared to abolish the application of the Sharia law to members of the Muslim minority in Thrace when this is requested by the interested parties whom it affects directly. Issues relating to the treatment of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities in the OSCE region are likely to remain an important OSCE focus in the coming period, especially in light of developments in the Caucasus, and it remains to be seen how the Greek chairmanship will address these concerns in light of its own rigid approach to minorities in its domestic policies. Throughout the HDIM, many NGOs continued to express concern about the fitness of Kazakhstan to serve as OSCE Chair-in-Office in 2010 given serious short comings in that country’s human rights record. In particular, Kazakhstan was sharply criticized for a draft religion law (passed by parliament, but not yet adopted into law). One NGO argued that a Kazakhstan chairmanship, with this law in place, would undermine the integrity of the OSCE, and urged participating States to reconsider Kazakhstan for the 2010 leadership position if the law is enacted. Juxtaposing Kazakhstan’s future chairmanship with the possible final passage of a retrograde law on religion, the Almaty Helsinki Committee asked the assembled representatives, “Are human rights still a priority – or not?” (Meanwhile, on October 5, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Kazakhstan.) On the eve of the HDIM, Belarus held elections. Those elections received considerable critical attention during the HDIM’s focus on democratic elections, with the United States and numerous others expressing disappointment that the elections did not meet OSCE commitments, despite promises by senior Belarusian officials that improvements would be forthcoming. Norway and several other speakers voiced particular concern over pressures being placed on ODIHR to circumscribe its election observation activities. Illustrating those pressures, the Russian Federation reiterated elements of a proposal it drafted on election observation that would significantly limit the independence of ODIHR in its election observation work. The Head of the U.S. Delegation noted that an invitation for the OSCE to observe the November elections in the United States was issued early and without conditions as to the size or scope of the observation. (Russia and others have attempted to impose numerical and other limitations on election observation missions undertaken by the ODIHR and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.) Tolerance issues featured prominently during discussions this year, as they have at other recent HDIMs. Forty-three interventions were made, forcing the moderator to close the speakers list and requiring presenters to truncate their remarks. Muslim, migrant, and other groups representing visible minorities focused on discrimination in immigration policies, employment, housing, and other sectors, including racial profiling and hate crimes, amidst calls for OSCE countries to improve implementation of existing anti-discrimination laws. Jewish and other NGOs called for sustained efforts to combat anti-Semitism. Representatives of religious communities expressed concern about the confusion made by ODIHR in its Annual Hate Crimes Report between religious liberty issues and intolerance towards members of religious groups. This year, some governments and NGOs elevated their concerns relating to gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender persons, increasingly placing these concerns in the context of the OSCE’s focus on hate crimes. A civil society tolerance pre-HDIM meeting and numerous side events were held on a broad range of tolerance-related topics. The United States and several U.S.-based NGOS called for a high-level conference on tolerance issues to be held in 2009. Unlike in prior years, however, no other State echoed this proposal or stepped forward with an offer to host such a high-level conference. In many of the formal implementation review sessions this year, NGOs made reference to specific decisions of the European Court on Human Rights, urging governments to implement judgments handed down in recent cases. During the discussion of issues relating to Roma, NGOs continued to place a strong focus on the situation in Italy, where Roma (and immigrants) have been the target of hate crimes and mob violence. NGOs reminded Italy that, at the OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting in July, they had urged Italy to come to the HDIM with concrete information regarding the prosecution of individuals for violent attacks against Roma. Regrettably, the Italian delegation was unable to provide any information on prosecutions, fostering the impression that a climate of impunity persists in Italy. As at other OSCE fora, the United States was criticized for retaining the death penalty, contrary to the abolitionist trend among the OSCE participating States. Of the 56 OSCE participating States, 54 have abolished, suspended or imposed a moratorium on the death penalty and only two – the United States and Belarus – continue to impose capital punishment as a criminal sanction. Two side events held during the HDIM also put a spotlight on the United States. The first event was organized by Freedom House and entitled, “Today’s American: How Free?” At this event, Freedom House released a book by the same title which examined “the state of freedom and justice in post-9/11 America.” The second event was a panel discussion on “War on Terror or War on Human Rights?” organized by the American Civil Liberties Union. Speakers from the ACLU, Amnesty International and the Polish Human Rights Foundation largely focused on issues relating to the United States, including the military commission trials at Guantanamo, and official Polish investigations into allegations that Poland (working with the United States) was involved in providing secret prisons for the detention and torture of “high-value” detainees.(3) In a somewhat novel development, Russian Government views were echoed by several like-minded NGOs which raised issues ranging from claims of “genocide” by Georgia in South Ossetia to grievances by ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia. Ironically, the Russian delegation, in its closing statement, asserted that this year’s HDIM had an “improved atmosphere” due (it was asserted) to the efforts by both governments and NGOs to find solutions to problems rather than casting blame. As at past HDIMs, some sessions generated such strong interest that the time allotted was insufficient to accommodate all those who wished to contribute to the discussion. For example, the session on freedom of the media was severely constrained, with more than 20 individuals unable to take the floor in the time allotted, and several countries unable to exercise rights of reply. Conversely, some sessions – for example, the session on equal opportunity for men and women, and the session on human dimension activities and projects – had, in terms of unused time available, an embarrassment of riches. Following a general pattern, Turkmenistan was again not present at the HDIM sessions this year.(4) In all, 53 participating States were represented at the meeting. At the closing session, the United States raised issues of particular concern relating to Turkmenistan under the “any other business” agenda item. (This is the sixth year in a row that the United States has made a special statement about the situation in Turkmenistan, a country that some view as having the worst human rights record in the OSCE.) For the past two years, there has been a new government in Turkmenistan. The U.S. statement this year noted some positive changes, but urged the new government to continue the momentum on reform by fully implementing steps it already has begun. In addition, the United States called for information on and access to Turkmenistan’s former representative to the OSCE, Batyr Berdiev. Berdiev, once Turkmenistan’s ambassador to the OSCE, was reportedly among the large number of people arrested following an attack on then-President Niyazov’s motorcade in 2002. His fate and whereabouts remain unknown. OSCE PA President João Soares addressed the closing plenary, the most senior Assembly official to participate in an HDIM meeting. The Russian-Georgian Conflict With the outbreak of armed violence between Russia and Georgia occurring only two months earlier, the war in South Ossetia would have seemed a natural subject for discussion during the HDIM. As a human rights forum, the meeting was unlikely to serve as a venue to debate the origins of the conflict, but there were expectations that participants would engage in a meaningful discussion of the human dimension of the tragedy and efforts to stem ongoing rights violations. As it turned out, this view was not widely shared by many of the governments and NGOs participating in the meeting. The opening plenary session foreshadowed the approach to this subject followed through most of the meeting. Among the senior OSCE officials, only High Commissioner on National Minorities Knut Vollebaek squarely addressed the situation in the south Caucasus. Vollebaek condemned the19th century-style politicization of national minority issues in the region and the violation of international borders. At the time of the crisis, he had cautioned against the practice of “conferring citizenship en masse to residents of other States” (a reference to Russian actions in South Ossetia) and warned that “the presence of one's citizens or ‘ethnic kin’ abroad must not be used as a justification for undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other States.” Sadly, that sound advice went unobserved in Georgia, but it is still applicable elsewhere in the OSCE region.(5) The statement delivered by France on behalf of the countries of the European Union failed to address the conflict. During the plenary, only Norway and Switzerland joined the United States in raising humanitarian concerns stemming from the conflict. In reply, the head of the Russian delegation delivered a tough statement which sidestepped humanitarian concerns, declaring that discussion of Georgia’s territorial integrity was now “irrelevant.” He called on participating States to adopt a pragmatic approach and urged acknowledgment of the creation of the new sovereign states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, terming their independence “irreversible” and “irrevocable.” Perhaps more surprising than this Russian bluster was the failure of any major NGO, including those who had been active in the conflict zone collecting information and working on humanitarian relief, to take advantage of the opportunity to raise the issue of South Ossetia during the opening plenary. As the HDIM moved into its working sessions, which cover the principal OSCE human dimension commitments, coverage of the conflict fared better. The Representative on Freedom of the Media remarked, in opening the session on free speech and freedom of the media that, for the first time in some years, two OSCE participating States were at war. During that session, he and other speakers called on the Russian Federation to permit independent media access to occupied areas to investigate the charges and counter-charges of genocide and ethnic cleansing. The tolerance discussion included calls by several delegations for Russia to cooperate and respond favorably to the HCNM’s request for access to South Ossetia to investigate the human rights situation in that part of Georgia. Disappointingly, during the session devoted to humanitarian commitments, several statements, including those of the ODHIR moderator and EU spokesperson, focused narrowly on labor conditions and migration, and failed to raise concerns regarding refugees and displaced persons, normally a major focus of this agenda item and obviously relevant to the Georgia crisis. Nevertheless, the session developed into one of the more animated at the HDIM. The Georgian delegation, which had been silent up to that point, spoke out against Russian aggression and alleged numerous human rights abuses. It expressed gratitude to the European Union for sending monitors to the conflict zone and urged the EU to pressure Russia to fully implement the Six-Point Ceasefire agreement negotiated by French President Sarkozy. The United States joined several delegations and NGOs calling on all parties to the conflict to observe their international obligations to protect refugees and create conditions for their security and safe voluntary return. In a pattern observed throughout the meeting, the Russian delegation did not respond to Georgian charges. It left it to an NGO, “Ossetia Accuses,” to make Russia’s case that Georgia had committed genocide against the people of South Ossetia. A common theme among many interventions was a call for an independent investigation of the causes of the conflict and a better monitoring of the plight of refugees, but to date Russian and South Ossetian authorities have denied both peacekeeping monitors and international journalists access to the region from elsewhere in Georgia. A joint assessment mission of experts from ODIHR and the HCNM, undertaken in mid-October, were initially denied access to South Ossetia, with limited access to Abkhazia granted to some team members. Eventually, several experts did gain access to the conflict zone in South Ossetia, though to accomplish this they had to travel from the north via the Russian Federation. One can only speculate why Georgia received such limited treatment at this HDIM. The crisis in the south Caucasus had dominated OSCE discussions at the Permanent Council in Vienna for weeks preceding the HDIM. Some participants may have feared that addressing it in Warsaw might have crowded out the broader human rights agenda. Others may have felt that, in the absence of a clear picture of the circumstances surrounding the conflict and with so many unanswered questions, it was best not to be too critical or too accusatory of either party. The EU (and particularly the French) were, at the time of the HDIM, in the process of negotiating the deployment of European observers to the conflict zone, and may have feared that criticism of Russia at this forum would have only complicated the task. In fact, the EU’s only oblique reference to Georgia was made at HDIM’s penultimate working session (a discussion which focused on human dimension “project activity”) in connection with the work of High Commissioner for National Minorities. (One observer of this session remarked that there seemed to be a greater stomach for dinging the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights for shortcomings in its work than for criticizing Russia for invading a neighboring OSCE participating State.) Finally, other participants, particularly NGOs, seemed more inclined to view human rights narrowly in terms of how governments treat their own citizens and not in terms of how the failure to respect key principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity are invariably accompanied by gross violations of human rights and can produce humanitarian disasters. Amid simmering tensions between Russia and Georgia which could erupt into renewed fighting, and completion of a report requested by the Finnish Chairmanship in time for the OSCE’s Ministerial in Helsinki in early December, Ministers will have to grapple with the impact of the south Caucasus conflict and what role the OSCE will have. Beyond Warsaw The relative quiet of the HDIM notwithstanding, French President M. Nicolas Sarkozy put a spotlight on OSCE issues during the course of the meeting. Speaking at a conference in Evian, France, on October 8, he responded to a call by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, issued in June during meetings with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, for a new “European Security Treaty” to revise Europe’s security architecture – a move seen by many as an attempt to rein in existing regional security organizations, including NATO and the OSCE. President Sarkozy indicated a willingness to discuss Medvedev’s ideas, but argued they should be addressed in the context of a special OSCE summit, which Sarkozy suggested could be held in 2009. The escalating global economic crisis was also very much on the minds of participants at the HDIM as daily reports of faltering financial institutions, plummeting markets, and capital flight promoted concerns over implications for the human dimension. Several delegations voiced particular concern over the possible adverse impact on foreign workers and those depending on remittances to make ends meet. Looking Ahead The human rights and humanitarian concerns stemming from the war in South Ossetia will likely come into sharper focus in the lead up to the December OSCE Ministerial in Helsinki as talks on the conflict resume in Geneva, and OSCE and other experts attempt to document the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of fighting and current conditions. The coming weeks can also be expected to bring renewed calls for an overhaul of the human dimension and the ODIHR by those seeking to curb attention paid to human rights and subordinate election monitoring activities. It remains to be seen whether Kazakhstan will fulfill the commitments it made a year ago in Madrid to undertake meaningful reforms by the end of this year. There is also the risk that a deepening economic crisis will divert attention elsewhere, even as the resulting fallout in the human dimension begins to manifest itself. It is unclear what priorities the Greek chairmanship will be set for 2009, a year that portends peril and promise. Notes (1) OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meetings are held every year, unless there is a Summit. Summits of Heads of State or Government are preceded by Review Conferences, which are mandated to review implementation of all OSCE commitments in all areas (military-security, economic and environmental cooperation, and the human dimension). (2) Helsinki Document 1992, The Challenges of Change, IV (16). (3) Interestingly, at the session on human rights and counterterrorism, moderator Zbigniew Lasocik, member of the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture, noted that Poland’s Constitutional Court had, the previous day, struck down a 2004 law that purported to allow the military to shoot down hijacked commercial aircraft – even if they were being used as weapons like the planes that killed thousands of people on 9/11. The Court reportedly reasoned that shooting down an aircraft being used as bomb would infringe on the constitutional protection of human life and dignity of the passengers. (4) Turkmenistan sent a representative to the HDIM in 2005 for the first time in several years. While responding to criticism delivered in the sessions, the representative appeared to focus more on monitoring the activities of Turkmen NGOs participating in the meeting. Turkmenistan subsequently complained that certain individuals who had been charged with crimes against the State should not be allowed to participate in OSCE meetings. Turkmenistan officials did not participate in the 2006 or 2007 HDIMs. Participation in the 2008 meeting would have been a welcome signal regarding current political developments. (5) The HCNM had previously expressed concern regarding Hungary’s overreach vis-a-vis ethnic Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries. In 2004, Hungary held a referendum on extending Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians abroad – an idea that still holds political currency in some quarters of Hungary – but the referendum failed due to low voter turnout.

  • Symposium Focused on Future of the OSCE

    By Janice Helwig, Policy Advisor The Embassy of Finland and the Center for Transatlantic Relations at John Hopkins University held a half-day symposium on October 15 to discuss the future of the OSCE. The symposium succeeded in laying out clearly the challenges currently facing the 56-state organization. There were, however, more questions than answers when it came to ideas on how to address those challenges. Participants in the symposium included the Secretary of State of Finland, prominent figures from OSCE’s past, academics, representatives of participating States, NGOs, and the Helsinki Commission. Finland currently holds the Chairmanship of the Vienna-based OSCE. At the outset of the meeting, there was an acknowledgement that Russia’s invasion of Georgia in early August altered the program originally envisioned by the Finnish chairmanship for the OSCE. Other issues raised included open challenges to core OSCE principles, values, and commitments; internal divisions and lack of consensus over what the organization should be doing; implications of a stronger and more active EU; and whether there is waning support for the OSCE in Washington. Rather than offering prescriptions for overcoming these challenges, many speakers instead underlined the challenges by reflecting their governments’ views of the OSCE. For example, the Russian speaker focused on President Medvedev’s June call for a new European security architecture and the need to reform the OSCE, a longstanding Moscow demand. U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary and Helsinki Commissioner David Kramer focused on the importance of implementing OSCE commitments on human rights, and the need for Kazakhstan to implement its Madrid reform promises in advance of its 2010 Chairmanship. The Kazakhstani speaker foreshadowed what could signal – for the U.S. at least – problematic views with serious implications for his country’s chairmanship, including questioning the validity and universal applicability of OSCE standards and commitments as well as raising doubt over the continued need for field missions. OSCE Secretariat representative Paul Fritch laid out frankly the challenges facing the OSCE today, and tried to start a discussion of how to address them. Early History of the Helsinki Process* The first panel focused on the history of the Helsinki Process, and featured U.S. Ambassador Max Kampelman (ret.), who had been active in the process in the 1980s, and Finnish Ambassador Markuu Reimaa, who recently published a book, Helsinki Catch, covering the negotiations leading up to the 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Ambassador Kampelman focused on his personal experiences and on the Madrid Meeting of the CSCE (1980-1983). He stressed that the CSCE was at that time the main framework for U.S.-Soviet dialogue and for reinforcing relations with NATO allies. Kampelman acknowledged the key role played by Commission staff throughout the Madrid Meeting. He then claimed to reveal a long-held secret that he had leveraged the Soviet desire to end the Madrid Meeting by securing permission for some 250,000 individuals - mostly Jews - to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. to Israel. Ambassador Reimaa cited the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as a crucial event that opened the eyes of many in both the West and East. He said that the negotiations leading up to the Helsinki Final Act were successful partly because none of the countries (numbering 35 at the time) expected much to come of the process. He suggested that, within two years, the Soviets were questioning the wisdom of their involvement, but that the Helsinki Process was like “a fish trap”: once in, you could not get out. He stressed the importance of dialogue, noting that CSCE offered the only venue where meaningful talks continued during the frosty first half of the 1980’s. Strengths and Weaknesses The second panel focused on the current Finnish Chairmanship of the OSCE, and featured Finnish State Secretary Pertti Torstila and Professor Terrence Hopmann of Johns Hopkins University SAIS. Secretary Torstila said that OSCE’s relevance was proven most recently in connection with the conflict in Georgia, but serious challenges to it exist in today’s world. A consensus-based organization cannot be greater than the sum of its parts, and many OSCE States are weak in their commitment to core principles. Secretary Torstila acknowledged that the state-building begun in the aftermath of the collapse of the U.S.S.R. remains incomplete, and urged that the OSCE be used as a venue for dialogue. In addition, the OSCE must avoid getting dragged down by internal wrangling, as some other International Organizations have done. He related that the CiO believes that the OSCE needs to be more involved in settling conflicts, not just managing them after the fact. Torstila provided a disappointing update on talks on Georgia that had opened and abruptly closed earlier that day in Geneva. Professor Hopmann said that the OSCE is in deep crisis at this point, arguing that the U.S. and Russia must decide if they believe the OSCE is worthwhile or not. Hopmann went on at length about the weakness of the organization’s conflict prevention capacity and the need to look at the relationship between core principles like self-determination and territorial integrity. He was highly critical of the lack of U.S. support for the organization, quipping that Washington spent more on Iraq in one hour than on the OSCE for an entire year. Beyond dwindling resources, he cited the failure of the U.S. Secretary of State to attend an OSCE Ministerial since Colin Powell in 2003. (Helsinki will serve as the venue for the 2008 OSCE Ministerial in early December.) Hopmann appealed for the next administration to play a more active role in the OSCE. The third panel focused on the future of the OSCE. It featured Mr. Aleksandr Lukashevich from the Russian Embassy, Assistant Secretary of State and Helsinki Commissioner David Kramer, Kazakhstani Ambassador at Large for OSCE Askar Tazhiev, and Director of the Office of the OSCE Secretary General, Paul Fritch. Mr. Lukashevich gave what appeared to be a scripted presentation of Russian views of the OSCE. He argued that the organization has failed to take the shape of an integrated security architecture that Russia had hoped it would. Instead, each OSCE country pursues its own agenda and geographic splits result. No country should predominate in the OSCE, and there should not be any “spheres of influence” in the organization. He repeated Russian assertions that the OSCE needs legal status, as well as a treaty-based Charter defining its goals adopted at the same time; he insisted that the U.S. fear that a Charter would undermine existing OSCE commitments is unfounded. Notwithstanding the restrictive proposals Moscow has circulated over the past couple of years that would undermine OSCE election observation activities and seriously weaken the role of NGOs in the organization, he rejected the notion that Russia is seeking to weaken existing OSCE institutions, including the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). He insisted that Russia has a positive agenda in the OSCE and wants to give the organization a “second wind.” Moreover, Russian President Medvedev has proposed discussion of a treaty on European security that would be legally binding and that would lay out the role and obligations of States for the medium- to long-term. The new treaty should stress that all States are equal and that there should be uniform rules and legally binding security guarantees for all, as well as uniform interpretation and implementation of the treaty. Mr. Lukashevich floated a proposal for an international forum with the participation of all OSCE countries as well as leading International Organizations. He said Russia hopes that the proposal could be reflected in the upcoming Helsinki Ministerial. Assistant Secretary of State and Helsinki Commissioner David Kramer stressed the importance of implementation of existing OSCE human rights commitments. He said that the U.S. would oppose any efforts to dilute OSCE standards or undermine the organization’s effectiveness, including its election observation activities undertaken by ODIHR and the Parliamentary Assembly. Kramer pointed out that most of the criticism of the OSCE seems to be coming from those States where fundamental freedoms are facing the most challenges. He then turned to Kazakhstan and the reform program it committed to late last year in Madrid concerning its 2010 Chairmanship. Kramer said that the U.S. is prepared to help Kazakhstan make progress on its Madrid commitments. However, currently, human rights defenders, NGOs, and independent media in Kazakhstan are threatened. Concerning Georgia, he stressed that the Russian Federation is responsible for protecting persons remaining in South Ossetia and for maintaining public order in all areas effectively under Russian control. Kramer insisted that OSCE monitors must have unimpeded access to all areas of Georgia, including South Ossetia. Kazakhstani Ambassador-at-Large for OSCE Askar Tazhiev’s statement raised serious questions about how his country might run its 2010 Chairmanship. Tazhiev stressed that there should be no blind adherence to OSCE commitments; rather, cultural differences and national particularities must be taken into account. Echoing long-standing Russian claims, he said the three dimensions of the OSCE – political/military, economic and environmental, and human - are imbalanced. There is too much emphasis on the human dimension and that should be fixed. Tazhiev reiterated Kazakhstan’s promise made in Madrid not to support efforts to weaken ODIHR or election observation, but at the same time endorsed Russian proposals concerning “strengthening” OSCE election observation. (Note: Russian initiatives would eviscerate election observation, for example by giving any country a virtual veto over every aspect of the process, including the evaluation of the conduct of the election.) He said that the effectiveness of OSCE field missions is in doubt, and many host countries – particularly those in Central Asia – feel their views are not being taken into account and are therefore questioning the further need for those missions. Finally, he noted that Kazakhstan supports Russia’s view that the OSCE needs a convention giving it legal personality as well as a Charter, adopted simultaneously. The Director of the Office of the OSCE Secretary General, Paul Fritch, gave a thoughtful overview of where the OSCE currently stands, and asked a series of questions (though not providing answers). In the 1990s, there was a unique and historic consensus within the organization. While some States view that period as the Golden Age, others view it as a time of humiliation. Consensus is now wearing thin in all three dimensions, and it is not in style to be a “country in transition.” The situation has changed dramatically, particularly with developments in Kosovo and Georgia. There is now open military confrontation in the OSCE region, between Georgia and Russia. There are also diverging views on energy and water resources which could lead to future conflicts. It is the first time that participating States are openly challenging the validity of OSCE commitments, and universal interpretation of them is yielding to local variations. At the same time that cohesion within the OSCE is eroding, external challenges are growing in scope and complexity. Relations with other International Organizations are changing as NATO expands and the EU becomes active in more areas. Fritch then threw out several good questions. How can the OSCE promote implementation of its values when some States openly challenge them (despite the fact that they were adopted on the basis of consensus)? Do OSCE mechanisms to deal with political military challenges need to be updated? What role can the OSCE play outside its geographical area? Will the OSCE take up Medvedev and Sarkozy’s proposal for a new security architecture and an OSCE summit in 2009? Now that the EU makes up half of the OSCE participating States, how will the two organizations divide their activities? In the discussion that followed, U.S. Ambassador Julie Finley rejected Terry Hopmann’s characterization of waning U.S. interest in the OSCE. In response to Russia, she stressed that actions speak louder than words. While recent Russian words have been lovely, corresponding actions have not. Picking up on the issue of legal personality raised by several speakers, she said that as soon as the U.S. had compromised and agreed to a limited legal convention, Russia reneged on the deal and began demanding that a treaty-based Charter be adopted at the same time. She asserted that Russia constantly moves the goalposts, and that is not constructive. The OSCE should look to the future and expand its activities, perhaps by bringing Libya, Syria, and Lebanon in as Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation. Spencer Oliver, Secretary General of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and former Commission Chief of Staff, drew on his extensive experience in the Helsinki Process dating back to the mid-1970s. He stressed the critical precedents set by the U.S. at the Belgrade Follow-up Meeting (1977-78) of naming names and being specific about human rights violations. Oliver credited Arthur J. Goldberg for his leadership of the U.S. delegation at Belgrade and commended the role played by Griffin Bell, appointed by President Carter to head the U.S. delegation at the opening of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting in 1980. Max Kampelman served under Bell until Ronald Reagan appointed him to lead the delegation through the end of the Madrid Meeting (1983). Oliver pointed out the irony that the OSCE, an organization promoting transparency, often operates behind closed doors. *encompassing the original Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its successor since January 1, 1995, the Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

  • East or West? The Future of Democracy in Moldova

    Ambassador Clifford Bond, Senior State Department Advisor with the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, moderated this briefing that focused on the trajectory of democratic institutions in Moldova, as well as the issues that were facing Eastern Europe. What was perhaps foremost on attendees’ minds was Russia’s invasion of the Republic of Georgia, which exposed the former U.S.S.R.’s expansionist goals and raised questions about Eastern Europe’s future and the potential for the European Bloc. Fortunately for Moldova, the country had made great progress as far as its elections, market freedoms, and negotiations to resolve the situation in Transdniestria were concerned, but Moldova remained a major source and transit country for sex trafficking.

  • The Role of OSCE Institutions in Advancing Human Rights and Democracy

    This hearing discussed the role of OSCE institutions in advancing human rights and democracy, highlighting the role of the United States. The United States was mentioned as a leading force of democracy promotion and protection of human rights. However, the witnesses mentioned certain issues like Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, rendition flights, and detention centers that suggest double-standards. The discussion centered on the importance of inclusive voice in government and the need to find a way to build pluralism into single-party developing democracies by establishing political parties that can be competitive, that can be critical of governments and that can bring new ideas and fresh faces into their government.

  • Russia, Georgia, and the Return of Power Politics

    This hearing, which Commissioner Benjamin L. Cardin presided over, was considered one of the most important hearings that the Helsinki Commission conducted in 2008 that dealt with Russia, Georgia, and the return of power politics Russian military involvement in Georgia represented a new chapter in U.S.-Russia relations, a chapter that, unsurprisingly, continues to have negative implications and ramifications. Obviously, the CSCE has strongly condemned Russia’s use of military force in Georgia, and there has been justified concern that, as Russia has gained more aggression internationally, they have also internally moved in the wrong direction as it relates to the liberties of the peoples within Russia. So, the goal of the hearing was to look for a way in which the U.S. could constructively engage Russia, a major international player, while simultaneously clarifying that Russia’s actions regarding Georgia have been intolerable.

  • OSCE 101: Briefing for Civil Society

    Please join the U.S. Helsinki Commission for OSCE 101: BRIEFING FOR CIVIL SOCIETY Thursday, September 4, 2008  10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.  Rayburn House Office Building  B318 For those in need of a refresher course and those interested in becoming involved. Learn about the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Role of Civil Society For those planning to travel to Warsaw, Poland, remember to register to participate in the OSCE’s Annual Human Rights Meeting: What: Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) When: September 29 – October 10, 2008 Where: Warsaw, Poland Why: Annual 2-week human rights conference What is the HDIM? The term "human dimension" describes the set of norms and activities related to human rights, the rule of law, and democracy that are regarded within the OSCE as one of the three pillars of its comprehensive security concept, along with the politico-military and the economic and environmental dimensions. Every year in Warsaw, the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) organizes a two-week conference, the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM). The HDIM is a forum where OSCE participating States discuss the implementation of human dimension commitments that were adopted by consensus at prior OSCE Summits or Ministerial Meetings. These commitments are not legally binding norms; instead, they are politically binding - a political promise to comply with the standards elaborated in OSCE documents. Follow-up meetings to review the implementation of the commitments are based on the principle that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned. A comprehensive, 2-volume compilation of the OSCE human dimension commitments (available in English and in Russian) can be ordered free of charge through the ODIHR website: Volume 1: Thematic Compilation and Volume 2: Chronological Compilation.

  • Ingushetia: The New Hot Spot in the North Caucasus

    By John Finerty, Staff Advisor According to the official version from Moscow, the secessionist war in Russia's North Caucasus republic of Chechnya is over. A handful of irreconcilable Islamic jihadisti may be holding out somewhere in the hills, but life has returned to normal for the great majority of Chechen people. To be sure, nowadays the most active theater of operations for the Chechen resistance appears to be the Internet. By dint of overwhelming numbers and firepower, and the use, on occasion, of brutal scorched-earth tactics (think Ireland, and the Black and Tans with more lethal weaponry), Moscow has restored a semblance of order in Chechnya and turned the reins of power over to a menacing Chechen satrap, Ramzan Kadyrov, and his small army of paramilitaries. However, the image of normalcy - embodied in photos of Chechnya's capital, Grozny, once again bustling with traffic and business - has proven deceptive. Guerrilla ambushes against Russian security forces, pro-Moscow militia, and local government officials still take a persistent, though numerically small, toll. Moreover, the violence -- in small-scale actions and occasional large-scale armed forays -- has now spread beyond the borders of Chechnya into the neighboring North Caucasus republics. The civilized world still grieves over the more than 300 children and adults who died as a result of the September 2004 assault on a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, by Chechen terrorists and their sympathizers. Further west, in Nalchik, capital of the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, an attack in November 2005 by militant Islamic insurgents on Russian security forces and local police left approximately one hundred dead. Directly east of Chechnya, in the Republic of Dagestan (Land of Mountains), "[K]idnappings and violence are commonplace. Firearms are ubiquitous and assassinations are a regular event" (BBC, March 2008). Many experts maintain that even without the Chechen uprising next door, and the related armed intrusions into Dagestan, this impoverished republic would still be plagued by violence and instability. In any event, pervasive corruption, together with religious and ethnic rivalries, has produced a landscape of lawlessness in which police officers have often been the target of choice. But the republic that has reverberated most tragically with the echoes of violence in Chechnya is Ingushetia, bordering directly on Chechnya's west. It is here, Moscow claims, that Chechen partisans and Islamic radicals have established a second front to continue their insurgency against the Russian central government. However, many human rights advocates and Ingush activists charge that Moscow’s heavy-handed response has produced a wave of violence and lawlessness against innocent citizens that is exacerbating, rather than ameliorating, the situation. According to a June 2008 report by Human Rights Watch, "Beginning in summer 2007, insurgents' attacks on public officials, law enforcement and security personnel, and civilians rose sharply [in Ingushetia]." These attacks, in turn, have led to brutal retaliation by the authorities and several seemingly senseless and unsolved murders of non-Ingush residents in the republic. According to the respected Russian human rights organization, "Memorial," at least 400 persons disappeared in Ingushetia between 2002 and 2006. The effect is such, argues Human Rights Watch, that Ingushetia is beginning to resemble the Chechnya of former years. The situation in Ingushetia was exacerbated in 2002 when Moscow replaced the popular president, retired Lt. Gen. Murad Aushev, with a Kremlin favorite who is disliked by many residents for his repressive policies and inability to deal with the growing disorder in the republic. At this time, a petition campaign is taking place in Ingushetia to have Aushev restored to his post. Against this backdrop, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe held a briefing on June 19th, 2008, entitled "Ingushetia: Russia's New Hot Spot in the Caucusas." The former head of the Chechen-Ingush office of the Russian human rights organization "Memorial," Eliza Musaeva, stated that since 2004, the year of the Beslan tragedy, Ingushetia has become unofficially a venue for Russia's counterterrorism operations, and subsequently a "hotbed of kidnappings." In response to the guerrilla attacks against government officials and facilities, she maintained, local law enforcement and security personnel frequently arrest innocent citizens for terrorism and try to physically coerce confessions out of them. However, when cases go to trial, juries sometimes refuse to convict, which has led to a change in police tactics. "They simply kidnap and kill those people who otherwise would have gone on trial,” Musaeva stated, "and these murders do not occur in the middle of the night. They occur in broad daylight." Moreover, "When families seek investigation of the murders of loved ones by police," she said, "the deceased are accused of resisting arrest." In November of last year, a six-year-old boy was killed by security forces during a raid on a home in search of militant Islamic insurgents. Grigory Shvedov, editor of the daily news website "KAVKAZSKY UZEL" (CAUCASUS KNOT) presented a picture of the North Caucasus as a region of diminishing federal control in Russia. The ruling elites make a show of loyalty to Moscow, but essentially run their bailiwicks as they see fit, i.e. with an enormous level of corruption. According to Svedov, the improper collection of taxes, lack of an independent judiciary and absence of political and legal freedoms, is radicalizing the populations of the North Caucasus regions, in some cases turning them to religious radicalism. In reality, he stated, "we see that active resistance is something which is really, really spread in the region." The rebels, he said, were not numerous - perhaps 200 in Ingushetia -- nor well organized, but they enjoyed significant and growing support from the civilian population (illustrating a familiar cycle in low-intensity conflicts: harassment and brutality by government forces against a civilian population suspected of supporting the resistance, creating increased popular support for the resistance because of the mistreatment meted out by the government forces.) Magomed Mutsolgov, chairman of the Ingushetia-based NGO "MASHR" ("Peace"), discussed the territorial conflict that broke out with North Ossetia in 1992 and the approximately 14,000 refugees left homeless as a result. According to his statistics, one hundred fifty-eight people have disappeared in Ingushetia since 2002, and over 700 have been murdered. "Unfortunately," he continued, "we have a lot of evidence that indicates that in the vast majority of those incidents, the law enforcement agencies were involved." Mr. Mutsolgov, whose brother disappeared in December 2003, stated that none of the criminal cases instituted after a kidnapping have been completed. There had been a considerable drop-off in the number of kidnappings over the last 12 to 18 months, he pointed out, but this welcome statistic has been offset by an increase in the number of murders. "All of this is made possible by the fact that officers of the law enforcement who participate in kidnapping and murders are above the law," he charged. In late July, an employee of the “MASHR” website, Zurab Tsechoyev, was abducted from his home and severely beaten by unknown persons who questioned him about the publication on the internet of a list of FSB operatives in Ingushetia. During the question and answer period, some of Mr. Mutsolgov's points were challenged by a member of the audience who is a native of North Ossetia, an indication that not all public discontent is directed exclusively at Moscow, (although the genesis of the territorial dispute between Ingushetia and North Ossetia goes back to Stalin's policy of juggling of ethnic groups and geo-political boundaries). The reports of sporadic ambushes and bombings, security sweeps, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings that continue to emerge from the North Caucasus confirm the picture painted by the Commission panelists. The weekly tolls of dead and wounded may be insignificant when compared with those at the height of the Chechen wars but, to use the phrase that Mikhail Gorbachev once applied to Afghanistan under Soviet occupation, the North Caucasus has become a "bleeding wound" that Moscow appears powerless to stanch.

  • Briefing on the Medical Evidence of Torture by U.S. Personnel

    Congressman Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL), Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Helsinki Commission), held a briefing with Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), regarding the medical evidence of torture of detainees by U.S. personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay.  Representatives of PHR presented their recently released report entitled, “Broken Laws, Broken Lives,” in which they documented individual cases of torture, the impact on detainees and made recommendations based on the findings of their investigation.

  • Uzbekistan Three Years after the Andijon Massacre: A land where cotton is king and hundreds of thousands of children are forced to pick it

    By Ronald J. McNamara, Policy Advisor The Helsinki Commission convened a briefing on May 13, 2008, the third anniversary of the massacre at Andijon, to hear from experts on the challenges facing the 28 million people of Uzbekistan, including the widespread use of child labor in that country’s lucrative cotton industry. Panelists addressing political, economic and human rights developments in the Central Asian nation were: Marsha Lisitsyna of Human Rights Watch, film maker and writer Shahida Tulaganova, Juliette Williams of the Environmental Justice Foundation, and Professor Eric McGlinchey of George Mason University. For nearly two decades, Islam Karimov has ruled over Uzbekistan in a regime long-criticized for its harsh reprisals against dissidents, contempt for democratic principles and widespread corruption. Marsha Lisitsyna provided an overview of the findings of a newly released Human Rights Watch report, “Saving its Secrets” Government Repression in Andijan. She decried the fact that the Government of Uzbekistan has never accepted responsibility for its role in Andijon and has been unwilling to allow an independent investigation into the circumstances surrounding the uprising and massacre. Lisitsyna described the ongoing efforts of the Uzbek government to seek out and persecute anyone it deems to have a connection to or information about those events. While welcoming the regime’s release of a number of human rights defenders, she stressed the fact that a dozen others languish in jail. The report, based on interviews with witnesses to Andijon and relatives in 2007 and 2008, describes the pressures on those who fled the country as well as the reality for those who have returned to Uzbekistan. Lisitsyna told of retribution aimed at family members, including depriving relatives of social benefits, constant surveillance by the security services as well as the labeling of children of refugees as “children of enemies of the state” by teachers. Returnees are generally isolated, finding it difficult to secure work, and are pressured to entice others to return. In urging the international community not to forget Andijon, Lisitsyna concluded, “If the Government of Uzbekistan is able to demonstrate -- would be able to demonstrate -- considerable progress on human rights for sure, we wouldn't need the sanctions. But unfortunately, to date, this is still not the case.” Shahida Tulaganova echoed this point, urging the international community, including the European Union and the United States, to resist consigning Andijon to the history books while those associated with the tragedy continue to face repression. She reported that nearly 30 rights activists, independent journalists and opposition figures remain jailed and are subject to various forms of abuse. Tulaganova focused on severe limitations imposed by the government on freedom of expression, including tight control of the Internet and reprisals against independent journalists. In this regard, she recalled the murder of her colleague, Alisher Saipov, a prominent investigative journalist and editor of an Uzbek-language newspaper, Siyosat, gunned down outside of his office in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. Saipov was an outspoken critic of President Karimov, reporting regularly on rights abuses in Uzbekistan. Tulaganova was critical of the European Union and the United States for not being more forceful in the aftermath of the 2007 flawed presidential elections perpetuating Karimov as president, a position he has held since 1990, making him the longest serving Soviet-era leader still in power. “The fact is that everyone is dealing with an illegitimate president and an illegitimate government,” she said. The deteriorating economy under Karimov, an economist by training and expert on state planning, is exacerbated by widespread corruption, resulting in a flood of labor migrants working outside of the country. Tulaganova voiced particular concern over the hundreds of thousands of school children forced to work under harsh conditions in Uzbekistan’s cotton fields. Juliette Williams focused on the reliance on forced child labor in the cotton industry, reportedly generating a billion dollars annually. She detailed state control over every aspect of cotton production, from seasonal quotas imposed on farmers to daily quotas demanded of school-age children, some as young as seven years old. “Underpinning the entire industry is the systematical use of forced child labor and slave wages in order to maximize profits to the state, with little or no return for laborers or wider society,” said Williams. In addition to the human toll, Williams described the environmental degradation stemming from the country’s cotton industry. She pointed to estimates that 60 percent of diverted water never even reaches the cotton fields, but is lost in the deteriorating Soviet-era irrigation network. Perhaps the most dramatic case involves the Aral Sea, once the world's fourth largest inland sea, that has been drained to just 15 percent of its former volume, largely due to mismanagement by the Soviets and their successors. Soil damage is another area of environmental concern. Based in the United Kingdom, Williams explained efforts to organize an international boycott of Uzbek cotton given the reliance on forced child labor. She concluded, “I appeal to the Helsinki Commission and to people here today to engage in a full examination of the human rights and environmental abuses connected to cotton production in Uzbekistan.” A poignant short documentary film, White Gold, the True Cost of Cotton [http://www.ejfoundation.org/page325.html], was shown during the briefing to provide a human face to child labor in Uzbekistan. Scenes of grounded derelict ships and caravans of camels crossing the now arid seabed that once supported fertile fishing grounds provide stark images of the cost to the environment. Professor McGlinchey pointed to several changing dynamics that could affect bilateral relations between the United States and Uzbekistan: a lessening of the importance of the Karshi-Khanabad base to operations in Afghanistan, Karimov’s concerns over his legacy, and volatility of international commodity markets. While each could provide an opening, he warned that they could also lead to retrenchment by the regime. The abrupt departure of that U.S. from the K2 base diminished Karimov’s ability to portray himself as a serious partner in the war against terrorism, McGlinchey suggested. Given regime changes in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, he suggested that Karimov might seek to orchestrate his own succession, opening an opportunity for U.S. engagement with possible successors. McGlinchey cited escalating food prices as another factor that could generate new pressures and popular demands, potentially further undermining the already fragile foundations of the government. He warned that a vulnerable Karimov regime may resort to even greater repression rather than reform and stressed the importance of U.S. monitoring of human rights as a lifeline to vulnerable activists. With respect to the crucial role of cotton in the Uzbek economy, McGlinchey suggested that it is an unsustainable industry in the region given the depleted water supplies. “Water is not, unfortunately, a renewable resource in Central Asia. The Aral Sea is almost tapped out, and now the glacier stores are going to be tapped out, and in the long run something else besides cotton has to be promoted,” said McGlinchey.

  • Georgians Return to Polls to Elect New Parliament as Political Polarization Persists

    By Ronald J. McNamara and Orest Deychakiwsky For the second time this year, Georgians went to the polls in national elections, casting ballots on May 21, 2008, for a new slimmed down 150–seat unicameral parliament, known as the Supreme Council, with half filled through proportional party lists and the other by single-mandate districts. Previous parliaments comprised 235 members. Timing of the parliamentary elections, originally scheduled for fall 2008, became a contentious issue late last year as violence erupted on the streets of Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, leading to early presidential elections and a plebiscite on when to hold the parliamentary contest. Incumbent Mikheil Saakashvili was reelected president in the January 5 election, narrowly escaping a second round. According to final results reported by the Central Election Commission, Saakashvili won 53.47 percent of the vote, with 70 percent of those casting ballots supporting the holding of early parliamentary elections. On March 21, the president called for the elections to be held in two months time. Mr. João Soares of Portugal, a Vice-President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the time, was appointed as Special Coordinator of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to lead short-term observers of the OSCE’s International Election Observation Mission (IEOM). In all, the OSCE fielded over 550 observers from 48 countries, including a parliamentary component of over 100 drawn from the OSCE PA, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the NATO PA. International observers, including two members of the Helsinki Commission staff, participated in an extensive program of briefings in Tbilisi prior to election day, including presentations by the ODIHR Core Team and the Central Elections Commission as well as a wide range of international and domestic NGO experts. Observers also heard from representatives of most of the political parties and blocs fielding candidates: Georgian Politics, the Republic Party, the Rights Alliance, the Labor Party, the United National Movement – for Victorious Georgia, the Georgian Union of Sportsmen, the United Opposition bloc, the All Georgian National Party of Radical Democrats, the Christian-Democratic Movement, and Our Country. In all, nine political parties and three blocs were registered for the parliamentary contest, including the newly formed Christian-Democratic Movement. In all, IEOM observer teams visited nearly 1,500 of the country’s 3,641 polling stations on election day. Helsinki Commission staff observed in the Marneuli Rayon, south of Tbilisi, a predominately Azeri region bordering on neighboring Azerbaijan and Armenia. According to the 2002 national census, the Azeri minority constituted 6.5 percent of Georgia’s population. This rural agricultural region comprises the District Election Commission 22, with 84 individual polling stations for slightly over 90,000 registered voters. Interest in observing in the Marneuli region was based in part on irregularities observed during the January 2008 presidential election. Several polling stations, at that time, registered voter turnouts in excess of 100 percent, with over 88 percent of the vote going to Saakashvili, exceptionally high when compared with other districts in that part of the country. Commission staff observed an opening and the voting in nearly a dozen individual polling stations throughout the rayon, or county. Among those sites visited was the area’s largest military installation, where soldiers lined up to cast their votes as senior officers chatted outside of the station. With a few exceptions, the balloting was conducted in an orderly manner and in line with CEC procedures. An exception was a polling station close to the Armenian border in which pandemonium prevailed and a number of serious irregularities were observed by the team. Conspicuously, ballots at the station and other voting materials lacked the required serial numbers. Domestic party observers were vocally protesting procedural problems at the station as one from their ranks was repeatedly rebuffed by the precinct chairman when the observer sought to lodge a formal written complaint in the official journal. Local police were called to the scene, though they stayed at a distance as long as the Helsinki Commission team was present. The closing and tabulation observed at another station proceeded smoothly, with good cooperation among the poll workers. The following day, on May 22, Soares held a press conference in Tbilisi to issue a statement of preliminary conclusions on behalf of the IEOM: “Overall, these elections clearly offered an opportunity for the Georgian people to choose their representatives from amongst a wide array of choices. The authorities and other political stakeholders made efforts to conduct these elections in line with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments. The International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) identified a number of problems which made this implementation uneven and incomplete.” Addressing a protest rally on May 26, Levan Gachechiladze, the leader of the United Opposition called for annulment of the election results. “We will not let a handful of criminals run the country,” he told supporters. Fellow opposition leader Davit Gamkrelidze told the crowd, “I have no right to enter a parliament that is the product of illegality, terror, and an illicit government. I cannot become a member of a parliament that is illegitimate, unlawful, and which is a product of Soviet-style elections.” On June 5, the Central Election Commission issued a release summarizing the elections results. According to the CEC, four political parties passed the 5 percent threshold based on the proportional system: United National Movement (59.18%), or 48 seats, the United Opposition (17.73%), 15 seats, Christian-Democrat (8.66%) and the Labor Party (7.44%), 6 seats each. The results of single-mandate contests were: 71 seats for the United National Movement, 2 seats for the United Opposition, and 2 for the Republican Party. In total, the United National Movement won 119 seats, a constitutional majority. The United Opposition leadership moved quickly to request the cancellation of the mandates for seats won by the party, precluding individuals lower on their list from occupying the seats. Four of those elected, however, broke ranks with their leaders, refusing to relinquish their seats. The Labor party chose to neither cancel nor occupy their seats in parliament. Meanwhile, the Christian-Democratic party positioned itself to foster unity among the small group of non-UNM members. Results for Marneuli showed overwhelming support for the ruling UNM, with 84.49%, far exceeding the level for the country as a whole. The only other party to pass the threshold in the region was the United Opposition, with 6.79%. Similar lopsided tallies favoring the UNM were recorded in six other regions, notably the predominately Armenian Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda, where support for the ruling party surpassed 90 percent. Traditionally, areas of Georgia with high concentrations of ethnic minorities, such as these, have turned out in large numbers, voting overwhelmingly for whatever the ruling party was at the time. The newly-elected parliament held its inaugural session on June 7. In remarks before the new parliament, President Saakashvili acknowledged the challenges facing the country’s elected leadership, “The entire world is looking at Georgia today. The Georgian people have overcome the most difficult political crisis last autumn at the expense of democratic consolidation. We have managed to overcome the political crisis with the help of democratic institutions, to solve all problems through peaceful democratic methods.” He continued, “our obligation is to make our compatriots feel that they are represented in the country’s governance; even the smallest group should feel that it has the right to be represented in the country’s governance, in making decisions about the future of our country.” Saakashvili concluded by stressing the importance of undertaking further reforms and fostering unity. In testimony before Congress several weeks after the elections, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, remarked, “Georgian democracy continues to lack a necessary element – a credible and viable opposition – and the United National Movement and the United Opposition share the blame for this shortcoming. Without a viable opposition, an empowered, independent parliament and strong, credible judiciary, and a reform process that respects dissenting voices, democracy will not be consolidated.” While political polarization persists in the country, it was less palpable at the time of the parliamentary elections than in January, when there were widespread concerns that the violent street clashes of November could be reignited. Heightened tensions over the breakaway region of Abkhazia and the possibility of war erupting with Russia following the April 20 shoot down of an unmanned aerial vehicle by a Russian fighter over Georgian airspace seemed to trump domestic political squabbling in the lead up to the parliamentary elections. Overcoming political turmoil and polarization in the country takes on even greater importance in the face of ever-growing Russian threats and provocative actions undermining Georgia’s territorial integrity. The Georgian authorities should build upon the reforms instituted in electoral laws and procedures prior to the parliamentary elections. A lingering concern that deserves attention is the low confidence among voters regarding the electoral process and skepticism regarding the role of the international community. Similarly, allegations of campaign irregularities from recent elections, including use of administrative resources by the ruling party; campaigning by state officials; intimidation of state workers, especially teachers; pressure on businesses to make campaign “donations”; unbalanced television coverage on private stations; ruling party dominance of elections commissions; and lingering errors on voters lists should be taken seriously and dealt with by the authorities. These and other concerns are discussed in greater detail in the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions issued by the IEOM on May 22, 2008. A final report on the May 21 parliamentary elections is expected to be released by the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights shortly.

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