Background: OSCE Election ObservationMonday, August 30, 2004
The United States has provided important leadership within the 55-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in advancing democracy and human rights. In 1990, the U.S. and all OSCE participating States agreed by consensus to the Copenhagen Document, reaffirming principles to strengthen respect for fundamental freedoms, and inviting observers from other participating States to observe national elections. That same year, a U.S.-sponsored initiative led to the creation of the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODllR) as the OSCE's focal point for all election-related matters, including election observation, technical assistance, and the review of electoral legislation. Thus OSCE commitments require participating States, including the United States, to invite other participating States to observe their elections. Consistent with this commitment, the U.S. formally invited ODllR to send observers to elections in 1996, 1998 2000 and 2002. In 2002, ODllR deployed a team of 10 international observers to Florida and produced a largely positive report saying "measures adopted in Florida can serve as an example of good practice to the rest of the U.S. and other OSCE participating States." In 2003 ,two ODIHR observers came to observe the California gubernatorial recall election. Each year, the ODllR deploys thousands of observers to monitor elections throughout the OSCE region in order to assess participating States ' compliance with OSCE election-related commitments. At the parliamentary level, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has developed a particularly active program for monitoring elections. The United States has fielded thousands of American election observers in OSCE countries since the early 1990s as part of these missions. ODllR missions are funded from the core budget of the OSCE to which the U.S. contributes 9% annually. These funds cover expenses for ODllR experts and basic support of the mission and are not used to finance the participation of individual observers. Thus, election observation has become an integral part of U.S. efforts to advance democracy throughout the OSCE region. Consistent with its OSCE commitments and in keeping with customary practice, the United States Government - through the U. S. Mission to the OSCE in Vienna - extended an invitation for the ODllR to observe the U.S. elections in November. An ODllR assessment team was in Washington September 7- 10 and visited the Federal Election Commission, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission the Republican and Democratic National Committees, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute and relevant non-governmental organizations. An assessment report will be prepared with recommendations concerning whether or not to observe, if so where, and how many observers following their return to Warsaw, Poland. While most ODIHR election observation missions have been deployed to the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, elections in established democracies have also been observed. The latter have included France (2002 presidential), the United Kingdom (2003 devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), and Spain (2004 parliamentary). In an unprecedented development, ODllR was invited to observe the 2004 elections to European Parliament in 25 OSCE participating States: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France Germany, Greece Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania Luxembourg, Malta The Netherlands Poland, Portgal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The only OSCE participating State to outright refuse to invite an election observation mission was Yugoslavia in 2000 under then-President Slobodan Milosevic. Prepared by the staff of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
U.S. Delegation Contributes to OSCE PA Annual Session in EdinburghFriday, August 06, 2004
By Chadwick Gore CSCE Staff Advisor A 13-member bipartisan U.S. delegation participated in the Thirteenth Annual Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, hosted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom in Edinburgh, Scotland, July 5-9. At the closing plenary, the Assembly approved the Edinburgh Declaration. The United States delegation led by Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), included Ranking Commissioner Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD), Commissioners Rep. Louise McIntosh Slaughter (D-NY), Rep. Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL), Rep. Robert B. Aderholt (R-AL), Rep. Mike McIntyre (D-NC), and Rep. Joseph R. Pitts (R-PA). Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Rep. Donald M. Payne (D-NJ), Rep. James E. Clyburn (D-SC), Rep. Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS), Rep. Thomas G. Tancredo (R-CO) and Rep. Hilda L. Solis (D-CA) were also among the delegation. While in Edinburgh, the delegation participated fully in the work of the Standing Committee and opening plenary as well as in the Assembly’s three committees. The delegation=s active participation demonstrated the continued commitment of the U.S. Congress to U.S.-European relations, mutual interests and common threats. Hastings and Cardin Elected to Assembly Leadership Posts Commissioner Hastings won handily a one-year term as OSCE PA President, prevailing over candidates from France and Finland in a first-round victory. In addition to Mr. Hastings’ election as OSCE PA President, three of the Assembly’s nine Vice Presidents were elected: Panos Kammenos (Greece), Giovanni Kessler (Italy) and Nebahat Albayrak (Netherlands). Commissioner Cardin was re-elected to serve as Chair of the General Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment. This year’s Assembly brought together nearly 300 parliamentarians from 52 OSCE participating States, as well as representatives from four Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation and one Partner for Cooperation. Representatives from the Council of Europe, Inter-parliamentary Union, European Parliament, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Assembly of the Western European Union, Council of the Interparliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the CIS and the Nordic Council also were present. Five countries, including Germany, Georgia, the Russian Federation, and Serbia and Montenegro, were represented at the level of Speaker of Parliament or President of the Senate. Prior to the Inaugural Plenary Session, the Standing Committee gathered to hear reports on various upcoming Assembly activities as well as reports by the Treasurer and the Secretary General. The OSCE PA Treasurer, Senator Jerry Grafstein (Canada), reported that the Assembly was operating well within its overall budget guidelines. He also reported that KPMG, the Assembly’s external auditors, had delivered a very positive assessment of the organization’s financial management, expressing complete approval of their financial procedures as applied by the International Secretariat. Additionally, he reported that the OSCE PA’s commitment to a full year of reserves was nearing realization. The Standing Committee unanimously approved the Treasurer’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2003/2004. OSCE PA Secretary General R. Spencer Oliver reported on the International Secretariat’s activities. Chairman Smith addressed the Standing Committee as the Assembly’s Special Representative on Human Trafficking and reported on his efforts to promote laws and parliamentary oversight in the OSCE region aimed at combating human trafficking. A report was heard from the election monitoring mission to Georgia. Martha Morrison, Director, Office for Inter-Parliamentary Activities for U.S. House of Representatives, reported on preparations and planning for the OSCE PA Washington Annual Session to be held July 1-5, 2005. The inaugural ceremony included welcoming addresses by The Right Honorable Peter Hain, MP, Leader of the House of Commons and Secretary of State for Wales and OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy. The President of the Assembly, Bruce George of the United Kingdom, presided. The theme for the Edinburgh Assembly was ACo-operation and Partnership: Coping with New Security Threats.” U.S. Initiatives Members of the U.S. Delegation were active in the work of the Assembly’s three committees and were successful in securing adoption of several supplementary items and amendments. The Edinburgh Declaration reflects considerable input based on U.S. initiatives. Leadership from the delegation resulted in adoption of ambitious language concerning the responsibility of OSCE States to combat trafficking in human beings, to fulfill their commitments regarding the fight against racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia, and to enhance transparency and cooperation between the OSCE and the OSCE PA. In the wake of revelations of abuse in Abu Ghraib, Chairman Smith won unanimous approval of a measure condemning governments’ use of torture and related abuses. “The supplementary item we propose is designed to make it absolutely clear that the U.S. delegation – and this Assembly – rejects and totally condemns any and all acts of torture, abuse, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of prisoners,” Smith said at the meeting. “The revelations of abuse at Abu Ghraib have shocked and dismayed the American people and people around the world,” he continued. “The acts committed are deplorable and appalling and violate both U.S. law and international law.” Democratic Whip Rep. Hoyer, who previously served as Helsinki Commission Chairman, also spoke on behalf of the resolution, noting that the entire U.S. Congress had denounced the acts at Abu Ghraib. The measure introduced by Smith reiterates the international standard that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may be invoked as a justification for torture.” The resolution also calls for cooperation with, and implementation of recommendations of the International Committee of the Red Cross and protection from reprisals for those who report instances of torture or abuse, and support for medical personnel and torture treatment centers in the identification, treatment, and rehabilitation of victims of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Last year, Chairman Smith spearheaded passage of the Torture Victim Relief Reauthorization Act, which authorized $20 million for 2004 and $25 million for 2005 for domestic treatment centers for the victims of torture; $11 million for 2004 and $12 million for 2005 for foreign treatment centers; and $6 million for 2004 and $7 million for 2005 for the United Nations Voluntary Fund for the Victims of Torture. Work of the Committees The General Committee on Political Affairs and Security considered supplementary items on “Measures to Promote Commitments by Non-State Actors to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines”, “ Moldova”, “Ukraine”, and “Peace in the Middle East: The Protection of the Holy Basin of Jerusalem”. The Committee re-elected Chair Göran Lennmarker (Sweden) and elected Vice-Chair Jean-Charles Gardetto (Monaco) and Rapporteur Pieter de Crem (Belgium). The General Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment took up supplementary items on “Kosovo”, and “Economic Cooperation in the OSCE Mediterranean Dimension”. The Committee re-elected Chair Benjamin Cardin (U.S.A.) and Rapporteur Leonid Ivanchenko (Russian Federation) and elected Vice-Chair Maria Santos (Portugal). The General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions considered supplementary items on “Combating Trafficking in Human Beings”, “Torture”, “Fulfilling OSCE Commitments Regarding the Fight Against Racism, Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia”, “A Situation of National Minorities in Latvia and Estonia”, “Belarus”, and “Serious Violation of Human Rights in Libya”. The Committee elected Chair Claudia Nolte (Germany), Vice-Chair Cecilia Wigstrom (Sweden) and Rapporteur Anne-Marie Lizin (Belgium). Additional Initiatives As the President’s Special Representative on Human Trafficking, Chairman Smith met with interested parliamentarians and staff from seven countries to discuss legislative and other initiatives to address the problem of human trafficking in the OSCE region. Particular areas of discussion included the involvement of peacekeepers in facilitating human trafficking and the continuing need for protection and assistance for victims in countries of destination. While in Edinburgh, members of the U.S. Delegation held bilateral talks with parliamentarians from the Republic of Ireland, The Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Serbia and Montenegro, and Germany. Chairman Smith was briefed by the Director of the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Ambassador Christian Strohal, on efforts to collect data on anti-Semitic incidents in the OSCE region as follow up to the Maastricht OSCE Ministerial and the Berlin Conference on anti-Semitism. Strohal also provided information on ODIHR planning for observation of the November U.S. elections. Specific side meetings were held during the course of the Annual Session on relations between the OSCE and a number of Mediterranean countries with a meeting on “Promoting Cooperation with the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation”, and presentations by Ambassador Janez Lenarcic, Chairman of the OSCE Contact Group with the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation, and OSCE PA Treasurer Jerry Grafstein of Canada, sponsor of the supplementary item on the region. The OSCE PA Special Representative on Gender Issues, Tone Tingsgard (Sweden), hosted an informal working breakfast to discuss gender issues. The breakfast was attended by several members of the U.S. Delegation. The Special Representative presented her plan for future actions addressing gender issues within the OSCE PA. Primary topics of discussion were the need for members of the Parliamentary Assembly who are interested in gender issues to engage more actively in the Assembly’s debates and to stand for election to positions within the Assembly. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.
Helsinki Commission Leadership Engages Heads of Nine CIS CountriesWednesday, July 28, 2004
By Elizabeth B. Pryor CSCE Senior Advisor On July 21, 2004, the bipartisan leadership of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) responded to a Declaration signed by nine members of the group known as the Commonwealth of Independent States. The text was presented to the OSCE Permanent Council earlier this month by Russia ’s Ambassador to the OSCE, Alexey N. Borodavkin. The presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan signed the declaration. CIS members Azerbaijan and Georgia declined to sign. Turkmenistan did not participate. While acknowledging that the OSCE occupies “a key place in the European security architecture,” the Declaration maintains that the organization has been unable to adapt to the changing political and security environment. The Helsinki Commission leadership – Chairman Representative Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Co-Chairman Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), House Ranking Member Representative Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) and Senate Ranking Member Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) – responded to each of the nine presidents who signed the Declaration. The Commissioners noted that three of those signing the Declaration, President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan, and President Karimov of Uzbekistan actually signed the original Helsinki Final Act document when their countries were accepted as OSCE participating States in 1992. In the letter to President Nazarbaev, the Commission leaders stressed that they “were particularly troubled to see Kazakhstan included on the signatories to the declaration, since you have expressed an interest in undertaking the chairmanship of the organization [OSCE] in 2009.” In their replies, Commissioners agreed about the importance of the Vienna-based OSCE and that its ability to adapt was essential to its continued relevance. They pointed out, however, that many of the assertions of the Declaration were already being addressed by the participating States. The CIS signatories had criticized the OSCE for “failing to implement in an appropriate manner” the fundamental documents of the organization, stating that the OSCE is not observing an allegedly agreed Helsinki principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Refuting the assertion that the OSCE was failing to implement its principles, the Commission leaders pointed out that the participating States, not the organization, are responsible for such implementation: “We should look to capitals when failures in implementation arise, not Vienna .” On the matter of “internal affairs,” the leadership reminded the presidents that this issue was definitively decided in the politically-binding concluding document to the 1991 Moscow Human Dimension meeting, which states: “They [the participating States] categorically and irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension ... are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.” Turning to the assertion that there is a serious imbalance between the three security dimensions of the OSCE – political-military, economic and environmental, and the human dimension – the Commissioners noted that since the issue of “imbalance” in OSCE priorities was raised several years ago, there has been significant movement in anti-terrorism and tangible military security issues. For example, path-breaking agreements on export controls for MANPADs, on assistance for reduction of excess ammunition, and on uniform standards for travel documents have been achieved in the last few months. The economic dimension is also being revitalized. For example, the OSCE has the most concrete and robust action plan to fight human trafficking of any international organization. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has called for a ministerial-level meeting to discuss ways of halting terrorist financing and has spoken out for increased membership in the World Trade Organization. Though welcoming the development of all of the OSCE dimensions, the Commissioners took issue with the idea that this should come at the expense of the promotion of human rights. The CIS signatories expressed concern that human dimension activities are concentrated in the states of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia , and that unfair standards regarding elections are directed at these nations. They went on to accuse OSCE missions of focusing on human rights and democratic development at the expense of the “full range of work covered by the Organization.” In response to the assertion that undue concentration was focused on human rights in the countries of the CIS and former Yugoslavia , the Commission leaders noted that on 85 occasions since January 2003 the Helsinki Commission had addressed, often publicly, human rights concerns in NATO countries. Public criticism of actions by the United States , as in the recent criminal treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison, has also been made in OSCE meetings and has been taken seriously. The United States has made clear that free and fair elections are crucial to the ongoing process of democratic development and welcomes election monitors to its own national elections in November 2004. The letters also addressed the continued need to locate missions or other OSCE representatives in the former Soviet and Yugoslav countries. In the case of every signatory to the CIS Declaration, there are persistent human rights violations and backward trends on democratic development. Specific concerns were cited for each country, including fraudulent conduct of elections, hindrance of free media, curtailment of religious freedom and freedom of assembly, corruption among public officials and, in several of the countries, detention of political opposition leaders. These abuses have been documented in the Commission report Democracy and Human Rights Trends in Eurasia and East Europe. It is with the goal of reversing these trends that all OSCE states have agreed to the establishment and retention of these missions. The poor implementation record on OSCE commitments argues for the continued necessity of these field offices, the Commissioners concluded. Finally, the leaders of the Commission expressed the hope that the discussion of OSCE’s development would move beyond the Declaration’s inaccurate reinterpretations of key OSCE documents and center on concrete suggestions. They welcomed any positive proposals that the presidents might offer. In this, as in all their work, the Helsinki Commission expressed confidence that by working together, the States of the OSCE region could reach their goal of true security and cooperation in Europe. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.
Advancing Democracy in AlbaniaTuesday, July 20, 2004
Albania is expected to hold new parliamentary elections, and further reform is viewed as key to their success. The country has faced tremendous challenges in its democratic development since emerging from harsh communist rule and self-imposed isolation in the early 1990s. Despite highly polarized politics and splits within the Socialist camp in particular, there has been renewed progress. Albania, nevertheless, continues to face the difficult task, common to the region, of tackling organized crime and official corruption. The Albanian Government is making efforts, for example, to combat trafficking in persons, though it remains a source and a transit country for women and children who are sexually exploited or used as forced labor elsewhere in Europe. Meanwhile, Albania has maintained strong bilateral ties with the United States and cooperated with the international response to past regional conflicts. The country is a strong supporter of the war on terrorism and works within the framework of the Adriatic Charter, a U.S. initiative that includes Macedonia and Croatia, in laying the groundwork for further European and Euro-Atlantic integration.
Commission Hearing Surveys Human Rights in Putin's RussiaFriday, July 02, 2004
By John Finerty Staff Advisor The United States Helsinki Commission held a hearing on May 20, 2004 to review governance practices and human rights in the Russian Federation under President Vladimir Putin. Witnesses focused on media independence, religious freedom, judicial procedures, xenophobia and anti-Semitism, and the war in Chechnya. Opening the hearing, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) expressed apprehension that President Putin was leading Russia in an authoritarian direction, increasingly reliant on Russia’s security apparatus and intelligence agencies to govern the country. Commission Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) also voiced his concerns, focusing on corruption in the Russian Government and abuses in the war in Chechnya. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Steven Pifer stated that Russians enjoy freedom of travel and emigration, and an independent print media that engages in robust political debates; religious association and expression is generally free, and Russians have incorporated voting into their political practices. However, Pifer voiced concern with the Putin administration’s undue influence on judicial proceedings, state control or sway over the broadcast media, the pressuring of non-governmental organizations, anti-Semitism, abuses in the war in Chechnya, and the lack of a level electoral playing field for the political opposition. Ambassador Pifer cited the U.S. record of advocating democratization and human rights to the Russian leadership, while pursuing cooperation on mutual security interests such as the war on terrorism, arms control, counter-proliferation, and the resolution of regional conflicts. Gary Kasparov, former world chess champion and chairman of Committee 2008: Free Choice, presented a critical view of the Putin administration, lamenting the slide of the Russian Government into authoritarianism. He described a variety of policies undertaken by the Putin administration that he viewed as backtracking from the democratic progress of the 1990s, including the curtailment of civil liberties and the flagrant abuse of human rights. Specifically, Kasparov described government influence over the broadcast media and manipulation of elections. The war in Chechnya had been sidelined as a topic of news discussion, he asserted, thus facilitating the concealment of wartime human rights abuses. He also faulted the media for disregarding the ineptness of government responses to terrorist attacks. On elections, Kasparov characterized the December 2003 parliamentary polls as unfair, and predicted that President Putin would use parliamentary maneuvers to change the constitution and extend his term, perhaps indefinitely. Mr. Kasparov condemned Russian activities in the Chechen war and described how “hundreds of Chechens, if not thousands, are being interrogated, tortured and killed” by Russian soldiers. He called for the deployment of independent observers to monitor Russian behavior and promote observance of human rights. As a final critique, Kasparov charged that Putin had stripped the judicial system of its independence and was using it to silence political opponents and critics, such as Mikhail Khordorkovsky and Igor Sutyagin. As for solutions, Kasparov highlighted his efforts to expose the corruption of the December 2003 elections through a lawsuit and public advocacy. He also urged the United States to use diplomatic means to leverage the Russian Government into democratic and civil liberties concessions. Edward Lozansky, president of Russia House and the American University in Moscow, offered a contrasting opinion, pointing to the successes of the Putin administration in taming the “oligarchs” and encouraging economic growth. He viewed state control of the broadcast media as less of a crisis, contending that free alternatives, such as print, electronic, and foreign media, provide the people with a variety of viewpoints. Ultimately, Dr. Lozansky argued, “President Putin enjoys overwhelming support of the Russian people” and that the Russian people “can freely express their opinions.” In closing, Lozansky suggested the United States should not undermine its relationship with Russia through unnecessary criticism, since bilateral cooperation between the nations remains essential in the war on terrorism, space exploration, energy, and the environment. Engagement and dialogue, rather than condemnation, is paramount, he suggested. Reverend Igor Nikitin, president of the Association of Christian Churches in Russia, offered a mixed assessment of the status of religious liberty in Russia. In northwest Russia and St. Petersburg particularly, religious tolerance is the norm. In other regions, however, Protestant churches and other non-Orthodox denominations have experienced discrimination and bureaucratic malfeasance. For instance, an unconstitutional requirement for churches to register their members – as opposed to merely the institution – is frequently enforced by local authorities, and a Moscow court has ordered the “liquidation” of the city’s community of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Nikitin urged measures to educate Russian officials on the importance of religious freedom as a civil liberty. Nickolai Butkevich, Research and Advocacy Director of the Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union, discussed the situation regarding xenophobia and the treatment of minorities in Russia. Mr. Butkevich noted that President Putin has made efforts at the national level to combat xenophobia, but that implementation of relevant directives is uneven at the local level. Some regions and cities have combated xenophobia and anti-Semitism, while other authorities have actively encouraged it. Mr. Butkevich described cases in Vladivostok, Voronezh, and other cities where individuals had been subject to abuse and local authorities reacted uncaringly or in collusion with perpetrators. In answer to a question posed by Chairman Smith on the disparity between the Russian Government’s public and international pronouncements that it will combat anti-Semitism and its failed implementation of such policies domestically, Butkevich blamed the disparity on a lack of prioritization by the central government. Mr. Kasparov contended though that President Putin has done nothing to address anti-Semitism or quell xenophobia. Answering other questions on the attitudes of the United States and the West toward the Chechen situation, governmental corruption, and the judiciary, Dr. Lozansky replied that Russia is stabilizing under the pragmatic policies of President Putin and that the international community must engage the country on matters of mutual interest. The witnesses responded with divergent views as to whether Russia was moving toward autocracy. While Kasparov made his case strongly that Russia was, Lozansky again insisted that it was not. Mr. Butkevich suggested that Russia was “backsliding toward authoritarianism,” but that President Putin certainly retains popular support. Reverend Nikitin stressed that the next few years will determine whether Russia evolves toward civil and religious liberty or tsarist, oppressive governance reemerges. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives, and one official from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Intern Colby Daughtry contributed to this article.
Activists Brief Commission on the War in Chechnya, Civil Society and Military Reform in RussiaThursday, July 01, 2004
By John Finerty CSCE Staff Advisor The United States Helsinki Commission held a briefing entitled “The War in Chechnya and Russian Civil Society” on June 17, 2004 with representatives of one of the largest and most active nongovernmental organizations in Russia, the Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia. Valentina Melnikova, National Director of CSM, and Natalia Zhukova, Chairwoman of the Nizhny Novgorod Committee of CSM, briefed the Commission on their efforts to publicize and protest human rights abuses in the Russian military and the current state of civil society in Russia. Helsinki Commission Senior Advisor Elizabeth B. Pryor opened the briefing, noting concerns that President Vladimir Putin’s verbal attacks on human rights organizations and their funding sources – delivered on May 26 during his annual State of the Federation address – may indicate future trouble for Russian NGOs perceived as politically hostile to the Kremlin. Ms. Zhukova described the work of her committee and addressed the impact of Putin’s recent comments on the committee’s activities. The Nizhny Novgorod Committee is one of 300 such bodies under the umbrella of CSM, comprising approximately 30 volunteer workers and handling nearly 2,000 requests for assistance from parents and soldiers annually. “The problem is that most [people] have simply no idea of what’s going on in their military…because television is censored,” she said. According to Zhukova, the Nizhny Novgorod Committee also provides assistance to approximately 700 deserters annually, precipitated by “beatings, harsh hazing on the part of officers and other soldiers, a criminal environment in the unit, lack of medical assistance, cases of extortion of money, [and] use of soldiers for slave labor.” In cooperation with the Foundation for Civil Liberties, CSM provides mediation services with authorities and legal assistance to the military deserters and their families. The Committee also works to ensure social protection for veterans of the Chechen wars with disabilities, lobbying and leading demonstrations in support of adequate allowances for wounded soldiers, and the families of those killed in action. Regarding the recent condemnation of Russian NGOs by top military and administration officials, Ms. Zhukova noted, “I can’t say that we experience direct persecution.… But after the onslaught announced by the Minister of Defense and after the State of the Nation address by President Putin, we believe that we have to expect financial pressure.” President Putin’s May 26 address, in which he accused some NGOs of serving “dubious group and commercial interests” rather than those of the Russian people, has been “viewed by the local authorities as an order,” according to Ms. Zhukova. Since Putin’s speech, she noted, the local governor has revoked the Committee’s discount on their office rent, resulting in a tenfold cost increase. Moreover, local funding has been depleted because “local businessmen have been so intimidated by the onslaught against us by the Ministry of Defense and by President Putin that we cannot expect anything from them,” she said. Neither does CSM receive substantial financing from abroad, Zhukova maintains, “We serve the interests of millions of Russian soldiers and their parents, defending them from arbitrary rule and lawlessness of the authorities.” Ms. Melnikova addressed the effects of the Putin administration on Russian civil society. The Russian people, she asserted, have been deprived of both political opposition and independent media since Putin came to power. She listed “the closed nature of the Chechen war, lack of information, [and] direct deceit of the population by the authorities,” as the negative effects of his administration’s actions. As a result of Putin’s policies, she said, “The war in Chechnya has ceased to exist as far as the Russian public is concerned.” Through media controls and a vigorous propaganda campaign, she said, the Russian Government has led the people to believe “that what’s going on in Chechnya is a counterterrorist operation, that we are fighting Arab mercenaries and Al Qaeda units.” “In reality, the Chechen problem has nothing to do with international terrorism or Islamic fundamentalism…. There is no trace of stabilization in Chechnya, and there are no attempts by the Russian authorities to strive for a peaceful resolution of the problem,” Melnikova stated. Portraying the Russian military as a “decrepit, poorly managed, federally-corrupted structure,” she described the same grim situation as Ms. Zhukova. In Chechnya, she charged, Russian officers force young men to become military criminals. If they return from service alive, they are often psychologically or physically disabled, and abandoned by the government that sent them to Chechnya. In answer to a question by Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) regarding the recently enacted Russian legislation on alternative military service, Melnikova called the alternative civil service law “inadequate.” She noted that it requires that soldiers serve terms double the length of ordinary military service, perform tasks that do not serve civil society, and often work hundreds of miles away from home. The panelists requested that Chairman Smith raise such issues as the fate of a bill regarding civilian control of the armed forces, which has been introduced in the State Duma, and the possibility for a second amnesty for military deserters when he meets with the Speaker of the State Duma at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session in early July. Chairman Smith indicated that U.S. officials have, in past meetings with Russian leaders, raised concerns about violent hazing of military conscripts. In response, Melnikova provided Smith with recent copies of “The News of the Committee of the Soldiers’ Mothers,” featuring vivid photographs of soldiers that had suffered serious injuries as a result of such hazing. “Russian officers do not treat their soldiers as human beings,” she said, “therefore, everything goes on as before.” Regarding the international community’s response to the Chechen conflict, Melnikova claimed: “There is not enough pressure exerted on Mr. Putin. … Ten years of war have infuriated both the Russian military and the Chechens to such an extent that we don’t see any possibility of peaceful resolution.... But I think Russia’s partners simply have to exert pressure on Putin to make him make at least some tentative steps toward peace, maybe offer some intermediate negotiations, maybe seek some mediation efforts on the part of governments or nongovernmental organizations. At least something has to be done.” Ms. Melnikova further criticized “the active connivance of the leaders of Western countries, including the United States” as one of the key reasons for the continued restriction of human rights in Russia. She voiced concern that Washington leaders now believe “that the Russian people don’t need democracy…. That the West supports the anti-democratic policies of the Russian authorities is simply absurd,” she said. She concluded by stating that the CSM “advocates and conducts a social campaign for military reform, for abolition of conscription and for the [establishment] of a professional armed force,” as well as for peace in Chechnya and the expansion of civilian control over the military. The CSM provides direct aid to more than 50,000 soldiers and their families annually. Finally, Melnikova argued that the “legal slavery, chaos, and corruption at all levels of the Russian military compromises not only Russian civil society but also the strategic objectives of Russia’s allies, including nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Absent democracy,” she said, “there can be no safe Russia.” Asked about recent attacks on nongovernmental organizations by Putin administration officials, Melnikova mentioned that Putin’s criticisms were preceded by comments by the Minister of Defense and Deputy Minister of Justice to the effect that NGOs were pursuing subversive or illegal activities. Although she hopes that NGOs will not be targeted by the national authorities, she said that the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky has tempered her optimism. Responding to questions about funding from Russian oligarchs, Melnikova stated, “Oligarchs dread to touch us [because] there is always a chance that the authorities can charge any businessman with any crime and throw him in prison, and they know it.” The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Intern Christen Broecker contributed to this article.
OSCE Meeting Examines Hate Crimes and Racist, Xenophobic, and Anti-Semitic Internet PropagandaWednesday, June 30, 2004
“I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” – Voltaire By Erika Schlager CSCE Counsel on International Law On June 16 and 17, 2004, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s participating States met in Paris for a meeting on “the Relationship between Racist, Xenophobic and Anti-Semitic Propaganda on the Internet and Hate Crimes.” The meeting was part of an OSCE focus this year on racism, xenophobia, discrimination, and anti-Semitism and, like two other special human dimension meetings scheduled for this year, was mandated by the OSCE Ministerial Meeting held Maastricht last December. Conferences on anti-Semitism (held in Berlin, April 28-29) and racism, discrimination and xenophobia (to be held in Brussels, September 13-14) are intended to build on high-level meetings already held last year in Vienna on those same subjects. The Paris meeting focused on a specific issue – the Internet - related to the overall topic. The convocation of a special meeting on the relationship between racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic propaganda on the Internet and hate crimes was the product of advocacy by non-governmental organizations such as IN@CH, the International Network Against Cyber Hate, and the leadership of the Government of France. IN@CH had previously raised awareness of the problem of hate mongering on the Internet at the OSCE’s annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in 2002 and, at the 2003 Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, hosted a side-event on the subject. Historically, the OSCE has been most effective when governments gain a sense of ownership of an issue and exercise leadership in moving it forward. Non-governmental organizations typically play a critical role in identifying concrete human rights problems and bringing them to the attention of governments. The U.S. Delegation to the Paris meeting was jointly led by Ambassador Stephan M. Minikes, head of the U.S. Mission to the OSCE; R. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights; and Dan Bryant, Assistant Attorney General for Legal Policy. Markham Erickson, General Counsel from Net Coalition; Brian Marcus, Director of Internet Monitoring; Anti-Defamation League, and Ronald Rychlak, Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Mississippi Law School, joined the delegation as Public Members. Other members of the delegation came from the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and the Helsinki Commission. The United States Delegation engaged fully in the 2-day meeting, making presentations in all formal sessions and side events, holding bilateral meetings, and conducting consultations with non-governmental organizations. Assistant Attorney General Dan Bryant was a keynote speaker. Although the meeting was mandated to examine the relationship between hate propaganda on the Internet and hate crimes, few participants actually discussed the nexus between these two phenomena. For many participants, the existence of a cause-and-effect relationship was simply an article of faith or intuition, and did not lead to an exploration of the nature of that relationship. As a consequence, the meeting made only a marginal contribution to an understanding of which populations might be most vulnerable to the influence of hate propaganda, whether hate propaganda on the Internet fosters some particular kinds of hate crimes more than others, or whether the effect of hate propaganda on the Internet plays a different role in fostering violent crimes than, for example, weak law enforcement or public officials who make or refuse to condemn racist, anti-Semitic or xenophobic remarks. It is not clear whether web-based hate propaganda is related to spikes in hate crimes that have occurred in some countries in recent years, or why, as seems to be the case, some places with unfettered Internet access have relatively lower levels of hate crimes than other places with similarly unfettered Internet access. Nevertheless, participants did address a broad range of subjects related to hate propaganda, hate crimes and the Internet over the course of the two days. Formal sessions focused on “Legislative Framework, Including Domestic and International Legislation Regarding Propaganda on the Internet and Hate Crimes,” “The Nature and Extent of the Relationship between Racist, Xenophobic and anti-Semitic Propaganda on the Internet and Hate Crimes,” “Public and Private Partnerships in the Fight Against Racism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism on the Internet – Best Practices,” and “Promoting Tolerance on and through the Internet – Best Practices to Educate Users and Heighten Public Awareness.” Side events were held on “Guaranteeing Media Freedom on the Internet,” “‘The IN@CH Network’ - Dealing with Cyber Hate on a Daily Basis,” “Identifying Examples of Hate Speech: A BBC Monitoring Project,” “Filtering: Princip, the Solution that goes beyond Key Words,” “Satellite Television and Anti-Semitism: How to Combat the Dissemination in Europe of Racist and Anti-Semitic Propaganda through Satellite Television?” and “Promoting Awareness of Anti-Semitism in the European Classroom: Teacher Training, Curricula, and the Internet.” A number of speakers, including U.S. Government representatives, discussed the legal mechanisms for action that might be taken when hate propaganda rises to the level of a crime in and of itself, such as when the hate propaganda constitutes a threat or incitement to a criminal action. Many speakers discussed the role of non-governmental organizations in monitoring and facilitating the removal of hate sites from the web when they violate the terms of agreements with their Internet service providers (ISPs). Some participants described ways in which the pernicious effects of hate speech can be mitigated or countered. For example, a Canadian non-governmental organization, Media Awareness Network, made a presentation on programs in Canadian schools designed to teach children to distinguish between hate propaganda sites and legitimate information sources. Vividly illustrating the challenges and risks for those organizations which monitor and report on the activities of extremist hate groups, the offices of People Against Racism, a Slovak non-governmental organization that participated in Paris meeting, were burned out only weeks before the meeting opened. Although there was broad agreement on the goal of combating hate propaganda, some participants flagged concerns about the methods that might be used to that end. For example, industry representatives provided some insight regarding difficulties faced due to the technological challenges of tracking, filtering, or blocking hate propaganda transmitted through the Internet, emails, or text messaging. Some concepts of regulation, they argued, could not be effectively implemented given the state of current technology. Asking ISPs to be responsible for screening all content on the web is not feasible, anymore than making telephone companies responsible for everything that gets said over the telephone. A few participants drew attention to factors other than hate propaganda on the Internet that may contribute to hate crimes. A Russian non-governmental representative, for example, remarked that there was more anti-Semitism in the Russian State Duma than on Russian-language web sites. And, illustrating the complexities of deciding exactly what constitutes hate propaganda, one non-governmental representative argued that evangelical Christian sites that reach out to Jews should be considered anti-Semitic. Similarly, the Russian delegation identified the web sites of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Hare Krishnas as “promoting hate doctrines.” Other concerns were voiced as well. Some non-governmental groups suggested that ISPs were ill-suited to determine whether web sites constituted hate propaganda or not. One described an ISP that removed an innocuous site devoted to English philosopher John Stuart Mill after that non-governmental organization – testing the bases upon which ISPs would act – urged the ISP to take down the allegedly racist site. Regulation of hate propaganda by ISPs, they concluded, lacked transparency and accountability. Some speakers warned that combating hate propaganda could be used as a pretense for sanctioning views disfavored by the regime. The International League for Human Rights suggested that states with “weak democratic institutions and traditions” should not be entrusted with additional powers of control beyond those that already exist. Indeed, some speakers argued there have already been instances where laws against incitement to racial hatred (or similar laws) have been misapplied for political or other purposes. The ongoing fight against terrorism, they suggested, increases that danger. In fact, only days after the Paris meeting concluded [June 22], the Paris-based watchdog Reporters without Borders released a report entitled “Internet Under Surveillance,” documenting repression of the Internet around the globe. One of the U.S. recommendations made during the meeting was that the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media should examine whether hate speech laws are being enforced in a discriminatory or selective manner or misused to suppress political dissent. The full texts of statements circulated at the Paris meeting by the United States and other participants are available through the OSCE’s Internet web site at http://www.osce.org/events/conferences/anti-racism. One of the sub-texts of the meeting was the putative “Atlantic Divide.” In the context of discussions of “cyber hate” and hate crimes, this phrase was used to describe the perceived gulf between the United States’ and Europe’s approaches to hate propaganda. According to the adherents of the “Atlantic divide” theory, the United States is a free-speech Wild West, where speech has no limitations or legal consequences. “Europe,” in contrast, is portrayed as a unified region speaking with one voice, populated by those who have wisely learned from the horrors of World War II that dangerous speech can and must be sanctioned and that governments are easily capable of performing this task and do so as a matter of course. The “Atlantic Divide” perception was fostered by Robert Badinter, former French Minister of Justice and current president of the OSCE Court of Arbitration and Conciliation, who, in a keynote address, dramatically appealed to the United States to “stop hiding behind the first amendment.” Others, however, implicitly or explicitly rejected this overly simplistic image. In the United States, a long chain of legal authority recognizes that the right to free speech and freedom of expression is not absolute. As U.S. Public Member Robert Rychlak noted, “When speech crosses the line and becomes more than speech – when it presents a clear and present danger – the authorities must be prepared to step in and take legal action. At that time, the speech may constitute an actual threat, true harassment, or be an incitement to imminent lawlessness.” Department of Justice officials separately gave examples of numerous recent cases where individuals were prosecuted for sending email messages that rose to the level racially motivated threats. While it is important not to over-read these or related cases – criminal sanctions based purely on one’s opinion remain prohibited – they should dispel the misimpression that there are no limitations whatsoever on speech or the consequences of speech in the United States. Conversely, the context of the meeting also provided an opportunity to reflect on the image of Europe as a continent uniformly bound in a single regulatory approach to hate speech. In reality, the national laws relating to hate speech of individual European countries vary considerably; what constitutes prohibited speech in one country may be permitted in the next. Moreover, both national courts and the European Court of Human Rights apply balancing tests to speech restrictions that, while not identical to balancing tests applied by U.S. courts, are not entirely dissimilar. The Hungarian Constitutional Court, for example, in May 2004 held that a proposed hate speech law would violate the free speech provisions of the Hungarian Constitution. Just before the opening of the Paris meeting, on June 13, the French Constitutional Council struck down parts of a new law governing communication over the Internet (adopted to implement a June 8, 2000, European Union directive on electronic commerce). The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce.
Helsinki Commission Briefing Sheds Light on Russia's Human Rights SituationWednesday, June 30, 2004
By John Finerty CSCE Staff Advisor On June 7, 2004, the United States Helsinki Commission held a briefing with four prominent Russian human rights activists to examine the state of human rights and civil liberties in the Russian Federation. Entitled “Russia: Are Rights in Retreat?,” the briefing covered such topics as elections, Chechnya, religious liberty, media freedom and the overall functioning of the legislative and judicial branches. The briefing was a follow up to the Commission’s May 20th hearing on “Human Rights in Putin’s Russia.” The briefing panel included Ludmilla Alexeeva, Chairwoman of the Moscow Helsinki Group and President of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. Other participants were Arseni Roginsky, Chairman of the International Memorial Society; Alexei Simonov, Head of the Glasnost Defense Fund; and Mara Polyakova, Director of the Independent Council for Legal Expertise. Commission Deputy Chief of Staff Ronald J. McNamara began the briefing with a moment of silence to honor the passing of President Ronald Reagan, a “stalwart supporter of freedom and human rights.” McNamara noted the timeliness of the briefing given Russian President Vladimir Putin’s U.S. visit to Sea Island, Georgia, for the G-8 Summit. He stated that despite Putin’s claim that “nothing will stop Russia” in its quest for economic and democratic freedom, some of Putin’s comments in his State of the Federation address had raised concerns over the Kremlin’s commitment to promote civil society in Russia. Putin’s accusations of NGOs seeking outside funding and not addressing serious issues were particularly troubling insofar as they may signal the beginning of a crackdown against NGOs in Russia. Mr. McNamara also referenced the growing problem of “spy mania,” with potentially chilling implications for Russia’s academics and scientific community. Arseni Roginsky began his remarks by stating that the trend in Russia over the past few years has been marked by “the efforts of the powers-that-be to destroy the isolated islands of independence and democracy that still continue to exist in Russia.” Specifically, Roginsky pointed to the new Russian law limiting public demonstrations and a new law on referenda. In sentiments echoed by other panelists, he decried the emergence of “made-to-order” elections controlled almost exclusively by the Putin administration and moneyed interests. Ms. Alexeeva later reiterated the concern about the changes on referenda, noting that even if the requisite two million signatures can be garnered, under the new law she believes mid-level Russian bureaucrats will be able to stop indefinitely the progress of a referendum. While the Putin administration has been quick to point to the Russian Constitution and its promise of free speech, Roginsky and panelist Alexei Simonov both claimed that this de jure right does not exist in reality. According to Simonov, while Russians may be legally entitled to say or print controversial statements, these sentiments are ignored by the powers-that-be. He contended that “[freedom of speech] means not only to shout out but to be heard.” According to Simonov, there are only four independent-minded Russian magazines with a combined circulation of around 500,000. Smaller such newspapers exist as well, but the costs of protecting against defamation suits, which number more than 50 per month according to Simonov, make it increasingly hard for them to stay in business. He also stated that most editorials in newspapers are written by what amount to essentially local bureaucrats; most newspapers rely on government or private funding, making them hardly free and independent. Simonov estimates that only 10 to 15 percent of newspapers are self-sustaining. “Most of them take money from somewhere, and each has this special somewhere, but nobody wants to speak of these ‘somewheres,’” he concluded. Related to this issue is more direct government control over radio and television broadcasts which are the main source of information for most Russians. Ms. Alexeeva and other panelists asserted that “government-controlled media reported those campaigns [in 2003/2004] in an utterly biased way,” denying access to opposition candidates and giving the United Russia Party extensive coverage. Another common theme throughout the briefing was the lack of judicial independence or reform. Mr. Roginsky prefaced the topic by noting that “…the court system is under great influence of the nationalistic, patriotic ideology that is flourishing in Russia at this time.” He specifically spoke of a recent case involving four Russian soldiers who admitted to killing six Chechen civilians by mistake and then attempting to cover it up. In Mr. Roginsky’s words, “The jury and the courts did state that indeed the murder had taken place; the people were killed. The people who were being tried were those who perpetrated the killing; however, they were not [found] guilty.” Mara Polyakova spoke extensively about judicial reform. She admitted that new democratic laws are being passed which reflect democratic principles, but the mechanisms needed to implement these principles are often lacking or are thwarted. She also stated that prisoners in Russia are tortured and that court records are still falsified. “The judges are still dependent in spite of the fact that their independence was loudly proclaimed in the constitution and other laws, because the real power remains in the hands of the chairmen of the courts who are part of or prone to influence by the executive,” Polyakova said. Speaking specifically on the war in Chechnya, Roginsky described the large number of Chechen civilians abducted or kidnapped monthly, and the one-sided propaganda about the conflict emanating from the state-controlled media. However, Mr. Roginsky denied that the term “genocide” applies to the current Chechen situation (as opposed to the 1944 deportations), calling it instead state-sponsored terror. In response to a question regarding cutbacks in U.S. assistance for democracy programs in Russia, Simonov said, “Americans do not quite correctly understand what is happening in Russia. They seem to like the democratic record of the current Russian Government, and they seem to be taking this rhetoric as the truth.” On a similar note, he later recommended that U.S. officials and international organizations should “never take at face value anything said by officials in Russia.” Mr. McNamara raised the religious freedom issue, specifically the labeling of non-Russian Orthodox groups as “non-traditional religions” and the court-ordered “liquidation” of the Jehovah’s Witnesses organization in Moscow, despite federal recognition. Ms. Alexeeva responded by saying that it would appear the Russian Orthodox Church is striving to become a state religion as it once was. The panelists were pessimistic about the chances of a successful appeal of the recent Moscow court decision against the Jehovah’s Witnesses, although Simonov suggested that any pressure from President Bush during the G-8 Summit might have an impact. Despite the comments of the panelists painting a fairly bleak picture of the state of civil and human rights in Russia, Ms. Alexeeva did caution that “if you look from the outside in, everything seems to be more frightening than when you are on the inside of that state. I don’t think the fascist system is being created in our country, and even less that it has already been created.” In closing the briefing, Mr. McNamara sought to put events in perspective by recalling that in November 1986 there were 700 known Soviet political prisoners and prisoners of conscience as well as tens of thousands of divided families in the U.S.S.R. He noted that all of those prisoners had been released and many of those emigration cases resolved by January 19, 1989, President Reagan’s final day in office. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Intern Nicholas Adams contributed to this article.
Uzbekistan: Stifled Democracy, Human Rights in DeclineThursday, June 24, 2004
The hearing will examine democratization and human rights in Uzbekistan in light of the impending decision by the Department of State whether to certify Uzbekistan to continue receiving U.S. assistance. Uzbekistan, an OSCE participating State since 1992, has been closely cooperating with the United States in the campaign against international terrorism. There is a U.S. military base in Uzbekistan and Washington has stepped up assistance significantly since 2001. The agreement on Strategic Partnership and Cooperation was signed by President Bush and President Karimov in March 2002. However, Uzbekistan’s human rights record has remained poor, impeding the further development of U.S.-Uzbek relations. Late last year, the State Department decertified Uzbekistan for aid under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program because it had not made progress toward ending police torture and other abuses.
Unsolved Murder of Ukrainian Journalist Heorhiy GongadzeThursday, June 24, 2004
Mr. President, for nearly 4 years the case of murdered Ukrainian investigative journalist Heorhiy Gongadze has gone unsolved, despite repeated calls by the Helsinki Commission, the State Department, and the international community for a fair and impartial investigation into this case. As cochairman of the Helsinki Commission, I have met with Gongadze's widow and their young twin daughters. Besides the human tragedy of the case, the Gongadze murder is a case study of the Ukrainian authorities' utter contempt for the rule of law. Gongadze, who was editor of the Ukrainian Internet news publication Ukrainska Pravda, which was critical of high-level corruption in Ukraine, disappeared in September 2000. His headless body was found in November of that year. That same month, audio recordings by a former member of the presidential security services surfaced that included excerpts of earlier conversations between Ukrainian President Kuchma and other senior officials discussing the desirability of Gongadze's elimination. Earlier this week, Ukraine's Prosecutor General's office announced that Ihor Honcharov, a high-ranking police officer who claimed to have information on how Ministry of Internal Affairs officials carried out orders to abduct Gongadze, died of “spinal trauma” while in police custody last year. This came on the heels of an article in the British newspaper, The Independent, which obtained leaked confidential documents from Ukraine indicating repeated obstruction into the Gongadze case at the highest levels. Furthermore, just yesterday, Ukraine's Prosecutor General announced that investigators are questioning a suspect who has allegedly admitted to killing Gongadze. Many close observers of the Ukrainian authorities' mishandling, obfuscation and evasiveness surrounding this case from the outset are suspicious with respect to this announcement. Just one of numerous examples of the Ukrainian authorities' obstruction of the case was the blocking of FBI experts from examining evidence gathered during the initial investigation in April 2002, after the Bureau had been invited by these authorities to advise and assist in the case and earlier had helped in identifying Gongadze's remains. The Ukrainian parliament's committee investigating the murder has recommended criminal proceedings against President Kuchma. This committee's work has been thwarted at every turn over the course of the last several years by the top-ranking Ukrainian authorities. A serious and credible investigation of this case is long overdue--one which brings to justice not only the perpetrators of this crime, but all those complicit in Gongadze's disappearance and murder, including President Kuchma. Ukraine faces critically important presidential elections this October. Last month, I introduced a bipartisan resolution urging the Ukrainian Government to ensure a democratic, transparent and fair election process. Unfortunately, there have been serious problems in Ukraine's pre-election environment. Ukraine can do much to demonstrate its commitment to democracy and the rule of law by conducting free and fair elections and fully and honestly investigating those who were behind the murder of Heorhiy Gongadze. The Ukrainian people deserve no less.
The War in Chechnya and Russian Civil SocietyThursday, June 17, 2004
This briefing was held in light of recent verbal attacks by President Putin and other Russian officials on human rights organizations and their funding sources that raised concerns about the future of Russian NGOs that may be viewed by the government as politically hostile. Regarding Moscow’s conduct of the war in Chechnya, the Commission recognized Russia’s right to defend its territorial integrity, but asserted that territorial integrity can be preserved without resorting to the brutal methods employed by some members of the Russian military and the pro-Moscow Chechnya militia. Valentina Melnikova, National Director of the Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia and Natalia Zhukova, Chairperson of the Nizhny Novgorod Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers testified at this briefing. The “Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers” has become the largest NGO in Russia as an umbrella organization embracing nearly 300 groups and thousands of members. The Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers have opposed the Kremlin’s conduct of the war in Chechnya and have accused the Russian Government of consistently under-reporting the number of Russian military casualties in the conflict.
Russia: Are Rights in Retreat?Monday, June 07, 2004
The Helsinki Commission briefing occurred in conjunction with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to the United States to attend the G8 Summit and focused on the status of democratic progress, human rights, civil liberties, and press freedom in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The consequences of President Putin’s ascent to power and elements of his government determined to reverse Russia’s direction and institute more authoritarian policies were among several topics that were discussed. Four prominent Russian human rights activists – including Ludmilla Alexeeva, Chairwoman of the Moscow Helsinki Group, and President, International Helsinki Commission for Human Rights; Arseni Roginsky, Chairman of the International Memorial Society; Alexei Simonov, Head of the Glasnost Defense Foundation and Mara Polyakova, Director of the Independent Council for Legal Experts – gave their assessment of the human rights situation in Russia today, including specific cases of particular interest.
Uncovering Collusion, Reforming Northern Ireland Police Focus of Helsinki Commission HearingsFriday, May 28, 2004
By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor The United States Helsinki Commission recently held two hearings focusing on human rights developments in Northern Ireland. The first, “Human Rights and Police Reform in Northern Ireland”, held March 16, 2004, dealt specifically with human rights and police reform. The second, “Northern Ireland Update: Implementation of the Cory Reports and Impact on Good Friday Agreement”, held May 5, supplemented the first one by examining the recently published Cory Collusion Inquiry Reports. Reports of Collusion Following decades of violence in Northern Ireland, the April 10, 1998, “Good Friday Agreement” provided a new avenue for peace by calling for devolved government, decommissioning (disarmament), police reform and other human rights measures. The process of implementing the agreement, however, has proven to be difficult. In the summer of 2001, the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Republic of Ireland met at Weston Park to resolve numerous problems which developed in the peace process. There, the two governments agreed that, among other things, “certain cases from the past remain a source of grave public concern, particularly those giving rise to serious allegations of collusion by the security forces.” They therefore agreed to “appoint a judge of international standing from outside both jurisdictions to undertake a thorough investigation of allegations of collusion” in six prominent murder cases, adding that, “in the event a Public Inquiry is recommended in any case, the relevant Government will implement that recommendation.” On May 29, 2002, the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Republic of Ireland appointed former Canadian Supreme Court Justice Peter Cory to fulfill this task, agreeing to publish his final reports. On October 7, 2003, Justice Cory delivered two reports to the Government of the Republic of Ireland and four reports to the Government of the United Kingdom. That December, the Irish Government published the reports it had received and announced its approval of a Public Inquiry in the one case as recommended (Cory found no evidence constituting a basis for the directing of a Public Inquiry in the other). It was not until April 2004, however, after many public appeals and legal action, that the British Government published the reports it had received from Justice Cory. While Cory recommended Public Inquiries in all four cases, the British Government approved only three. Regarding the fourth -- that of murdered Belfast lawyer Patrick Finucane -- Northern Ireland Secretary Paul Murphy noted not only the current prosecution of one individual, Ken Barrett, for the murder, but also the possibility of further prosecutions. Secretary Murphy indicated that “the way ahead” will be set out only at the conclusion of prosecutions. In contrast, Cory found “strong evidence that collusive acts were committed,” making this “one of the rare situations where a public inquiry will be of greater benefit than prosecutions.” Cory argued that a Public Inquiry “should be held as quickly as possible” in order “to achieve the benefits of determining the flaws in the system and suggesting the required remedy, and … to restore public confidence in the army, the police and the judicial system.” Justice Cory appeared before the Helsinki Commission on May 5 to discuss these issues. Other witnesses included Geraldine Finucane, widow of Patrick Finucane, and the non-governmental organization Human Rights First’s Washington office director, Elisa Massimino. Helsinki Commission Chairman, Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), opened the hearing by reciting the obligations undertaken by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic Ireland in the Weston Park Agreement of 2001. Chairman Smith emphasized that “the precise wording of the agreement was ‘will’, not ‘may’” with regard to the establishment of a Public Inquiry if recommended. Mr. Smith underlined that the timely implementation of Justice Cory’s recommendations is necessary to restore citizens’ confidence in government, the rule of law, and to ensure peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. Expressing deep disappointment in the British Government’s decision regarding the case of Patrick Finucane, Smith argued that “we owe it to the memory of those slain, their families, and every person in Ireland who cherishes justice to see to it that the British Government immediately commences the Public Inquiry as promised in the Weston Park Agreement; no exceptions, no excuses.” Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) welcomed the witnesses testifying before the Commission and acknowledged their contributions to the ongoing struggle for justice and peace in Northern Ireland. Mr. Cardin supported the sentiments stated by the Chairman and expressed his own hopes for a rapid resolution to the stalemate in the peace process. Noting the Helsinki Commission’s emphasis on implementation of OSCE commitments, Cardin added that “we don’t just speak about a problem, we watch it and follow up to make sure action is taken. And I can assure you that this commission will do just that.” Other Commissioners in attendance included Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY), Rep. Joseph R. Pitts (R-PA), and Rep. Robert B. Aderholt (R-AL). Justice Cory began his testimony by describing the four cases on which he reported to the British Government: Patrick Finucane was a Belfast lawyer who was gunned down in his home in 1989. Cory listed several alarming facts uncovered through his investigation which point to collusion between the killers of Patrick Finucane and several government agencies. These included British military intelligence, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Special Branch and the Security Service. Justice Cory also uncovered documents indicating that Finucane was a target in 1981, 1985, and in 1989 shortly before his murder. However, in order to protect the identity and safety of the agent, this information was not released to Patrick Finucane. According to Cory, this aspect alone constitutes evidence of collusion and requires the establishment of a Public Inquiry. Billy Wright was a militant Protestant leader known for committing acts of violence and inciting others to do the same. He was killed in 1997 in the confines of the Maze state prison by militant members of the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). Wright had been transferred to Maze because three members of INLA conspired to kidnap and execute him at his prior detention facility. However, a transfer to Maze was also granted to several INLA members. A prisoner’s list was circulated throughout the prison, which contained the exact times and locations of Wright’s whereabouts throughout the day. Other disturbing factors included a broken security camera, a large hole in the fence, and weapons that enabled the INLA prisoners to kill Billy Wright. Since Billy Wright was a prisoner in a state institution, Justice Cory concluded, it was the responsibility of the state to ensure Wright’s safety. He felt the above factors indicate collusion and thus recommended a Public Inquiry. Robert Hamill was a young Catholic construction worker who was only 25 when he was kicked to death in 1997 in Portadown. RUC officers in an armored vehicle were positioned nearby but had an obstructed view of the violence. The senior RUC officer on duty tried to assist one of the men responsible for Hamill’s death by calling the man’s father and instructing him to burn the clothes worn the night of the murder. The officer further compromised his position by asking two of his friends to lie on his behalf, by telling the authorities it was one of them who placed the call. The officer later admitted to charges of obstruction of justice. Another man at the scene and likely involved in the attack was taken into custody only to be released without explanation. Justice Cory concluded the lack of accountability by the police and the attempt to destroy evidence warranted the establishment of a Public Inquiry. Rosemary Nelson was a prominent lawyer who was killed when her car was blown up in 1999. She had taken on several prominent and controversial cases during which she was openly threatened by the RUC officers. Her clients were threatened and told to find a different lawyer, under advisement that Ms. Nelson would soon be dead. Aside from verbal threats there were also written threats, one appearing in a pamphlet entitled “A Man without a Country” which indirectly encouraged violence against Ms. Nelson and her work. A number of clients, independent agencies, and Ms. Nelson herself contacted the RUC and the Northern Ireland Office regarding the threats. In his investigation Justice Cory discovered that the Northern Ireland Office contacted the RUC for a threat assessment. That request was never answered. Due to lack of information the ministry concluded there was no direct threat and took no action. Justice Cory determined that the failure of both institutions to take preventive action and the mishandling of documents vital to the safety of Ms. Nelson constitute the possibility of collusion. Based on the evidence uncovered, a Public Inquiry was recommended despite what he considered to be a thorough investigation of the crime. Chairman Smith noted that Rosemary Nelson had testified before the U.S. Congress six months prior to her murder. The last two cases discussed by Justice Cory were those on which he reported to the Irish Government: Lord Justice Maurice and Lady Cecily Gibson were killed in 1987 when their car was blown up as they returned from vacation in England. Lord Gibson was a prominent judge who presided over a number of significant and controversial cases in Northern Ireland. Prior to his death he had been warned by both RUC and Garda (Irish police) officers to take all necessary precautions to ensure his safety. Upon completion of the investigation, Justice Cory found no material evidence linking the Garda to the deaths of Lord Justice and Lady Gibson. Although the circumstances surrounding the deaths are suspicious, Justice Cory concluded that suspicion may not be used as a ground for establishing a Public Inquiry. RUC Chief Superintendent Harry Breen and Superintendent Bob Buchanan were killed in a violent ambush as they returned from a Garda office in the Republic of Ireland in 1989. Justice Cory uncovered documents which pointed to collusion between the killers and a member of the Garda, which would account for the precise timing and execution of the assault. The clear presence of material evidence justified the establishment of a Public Inquiry, Cory maintains. Concluding his remarks, Justice Cory praised the cooperation and dedication of the police and intelligence agencies assisting his investigations. Upon questions posed by Chairman Smith and other Members of Congress as to whether he was able to examine all the documents vital to his investigation, Cory commended all of the agencies he worked with for their contributions to the investigation. Regarding the murder of Patrick Finucane, Justice Cory stated that in this particular case a Public Inquiry ought to take precedence over the criminal prosecution in order to restore peace and transparency in the community. He compared the current state of ambiguity to a deadly disease: “In light of the suspicion that is there, it must be open. And if it isn’t then the suspicion grows like a cancerous sore and just will grow greater and greater until the exploration is made.” Justice Cory also shared his concerns with the Commission regarding the feasibility of a complete and thorough investigation due to the recent passing of two key witnesses in the case. Mrs. Finucane followed Justice Cory. She spoke of her long and frustrating battle to learn the truth about the murder of her husband, an effort that has been sabotaged by long investigations and other delays. Delays in releasing the Cory Reports in the United Kingdom, for example, forced Mrs. Finucane to begin a legal battle to have them made public. Although Mrs. Finucane and her family were skeptical at the onset of the investigation conducted by Justice Cory, she thanked him publicly at the hearing for completing a thorough and uncompromising investigation ahead of schedule while maintaining respect and compassion for the families of the victims. Despite the recommendation for a Public Inquiry set forth by Justice Cory and appeals filed by international organizations, governments, and law societies, she reported that the British Government has refused to establish such an inquiry. Recently on the floor of the United Nations the Government of Republic of Ireland called for a Public Inquiry. In conclusion, Mrs. Finucane asked the Helsinki Commission to continue to provide support and assistance in seeing this case to the end. Ms. Elisa Massimino began her testimony by urging the British Government to fulfill its obligations under the Weston Park Agreement of 2001. She also noted that Justice Cory, the United Kingdom’s most senior policeman, Sir John Stevens, and the United Nations have all found evidence of collusion. Ms. Massimino stated that “a public inquiry would help to ensure that current policies, procedures, and structures are likely to withstand future prospects of institutional conflict and corruption of the kind that Northern Ireland has experienced in the past, and it would go a long way toward instilling long needed trust in the rule of law.” She added that a Public Inquiry would not interfere with any prosecution. Police Reform While hoping to address outstanding cases from the past, the Good Friday Agreement and the subsequent peace process also initiated changes to preclude new issues from arising. Reforming the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) into a Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) which would have the respect and support of all communities has been vital in this regard. Part of this reform included the establishment in 1998 of the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland to provide an independent and impartial police complaints service in which both the public and the police would have confidence. The March 16 Helsinki Commission hearing largely focused on the practices, oversight, training and other activities of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Testifying before the Commission were Dr. Mitchell B. Reiss, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State; Nuala O’Loan, Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland; Paul Mageean, Legal Officer, Committee on the Administration of Justice; Elisa Massimino, Director of Washington office, Human Rights First; Jane Winter, Director, British Irish Rights Watch; and Brendan McAllister, Director of Mediation Northern Ireland. In his opening statement, Chairman Smith stressed that proper police conduct is essential to maintaining a dialogue between conflicting parties in Northern Ireland, and only a police force which gains the confidence of the community can secure a lasting peace. Accordingly, Smith observed that some problems remain in policing, particularly the harassment of attorneys. Other Commissioners in attendance included Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), Rep. Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL), and Rep. Robert B. Aderholt (R-AL). Dr. Reiss began his testimony by acknowledging that progress on human rights issues remains to be made, but internal reforms and supervisory bodies such as the Police Ombudsman and the Office of the Oversight Commission, headed by Tom Constantine, have guided the PSNI in a positive direction. “Despite the instability in the political process, the policing institutions have performed well over the past two years,” Reiss said. He was encouraged by recent opinion polls describing public attitudes toward Northern Ireland’s policing institutions, as they now indicate that half of Catholics have confidence in the PSNI, up from one-third in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, Reiss remains concerned about reforming the Special Branch of the PSNI and stated that Sinn Fein, currently the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland, should rethink its refusal to participate in the governance of the policing institutions. In his questions to Dr. Reiss, Chairman Smith inquired about the need for rapid reform of the Special Branch and argued that the PSNI must disclose its training curriculum. Dr. Reiss agreed that provisions in legislation for the International Fund for Ireland authorizing assistance to promote human rights training for police, encourage police-community dialogue, and support mediation efforts would be beneficial to the police reform process. Commissioner Hastings remarked that police reform and reconciliation in Northern Ireland would benefit by drawing on the expertise of others in nations having resolved similar problems. Dr. Reiss agreed and noted that experts had been brought in from Bosnia, South Africa, and elsewhere to provide their insight. Ms. O’Loan stressed the importance of an independent Ombudsman, charged with investigating complaints of police abuses and making recommendations for policy changes. If necessary, the Ombudsman also refers cases for prosecution. Investigations are evidence-based and operate strictly under the legal mandate granted by Parliament; the office has jurisdiction only over PSNI, not the British military presence in Northern Ireland. Ms. O’Loan continued by detailing the accomplishments and challenges her office has faced in recent years. She noted that PSNI has grown more cooperative since the establishment of the Ombudsman, even to the point where police officers are willing to volunteer evidence and testify against abusive colleagues. Moreover, O’Loan was pleased with a trend of decreased usage of firearms and rubber bullets by the police – a testament to the policy of the Ombudsman to investigate every incident in which a weapon is fired. However, Ms. O’Loan described how her office is stretched by the need to investigate historical cases of police abuses. She believed that such investigations are vital for the process of reconciliation, but described how they consume sizable resources and staff. Chairman Smith asked O’Loan whether the Ombudsman had sufficient funding to study the historical cases of police abuse, inquired as to the Ombudsman’s contribution in police training, and asked how the Ombudsman acts to preempt abuse by problem officers. Ms. O’Loan answered that she had requested additional funding to cover historical cases, and that the matter was pending. She highlighted the human rights instruction the Ombudsman had provided to police trainees and described the Ombudsman’s early warning system for detecting abusive officers, which triggers an investigation of an officer if he is the subject of three or more complaints per year. Chairman Smith also reiterated to Ms. O’Loan a need to investigate complaints of the harassment of attorneys by the police and other authorities. Following Ms. O’Loan, the Commission proceeded to hear from the remainder of the witnesses in its third panel. Generally, the third panel held a more guarded view of the progress of police reform in Northern Ireland in recent years. Paul Mageean began his testimony by calling for the government, political parties, and civil society of Northern Ireland to issue a mutually binding written declaration of human rights principles. He argued that such a “bill of rights” would set a positive tone for policing and government activities. Mageean also cited specific violations of human rights by Northern Ireland’s policing and judicial institutions, including the continued use of emergency anti-terrorism legislation to try suspects without juries of their peers, “heavy handed” police tactics, politically motivated raids and arrests by Special Branch, delays in addressing sectarianism within PSNI, and the use of plastic bullets. Elisa Massimino called for reforms to Northern Ireland’s criminal justice system. She understood that current legislative efforts at reform are underway, but she desired a quickened pace to establish a judicial appointment commission to “secure a judiciary in Northern Ireland that is reflective of society.” Massimino also wanted increased human rights training, the curtailed usage of emergency detention powers, and Public Inquires to determine if the police were complicit in the assassinations of Patrick Finucane and Rosemary Nelson, two human rights attorneys. Jane Winter joined Massimino’s request for public investigations into police collusion in the Finucane and Nelson murders. In calling on the British Government to release reports authored by Justice Peter Cory, she garnered Chairman Smith’s support, and London did release the reports two weeks later. Brendan McAllister described the role of his organization in providing expert advice to the police as they implement their reforms, particularly by facilitating dialogue and exchange programs with foreign police forces and communities that have dealt with similar problems. Mr. McAllister said the PSNI had made substantial progress in developing a concept of “community policing,” but the process requires a long-term commitment. McAllister warned, however, that the situation is tenuous in Northern Ireland due to the political vacuum created by the collapse of the territory’s executive and assembly. Chairman Smith sensed from the testimony that the Ombudsman has done much to improve the quality of policing. Smith concluded by highlighting legislation that he had introduced, which has passed the House but is awaiting action in the Senate, that would authorize International Fund for Ireland monies to be spent on training the PSNI in human rights practices. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Interns Colby Daughtry and Irina Smirnov contributed to this article.
Helsinki Commissioners Active at Parliamentary Assembly Winter MeetingTuesday, April 20, 2004
Approximately 250 parliamentarians from 50 OSCE participating States met February 19-20 in Vienna for the third annual Winter Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The United States delegation was headed by Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman of the United States Helsinki Commission. Also participating were Ranking House Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) and Commissioner Rep. Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL). Former Commission Chairman Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD) also attended. At the Vienna Meeting, OSCE PA President Bruce George appointed Chairman Smith as his Special Representative on Human Trafficking Issues. Smith will serve as the Assembly’s point person for collecting information on human trafficking in the OSCE region; promoting dialogue within the OSCE on how to combat human trafficking; and, advising the Assembly on the development of new anti-trafficking policies. Over the past five years, Chairman Smith has provided considerable leadership in raising human trafficking concerns within the Assembly. In Congress, Smith sponsored the “Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act,” which enables the U.S. Government to prosecute offenders and provides resources to help victims of trafficking rebuild their lives. Ranking House Member Benjamin L. Cardin, who chairs the Assembly’s Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment, led a panel discussion on economic challenges and opportunities in the Republic of Georgia following the historic “Revolution of the Roses.” OSCE PA Vice-President and Speaker of the Georgian Parliament, Nino Burjanadze, described her experience as Acting President of the country after the resignation of former President Eduard Shevardnadze following flawed elections in late 2003. Speaker Burjanadze stated emphatically that the revolution was unavoidable and inevitable because corruption had been so overwhelming that it was a threat to Georgia’s national security. She reviewed the steps the new government is taking to combat corruption and strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law. Joining Burjanadze was Ambassador Roy Reeve, Head of the OSCE Mission in Georgia. The Committee was also addressed by the OSCE Coordinator for Economic and Environmental Activities, Dr. Marcin Swiecicki, and Committee Rapporteur Dr. Leonid Ivanchenko. Commissioner Rep. Alcee L. Hastings, who serves as one of nine Assembly Vice Presidents, held a series of meetings with delegations in Vienna in his bid for the presidency of the OSCE PA that will be decided in elections to take place in early July at the Edinburgh Annual Session. Hastings also met with the leadership of the various political groups -- the Conservatives, Greens, Liberals, and Socialists. He discussed his plans for future development of the Assembly and its relationship with the governmental side of the OSCE. Rep. Hoyer chaired the Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency and Accountability, which discussed ways to further improve relations between the parliamentary and governmental parts of the OSCE, including regular access for Ambassador Andreas Nothelle, Permanent OSCE PA Representative in Vienna, to all OSCE meetings. Discussion also focused on streamlining Assembly declarations of the annual sessions as a means of enhancing the OSCE PA’s influence on the work of the Permanent Council in Vienna. The committee concluded that a limited number of recommendations should be included in forthcoming declarations sent to the PC each year, coupled with a significant reduction in preamble language. Members of the U.S. delegation were also briefed by U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Stephan M. Minikes and Ambassador Andreas Nothelle on issues of concern in Vienna. A bilateral meeting was held with Head of the French delegation Mr. Michel Voisin and French Ambassador to the OSCE Yves Doutriaux to discuss the recent French ban on wearing headscarves, yarmulkes, crucifixes and other obvious religious symbols in public schools. ODIHR Director Ambassador Christian Strohal discussed human dimension issues, including the future of election observations and budget issues, as well as programs dealing with human trafficking and anti-Semitism. Bulgarian Ambassador and Chairman-in-Office Representative Ambassador Ivo Petrov outlined the CiO’s plan for 2004 and issues around the anti-Semitism program and anti-trafficking initiatives. The delegation was also briefed by Helen Santiago Fink of the OSCE Economic Coordinator’s Office, who addressed the economic dimension of trafficking in persons. Dr. Andreas Khol, President of the Austrian Nationalrat, welcomed the opening of the Winter Meeting for its ability to encourage “intensified dialogue and co-operation between the governmental and parliamentary dimensions of the OSCE.” OSCE Chairman-in-Office Dr. Solomon Passy who is Bulgaria’s Foreign Minister gave his overview of the priorities of the Bulgarian Chairmanship for 2004. Other OSCE officials made presentations, including Chair of the Permanent Council and Representative of the Chairman-in-Office Bulgarian Ambassador Ivo Petrov; Chair of the Forum for Security Cooperation, Coordinator for OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities Ambassador Marcin Swiecicki; OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities Ambassador Rolf Ekééus; a representative from the office of the OSCE Representative for Freedom of the Media; Director of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Ambassador Christian Strohal; and OSCE Secretary General Ambassador Jan Kubis. All presentations were followed by question and answer sessions. Each of the rapporteurs of the three General Committees discussed their draft reports for the forthcoming OSCE PA Annual Session this July in Edinburgh, Scotland. All have focused their reports on the theme for the annual session, “Co-operation and Partnership: Coping with New Security Threats.” The ninth OSCE Prize for Journalism and Democracy was presented to the New York-based NGO Committee to Protect Journalists, represented by Executive Director Ann Cooper. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives, and one official from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce.
Bulgarian Foreign Minister Passy Testifies before CommissionThursday, April 08, 2004
By Orest Deychakiwsky CSCE Staff Advisor The United States Helsinki Commission convened its first hearing of 2004, featuring the testimony of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy early in his tenure in his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Accompanying Minister Passy were Ambassador Ivan Naydenov, Director of the OSCE section of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry and personal representative of the Chairman-in-Office; Elena Poptodorova, Ambassador of the Republic of Bulgaria to the United States; and Richard Murphy, Spokesman for the OSCE. Minister Passy, appearing before the Commission on February 26, laid out his goals of implementing OSCE commitments in the war on terrorism, focusing on the human dimension and managing regional conflicts. Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) opened the hearing by extending his heartfelt condolences on behalf of Members of the Commission to Minister Passy regarding the tragic death of his colleague and personal friend, President Boris Traikovsky of Macedonia. Passy began his testimony with the question of the relevance and the current role of the OSCE considering the end of the Cold War and the existence of organizations such as NATO, the European Union, and the NATO-Russia Council. The Bulgarian Foreign Minister noted the uniqueness of the OSCE as the only organization providing a comprehensive security model founded on the values of respect for human rights and promotion of democratic institutions. Though less than three decades old, the OSCE has proven its ability to tackle the challenges of conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Central Asia. Notable are the OSCE's efforts to end the civil war in Tajikistan and the secessionist armed conflict in Transdniestria, and rebuilding the war-torn societies in the Balkans. With 18 field missions, the OSCE remains, according to Passy, “the most comprehensive security forum.” Minister Passy stressed that the war on terrorism is one of his top priorities. He focused on issues such as airport security, policing, and secure travel documents as potentially helpful tools in thwarting the spread of terrorism. In order to achieve this goal, the OSCE organized an inter-governmental conference where practitioners and security experts shared their ideas on improving the safety and security of aircraft. The OSCE also launched an Internet-based network, designed to facilitate cooperation between security experts and help match resources with needs. The Chairman-in-Office cited policing as “the perfect OSCE issue, bringing together security and human rights.” He commended American police officers for providing outstanding service in OSCE police reform efforts and their contribution to the establishment of an “accountable police force that is trusted by the population and does not have to resort to brutality or torture to solve crimes.” Minister Passy reaffirmed his commitment to continue the battle against anti-Semitism, racism, and xenophobia, informing the Commission of three important events that will help address these problems which continue to plague many participating States. In April, a conference on anti-Semitism will take place in Berlin, followed by a September conference on tolerance and xenophobia in Brussels. A June meeting in Paris will address the relationship between xenophobic and anti-Semitic propaganda on the Internet and hate crimes. Chairman Smith, strongly supported by Ranking House Commissioner Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD), urged Passy to follow up on the Berlin conference with robust action. "'Never again' has to mean 'never again' in all of its vicious manifestations," Chairman Smith proclaimed. On the issue of trafficking in human beings, the Bulgarian Chairman-in-Office focused on the problem of countries of destination. “A firm and persistent police clampdown on the work of traffickers in the Western cities would send a clear message to these criminal gangs that their evil work will not be tolerated,” said Passy. Chairman Smith echoed this sentiment by citing the estimated 18,000-20,000 victims trafficked annually into the United States. Passy also emphasized that the OSCE must undertake a special commitment of prosecuting traffickers -- and anyone else associated with this evil trade -- while treating victims with dignity and compassion. Chairman Smith asked the Bulgarian Foreign Minister to devote special attention to the March parliamentary elections in Georgia, underscoring the importance that these elections be carried out in a free and open manner. Passy commended the OSCE mission in Georgia for doing a remarkable job in monitoring the border with Chechnya and assisting in the destruction of the Soviet stockpiles of ammunition. Smith similarly urged that the OSCE conduct close observation of the upcoming elections in Belarus and Ukraine. He insisted that an open and free media must be allowed to cover the election process and provide access to the voices of the opposition candidates; otherwise, the results of the elections will be predetermined. In response, Minister Passy stressed that the involvement of the OSCE in the election process is indispensable and mentioned his upcoming trip to Ukraine, where he planned to meet with both government officials and the opposition. With regard to Belarus, Chairman Passy stated he “shared the view that the necessary conditions for free elections [need to] be created” and noted that the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) plans to monitor parliamentary elections expected this Fall. The Chairman-in-Office also noted the OSCE’s determination to end the ongoing conflict between Moldova and the secessionist region of Transdniestria. Mediators held two meetings in Sofia and Belgrade during which the conflicting parties resumed negotiations. Commissioner Cardin posed a question on the possible re-engagement of OSCE activities in Chechnya. Minister Passy stated that during his recent meeting with then-Foreign Minister Ivanov, Russia was the first to address this issue and even suggested a list of concrete projects, the scope and details of which are still being discussed. Passy promised to keep the Commission informed of any related developments. The Bulgarian CIO said he also plans to promote the issue of education throughout the remainder of his year in office. Although it is an issue that has not received much attention in the OSCE, Passy said that “education and training are vital for empowering individuals and groups with the capacity to resolve conflict in a peaceful manner.” The first Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting was devoted to this subject. The hearing concluded with Minister Passy’s personal vision for the future of the OSCE. He called for a stronger focus on OSCE activities in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Additionally, he suggested that the OSCE should reach out to countries beyond its scope, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, which could benefit from the comprehensive security model offered by the OSCE. An unofficial transcript of the hearing is available through the Helsinki Commission’s Internet site at http://www.csce.gov. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives, and one official from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Intern Irina Smirnov contributed to this article.
Helsinki Commission Briefing Highlights OSCE's Military Dimension of SecurityTuesday, March 23, 2004
By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor The United States Helsinki Commission held a briefing February 11, 2004 to review the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Forum for Security Cooperation, particularly during the period in late 2003 when the United States chaired the FSC. The purpose of the briefing was to gauge how the OSCE is responding to the latest changes in the security environment, such as the war on terrorism, weapons proliferation, and regional conflicts involving OSCE states. The briefing featured James Cox, the Chief Arms Control Delegate of the United States to the OSCE in Vienna. Helsinki Commission Senior Advisor Elizabeth B. Pryor opened the briefing, noting the OSCE’s well-known contribution to security through the promotion of human rights and democratic change. She stressed, however, that the military dimension of the OSCE should not be overlooked. “Measures such as advance notification of troop maneuvers and observation of military exercises have become such a part of our way of interacting that we too frequently take such transparency for granted,” Ms. Pryor stated. Capitalizing on the dramatic changes in Europe in the 1990s, the OSCE “expanded the degree of military openness, then encouraged further reductions in force levels and equipment, and placed military institutions under democratic civilian control.” Mr. Cox began by describing the FSC’s creation in 1992 to respond to military questions in the post-Cold War era, such as the change in force levels and the significant shift in the security environment. Among other things, the Forum has been tasked to establish a web of arms control agreements and confidence- and security-building measures. The FSC also pursues the implementation of these agreements, develops a security dialogue, and considers norms and standards on such politico-military features of security as civilian control of armed forces and adherence to international humanitarian law. The OSCE made crucial steps toward addressing new threats to security and stability in the 21st century when the United States held the FSC chairmanship from September to December of 2003. These steps were taken with the realization that the FSC now must expand beyond the limits of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. Mr. Cox stressed that the FSC needs to broaden its focus not only to address interstate relations between armed forces of OSCE participating States, but also non-OSCE States. New security threats to the OSCE region include non-state actors, terrorism, proliferation, and organized crime. Under the United States’ chairmanship, the FSC highlighted the proliferation of arms, the control of man-portable air defense systems, and civil-military emergency preparedness. With regard to non-proliferation, the United States hosted a number of speakers to suggest ways to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Effective and comprehensive controls for MANPADS were discussed, highlighting the threat posed by these weapons to civil aviation. The FSC encouraged the participating States to prevent illicit transfers of MANPADS by destroying excess devices. In addition, the EU, NATO, and UN speakers, and others were invited to the FSC to discuss their disaster response procedures. The OSCE’s Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, or SALW, contains provisions for the destruction of excess MANPADS. The provisions also allows states to request assistance on the security and management of stockpiles, encourage the establishment of border controls in order to reduce the transfer of small arms, and provide for the disposal of light arms. Mr. Cox also discussed initiatives addressing management and destruction of excess stockpiles of ammunition and explosive material, both through better management and destruction. In closing his presentation, Cox asserted that progress has been made in all spheres of European security, but he did not want to leave “too rosy a picture.” The FSC is a consensus body which, by its nature, limits what any one country can achieve and has no enforcement capability. Nevertheless, he stressed that the FSC is useful to the 55 participating OSCE countries because it has norm and standard setting capabilities and provides a forum to discuss issues of national interest. During a question-and-answer period, a question was asked about the stance of FSC participants that may be hiding their weapons and stockpiles. Mr. Cox reiterated that although the FSC has no enforcement capability, its politically binding decisions are to be taken very seriously. Positive developments have occurred with recent requests for clean-up disarmament assistance, including by Belarus. Another issue raised was the failure of Russia to implement commitments adopted at the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit with respect to Moldova and Georgia. The Istanbul commitments require Russia to remove troops and arsenals from Moldova and close military bases in the Republic of Georgia. To this day, Russian troops and weapons remain in Moldova and Georgia. Mr. Cox affirmed that these issues are raised in Vienna. A related issue is OSCE peacekeeping. As Cox explained, the notion of OSCE peacekeeping would be difficult to undertake, as the organization lacks the necessary infrastructure to conduct such operations. Compared to NATO forces and European Union efforts to take on these operations, peacekeeping is on the low end of FSC considerations, and there has been no agreement to go beyond the original OSCE language on the matter developed in 1992. In response to a question regarding Russian military conduct in Chechnya, Cox noted that this is usually discussed as a human rights issue at the Permanent Council. He did note, however, initiatives within the military dimension, including a Swedish request to observe a Russian military exercise in Dagestan, neighboring Chechnya, which Moscow denied on security grounds, are addressed in the FSC. Finally, Cox was asked about the focus of the 2004 Annual Security Review Conference. He predicted this second meeting will center on the implementation of counterterrorism measures, including commitments agreed at the Maastricht Ministerial, and further enhancing border security. The first ASRC was held in 2003 to review select issues such as organized crime, arms trafficking, and terrorism. It also encouraged the adoption of biometric standards for travel documents as a means to improve border security. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Interns Colby Daughtry and Erin Carden contributed to this article.
Helsinki Commission Hearing Reviews Bulgaria’s Leadership of the OSCEThursday, February 26, 2004
His Excellency Solomon Passy, Foreign Minister of Bulgaria and Chair-in-Office of the OSCE testified in front of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, chaired by the Honorable Christopher Smith (NJ-04). Passy’s testimony regarded the OSCE’s program for 2004 under Bulgaria’s leadership. Passy stated that implementations of OSCE commitments would top the agenda for Bulgaria’s Chairmanship of the OSCE. The hearing covered the conflict in Chechnya; OSCE efforts to resolve the Transdniestrian conflict and “frozen conflicts” in the Caucasus; OSCE efforts to combat anti-Semitism and human trafficking; the situation in Central Asia; and promoting respect for human rights and democratic values throughout the OSCE region. Passy also spoke about Bulgaria’s experience with its own transition to democracy and its ongoing human rights efforts.
The Bulgarian Leadership of the OSCEThursday, February 26, 2004
This hearing, which Representative Christopher H. Smith presided over, focused on the Bulgarian Chairmanship of the OSCE, which had begun in for January 2004 and would continue for a year. The hearing specifically reviewed the OSCE’s program for 2004 under Bulgaria’s leadership. Solomon Passy, witness at the hearing, said that implementation of OSCE commitments would top the agenda for Bulgaria’s OSCE Chairmanship. Specific issues that attendees discussed included the Chechnyan conflict, OSCE efforts to revoke the Transdniestrian conflict, work to resolve the “frozen conflicts” in the Caucasus, efforts to combat anti-Semitism and human trafficking, the situation in Central Asia, and promoting respect for human rights and democratic values throughout the OSCE region.
The harrowing tale of Bill Browder—how an American-born businessman became an enemy of the Russian state, how he has to live in constant fear, never knowing if the long arm of the Kremlin will snatch him, or kill him—is its own kind of daily terror. But what Browder’s story tells us about the way Vladimir Putin operates, and what he might want from this country, should scare us all.
William Browder took his family on vacation in July, though he won't say where because that is one of those extraneous bits of personal information that could, in a roundabout way, get him bundled off to a Siberian prison or, possibly, killed. For eight years, he's been jamming up the gears of Vladimir Putin's kleptocratic machine, a job that seems to often end in jail or death, both of which he'd very much like to avoid. He'll concede, at least, that his leisure travels took him from London, where he lives, through Chicago, where he changed planes. As he walked through a terminal at O'Hare, he got a call from a New York Times reporter named Jo Becker.
"Do you know anything," she asked, "about a Russian lawyer named Natalia Veselnitskaya?"
Browder stopped short. "Yes," he said. "I know a lot about her."
One of the most important things he knew was that Veselnitskaya had spent many dollars and many hours trying to convince Washington that Browder is a criminal. More than a decade ago, Browder was the largest individual foreign investor in Russia, managing billions in his hedge fund. Then, in 2009, one of his attorneys was tortured to death in a Moscow jail after exposing a massive tax fraud committed by Russian gangsters. His name was Sergei Magnitsky, and Browder has spent the years since trying to hold accountable anyone connected to Sergei's death. The most significant way is through the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, a 2012 U.S. law that freezes the assets and cripples the travel of specific Russians, many of whom have allegedly laundered millions of dollars in the West.
The Kremlin hates that law. Putin's hold on power requires the loyalty of dozens of wealthy oligarchs and thousands of complicit functionaries, and their loyalty, in turn, requires Putin to protect the cash they've stashed overseas. Putin hates the law so much that he retaliated by banning Americans from adopting Russian children—yes, by holding orphans hostage—and has said that overturning the Magnitsky Act is a top priority.
That's where Veselnitskaya comes in. As a lawyer, she represented a Russian businessman trying to recover $14 million frozen by the Magnitsky Act. More important, she was involved in an extensive 2016 lobbying and public-relations campaign to weaken or eliminate the act, in large part by recasting Browder as a villain who conned Congress into passing it. That was not empty political spin for an American audience: The Russians really do want Browder in prison. In 2013, a Russian court convicted him in absentia (and Sergei in his grave) of the very crime Sergei uncovered and sentenced Browder to nine years in prison. Later, it got worse. In April 2016, Russian authorities accused Browder of murdering Sergei—that is, of killing the person on whose behalf Browder had been crusading, and who the Russians for seven years had insisted was not, in fact, murdered.
The campaign was oafish yet persistent enough that Browder thought it wise to compile a 26-page presentation on the people behind it. Veselnitskaya appears on five of those pages.
"I've been trying to get someone to write this goddamned story," Browder told Becker on July 8. "She's not just some private lawyer. She's a tool of the Russian government."
But why, Browder wanted to know, was Becker suddenly interested?
"I can't tell you," she said. "But I think you'll be interested in a few hours."
Browder flew off to the place he won't name, switched on his phone, and scrolled to the Times website. He drew in a sharp breath.
He exhaled. F***.
Donald Trump Jr. told the Times that the June 9, 2016, meeting had been about adoptions, which demonstrated either how out of his depth he was or how stupid he thought reporters were. If Veselnitskaya had been talking about adoption, she of course had been talking about the Magnitsky Act.
Which meant she'd also been talking about Bill Browder.
He read the story again, closely. Browder wasn't sure what the implications were. But if he'd known about it in real time—that the staff of a major-party presidential candidate was listening intently to those who accuse him of murder and want him extradited and imprisoned—he would have been terrified.
"Putin kills people," Browder said to me one afternoon this autumn. "That's a known fact. But Putin likes to pretend that he doesn't kill people. So he tends to kill people he can get away with killing."
Browder did not say this as if it were a revelation. (And technically it's an allegation that Putin has people killed, albeit one so thoroughly supported by evidence and circumstance that no one credibly disputes it.) Rather, he told me that by way of explaining why he was telling me anything at all: The more often and publicly he tells the story of Sergei Magnitsky, the less likely he'll be to get poisoned or shot or tossed out a window, which has happened to a number of Putin's critics. If anything does happen to him, he reasons, the list of suspects would be short.
He spoke softly, methodically, though with great efficiency; not scripted, but well practiced. We were in the conference room of his offices in London. Afternoon light washed through a wall of windows, threw bright highlights onto his scalp, sparked off the frame of his glasses. Browder is 53 years old, medium build, medium height, medium demeanor, and was wearing a medium-blue suit. He does not look like a threat to Russian national security, which the Kremlin declared him to be 12 years ago. Still, there is a hint of steel, something hard and sharp beneath all of the mediumness; if he confessed that he'd served in the Special Forces, it would be a little surprising but not shocking.
It was late September, and Donald Trump had been president for 248 days. In the weeks after the election, Browder was "worried and confused." Trump has a creepy habit of praising Putin, but he'd also surrounded himself with Russia hard-liners like General James Mattis, Nikki Haley, and Mike Pompeo—secretary of defense, ambassador to the United Nations, and director of the CIA, respectively. Browder war-gamed the Magnitsky Act but didn't see any way that Trump could kill it—Congress would have to repeal the law—only a chance that he might refuse to add more names to the target list. (Five people were added to the list last January, bringing the total to 44.) He figured the same was true with the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which President Obama signed shortly before leaving office, expanding the targeted-sanctions tool to human-rights abusers worldwide. The Russians hate that law, too, because having "Magnitsky" in the title reminds the entire planet where the standard was set and by whom.
The first months of the new administration unspooled, spring into summer. Trump's flirtation with Putin persisted, but with no practical effect. "The Russians got nothing," Browder said. Congress, in fact, imposed its own sanctions on Russia for meddling in the 2016 election, cutting Trump out of the loop entirely. "I watch this like a hawk," Browder said, "and so far they've gotten nothing. There's not a single piece of Russian policy that's gone Putin's way."
But then, in July, the Times reported that Veselnitskaya had met with Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort, Trump's campaign manager at the time, in June 2016. That shifted the calculus. "America has been my staunchest ally," Browder said. "It wasn't an assumption but a question: Had they flipped my biggest ally?"
That was still an open question when we met in London. Much more had been reported about Trump and Russia. Other contacts and communications were known, and details kept evolving, an endless, sloppy churn of information. There was more, too, about the meeting with Veselnitskaya, which happened two weeks after Trump secured the nomination: It was attended by eight people in all, including Rinat Akhmetshin, who is usually described as a former Russian military-intelligence officer, though that generously assumes that any Russian spook is ever fully retired from the spy game. Browder has another PowerPoint presentation on him. Additionally, Manafort's notes on the meeting reportedly mentioned Browder by name.
This is all bad. "They were in a meeting to discuss Bill Browder, the Magnitsky Act, and how to get the Magnitsky Act repealed," he said. "Now, what [the Russians] were offering in return, we don't know. But if it had just been a courtesy meeting, only one of [the Trump team] would have showed up."
Maybe no one will ever know what, if anything, the Russians offered. But there's no doubt what they wanted, and how badly. In a four-page memo prepared for the meeting by Veselnitskaya (and later obtained by Foreign Policy), the Magnitsky Act was inspired by "a fugitive criminal" who ripped off the Russian treasury and then went on a worldwide publicity tour to, apparently, cover it up. "Using the grief of the family of Magnitsky to his own advantage, Browder exposes them as a human shield to distract attention from the details of his own crime," she wrote. Passage of the Magnitsky Act, moreover, marked "the beginning of a new round of the Cold War."
That is an assertion as grandiose as it is belligerent. And yet it is not wholly inaccurate. To understand why the Kremlin is so perturbed, it helps to understand Bill Browder. In many ways, he is the Rosetta Stone for decoding the curious relationship between the Trumps and the Russians.
Browder's grandfather Earl was a communist. He started as a union organizer in Kansas and spent some time in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, where he married a Jewish intellectual and had the first of his three sons, Felix. The family moved to Yonkers in 1932, where Earl became secretary general of the Communist Party USA. He ran for president twice, in 1936 and 1940, and Time magazine put him on its cover in 1938 above the headline COMRADE EARL BROWDER. His fortunes fell in 1941, when he was convicted of passport fraud. His four-year sentence was commuted after 14 months, and he was released into relative obscurity until the 1950s, when he was harassed by the House Un-American Activities Committee.
Bill's grandmother steered her boys away from politics and toward academics, in which they wildly overachieved. Felix enrolled at M.I.T. at the age of 16, graduated in two years, and had a Princeton Ph.D. in math when he was 20. He met his wife, Eva, at M.I.T., a Jewish girl who'd fled Vienna ahead of the Nazis and spent her teenage years in a tenement with her impoverished mother.
Felix and Eva had two boys. Their first, Thomas, took after his father: University of Chicago at 15, doctoral student in physics at 19. Their second, Bill, did not. He liked to ski and smoke and drink. He got kicked out of a second-tier boarding school and barely got into the University of Colorado, which was fine with him because it was a notorious party school. By his account, he spent his formative years rebelling against everything his leftist-intellectual family held sacred.
"Rejecting school was a good start, but if I really wanted to upset my parents, then I would have to come up with something else," he wrote in his 2015 book, Red Notice: A True Story of High Finance, Murder, and One Man's Fight for Justice. "Then, toward the end of high school, it hit me. I would put on a suit and tie and become a capitalist. Nothing would piss off my family more than that."
He started studying, transferred to the University of Chicago, got into a two-year pre-MBA program at Bain & Company, in Boston. He parlayed that and an essay about Comrade Earl Browder—from communist to capitalist in two generations!—into a seat at Stanford. Out of genealogical curiosity, he began thinking about Eastern Europe. "If that's where my grandfather had carved out his niche," he wrote, "then maybe I could, too." He got a job with a consulting firm and moved to London in August 1989. Three months later, the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union crumbled. Eastern Europe was wide open for business.
His first account was consulting for a Polish bus manufacturer that was bleeding cash. It was miserable work in a miserable little city, but while he was there his translator explained the financial tables in the local newspaper. With the fall of communism, nationalized companies were being privatized and their stocks were offered at fire-sale prices: A company with $160 million in profits the previous year had a stock valuation of only $80 million.
Browder invested his entire savings, $2,000, in Polish stocks. He eventually walked away with $20,000. He'd found his niche.
By 1993, he was in Moscow, investing in staggeringly undervalued stocks: He invested $25 million and turned a $100 million profit. With money that good and almost no Western competition, Browder, in 1996, raised enough cash to open his own fund, Hermitage Capital.
Over the next decade, Hermitage did exceptionally well. The downside, though, was that the economy wasn't transitioning from communism to capitalism so much as it was devolving into gangsterism. Corruption was endemic. A handful of oligarchs looted and swindled at their leisure. Browder countered by positioning himself as an activist shareholder; he and his staff would piece together who was ripping off what, name names, try to impose a modicum of order on a lawless system.
When Vladimir Putin rose to power, Browder believed he was a reformer eager to purge the kleptocracy. In 2003, for example, Putin arrested the country's richest man, oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky, charged him with fraud, and displayed him in a cage in a courtroom until his inevitable conviction. In the context of the time, many critics saw the ordeal as a capricious show trial orchestrated by an authoritarian thug.
Not Browder. "I would trust Putin any day of the week," he told The Washington Post in early 2004. "It's like being in a lawless schoolyard where there's bullies running around and beating up all us little people, and then one day a big bully comes along and all the little bullies fall into line. That's what the state is supposed to be—the big bully."
But Putin, he discovered, wasn't pushing for good corporate governance. He was taking over the rackets. Putin put Khodorkovsky in a cage for the same reason Vito Corleone put a horse's head in Jack Woltz's bed: to send a message. Oligarchs could steal, but they had to pay tribute.
Oligarchs no longer needed to be named and shamed; they needed to be kept in line and to keep earning. At that point, an activist shareholder like Browder became an expensive nuisance. Browder was kicked out of the country on November 13, 2005.
For a while, he thought the Russian bureaucracy had made a mistake by canceling his visa, confusing him with someone else, perhaps, or misfiling some paperwork. He enlisted the help of British diplomats—Browder had been a British citizen since 1998—to no avail. There had been no mistake. Browder had been declared a threat to Russian national security.
Hermitage Capital remained in business, though, its office run by Browder's staff while he oversaw operations from London. But in Moscow, the pressure only increased. In June 2007, security forces raided Hermitage and the office of the law firm it employed. They carted away computers and files and, interestingly, all the corporate seals and stamps. At first, none of that made sense.
But then Sergei Magnitsky, a 36-year-old Muscovite who handled tax matters for Hermitage, started digging around. He eventually discovered three of Hermitage's holding companies had been used by Russian gangsters to swindle $230 million in tax rebates. It was a straight-up robbery of the Russian treasury. The scam wasn't unheard of, except the amount was perhaps the largest such tax fraud ever uncovered in Russia.
Browder and his staff reported the theft to the authorities and the media in the summer of 2008. They even named suspects, including some of the security officials who'd earlier been involved in the office raids. Nothing happened. Then, a few months later, on November 24, 2008, Sergei was arrested at his home.
He was held for nearly a year in various prisons, overrun with rats and damp with sewage. According to complaints Sergei wrote, he was fed porridge infested with insects and rotten fish boiled into mush. He contracted pancreatitis and gallstones but was refused treatment. Yet he was repeatedly told he would be released if he would recant his allegations and, instead, implicate Browder as the mastermind of the tax scam. He refused every time.
Almost a year after he was arrested, desperately ill, Sergei was handcuffed to a bed rail in an isolation cell. Eight guards beat him with rubber truncheons. A little more than an hour later, he was dead.
Before Sergei was killed, Browder had been lobbying anyone he could think of to pressure the Russians into releasing his accountant. One of the agencies he approached in the spring of 2009 was the U.S. Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency in Washington that monitors human rights in 57 countries, including Russia.
Kyle Parker, one of the Russia experts there, wasn't interested. He knew who Browder was—the money manager who'd championed Putin, the guy who'd made the rounds of Western capitals a few years earlier trying to get his visa restored. He assumed that's what Browder was still after. "Not gonna be able to make it," he e-mailed a colleague scheduling the meeting. "Unless much has changed, I see this meeting as info only and would not support any action on our part."
He eventually met with Browder, though, and he listened to the story of Sergei. Parker understood, but it didn't seem especially uncommon. "I was thinking: Why is Bill trying to suck us into a pissing match between competing criminal groups?"
Parker didn't even include Sergei in a 2009 letter to Obama highlighting the commission's most pressing concerns.
After Sergei had been killed, Browder went back to the Helsinki Commission.
Parker told him how sorry he was. He told him that he cried when he heard Sergei was dead, that he read about it through teary eyes on the Metro, riding the Red Line home to his wife and kids. He said he was going to help.
"Here you have this Russian hero almost of a literary quality in Sergei Magnitsky," Parker told me. "He wasn't a guy who went to rallies with a bullhorn and protested human-rights abuses in Chechnya. He was a bookish, middle-class Muscovite. I see Sergei metaphorically as that Chinese guy standing in front of the tanks, but with a briefcase. He provided an example for all the other Russians that not everybody goes in for the deal, not everybody is corrupt, not everybody looks the other way when people are swindled."
What Browder wanted was some form of justice for Sergei, though what form that would take was unclear. He'd researched his options for months. The Russians weren't going to prosecute anyone—officially, Sergei died of heart failure. There was no international mechanism to hold Russian nationals criminally accountable in another country. "Eventually," Browder said, "it became obvious that I was going to have to come up with justice on my own."
He outlined a three-pronged approach. One was media, simply getting Sergei's name and his death and the reasons for it into the public consciousness. He talked to reporters, and he produced a series of YouTube videos, short documentaries on the people allegedly involved in Sergei's death.
The second was tracing the money. "They killed him for $230 million," Browder said, "and I was going to find out where that money went." It was parceled out to dozens of people, tucked away in Swiss accounts and American real estate and Panamanian banks, some of it held by proxies; part of it allegedly ended up in the account of a Russian cellist who happened to be a childhood friend of Putin's. By mining bank transfers and financial records, Browder and his staff have accounted for much of it, including $14 million allegedly laundered by a Cypriot company into Manhattan property. (The Justice Department froze those funds in 2013 but settled with the company, Prevezon, last summer for $5.9 million. Prevezon's owner, a Russian named Denis Katsyv, is represented by Natalia Veselnitskaya. The case did not allege that he had any role in Magnitsky's death.)
The final prong was political. Browder had heard about an obscure regulation that allows the State Department to put visa restrictions on corrupt foreign officials. But in the spring of 2010, the Obama administration was attempting to normalize relations with Russia—a "reset," as Obama famously put it. People die horrible deaths every day, and it's terrible and it shouldn't happen. But Russia is also a large country with a significant sphere of geopolitical influence and a lot of nuclear weapons. In that context, a dead middle-class tax lawyer wasn't relevant.
But what if, Parker suggested, they went to Congress? What if the legislature, rather than the administration, took action?
That was also a long shot. Getting any law passed is difficult, let alone one the administration opposes. But Browder told Sergei's story to congressional committees and individual senators and congressmen, and he kept telling it until the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act was passed by both houses of Congress and signed into law 11 days before Christmas 2012.
The act originally named 18 Russians, including bureaucrats implicated in the original scam; investigators Sergei had accused of being involved and getting a cut of the $230 million; jailers who tormented him; and two alleged killers. As more of the stolen money was traced, more names were added to the list. Everyone on it is banned from entering the United States and, more damaging, cut off from the American banking system. That has a ripple effect: Legitimate financial institutions all over the world monitor the Treasury Department list of sanctioned individuals and are loath to do business with anyone on it. "That's what people hate about it the most," Browder said. "It makes you a financial leper."
And that matters to Putin, Browder maintains, because the Russians on the list are not independently wealthy, like, say, Bill Gates or Richard Branson. "They're dependently wealthy," he said. "They're dependent on Putin." If the deal is that corrupt Russians can keep their cash in return for their loyalty, the Magnitsky Act is an enormous thorn in Putin's side. If he can't protect anyone's pilfered money, what's the point of loyalty? Putin surely understands that, because he was so transparently rattled: Taking orphans hostage is not the reasoned reaction of a man merely annoyed.
Browder initially wanted to call the law the Justice for Sergei Magnitsky Act. But Parker never took to that. "Banning some corrupt officials from coming here isn't even close to justice," he said. "But it's a legislative monument to Sergei Magnitsky until one day Russia builds a stone monument to him. Because I have no doubt he'll be seen as the Russian patriot and hero that he was."
Not quite three weeks after the Times broke the story of Veselnitskaya lobbying the Trump campaign to get rid of the Magnitsky Act, Browder testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee about, primarily, how Russian operatives wield influence and frame their propaganda. Eight years after he'd started targeting a handful of Russian crooks, Browder was suddenly very relevant to a much larger political storm.
He flew home to London after he testified but had to return to the United States in early August. He checked in at an airline counter in Heathrow but was told there was a problem with his visa. He'd been flagged by Interpol, which had issued a red notice on him. It's basically an international arrest warrant, and it was the fourth requested by the Russians for Browder. Technically, a member nation is supposed to extradite him to the country that asked for the notice. But the British, along with other sensible Western nations, stopped taking Russia's attempts regarding Browder seriously years ago.
In the end, it was only an inconvenience. But what if he'd been in, say, Finland when that notice popped up? The Finns are fine people, but they also have a 500-mile border with Russia. Would letting Browder go be worth risking an international incident with a bigger, more aggressive neighbor? He can make a reasonable case that, no, he would not be worth it. "I'm very realistic about who's coming to my defense," he said. "I am my defense."
So he's careful. He avoids countries that might be friendly to Putin. Much of the Third World is out. So is Hong Kong. He'd be fine in Japan, but only if he didn't fly over Russian airspace. What if the plane has trouble and makes an emergency landing in Novosibirsk? That's where Khodorkovsky was seized and hauled off to a cage.
Even in London, he's cautious. He won't talk about his family or where he lives. He varies his schedule and his route to work every day. He doesn't eat in the same restaurant twice in succession, or in any restaurant with predictable frequency; Russian agents have reputedly twice poisoned dissidents in London. He told me the British government has rebuffed at least a dozen requests to extradite him, and American intelligence has warned him that Russian agents planned to grab him off the street.
Years ago, a Russian living in London came to Browder's staff with information about certain wealthy, corrupt people in Moscow. He was cagey and shifty and, at first, it seemed like he might be a Russian agent trying to plant false clues. But his information checked out and Browder learned who he really was. His name was Alexander Perepilichnyy, and he was nervous because he believed he was on a Russian hit list.
On November 10, 2012, Perepilichnyy dropped dead in front of his house in Surrey. There was no obvious cause of death—no heart attack or stroke or aneurysm—and an inquest wasn't opened until last June. Perepilichnyy wasn't a well-known dissident, so no one thought to take a hard look when he died. "They got away with it," Browder said, meaning the Russians. "That's a perfect example of why you don't want to be an anonymous guy who drops dead."
So Browder is deliberately not anonymous. He does not live in cloistered fear. When a car service got confused trying to pick him up for a photo shoot—definitely a way to not be anonymous—we took the Tube a few stops, then walked through Kentish Town to the studio. There was no security, just two men wandering around London. He has hobbies that he asked I not name, but none of them are solitary or sedentary. "One thing I can tell you," he said, "with the threat of death hanging over you, you live life to the fullest." He laughed a little.
In this new version of his life, Browder is still most often referred to as a financier, but that's only marginally true. He gave all his investors their money back, and manages only his own now. Justice for Sergei—and aggravating Putin—is his full-time job. His staff of 11 tracks money launderers, deciphering which flunky is fronting for which oligarch, sniffing out the rest of that $230 million. He lobbies other governments to pass their own versions of the Magnitsky Act. The United Kingdom has one, as does Estonia. Lithuania is close, and Canada passed one in October. "Unconstructive political games," Putin told a Canadian interviewer immediately after, orchestrated by "the criminal activities of an entire gang led by one particular man, I believe Browder is his name."
And Putin wasn't finished. A week later, Russia slipped another red notice into Interpol's system. For the second time in three months, Browder was temporarily barred from entering the U.S. It's relentless, Putin clawing at him, thrashing. "Their main objective is to get me back to Russia," he said. "And they only have to get lucky once. I have to be lucky every time."
"Everything Bill's done has cost him tremendously," Parker said. "It's cost him money, restricted his personal freedom. And he didn't have to. He was out of Russia. He could have done what many did and walked away. Bad things happen, right? But here's a guy who's proven whatever he needed to prove to himself. He made his money. Now here's a way to find meaning. It's also a debt of honor."
No, it's more than that. "It's penance," Browder said. Sergei Magnitsky was an ordinary Muscovite who happened to work for an American who annoyed Vladimir Putin. "Sergei was killed because of me. He was killed instead of me." He let that hang there a moment. "So, yeah, it's all penance."
Sean Flynn is a GQ correspondent.
This story originally appeared in the December 2017 issue with the title "Putin Enemy No.1."