Title

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Bill Browder, Putin Enemy No. 1
GQ
Sean Flynn
Tuesday, November 14, 2017

The harrowing tale of Bill Browder—how an American-born businessman became an enemy of the Russian state, how he has to live in constant fear, never knowing if the long arm of the Kremlin will snatch him, or kill him—is its own kind of daily terror. But what Browder’s story tells us about the way Vladimir Putin operates, and what he might want from this country, should scare us all.

William Browder took his family on vacation in July, though he won't say where because that is one of those extraneous bits of personal information that could, in a roundabout way, get him bundled off to a Siberian prison or, possibly, killed. For eight years, he's been jamming up the gears of Vladimir Putin's kleptocratic machine, a job that seems to often end in jail or death, both of which he'd very much like to avoid. He'll concede, at least, that his leisure travels took him from London, where he lives, through Chicago, where he changed planes. As he walked through a terminal at O'Hare, he got a call from a New York Times reporter named Jo Becker.

"Do you know anything," she asked, "about a Russian lawyer named Natalia Veselnitskaya?"

Browder stopped short. "Yes," he said. "I know a lot about her."

One of the most important things he knew was that Veselnitskaya had spent many dollars and many hours trying to convince Washington that Browder is a criminal. More than a decade ago, Browder was the largest individual foreign investor in Russia, managing billions in his hedge fund. Then, in 2009, one of his attorneys was tortured to death in a Moscow jail after exposing a massive tax fraud committed by Russian gangsters. His name was Sergei Magnitsky, and Browder has spent the years since trying to hold accountable anyone connected to Sergei's death. The most significant way is through the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, a 2012 U.S. law that freezes the assets and cripples the travel of specific Russians, many of whom have allegedly laundered millions of dollars in the West.

The Kremlin hates that law. Putin's hold on power requires the loyalty of dozens of wealthy oligarchs and thousands of complicit functionaries, and their loyalty, in turn, requires Putin to protect the cash they've stashed overseas. Putin hates the law so much that he retaliated by banning Americans from adopting Russian children—yes, by holding orphans hostage—and has said that overturning the Magnitsky Act is a top priority.

That's where Veselnitskaya comes in. As a lawyer, she represented a Russian businessman trying to recover $14 million frozen by the Magnitsky Act. More important, she was involved in an extensive 2016 lobbying and public-relations campaign to weaken or eliminate the act, in large part by recasting Browder as a villain who conned Congress into passing it. That was not empty political spin for an American audience: The Russians really do want Browder in prison. In 2013, a Russian court convicted him in absentia (and Sergei in his grave) of the very crime Sergei uncovered and sentenced Browder to nine years in prison. Later, it got worse. In April 2016, Russian authorities accused Browder of murdering Sergei—that is, of killing the person on whose behalf Browder had been crusading, and who the Russians for seven years had insisted was not, in fact, murdered.

The campaign was oafish yet persistent enough that Browder thought it wise to compile a 26-page presentation on the people behind it. Veselnitskaya appears on five of those pages.

"I've been trying to get someone to write this goddamned story," Browder told Becker on July 8. "She's not just some private lawyer. She's a tool of the Russian government."

But why, Browder wanted to know, was Becker suddenly interested?

"I can't tell you," she said. "But I think you'll be interested in a few hours."

Browder flew off to the place he won't name, switched on his phone, and scrolled to the Times website. He drew in a sharp breath.

He exhaled. F***.

Donald Trump Jr. told the Times that the June 9, 2016, meeting had been about adoptions, which demonstrated either how out of his depth he was or how stupid he thought reporters were. If Veselnitskaya had been talking about adoption, she of course had been talking about the Magnitsky Act.

Which meant she'd also been talking about Bill Browder.

He read the story again, closely. Browder wasn't sure what the implications were. But if he'd known about it in real time—that the staff of a major-party presidential candidate was listening intently to those who accuse him of murder and want him extradited and imprisoned—he would have been terrified.

"Putin kills people," Browder said to me one afternoon this autumn. "That's a known fact. But Putin likes to pretend that he doesn't kill people. So he tends to kill people he can get away with killing."

Browder did not say this as if it were a revelation. (And technically it's an allegation that Putin has people killed, albeit one so thoroughly supported by evidence and circumstance that no one credibly disputes it.) Rather, he told me that by way of explaining why he was telling me anything at all: The more often and publicly he tells the story of Sergei Magnitsky, the less likely he'll be to get poisoned or shot or tossed out a window, which has happened to a number of Putin's critics. If anything does happen to him, he reasons, the list of suspects would be short.

He spoke softly, methodically, though with great efficiency; not scripted, but well practiced. We were in the conference room of his offices in London. Afternoon light washed through a wall of windows, threw bright highlights onto his scalp, sparked off the frame of his glasses. Browder is 53 years old, medium build, medium height, medium demeanor, and was wearing a medium-blue suit. He does not look like a threat to Russian national security, which the Kremlin declared him to be 12 years ago. Still, there is a hint of steel, something hard and sharp beneath all of the mediumness; if he confessed that he'd served in the Special Forces, it would be a little surprising but not shocking.

It was late September, and Donald Trump had been president for 248 days. In the weeks after the election, Browder was "worried and confused." Trump has a creepy habit of praising Putin, but he'd also surrounded himself with Russia hard-liners like General James Mattis, Nikki Haley, and Mike Pompeo—secretary of defense, ambassador to the United Nations, and director of the CIA, respectively. Browder war-gamed the Magnitsky Act but didn't see any way that Trump could kill it—Congress would have to repeal the law—only a chance that he might refuse to add more names to the target list. (Five people were added to the list last January, bringing the total to 44.) He figured the same was true with the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which President Obama signed shortly before leaving office, expanding the targeted-sanctions tool to human-rights abusers worldwide. The Russians hate that law, too, because having "Magnitsky" in the title reminds the entire planet where the standard was set and by whom.

The first months of the new administration unspooled, spring into summer. Trump's flirtation with Putin persisted, but with no practical effect. "The Russians got nothing," Browder said. Congress, in fact, imposed its own sanctions on Russia for meddling in the 2016 election, cutting Trump out of the loop entirely. "I watch this like a hawk," Browder said, "and so far they've gotten nothing. There's not a single piece of Russian policy that's gone Putin's way."

But then, in July, the Times reported that Veselnitskaya had met with Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort, Trump's campaign manager at the time, in June 2016. That shifted the calculus. "America has been my staunchest ally," Browder said. "It wasn't an assumption but a question: Had they flipped my biggest ally?"

That was still an open question when we met in London. Much more had been reported about Trump and Russia. Other contacts and communications were known, and details kept evolving, an endless, sloppy churn of information. There was more, too, about the meeting with Veselnitskaya, which happened two weeks after Trump secured the nomination: It was attended by eight people in all, including Rinat Akhmetshin, who is usually described as a former Russian military-intelligence officer, though that generously assumes that any Russian spook is ever fully retired from the spy game. Browder has another PowerPoint presentation on him. Additionally, Manafort's notes on the meeting reportedly mentioned Browder by name.

This is all bad. "They were in a meeting to discuss Bill Browder, the Magnitsky Act, and how to get the Magnitsky Act repealed," he said. "Now, what [the Russians] were offering in return, we don't know. But if it had just been a courtesy meeting, only one of [the Trump team] would have showed up."

Maybe no one will ever know what, if anything, the Russians offered. But there's no doubt what they wanted, and how badly. In a four-page memo prepared for the meeting by Veselnitskaya (and later obtained by Foreign Policy), the Magnitsky Act was inspired by "a fugitive criminal" who ripped off the Russian treasury and then went on a worldwide publicity tour to, apparently, cover it up. "Using the grief of the family of Magnitsky to his own advantage, Browder exposes them as a human shield to distract attention from the details of his own crime," she wrote. Passage of the Magnitsky Act, moreover, marked "the beginning of a new round of the Cold War."

That is an assertion as grandiose as it is belligerent. And yet it is not wholly inaccurate. To understand why the Kremlin is so perturbed, it helps to understand Bill Browder. In many ways, he is the Rosetta Stone for decoding the curious relationship between the Trumps and the Russians.

Browder's grandfather Earl was a communist. He started as a union organizer in Kansas and spent some time in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, where he married a Jewish intellectual and had the first of his three sons, Felix. The family moved to Yonkers in 1932, where Earl became secretary general of the Communist Party USA. He ran for president twice, in 1936 and 1940, and Time magazine put him on its cover in 1938 above the headline COMRADE EARL BROWDER. His fortunes fell in 1941, when he was convicted of passport fraud. His four-year sentence was commuted after 14 months, and he was released into relative obscurity until the 1950s, when he was harassed by the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Bill's grandmother steered her boys away from politics and toward academics, in which they wildly overachieved. Felix enrolled at M.I.T. at the age of 16, graduated in two years, and had a Princeton Ph.D. in math when he was 20. He met his wife, Eva, at M.I.T., a Jewish girl who'd fled Vienna ahead of the Nazis and spent her teenage years in a tenement with her impoverished mother.

Felix and Eva had two boys. Their first, Thomas, took after his father: University of Chicago at 15, doctoral student in physics at 19. Their second, Bill, did not. He liked to ski and smoke and drink. He got kicked out of a second-tier boarding school and barely got into the University of Colorado, which was fine with him because it was a notorious party school. By his account, he spent his formative years rebelling against everything his leftist-intellectual family held sacred.

"Rejecting school was a good start, but if I really wanted to upset my parents, then I would have to come up with something else," he wrote in his 2015 book, Red Notice: A True Story of High Finance, Murder, and One Man's Fight for Justice. "Then, toward the end of high school, it hit me. I would put on a suit and tie and become a capitalist. Nothing would piss off my family more than that."

He started studying, transferred to the University of Chicago, got into a two-year pre-MBA program at Bain & Company, in Boston. He parlayed that and an essay about Comrade Earl Browder—from communist to capitalist in two generations!—into a seat at Stanford. Out of genealogical curiosity, he began thinking about Eastern Europe. "If that's where my grandfather had carved out his niche," he wrote, "then maybe I could, too." He got a job with a consulting firm and moved to London in August 1989. Three months later, the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union crumbled. Eastern Europe was wide open for business.

His first account was consulting for a Polish bus manufacturer that was bleeding cash. It was miserable work in a miserable little city, but while he was there his translator explained the financial tables in the local newspaper. With the fall of communism, nationalized companies were being privatized and their stocks were offered at fire-sale prices: A company with $160 million in profits the previous year had a stock valuation of only $80 million.

Browder invested his entire savings, $2,000, in Polish stocks. He eventually walked away with $20,000. He'd found his niche.

By 1993, he was in Moscow, investing in staggeringly undervalued stocks: He invested $25 million and turned a $100 million profit. With money that good and almost no Western competition, Browder, in 1996, raised enough cash to open his own fund, Hermitage Capital.

Over the next decade, Hermitage did exceptionally well. The downside, though, was that the economy wasn't transitioning from communism to capitalism so much as it was devolving into gangsterism. Corruption was endemic. A handful of oligarchs looted and swindled at their leisure. Browder countered by positioning himself as an activist shareholder; he and his staff would piece together who was ripping off what, name names, try to impose a modicum of order on a lawless system.

When Vladimir Putin rose to power, Browder believed he was a reformer eager to purge the kleptocracy. In 2003, for example, Putin arrested the country's richest man, oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky, charged him with fraud, and displayed him in a cage in a courtroom until his inevitable conviction. In the context of the time, many critics saw the ordeal as a capricious show trial orchestrated by an authoritarian thug.

Not Browder. "I would trust Putin any day of the week," he told The Washington Post in early 2004. "It's like being in a lawless schoolyard where there's bullies running around and beating up all us little people, and then one day a big bully comes along and all the little bullies fall into line. That's what the state is supposed to be—the big bully."

But Putin, he discovered, wasn't pushing for good corporate governance. He was taking over the rackets. Putin put Khodorkovsky in a cage for the same reason Vito Corleone put a horse's head in Jack Woltz's bed: to send a message. Oligarchs could steal, but they had to pay tribute.

Oligarchs no longer needed to be named and shamed; they needed to be kept in line and to keep earning. At that point, an activist shareholder like Browder became an expensive nuisance. Browder was kicked out of the country on November 13, 2005.

For a while, he thought the Russian bureaucracy had made a mistake by canceling his visa, confusing him with someone else, perhaps, or misfiling some paperwork. He enlisted the help of British diplomats—Browder had been a British citizen since 1998—to no avail. There had been no mistake. Browder had been declared a threat to Russian national security.

Hermitage Capital remained in business, though, its office run by Browder's staff while he oversaw operations from London. But in Moscow, the pressure only increased. In June 2007, security forces raided Hermitage and the office of the law firm it employed. They carted away computers and files and, interestingly, all the corporate seals and stamps. At first, none of that made sense.

But then Sergei Magnitsky, a 36-year-old Muscovite who handled tax matters for Hermitage, started digging around. He eventually discovered three of Hermitage's holding companies had been used by Russian gangsters to swindle $230 million in tax rebates. It was a straight-up robbery of the Russian treasury. The scam wasn't unheard of, except the amount was perhaps the largest such tax fraud ever uncovered in Russia.

Browder and his staff reported the theft to the authorities and the media in the summer of 2008. They even named suspects, including some of the security officials who'd earlier been involved in the office raids. Nothing happened. Then, a few months later, on November 24, 2008, Sergei was arrested at his home.

He was held for nearly a year in various prisons, overrun with rats and damp with sewage. According to complaints Sergei wrote, he was fed porridge infested with insects and rotten fish boiled into mush. He contracted pancreatitis and gallstones but was refused treatment. Yet he was repeatedly told he would be released if he would recant his allegations and, instead, implicate Browder as the mastermind of the tax scam. He refused every time.

Almost a year after he was arrested, desperately ill, Sergei was handcuffed to a bed rail in an isolation cell. Eight guards beat him with rubber truncheons. A little more than an hour later, he was dead.

Before Sergei was killed, Browder had been lobbying anyone he could think of to pressure the Russians into releasing his accountant. One of the agencies he approached in the spring of 2009 was the U.S. Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency in Washington that monitors human rights in 57 countries, including Russia.

Kyle Parker, one of the Russia experts there, wasn't interested. He knew who Browder was—the money manager who'd championed Putin, the guy who'd made the rounds of Western capitals a few years earlier trying to get his visa restored. He assumed that's what Browder was still after. "Not gonna be able to make it," he e-mailed a colleague scheduling the meeting. "Unless much has changed, I see this meeting as info only and would not support any action on our part."

He eventually met with Browder, though, and he listened to the story of Sergei. Parker understood, but it didn't seem especially uncommon. "I was thinking: Why is Bill trying to suck us into a pissing match between competing criminal groups?"

Parker didn't even include Sergei in a 2009 letter to Obama highlighting the commission's most pressing concerns.

After Sergei had been killed, Browder went back to the Helsinki Commission.

Parker told him how sorry he was. He told him that he cried when he heard Sergei was dead, that he read about it through teary eyes on the Metro, riding the Red Line home to his wife and kids. He said he was going to help.

"Here you have this Russian hero almost of a literary quality in Sergei Magnitsky," Parker told me. "He wasn't a guy who went to rallies with a bullhorn and protested human-rights abuses in Chechnya. He was a bookish, middle-class Muscovite. I see Sergei metaphorically as that Chinese guy standing in front of the tanks, but with a briefcase. He provided an example for all the other Russians that not everybody goes in for the deal, not everybody is corrupt, not everybody looks the other way when people are swindled."

What Browder wanted was some form of justice for Sergei, though what form that would take was unclear. He'd researched his options for months. The Russians weren't going to prosecute anyone—officially, Sergei died of heart failure. There was no international mechanism to hold Russian nationals criminally accountable in another country. "Eventually," Browder said, "it became obvious that I was going to have to come up with justice on my own."

He outlined a three-pronged approach. One was media, simply getting Sergei's name and his death and the reasons for it into the public consciousness. He talked to reporters, and he produced a series of YouTube videos, short documentaries on the people allegedly involved in Sergei's death.

The second was tracing the money. "They killed him for $230 million," Browder said, "and I was going to find out where that money went." It was parceled out to dozens of people, tucked away in Swiss accounts and American real estate and Panamanian banks, some of it held by proxies; part of it allegedly ended up in the account of a Russian cellist who happened to be a childhood friend of Putin's. By mining bank transfers and financial records, Browder and his staff have accounted for much of it, including $14 million allegedly laundered by a Cypriot company into Manhattan property. (The Justice Department froze those funds in 2013 but settled with the company, Prevezon, last summer for $5.9 million. Prevezon's owner, a Russian named Denis Katsyv, is represented by Natalia Veselnitskaya. The case did not allege that he had any role in Magnitsky's death.)

The final prong was political. Browder had heard about an obscure regulation that allows the State Department to put visa restrictions on corrupt foreign officials. But in the spring of 2010, the Obama administration was attempting to normalize relations with Russia—a "reset," as Obama famously put it. People die horrible deaths every day, and it's terrible and it shouldn't happen. But Russia is also a large country with a significant sphere of geopolitical influence and a lot of nuclear weapons. In that context, a dead middle-class tax lawyer wasn't relevant.

But what if, Parker suggested, they went to Congress? What if the legislature, rather than the administration, took action?

That was also a long shot. Getting any law passed is difficult, let alone one the administration opposes. But Browder told Sergei's story to congressional committees and individual senators and congressmen, and he kept telling it until the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act was passed by both houses of Congress and signed into law 11 days before Christmas 2012.

The act originally named 18 Russians, including bureaucrats implicated in the original scam; investigators Sergei had accused of being involved and getting a cut of the $230 million; jailers who tormented him; and two alleged killers. As more of the stolen money was traced, more names were added to the list. Everyone on it is banned from entering the United States and, more damaging, cut off from the American banking system. That has a ripple effect: Legitimate financial institutions all over the world monitor the Treasury Department list of sanctioned individuals and are loath to do business with anyone on it. "That's what people hate about it the most," Browder said. "It makes you a financial leper."

And that matters to Putin, Browder maintains, because the Russians on the list are not independently wealthy, like, say, Bill Gates or Richard Branson. "They're dependently wealthy," he said. "They're dependent on Putin." If the deal is that corrupt Russians can keep their cash in return for their loyalty, the Magnitsky Act is an enormous thorn in Putin's side. If he can't protect anyone's pilfered money, what's the point of loyalty? Putin surely understands that, because he was so transparently rattled: Taking orphans hostage is not the reasoned reaction of a man merely annoyed.

Browder initially wanted to call the law the Justice for Sergei Magnitsky Act. But Parker never took to that. "Banning some corrupt officials from coming here isn't even close to justice," he said. "But it's a legislative monument to Sergei Magnitsky until one day Russia builds a stone monument to him. Because I have no doubt he'll be seen as the Russian patriot and hero that he was."

Not quite three weeks after the Times broke the story of Veselnitskaya lobbying the Trump campaign to get rid of the Magnitsky Act, Browder testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee about, primarily, how Russian operatives wield influence and frame their propaganda. Eight years after he'd started targeting a handful of Russian crooks, Browder was suddenly very relevant to a much larger political storm.

He flew home to London after he testified but had to return to the United States in early August. He checked in at an airline counter in Heathrow but was told there was a problem with his visa. He'd been flagged by Interpol, which had issued a red notice on him. It's basically an international arrest warrant, and it was the fourth requested by the Russians for Browder. Technically, a member nation is supposed to extradite him to the country that asked for the notice. But the British, along with other sensible Western nations, stopped taking Russia's attempts regarding Browder seriously years ago.

In the end, it was only an inconvenience. But what if he'd been in, say, Finland when that notice popped up? The Finns are fine people, but they also have a 500-mile border with Russia. Would letting Browder go be worth risking an international incident with a bigger, more aggressive neighbor? He can make a reasonable case that, no, he would not be worth it. "I'm very realistic about who's coming to my defense," he said. "I am my defense."

So he's careful. He avoids countries that might be friendly to Putin. Much of the Third World is out. So is Hong Kong. He'd be fine in Japan, but only if he didn't fly over Russian airspace. What if the plane has trouble and makes an emergency landing in Novosibirsk? That's where Khodorkovsky was seized and hauled off to a cage.

Even in London, he's cautious. He won't talk about his family or where he lives. He varies his schedule and his route to work every day. He doesn't eat in the same restaurant twice in succession, or in any restaurant with predictable frequency; Russian agents have reputedly twice poisoned dissidents in London. He told me the British government has rebuffed at least a dozen requests to extradite him, and American intelligence has warned him that Russian agents planned to grab him off the street.

Years ago, a Russian living in London came to Browder's staff with information about certain wealthy, corrupt people in Moscow. He was cagey and shifty and, at first, it seemed like he might be a Russian agent trying to plant false clues. But his information checked out and Browder learned who he really was. His name was Alexander Perepilichnyy, and he was nervous because he believed he was on a Russian hit list.

On November 10, 2012, Perepilichnyy dropped dead in front of his house in Surrey. There was no obvious cause of death—no heart attack or stroke or aneurysm—and an inquest wasn't opened until last June. Perepilichnyy wasn't a well-known dissident, so no one thought to take a hard look when he died. "They got away with it," Browder said, meaning the Russians. "That's a perfect example of why you don't want to be an anonymous guy who drops dead."

So Browder is deliberately not anonymous. He does not live in cloistered fear. When a car service got confused trying to pick him up for a photo shoot—definitely a way to not be anonymous—we took the Tube a few stops, then walked through Kentish Town to the studio. There was no security, just two men wandering around London. He has hobbies that he asked I not name, but none of them are solitary or sedentary. "One thing I can tell you," he said, "with the threat of death hanging over you, you live life to the fullest." He laughed a little.

In this new version of his life, Browder is still most often referred to as a financier, but that's only marginally true. He gave all his investors their money back, and manages only his own now. Justice for Sergei—and aggravating Putin—is his full-time job. His staff of 11 tracks money launderers, deciphering which flunky is fronting for which oligarch, sniffing out the rest of that $230 million. He lobbies other governments to pass their own versions of the Magnitsky Act. The United Kingdom has one, as does Estonia. Lithuania is close, and Canada passed one in October. "Unconstructive political games," Putin told a Canadian interviewer immediately after, orchestrated by "the criminal activities of an entire gang led by one particular man, I believe Browder is his name."

And Putin wasn't finished. A week later, Russia slipped another red notice into Interpol's system. For the second time in three months, Browder was temporarily barred from entering the U.S. It's relentless, Putin clawing at him, thrashing. "Their main objective is to get me back to Russia," he said. "And they only have to get lucky once. I have to be lucky every time."

"Everything Bill's done has cost him tremendously," Parker said. "It's cost him money, restricted his personal freedom. And he didn't have to. He was out of Russia. He could have done what many did and walked away. Bad things happen, right? But here's a guy who's proven whatever he needed to prove to himself. He made his money. Now here's a way to find meaning. It's also a debt of honor."

No, it's more than that. "It's penance," Browder said. Sergei Magnitsky was an ordinary Muscovite who happened to work for an American who annoyed Vladimir Putin. "Sergei was killed because of me. He was killed instead of me." He let that hang there a moment. "So, yeah, it's all penance."

Sean Flynn is a GQ correspondent.

This story originally appeared in the December 2017 issue with the title "Putin Enemy No.1."

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Despite increasing pressure from the international community on Serbia’s domestic courts to shoulder greater responsibility for holding war criminals accountable, only four domestic trials were held this year. There is also no indication of upcoming trials or of a permanent commitment to such a process. Trials that have proceeded suffered from a lack of witness protection, poor case preparation by prosecutors, and problems facilitating witnesses traveling from other areas of the former Yugoslavia. James Fisfis, Resident Program Officer for Serbia at the International Republican Institute, remained optimistic. Fisfis presented the results of an IRI survey suggesting that 56 percent of Serbian citizens believe the country is now on the right track, up from 38 percent before the assassination. Sixty-four percent of Serbian respondents currently support cooperation with The Hague, seeing it as a necessary measure toward gaining international acceptance. The data suggest a window of opportunity exists for pressure to reform to have an impact. Ivan Vujacic, Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro to the United States, acknowledged that “more can be done and more will be done” in cooperation with the Tribunal, but focused on the progress made over the last two and half years, which he described as “remarkable.” In particular, he pointed to the recent arrests of three “pillars of Milosevic’s rule”: Miroslav Radic, Franko Simatovic, and Jovica Stanisic. Ambassador Vujacic said that the Serbian Government was highly committed to protecting human rights. He stated that during the war “the ultimate human right, the right to life was taken from the victims in atrocities defined as war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Vujacic promised that all indictees in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro will be arrested and transferred to The Hague. A second Helsinki Commission letter to Secretary of State Powell dated June 12th, declared that certification could not be justified at the time. The letter concluded: “To certify would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy goals supporting international justice and successful and complete democratic change in Serbia.” The letter reiterated that the Serbian authorities had yet to arrest and transfer Mladic and other indictees who are most likely in Serbia, and even this did not define the full cooperation with the Tribunal desired. Commission Members warned that if certification occurred while the required conditions remained unmet, the United States’ ability to affect change in Serbia would be diminished, making it more difficult for Serbia’s political leadership to undertake necessary reforms. Some Commission Members view the June 13 arrest of the indicted war crimes suspect Veselin Sljivancanin by the Belgrade authorities as an important positive step toward increased cooperation with the ICTY. However, continued failure to apprehend Mladic and other leading indictees remains a serious cause of concern that places barriers to Serbia and Montenegro’s full re-integration into the international community. In a press release announcing certification, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher asserted that the Secretary’s decision to certify does not indicate that Serbia has fulfilled its commitment. “We have made clear ... that the United States expects further actions to be taken in order to meet those obligations,” Boucher said, “including by arresting and transferring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.” The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

  • From the Bad to the Worst... Helsinki Commission Hearing Sets Sites on Arms Sales to Rogue Regimes

    By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor   The United States Helsinki Commission held a hearing June 5, 2003, to examine the transfer of arms to rogue regimes by certain participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in violation of non-proliferation obligations set forth in OSCE commitments. Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) chaired the hearing entitled “Arming Rogue Regimes: The Role of OSCE participating States.” Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton testified on behalf of the Administration. Also testifying were Roman Kupchinsky, editor of Crime and Corruption Watch for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Terence Taylor, President and Executive Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United States. Co-Chairman Smith, in opening the hearing, stressed the importance of examining the capacity and readiness of certain OSCE participating States to be sources of supply. He emphasized the Commission’s desire to focus on the role of suppliers in the effort to curb the spread of dangerous weaponry and militarily significant equipment and technology to rogue regimes around the world. Mr. Smith noted that, particularly among former Warsaw Pact States, several countries remained vulnerable to the lure of responding to the demand from rogue regimes for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), delivery systems and small arms or light weapons. He cited press articles and official investigations reporting that Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Moldova, Russia, Serbia-Montenegro and Ukraine have supplied dangerous regimes and combatants with military equipment or militarily-significant technology and resources. In some cases, these revelations were followed by government efforts to stop the flow and address those responsible. However, in other cases, government officials have attempted to cover-up and deny involvement. Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO) said, “While some may claim a lack of technical know-how impedes their ability to track arms transfers, we must not lose sight of the important element of political will.” He added that the United States “cannot afford to turn to a blind eye with respect to the complicity of senior civilian and military leaders in transfers that violate international commitments or are otherwise detrimental to the security interests of the United States.” Campbell added, “At a time when the OSCE is assessing ‘new threats’ to security, it would be foolhardy to overlook the multidimensional threats posed by corruption and international crime.” Commissioner Rep. Zach Wamp (R-TN) stressed his belief in the importance of such a hearing as a forum to learn the hard facts in order to benefit the world community. Commissioner Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) stated that the OSCE has a particular responsibility to make sure that weapons of mass destruction are not made available to rogue regimes and terrorist organizations. Commissioner Rep. Joseph R. Pitts (R-PA) expressed concern as to whether the governments of France and Russia fully understand the implications of doing business deals with rogue regimes. The three witnesses confirmed that a number of OSCE participating States possess the technology and ability to supply rogue regimes, terrorist groups, and combatants in regional conflicts with militarily significant equipment and know-how. The end of the Cold War left several Warsaw Pact States with huge stockpiles of military hardware, while economic downturns have made their military industries and research institutes desperate for funds. Under Secretary Bolton asserted that the United States has encouraged these countries to maintain tight control over such facilities and has invested in programs to destroy surplus equipment and convert the factories into industrial production. Still, several countries remain vulnerable to the lure of responding to the demand by rogue regimes for sophisticated weapons systems as well as small arms or light weapons. Organized crime and widespread corruption compound the problem, as well as a widespread attitude that what the purchasers do with arms they buy is neither the concern nor the responsibility of the supplier. Among specific OSCE countries cited was Belarus, where the Lukashenka regime threatens the security of others by facilitating the proliferation of arms and militarily significant equipment to rogue regimes and conflict areas around the world. “Belarus is one of the least responsive OSCE members states, and has done little to show it is serious about non-proliferation,” Bolton said, adding that since Iraq kept intricate details of all arms transactions, the United States expected to uncover significant details regarding Belarus’ role as a supplier. Russia’s role was also discussed, especially in light of concerns about Russian technology and expertise and Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Under Secretary Bolton underscored his ongoing engagement with Moscow on non-proliferation issues and reported some progress in cooperation with the Russian Government to control exports. At the same time, questions were raised about Russia’s willingness to make greater inroads toward non-proliferation and the possibility of an “oligarch” outside the government who may be in control of deals with Iran concerning that country’s Bushehr nuclear reactor. While President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Government may at times be very much aware of what is happening, Russian oligarchs are nevertheless a major problem. One alleged arms dealer, Victor Bout, continues to reside in Moscow despite being wanted in Belgium and the United Kingdom on an Interpol warrant, according to Mr. Kupchinsky. He alleged that the protection that Bout has in Russia is “very high-level” and that Russian Interpol has not acted on warrants that have been given to them. Ukraine remains a major player in arms sales and transfers. Co-Chairman Campbell said President Leonid Kuchma’s personal authorization of the Kolchuga sale “renders him an unreliable partner and casts a shadow over relations with Ukraine as long as he is in power.” Under Secretary Bolton noted that the Kolchuga incident was duly noted by other governments. “Well, I think certainly the Kolchuga incident got their attention in a major way,” he said. “And I think the Government of Ukraine is still trying to deal with that.” Bulgaria, slated to take over the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2004 also featured prominently in the hearing. It was noted that Bulgaria had a well-developed arms industry from its days as a Warsaw Pact member that led to significant arms transfers in the 1990s. Mr. Kupchinsky stated that, from his observations, the Bulgarians have not been concerned with the ultimate destination of their arms shipments and that this was an attitude persisting in most of the former Warsaw Pact countries and Soviet successor states. Mr. Taylor expressed particular concern about individuals in the private sector who are likely to be unaware of the need to protect themselves from those seeking to buy their equipment, resources or technology. Taylor also advocated greater transparency in reporting transfers of militarily-significant items and spoke positively of OSCE efforts in this area, especially with regard to small arms and light weapons. Commissioner Cardin sought recommendations on how to make transparency laws and controls more effective internationally. Mr. Taylor said that a good framework for dealing with proliferation issues already exists on paper; however, the real challenge is ensuring that states follow through on their commitments by insisting on full compliance, thorough reporting, and accountability. Strong export controls provide major contributions toward preventing illicit arms transfers. Mr. Bolton said that U.S. export control assistance is largely responsible for over a dozen European and Eurasian countries adopting comprehensive export control laws that meet international standards. This program was created initially to address the proliferation concerns among former Soviet Union states and others. A number of OSCE countries still need additional assistance to develop appropriate legal frameworks and increase enforcement capabilities to combat the transfers of sensitive goods and technologies. Under Secretary Bolton stressed the top priority given by the Bush Administration to discouraging proliferation of WMD. In this regard the steps that OSCE members take toward their commitments on non-proliferation are especially important. However, as encouraging as OSCE declarations are, they are worthless if the participating States do not take them seriously. It is therefore necessary for the United States to continue its strong leadership role in both bilateral and multilateral fora to stem the proliferation of WMD and the means to deliver them, including robust enforcement of U.S. non-proliferation laws. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

  • US SHDM Statement on Religious Freedom

    Freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief is a cornerstone of OSCE commitments protecting human rights. The 1989 Vienna Concluding Document declared that participating States will "take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination against individuals or communities on the grounds of religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, political, economic, social and cultural life, and to ensure the effective equality between believers and non-believers." The document went on to declare that participating States will "foster a climate of mutual tolerance and respect between believers of different communities as well as between believers and non-believers." Corporately, the participating States have agreed to a rich body of commitments meant to facilitate not frustrate the profession and practice of religion. In too many OSCE countries today, however, government officials use restrictive laws and ignore constitutional protections in such a way as to unjustifiably limit the practice of religion for members of many unpopular groups. The drafters of OSCE agreements on religious freedom evidently recognized the important role governments play in fostering a climate of tolerance in their societies. Government intolerance of religious groups, in most cases, will only lead to greater intolerance among their populace. One elementary responsibility of the state in this regard is non-discrimination towards individual members or groups. This issue was addressed at the ad hoc meeting hosted by the Dutch in the summer of 2001, which highlighted how, in the OSCE region, policies that favor certain religious groups tend to, as a corollary, penalize other religious groups by denying legal personality or equal status. By institutionalizing discriminatory policies toward a group, government actions can have the effect of stigmatizing certain religious communities. In some OSCE countries, this has taken the form of special lists, centers offering one-sided information or burdensome registration laws creating hurdles impossible to overcome. Such acts, especially by EU countries, are especially worrisome as many incoming EU countries are copying such acts and regulations, often without the long-standing democratic practices and protections to prevent discrimination or abuse. We urge countries that have hierarchical structures to examine their laws carefully to determine if they are unjustifiably restricting or penalizing those citizens who do not belong to these particular religious bodies.

  • Certification of Assistance to Serbia

    Mr. Speaker, the U.S. Department of State last week made its determination to certify compliance by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro with the terms of section 578 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 108-7). This section conditions certain bilateral assistance to Serbia on progress in three areas, although by far the most critical being cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.   I agree with the Department’s assessment that progress has been made, especially since March. In particular, I welcomed action earlier this month by the Serbian authorities to apprehend Veselin Svjilancanin, indicted by the Tribunal for the 1991 massacre near Vukovar in Croatia. Although there was resistance, this action was a success and signaled what is perhaps a new determination by Belgrade to transfer all remaining indictees. Having been in Vukovar, along with my good friend and colleague Mr. Wolf, just before the city fell to Serb forces, I am glad to see all three indicted by the Tribunal for this crime will be tried in The Hague.   Nevertheless, Mr. Speaker, I am concerned that the Department’s determination was the wrong one to make. While progress has been made, it remains insufficient. Still at large and believed to have been in Serbia are several other persons, including Ratko Mladic and others, Ljubisa Beara, Vujadin Popovic, Ljubomir Borovcanin, Vinko Pandurevic and Drago Nikolic, indicted by the Tribunal for their connection to the1995 Srebrenica massacre in which thousands of innocent people were executed.   I am concerned, deeply concerned, that these individuals will continue to evade justice while officials in Belgrade may get the impression they have done enough. Clearly, they have not. Mr. Speaker, I would urge Serbian authorities to take the action necessary to remove "cooperation with the Tribunal" as an outstanding issue in our bilateral relationship. In doing so, they will also continue to help Serbia emerge from Slobodan Milosevic’s legacy of nationalist hatred.   In the meantime, Mr. Speaker, I also urge the State Department to use remaining levers to encourage not just better, but full, cooperation with the Tribunal, which Secretary Powell had assured Mr. Cardin and myself in correspondence was a position we all shared. The crimes which occurred were too severe and too horrendous to allow those responsible to escape justice.

  • Combating Torture and Assisting Victims of Torture

    Mr. President, I rise to address the barbaric practices that constitute torture as we mark the United Nations Day in Support of the Victims of Torture. Astonishingly, an estimated 500,000 victims of torture live in the United States today, including many in my home State of Colorado. The United States has provided vital leadership in the campaign to prevent torture around the world. The United States must not equivocate on this most basic of human rights. While the United States has consistently spoken out forcefully against the use of torture around the world, serious questions have been raised suggesting U.S. complicity in torture as part of the war against terrorism. This prompted me to join other members of the Helsinki Commission in writing to the White House recently urging an investigation of "serious allegations that the United States is using torture, both directly and indirectly, during interrogations of those suspected of terrorism." Against this backdrop, I urge the administration to issue a forthright statement on torture. In his State of the Union Address, President Bush described the horrific forms of torture employed by the Hussein regime and concluded, "If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning." Even as experts document the scope of torture in Iraq, there must be no doubt concerning U.S. policy and practice. As Cochairman of the Helsinki Commission, I am particularly concerned that torture remains a tolerated if not promoted practice by come countries, even within the membership of the 55-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE. In some places, like Uzbekistan, members of the political opposition or religious minorities are especially likely to be the victims of torture. Tragically, two more people there have joined the long list of those who have died in custody amid credible allegations of abuse and torture, just weeks after the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development hosted a prestigious meeting in Tashkent, and days after the Secretary of State determined Uzbekistan is eligible for continued U.S. assistance. Moreover, the shortsighted practice of making martyrs out of Islamic extremists may have exactly the opposite effect the government claims to be seeking in its efforts to combat terrorism. In Georgia, torture and abuse comes hand in hand with police corruption. In the most recent State Department Country Report on human rights in Georgia, the Department stated: "[s]ecurity forces continued to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse detainees.... NGOs also blamed several deaths in custody on physical abuse, torture, or inhumane and life-threatening prison conditions." Even President Shevardnadze has, in the past, acknowledged the prevalence of abuse against detainees and prisoners. I welcome a new initiative of the OSCE Mission in Georgia to combat torture, but I would also note that antitorture initiatives have come and gone in Georgia with little to show for it. Without real political will, I am afraid this latest initiative may end up like the others. In Turkey--a country which has been given particular attention by the Helsinki Commission--even the doctors who treat the victims of torture have become targets themselves. Their offices have been raided, records seized, and even some doctors have been arrested and tortured. Moreover, the patients of these doctors, all of whom have already suffered at the hands of the authorities, have often been rearrested, retortured and recharged based on their testimonies given to the medical authorities. As a result of these practices, Turkey has been repeatedly sanctioned by the European Court of Human Rights. The Turkish nongovernmental organization, the Human Rights Foundation, appears to be making some headway in defending these doctors. Last year, Turkey's Grand National Assembly has passed significant legislation with severe penalties for those convicted of torture. A major effort still needs to be made to conform the application of the law in the regional courts of Turkey with the intent of the parliamentarians. The Helsinki Commission will continue to monitor developments in Turkey and the implementation of this law. In the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Charter, the participating States committed themselves to "eradicating torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the OSCE area. To this end, we will promote legislation to provide procedural and substantive safeguards and remedies to combat these practices. We will assist victims and cooperate with relevant international organizations and nongovernmental organizations, as appropriate." Clearly a strategy to confront and combat torture must emphasize prevention of torture, prosecution of those who commit torture, and assistance for the victims of torture. As we mark the United Nations Day in Support of the Victims of Torture, I note the good work being done by the Rocky Mountain Survivors Center, located in Denver. The center is part of a nationwide network committed to assisting the victims of torture living in the United States.

  • H.R. 2620: Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act

    Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, which is intended to improve the United States’ efforts in combating the scourge of human trafficking. I am very pleased to have Congressmen Lantos, Ranking Member of the International Relations Committee, Congressman Pitts and Congresswoman Slaughter, join me as original cosponsors. According to a recently released U.S. Government estimate, 800,000 to 900,000 women, children and men fall victim to international trafficking each year and end up prisoners of slavery-like practices in the commercial sex industry, domestic servitude, sweatshops, and agricultural farms, among other destinations. In October 2000, we adopted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), P.L. 106-386. As a result of that law, the U.S. Government allocated $68.2 million last year to combat trafficking in human beings. In the past two years, federal prosecutors initiated prosecutions of 79 traffickers--three times as many as in the two previous years. Nearly 400 survivors of trafficking in the United States have received assistance, facilitated by the Department of Health and Human Services, to begin recovering from their trauma and to rebuild their shattered lives. Thanks to the efforts of the State Department, USAID, and the spotlight put on the issue through the annual Trafficking in Persons Report, governments worldwide have also begun taking significant actions against human trafficking. Despite these substantive inroads, people continue to be bought and sold in modern day slavery. Victims continue to face obstacles in the process of securing needed assistance. We are not yet addressing trafficking in persons as an organized crime activity. We have not yet aggressively targeted sex tourism as a factor contributing to the demand for trafficked persons in prostitution, and more specialized research is needed. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) would address these and other areas of concern, would authorize funding to continue our government’s efforts against trafficking, and would build upon the experience of implementing the TVPA to refine U.S. laws and practices to better fulfill the intent of that law. Specifically, the TVPRA would enhance the prevention of human trafficking by: Requiring that U.S. Government contracts relating to international affairs contain clauses authorizing termination by the United States if the contractor engages in human trafficking or procures commercial sexual services while the contract is in force; Promoting innovative trafficking prevention initiatives, such as border interdiction programs; Requiring airlines to inform passengers about U.S. laws against sex tourism. The TVPRA would enhance protections for trafficking victims by: Allowing Federal, State or local law enforcement authorities to certify, for the purpose of receiving benefits, that a victim of trafficking has cooperated in the investigation or prosecution of trafficking crimes; Allowing trafficking victims to sue their traffickers in U.S. courts; Eliminating the requirement that a victim of trafficking between the ages of 15 and 18 must cooperate with the investigation and prosecution of his or her trafficker in order to be eligible for a T-visa; Allowing benefits and services available to victims of trafficking to be available for their family members legally entitled to join them in United States; and Providing for the confidentiality of T-visa applications. The TVPRA would enhance prosecution of trafficking-related crimes by: Permitting federal anti-trafficking statutes to be used to prosecute acts of trafficking involving foreign commerce or occurring in the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States; Making human trafficking crimes predicate offenses for RICO charges; and Encouraging the use of International Law Enforcement Academies to train foreign law enforcement authorities, prosecutors and members of the judiciary regarding human trafficking. The TVPRA would improve the U.S. Government’s response to trafficking by: Encouraging critical research initiatives; Mandating a report on federal agencies’ implementation of the TVPA; Designating that the Director of the State Department Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking shall have the rank of Ambassador-at-Large; and Prohibiting the use of funds to promote, support, or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution. The TVPRA would reauthorize appropriations for each of FY 2004 and 2005: $4 million to the Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking; $15 million to the Department of Health and Human Services; To the Secretary of State, $15 million for assistance for victims in other countries; $15 million for programs to improve law enforcement and prosecution; and $15 million for trafficking prevention initiatives; $300,000 to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe for trafficking prevention and legal reform programs; $15 million to the Department of Justice for assistance to victims in the United States and $250,000 for anti-trafficking training activities at the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs); $15 million to the President for foreign victim assistance (prevention activities); $15 million for assistance to foreign countries to meet the minimum standards to combat trafficking; $300,000 for research; and $250,000 for anti-trafficking training activities at the ILEAs; and $10 million to the Department of Labor. Mr. Speaker, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 enjoyed broad, bi-partisan support in both Houses of Congress. We are making progress in our battle against modern day slavery, but clearly there is still much work to be done by government authorities, by civil society, by our faith communities, and by all men and women of good will. As lawmakers, we have the opportunity to make our contribution to this endeavor. I strongly urge my colleagues to support this commonsense reauthorization bill to support and enhance the good work which has been undertaken.

  • International Day in Support of the Victims of Torture

    Mr. Speaker, as Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I find myself dealing with the issue of torture many times over during the course of any given year--torture committed by Russian forces in Chechnya, systematic police abuse of Roma in Greece, prisoners tortured to death in Uzbekistan, to give just a few recent examples.   Unfortunately, torture remains the weapon of choice by many oppressive regimes, systematically used to silence political opposition, punish religious minorities, or target those who are ethnically or racially different from those in power.   But on the occasion of the United Nations' Day in Support of the Victims of Torture, I'd like to reflect on the steps that can be taken to help prevent torture from occurring in the first place.   Torture is prohibited by a multitude of international instruments, including documents of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Moreover, it is absolute and nonderogable under any circumstances, even wartime. The challenge, then, is to translate this commitment into practice.   Amnesty International has issued a number of recommendations to help end torture. They are remarkably straightforward and easy to grasp: officials at the highest level should condemn torture; governments should ensure access to prisoners; secret detentions should be prohibited; and confessions obtained through torture should be excluded from evidence in the courtroom. I believe the implementation of these fundamental principles would have a significant impact in reducing torture. At the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's Annual Session two years ago, I introduced a resolution, passed by the Assembly, that built on these basic concepts.   While we work to eradicate torture, we must not forget those who have already become its victims. Along with Representative TOM LANTOS, I have introduced H.R. 1813, legislation to re-authorize the Torture Victims Relief Act and the list of cosponsors is growing. The Senate companion bill, S. 854 was introduced by Senator COLEMAN. This reauthorization will continue funding for centers here in the United States that help provide treatment for the estimated half million survivors, most of whom came to this country as refugees. It will also provide funds, distributed through the Agency for International Development or the U.N. Voluntary Fund for the Victims of Torture, for treatment centers abroad. While life for torture survivors can never be the same, treatment can provide victims the hope of becoming stable and productive members of their communities. I urge my colleagues in the House to join in supporting this measure as a tangible support of the victims of torture.

  • Torture Deaths in Uzbekistan Reveal Lack of Progress

    Mr. Speaker, in March 2002, the United States and Uzbekistan signed a declaration proclaiming a "Strategic Partnership" between our countries. This former Soviet republic, with the largest population of the five Central Asian countries, has played an important role in assisting the United States after 9/11, and I am grateful for that.   At the same time, as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I have deep concerns about the human rights situation in Uzbekistan, where no political opposition, no freedom of speech nor freedom of association are permitted. As a result of this situation, Congress has conditioned the release of financial assistance to Uzbekistan upon a determination by the Secretary of State that Tashkent is making "substantial and continuing progress" in meeting commitments specified in the March 2002 bilateral declaration, including in the field of human rights. The Secretary has twice--on August 26, 2002 and May 14, 2003--made such a determination.   Regrettably, there has been no "substantial and continuing progress" in the field of human rights in Uzbekistan. True, a human rights group has been registered, censorship has formally been lifted, and there have been amnesties, but these are largely token deliverables meant to give the appearance of progress. Uzbekistan has also admitted the U.N.'s Special Rapporteur on Torture. But all these gestures are more cosmetic than substantial. In fact, the U.N. Special Rapporteur concluded that torture is "systematic" in Uzbekistan. Instead of claiming credit for allowing him into the country at all, President Karimov should renounce this barbaric practice and Tashkent should take urgent measures to prevent and punish acts of torture. Unfortunately, thus far President Karimov has refused to take even the simple step of acknowledging and renouncing torture. More to the point, just after the Secretary's most recent determination last month, Orif Ershanov and Otamaza Gafaro joined the unconscionably long list of individuals who have died as a result of torture or other abuse inflicted by Uzbek officials.   Once again, Uzbek officials maintain that these most recent deaths in custody were the result of "natural causes." But the country's deplorable record undermines the credibility of such assertions. Frankly, I am surprised by Tashkent's claims; last year, there were two cases when Uzbek policemen who tortured prisoners, in some cases to death, received long prison terms. Their sentences constituted a sad form of progress in Uzbekistan, allowing observers to hope that law enforcement officials would have reason to fear serious consequences for mistreating people in their care. The latest assertions about "natural causes" signal clear regression to old positions that damage Uzbekistan's government and should be an embarrassment to the United States.   Particularly with respect to torture, Tashkent should immediately take several steps to demonstrate to the international community a serious commitment to make meaningful progress.   First, the Government of Uzbekistan should provide immediate access, organized by the OSCE, for independent medical experts to examine the bodies of Ershanov and Gafaro. Unfortunately, we have received indications that Uzbekistan is balking at admitting independent forensic specialists. Furthermore, Tashkent should establish a system of access for independent experts to investigate all cases of alleged torture and should act on the recommendations of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture.   It is equally important that Uzbekistan unconditionally release those who have been jailed because of their political opposition or religious affiliation. I have repeatedly urged Uzbek officials, including President Karimov during his visit to Washington in March of last year, to release the writer Mamadali Makhmudov, for example. One of the Bekjanov brothers has indeed been freed, but two of his siblings remain in prison, and we have received reports from family members of their declining health. As the most recent deaths in custody demonstrate, fears that such prisoners may die from their mistreatment during incarceration are well founded.   Mr. Speaker, improved relations are in the interest of both Uzbekistan and the United States. But closer, deeper ties will not be built on the graves of Uzbekistan's citizens who have been tortured to death. I hope, Mr. Speaker, that I will soon be able to report back to my colleagues that President Karimov has taken meaningful steps to confront torture and bring a measure of justice to its victims.

  • Arming Rogue Regimes: The Role of OSCE Participating States

    The hearing will consider the efforts to curb the spread of deadly weapons and related militarily significant technology and equipment to dangerous regimes around the world. Rather than focus on the efforts by these regimes to acquire the material, we want to examine the capacity and willingness of participating States in the OSCE to be their source. The end of the Cold War left some states, especially those of the former Warsaw Pact, with huge stockpiles of military hardware, while economic downturns made their military industries and research institutes desperate for funds. The United States has encouraged these countries to maintain tight control over surplus equipment and convert the factories into industrial production. Still, several countries remain vulnerable to the lure of responding to the demand, even from rogue states and regimes, for weapons of mass destruction, delivery system, and small arms or light weapons.

  • Democracy, Human Rights and Justice in Serbia Today

    Donald Kursch, Senior Advisor at the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, moderated this briefing that discussed, among other things, the trajectory of democratic institutions in Serbia. This briefing was held in the wake of the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic, after which the authorities in Belgrade undertook tough measures to crack down on the criminal elements that had continued to be a barrier to Serbia and Montenegro’s full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community’s institutions. More restrictive measures against crime in Serbia and Montenegro had underscored the progress already made by democratic forces in overcoming the estrangement between the two countries and the West.

  • Internally Displaced Persons In The Caucasus Region And Southeastern Anatolia

    Rep. Chris Smith (NJ-04), other legislators, and witnesses discussed Internally Displaced Persons (or IDPs) in the north Caucasus region of the Russian Federation, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. At the time of this hearing, this set of countries represented the greatest concentration of IDPs fleeing conflicts anywhere in the OSCE, which then consisted of 55 states. IDPs are not granted the same protections as refugees as stipulated under the U.N. Refugee Convention, although IDPs face similar problems, due to the fact that IDPs do not cross international borders.

  • Human Rights in Chechnya Focus of Helsinki Commission Briefing

    By John Finerty, CSCE Staff Advisor The United States Helsinki Commission held a briefing April 24, 2003 on the critical human rights and humanitarian situation in war-torn Chechnya, Russian Federation. The panelists of the briefing were Eliza Moussaeva, Director of the Ingushetia office of the Memorial Human Rights Center, and Bela Tsugaeva, Information Manager of World Vision, Ingushetia. The Commission guests were accompanied by Maureen Greenwood, Advocacy Director for Europe and Eurasia, Amnesty International, USA. Helsinki Commission Deputy Chief of Staff Ron McNamara opened the briefing. “Despite concerted efforts by the Russian leadership to portray the situation in Chechnya as approaching normal, the pattern of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of OSCE commitments by Russian forces continues,” McNamara said. “From reports of credible and courageous human rights activists such as our panelists, it is clear that the most egregious violations of international humanitarian law anywhere in the OSCE region are occurring in Chechnya today.” Ms. Moussaeva said that, as of late, Russian forces no longer conduct sweep operations (“zachistki”) in search of rebels, but now rely on night raids by masked personnel. In the three months from January to March, there were 119 abductions by federal forces engaged in such operations, according to Moussaeva, who added that during the same period last year, there were 82 abductions marking an increase in such activity by Federation forces. This shift in tactics has made it more difficult for families to trace their abducted relatives, whereas previously relatives generally knew which units had conducted the sweeps. Now, units and identities of the raiders are unknown, as well as the location of detainees. Officially, 2,800 persons are missing. Memorial believes the actual number to be significantly higher. Mass graves are a common find. In January, one mass grave was found in which the exact number of corpses could not be ascertained, because the bodies had been blown up by grenades to hide traces of torture and abuse. Authorities claim these individuals were abducted by Chechen rebel forces; yet some family members, who were able to identify their relatives by the clothing on the bodies, say that these individuals were actually taken by federal forces. According to Moussaeva, Moscow’s highly-touted March 23rd constitutional referendum has not marked an improvement in Chechen life on the ground. On one single day after the referendum, Memorial received reports of several cases of individuals abducted by federal forces. On the same day, a bus exploded, killing nine. Ms. Moussaeva asked, “So we have the question, why did we need that referendum if it didn’t change the situation for the better, if it didn’t bring us stability?” Regarding an OSCE presence in Chechnya, Moussaeva said, “We hope that they would have the opportunity to open in Chechnya again, and it will be a great help for us. The OSCE had a very positive experience and a good image after the first war.” Ms. Tsugaeva spoke about the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to information compiled by the Danish Refugee Council, there are some 92,000 IDPs in the neighboring republic of Ingushetia, which has a population of only 350,000. Fifteen thousand of the IDPs live in five large tent camps, 27,000 in other structures such as industrial plants or farms, and 50,000 in private accommodations, for which most have to pay rent. Most individuals lack basic necessities and have been asked by Ingushetia to leave, yet they have nowhere to go. Refugees in this region have also been subjected to efforts by federal officials to drive them away. Seventy percent of aid comes mainly from international NGOs, and the remainder from the UN. Bread distribution to these people is vital but irregular. Most international NGOs have been unable to open offices in Chechnya due to the security situation, meaning only the most needy, such as children and the elderly, can be provided for. Many land mines scattered throughout parts of the country formerly occupied by military forces are an additional cause for concern. According to official statistics, there were over 5,000 victims of landmine explosions in 2002. Despite the work of international NGOs such as the Handicap International Organization, most of these victims do not have access to adequate medical care and are in one way or another incapacitated for life. Ms. Moussaeva stated that an office established by the Putin government to monitor the human rights situation in Chechnya was ineffectual and merely for show. Of more than 29,000 complaints of harassment by federal forces filed by individuals, only 550 had been investigated. Ms. Greenwood commended the Helsinki Commission for its letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell urging the U.S. delegation at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva to push for a strong resolution to the conflict in Geneva. The recently concluded 58th Meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights failed by a vote of 15-21 to adopt a U.S.-supported resolution expressing “deep concern” about reported human rights violations in Chechnya. “Amnesty would like to thank co-signers Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Representative Christopher Smith, Senator Gordon Smith, Representative Steny Hoyer, Representative Robert Aderholt and Representative Ben Cardin,” Greenwood said. Furthermore, Greenwood expressed Amnesty International’s concern regarding the targeting of civilians on both sides of the conflict. Chechen rebel forces have engaged in abductions, hostage taking, and assassinations. Russians have used tactics such as extra-judicial executions, rape, and torture. Amnesty International profiles a few prominent cases, but these represent hundreds of other cases of human rights abuses. Ms. Greenwood presented Amnesty International’s recommendations for the United States Government, including: pressuring the Russian Government not to close tent camps for IDPs; encouraging the US Government to maintain funding levels of the Freedom Support Act for pro-human rights and democracy NGOs in the Russian Federation; demanding access to Chechnya for international journalists and observers; and, supporting the establishment of a human rights tribunal in the Council of Europe. Amnesty International’s recommendations for the Russian Government included providing accountability for previous abuses and ending violations of human rights law. Finally, Amnesty International called upon Chechen rebels to abide by international law, and stop the kidnaping and killings. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission intern Sean Callagy contributed to this article.

  • Prevention of Anti-Semitic Violence

    Mr. President, I appreciate the broad bipartisan support given to Senate Concurrent Resolution 7, and the prompt action by the Committee on Foreign Relations, allowing for timely consideration of this resolution by the full Senate. Anti-Semitism is an evil that has bedeviled previous generations, formed a black spot on human history, and remains a problem to this day. As Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I have been particularly concerned over the disturbing rise in anti-Semitism and related violence in many participating States of the 55-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, including the United States.   The anti-Semitic violence we witnessed in 2002, which stretched the breadth of the OSCE region, is a wake-up call that this evil still lives today, often coupled with a resurgence of aggressive nationalism and an increase in neo-Nazi “skin head” activity. Together with colleagues on the Helsinki Commission, we have diligently urged the leaders of OSCE participating States to confront and combat the plague of anti-Semitism. Through concerted efforts by the State Department and the U.S. Mission to the OSCE, a conference focused on anti-Semitism--called for in the pending resolution--will be convened in Vienna, Austria, June 19-20.   Meanwhile, the Helsinki Commission has undertaken a number of initiatives aimed at further elevating the attention given to rising anti-Semitism. In the year since the Commission's hearing on this issue, Commissioners have pursued it within the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly as well as in contacts with officials from countries of particular concern. I would point to France as a country that has recognized the problem and acted to confront anti-Semitism and related violence with tougher laws and more vigorous law enforcement. I urge French officials to remain vigilant, while recognizing that none of our countries is immune.   A recent opinion survey of adults in five European countries conducted by the Anti-Defamation League, ADL, found that 21 percent harbor “strong anti-Semitic views.” At the same time, the survey revealed that 61 percent of the individuals polled stated they are “very concerned” or “fairly concerned” about violence directed against European Jews. An ADL national poll of 1000 American adults found that 17 percent of Americans holds views about Jews that are “unquestionably anti-Semitic,” an increase of 5 percent from the previous survey conducted four years earlier. According to ADL there were 1,559 reported anti-Semitic incidents in the U.S. in 2002, with attacks on campuses rising by 24 percent over the previous year.   Mr. President, if anti-Semitism is ignored and allowed to fester and grow, our societies and civilization will suffer. A particularly disturbing element we have observed is the growth of anti-Semitic acts and attitudes among young people ranging from a rise in incidents on U.S. college campuses to violent attacks perpetrated on Jews by young members of immigrant communities in Western Europe. Education is essential to reversing the rise in anti-Semitism. Our young people must be taught about the Holocaust and other acts of genocide. Institutions such as the Holocaust Memorial Museum are making valuable contributions to promote the sharing of this experience at home and abroad. Such activity should have our strong support as a vital tool in confronting and combating anti-Semitism.   Mr. President, passage of the Senate Concurrent Resolution 7 will put the United States Senate on record and send an unequivocal message that anti-Semitism must be confronted, and it must be confronted now.   Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the concurrent resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, with no intervening action or debate.   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.   The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 7) was agreed to.   The preamble was agreed to.   The concurrent resolution, with its preamble, reads as follows:   S. CON. RES. 7   Whereas the expressions of anti-Semitism experienced throughout the region encompassing the participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have included physical assaults, with some instances involving weapons or stones, arson of synagogues, and desecration of Jewish cultural sites, such as cemeteries and statues;   Whereas vicious propaganda and violence in many OSCE States against Jews, foreigners, and others portrayed as alien have reached alarming levels, in part due to the dangerous promotion of aggressive nationalism by political figures and others;   Whereas violence and other manifestations of xenophobia and discrimination can never be justified by political issues or international developments;   Whereas the Copenhagen Concluding Document adopted by the OSCE in 1990 was the first international agreement to condemn anti-Semitic acts, and the OSCE participating States pledged to “clearly and unequivocally condemn totalitarianism, racial and ethnic hatred, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and discrimination against anyone as well as persecution on religious and ideological grounds”;   Whereas the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at its meeting in Berlin in July 2002, unanimously adopted a resolution that, among other things, called upon participating States to ensure aggressive law enforcement by local and national authorities, including thorough investigation of anti-Semitic criminal acts, apprehension of perpetrators, initiation of appropriate criminal prosecutions, and judicial proceedings;   Whereas Decision No. 6 adopted by the OSCE Ministerial Council at its Tenth Meeting held in Porto, Portugal in December 2002 (the “Porto Ministerial Declaration”) condemned “the recent increase in anti-Semitic incidents in the OSCE area, recognizing the role that the existence of anti-Semitism has played throughout history as a major threat to freedom”;   Whereas the Porto Ministerial Declaration also urged “the convening of separately designated human dimension events on issues addressed in this decision, including on the topics of anti-Semitism, discrimination and racism, and xenophobia”; and   Whereas on December 10, 2002, at the Washington Parliamentary Forum on Confronting and Combating anti-Semitism in the OSCE Region, representatives of the United States Congress and the German Parliament agreed to denounce all forms of anti-Semitism and agreed that “anti-Semitic bigotry must have no place in our democratic societies”: Now, therefore, be it   Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that--   (1) officials of the executive branch and Members of Congress should raise the issue of anti-Semitism in their bilateral contacts with other countries and at multilateral fora, including meetings of the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Twelfth Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to be convened in July 2003;   (2) participating States of the OSCE should unequivocally condemn anti-Semitism (including violence against Jews and Jewish cultural sites), racial and ethnic hatred, xenophobia, and discrimination, as well as persecution on religious grounds whenever it occurs;   (3) participating States of the OSCE should ensure effective law enforcement by local and national authorities to prevent and counter criminal acts stemming from anti-Semitism, xenophobia, or racial or ethnic hatred, whether directed at individuals, communities, or property, including maintaining mechanisms for the thorough investigation and prosecution of such acts;   (4) participating States of the OSCE should promote the creation of educational efforts throughout the region encompassing the participating States of the OSCE to counter anti-Semitic stereotypes and attitudes among younger people, increase Holocaust awareness programs, and help identify the necessary resources to accomplish this goal;   (5) legislators in all OSCE participating States should play a leading role in combating anti-Semitism and ensure that the resolution adopted at the 2002 meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Berlin is followed up by a series of concrete actions at the national level; and   (6) the OSCE should organize a separately designated human dimension event on anti-Semitism as early as possible in 2003, consistent with the Porto Ministerial Declaration adopted by the OSCE at the Tenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council in December 2002.

  • The Continuing Plight of Roma in Greece

    Mr. Speaker, the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) and Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM) have just published a report on the human rights situation of Roma in Greece. “Cleaning Operations: Excluding Roma in Greece” documents the plight of the inhabitants of the Romani settlement of Aspropyrgos, outside Athens, and details the problems of Roma across the country. Illustrated with stark scenes of bulldozed homes and marginalized and neglected Romani communities, a picture disturbing in more ways than one has been painted.   In particular, the report supports the accusation that the Government of Greece has used preparations for the 2004 Olympics as justification for the campaign to uproot Roma. Ironically, Greece currently holds the presidency of the European Union.   The Helsinki Commission, which I co-chair, held hearings in 1998, 2000, and in 2002 focused on the human rights problems faced by Roma with the intent of raising the awareness of these problems amongst the governments of the OSCE participating States. The plight of the Roma has also been addressed in specific hearings or briefings covering Greece, Russia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Romania, as well as the OSCE process.   Members of the Commission have also sent several letters to Greek leaders in recent years addressing longstanding human rights concerns in the Hellenic Republic, including those affecting the Romani community. These expressions of concern have specifically addressed forced evacuations of Roma from numerous villages, the abusive application of the use of national identity cards issued to Roma, the inability of Roma children to have access to schools on a non-discriminatory basis and other matters of blatant racial discrimination.   This newly released report on Roma clearly indicates that the Greek Government has failed to properly address many of these ongoing concerns. At a June 2002 Commission hearing on Greece, in fact, I raised the specter of an intensified campaign targeting Roma to obtain land for use as venues for the 2004 Olympics. This campaign is well documented in this report.   Notwithstanding the assertions of Greek officials at the Commission hearing that “everything is done (concerning the relocation) in consultation with, and with the consent of, the Roma involved,” numerous non-governmental organizations have raised such issues with Athens. Greek human rights activists have stepped forward.   As an original signatory to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, Greece has accepted numerous commitments pertaining to the treatment of Roma and joined in condemning discrimination against Roma, a provision found in the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit Document. Regrettably, the Greek Government has failed to fulfill these commitments, as documented in the new ERRC/GHM report on Roma in Greece.   The ERRC and GHM conducted intensive field missions that revealed several patterns of human rights abuse against Roma in Greece: cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment of Roma in housing; police violence against Roma; exclusion of Roma from the educational system; and, barriers to access to health care and other social support services for Roma.   Based on the facts in this report and the discussions I have had over the years in my leadership capacity with the Helsinki Commission, I urge the Government of Greece to take corrective measures, without delay, along the lines recommended by the ERRC and the GHM:   1. Facilitate access to Greek citizenship for those Roma residing in Greece who are stateless and provide the necessary legal documents (such as identity cards) to all Roma.   2. Use all appropriate means to guarantee protection against forced evictions outside the rule of law and without due process.   3. Bring to justice public officials and private individuals responsible for forced evictions of Roma in breach of Greek law.   4. Carry out thorough and timely investigations into all alleged instances of police abuse.   5. Undertake effective measures to ensure that local authorities register all persons factually residing in a given municipality, without regard to ethnicity.   6. Ensure that Romani schoolchildren have equal access to education in a desegregated school environment.   7. Without delay, adopt comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, as called for in the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit Document.   8. Conduct public information campaigns on human rights and remedies available to victims of human rights abuse, and distribute in both the Greek and Romani languages.   9. Conduct comprehensive human rights and anti-racism training for national and local administrators, members of the police force, and the judiciary.   10. At the highest levels, speak out against racial discrimination against Roma and others, and make clear that racism will not be tolerated.   The Helsinki Commission will continue to monitor the situation of Roma in the Hellenic Republic with the aim of encouraging the Government of Greece to implement commitments it has agreed to within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Commission will also work to ensure that the plight of Roma in Greece is raised at the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting to be held this fall in Warsaw.

  • Bringing Justice to Southeastern Europe

    Representative Chris Smith of New Jersey spoke on behalf of the Commission on the Yugoslav conflicts and its tumultuous impact on the development of post-Cold War Europe, as it exposed flaws in the United Nations and the European Union, whilst simultaneously inspiring the OSCE and NATO to act. The briefing addressed the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the understanding that justice must be part of a post-conflict recovery. The speaker – Honorable Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia since 1999 – was responsible for ensuring that those individuals responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in contemporary Southeast Europe were held accountable. She spoke of the limitations and successes of the Tribunal, referring to two decades of experience as a prosecutor.

  • Human Rights in Belarus and Russia

    Mr. Speaker, as Co-Chairman of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I have followed with particular concern both the deadly climate in Chechnya and the deterioration of human rights in Belarus. Such violations of basic human rights deserve focused criticism, and it is appropriate that the agenda of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights included resolutions on each situation.   On April 17, the U.N. Commission voted 23-14 with 16 abstentions to approve a U.S.-cosponsored resolution urging the Belarusian authorities to investigate "fully and impartially" credible reports that senior government officials were involved in the disappearances in 1999 and 2000 of leading opposition figures and a journalist. I have followed these cases closely and have become increasingly frustrated at the Belarusian regime's intransigence in meaningfully investigating these disappearances. Here in Washington and at OSCE Parliamentary Assembly meetings in Paris and Berlin, I have had occasion to meet with the wives of the disappeared. These meetings have been heart-wrenching. The cases of their husbands--who disappeared in 1999 and 2000 and are presumed to have been murdered--offer a chilling glimpse into the nature of the regime of Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenka, a regime that has the worst human rights record in Europe today. In February, I introduced H.R. 854, the Belarus Democracy Act, designed to bolster democratic development in that beleaguered country, and I am pleased that the State Department authorization bill approved yesterday by the House International Relations Committee includes key provisions of the Belarus Democracy Act. This bill encourages sanctions against the Belarusian regime until certain conditions are met, including a full accounting of these tragic disappearances.   The Belarusian people deserve to live in a society where democratic principles and human rights are respected and the rule of law is paramount, and I believe that the passage of the U.N. Human Rights Commission resolution is an important step towards that end.   Mr. Speaker, I wish I could report that the U.N. Commission on Human Rights had acted with equal conscience on the issue of Chechnya. We all know the desperate human rights situation in that war-torn region of the Russian Federation. Since the Chechen war reignited in 1999, international and domestic Russian human rights organizations have documented the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force by elements of the Russian military, as well as extrajudicial killings, abuse of prisoners, kidnaping, rape, and extortion of civilians. According to official statistics, 2,800 persons are missing in Chechnya; mutilated bodies of young Chechen males turn up almost daily. A representative of the respected human rights organization Memorial reported at a recent Helsinki Commission briefing that "one of the recent tendencies is to explode the corpses" in order to prevent identification. Needless to say, all of this is in clear violation of the Geneva Convention and the OSCE Code of Conduct during internal conflicts.   What's left of the Chechen capital of Grozny after Russian artillery shelling has been compared to the ruins of Stalingrad in 1943. According to the U.N., there are 92,000 internally displaced persons forced to flee from the fighting, with around 17,000 living in tent camps in neighboring Ingushetia.   Chechen forces are not entirely blameless. There are credible reports of their executing prisoners and using non-combatants as human shields. They have also assassinated pro-Moscow Chechen officials. The U.S. Government has placed three militant groups involved in the Chechen resistance on its list of terrorist groups.   Still, is this an excuse for Russia's savage war against the civilian population?   Despite all the documentation and eyewitness testimony on egregious human rights violations committed in Chechnya, the Commission on Human Rights rejected by a vote of 15-21 an even-handed European Union resolution expressing deep concern at the reported ongoing violations of international law in Chechnya. I note that the U.S. delegation did not cosponsor the resolution, though it did support it when the measure came to a vote. We should not be surprised that China, Sudan and Zimbabwe voted against the resolution. I do find it disconcerting, though, that the delegations of Armenia and Ukraine are in that less than distinguished company.   Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Commission noted: "The United States believes it important that the Commission address the serious human rights abuses that have occurred in Chechnya. We recognize Russia's right to defend its territorial integrity and itself against terrorism. The broader conflict in Chechnya cannot be resolved militarily and requires a political solution. Human rights violations by Russian forces in Chechnya need to be curtailed, and abusers held accountable."   So the people of Chechnya continue to suffer, and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights looks the other way.

  • The Troubled Media Environment in Ukraine

    Mr. President, later this week individuals around the world will mark World Press Freedom Day. The functioning of free and independent media is tied closely to the exercise of many other fundamental freedoms as well as to the future of any democratic society. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which I co-chair, is responsible for monitoring press freedom in the 55 participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE. Recently, I reported to the Senate on the deplorable conditions for independent media in the Republic of Belarus. Today, I will address the situation of journalists and media outlets in Ukraine.   Several discouraging reports have come out recently concerning the medic environment in Ukraine. These reports merit attention, especially within the context of critical presidential elections scheduled to take place in Ukraine next year. The State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in Ukraine for 2002 summarizes media freedoms as follows: "Authorities interfered with the news media by intimidating journalists, issuing written and oral instructions about events to cover and not to cover, and pressuring them into applying self-censorship. Nevertheless a wide range of opinion was available in newspapers, periodicals, and Internet news sources."   Current negative trends and restrictive practices with respect to media freedom in Ukraine are sources of concern, especially given that country's leadership claims concerning integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Lack of compliance with international human rights standards, including OSCE commitments, on freedom of expression undermines that process. Moreover, an independent media free from governmental pressure is an essential factor in ensuring a level playing field in the upcoming 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine.   In her April 18, 2003 annual report to the Ukrainian parliament, Ombudsman Nina Karpachova asserted that journalism remains among the most dangerous professions in Ukraine, with 36 media employees having been killed over the past ten years, while beatings, intimidation of media employees, freezing of bank accounts of media outlets, and confiscation of entire print runs of newspapers and other publications have become commonplace in Ukraine.   The murder of prominent journalist Heorhiy Gongadze--who disappeared in September 2000--remains unsolved. Ukrainian President Kuchma and a number of high-ranking officials have been implicated in his disappearance and the circumstances leading to his murder. The Ukrainian authorities' handling, or more accurately mishandling of this case, has been characterized by obfuscation and stonewalling. Not surprisingly, lack of transparency illustrated by the Gongadze case has fueled the debilitating problem of widespread corruption reaching the highest levels of the Government of Ukraine.   Audio recordings exist that contain conversations between Kuchma and other senior government officials discussing the desirability of Gongadze's elimination. Some of these have been passed to the U.S. Department of Justice as part of a larger set of recordings of Kuchma's conversations implicating him and his cronies in numerous scandals. Together with Commission Co-Chairman Rep. Chris Smith, I recently wrote to the Department of Justice requesting technical assistance to determine whether the recordings in which the Gongadze matter is discussed are genuine. A credible and transparent investigation of this case by Ukrainian authorities is long overdue and the perpetrators--no matter who they may be--need to be brought to justice.   The case of Ihor Alexandrov, a director of a regional television station, who was beaten in July 2001 and subsequently died also remains unsolved. Serious questions remain about the way in which that case was handled by the authorities.   A Human Rights Watch report, “Negotiating the News: Informal State Censorship of Ukrainian Television,” issued in March, details the use of explicit directives or temnyky, lists of topics, which have been sent to editors from Kuchma's Presidential Administration on what subjects to cover and in what manner. The report correctly notes that these temnyky have eroded freedom of expression in Ukraine, as "editors and journalists feel obligated to comply with temnyky instructions due to economic and political pressures and fear repercussions for non-cooperation." To their credit, the independent media are struggling to counter attempts by the central authorities to control their reporting and coverage of issues and events.   Another troubling feature of the media environment has been the control exerted by various oligarchs with close links to the government who own major media outlets. There is growing evidence that backers of the current Prime Minister and other political figures have been buying out previously independent news sources, including websites, and either firing reporters or telling them to cease criticism of the government of find new jobs.   Last December, Ukraine's parliament held hearings on "Society, Mass Media, Authority: Freedom of Speech and Censorship in Ukraine." Journalists' testimony confirmed the existence of censorship, including temnyky, as well as various instruments of harassment and intimidation. Tax inspections, various legal actions or license withdrawals have all been used as mechanisms by the authorities to pressure media outlets that have not towed the line or have supported opposition parties.   As a result of these hearings, the parliament, on April 3rd, voted 252 to one to approve a law defining and banning state censorship in the Ukrainian media. This is a welcome step. However, given the power of the presidential administration, the law's implementation remains an open question at best, particularly in the lead up to the 2004 elections in Ukraine.   I urge our Ukrainian parliamentary colleagues to continue to actively press their government to comply with Ukraine's commitments to fundamental freedoms freely agreed to as a signatory to the Helsinki Final Act. I also urge the Ukrainian authorities, including the constitutional "guarantor", to end their campaign to stifle independent reporting and viewpoints in the media. Good news from Ukraine will come not from the spin doctors of the presidential administration, but when independent media and journalists can pursue their responsibilities free of harassment, intimidation, and fear.

  • The Critical Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation in Chechnya

    This briefing followed a defeat, by a vote of 15-21 at the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, of a U.S.–supported resolution expressing “deep concern” about reported human rights violation in Chechnya.  The developments in Chechnya since the outbreak of the war in 1994 were briefly surveyed, while the focus of discussion was largely on the human dimension of the situation and the dangers faced by average Chechen civilians. Witnesses testifying at the hearing – including Eliza Moussaeva, Director of the Ingushetia Office of the Memorial Human Rights Center; Bela Tsugaeva, Information Manager of World Vision; and Maureen Greenwood, Advocacy Director for the Europe and Eurasia division of Amnesty International – addressed the dismal state of human rights in Chechnya and the issue of international assistance, which was less effective than it could have been due to government accountability issues. The lack of infrastructure and security guarantees was additional topics of discussion.

  • The Referendum in Chechnya

    Mr. Speaker, last Sunday, while the world's eyes were focused on the momentous events taking place in Iraq, a constitutional referendum was held in the war-torn region of Chechnya. The referendum was held as part of the Russian Government's attempt to “normalize” the situation in that tortured part of Russia's North Caucasus.   For the last ten years, Chechnya has been the scene of a bloody war between armed Chechen rebels and Russian military forces. Hostilities were precipitated in late 1994 when, in the wake of Chechnya's attempt to secede from the Russian Federation, Russian military forces launched a full-scale assault on the Chechen capital of Grozny. There was a restive peace from 1996 until the summer of 1999, when the armed clashes erupted anew. The roots of this conflict go back to Tsarist conquests in the 19th century and Stalin's brutal deportation of the Chechen people to Central Asia during World War II. Unfortunately, certain radical Islamic militant elements linked to international terrorism have become involved on the Chechen side, though the State Department has stressed that not all Chechens are terrorists.   Despite Moscow's repeated claims that heavy-handed Russian tactics in Chechnya are part of the war against global terrorism, the situation is far more complex. Many Chechens have taken up arms against what they believe is a repressive colonial power and wish to see Chechnya as an independent state that will be able to make the critical choice regarding the future of its people. As is so frequently the case, the civilian population has suffered terribly from the war. While both sides are guilty of violations of international humanitarian law, the Russian military and special operations units have been responsible for numerous and well-documented instances of gratuitous, brutal and mass violence against the civilian population.   During my years in the leadership of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Commission has conducted eight hearings and briefings on Chechnya. Witnesses, including a nurse who was present in a Chechen town where some of the worst atrocities by Russian forces took place, have described the appalling fate of the civilian population.   According to the U.S. State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001, “The indiscriminate use of force by government troops in the Chechen conflict resulted in widespread civilian casualties and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons, the majority of whom sought refuge in the neighboring republic of Ingushetia. Attempts by government forces to regain control over Chechnya were accompanied by the indiscriminate use of air power and artillery. There were numerous reports of attacks by government forces on civilian targets, including the bombing of schools and residential areas.” The report continues: “Command and control among military and special police units often appeared to be weak, and a climate of lawlessness, corruption, and impunity flourished, which fostered individual acts by government forces of violence and looting against civilians.” Among the examples of such lawlessness and impunity in the Country Reports were “...reports of mass graves and 'dumping grounds' for victims allegedly executed by Russian forces in Chechnya” and “cleansing” operations directed against guerrillas but resulting in deaths and the disappearance of non-combatants.   The State Department points out that Chechen forces also committed serious abuses: “According to unconfirmed reports, rebels killed civilians who would not assist them, used civilians as human shields, forced civilians to build fortifications, and prevented refugees from fleeing Chechnya. In several cases, elderly Russian civilians were killed for no apparent reason other than their ethnicity.”   Against this unsettling backdrop, with an estimated 100,000 internally displaced persons living in refugee camps in neighboring Ingushetia, and under the guns of approximately 80,000 Russian soldiers in Chechnya, the Chechen people have reportedly voted overwhelmingly for the proposed new constitution. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that a genuine assessment of the public will would have been determined under such circumstances. I would ask the same question I asked in a Helsinki Commission press release over a month ago: “Are we supposed to believe that this referendum will stabilize Chechnya while armed conflict between the Russian military and Chechen fighters continue to produce death and destruction?'”   The well-respected Russian human rights group, Memorial, has charged that Chechens were pressured to vote with the threat of losing their pensions or humanitarian aid. A joint assessment mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe stated that “no group has been able to campaign officially against the referendum in the mass media or distribute literature arguing against the referendum,” although some opposition opinions were voiced in the media. Incidentally, in the concluding communique of the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit, the Russian Government agreed that all sides should seek a political solution to the conflict, and avail themselves of the assistance of the OSCE. This commitment was seriously undermined when the Russian government evicted the OSCE Assistance Mission to Chechnya at the end of last year.   Mr. Speaker, the Bush Administration has stated that “...we hope [the referendum] can be the basis for a political solution to that tragic conflict.” I find that rather optimistic. The Russian Government might better instruct its military to stop terrorizing the civilian population, prosecute human rights violators and rebuild Chechnya. Then perhaps it would not have to hold referenda in Chechnya under armed guard.

  • Belarus Democracy Act 2003

    Mr. President, as Co-Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I have closely monitored developments in the Republic of Belarus and informed my Senate colleagues of disturbing trends in that nation. I have met with members of the fledgling democratic opposition who, at great personal risk, dare to speak out against the repressive regime led by Alexander Lukashenka. I have met with the courageous wives whose husbands disappeared because they stood up to the regime and would not be silent. Against the backdrop of this climate of fear, the powers of the state have been brought to bear against independent journalists, trade unionists, and other voices of dissent. Increasingly, Belarus has been driven into self-imposed isolation under Lukashenka devoid of legitimate leadership or accountability. A little over a year ago I addressed the Senate to voice concern over reported arms deals between the regime and rouge states, including Iraq. It appears that such sales have taken on greater importance as the Belarusian economy spirals downward. Mr. President, while some might be tempted to dismiss Belarus as an anomaly, the stakes are too high and the costs too great to ignore. Accordingly, today, I am introducing the Belarus Democracy Act of 2003, which is designed to help put an end to repression and human rights violations in Belarus and to promote Belarus’ entry into a democratic Euro-Atlantic community of nations. As a participating State in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Belarus has accepted a series of norms in the areas of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As Europe’s last dictator, Lukashenka continues to brashly trample the fundamental rights of his own people and their culture. As I alluded to earlier, independent media, non-governmental organizations, trade unions and the democratic opposition have had to operate under extremely difficult conditions, often facing serious mistreatment and an orchestrated campaign of harassment. Despite the repressions there are courageous individuals who support democracy have not been silenced. Two weeks ago, for example, Alexander Yarashuk, the leader of the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions, called on Lukashenka to immediately cease backing Saddam. Moreover, just last week, on March 12, thousands gathered peacefully in a central Minsk square to protest deteriorating economic and social conditions in Belarus. Four of the rally’s organizers – Andrei Sannikov, Ludmila Gryaznova, Dmitry Bondarenko and Leonid Malakhov – were given 15 day jail sentences for “participation in unauthorized mass actions.” Despite calls for change within Belarus, and considerable prodding from the international community, Lukashenka has shown no desire to deviate from his path of authoritarianism and personal profit at the expense of his own people. A few months ago, Lukashenka, who effectively controls the Belarusian parliament, signed into laws a new, repressive religion law. Local elections held earlier this month followed the pattern of Belarus’ 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential elections – they were a joke. Control of election commissions, denials of registration for opposition candidates, “early voting” and outright falsifications were the norm. Mr. President, the Belarus Democracy Act of 2003 would authorize additional assistance for democracy-building activities such as support for NGOs, independent media, including radio and television broadcasting to Belarus, and international exchanges. It also encourages free and fair parliamentary elections, which have been notably absent in Belarus. This bill would also deny high-ranking officials of the Lukashenka regime entry into the United States. Additionally, strategic exports to the Belarusian Government would be prohibited, as well as U.S. Government financing, except for humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products. The U.S. executive directors of the international financial institutions would be encouraged to vote against financial assistance to the Government of Belarus except for loans and assistance for humanitarian needs. The bill would also require reports from the President concerning the sale of delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies from Belarus to rogue states, including Iraq and North Korea. I am very pleased that the Ranking Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Biden, is an original cosponsor of this measure. His support will ensure that we proceed on a bipartisan basis as we work to ensure the timely adoption and implementation of this legislation. Mr. President, the goal of the Belarus Democracy Act is to assist Belarus in becoming a genuine European state, in which respect for human rights and democracy is the norm and in which the long-suffering Belarusian people are able to overcome the legacy of dictatorship – past and present. Adoption and implementation of the Belarus Democracy Act will offer a ray of hope that the current period of political, economic and social stagnation will indeed end. The people of Belarus deserve a chance for a brighter future free of repression and fear. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Belarus Democracy Act be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: S. 700 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the "Belarus Democracy Act of 2003''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States supports the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law in the Republic of Belarus consistent with its commitments as a participating state of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (2) The United States has a vital interest in the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus and its integration into the European community of democracies. (3) The last parliamentary election in Belarus deemed to be free and fair by the international community was conducted in 1995 from which emerged the 13th Supreme Soviet whose democratically and constitutionally derived authorities and powers have been usurped by the authoritarian regime of Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenka. (4) In November 1996, Lukashenka orchestrated an illegal and unconstitutional referendum that enabled him to impose a new constitution, abolish the duly-elected parliament, the 13th Supreme Soviet, install a largely powerless National Assembly, and extend his term of office to 2001. (5) In May 1999, democratic forces in Belarus challenged Lukashenka's unconstitutional extension of his presidential term by staging alternative presidential elections which were met with repression. (6) Democratic forces in Belarus have organized peaceful demonstrations against the Lukashenka regime in cities and towns throughout Belarus which led to beatings, mass arrests, and extended incarcerations. (7) Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, and Yuri Zakharenka, who have been leaders and supporters of the democratic forces in Belarus, and Dmitry Zavadsky, a journalist known for his critical reporting in Belarus, have disappeared and are presumed dead. (8) Former Belarus Government officials have come forward with credible allegations and evidence that top officials of the Lukashenka regime were involved in the disappearances. (9) The Lukashenka regime systematically harasses and represses the independent media and independent trade unions, imprisons independent journalists, and actively suppresses freedom of speech and expression. (10) The Lukashenka regime harasses the autocephalic Belarusian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish community, the Hindu Lights of Kalyasa community, evangelical Protestant churches (such as Baptist and Pentecostal groups), and other minority religious groups. (11) The Law on Religious Freedom and Religious Organizations, passed by the National Assembly and signed by Lukashenka on October 31, 2002, establishes one of the most repressive legal regimes in the OSCE region, severely limiting religious freedom and placing excessively burdensome government controls on religious practice. (12) The United States, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly, and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly have not recognized the National Assembly. (13) The parliamentary elections of October 15, 2000, conducted in the absence of a democratic election law, were illegitimate, unconstitutional, and plagued by violent human rights abuses committed by the Lukashenka regime, and have been determined by the OSCE to be nondemocratic. (14) The presidential election of September 9, 2001, was determined by the OSCE and other observers to be fundamentally unfair, to have failed to meet OSCE commitments for democratic elections formulated in the 1990 Copenhagen Document, and to have featured significant and abusive misconduct by the Lukashenka regime, including-- (A) the harassment, arrest, and imprisonment of opposition members; (B) the denial of equal and fair access by opposition candidates to state-controlled media; (C) the seizure of equipment and property of independent nongovernmental organizations and press organizations, and the harassment of their staff and management; (D) voting and vote counting procedures that were not transparent; and (E) a campaign of intimidation directed against opposition activists, domestic election observation organizations, and opposition and independent media, and a libelous media campaign against international observers. SEC. 3. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN BELARUS. (a) PURPOSES OF ASSISTANCE.--Assistance under this section shall be available for the following purposes: (1) To assist the people of the Republic of Belarus in regaining their freedom and to enable them to join the European community of democracies. (2) To encourage free and fair presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in Belarus, conducted in a manner consistent with internationally accepted standards and under the supervision of internationally recognized observers. (3) To assist in restoring and strengthening institutions of democratic governance in Belarus. (b) AUTHORIZATION FOR ASSISTANCE.--To carry out the purposes set forth in subsection (a), the President is authorized to furnish assistance and other support for the activities described in subsection (c), to be provided primarily for indigenous groups in Belarus that are committed to the support of democratic processes in Belarus. (c) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.--Activities that may be supported by assistance under subsection (b) include-- (1) the observation of elections and the promotion of free and fair electoral processes; (2) the development of democratic political parties; (3) radio and television broadcasting to and within Belarus; (4) the development of nongovernmental organizations promoting democracy and supporting human rights; (5) the development of independent media working within Belarus and from locations outside Belarus, and supported by non-state-controlled printing facilities; (6) international exchanges and advanced professional training programs for leaders and members of the democratic forces in matters central to the development of civil society; and (7) other activities consistent with the purposes of this Act. (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out this section $40,000,000 for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. (2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended. SEC. 4. RADIO BROADCASTING TO BELARUS. (a) PURPOSE.--It is the purpose of this section to authorize increased support for United States Government and surrogate radio broadcasting to the Republic of Belarus that will facilitate the unhindered dissemination of information in Belarus. (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--In addition to such sums as are otherwise authorized to be appropriated, there is authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for each fiscal year for Voice of America and RFE/RL, Incorporated for radio broadcasting to the people of Belarus in languages spoken in Belarus. (c) REPORT ON RADIO BROADCASTING TO AND IN BELARUS.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how funds appropriated and allocated pursuant to the authorizations of appropriations under subsection (b) and section 3(d) will be used to provide AM and FM broadcasting that covers the territory of Belarus and delivers independent and uncensored programming. SEC. 5. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS. (a) APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.--The sanctions described in subsections (c) and (d), and any sanction imposed under subsection (e) or (f), shall apply with respect to the Republic of Belarus until the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Belarus has made significant progress in meeting the conditions described in subsection (b). (b) CONDITIONS.--The conditions referred to in subsection (a) are the following: (1) The release of individuals in Belarus who have been jailed based on political or religious beliefs. (2) The withdrawal of politically motivated legal charges against all opposition figures and independent journalists in Belarus. (3) A full accounting of the disappearances of opposition leaders and journalists in Belarus, including Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, Yuri Zakharenka, and Dmitry Zavadsky, and the prosecution of the individuals who are responsible for their disappearances. (4) The cessation of all forms of harassment and repression against the independent media, independent trade unions, nongovernmental organizations, religious organizations (including their leadership and members), and the political opposition in Belarus. (5) The implementation of free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in Belarus consistent with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) standards on democratic elections and in cooperation with relevant OSCE institutions. (c) PROHIBITION ON STRATEGIC EXPORTS TO BELARUS.-- (1) PROHIBITION.--No computers, computer software, goods, or technology intended to manufacture or service computers, or any other related goods or technology, may be exported to Belarus for use by the Government of Belarus, or by its military, police, prison system, or national security agencies. The prohibition in the preceding sentence shall not apply with respect to the export of goods or technology for democracy-building or humanitarian purposes. (2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the issuance of licenses to ensure the safety of civil aviation and safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft of United States origin or to ensure the safety of ocean-going maritime traffic in international waters. (d) PROHIBITION ON LOANS AND INVESTMENT.-- (1) UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FINANCING.--No loan, credit guarantee, insurance, financing, or other similar financial assistance may be extended by any agency of the United States Government (including the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) to the Government of Belarus, except with respect to the provision of humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products. (2) TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY.--No funds available to the Trade and Development Agency may be available for activities of the Agency in or for Belarus. (e) DENIAL OF ENTRY INTO UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN BELARUS OFFICIALS.-- (1) DENIAL OF ENTRY.--It is the sense of Congress that, in addition to the sanctions provided for in subsections (c) and (d), the President should use the authority under section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)) to deny the entry into the United States of any alien who-- (A) holds a position in the senior leadership of the Government of Belarus; or (B) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person described in subparagraph (A). (2) SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS DEFINED.--In this subsection, the term ``senior leadership of the Government of Belarus'' includes-- (A) the President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, government ministers, Chairmen of State Committees, and members of the Presidential Administration of Belarus; (B) any official of the Government of Belarus who is personally and substantially involved in the suppression of freedom in Belarus, including judges and prosecutors; and (C) any other individual determined by the Secretary of State (or the Secretary's designee) to be personally and substantially involved in the formulation or execution of the policies of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus that are in contradiction of internationally recognized human rights standards. (f) MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.--It is the sense of Congress that, in addition to the sanctions provided for in subsections (c) and (d), the Secretary of the Treasury should instruct the United States Executive Director of each international financial institution to which the United States is a member to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any extension by those institutions of any financial assistance (including any technical assistance or grant) of any kind to the Government of Belarus, except for loans and assistance that serve humanitarian needs. (g) WAIVER.--The President may waive the application of any sanction described in this section with respect to Belarus if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that it is important to the national interests of the United States to do so. SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION. It is the sense of Congress that the President should continue to seek to coordinate with other countries, particularly European countries, a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to further the purposes of this Act, including, as appropriate, encouraging other countries to take measures with respect to the Republic of Belarus that are similar to measures provided for in this Act. SEC. 7. ANNUAL REPORTS. (a) REPORTS.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every year thereafter, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes, with respect to the preceding 12-month period, the following: (1) The sale or delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies from the Republic of Belarus to any country, the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)), has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. (2) An identification of each country described in paragraph (1) and a detailed description of the weapons or weapons-related technologies involved in the sale. (3) An identification of the goods, services, credits, or other consideration received by Belarus in exchange for the weapons or weapons-related technologies. (4) The personal assets and wealth of Aleksandr Lukashenka and other senior leadership of the Government of Belarus. (b) FORM.--A report transmitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex. SEC. 8. DECLARATION OF POLICY. Congress hereby-- (1) expresses its support to those in the Republic of Belarus seeking-- (A) to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and to consolidate the independence and sovereignty of Belarus; and (B) to promote the integration of Belarus into the European community of democracies; (2) expresses its grave concern about the disappearances of Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, Yuri Zakharenka, and Dmitry Zavadsky; (3) calls upon the Lukashenka regime in Belarus to cease its persecution of political opponents or independent journalists and to release those individuals who have been imprisoned for opposing his regime or for exercising their right to freedom of speech; (4) calls upon the Lukashenka regime to end the pattern of clear, gross, and uncorrected violations of relevant human dimension commitments of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and to respect the basic freedoms of speech, expression, assembly, association, language, culture, and religion or belief; (5) calls upon the Government of the Russian Federation to use its influence to encourage democratic development in Belarus so that Belarus can become a democratic, prosperous, sovereign, and independent state that is integrated into Europe; (6) calls upon the Government of Belarus to resolve the continuing constitutional and political crisis in Belarus through-- (A) free, fair, and transparent presidential and parliamentary elections in Belarus, as called for by the OSCE; (B) respect for human rights in Belarus; (C) an end to the current climate of fear in Belarus; (D) meaningful access by the opposition to state media in Belarus; (E) modification of the electoral code of Belarus in keeping with OSCE commitments; (F) engagement in genuine talks with the opposition in Belarus; and (G) modifications of the constitution of Belarus to allow for genuine authority for the parliament; and (7) commends the democratic opposition in Belarus for their commitment to freedom, their courage in the face of the repression of the Lukashenka regime, and the emergence of a pluralist civil society in Belarus--the foundation for the development of democratic political structures. SEC. 9. DEFINITION. In this Act, the term "appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (1) the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. 

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