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On February 9, Georgian Defense Minister Juansher Burchuladze visited the U.S. and met with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who announced that Georgia had been approved for the risk-assessed payment schedule making it easier for Georgia to acquire critical military capabilities. The Defense Secretary stressed the importance of defense partnership between the U.S. and Georgia. He also emphasized that Georgia’s participation in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group “helps us all strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and to bolster the rules-based international order that keeps us all secure. And that’s crucial as Ukraine fights bravely against Russia’s unprovoked and unjust invasion.” This announcement comes in the midst of the consistent unfriendly rhetoric on the ruling Georgian Dream’s part accusing U.S. and EU of wanting to drag Georgia into the Russia-Ukraine war. In this vein, GD Chair Kobakhidze recently announced that Russia has a military “advantage” both overall and at the current stage of its campaign in Ukraine. He suggested that because of this “advantage,” the “global party of war” wants to see Georgia drawn into hostilities. He said he was careful not to name the names to that “global party” not to spoil inter-state relations, but “you know who I mean.” We asked foreign relations experts what to make of these two contradictory trends – the ongoing strategic partnership and hostile “global party of war” rhetoric, how does the U.S. reconcile them in dealing with Georgia, and what it could do differently? Michael Cecire, Senior Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE The reality is that bilateral relations between the United States and Georgia continue to be largely, on the institutional level, quite excellent. In Georgia, U.S. agencies find willing, enthusiastic, and competent partners, including in coordinating on regional security and countering Russian aggression. In that sense, SECDEF Austin is entirely correct, and echoes a reality-based sentiment that is not hard to find throughout U.S. government agencies that partner with their Georgian counterparts. And even more broadly, Defense Minister Burchuladze as well as (and particularly) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are forceful and articulate advocates for the bilateral relationship in Washington and international forums.  At the same time, Mr. Kobakhidze’s escalating statements, and that of other certain GD principals and their proxies, are purposefully divergent and deliberately incendiary not in spite of strong U.S.-Georgia institutional cooperation but because of it. If it weren’t on such a grave subject, the implications of the “war party” rhetoric would be mildly hilarious: that somehow the U.S. or the Ukrainian military — the same one holding its own against Russia and often besting them despite its material disadvantages — is just waiting anxiously for Georgia to enter the war and save them. The absurdity is overwhelming if you give it anything more than a half-second of consideration. But the point isn’t to offer a logical analysis but to set a kind of classic disinformation trap for U.S. and Western policymakers that works precisely because of how patently ridiculous the premise is.  So far, the United States has allowed itself to compartmentalize its relationship between the institutional on the one hand, the one SECDEF Austin refers to, and the political — for which our senior-most representative in Tbilisi, Ambassador Kelly Degnan, has borne the brunt, unfortunately. For a time, this was a defensible approach with the expectation that the former was enduring and the latter was an unfortunate but temporary phenomenon, but as anti-West attacks have escalated and accelerated, I expect this approach to shift to underline the opportunity cost that the Georgian government — and the Georgian people as a result — is accruing through these mixed and unfriendly messages, while doing nothing to enhance its security. One needn’t look far in the Caucasus to find other regimes where accepting Russia’s embrace has only led to more pain and less independence. Laura Linderman, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center The US and Georgian governments have had and continue to have quite good operational cooperation, coordination, and information sharing. I would argue that it is precisely because of this excellent “behind the scenes” cooperation that Georgian government officials, such as Georgian Dream chair Irakli Kobakhidze in this case, feel the need to make incendiary and unwelcome comments about the United States and its government, Embassy, and Ambassador. I would speculate Mr. Kobakhidze and others may feel the need to signal to their northern neighbor that they are not that cozy with the United States, despite the operational reality. While so far, the Georgian dream has been able to continue this “behind the scenes” cooperation and public “denigration” dynamic for some months without obvious public consequences, it cannot continue to walk this line indefinitely. Indeed, comments about US Ambassador Kelly Degnan have been especially vitriolic and damaging. I would expect or assume that privately the United States government is and will continue to indicate to the Georgian government that such statements will have an impact on operational relations, aid, and other forms of collaboration. A more contentious relationship with the United States will, by extension, have an impact on Georgia’s security. Sergi Kapanadze, Founder, GRASS The U.S. could be a lot more effective in pressing Georgia’s Government to curb anti-Western rhetoric and policies. Unfortunately, not all instruments are used to this end. The U.S. only tries to use carrots, starting with simple photo opportunities and ending with financial and military assistance. However, for the US interest to be credible, Washington needs to add some sticks as well. A simple threat of individual sanctions or high-level statements about the concrete problems that Georgian democracy faces could sometimes do the job. In other cases, tying democratic conditionalities to foreign assistance, including from the IMF and World Bank could do the job. But what is never going to help, is when Washington stays mute when the Georgian Dream rejects the ambassadorial nominee, allows Tbilisi to demonize US Ambassador, or totally disregard US championed judiciary and other reforms.

Russia's revanchist and imperial ambitions may not stop at Ukraine. Unless Russian forces are defeated in Ukraine or withdrawn by new Kremlin rulers, Moscow might assault other post-Soviet neighbors. The West may face limits on the extent to which it could help them thwart such attacks. As repression has climbed under President Vladimir Putin and Russia has become more autocratic, Russian behavior has become more imperial and revanchist, not least in Ukraine, a conflict that will be one year old on Feb. 24. But Moscow's expansive ambitions may go well beyond it. In 2005, Putin called the Soviet collapse “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” In 2008, then-Prime Minister Putin told President George W. Bush, “Ukraine is not even a country.” Soon Russia invaded Georgia and asserted “privileged interests” in the wider region. In 2014 and on a larger scale in 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. In 2022, Putin claimed that prior to President Nursultan Nazarbayev's reign, “Kazakhs never had statehood.” In 2016, Putin claimed that Russia's border “has no end.” No wonder neighbors worry. They have reason to fear where Putin's Russia might strike next, especially if revanchist rulers remain in the Kremlin or the invaders prevail in Ukraine. Where might new Russian threats emerge? The Baltics: Alleging a mission to protect Russians anywhere, Moscow might try to seize Estonia with its ethnic Russian enclave of Narva, or Latvia, where ethnic Russians are a quarter of the population. Russia could seek to invade Lithuania, a neighbor that is not friendly toward Russia lodged between hyper-armed Kaliningrad and Belarus. Since the Baltics lack geographic depth, the Kremlin might think Russian forces could take them before NATO reinforcements arrived and defeat any attempt to recover them. Belarus: Likely shocked by the widespread street protests in 2020, the Kremlin could seek to deepen subservience by absorbing Belarus. Putin might be angry that despite having a friendly dictator, Belarus refuses to send troops to Ukraine or host a Russian air base. The Kremlin might calculate that it could oust President Alexander Lukashenko and take control of or annex Belarus without Western intervention. Moscow might worry about sparking more protests. Moldova: In February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned that democratic Moldova could become the “next Ukraine.” Russian troops already occupy separatist Transnistria. Unless Russia seized southern Ukraine up to the Moldovan border, it might see risks in mounting a larger invasion against a country linked to the West and bordering on NATO stalwart Romania. Georgia: If Russia seized the Black Sea coastline remaining under the control of Georgia, it would control seaborne access for goods flowing to and from China, Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The Kremlin might view democratic Georgia, despite ties to the West, as far from most of Europe and vulnerable. Kazakhstan: Russian forces could attempt to invade the northern regions of Kazakhstan that host significant Slavic minorities. Russian revanchists have long called for incorporation of these areas, as did the late Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. The Kremlin might view the West as unable to do much to help faraway Kazakhstan repel an invasion. Peacekeepers from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization intervened to help quell protests in Kazakhstan last year. Caspian energy: Russia could seek to capture Caspian energy assets in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Unlike other possible land grabs, the Kremlin might think this one would be a financial boon. A Russian naval armada in the Caspian Sea could strike coastal targets and help protect energy assets from collateral damage. The Kremlin would expect strong Western political opposition and tougher sanctions. But despite huge Western investments in Caspian energy, the Kremlin might not expect large-scale military intervention so far from NATO's main sources of power. No question, for Russia's revanchists and imperialists, Ukraine is the main game. But they may want more. And they might think the West's unprecedented military support for Ukraine will not be replicated elsewhere. The war has shown the value of sustained, low-cost training by NATO allies of Ukrainian troops, such as how to fight in decentralized and agile ways. Georgian forces have also benefitted. The allies might promote regional security by training more forces from friendly post-Soviet countries. The fate of Russia's neighbors may hinge in great part on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Especially if the Kremlin managed to portray the war as a success, it might be emboldened to employ force against other neighbors. This is one reason why the West has strong interests in a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine and an end to revanchist rule in Russia. The West might be bolder about asserting the latter interest. William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. He was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia, and senior adviser at the U.S. Helsinki Commission. This commentary originally appeared on The Hill on February 16, 2023. Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.

VIENNA (AP) — Austria has come under heavy criticism for granting visas that will allow sanctioned Russian lawmakers to attend a Vienna meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The issue highlights the delicate balancing act the European country has engaged in while trying to maintain its longstanding position of military neutrality during the war in Ukraine. The Austrian government has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine almost a year ago but also stressed the need to maintain diplomatic relations with Moscow. Austria hosts several U.N. agencies and international organizations such as the OSCE, which was established during the Cold War as a forum for dialogue between East and West. Russia is one of the 57 nations in North America, Europe and Asia that participate in the Vienna-based organization. Moscow plans to send delegates to the Feb. 23-24 meeting of the OSCE’s parliamentary assembly, including 15 Russian lawmakers who are under European Union sanctions. Among them are Deputy Duma Chairman Pyotr Tolstoy and fellow parliament member Leonid Slutsky. In a letter to Austria’s chancellor, foreign minister and other officials, 81 OSCE delegates from 20 countries, including France, Canada, Britain, Poland and Ukraine, called upon the Austrian government to prohibit the participation of the sanctioned Russians. “It is important to remember that Russian parliamentarians are an integral part of the power system and complicit in the crimes Russia commits every day in Ukraine,” read the letter, which was seen by The Associated Press. “They have no place in an institution tasked with promoting sincere dialogue and opposition to the war.” The U.S. delegates to the Parliamentary Assembly were not among the letter’s signatories. U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Michael Carpenter told reporters Friday that the Russian delegates “are not people who deserve to be able to travel to Western countries.” However, Carpenter added that it was “up to the Austrian government to determine whether they are going to grant visas or not.” Austrian officials haven’t commented on the letter. On Feb. 5, Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg defended Austria’s decision to allow the sanctioned Russians to enter the country, arguing it was important to keep channels of communication with Moscow open despite the “brutal Russian attack against Ukraine.” The Austrian Foreign Ministry also insisted that as host to the OSCE headquarters in Vienna, it is legally obliged to grant visas to representatives of participating nations who want to take part in meetings there. Austria, which became a European Union member in 1995, has criticized Moscow and joined the sanctions the EU imposed against Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. But unlike Finland and Sweden, which decided to abandon their non-aligned stances in May by applying to join NATO, Austria remains committed to the military neutrality it adopted in 1955. The Austrian government has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine but no weapons. Chancellor Karl Nehammer became the first and so far only EU leader to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin face-to-face after the war started. Nehammer traveled to Moscow in April 2022 in a fruitless attempt to persuade the Russian leader to end the invasion. Support remains strong for Austrian neutrality among the public and political establishment. “I believe that Austrian neutrality can still play a positive role today,” saysid Ralph Janik, an expert in international law and researcher at the Sigmund Freud private university in Vienna. “The alternative would be to join NATO, but every single Austrian politician is very well aware that this is not supported by the majority of the Austrian public.” Austria, which was annexed by Nazi Germany in the run-up to World War II, declared neutrality after the war under pressure from Western allies and the Soviet Union. It sought a role as a mediator between East and West and developed ties with Moscow during and after the Cold War. In 1968, Austria became the first Western European country to import gas from the Soviet Union, and its dependence on Russian energy increased in the following decades. Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 80% of Austria’s natural gas came from Russia. It has since reduced the share to just over 20% by turning to Norwegian gas, according to Austria’s regulator for electricity and gas. The Austrian banking system is also closely connected to Russia. Austria’s second-largest bank, the Raiffeisenbank International, earned more than half of its profits in 2022 from Russia. The bank has come under intense pressure for continuing its business in Russia despite Moscow’s war against Ukraine, and is currently evaluating strategic options, including an exit from Russia. Vienna is also known to be a playground for spies, including from Russia, due to its lenient espionage laws. Despite its initial reluctance, Austria has expelled eight Russian diplomats who are believed to have been engaged in spying since the start of the Russian war against Ukraine. While there are no signs of a shift away from Austrian neutrality, some have called for the policy to be reassessed following the Ukraine war. Werner Fasslabend, a former Austrian defense minister from the conservative People’s Party, is among the few prominent voices arguing in favor of the country renouncing neutrality and joining NATO. With the end of Cold War and Austria’s accession to the EU, Austrian neutrality has “lost its function,” said Fasslabend, the director of the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy. As a NATO member, Austria would “be in a better position to shape European security policy and will gain greater security,” he added, admitting that it was unlikely to happen given it would require changing the constitution by a two-thirds majority in the Austrian parliament. “This majority is not within sight,” Fasslabend said. Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

President Biden has poorly explained why supporting Ukraine is in America’s interests. There are better arguments to make. Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is nearing its first anniversary, and the United States should be proud that our support has empowered Kyiv to push back against the Kremlin. But the Biden administration still has not clearly articulated why continued American leadership is needed and why the only acceptable outcome is victory for Ukraine. As a result, after one year of fighting, and as we face domestic issues such as inflation, crime, and an open southern border, the American people are asking questions about U.S. support for Ukraine. This is understandable. There is, however, a persuasive case for continued American aid to Ukraine. But we have to make that case. Public diplomacy starts at home. A few weeks before Secretary of State George Marshall went to Harvard to unveil the Marshall Plan in June 1947, his deputy, Dean Acheson, made a speech of his own in my home state of Mississippi. Acheson recognized that it was not just the Harvard faculty club whose opinion mattered — William F. Buckley’s first 2,000 names in the Boston phone book would also have a say. At Delta State University, Acheson argued that American engagement in Europe was “necessary for our national security.” In 1984, President Reagan made a similar point in Gulfport, Miss., at the height of the Cold War. He pointed out the need to strengthen our defense-industrial base, naval fleet, and ammunition stocks, saying, we can “never again allow America to let her guard down.” President Biden has not acted or spoken with the same strength and candor. Before February 24, 2022, he suggested that Russia might get away with “minor incursions” into Ukraine. The messaging most Americans heard from the White House last summer was “Putin’s price hike” — an attempt to dismiss concerns about the president’s failed energy policies. Instead of the president, Congress has led the charge at every step, both in explaining this effort to the American people and in provisioning Ukraine. The administration’s recent timidity in providing Ukraine with a handful of tanks allowed Europeans to hide behind the U.S. for months, rather than provide Ukraine what it needs in time to make a difference for the coming spring offensive. That hesitation was in keeping with endless debates we have seen about equipment like HIMARS and drones. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians are fighting courageously, but with one hand tied behind their backs. Recently, I took to the Senate floor to make the case for more, better, and faster advanced weapons deliveries to Ukraine. I offered four clear reasons why continuing to support Ukraine is in America’s national interest. The argument needs to be based on more than vague appeals to the rules-based international order, which persuade few outside the Beltway. First, Ukraine matters to the United States because the security of Europe is closely tied to our own security and prosperity. When Vladimir Putin says that he seeks the “collapse of Western hegemony,” he means the power of the U.S. and of our allies. Second, this is a good investment for us. Reporting indicates that the U.S. contribution to Ukraine as a percent of our own GDP so far has been less than that of Canada, the United Kingdom, and every Baltic country, at a clip of just 0.2 percent. The result of these relatively modest investments is that Russia’s military is significantly weakened and Moscow can no longer carry out a near-term invasion of any nation in the NATO alliance. Further, 40 percent of U.S. aid for Ukraine, or about $44 billion, is being spent here at home on our defense-industrial base and readiness. Third, the United States is leading a transformation in Europe’s security architecture that will make it far less likely that American service members will be put in danger in the future. For years, American force planners have agonized over hard choices about how to assist in Europe’s defenses. These choices have been made all the more challenging as a result of the “free rider” problem in NATO defense spending. With our allies committing to rearming, we may soon see that dilemma in our strategy for the European continent subside. Fourth, victory in Ukraine will help deter the Chinese Communist Party in the Indo-Pacific. General Secretary Xi Jinping is watching the other side of Eurasia closely, with an eye toward Taiwan. As Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida has stated, “Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow.” Last month, our allies in Tokyo committed to double their defense spending as a percent of GDP to 2 percent. Beyond those key reasons, it is important to understand that a long war for Ukraine would cost even more and favors Putin. Providing Ukraine with needed arms, including ATACMS, long-range missiles, and advanced drones like the Grey Eagle and Reaper could tip the balance in their favor and diminish the odds of a protracted conflict by better positioning Kyiv to end the war on the right terms. As we consider additional support, political leaders also owe the American people oversight of how their hard-earned taxpayer dollars are being spent. Twenty reviews of Ukraine assistance have been completed, with another 64 reviews ongoing or planned. As ranking member on the Senate Armed Services committee, I will continue that oversight. American support for Ukraine should not be taken for granted, in Kyiv or in Washington. It will be earned by legislators who persuade voters at civic clubs, at churches and faith institutions, and in conversations at local grocery stores, face to face. I will continue to have those tough discussions in Tupelo, Olive Branch, Jackson, Gulfport, and everywhere in-between. I invite my colleagues in Congress and in the administration to do the same across the country. The American people deserve no less.  

The capacity of a modern economy to produce food and goods for its citizens, and weapons and fuel for its military to project power, are the undeniable twin pillars of global power. Both depend on reasonably priced and readily available energy.  Almost 80% of America’s energy is supplied by oil, gas and coal. Only 20% comes from other sources such as hydropower, nuclear, wind and solar. Even the greenest of economies will need fossil fuel backup when the wind doesn’t blow and the sun doesn’t shine. Wind and solar provide 5% of our total consumption and only 2% of the energy to power some 290 million vehicles. In other words, Americans literally run and fight on fossil fuels.  Russia, despite an economy smaller than Italy’s, has shown it could defy all international norms and invade a neighboring country because it has abundant energy. Weapons, and more weapons. First it was Javelins, then Howitzers, then HIMARS, then anti-missile and drone capability, then longer range ATACMS, then better tanks, now F-16s. Who can tell what the next weapon will be needed to defend against Russian aggression?  Russia has its weapons, too, and they are being paid for by the sale of oil, gas, coal, and fossil fuel-derived products like petrochemicals, fertilizers, etc. Russian missiles, planes, drones, tanks and artillery that shed Ukrainian blood and destroy homes, hospitals and electric-power stations are bought with Russia’s fossil fuel revenues. Energy is Russia’s greatest weapon as it makes possible all the others. Only with such revenues can Russia continue its devastation of Ukraine. A new Russian offensive is brewing, and it too will be financed by its energy revenues.  Russians from Putin on down are talking about a much longer war because they have the revenues to support one and they don’t have to worry about a citizen-taxpayer revolt or getting reelected.  While the U.S. and Europe have restricted their purchases and consumption of Russian energy, it is sold elsewhere. That energy sells at a discount, but Russia is still earning hundreds of billions of dollars from energy sales and thus able to continue its war for as long as Putin wants. In spite of sanctions, Russia sold over $350 worth of fossil fuels in 2022. In the meantime, Germany keeps its fracking ban.  To achieve peace in Europe and avoid potential wars elsewhere, one would think that America and the West would be increasing their own supply of oil, gas and coal and driving down prices on the global market. Such an initiative would also give fence-sitting countries like India and Brazil in the “Global South” alternative sources to substitute for Russian products.  One would also think that the West would understand that its ability to replenish weapons and ammunition being sent to Ukraine and resist aggression, anywhere, like Taiwan for example, is based on production, shipment and fueling with fossil fuels and decidedly not on wind and solar. There will never be an electric tank! And why not drive down the price that Russia receives for its energy while providing the economic and military security derived from fossil fuels? The answer from Europe and now America has been an emphatic “no”. Apparently, addressing the “climate crisis” takes priority over national defense, stopping Russian aggression in Europe, and securing reliable, affordable energy to run modern industrial economies.  The alternative - simultaneously furthering the technology of renewables like wind and solar while building up fossil fuels within an “all of the above” approach is anathema to those who believe religiously that climate change is an existential threat. Ironically, the same people are happy to substitute U.S. fossil fuels with oil from dictatorships like Venezuela, Iran and Saudi Arabia. They don’t seem concerned that wind, solar and battery supply chains run mostly through Communist China.  An “all of the above” energy strategy would make it harder for Russia to finance its war, save Ukrainian lives and mitigate their suffering. It would show that America was willing to challenge Russia’s energy dominance now and into the future.  Sadly, the very opposite is happening. The U.S. is killing energy transport pipelines, curtailing permitting of refineries and natural gas export facilities, suppressing oil and gas leases and worst of all, stifling longer-term investment in the industry. Driven by an all-encompassing determination to limit CO2 emissions, Europe, and now America, have declared war of fossil fuels. Meanwhile, Russia and China burn oil, gas and coal and emit greenhouse gasses at levels that dwarf the West’s.  Governments in Europe and now in America have utterly failed to see that by suppressing fossil fuels, they are ceding enormous power to countries like Russia, and Iran, China who use those very fossil fuels as a way to strengthen themselves and threaten others.  Energy has been weaponized and the West is in full energy-disarmament mode. The West is forfeiting its ability to gain peace through strength with energy being the all-encompassing weapon in national and alliance arsenals.  The Russian people have experienced far greater suffering when total war was being waged on their own territory and millions perished. This time, the Russian people don’t feel the brunt of the war so the pressure to end it is limited and Russia’s vast fossil fuel revenues are available to continue it, perhaps for years.  It is doubtful that that support for Ukraine from potentially fickle Western democracies could last that long. National economies and nations’ militaries still run on fossil fuels. There is no substitute for fossil fuel dominance, even on a longer-term horizon. To believe and act otherwise is suicidal. It’s the real “existential threat”. Don Ritter holds a Science Doctorate from MIT, was a National Academy of Sciences Fellow in the USSR and speaks fluent Russian, served fourteen years on the House of Representatives’ Energy and Commerce and Science and Technology Committees, served as Ranking Member on the Congressional Helsinki Commission, was the founding Co-Chair of the Baltic States-Ukraine Caucus, and created and led the National Environmental Policy Institute after leaving Congress. He is a founder and President & CEO Emeritus of the Afghan American Chamber of Commerce and  a Trustee of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation (VOC) where he Co-Chairs the Museum Capital Campaign.  

A bipartisan group of House lawmakers introduced legislation on Wednesday to designate Russian mercenary company Wagner Group as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). The Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries (HARM) Act, sponsored by nine members of the lower chamber, would require the State Department to designate the Wagner Group an FTO within 90 days of becoming law. The lawmakers cited the paramilitary company’s history of human rights violations in Africa and ongoing deployment of private soldiers in Ukraine to fight with Russia, adding that the Wagner Group has received weapons from North Korea, a U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism. “Where the Wagner Group operates, atrocities follow,” said Rep. Steve Cohen (D-Tenn.) in a statement. “The HARM Act will identify Putin’s private mercenary group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and let the world know that its activities are both malign and illegal.” The Biden administration designated the Wagner Group as a transnational criminal organization last week and announced countries and entities supporting it would run afoul of the U.S. government. But an FTO designation would authorize the U.S. to slap criminal penalties on entities supporting Wagner Group, according to the lawmakers sponsoring the HARM Act. Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) said in a statement the Biden administration’s designation “does not go far enough” against Wagner, adding it should use the FTO label to “expose them in their true state as a murderous, criminal enterprise.” “The Wagner Group has been engaging in nefarious atrocities around the globe, all at the behest of war criminal Putin and his cronies,” Wilson said. Legislation to designate the Wagner Group an FTO was also introduced last year in both the House and Senate. There was a standoff between the Biden administration and some U.S. lawmakers last year over designating Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism. The administration said the designation, which comes with a raft of restrictions and penalties, could do more harm than good for Ukraine. Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, formed the Wagner Group in 2014. The mercenary outfit has since meddled in conflicts across the world, from Africa to Syria and now Ukraine, where Wagner forces are fighting alongside Russian soldiers in the eastern Donetsk region. DOJ disrupts global ransomware gangTop FDA safety official resigns In November, the European Parliament passed a resolution urging the European Council to adopt a measure that would place Wagner Group on an EU terrorist list. Rep. Ruben Gallego (D-Ariz.), who is vying for a Senate seat in 2024, also sponsored the HARM Act and called for “rebuking mercenary terrorist organizations like the Wagner Group.” “While Ukrainians stand up for freedom and democracy, the Wagner Group stands with authoritarian regimes like Russia,” Gallego said in a statement. “Declaring them a Foreign Terrorist Organization is a commonsense step to hold them accountable for their atrocities in Ukraine and across the globe.”