

# IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

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## HEARING BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

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SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS IN AFGHANISTAN

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DECEMBER 4, 1985

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Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe



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## **PUBLIC HEARING ON SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS IN AFGHANISTAN**

**WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1985**

**COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,**  
*Washington, DC.*

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Independence Avenue and South Capitol Street SW., at 10 a.m., Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato (Chairman) and Representative Steny H. Hoyer (Cochairman) presiding.

In attendance: Commissioners and Senators Gordon J. Humphrey and Dennis DeConcini; Commissioners and Representatives Don Ritter and Christopher H. Smith; and Representative Gary L. Ackerman.

Also in attendance: Michael R. Hathaway, staff director, and Mary Sue Hafner, general counsel of the Commission.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN D'AMATO**

Chairman D'AMATO. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe hearing with respect to Soviet Helsinki Final Act violations in Afghanistan, will come to order.

We have a number of outstanding witnesses appearing before us today who will, we believe, give vivid testimony concerning the genocide that is taking place right now, at this very moment, in Afghanistan. They will provide evidence of torture, mayhem, and murder of Afghanistan's citizens—men, women, and children. These witnesses testimony will be far more eloquent than our statements. Their demonstration of what Soviet aggression has done to them and to their brothers and sisters in their homeland, of the destruction of their homes, of the scattering of their families, and, of course, of the inaction of the free world will present a powerful and deeply tragic story. It would help move us to really respond in a meaningful way to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan.

So, rather than making a 19-page speech, I'm going to ask that my opening statement be submitted in the record as if read in its entirety.

I'm going to ask my colleagues if they would also hold their opening statements to a minimum length so that we can hear from all of our witnesses who are here today.

And I'm also going to ask Congressman Ackerman, who is not a member of the Commission, but who is interested in this, if he'd like to join us for the purpose of making a statement and also take part in today's proceeding.

Congressman, why don't you come up and join us?

And now I turn to Cochairman, Congressman Hoyer, for his opening statement.

[Following is the full text of Chairman D'Amato's statement:]

4 DEC 85

SENATOR ALFONSE D'AMATO  
OPENING STATEMENT  
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE  
HEARING ON  
HELSINKI FINAL ACT VIOLATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

I WANT TO WELCOME YOU TO THE SECOND HELSINKI COMMISSION HEARING ON AFGHANISTAN. THE COMMISSION HELD ITS FIRST HEARING ON THIS SUBJECT IN 1980. ALL OF US HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR A SECOND SUCH HEARING.

WE COME TOGETHER TODAY NEARLY SIX YEARS AFTER THE DECEMBER 25, 1979 SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN HAS WORSENERED DRAMATICALLY SINCE OUR FIRST HEARING.

SINCE THE 1979 SOVIET INVASION, ROUGHLY HALF THE POPULATION OF THE COUNTRY HAS BEEN KILLED, WOUNDED, OR FORCED TO SEEK REFUGE FROM THE WAR. WHILE MOST OF US ARE FULLY FAMILIAR WITH THESE VERY GRIM STATISTICS, A SHORT REVIEW IS IN ORDER TO PLACE THE SITUATION IN PERSPECTIVE.

ALMOST 50,000 FREEDOM FIGHTERS HAVE BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED. APPROXIMATELY 800,000 CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED. ROUGHLY 3.5 MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES HAVE FLED TO PAKISTAN AND 1.5 MILLION TO IRAN. FINALLY, ABOUT 2 MILLION AFGHANS HAVE BEEN FORCED TO FLEE THEIR HOMES IN THE RURAL AREAS AND SEEK SHELTER IN THE CITIES.

DR. LOUIS DUPREE OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY COINED A TERM FOR THIS UNPARALLELED SITUATION -- HE CALLED IT "MIGRATORY GENOCIDE." THAT'S WHAT IS GOING ON IN AFGHANISTAN -- THE DELIBERATE DESTRUCTION OF A PEOPLE, A CULTURE, AND A WAY OF LIFE AS THE RESULT OF SYSTEMATIC APPLICATION OF BRUTAL ARMED FORCE BY THE SOVIET UNION.

OUR WITNESSES THIS MORNING WILL TELL STORIES OF HORROR AND OF HEROISM UNDER THE MOST EXTREME CONDITIONS. THEY HOPE THEIR WORDS WILL FIRE OUR IMAGINATIONS AND STEEL OUR RESOLVE TO SUPPORT THE RESISTANCE AGAINST THIS MOST RECENT SOVIET ATTEMPT TO EXPAND THEIR EMPIRE BY FORCE OF ARMS.

NO WORDS CAN BE SPOKEN AND NO PICTURES CAN BE SHOWN WHICH CAN CONVEY THE FULL IMPACT OF THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN. THE PRESENCE HERE OF FIGHTERS AND JOURNALISTS, OF DIPLOMATS AND LEGISLATORS GIVES US THE OPPORTUNITY TO AGAIN DOCUMENT THE FLAGRANT SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT THEY COMMIT EVERY DAY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR IMPERIAL AMBITIONS.

WE HAVE BEFORE US CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY -- CRIMES SIMILAR TO THOSE WHICH AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II SENT SO MANY OF HITLER'S LIEUTENANTS TO THE GALLOWS. WE HAVE MASS EXECUTIONS IN REPRISAL FOR GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE THE COMMON USE OF TORTURE ON PRISONERS. WE HAVE SUMMARY EXECUTIONS OF GUERRILLAS CAPTURED IN BATTLE. WE HAVE ROUTINE DESTRUCTION OF WHOLE AFGHAN VILLAGES BOTH BY GROUND FORCES AND BY BOMBARDMENT FROM THE AIR, OFTEN WITH THE ENTIRE POPULATION BEING KILLED AS WELL.

THE NAMES OF HITLER'S KILLERS LIVE IN INFAMY -- HIMMLER, HEYDRICH, EICHMAN. THE SITES OF REPRISALS ARE MAINTAINED AS SHRINES SO THAT WE DO NOT FORGET -- DESTROYED VILLAGES LIKE LIDICE WHERE THE NAZIS KILLED 300 CZECHS IN REPRISAL FOR HEYDRICH'S ASSASSINATION.

WILL THE LAGHMAN MASSACRE ALSO LIVE IN INFAMY? WILL THE MORE THAN 300 AFGHAN MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN SLAUGHTERED THERE IN REPRISAL FOR ATTACKS ON THE SOVIET INVADERS BE REMEMBERED? WHAT ABOUT ALL OF THE OTHER DESTROYED VILLAGES, MURDERED INNOCENTS, BURNED MOSQUES, AND MUTILATED CHILDREN?

MORE IMPORTANTLY, WHO IS ASKING FOR THE NAMES AND RANKS OF THE SOVIET OFFICERS WHO ORDERED THE KILLINGS? WHERE IS THE INTERNATIONAL OUTCRY? WHERE IS THE MODERN NUREMBURG



TRIBUNAL SITTING TO RENDER THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIVILIZED WORLD ON THESE MONSTROUS CRIMES?

I HAVE NOTHING BUT PRAISE FOR THE WORK OF DR. FELIX ERMACORA, THE SPECIAL RAPPOREUR OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. WITHIN THE LIMITS IMPOSED UPON HIS WORK BY THE UNITED NATIONS STRUCTURE, HE HAS PRODUCED A SECOND REPORT, EVEN MORE STUNNING THAN THE FIRST, DOCUMENTING CURRENT CONDITIONS IN AFGHANISTAN.

BUT IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT HE NEVER REFERS TO SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN. ALWAYS, IT IS "FOREIGN TROOPS," OR "FOREIGN FORCES." WE MUST BE GRATEFUL THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL IN MAKING CERTAIN THAT THEY WERE NOT NAMED AT ALL IN ERMACORA'S REPORT.

THE UNITED NATIONS VOTED AGAIN, ON NOVEMBER 13TH, FOR THE SEVENTH TIME, IN FAVOR OF A PAKISTANI RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE VOTE WAS 122 IN FAVOR AND 19 AGAINST, APPROVING THE RESOLUTION BY THE LARGEST MARGIN EVER.

THIS VOTE BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE DEBATE ON THE RESOLUTION BEFORE THE VOTE ARE A WEAK SUBSTITUTE FOR A NEW NUREMBURG TRIBUNAL. WE WATCH GENOCIDE UNFOLD BEFORE OUR EYES -- WE HEAR TESTIMONY AND SEE EVIDENCE OF DESTRUCTION ON AN UNIMAGINABLE SCALE -- BUT BECAUSE THE CRIMINAL HAS NUCLEAR

WEAPONS, WE CENSOR OUR EMOTIONS AND MUFFLE OUR CRITICISM SO AS TO SUPPORT AN IMPROVED "ATMOSPHERE" BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

AFGHANISTAN IS NOT THE LEAST OF THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE HELSINKI PROCESS. WE BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION IS VIOLATING PRINCIPLES I, II, VIII, IX, AND X OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS IN BASKET I OF THE FINAL ACT. THESE PRINCIPLES RELATE, RESPECTIVELY, TO: SOVEREIGN EQUALITY, RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS INHERENT IN SOVEREIGNTY; REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE; EQUAL RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES; COOPERATION AMONG STATES; AND FULFILMENT IN GOOD FAITH OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

THE SOVIET UNION IS CLEARLY VIOLATING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF AFGHAN CITIZENS IN THE MOST GROSS AND BARBARIC MANNER. THESE VIOLATIONS ARE SYSTEMATIC, PERVASIVE, AND CONTINUING.

IF THE SOVIETS EXPECT US TO TREAT THEIR WORDS AND THEIR PROMISES AS MEANINGFUL EXPRESSIONS OF THE WILL OF THE SOVIET STATE, THEY MUST CEASE THEIR VIOLATIONS OF THE FINAL ACT AND WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. THEY ARE CURRENTLY PRESSING UPON US AND OUR ALLIES A PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE AS PART OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS AT THE CDE MEETING IN STOCKHOLM -- ONE OF THE SUBSIDIARY PORTIONS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS. INDEED, THIS PRINCIPLE WAS EVEN MENTIONED EXPLICITLY IN THE CONTEXT

OF CDE IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AT THE END OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT.

YET, HOW MUCH TRUST SHOULD WE AND OUR ALLIES PLACE IN THEIR WORD ON THIS ISSUE IF THEY DISREGARD PRINCIPLE 11 OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IN WHICH THEY PROMISED TO "REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE. . ."

THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS THERE HAVE VIOLATED MANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS -- THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND, OF COURSE, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THESE CONTINUING VIOLATIONS ARE LIVING TESTIMONY OF THE REGARD IN WHICH THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION HOLD THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

THESE VIOLATIONS ARE A WARNING TO US. ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF SOVIET DESIRES TO CONCLUDE YET MORE AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES IN MANY FIELDS, WE MUST LEARN TO LOOK BEYOND THEIR WORDS TO THEIR CONDUCT. THEY DISPLAY A CALCULATED DISDAIN FOR THE BASIC NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT. THEY USE INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN OUR RESPECT FOR IT

COMPELS A RESULT TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. THEY IGNORE IT WHEN IT WOULD PREVENT THEM FROM UNDERTAKING ACTS THEY BELIEVE ARE TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. TO THEM, IT'S A WIN-WIN SITUATION.

THERE MUST BE COSTS FOR THEIR CRIMES. WE CANNOT CONVENE A NEW NUREMBURG TRIBUNAL, BECAUSE EVEN THOUGH THE WITNESSES AND THE EVIDENCE OF THE CRIMES ARE HERE, THE CRIMINALS WILL NOT WILLINGLY COME INTO OUR JURISDICTION. WE MUST, HOWEVER, CONVENE A MORAL NUREMBURG TRIBUNAL IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND OUR DIPLOMACY. WE CANNOT DIVORCE OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION FROM THEIR GENOCIDE IN AFGHANISTAN. IF WE DO SO, WE MERELY INSURE THAT THERE WILL BE MORE LIDICES AND MORE LAGHMANS. IF WE DO SO, WE PROVE THAT ALL OF THE HIGH PRINCIPLES WE HAVE SO SOLEMNLY ENSHRINED IN OUR STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WERE LIES -- LIES WE TOLD OURSELVES AND LIES WE TOLD EACH OTHER.

AT THIS POINT, I TURN TO MY DISTINGUISHED CO-CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSMAN STENY HOYER OF MARYLAND, FOR ANY REMARKS HE MAY HAVE.

Cochairman HOYER. Senator D'Amato, I thank you for your opening statement.

I agree that there is ample reason for all of us to make relatively lengthy opening statements to give a chronology of the abuses and human rights violations that are occurring in Afghanistan.

Suffice it to say that the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe has concluded that this matter is certainly within the purview of this Commission and ought to be looked into as deeply as possible. This is an issue that ought to be focused on by the Congress and by the American public. It is important to continue our efforts to assist in any way possible those who are attempting to protect their human rights, and their rights to freedom, and their rights to self-determination in the unhappy land of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union obviously is engaged in a brutal war in Afghanistan in which the primary target is the civilian population. It is a war characterized by extremes, cruelty to civilians, indiscriminate warfare, religious intolerance, and hatred.

Without further amplifying on the statement that I have prepared, which I ask, Mr. Chairman, be included in its entirety in the record at this point. I congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Humphrey, and Congressman Ritter, for focusing on this issue, and welcome the participation of Congressman Ackerman.

Thank you very much.

[Following is the full text of Cochairman Hoyer's statement:]

REPRESENTATIVE STENY H. HOYER  
OPENING STATEMENT  
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE  
HEARING ON  
HELSINKI FINAL ACT VIOLATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

December 4, 1985

ALMOST SIX YEARS AGO, IN DECEMBER 1979, THE SOVIET UNION  
INVADED THE INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN NATION OF AFGHANISTAN. TODAY  
OVER 100,000 SOVIET TROOPS REMAIN AT WAR WITH THE AFGHAN  
PEOPLE. HELSINKI WATCH REPORTS THAT "JUST ABOUT EVERY  
CONCEIVABLE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION IS OCCURRING IN  
AFGHANISTAN." FOUR TO FIVE MILLION HAVE FLED THE BLOODY WAR,  
REPRESENTING ALMOST 1/3 OF AFGHANISTAN'S PREWAR POPULATION.  
ALMOST 75% OF THOSE REFUGEES ARE WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

THE NOVEMBER INTERIM REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN,  
PREPARED BY THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORTS THAT  
DURING NINE MONTHS THIS YEAR "32,755 CIVILIANS WERE REPORTED TO  
HAVE BEEN KILLED, 1,834 HOUSES DESTROYED, 74 VILLAGES DESTROYED  
AND 3,308 ANIMALS KILLED." THERE HAS BEEN DELIBERATE  
DESTRUCTION OF IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND AGRICULTURE. THE  
INTENDED RESULT - FORCED STARVATION.

THE SOVIET UNION IS ENGAGED IN A BRUTAL WAR IN WHICH THE  
PRIMARY TARGET IS THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.. IT IS A WAR  
CHARACTERIZED BY EXTREMES; CRUELTY TO CIVILIANS, INDISCRIMINATE  
WARFARE, RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE, AND HATRED.

THE INVASION AND CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN ARE  
VIOLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT UNDER

WHICH THE PARTICIPATING STATES DECLARED THEIR INTENTION TO CONDUCT THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES IN THE SPIRIT OF THE FINAL ACT. . . RESPECT FOR ANOTHER STATE'S SOVEREIGN EQUALITY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE: REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE: THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS: RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS INCLUDING THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, RELIGION OR BELIEF. . .

PRINCIPLE X OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT STATES THAT INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ARE TO BE SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED. IN 1925 THE GENEVA PROTOCOL WAS SIGNED BANNING THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL GASES. IN 1972, 111 COUNTRIES SIGNED AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION PLEDGING NOT TO DEVELOP, PRODUCE, STOCKPILE OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRE BIOLOGICAL OR TOXIC WEAPONS. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT BOTH THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1925 AND THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY VIOLATED BY THE SOVIET UNION. THESE TRANSGRESSIONS VIOLATE PRINCIPLE X OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

THE COMMISSION'S CONCERNS HOWEVER ARE NOT SIMPLY CENTERED ON THE LEGAL OR POLITICAL TRANSGRESSIONS BY THE SOVIET UNION IN ITS INVASION AND CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. WE ARE MORALLY CONCERNED WITH THE SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS BRUTALITY METED OUT TO A PROUD AND INDEPENDENT PEOPLE. TODAY'S HEARING IS INTENDED TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND TO THE SCRUTINY OF WORLD OPINION THESE ACTS WHICH THREATEN

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION, ADVERSELY AFFECT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THREATEN THE SURVIVAL OF THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN. THE COMMISSION IS INTENT ON ASSURING THE DIGNITY OF ALL PEOPLE.

THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN FOR CONVENING THIS HEARING. IT IS A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE AND THE HEARING IS TIMELY. FIRST SECRETARY GORBACHEV HAS INDICATED A DESIRE FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. THE COMMISSION CERTAINLY SHARES THAT GOAL. HOWEVER IN THE INTERIM THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES MUST STOP. A NATION'S SURVIVAL IS AT STAKE.

Chairman D'AMATO. Congressman Ritter.

Mr. RITTER. I thank the Chairman. I want to thank the Helsinki Commission for its leadership in this issue. The Helsinki Commission has really been out front in bringing the Afghanistan issue to the Congress and to the American people.

I, too, will dispense with a wordy opening statement. I'd simply like to mention that in light of the recent summit, given the testimony that we will hear today, and given the situation in Afghanistan, it is of the utmost hypocrisy for the Soviets to ever even mention the word peace because they are conducting a war, a genocidal war, at the same time—at the very same moment the Soviets are seeking the language of nonuse of force in the CDE meetings currently underway, and this, again, is the utmost in hypocrisy.

So, without further ado, I will yield back to the Chairman and await the very interesting testimony from our witnesses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman D'AMATO. Senator Humphrey.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, I will put my full statement in the record with your permission.

Let me begin by thanking you and Congressman Hoyer, our Co-chairman, for an early hearing on Afghanistan.

There's no question that the abuse of human rights, gross abuse of human rights in Afghanistan by the Soviet Union falls under the purview not only of this Commission, but under the responsibilities of the parties signatory to the Helsinki agreements.

In 1975, those participating states acknowledged that all governments have a responsibility to protect and preserve certain individual rights, not just in Europe, but all over the world. That gives us our jurisdiction in this matter without any question. I commend not only this current leadership of this Commission but past leadership as well, who have on a number of occasions delved into this important subject.



Mr. Chairman, I have a full statement for the record and yield the balance of my time.

[Following is the full text of Senator Humphrey's statement:]

STATEMENT PREPARED FOR SENATOR GORDON J. HUMPHREY  
HELSINKI COMMISSION MEETING  
DECEMBER 4, 1985

GOOD MORNING. I WANT TO THANK CHAIRMAN D'AMATO AND  
CO-CHAIRMAN HOYER FOR HOLDING THIS HEARING ON AFGHANISTAN.  
THEIR COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD IS  
WELL-KNOWN, AND WE ARE FORTUNATE TO HAVE SUCH ABLE LEADERSHIP  
ON THE COMMISSION.

TODAY WE FOCUS ON A TOPIC THAT I CONSIDER INTEGRAL TO  
THE HELSINKI PROCESS AND CRUCIAL TO THE FUTURE OF EAST-WEST  
RELATIONS -- AFGHANISTAN. NOWHERE ON THE FACE OF THE EARTH  
HAS THE SPIRIT AND COMMITMENT OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS BEEN  
BROKEN SO BLATANTLY THAN IN THAT WAR-TORN, DEVASTATED  
COUNTRY. THE SOVIET INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN  
REMINDS US THAT THE TWIN SOVIET GOALS OF EXPANSION AND  
REGIONAL HEGEMONY, WHICH THE WEST ATTEMPTED TO CURTAIL AT  
HELSINKI, HAS BEEN REASSERTED AS DOMINANT THEMES OF SOVIET  
FOREIGN POLICY.

IN 1975, THE PARTICIPATING STATES AT HELSINKI  
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO  
PROTECT AND PRESERVE CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, NOT JUST IN  
EUROPE, BUT ALL OVER THE WORLD. INTERNATIONAL BORDERS AND  
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY WERE NOT TO BE BARRIERS TO THE  
INVESTIGATION OF ABUSES OF THESE RIGHTS. THIS FUNDAMENTAL  
PRINCIPLE UNDERLIES THE HELSINKI ACCORDS AND IS ESSENTIAL TO  
THE HELSINKI PROCESS. THIS HEARING TODAY IS PART OF THE  
UNITED STATES' CONTINUING PERFORMANCE OF ITS OBLIGATIONS AND  
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE HELSINKI ACCORDS.

AS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF  
AFGHANISTAN, THE AFGHAN PEOPLE NO LONGER ENJOY EVEN THE MOST  
BASIC OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE SOVIET AND KARMAL FORCES ARE  
WAGING A TOTAL WAR AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN. THE  
SOVIETS ARE NOT SEEKING SIMPLY THE CAPITULATION OF THE  
RESISTANCE FORCES OR AN END TO THE OPPOSITION. THEY ARE

ENGAGED IN THE WHOLESAL SLAUGHTER OF A PEOPLE AND THE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF A CULTURE. THEIR TACTICS INCLUDE MURDER, TORTURE AND IMPRISONMENT OF INDIVIDUALS; WIDESCALE BOMBING OF VILLAGES AND MASSACRES OF CIVILIANS; IN SHORT, THE TOTAL DESTRUCTION AND DEVASTATION OF WHOLE AREAS OF THE COUNTRY.

THESE ARE NOT SIMPLY THE ISOLATED STORIES OF REFUGEES OR THE PARTISAN ACCOUNTS OF MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION. THE EVIDENCE OF THESE ABUSES HAS BEEN CAREFULLY GATHERED AND VERIFIED BY DR. FELIX ERMACORA, APPOINTED BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS A SPECIAL RAPORTEUR FOR AFGHANISTAN. THE OBJECTIVITY AND IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY IS AT THIS VERY MOMENT BEING SANCTIONED AND DETERMINED BY THE THIRD COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH BEGAN THE CONSIDERATION OF THIS REPORT ON MONDAY AND WHICH WILL VOTE ON FRIDAY WHETHER TO RECOMMEND THE REPORT FOR APPROVAL BY THE ENTIRE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

DR. ERMACORA HAS PREPARED AN UPDATED AND REVISED REPORT NOW BEING ADDRESSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH MAKES FUNDAMENTALLY CLEAR THE DIRECT CORRELATION BETWEEN THE DETERIORATING HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE PRESENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET TROOPS SHORING UP AN UNREPRESENTATIVE AND OPPRESSIVE REGIME. THE SOVIET AND KARMAL FORCES ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE AN ALIEN AND UNACCEPTABLE REGIME ON THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN IS CLEARLY THE REASON FOR THE WAR AGAINST THE COMMUNIST FORCES. DOCTOR ERMACORA'S RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS LATEST REPORT REAFFIRM HIS EARLIER POSITION THAT THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN MUST BE ALLOWED FREELY TO PARTICIPATE IN DETERMINING THE FUTURE OF THEIR NATION AND THEIR GOVERNMENT IF THE WIDESPREAD HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ARE TO BE ENDED. REFERRING TO THE HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL BASES OF AFGHAN SOCIETY, DR. ERMACORA RIGHTLY OBSERVES THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN - AND THIS MEANS SOVIET - TROOPS IS A PRECONDITION TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE SOVIET-BLOC'S UTTER NEGLECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS -- BE IT IN AFGHANISTAN, EASTERN EUROPE OR ANYWHERE ON THE GLOBE, CONTINUES TO BE A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO FULFILLMENT OF THE GOALS OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS. IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS WILL ONLY COME AS A RESULT OF CONTINUED WESTERN PRESSURE AND VIGILANCE. THESE HELSINKI COMMISSION MEETINGS PROVIDE US NOT ONLY WITH THE BENEFITS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE, BUT THEY GIVE US THE OPPORTUNITY TO REAFFIRM OUR TOTAL COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS THAT WE HOLD DEAR.

Chairman D'AMATO. Your statement will be included in the record as if read in its entirety.

Congressman Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very much. Let me also thank the Commission for putting the plight of these peace-loving, freedom-loving people on the front burner of the American agenda, and hopefully to attract more attention of the world media.

I would, if you would allow me a moment or two to address my remarks basically—as I know that we will be hearing directly from people who will point out the tremendous atrocities that are taking place in Afghanistan at the hands of the brutal Soviet invaders—I would like to mention a facility in the city of New York, a facility, Mr. Chairman, that you have visited and seen firsthand, as I have, and spoken to those individuals.

This is basically the story of 33 people, 33 people who love freedom, who want to have their existence unfettered, unimpinged upon by a foreign dominating force, 33 people who, in many instances—and it's a tragic and ironic story because in many instances these 33 people have risked their very lives, their very being to go up against their own Government, which has been co-opted, to go up against the most powerful Eastern army in the world, to risk life and limb in order to have their freedom.

Somehow they have managed to cross over the entire world in search of their dream of peace and freedom to reach what to them and to many millions throughout the world has been the last hope for freedom, the shore of the United States.

Irony upon irony, they wind up in, instead of the land of freedom, they wind up for the first time in their lives in jail, in a cage, behind bars for no other reason than the fact that they neglected

to go to their own repressive Government or to a Soviet tank commander and to ask for proper documentation to leave their own country.

I'd like, if I can, to just take another minute and read to you from an affidavit, if I can, from one of these very young people.

He begins by stating that he is an Afghan national, 16 years of age, and an applicant for political asylum in the United States.

He came here on February 13, 1985. He left school in Afghanistan in 1982 to join the "mujahideen" as an active member. Because he was so young—that would make him, I guess, 12 years old or so at the time. Because he was so young he was able to go through the street bazaar and carry supplies to the resistance.

He goes on in the affidavit to tell of being given an assignment to find out who snitched on some of his friends and caused them to be executed.

Upon—after doing that, his identity was discovered because the person that he found responsible was related to somebody who knew who he was.

He goes on to say that he was able to escape from his country to go to Pakistan, where he was called by his father, who located him, and told him that his brother and cousin had already been killed. Subsequently, another cousin was killed, and that his very life was in danger as there were Soviet agents looking for him in Pakistan.

He goes on to say that he purchased a passport and a plane ticket from a man that he had met. He came to the United States, where he had heard that the Government and the people were familiar with and sympathetic to the problems of refugees all over the world, the country which promised to help the Afghan refugees.

He came here and applied for political asylum, but has been incarcerated instead. He finds it ironic, puzzling, and sad to find himself in jail.

He cannot deal with the fact that he is not free in the land of "Lady Liberty." Why is he imprisoned for fleeing a Communist regime and from torture?

He was supposed to go before a judge for a hearing last month but was informed that the judge was on vacation and, therefore, he will have to wait an indeterminate period.

From this jail and the mental torture he has been put through, it has become clear to him that what he had heard about the United States and what he had hoped for, and what was promised and announced to the world, is not anything other than a dream and propaganda.

He feels that the United States will never extend a helping hand to him. He feels that he will never be free nor be granted political asylum.

Since it seems that there is no hope for him here, he gives up his case and requests that he be sent back to his beloved and invaded country under the Russian torture. Although it is very clear that he will be killed in Afghanistan, he is sure that by his death the poor Afghan people who suffer under the Russian atrocities will recognize the United States' true humanitarian feelings.

Before he dies, however, he will tell them that there is no hope for their safety, and it would be better to be killed by the Russians

before leaving the country and coming to a foreign land where they will face jail, torture, and be treated like animals.

Mr. Chairman, I think that's a very, very distressing message that we hear from this 16-year-old young man. If there's anything that we can do to clear the record to show that this is not the intention of the American people, but rather a misguided policy of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, that we will clear the name of the United States and help a freedom-loving people.

Today, Congressman Lagomarsino and I have released a letter that we have sent over to the President, signed by over 73 Members of the Congress, urging him to step in and to have the Immigration and Naturalization Service use its discretion which it has to parole these people so that they no longer languish for as long as 14 months, as some of them already have.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman D'AMATO. Congressman, thank you for raising this issue at this time. I assure you that the Commission and this Senator will also review what you have brought to us.

We have already petitioned Immigration and Naturalization Service directly for quicker action in these areas.

As you mentioned, these cases are very, very distressing and I think, can and should be avoided through improved U.S. policy.

Now we're going to turn to our witnesses.

Chairman D'AMATO. Mr. Movchan is a former Soviet Army sergeant, who served in Afghanistan. He deserted to the Afghan resistance forces in June 1983. He's Ukrainian by nationality. He's 22 years old. Mr. Movchan arrived in the United States in 1984 and works in New York City.

Mr. Movchan.

Mr. MOVCHAN [statement read by an interpreter]. When I arrived in Afghanistan as a sergeant in the Soviet Army in October 1982, it was not long before all the slogans and appeals of the Soviet leadership lost all meaning for me.

I spent 7 months there in the ranks of the Soviet Army from October 1982-June 1983, and just over 1 year with the "mujahideen," the Afghan freedom fighters, from June 1983-July 1984.

Even before I was called up to serve in Afghanistan, I knew that there was something going on there, even though at that time the Soviet press was completely silent about the military offensive. Like most people in the Soviet Union, I knew that there was a war only from the information brought back by soldiers who had already done their military service there.

I used to meet up with some of the young men who had been there and listened to the stories they told, although as a rule, they did not like to talk about what they had experienced.

I found their behavior strange at that time, and it was only after I had been there myself that I began to understand them. They have time to reflect and realize the implications of what they did in Afghanistan once they return home to more peaceful surroundings. Because there, where they were living targets, where they were involved in real fighting, they concentrated only on how to save themselves. It is difficult for them to admit that they were preserving their own lives at the expense of the lives of the Afghan people.



I had the good fortune not to be involved in any direct combat because the weaponry I was issued with could not be used against the "mujahideen." My rocket-launcher was an antitank weapon, and, of course, the "mujahideen" do not have access to such sophisticated equipment. My platoon was deployed to defend the main headquarters of the regiment.

I heard about the activities of our regiment only from the stories passed around by my colleagues. Officially, we were told nothing.

On one occasion, a village near our base was destroyed and most of the inhabitants were killed by Soviet tanks. Very few escaped. The reason for this attack was because a group of "mujahideen" had ambushed some Soviet soldiers from this position. This type of retaliatory action against the civilian population is the typical response to such "mujahideen" activities.

There were many stories told about atrocities toward the indigenous population. Soviet soldiers and their officers were involved in looting. They robbed the population of anything of value. All of this was hidden away under the official justification that "there are no peace-loving people here; they are all dushmans," the enemy in Afghan.

This type of activity not only went on without any reprimands from the army authorities, but was positively encouraged by giving out awards.

There are two reasons most commonly given by officials to explain the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The first is, to prevent the invasion of the country by foreign powers, that is, United States or Pakistan. The second states that this is the only way to defend the Soviet Union's southern borders.

Even those who believed in the right of the Soviet Union to be in Afghanistan, and there are still a few who do, lose all their desire to remain when they see the reality of the situation.

I heard discontent about the war not only from the ordinary soldiers, but also from the officers. In general, however, although there are feelings of despondency, even the higher ranking officers see that there is no way out of the situation. They feel obliged to continue fighting a war in which they do not believe. They understand, through their own experience, that the Soviet Union is not an adversary that can be easily dismissed.

During the year I was with the "mujahideen," I saw that this is truly a war supported by the whole nation. I saw how joyfully the Afghan people supported the "mujahideen."

When I was in the Soviet Army, the reception was completely different. There were no flowers or grateful smiles as they show on Soviet television. Throughout my 7 months in the Soviet ranks, I saw no gratitude from anyone in Afghanistan. No one thanked us for our fraternal assistance nor for the bloodshed we caused.

I grew to realize that the whole country has risen in the struggle for its defense, and, ironically, it is only in this context that the quote, "there are no peace-loving people among the Afghans," makes sense.

The Afghans have not remained indifferent to their fate when their freedom as a nation has been threatened and when justice has been violated. The group of turncoats who have hidden themselves in Kabul, behind a wall of Soviet tanks, cannot be included

in these references to the Afghan people. These are the sentiments I heard and learned to experience during the time I spent with the Afghans.

The tragedy of Afghanistan has two sides for consideration. The Afghan people have suffered tremendous losses, and, I feel very humble in trying to convey to you in my own words the suffering that they have experienced. I can say only that the magnitude of the grief that the Soviet Army has brought to Afghanistan is felt by each Afghan to the depths of his soul.

The second consideration involves the plight of the young Soviet soldiers, who are being used as cannon fodder by the Soviet leadership, to fight for a cause in which they do not believe.

I have tried to give you a brief description of what is happening in Afghanistan from my own experiences and observations. The tragedy of Afghanistan cannot compare with any other crisis now taking place in the world in terms of the cruelty that is being inflicted on the people.

But there is yet another tragedy of a lesser dimension which I would also like to bring to your attention. It is the plight of Soviet POW's in Afghanistan. No one knows for certain how many there are, but I believe that there are several hundred such prisoners. Some of them were captured, but many of them, like myself, left the Soviet Army voluntarily.

Historically, the Soviet POW has been treated as a traitor in the Soviet Union. Many Soviet POW's now in Afghanistan do not want to return to the U.S.S.R., partly for fear of what may happen to them. I know that there are some who want asylum in the West, especially in the United States.

Here are the names of four Soviet Army defectors who have asked for asylum in America—Sergei Meshcheryakov, Grisha Suleymanov, Fyodor Khasanov, and Akram Fayzulayev. Their written request for asylum was brought out of Afghanistan by Ludmilla Thorne, a representative of Freedom House, in 1983. But, unfortunately, in spite of many efforts, these four young men are still in Afghanistan and not here. I have a copy of their asylum request which I can show you.

More recently, Vladislav Naumov, Sergei Busov, and Vadim Plotnikov have also expressed the desire to come to the West. Plotnikov, by the way, has close relatives living near Boston.

These are only a few of the names of Soviet POW's that are known to us. I know numerous others, but time does not permit me to list them all. There are many POW's whose names are not known. But if they have taken the crucial step of defecting from the Soviet Army, you can be sure it is because they no longer wish to be a part of the unjust and dirty war in Afghanistan. They surely deserve our support.

In the whole tragedy of Afghanistan, this is something small that America can do to help. I sincerely ask that you do everything in your power to help them make their way to America.

Thank you for inviting me to come here and for allowing me to share some of my thoughts with you.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you very much, and, we'll have some questions for Mr. Movchan. Hamed is a member of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan. He's 22 years old. He joined the free-

dom fighters at age 17. He drives an ambulance and fights in Afghanistan. He has also accompanied many American journalists covering the resistance.

Hamed.

HAMED. In the name of Allah, the beneficent, the merciful, the all-seeing, the all-forgiving, the all-sustaining. First of all, I thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to talk to you about the forgotten land of Afghanistan, where the Communists are committing inhuman acts, atrocities, killing innocent people indiscriminately and randomly, also committing genocide.

Let me tell you something about the atrocities which have been committed by the Soviets in different places.

Last year, about 200 innocent children were kidnaped in Farah Province, which is to the north of Afghanistan, and nobody knows about their fate.

In Wakhan Province, 10 women, whose houses were bombed, and were proceeding to another village for shelter, were confronted by the Soviet soldiers and brutally killed.

Similarly, 60—about 60 children who were reading the Holy Koran early in the morning, in one of the mosques, in one of the provinces, in one of the villages, were bombed by jet fighters. They were all killed on the spot.

Similarly, you might be aware of the mass killings and massacre about the Baghlan Province and Kunyar Province as well. They massacred the people.

In areas called Hannabad and Monsahib, they killed the people randomly. The same in Laghman Province, a few months back, they killed the people randomly there, and massacred. They killed everybody, human beings, everybody.

The Communists are using incendiary bombs, boobytraps, and toy bombs, which have been banned by the Geneva Convention, and they do it deliberately. They have used everything except nuclear bombs. Tens of thousands of people have been maimed by these mines, mostly innocent children. Nearly 2 million have been killed due to brutal and inhuman acts of the occupation forces. Many more have been imprisoned for political purposes, given electric shocks, and tortured severely. They have suffered permanent physical and mental damage. Many more have been jailed without charges.

The Soviets have destroyed the agricultural infrastructure and irrigation system of my country. They have killed the livestock so that the people are going hungry.

The freedom fighters also have little food and rarely have proper clothing. Most of them wear only sandals on their feet in the winter, and, the Afghan winter is terribly cold. I have seen many of my colleagues whose feet were bleeding or who were suffering from frostbite.

Lack of ammunition and appropriate weapons are also a major concern to us. We are fighting against a superpower that is using the latest helicopter gunships, more advanced than the ones used in Vietnam, jet fighters, tanks, chemical and biological weapons, and other sophisticated weaponry.

I have seen many brave commandos and freedom fighters killed. It's not because the Soviets are better fighters, but its because we do not have effective weapons to fight with.

I have seen many people shelled by armor plated helicopters. Innocent children have been picked up by the Soviet troops in helicopters and dropped to their deaths from high altitude, and yet, we can do nothing against this but watch and pray.

In refugee camps in Pakistan, the conditions under which the Afghans live are horrible. There are food and water shortages.

The weather in Pakistan in the summer is extremely hot, sometimes as high as 130°. Many refugees suffer heatstrokes. Children are dying from thirst. I've particularly seen many children die from thirst, from diseases like dysentery, malaria, and others which are rampant in these refugee camps, from classic malnutrition. I have seen this myself.

In winter, they're housed mainly in tents. The refugees suffer from the terrible cold. In addition to this, there are many who don't have tents and who go without shelter for months and suffer.

The relief agencies that are based in Pakistan, like the Inter-Aid Committee, are doing their best and have been providing the newly arrived refugees with temporary shelter. But they are dealing with the largest group of refugees in the world, and the logistical problems are enormous.

You should remember and understand that the refugees who are in Pakistan are equal to the population of Israel and New Zealand. You are dealing with that number, which we are grateful for.

In spite of all these difficulties, the Afghans who have battled for freedom throughout history have been resisting the world's most sophisticated, barbaric, and ruthless army for 6 years. That has not been easy.

The West should know that the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan is not only destroying my country and slaughtering my people, it's also a threat to the free world.

If this imperialist power is not defeated in Afghanistan, it will be impossible to stop the offensive army elsewhere in the world. If the Soviet Union reaches the warm water ports of the Persian Gulf, they can control the oil supply to the West and Japan and severely damage the economies of these countries.

The free world must realize that the current Afghan war is not against the Afghans alone. It's a war for the security of the region, neighboring countries, and, indeed, for the stability of the rest of the world.

Thank you.

Chairman D'AMATO. Tor.

TOR. In the name of Allah the beneficent and merciful. At first, I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to talk about a country which has never been under the yoke of any power so far, and has shed its blood for freedom throughout its history. We will continue this holy struggle until we have our beloved homeland free from the hand of the aggressors.

My name is Torially Khanjar, a freedom fighter and assistant doctor. I would like to talk to you about the medicine situation in my country.

The biggest problem which we have is lack of medicine inside of Afghanistan and in the refugee camps.

On the one hand, our people are being killed by the cruel Red army. On the other hand, they will die from communicable and infectious disease due to the nonavailability of medicine.

There is no one to give these unarmed people medication, to do this job.

Two months ago, we were passing a village which was located southeast in Afghanistan. It was a small village, 20 families, with almost 50 children, who were 1 to 12 years old.

When the people came to know about me being an assistant doctor, I was surrounded by the people. When I entered the bombed house, I saw small children suffering from different diseases and, classic malnutrition.

In 1 week's time, 12 of those children had died and the others were in critical condition. Unfortunately, I had no medicine with me to relieve them the pain, other than a small amount which I had applied to the wounds of the other freedom fighters.

Everybody was asking me for medicine. I had no alternative but to watch and pray.

When we were leaving this village at night, there was screaming in the house next to us. I came to know that two more children died—that is the problem.

I came back, and I reported the situation for our political organization, which is based in the Province. They provided a small, small amount of money which they had, and I purchased some antibiotics and analgesic medicine.

It was a time when I was told to go to the south part of Afghanistan. A big force of Russia had come.

When I go to it, the fighting was again fierce. The medicine which I had with me didn't last more than 1 hour.

After that, I saw a young freedom fighter who had his arm cutoff sharply. He was bleeding. I immediately cutoff a piece of cloth from my clothes, wrapped his arm, and stanchd his blood temporarily.

I told his friend who was in the same trench with him to ask him out from the fighting.

They got him only 10 meters from the trench, and he didn't want to leave his friend, he wanted to continue fighting and continue the fight.

When I watched him, his blood came again, and he was in a coma. I again tried to work as hard with another piece of cloth, but I know that he would die. And he too said, "God is great," and said, "Freedom, freedom." He died.

The fighting was for the full day. The freedom fighters fought without food. They were drinking only water with some piece of bread which was collected from the village.

They said that during this some were wounded. For the wounded, I had no serum. I gave just two spoons of salt and one spoon of sugar and water that they were drinking.

When they were drinking this thing, some of them were vomiting again.

There were hardly any donkeys, or horses for transporting the wounded. There were no available vegetables to eat. The freedom

fighters carried most of the wounded on their shoulders. Some of the wounded died before they could receive treatment. Carrying them on their shoulders was very shaky and unsteady.

If we had an ambulance, we could save many wounded freedom fighters' lives.

Three years ago, inter-aid committee, which is the basis—it's a relief committee, they do not ask ambulance. And we save many people's lives. The ambulances don't—so much—and it falls apart when hard shaken. So much it's climbing on the mountain, and you know, one ambulance is not enough for all Afghanistan.

You have to judge it yourself. I call for all freedom-loving countries to help us in this struggle just for freedom.

Thank you very much.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you very much.

So that we will have time to hear our other panelists, Jan Goodwin and Kurt Lobek, both journalists who extensively traveled in and covered the ongoing situation in Afghanistan, I'm going to ask our members of the Commission to attempt to limit their questions. Let's not duplicate each other's questions, so that we can hear both panel No. 2 and also our third panel, Ambassador Gerald Helman and Ambassador Schifter.

I'm going to attempt to limit my questions to just a few minutes. I would appreciate that same undertaking from the other members of the Commission.

Mr. Movchan, were you given any instructions in terms of the treatment of the captured "mujahideen" or of civilians suspected of aiding them?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. As I said at the beginning, I wasn't in military operations myself.

As far as I know, the soldiers are told to be on the lookout where the civilian population is and where the guerrillas are.

But, in practice, the soldiers close their eyes to this during operations, and they would simply shoot at anything, and they would receive awards for this.

Of course, when there are widespread operations involving heavy equipment, such as tanks and planes, certainly these orders must come from the top. Soldiers aren't authorized to do things on their own in this regard.

Chairman D'AMATO. How is that you came to defect? How did you do that and why?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. I left the Soviet Army because there was a possibility to do so.

At the exact moment of defection, I really don't know what happened. It just kind of did. But the larger reason would be that I didn't like serving in the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.

Chairman D'AMATO. Congressman Ritter.

Mr. RITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I would like to thank the witnesses for their excellent testimony.

I'd like to follow up with Mr. Movchan on the question of Soviet soldiers who have defected or who have been captured.

In paragraph 2 of your statement, there's a comment here on the Soviet soldiers. It is difficult for them to admit that they were preserving their own lives at the expense of the lives of the Afghan people.

In another place—and I'd like to put forward a question. Is it possible that we could have more Soviet soldiers make that admission?

In paragraph 2, page 2, you talk about even the high ranking officers seeing that there is no way out of the situation.

Is there a possibility that we could be more creative in offering a policy to encourage a way out of the situation?

In terms of Soviet POW's being treated as traitors in the Soviet Union, is it possible that information could be transmitted to the Soviet soldiers that would provide some incentive for either not going back or defecting with the idea that if they were captured and were a POW, they would be severely treated at home?

You talk about four Soviet defectors who were brought out by Ludmilla Thorne of Freedom House, who to this day have not received asylum in the United States; and others who also have expressed similar desire.

You say, then, surely, they deserve our support; and your closing paragraph is, I think, very insightful.

In the whole tragedy of Afghanistan, there is something small that America could do to help. I sincerely ask you to do everything in your power to help them make their way to America.

I'd like to know from you, What could be done in order to create a pipeline of defectors out of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan? What could we be doing to further demoralize Soviet troops?

A Soviet troop soldier who defects is far more valuable than a Soviet soldier who is killed. Because he is not only not there killing Afghans, he also serves as an example to his compatriots.

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. Of course there are possibilities to encourage them to come.

Mr. RITTER. Could you please speak more directly into the microphone? Thank you.

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. Of course there are possibilities to encourage them to come. But we must first address ourselves to those who are captured already.

The soldiers that are serving in Afghanistan, if they hear over our international broadcasts about Soviet soldiers who have, indeed, made it here, and once the number of those soldiers increases, there will be more encouragement for Soviet soldiers in the ranks of the Soviet Army to actually come over.

Mr. RITTER. Is there a radio communication that the Soviet soldiers receive in Afghanistan at the present time that gives the opposite side of their Government's policy?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. He says officially there are none, but in operations the soldiers might have Japanese radios, shortwave radios, which they use to listen to foreign broadcasts.

These foreign broadcasts very often go through the grapevine among Soviet soldiers.

Mr. RITTER. Would a stronger communications effort and an effort to provide asylum in the United States, in your opinion, would this markedly increase the flow of Soviet defectors in Afghanistan?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. He would like to remind you that there are soldiers that are waiting for 2 years now, that are waiting to come to the West.

He has the statement with regard to this matter, and he would like me to read it in English. This was to Ludmilla Thorne.

Ludmilla Thorne: Dear Lucia, We did not have the opportunity to speak with you on a one-to-one basis. But you, who are Orthodox Christians, must help us to make our way to America.

P.S. I hope that you will help us in our striving to come to America. We want to become American citizens. Signed, Sergei Meshcheryakov, Grisha Suleymanov, Fedor Khasanov, and Akram Fayzulayev.

Chairman D'AMATO. It would seem to me, Congressman, that that raises a question of what would seem to be an obvious failure on the part of the administration to properly handle the issue of asylum for Soviet POW's or those Soviet soldiers who defect. We should ask Ambassador Helman about this and attempt to get an explanation as to why this policy issue still exists after 5 years of the war in Afghanistan.

There are probably very few of our colleagues who have this information. I have to confess it's the first time someone's come to me or come to my knowledge, to the Commission and provided this information. At least it's the first that I'm aware of it.

We're going to ask that question. I think it most appropriately lies with our last panel.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, I agree completely.

I would just like to propose that the Helsinki Commission take a leadership role in assisting this administration, or the requisite powers that be, to formulate a policy.

Chairman D'AMATO. You mean in trying to put some spine into the State Department?

Mr. RITTER. That is in the gentleman's words. But, yes, I think—

Chairman D'AMATO. I'm noted for understatement.

Mr. RITTER. I think that this country has a real responsibility; one, to provide asylum to these Soviet Army defectors, and, two,—

Chairman D'AMATO. All right. Let's build a case.

Mr. RITTER [continuing]. To devise a forward-thinking policy that encourages communication with Soviet Army troops, encourages an underground railroad of defectors, and from within, removes the morale and the fighting forces from Afghanistan.

I thank the Chairman.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you, Congressman.

Senator Humphrey has requested, if we could have a copy of that communique, making the plea from your four comrades who are looking for political asylum here in the United States—and we'd like to make that letter part of the official record. [See app. 1.]

Senator Humphrey.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to address a few more questions to Mr. Movchan about the situation with defectors.

Mr. Movchan, in the mind of Soviet soldiers, what kind of reception do they expect from the "mujahideen" if they choose to defect? What sort of treatment do they expect?



Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. In reality, the Soviet soldier thinks that "mujahideen" will not allow him to live.

But when I defected, the Soviet—the "mujahideen"—there were already—the word was out that they were treating Soviet defectors a bit more kindly.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Do the Soviet officers and leadership tell the Soviet soldiers that they will be killed if they defect, killed by the "mujahideen?"

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. Of course. That's a way of preventing desertions.

He says that you have to understand the context, that later on they changed their tack somewhat and they said that it's worse, that if one man falls into the hands of Soviets—into the hands of the "mujahideen," than if they kill a hundred Soviet soldiers.

Mr. HUMPHREY. For reasons of—

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. He's saying that if the Soviet soldier comes to the "mujahideen" side alive then he'll be able to tell about the justness of their cause and that the Soviet Union will fall into a bad light as a result.

Mr. HUMPHREY. So, in other words, the officers, the Soviet officers, have changed tactics from merely telling the soldier they would be killed at the hands of the "mujahideen" and now are saying that it is, in a way, a betrayal of their colleagues. Is that the message?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. No; he says the—that officially they still say they will be killed.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. But the word is out that you'll be treated more kindly. The word among the soldiers.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes; all right. Fine.

What can the "mujahideen" do?

We've heard what the United States and other Western nations can do in the way of more readily extending asylum.

What can the "mujahideen" do to encourage more Soviet defections?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. He says, in this particular case, the "mujahideen" are doing more in this regard than the West.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. He says that at this time there are several hundred there. He was one of them; and he can say from his own experience that the "mujahideen" treated him well.

With the exception of a few groups, most of them treat deserters well, and this encourages further defections.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Fine.

I want to ask Mr. Movchan about his own experience here in this country.

What—has he been treated sympathetically? Well, let me back up.

What contact has he had with U.S. agencies, State Department, CIA, and other agencies? What contact has he had with those agencies?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. Honestly, no connection with these agencies.

Mr. HUMPHREY. So, in other words, after his arrival here, he was ignored by the U.S. Government? Is that correct?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. He says that his was an exceptional case. There have been very few cases such as his. That he would prefer not to talk about the way he came here—

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. MOVCHAN [continuing through an interpreter]. That you can find out about this from government sources.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I understand. But I'm simply trying to—to establish for the record what efforts our Government has made to help Mr. Movchan in his resettlement here.

Has there been any offer of assistance of any kind from our Government?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. He says, when the four of them first came here, Freedom House and the International Rescue Committee helped him out.

Mr. HUMPHREY. But there was no help extended from U.S. Government, is that correct, or offered?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. Besides these organizations, no; no one.

Mr. HUMPHREY. All right.

Some of Mr. Movchan's colleagues have since returned to the Soviet Union have they not? Were they from his group or were they from another?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. He says there were two groups. The first consisted of two. The second consisted of four, in which he was in. One returned subsequently; and that was Rishkov.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Can Mr. Movchan tell us why that colleague returned? Was it through any—any shortfall on the part of our Government in offering assistance, or sympathy, or—why—why did he return? Was it some fault of ours that he returned?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. He says he saw him only a few times, and only very briefly at that.

He says that people are different, and that he had a tough time settling down here and getting accustomed to new ways.

After 20 years, it's difficult to get accustomed to a new country and to be away from your loved ones.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That's precisely my point; and my question is, Should there be some effort on the part of the U.S. Government to assist these defectors and, hopefully, the great many more who would come if we had an active policy in that direction?

That's my point. It's difficult to readjust. Is there something that we should be doing for these and for others who will come?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. Rishkov did receive assistance, not governmental assistance, but he did. But, once again, there are different people and, he just couldn't settle down here. He didn't want to learn here. This was not the place for him.

There are different types of people, and you have to be prepared for the possibility that some of them will return. There are some

people that will crawl into a noose of their own accord if only for the small chance that they'll see their loved ones again.

In the case of Rishkov, too, in England, it's likely that the Soviet Union played a role in their return.

I have no proof for this, but that's what I think.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, before my time expires—perhaps it has. But, in any event, let me very quickly ask our Afghan witnesses a question or two about medical conditions which they seem well qualified to answer.

I understand, for reasons of security or preference, we're using first names.

Hamed, has the flow of medical supplies improved at all, let us say, over the last year, last 2 years?

You describe—each of you describe an urgency, a situation of unspeakable suffering.

Has the flow of medical supplies improved at all?

HAMED. It's his field. He can answer.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Fine; thank you.

Tor?

TOR. Yes; we have inside of our garrison a medical clinic. The first time the Russians came for a look at the clinic, they bombarded it, and they're trying to destroy it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I'm sorry. We can't hear. Will you speak a little louder, please?

TOR. The first time the Russian helicopters came and there is an attack there on that place, bombarding the first clinic. And the Afghans want to improve the medicine because that's the first problem.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

TOR. When we have more medicine we can treat our wounded and we can save more lives.

Mr. HUMPHREY. You describe a situation in which you have no medicines—

TOR. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREY [continuing]. No equipment.

TOR. You know, we—

Mr. HUMPHREY. Is it getting any better?

TOR. We have—OK. We have some clinic in some part of Afghanistan.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

TOR. Since the medicine is finished, the clinic is just like a house. If the clinic is out of medicine, that's a big problem. We have just some medicine, that is not enough for all, all parts of Afghanistan; and today we have this problem.

Sometimes, the relief agency—or the other countries—help us with medicine. That medicine is not so much a problem. For example, the help for us, in the area of something like this—the medicine, the medicine to treat need; and that's not received for us.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Thank you.

Chairman D'AMATO. I want to acknowledge that Senator DeConcini is here. There is a vote in progress in the Senate right now. That's why he is leaving.

Congressman Hoyer, I'm going to leave to go over and vote, and then I'll return. So, Congressman, would you continue to——

Cochairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm going to ask just a few questions, and I'm going to try to be brief so that we can hear all the panelists, because one of our problems in past hearings is that we spend a lot of time on questions and statements of our own and don't hear as much from the witnesses as we would like.

Mr. Movchan, if I may, in your statement you alluded to this, but what was the policy of your leadership with respect to treatment of the civilian population in Afghanistan, and most particularly to the military efforts against civilian population?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. As I mentioned in my statement, there are no peace-loving people in Afghanistan.

He says but they did pay at least lipservice to humanitarian concerns and, during military operations, they said keep an eye out on the civilian population.

But, on the other hand, in practice, the officers and the soldiers knew that the more atrocities you commit the more you'll be rewarded.

Cochairman HOYER. Hamed and Tor, we hear a lot about disagreements among the Afghan freedom fighters, factionalism, that is, different groups disagreeing on how the war is being conducted.

Have you had an opportunity to see how serious a problem it is, if it is, in fact, a problem?

HAMED. In the past, we had some slight differences and problems, but we have solved them now.

Recently, we have formed a coalition and reports are being made to bring about a complete unity. The freedom fighters have consolidated their ranks.

As far as I know, being involved, you know, for 6 years, and operating in different parts of Afghanistan, I have never seen freedom fighters having internecine fightings.

And, now, there is more coordination, collaboration, and cooperation between them. They plan battles together. They fight together. They borrow weapons from each other when they need.

Jan Goodwin, who is a journalist, went with us. We took her inside Jalalabad. She will describe how they borrowed weapons from each other, how cooperative they were, but with little means.

Cochairman HOYER. From your perspectives, Hamed and Tor, has the ability of the freedom fighters in Afghanistan improved in recent months?

HAMED. The freedom fighters have been successful in all their operations, besides being on very unequal footings, that being disproportionate. I mean we have been successful but with little means. We are quite, you know, capable of using any guns. But, unfortunately, we don't have them available.

Cochairman HOYER. Now, when you say you don't have them available, what I'm really getting at is, has your ability to resist increased or decreased in recent months or in the past year?

HAMED. We have increased.

Cochairman HOYER. Decreased?

HAMED. No; we have increased over——

Cochairman HOYER. Increased.

HAMED. Yes.

Cochairman HOYER. Tor, do you agree with that assessment?

TOR. Yes.

Cochairman HOYER. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HAMED, I have a few questions. Or Tor, if either of you would like to address these issues.

As you know, the summit in Geneva spent a great deal of time discussing arms control issues, although one of the areas of lengthy discussion between President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev was in trying to define the term "regional conflicts." Thus, Nicaragua, certainly Afghanistan come to mind.

There's a growing perception on the part of, I think, many Americans that the Soviets are looking for some way to dislodge themselves from Afghanistan, since they have suffered a great number of losses and casualties. It was not an easy operation as they had envisioned early on. Certainly the freedom fighters have been very, very steadfast and tremendous and courageous battlers.

Do you have any realistic hope, in light of the summit and the prospect of ongoing discussions with the Soviets, that some framework will be worked out so that a political solution can be reached in this situation?

HAMED. I would say, I hope they could create a solution for such a problem, but I don't think so.

We greatly appreciate President Reagan's intention for raising the Afghan issue, as he's raised it all the time.

But I don't think so—the other side—Mr. Gorbachev would ever come—would ever arrive to an understanding.

Because he had already said that that's a regional issue, it's not worth discussing. Whenever they have—the United Nations, whenever they have discussed Afghan problems, whenever they have condemned Russian intervention in Afghanistan, in retaliation they have increased killing innocent people, civilian people, they have intensified their offensives and fighting. I don't think he will—he's willing to discuss the Afghan issue and solve it amicably.

Mr. SMITH. To the best of your knowledge, has the use of chemical agents been on the rise, remained steady, or diminished in the last year?

HAMED. Yes; of course, they have been using this for a long time in Afghanistan, chemical and biological weapons, and, as I mentioned before, boobytraps, toy bombs shaped like pens, and parrots. They have been using this deliberately.

They have already broken the Geneva Convention. They have never had respect for human lives.

Mr. SMITH. Hamed, do your fellow leaders feel that the commitment of the United States is longstanding and will continue into the future or will diminish? Is there any concern that we say at some point not follow through on our commitments?

HAMED. We consider Afghanistan, you know—this is not only our cause. It's an American cause, too. We share the same ideals. We both believe in freedom. We are both opposed to Communists and, we only need their humanitarian and military assistance. We don't need manpower. We don't need U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. We

can fight our own war. We only need the material support, political support, and diplomatic support.

Mr. SMITH. Have the other Western allies been supportive?

HAMED. I wouldn't say effectively.

Mr. SMITH. Not effectively.

How about the other Islamic republics, particularly in the Middle East?

HAMED. We receive some support, mostly relief supplies, and some weapons. I would say they're not the weapons designed against the helicopters or jet fighters which we really suffer from. I mean they are not effective weapons. We need something effective. We need surface-to-air missiles to counteract their sophisticated weaponry.

As I mentioned before, I have seen many freedom fighters killed, leaders, just killed in desperation by these armor-plated helicopters.

They might have survived those chances, but they didn't have weapons to fight.

There are refugees in Pakistan who are willing to go back so that they could fight the Communists, but they don't have weapons. They are begging for weapons. The same in Afghanistan. Almost one-quarter of a million are armed. There are hundreds of thousands of others who are not armed and are just asking for weapons so that they could fight the common enemies.

You do understand how disappointing for the freedom fighter it is who wants to fight the Communists while not having weapons.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for your comments. Your point was very well taken.

I do have one question for Mr. Movchan.

To the best of our knowledge, Mr. Movchan, at least five Soviet defectors have apparently voluntarily returned to the Soviet Union. British newspapers indicate that perhaps two were shot.

Could you give us some idea of why they might have returned? Perhaps it was a pressure put on the families. What could induce them to return knowing of their probable fate if they so chose?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. He's questioning the number, first of all. He's saying that if you count all of them, including the ones in Switzerland, there are probably more.

Of the three that were here and the two in England, there probably was pressure put both on the family and on them. The Soviet leadership puts this pressure on because the issue of defectors in Afghanistan is a pin in their side, a thorn in their side.

Mr. SMITH. How do they make contact?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. They receive letters, from their letters, very often in which the family writes asking them to come back, but there's no way of knowing who really wrote those letters.

Mr. SMITH. I see.

Is there any evidence that families within the Soviet Union have suffered job loss, perhaps imprisonment, interrogation that you know of?

Mr. MOVCHAN [through an interpreter]. As far as I know, there are no such practices going on. But they carry on so-called long discussions with the family in which they lay pressure for them to

have their sons return and, if not, then they might ask them to disclaim their sons.

Mr. SMITH. OK. Thank you.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Cochairman HOYER. Mr. Chairman, before we conclude, I'd like to thank Mr. Fedynsky, who is, I believe, Ukrainian or of Ukrainian background.

Mr. FEDYNSKY. Ukrainian. Born in Pennsylvania.

Cochairman HOYER. Born in Pennsylvania.

Don Ritter should be here. He would cheer. Thank you for the excellent job you've done.

Mr. FEDYNSKY. Thank you.

Cochairman HOYER. I also want to point out that we have before us two very young people, 22 and 20, I believe, who have given very substantive and compelling testimony. I know you share my thanks for their being with us and for sharing information with the Commission.

Chairman D'AMATO. Congressman, we sincerely appreciate the firsthand accounts that we get from those who have seen the tragedy in Afghanistan. I think it will help this Commission, and hopefully the Members of the Congress and the administration, in formulating some more humane programs to deal with this situation.

As limited as we may be, I think there is much more that we can do.

We thank you for your testimony. I believe that it will result in some action by this committee.

Thank you very much.

Our next panel consists of two people who are absolutely renowned for their professional expertise.

They will testify to the horrors and tragedies that are unfolding in Afghanistan. It is so important that the world have an opportunity to see the truth with the vision and the eloquence of a writer and reporter like Jan Goodwin and a film journalist like Kurt Lobek. We deeply appreciate your being with us today to give to us your insights on what is taking place in Afghanistan and what we, the United States of America—I'm going to ask you this so that if you don't address it in your prepared testimony, you might want to comment on it—what we should be doing.

We'd all appreciate your comments and your insight.

Ms. Goodwin, Jan Goodwin. Thank you for being with us, Jan.

Ms. GOODWIN. Good morning. Thank you for inviting me.

Four weeks ago, I returned from a 3-month trip inside Afghanistan, where I traveled through 10 provinces with the freedom fighters.

This was my second trip to Afghanistan. The last one was a year ago. The changes in that year are extremely tragic.

As you know, in the 6 years since the Soviet invasion, half the Afghan population has either been forced to flee or has been killed. This year, however, the Soviets have dramatically stepped up the war. One major offensive has led into another, and another, and another, without respite.

The Red Cross hospital in Peshawar, Pakistan, has taken unprecedented numbers of war wounded. They've had tents and wall-to-

wall beds on every spare inch of ground. Even casual visitors are pressed into donating badly needed blood.

The Soviet escalation is aimed at closing the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, in an effort to cut off "mujahideen" movement and their supply lines.

To illustrate what life is like inside Afghanistan in 1985, let me share with you a couple of my own experiences.

One of them took place inside Paktia Province, which was the site of the largest Soviet offensive this summer.

I first saw Jezi, the valley there, last year. It was a beautiful alpine region with fertile valleys, stately forests, and towering peaks.

Thirteen months later, I stood there again as the Jezi peace was shattered by the scream of wave after unrelentless wave of Mig fighters, the barrage of 500-pound bombs tearing up the countryside, the thudding of constant shells.

For 24 hours a day, the earth beneath us shook in this carpet bombing attack. This massive bombardment continued for 3 days and 3 nights as the Soviet Forces pushed toward the border.

When I left that valley, I turned around and looked back at Jezi. As I did, I realized, my God, this is what nuclear winter is going to look like. Those stately forests had gone, the mountain sides were bare, blackened, charred, victim to incendiary bombs and napalm. There wasn't a human or an animal moving. The ghost of that valley is a microcosm for much of Afghanistan today.

There is also a second incident, which is very different, but it's just as shocking.

I was in an Afghan refugee camp in Pakistan having a meal with six men. I don't remember what we ate that day, but I do know that the main course was sorrow.

Each of those six men, were survivors of the Laghman massacre in which more than 300 people in their village were slaughtered by the Soviets in a reprisal attack on civilians. Each of them had lost their wives and every one of their children, and some of those men had had eight or nine youngsters.

The children, one as young as 16 days, were lucky if they died with a simple bullet through the head—most did not. Some of them were used for what appeared to be bayonet practice, others were burned alive. The last time I heard of practices such as these, it was in Pol Pot's Cambodia.

While these six men did survive the massacre, physically, emotionally, they are broken people.

Massacres like Laghman, where Soviets carry out brutal reprisals on innocent civilians are becoming more and more frequent, more and more barbaric.

When word leaked out that I and a resistance official were traveling through Ghazni Province, the specific villages through which we passed were devastated by helicopter gunship bombing and heavy shelling. The children that I played with one day, were dead the next.

How are the Afghans equipped to fight back one of the most sophisticated armies on Earth? I think I can best answer that when I tell you that Western journalists are better equipped than they are. Commanders would borrow my binoculars because they didn't



have any of their own. I was invariably the only one with a sleeping bag, boots, or even a water bottle and this is one of the toughest terrains in the world and one of the most arid. I was always the only one carrying painkillers.

Resistance member Tor, here this morning, is a trained paramedic. He's begged relief agencies for medications to take inside Afghanistan, mostly without success.

You can ask him how it feels to be faced with a malnourished and sick child and have nothing stronger than vitamin C to give that child. You can ask him how it feels to operate on a wounded freedom fighter's knee and know that he's got nothing stronger than aspirin to dispense.

I witnessed these two incidents and I witnessed many similar ones. As I did, I kept remembering the State Department official who was explaining to me why the \$2 million appropriated for medical care inside Afghanistan was being spent in Pakistan instead. "There's no point in sending such aid inside," he told me. "The Afghans are an uneducated bunch. They wouldn't know what to do with it. It would just be wasted." With this kind of attitude, is it any wonder then that to be wounded inside Afghanistan is to die?

Chairman D'AMATO. Do you remember who that official was?

Ms. GOODWIN. I do have his name. I am reluctant to share it at this point in this meeting. I can talk to people about it afterwards.

Chairman D'AMATO. Wonderful.

Ms. GOODWIN. I also remember the freedom fighter attacks which I went on where men walked through minefields for their companions because the Afghans don't have mine detectors, where a successful storming of a Soviet base came to an abrupt halt because the freedom fighters ran out of ammunition, where aged guns jammed at crucial moments, and where all too frequently the only ammunition I saw dated back to 1949.

So, where is the military aid we are sending?

In 10 Provinces, I didn't see it. The freedom fighters will tell you the same thing.

A cynical colleague of mine has suggested that ammunition dating back to 1949 may, in fact, be American aid. I don't want to believe that. But just in case it's true, I would like to point out that the shelf life of much of the ammunition is considerably less than 36 years, even under the best storage conditions.

There are other shortages, too. Food is one in many of the Provinces. I saw farmers forced to work at night, in the dark, with just small oil lamps because they were fearful of gunship attacks if they farmed during the day. This is a deliberate Soviet policy.

I, myself, lived on black tea, bread, and raw onions for a week, because there was nothing else available. I also saw the end result of such poor diets, children dying from measles because they were too weak from malnutrition to survive simple childhood diseases.

There's another shortage in Afghanistan, too, that never gets mentioned, and that's education. Children outside the Soviet-held areas don't have schools because they've been bombed and most of their teachers have either fled or been killed.

Even in the refugee camps in Pakistan, the situation is little better. Of the approximately 2 million children in the camps, there

are only schools for 70,000 and most of these are for only a few grades anyway.

We are wasting a generation of brains, and without education, there is no way the Afghans can rebuild their nation.

Even in Soviet-held Afghanistan, education is disrupted, but for different reasons. Children are refused high school diplomas on graduation unless they join the Communist Party.

The two young freedom fighters here today joined the resistance after they were told they could not graduate and therefore could not go on to college, unless they became Communists.

There are also children much younger than this, of course, whose education and whose very lives are disrupted when they are forcibly shipped to the Soviet Union for 10 years immersion in Soviet doctrine. Forcible transportation of this nature is against the Geneva Convention. But in the war in Afghanistan this, tragically, is not the only violation of international law.

This little gadget in my hand is also banned by an international law, which the Soviets, themselves, signed in 1981. This is a butterfly bomb, an antipersonnel mine that has been dropped by the thousands over Afghanistan. Some of the mines look like this, 4 inches long, with a small fin, which causes it to flutter to the ground, hence its name butterfly. They come in different colors and are camouflaged like this one to blend in with the terrain. This one's designed for the desert, others are for rocks, and others are green. Then there are the brightly colored plastic toy bombs, which are made to resemble small plastic parrots, alarm clocks, or pens, even dolls. Both butterfly and toy bombs are designed to maim, not to kill. The principal victims of these are the children. When a child picks one up or treads on it, it will blow off an arm or leg or blind him.

As a journalist, I have covered wars in the Middle East, in Central America, and in Cambodia. I have never seen as many child amputees as I have among the Afghans.

I could go on all morning talking about the hunger, the cold, the wounded, or the dead. But I think you get the picture, and unfortunately the picture today in Afghanistan is not a pretty one.

Before I close, there is one last point I'd like to mention. This is one that Congressman Ackerman raised here this morning. We are here today to discuss Soviet violations of human rights principles in Afghanistan. But, unfortunately, the United States is not doing all it can to help the victims of those violations.

As you heard Congressman Ackerman say, some of the Afghans who have sought refuge in this country are being turned away. Many of you are probably not aware that those 33 Afghans, all of whom have asked for political asylum, are being held in jail in the immigration center in Manhattan.

The Afghans languishing there, two of whom are women, are systematically being deported back to Pakistan where they are given the choice of either being tried for illegal entry or being shipped back to Afghanistan. If they opt for trial, this eventually results in their being shipped back to Afghanistan anyway because Pakistan does not accept Afghans who have applied for asylum elsewhere.

Those Afghans who are not sent back to Pakistan are sent into orbit. Now, this is an interesting method of dealing with such a

problem. Let me give you an example: there were two Afghans who were deported from the United States to Korea by plane. Korea didn't want them, not surprisingly. Why would they? Those unfortunate Afghans then spent several weeks flying around the world from one country to another all of which rejected them. They went from Korea to Taiwan, from Taiwan to Sri Lanka, from Sri Lanka to Saudi Arabia, to Thailand, and back to Korea.

The Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights recently filed a suit maintaining that the incarceration of these Afghans violated domestic and international law. I think we should remember that here this morning.

Thank you.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you very much, Jan.

Mr. Lobek.

Mr. LOBEK. Mr. Chairman, as Ms. Goodwin or anybody who has been to Afghanistan in the past several years, we could talk for the next month on what's happening in Afghanistan. In the interest of your time and to be as blunt and specific as possible, I will try to be as short as possible.

My partner Anne Hurd and I have been contracted for the last 2½ years to all three major American television networks, for the last year exclusively to CBS News for coverage of the wars in Afghanistan and Nicaragua.

I would like to start my testimony this morning with the most recent story and show you that we had on CBS News, and then make a brief statement. Following whatever questions you may have, I have another short tape, which is a story that tells itself of what is now happening in Afghanistan.

The first story, however, will bring this into context today.

[Whereupon, a videotape was shown.]

Mr. LOBEK. Mr. Chairman, this month marks the sixth anniversary of the invasion of Afghanistan by the Army of the Soviet Union. For 6 years now, the jet aircraft, helicopters, tanks, and soldiers of the Soviet Union have unsuccessfully tried to subjugate and subdue the people of Afghanistan.

However, while the people of Afghanistan have put up a valiant and courageous resistance, although inadequately armed and with miniscule outside assistance, let us not overlook that the cost has been horrendous. Hundreds and thousands of women, children, and elderly persons have been violently murdered. Many thousands have been permanently injured and disfigured. Millions have had their homes and villages utterly destroyed and been forced into refugee status in Pakistan and Iran.

I would venture to say that not a single family in Afghanistan has not been brutally affected by this barbaric invasion.

I have made six extended trips into Afghanistan in the past 2½ years. The situation has steadily deteriorated inside this country. Villages just 2 years ago were well populated, people were working farms and herding animals, hiding when helicopters appeared, and trying to maintain a normal life. On one trip this last summer, I walked through 32 villages from the Pakistani border to, and inside, the city of Kabul. Only 8 of these villages were still inhabited, and these only sparsely.

The farms have been bombed, irrigation systems destroyed. I took videotape pictures in one village where Soviet commando troops had machinegunned over 200 camels, cows, and family dogs to death. The crime of these animals had been to provide support to the people who are resisting foreign domination.

The city of Kabul, the heart of Afghanistan, has been turned into an armed prison. The surrounding countryside is dying, but the resistance continues.

The determination and the zeal with which these people are fighting and dying for their country is remarkable. Having spent months living with them inside of Afghanistan and being with them during battles with the Soviets, I have come to truly believe them when they say that they will fight until only one Afghan is still living.

The problem is, of course, the Soviets do not appear to oppose that possibility.

I have witnessed and unfortunately personally felt the effect of searing napalm dropped upon the people of Afghanistan. I have seen hundreds of children missing hands or feet as a result of butterfly and toy bombs designed to attract children's attention and then explode in their faces. I have witnessed sustained bombing attacks on civilian houses which leave entire villages uninhabitable. I have listened to eyewitness reports of Soviet atrocities, such as that of the Laghman Valley earlier this year.

In Laghman, the Soviets rounded up villagers and slit the stomachs of pregnant women, asking them, "Where is your God now?" They pushed tiny babies into ovens and left nearly 4,000 civilian corpses of noncombatants scattered across the valley.

Despite these daily examples of murder and brutality, the resistance somehow struggles on. Although the resistance has almost no capability to combat jet aircraft and helicopters which are decimating their country, they are actually superior in their effectiveness against the Soviet Army on the ground. I have watched them completely outfox and frustrate Soviet infantry, commando, and even the so-called spetsnaz troops.

On the ground, the so-called superpower is a joke.

The young defector who is testifying before you today can attest to the fact that they are really just an overgrown Third World army, not the invincible Red army that is supposed to strike fear behind the Iron Curtain.

I personally would hope that this Commission could be instrumental in helping several Soviet defectors who are currently in Afghanistan who wish to come to this country to do so. They could further help dispel the myth of the Red army and tell more of the built-in brutality of its methods.

It is true that the Soviets have suffered losses in Afghanistan. But we should be very careful before we make the assessment that this could by itself cause a change for the better in this war devastated country.

While casualties and body counts affect our Western ethics and morality, I have seen no signs that these concerns are part of the decisionmaking criteria of the Soviets. This is a regime that for propaganda purposes tries to enlist sympathy for the fact that they lost 20 million people during World War II, while conveniently not

mentioning that they have murdered nearly 50 million of their own citizens in order to maintain power.

Covering the war in Afghanistan is one of the most, if not the most, difficult reporting jobs in the world today.

It is the story of a people attempting to determine their own destiny free from foreign domination, of people seeking religious freedom, or people who want to be left alone to live in peace and freedom. Something we should understand.

Before you have any questions, if you'll indulge me. I have another short tape, which is self-explanatory. It starts with a story that we did last summer, and then a montage that is self-explanatory.

[Whereupon, a videotape was shown.]

Chairman D'AMATO. Mr. Lobek, you summed up your vivid presentation with the words that the task on behalf of the Afghans becomes more difficult each day.

What kind of supplies, military and medical, were you able to observe or did you learn of that were reaching the freedom fighters?

Mr. LOBEK. They have been receiving for the last 4 years small arms, which are copies of Soviet-type weaponry, which makes sense because of the ammunition situation, because a lot of their weaponry is captured weaponry, of Chinese manufacture. That would be the majority of outside weaponry which is supplied to them.

This is the type of machineguns that you saw, Kalashnikov automatic rifles. They have, within the last year, received BM-12 surface-to-surface rockets, which have a range of 3 to 4 kilometers. Practically no accuracy on the BM-12's.

There have been a few SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles that have been provided to them. The problem with these, most of them are third and fourth generation SAM-7's, some of which were PLO stock that was captured in Israel, some was old Soviet stock that had been left in Egypt. Many of them, when they reach the "mujahideen," are defective. The tail fin guidance systems are bent, and they don't work. The electric targeting system doesn't function. The SAM-7 is really the SAM-7A model which they have—it's really not effective. It's not at all against jet aircraft, and with the new heavily armored helicopters, not very effective.

Other than the BM-12's and a few of these SAM-7's, there has not been an increase in the quality of weaponry that they have received in the last 4 years.

While, on the other side, Afghanistan has been a military testing ground for the Soviets. They've tried everything. Some things are not effective. Some things are very effective.

I often have described it as the Sioux Indians trying to fight the 82d Airborne backed by the Strategic Air Command. That's about what it is.

Chairman D'AMATO. Let me ask both of you, then, a question. Both of you are probably more expert than all of us, than any of us in the Congress, having been there, having observed, having studied, having reported on the situation.

What, if anything, can and should we be doing? If you had it within your power, given the situation today, the world situation, given the limitations that we have, what can we be doing and what should we be doing?

Mr. LOBEK. Go ahead.

Ms. GOODWIN. I think there are two things that we should be doing if we're going to be sending in arms. I think we should be monitoring that they are getting in. Because there is a definite breakdown in the system. It is not happening and many of the arms, in many cases, are not getting in.

The other thing I think we should be doing is sending in appropriate weapons if we're going to do this, if this is going to be our policy. If you don't send armor-piercing ammunition, you really are wasting your time. Everything the Soviets have is armor-plated, therefore, the Afghans need armor-piercing ammunition. So, you've really got to be doing that.

Take the oerlikons that we were supposed to send in earlier this year, 10 of them, only 4 were sent in for reasons of "a test." We already knew before we sent them that those things are so darn heavy that they have to be totally dismantled to move. Of the four that went in, I learned that all were lost to the Soviets the first time the "mujahideen" bases were overrun. Because they cannot pick them up and retreat with them, they are forced to leave them behind.

Now, if we're going to be sending equipment like this, again, I question the sanity of it.

If we are going to send them arms of this nature, they've got to have ones they can carry on their shoulders. They don't have methods of transporting anything else.

Mr. LOBEK. I would answer that question in two ways. There's no question that the type of military equipment could be provided to them that could cost the Soviet Union, it could make an economic cost to them in the loss of aircraft. That would certainly be more damaging to them than the situation is now.

But I don't think that we can overlook the fact that there will not be a military solution to Afghanistan.

The Afghan "mujahideen," despite their courage, despite the valiant effort that they have portrayed, are not going to defeat the Soviet Army.

There is only a political solution. That political solution can only be brought about by extreme pressure by those of us who understand with and agree with what those people are fighting for.

They are very frustrated when we consider ourselves allied with them in their fight for freedom and buy gas, natural gas, as much as we can, from the Soviet Union; sell computer technology, which is used to direct the weapons that are killing Afghans; continue to sell every type of technology and every type of support to their enemy. It is very frustrating to them.

It is very frustrating to them when they see talks of and expressions from Western political leaders as to how we must sit down and shake hands in friendship with the Soviet Union and talk about peace, when the Soviet Union is creating in Afghanistan, today, a holocaust.

It's very frustrating to them when they see Western political leaders talk about such things as genocide and holocaust, saying never again, and yet it is happening every day in Afghanistan.

There will only be a political solution in Afghanistan if you gentlemen, and your colleagues in the Congress, and your counterparts

in the other branches of this Government, and the Western European allies say enough is enough.

Chairman D'AMATO. Any one of us could spend hours asking for your opinions on a whole host of matters, and the time does not permit us to do that.

I'm going to ask my colleagues if they could limit their questions, because we do have another panel.

I deeply appreciate, as I know all of my colleagues do, the time that both of you have taken to share with this Commission your insights from the years that you have given to this area of the world. Unfortunately, the events in Afghanistan have not been a catalyst causing us to use the force and power that we do have, military and more importantly, our moral and political leadership in the ways necessary to bring about a resolution.

So, I'm going to ask my associates if they would attempt to limit their questions.

My Cochairman, Congressman Hoyer.

Cochairman HOYER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

I thought the testimony was powerful, pointed, thought-provoking, and effective. For that, I thank both of you.

I'm going to pass on questions only because our time is limited and I want to hear from our State Department representatives, who I'm sure may have some comments on your testimony and some comments of their own.

But I want to thank you very, very much for not only taking the time to be with us today, but for what you have done and continue to do to make the American public and the world aware of, as Mr. Lobek points out, the holocaust that is ongoing in Afghanistan.

Thank you very much.

Chairman D'AMATO. Senator Humphrey.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lobek, you say that only a political solution is possible. You don't mean to imply by that that there is no use to military efforts?

Mr. LOBEK. No; of course not. They have to attempt to survive, and the only way they can survive is in a defensive situation to protect themselves as best possible from the Soviet Army.

What I said and what I mean to say is that they are not going to win by beating the Soviet Army.

Mr. HUMPHREY. All right.

Mr. LOBEK. I don't think they think they are.

Mr. HUMPHREY. You say that a political solution is only possible if the Western nations bring to bear maximum pressure. What do you mean by that?

Mr. LOBEK. I think that history has shown that whenever we in the free world have stood up to the Soviet Union and drawn a line or made a statement of commitment to an ideal, they have reacted to that.

I don't think that we are doing that yet in this situation.

I think that we have some very flowery and good statements from some of our political leaders. But I don't feel that that—I don't see how that has been backed up by political pressures.

We were told in Geneva that the subject was brought up and that there may be different sentences or different wording coming

from Soviet leadership about Afghanistan. But it's certainly not adequate for the "mujahideen" or for the people of Afghanistan that it was merely brought up.

What's been done about it?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Among the pressures, of course, is military pressure. That pressure has been rather effective, it would appear, at least from this distance, in bringing the Soviets to a point where they're beginning to talk publicly about withdrawal. Therefore, it would seem that this is no time to slack up in that regard or in any regard.

You say that—perhaps it was Ms. Goodwin who said it. But you implied it, in any case, that weapons are not getting through, that pipeline is leaking. Can you tell us more about that?

How many trips have you made there? How many days have you spent over what period of years now?

Mr. LOBEK. I've made six trips in 2½ years, and spent 7 months in Afghanistan.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Seven. All right, sir.

Mr. LOBEK. I did——

Mr. HUMPHREY. You are probably, in that respect, the best qualified person, Western journalist in any case, to testify to us on this subject.

Many people say that the military materiel is not getting through. I hear that all of the time.

On the other hand, Government officials insist that it is.

Whom do we believe?

Mr. LOBEK. First of all, let me say that there are others, and I certainly wouldn't want anything on the record to say that there are not other very qualified and experienced journalists who have been there, because there are.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Have any spent 7 months in the last 2½ years?

Mr. LOBEK. I think there's possibly two or three that have.

Mr. HUMPHREY. All right.

Mr. LOBEK. But I appreciate the statements.

I did not make the statement that there is a leak in the pipeline. I have spent considerable time attempting to follow the pipeline of arms distribution to the "mujahideen." I have, in that context, done extensive investigative journalism in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, in Nicaragua, and in Washington.

The only thing I can say in that regard that I do believe I have learned, I do not believe that the Pakistani Government is skimming off weapons in the pipeline for the logical reason that the types of weapons that are being sent to the "mujahideen" the Pakistanis do not need. They already have a much more sophisticated military situation. They don't need Kalashnikovs and Dashikas and RPG's. They have more than they need, and they are a much more sophisticated situation than that.

There have been statements of "mujahideen" political leaders and some "mujahideen" individuals who are skimming the arms and selling them in arms bazaars.

Well, there may be some small instances of this taking place. But if it is done on the magnitude that is implied by the current article in Time magazine, who is buying these weapons? The "mujahideen" don't have the kind of money. If we're talking about a leak



of \$200 or \$300 million in a pipeline, and it's being taken by political leaders and sold in the open market, there's not \$200 or \$300 million available to these poor peasants for which to buy that. That doesn't make logical sense.

I do think it makes sense, without trying to breach any American or Western European security situations, and so far this is a covert aid program, as you are aware of—I think it is fair to say that it is obvious to those of us who have learned on our own that there is Western support being given to the Chinese to pay for weapons that go to the “mujahideen.” I think it is fair to say that there is Western support to Egyptians that go to the “mujahideen.”

I have not detected, and I have looked for, a leak in the pipeline. Where I think the problem may be is, that at the beginning of the pipeline there are not those items being put into it that publicly some of us may have been led to believe were put into it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. You think the problem is at the beginning of the pipeline.

Ms. Goodwin, do you disagree or agree with that? What is your point of view?

Ms. GOODWIN. I disagree with that slightly. I would go along with a lot of that. I'm not as kind, I think, toward Pakistan. I do think there is possibly some skimming there. But I think that we should have monitoring all the way along that line.

Mr. HUMPHREY. But you made a rather strong statement a moment ago, saying that weapons are not getting in, that there is a breakdown, to use your words.

What did you mean by that?

Ms. GOODWIN. What I meant was that the amount of money that is being spent, which is a publicized figure, whether we like it or not, is certainly not reflected in my journeys through 10 provinces with the freedom fighters. Every freedom fighter that I have interviewed, every commander, right up to the chief of staff of the new unity of the group will confirm that.

The stuff is not getting through. Where is it?

Mr. HUMPHREY. What stuff?

Ms. GOODWIN. The arms. The arms and the ammunition are not getting through.

Mr. HUMPHREY. They're getting nothing?

Ms. GOODWIN. They are getting a certain amount, as Kurt Lobek says. It's small arms. Much of the time the ammunition did horrify me. The quality of the ammunition that was shipped inside, the dates on that bothered me.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Quality.

Have you observed the same problem, Mr. Lobek, quality?

Mr. LOBEK. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Problems with the ammunition?

Mr. LOBEK. The quality of most of the Chinese manufactured ammunition and the weapons themselves that reached the “mujahideen” you wouldn't go hunting with.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Chinese. But across, in general, commenting on—on the quality of the ammunition and weapons in general—

Mr. LOBEK. Ninety-five percent of the weaponry that I have seen was either captured Soviet weaponry or—

Mr. HUMPHREY. How do you know?

Mr. LOBEK. You can tell by the markings on the weapon.

Ms. GOODWIN. Right.

Mr. LOBEK. Or Chinese-manufactured copies of Soviet weapons.

Mr. HUMPHREY. You're saying that only 5 percent of what you see appears to have come from Western sources?

Mr. LOBEK. Yes; sir.

Ms. GOODWIN. I will concur with that, too.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Well, in that case, doesn't that contradict what you said a moment ago about apparently there's no problem in the pipeline except that the—

Mr. LOBEK. No. I didn't—I didn't mean to imply that the pipeline was not—that the weapons in that pipeline that we're referring to were not Chinese manufactured or other weapons.

I'm not privy to what the CIA does. But I think it would make sense were I running a covert operation that I would give them the types of weapons that they could use.

They frequently capture Soviet ammunition. So, it would make sense that they had weapons that could use Soviet ammunition.

The one thing that I think that does not come out in some of these discussions and in many news reports, unfortunately, with my medium, because we don't have the time to get into types of issues, people have been saying, for example, that the "mujahideen" should be given Stinger missiles so they can shoot down Mig-23's which murder people and kill villages.

There's no question, if they had Stinger missiles they would shoot down jet airplanes. But if they had Stinger missiles, it would then not be the "mujahideen" of Afghanistan affecting the Soviet Union. Then we would see, if not a much quicker summit conversation, there would definitely be a hotline telephone conversation, because that would be the United States versus the Soviet Union, because we're the ones that make Stinger missiles.

I don't know that the political decision has been made to do that. I think that's not in my realm as a reporter.

If you politicians make that decision, I will certainly be there to report the Mig coming down. But that's your decision to make. If you want to do that, I think you have to look at the possible consequences. I think that that is happening within our Government.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman D'AMATO. Congressman Ritter.

Mr. RITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think most of what I was interested in has been covered in the testimony and in the question and the answer period.

But just a moment on the media coverage of the war in Afghanistan. This comes up consistently at discussions such as this. One looks around at all the television cameras beaming the messages out to the United States of America and the people.

One has proof right here in this pudding.

First of all, do you think the media coverage is anywhere near sufficient, and, if not, why not? What's behind the reticence of the American media to cover this, this—

Mr. LOBEK. No, of course, it's not sufficient.

If we look to a similar experience in our own history—let's take Vietnam as the most recent war situation in the Third World in which we were involved in. It was on television news every night.

It was on the front page of every American newspaper every day for several years. That was because we are a free country. Our Army, our Air Force, our Navy took our reporters in to report the war, whether it ended up being favorable stories or not. We had access to that story. That story was then given to the American people.

The American people, based on the information they got, made their political issues.

In a TV Guide article, a recent one concerning the coverage of Afghanistan of Mike Hoover and myself, the headline on the article says, "The Soviet Ambassadors Promise The Next Journalist We Find In Afghanistan Will Be Killed."

I was in Pakistan when the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan made that public promise.

There are not an awful lot of journalists that want to go to Afghanistan and get shot because they were covering the war.

I have no doubt in my mind that if I were captured by the Soviet Army in Afghanistan carrying a television camera, that would be prima facie evidence that I was an American spy.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Lobek, how do you explain the paucity of coverage of this extraordinary hearing today in terms of visual media?

Mr. LOBEK. Because it is not a daily story in America. Because of the difficulty, not because of an editorial room or a newsroom decision not to cover it. I make that statement by the fact that everything I have done in Afghanistan has been on network television in America, and they continually send me back. Because it is so difficult to cover. Because it is physically impossible to have it on the news every day and every night.

The interest and the desire for more information among your constituents is not there. Because of the fact that they are not constantly bombarded with this story, it is not part—it is not prioritized in their consciousness.

That's your job and my job and I think we're both trying to do what we can. But it's a difficult situation that we're both in.

Ms. GOODWIN. I would like to add a footnote to that if I may. Apart from the hardships of actually covering this war, there's a new situation that just started a couple of months ago in Pakistan.

Pakistan is now trying to also keep foreign journalists from covering this war. I, myself, was arrested, expelled, and had to go back under cover to cover this war.

But what is now happening, and all the groups have been told this, is that Pakistan is fining each of the "mujahideen" groups, every time they are caught taking a journalist inside.

Now, these sums are quite large to these groups who are desperate for money anyway, and they are incremental, they increase. This is something that—this is a brandnew policy.

Mr. RITTER. Well, I think this is fertile ground for the Helsinki Commission to bring this to the attention of the Congress and the administration.

I think the Congress has to vote on assistance to Pakistan. I think they'd be outraged if they knew that the journalists were being fined by—

Ms. GOODWIN. We're not being fined.

Mr. RITTER. The—

Ms. GOODWIN. The particular groups that take us in are being fined.

Mr. RITTER. The Afghan freedom fighters are being fined for taking American—

Chairman D'AMATO. Well, Congressman, we really should understand the realities of Pakistan's relationship with the Soviets and the Pakistani's understanding what the Soviets can and will do. It's a very fine line that they deal with.

Mr. RITTER. But this is a new—this is a new—

Chairman D'AMATO. No; it's not new.

Mr. RITTER. It's hard—

Chairman D'AMATO. I think the Soviets are playing—that the Soviets—you mean that the Pakistanis—

Mr. RITTER. Well, it's obviously coming from some Soviet pressure if—

Chairman D'AMATO. It's obvious that the Soviets have indicated to the Pakistanis that they'll tolerate so much and no more, and those—those Mig's, those fighter planes, and those weapon systems that we've seen so far at work within the borders of Afghanistan, will not be confined to Afghanistan.

From this testimony and everything that we've heard in briefings, et cetera, that this situation takes on the political dimensions when we have these kinds of activities.

I'm not shocked by it, and I'm not suggesting that it's something that's nice. But it's something we should understand.

Mr. LOBEK. I think, Senator—

Chairman D'AMATO. It's something that's been going on for a number of years.

Mr. LOBEK. I think—

Chairman D'AMATO. Pakistan has been playing this very careful role, and it's not a very comfortable role for them, being where they are.

Mr. LOBEK. I think, Senator, you have very accurately described the rock and a hard place situation that Pakistan views themselves as being in.

I think that also. We'll only go one way or another by what they view as—

Ms. GOODWIN. Yes.

Mr. LOBEK [continuing]. The political support from us that they—well, I think you accurately stated it.

Mr. RITTER. Well, I would just like to close with the comment that this, the intensification of the war under Gorbachev is proceeding apace. Again the very idea that this man can utter the word peace in Geneva and talk about promoting peace, and have a Time magazine quotation on the cover where he is actually quoting about the state of the world, the danger of the world, and here he is carrying on the destruction of the Afghan nation, is hypocrisy in the utmost and must be recognized by the American people and the people of the West.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you, Congressman.

Congressman Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, Mr. Lobek and Ms. Goodwin, that was very compelling testimony. I think the chairman asked the basic, fundamental question. What more can we do?

I think many of us are going to go back and allow what we've seen and heard to sink in and guide us as we consider various legislation affecting our policies with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

I do have just a few questions I would like to ask you.

A few hours ago we were making up legislation on a resolution on worldwide immunization by the year 1990.

A couple of weeks ago I was at the United Nations, and I was part of a signing ceremony whereby the United States reiterated its support for that very laudable goal of trying to eliminate such things as measles, and tetanus, whooping cough, diphtheria, and other diseases that could be prevented with the proper vaccination.

Ms. Goodwin, you point out in your testimony that children are dying from measles and such preventable diseases in Afghanistan.

I understand UNICEF has a program in Kabul, but it has it nowhere else in Afghanistan.

I was wondering what the prospects might be of UNICEF taking a leading role in trying to negotiate or have the parties involved negotiate some sort of ceasefire so that an immunization program could go forward.

It's not without precedent. It's occurred very recently in El Salvador. The insurgents there, the terrorists, laid down their arms for 3 days. And 300,000 children were immunized against 5 or 6 of the leading diseases.

I think it's a thought that should be pursued. Certainly a ceasefire should be pursued.

Ms. Goodwin, do you want to comment?

Ms. GOODWIN. I think the major problem with that would be the terrain of Afghanistan.

El Salvador is a very small country. It's a lot easier to walk around. Afghanistan is a larger country. The terrain there is extremely tough. You could not do it in 3 days. I'm not sure you could do it in 3 months.

Mr. SMITH. Certainly there might be some pockets where it might be approached. There must be some centers of population that the appropriate authorities could isolate and initiate a concentrated immunization program.

Mr. LOBEK. There's no question that disease problems exist within Afghanistan. I, myself, have contracted both malaria and cholera in covering this war. Cholera is a disease which is deadly in that part of the world which is quickly cured with proper medicines. Malaria the same thing, or at least tempered.

When you refer to, can UNICEF be instrumental, can the United Nations or a branch office of the United Nations help to effect a ceasefire—I think the primary cause of death in Afghanistan is quickly induced lead poisoning. I don't know exactly what U.N. auspice should take care of this disease.

I do know that the Soviet Union and the so-called Government of Afghanistan do not recognize the United Nations' right to even discuss Afghanistan, as witness the resolution which just passed with the support of 122 countries.

Now, if the Soviet Union and the so-called Government of Afghanistan can totally ignore this resolution, I don't think you'll see the two—the two employees of UNICEF in Kabul being allowed to spread across the country with an antimeasles vaccine.

Mr. SMITH. What role are we playing and what role is the United Nations playing at the refugee camps in Pakistan?

Mr. LOBEK. Extensive. Half of the daily cost of the upkeep of the refugees is done by the UNHCR, which is the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, and the World Food Program, which, as you know from your appropriation committees, is U.S. money.

Mr. SMITH. One final question. Has the United States and Western peace groups demonstrated any interest in Afghanistan other than just a cursory interest?

Mr. LOBEK. Absolutely.

Mr. SMITH. They have?

Ms. GOODWIN. Yes.

Mr. LOBEK. In fact, I have never seen an issue in my entire political experience that this is not an American left-right issue. This is a right-wrong issue. The makeup of the Commission in front of me testifies to that.

Mr. SMITH. What I'm suggesting is that I think U.S. peace groups should make the goal of peace in Afghanistan a prominent issue on their agendas.

Mr. LOBEK. We Americans and the various groups in this country that use the word "peace," we mean the absence of war.

The problem is that the other side uses the word peace to mean another method of continuing the struggle.

Mr. SMITH. I think that we're in agreement that U.S. peace groups should concentrate on bringing an end to war in Afghanistan.

Are you saying that they do?

Mr. LOBEK. Yes. I've seen numerous American groups, liberal, conservative, in-between, political activist groups. We have them sitting here today.

Mr. SMITH. Can you name some of the peace groups?

I mention this because very often—and I have had them in my office—they bring up issues concerning nuclear freeze and issues that I am very much in agreement with in many instances. But when I raise Afghanistan, very often it's, "oh, that's that war." It's very often not a center-stage-priority issue.

I just think that in the minds of many Americans—and maybe we can't get television coverage every night—but some publicity would further sensitize the people and the Congress to this issue. We do operate on the basis of "where the pressure is coming from." Thus, if the peace groups, which do have access to the press, would make more of a ruckus, this issue would become more important in the minds of many Americans and more would be done politically as well as militarily in terms of support.

So, I raise that very seriously. I have raised it with every group I have met with. The response has always been, "oh, yes, we don't like what's going on there, but let's not concentrate on that right now."

You know, I've been on this Helsinki Commission for 4 years. I've been in the Soviet Union. I've worked with many dissidents—

Romanian, Yugoslav, Hungarian, and those of the Soviet Union. They have not had it easy. Yet I find it amazing how willing so many here in the United States are to accept the word of Gorbachev or some other Soviet official on the arms control issue. When it comes to human rights and the Helsinki accords or Afghanistan, however, it's sort of like, well, that doesn't mean anything; the important thing is that we have a treaty and we reduce our stockpiles. I don't want to belittle the importance of arms control, however, human rights assurances are equally important.

Mr. LOBEK. There's no question that that problem exists. But I would assume one of the functions of this Commission is to try to reprioritize our concerns.

Mr. SMITH. Exactly.

Thank you.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you, Congressman.

We've never had such powerful and vivid testimony and descriptions as that given by both Jan Goodwin and Mr. Lobek. We deeply appreciate it.

It would seem to me that the conspiracy of apathy and silence has not been broken, maybe because we don't see American boys dying. But we've seen these things take place in the past. Maybe it's why we can be indifferent to the tragedy in Cambodia. Maybe that's why we can be indifferent to genocide in other areas of the world.

It's tragic, but we see this holocaust being committed once again, another act of genocide, and we are shockingly indifferent. This may be because the consequences of facing these truths might be difficult if not impossible to accept. We lack the courage to really say that, and we lack the courage to look the Russians straight in the eye and take them straight-on about this because there may be consequences that we're not willing to bear. We might not be willing to pay that price for what might take place over a very real confrontation with them over the issue.

But let me thank you and commend both of you for your activities not only here today, but for your professionalism, for your outspokenness, and for your candor. We deeply appreciate your help.

I hope that we would be able to do our part—not to be part of that conspiracy of silence and indifference toward Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

Thank you very much.

Mr. LOBEK. Not only for myself, but I have no fear of contradiction, that for the people of Afghanistan we appreciate this opportunity for a hearing.

Ms. GOODWIN. Yes.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Lobek.

We will now call our final panel. Ambassador Gerald Helman. He's the Deputy to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. Ambassador Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State and formerly our Ambassador to the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

Would you please sit down?

We do have your prepared testimony and we'll receive it into the record as if read in its entirety.

Ambassador Helman, I think you've heard a number of things that we would ask you to respond to in your verbal presentation.

I wonder why, when we look at this butterfly bomb, why the American people haven't heard more about it and why the State Department hasn't made more of it.

It does seem to me, Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Secretary, that I don't think we have the political guts to really take this issue on.

Mr. HELMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify before you.

It's a hard act to follow Kurt Lobek and Ms. Goodwin. I know their excellent work. I would only wish that other American journalists—

Chairman D'AMATO. Could you please speak—I'm sorry. Could you please speak—

Mr. HELMAN [continuing]. Did as good a job as they have—

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you.

Mr. HELMAN [continuing]. In presenting to the American public and to the world public information on what's going on inside Afghanistan, not only butterfly bombs, but a lot of other activities which have resulted in one of the most tragic human rights situations, humanitarian situations in modern history.

Specifically with respect to butterfly bombs, those have been, I believe, fairly widely publicized. Certainly it's a heinous violation of human rights. We've made no bones about it. I think it's been identified in a variety of human rights reports. I believe most recently by Professor Ermacora, an Austrian jurist, who is the U.N. rapporteur on the human rights situation within Afghanistan.

Let me say more generally in my—and I'll make my remarks very brief because I realize that there are questions that—

Chairman D'AMATO. I'm going to ask you to address yourself to something that has been raised.

Mr. HELMAN. Yes.

Chairman D'AMATO. And, that is, the issue of political asylum for Soviet POW's. You've heard testimony about this problem this morning. You've heard about the four cases. We're going to provide them to you. I'd like you to address that point. If you're not prepared to give us any specifics, I would like you to specifically review the four cases that have been brought forth today. We'll give them to you. Please make a report to this Commission.

I'd like to raise one other issue. If there is a group that is incompetent, one that seems to my mind to have few in the way of peers, it is the INS, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

For the life of me—I've been down at that immigration place, 4 years ago. How we can let Cuban desperados, who are convicted in our State courts of the most incredible crimes, loose after they serve their 5, 6, 7, 8 years? We let them back out onto the streets. We don't take them into custody—but we let them back out on the street to continue to murder, rape, and commit every other kind of crime imaginable.

But we take Afghans who come here and throw them into these cells. Now we are holding 33 of them. Before that there were others, when I went down at Christmas time and got them out. They languish there, because they are caught in this maze of juris-



dictions, because the Pakistanis say we don't want them, and the Koreans say we don't want them. It's beyond me.

I am not willing to sign off on every one of those 33, and I don't think my colleagues are—there may be some who should not be released.

But I cannot believe that every single one of them, particularly in light of the fact that we have sponsors for them, et cetera, should languish in jail there. There are probably many good people held there who should be released.

Now, what does the State Department do? If we just say that's the Immigration and Naturalization Service's business, that's complicity with this situation. The State Department cannot claim, as Pontius Pilate did, clean hands, and say, we wash our hands of it.

That's what's going on in this Government, in this administration.

No, I don't blame the Immigration and Naturalization Service. They're getting orders.

Now, I'd like you to address those two issues.

Mr. HELMAN. Well, let me address the first issue, and then I'll, with pleasure, allow Ambassador Schifter to address the second one.

Six Soviet soldiers have been presented to us for parole into the United States, soldiers who fought in Afghanistan, one of which was—

Chairman D'AMATO. Does that include—

Mr. HELMAN [continuing]. Mr. Movchan. That's correct, sir.

Chairman D'AMATO. OK.

Mr. HELMAN. All of them have been paroled into the United States.

One has redefected. Five are still here.

Mr. RITTER. Excuse me, Mr. Ambassador. Could you please speak more directly into that microphone?

Mr. HELMAN. Yes. I'm sorry.

Six Soviet soldiers have been presented to the United States who fought in Afghanistan. They have all been paroled into the United States. Five are still here, including Mr. Movchan. One has redefected.

I think it's safe to say that any Soviet soldier who is presented for parole in the United States will, in fact, be paroled into the United States.

It is a—

Chairman D'AMATO. OK.

Mr. HELMAN [continuing]. complex situation.

Chairman D'AMATO. Well, when you say presented for parole, what about the case of these four who are seeking entry? How do they get to put their case? If it's the case that there are four people over there who are looking to come over here, how do they make their formal presentation?

Maybe I place you at a disadvantage, because we have just learned about these four cases.

Are you aware of these four cases?

Mr. HELMAN. We've been made aware of these four. These four are prisoners of the "mujahideen" inside Afghanistan.

Chairman D'AMATO. Have they asked to come to the United States?

Mr. HELMAN. They have not presented themselves to us.

Chairman D'AMATO. Oh. You mean they have to be here.

Mr. HELMAN. Well, they have to get here, and I'm not going to—you know, there's no way I can discuss the way others have come here.

Chairman D'AMATO. I—

Mr. HELMAN. All I can say is that they are prisoners of the "mujahideen" inside Afghanistan. We have no way of sending consular—

Chairman D'AMATO. OK.

Mr. HELMAN [continuing]. Officers in there.

Chairman D'AMATO. If the "mujahideen" releases them and they find their way, let's say, to a neutral country or a country where we have our own diplomats, they can then ask for political asylum?

Mr. HELMAN. I think we'd find a way, yes, under those circumstances.

Chairman D'AMATO. We're going to pass this on to the "mujahideen." We're going to give you the names of these four. We're going to see if we can help.

Mr. HELMAN. Fine.

Chairman D'AMATO. Apparently, this is a catch-22 where these four people say, look, we want to come on out. I don't believe the "mujahideen" are blocking them. We can ascertain that.

If you say, well, everybody who presents himself gets in, but if you have to be able to present yourself, then you make it impossible to cross the line to really present yourself, then, in effect, we're not going to let anybody in.

I'd like to get down to how do we really do that.

I'm not going to ask you to explain it here publicly. We certainly want to follow up as it relates to these four. If there are others, we should follow up on them as well.

Mr. HELMAN. Fine.

Chairman D'AMATO. I'm going to depart—yes.

Mr. SCHIFTER. Senator, with regard to the question that you posed concerning the Afghans now in New York, the problem that all of us have to be concerned about is this: Our hearts go out to a great many people under suffering circumstances who want to come to this country. The Congress of the United States has decided that there are limits to the number of persons that we can let into the country. As far as Afghans are concerned, there are limits there, too.

We have set up a process, a bureaucratic process to be sure, under which people get in line.

The basic problem here is, under what circumstances do we allow somebody to, essentially, jump the line.

My understanding is that we take in about 2,500 people a year from Afghanistan, under a procedure established by, in this particular case, the State Department, which reviews cases abroad, in cooperation with the Immigration Naturalization Service.

In this situation, as in similar situations arising elsewhere, in Central America as well, the same problem always arises. Once

you have a process, once you have limits established by the Congress, and you then set priorities, you have to adhere to them.

If there are special exceptions that would justify you on humanitarian grounds or similar grounds to let somebody jump the line, you let them jump the line.

But that is the situation in which we find ourselves.

Chairman D'AMATO. I know it's an unusual procedure, but because we've read your testimony, and it's in the record, I'm going to ask you to forgo your normal presentations.

We're well beyond our scheduled time for this hearing to end. I'm now going to call upon Congressman Hoyer.

Congressman Hoyer.

Cochairman HOYER. Thank you very much.

I'm sorry that we're so late. I concur with the Chairman's process, but I would have liked to and I think it would have been useful to go through your entire testimony.

Ambassador Schifter, if I may, the President has stated upon his return from Geneva, that we have a new start. Presumably this new start is not just on discussions in Geneva, but also, in general, in our communications and relations with the Soviets.

Mr. Ritter has been very articulate about that new beginning and Gorbachev's presentations with reference to peace.

How do you view this new beginning, particularly in the context of this Afghanistan situation about which we've been talking this morning?

Mr. SCHIFTER. Congressman, we cannot really make any predictions at this particular point. Time will tell whether anything is going to come out of the discussions had in Geneva on that particular issue.

We cannot be optimistic. At the same time, I would say one should not be pessimistic either.

Mr. Lobek certainly made an excellent presentation, made the points that should be made here. And, that is, that ultimately the solution to be attained here would have to be a political solution.

Whether it can be attained, only time will tell us whether it's possible.

Cochairman HOYER. Have you had an opportunity of reviewing the Ermacora report?

Mr. SCHIFTER. Yes.

Cochairman HOYER. What effect, if any, do you think that will have on the Soviets?

Mr. SCHIFTER. Well, it will have some effect, Congressman.

But I want to say that I fully agree with the statement made by Congressman Smith earlier concerning the problem of publicity. To the extent to which the publicity given to the Ermacora report or any other similar reports on the serious human rights violations by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, to the extent to which these reports are publicized, well publicized, to that extent will they have an impact on the Soviets.

If they aren't, if they aren't publicized, they do not have an impact.

Cochairman HOYER. Mr. Ambassador, in that context, as the U.S. representative to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, what

support are we getting or is Afghanistan getting from our allies and other Third World nations?

Mr. SCHIFTER. When it comes to voting, it's substantial there. The majorities are great. The number of members of the Commission that are prepared to speak up is much more limited. The amount of practical support given is more limited still.

Cochairman HOYER. No more than miniscule? Is that what you'd say?

Mr. SCHIFTER. I would say so.

But as far as voting is concerned, in all fairness, the overwhelming majority does vote for the resolutions on the issue of Afghanistan. We now have two sets of resolutions on this issue. The first deals purely with the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the issue of foreign troops being in the country. Although it is interesting that this resolution never refers to the Soviet Union. As far as the text of the resolution is concerned, it might be people from Mars who have invaded Afghanistan.

Then there's another resolution dealing with human rights violations within Afghanistan. Both of these resolutions now pass by overwhelming margins. I mean about 6-to-1 margins.

Cochairman HOYER. Mr. Ambassador, are we taking steps to perhaps make these resolutions more pointed as they relate to the Soviet Union?

Mr. SCHIFTER. We make—we make every effort. Yes.

Cochairman HOYER. Unsuccessfully, as it's done?

Mr. SCHIFTER. Well, in some situations in which I have been involved, there has been some success.

Cochairman HOYER. This is my last question of you, Mr. Ambassador. What present plans do you have, that is, the State Department, to heighten the focus on Afghanistan?

Mr. SCHIFTER. I want to say that the statements that have been made here—that there is a greater need for publicity—are, in my view, valid. I hope that we can act accordingly.

Cochairman HOYER. Does that mean that plans are going to be formulated to carry that out and to effect that end?

Mr. SCHIFTER. I would hope so.

Mr. HELMAN. Can I? Can I supplement that, sir?

I think you'll find that in terms of the yearend statements and reports which will be made, the administration will do a very good job of calling attention to the situation in Afghanistan and encouraging others to do so as well.

Chairman D'AMATO. Mr. Ambassador, I don't mean this personally. If you or Dick Schifter were there making that policy, I'd have no doubt that there would be more attention, more emphasis, more—more substance given to the rhetoric.

I have a difficult time believing that we have the moral stick-to-itiveness we need. It takes a lot of courage to do what has to and should be done.

I think if we had that courage and exhibited it the Soviets would back down. We could reach a political resolution to this situation.

But I don't see it. We are like a butterfly, flitting around from crisis to crisis, from media and press event to media and press event. And the suffering in Afghanistan will continue.

I don't believe it. If you had your druthers or if Dick Schifter, if he had his druthers, you would raise it to the proper level. But I don't see it coming.

That's one person's observation. I don't think there are too many of my colleagues who would disagree. Did I make an overstatement? If I did, you know, jump in.

Cochairman HOYER. You looked at me to jump in to defend the administration?

Chairman D'AMATO. Well, if anybody has a different point of a view, I'd like to get it on the record now. We've got Republicans and Democrats here. I think that we've got you outnumbered right now. My God, it's 4 to 1. But it takes four of us to handle this fellow.

There's a cynicism that exists in the Congress.

Cochairman HOYER. I've got Ambassador Schifter, don't forget.

Chairman D'AMATO. Right. Oh, that's right.

Cochairman HOYER. He's—

Chairman D'AMATO. You've got Dick as well.

Cochairman HOYER. Let me, if I might follow up, Mr. Chairman. Your comments are well taken.

Two additional questions of Ambassador Helman. First of all, Ms. Goodwin in her testimony, indicated that she had received comments from the State Department that one of the reasons for not applying more resources within Afghanistan was because the Afghans were uneducated. The implication was that they were unable to use those resources very effectively and, therefore, it would be a waste.

Is that, in fact, the sentiment of the State Department? If so—well, first of all, is that, from your view, a valid problem and is it the view of the State Department?

Mr. HELMAN. Well, it is not the view of the State Department.

The resources that we have, in part, are being devoted to training of Afghans so that, in fact, they can employ pharmaceuticals and painkillers inside Afghanistan itself.

We have programs whereby hundreds of Afghans are being trained, up to certain levels of medical skills, so that they can go back into Afghanistan and work with their people.

It is a problem in training. But we have not denied them resources simply because somehow, as the comments suggested, the Afghans somehow are dumb. They're not.

Chairman D'AMATO. Mr. Ambassador, that may be your honest-to-God feeling, and these may be the reports that you are getting. But, Jan Goodwin sits there and shakes her head in disbelief—she's spoken to someone from the State Department who has expressed that view. I have no doubt that she's absolutely correct.

You should look into that situation. If that's the kind of jackass that we have over there who represents us, let's find out what's going on.

Mr. HELMAN. I know no one in the State Department who would have made that statement. I know of no one.

Chairman D'AMATO. Well, suppose we furnish you with the name—

Mr. HELMAN. If you'd furnish me the name—

Chairman D'AMATO. Would you look into this?

Mr. HELMAN. I certainly will.

Chairman D'AMATO. You'll probably find a 35-year career diplomat, who doesn't like being there, and who would like to be in Paris.

Mr. HELMAN. Well, let me look into it, if I get the name.

Chairman D'AMATO. All right.

I don't think it's appropriate to shrug that off.

Now, Mr.—

Mr. HELMAN. No. I'm trying—I'm not trying to shrug it off.

Chairman D'AMATO. Jan Goodwin, would you provide us with that name?

Ms. GOODWIN. At this point; I won't.

Chairman D'AMATO. No. We're not asking you at this point.

Ms. GOODWIN. In this room.

Chairman D'AMATO. Good.

Mr. HELMAN. But the important point—this does not represent either our policy or our practice.

Chairman D'AMATO. Well, it's great if we say here in Washington that it doesn't represent our policy and our practice, and it's a different matter if out in the field that's what's taking place.

If it's a different matter out in the field, it may explain why the medicine and supplies aren't getting through.

Mr. HELMAN. Let me find out about it. [See app. 2.]

Cochairman HOYER. My last question to you, Ambassador Helman. There have been discussions about how much of the aid that is sent, in fact, gets delivered on site.

Does the State Department have concerns about that? Is it monitoring that, and does it have any reason to believe that substantial amounts of aid, either humanitarian or other forms of aid, being sent are not being received—

Mr. HELMAN. Mr.—

Cochairman HOYER [continuing]. From whatever point of source?

Mr. HELMAN. Mr. Congressman, certainly we are concerned about these kinds of reports. I can address the humanitarian side of the question.

We've tried our best to fund those agencies, voluntary agencies, who, in fact, have medical programs inside Afghanistan. What they have been able to do falls far short of what is necessary.

We've tried to encourage them to expand their programs to the extent that the circumstances inside the country permit.

I have no evidence at all that on the humanitarian level the assistance we are providing through these agencies are not being used properly. In fact, I believe they are being used as well and as effectively as the circumstances permit.

Cochairman HOYER. What about the shortage of medical supplies that we heard Tor, I believe, speak to?

Mr. HELMAN. There's no question there is a shortage of medical supplies.

In my testimony, I have tried to define the extent of the medical and overall humanitarian need.

Part of the problem is getting people who are capable of employing those medical supplies where they can be used. There's a war on. It's not easy. It can be done only to a limited extent. The situation is really far, far from satisfactory.

We have tried to fully fund—I think we have fully funded every voluntary agency that, in fact, is active inside Afghanistan with medical programs.

I might add that——

Cochairman HOYER. Without belaboring it, if Senator D'Amato were here, he would respond to that answer, I think, much more animatedly than I'm going to respond to it. However, although I'm not a medical technician, it appears to me that if somebody is in pain and I have a painkiller to administer, it does not take a whole lot of experience, training, or, frankly, intelligence to administer that painkiller, assuming it's in the form of a pill or something of that nature. Apparently, from what Tor is saying, they're simply not available.

Now, to the extent that we could help that, then certainly we should. You did not reflect the attitude, that Ms. Goodwin indicated, was relayed to her.

However, the problem of getting medical supplies to Afghanistan is not related, I think, to the ability to use such supplies appropriately. There are obviously some basic supplies that can be used by almost anybody I would think, and they apparently——

Mr. HELMAN. All——

Cochairman HOYER [continuing]. Are not getting through.

Mr. HELMAN. All I can say is that we are putting in as many medical supplies as we possibly can.

Obviously it is very difficult to supervise distribution within that country for lots of very apparent reasons. But we're trying to do our best to put them in.

It's not a matter of funding. The money is there. It's a matter of getting it where it can be used.

There are some organizations, I should add, and very respectable organizations, who are very reluctant to associate themselves with anything other than the most basic pharmaceuticals on the grounds that some training is necessary to employ some of these pharmaceuticals. Others are rather more flexible in their policies.

We've tried to work with a lot of them.

Cochairman HOYER. I understand that.

Senator Humphrey.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Ambassador Helman, you are the Director of the State Department Inter-agency Task Force on Afghanistan. Does that mean that you are the head of that task force?

Mr. HELMAN. For humanitarian matters; yes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Humanitarian matters only?

Mr. HELMAN. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. All right.

Notwithstanding, is there—my first questions will go to the question—to the matter of Soviet defectors.

Is there an understanding on the task force of the opportunity to undermine morale of Soviet forces by encouraging defections?

Mr. HELMAN. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. There is?

Mr. HELMAN. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Now, you say we've been aware of the request of four—Meshcheryakov, Suleymanov, Khasanov, and Fayzulayev. How long have we been aware of this request?

Mr. HELMAN. I think we've been aware of that request for a number of months.

Mr. HUMPHREY. What are we doing about it?

Mr. HELMAN. Senator, until those people—those people are in Afghanistan itself.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I understand.

Mr. HELMAN. We have no way of getting to them—

Mr. HUMPHREY. Have you made it clear—

Mr. HELMAN [continuing]. And bringing them out.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Have we made it clear to the Afghan political groups that we would give these four—that we are aware that these four are seeking asylum and that we are willing to give it to them?

Mr. HELMAN. I believe the Afghan political groups are aware that any of the Soviet prisoners—

Mr. HUMPHREY. Have we made a specific request in this case, Ambassador Helman?

Mr. HELMAN. In the case of those four; no.

Mr. HUMPHREY. We've done nothing in fact?

Mr. HELMAN. We have not made a specific request in—

Mr. HUMPHREY. What have we—

Mr. HELMAN [continuing]. The case of those four.

Mr. HUMPHREY [continuing]. Done specifically with respect to these four?

Mr. HELMAN. With respect to those four, we have the information.

If they are presented to us—

Mr. HUMPHREY. We have had the information for months and we've done nothing, isn't that the answer?

Mr. HELMAN. The answer is something which I don't believe I can go into without making it impossible to bring anyone out in the future.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Well, that's a rather fuzzy answer.

Can you—is there a further elaboration on my direct question? Have we done anything to encourage, facilitate the transport of these four individuals, about whom we know, to such a place that we can give them political asylum?

Mr. HELMAN. At this point, I really can't answer it on the record, Mr. Senator.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Why not?

Mr. HELMAN. Because to the extent that it is answered on the record it will make it that much more difficult to bring out those and others.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Well, I don't really see much purpose in these hearings may I say, Congressman Hoyer, Chairman, if our witnesses are permitted to evade answering direct questions.

We—do we have power to administer oath?

I don't suggest we do it in this case. But just for future reference, do we have power to administer oath?

Cochairman HOYER. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. We also have power to subpoena, have we not?

Cochairman HOYER. I would think—

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think perhaps—



Cochairman HOYER [continuing]. The answer to that question is——

Mr. HUMPHREY [continuing]. We ought to——

Cochairman HOYER [continuing]. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREY [continuing]. Subpoena whatever records exist in this case, I would suggest to the Cochairman, and find out what the hell is going on, why we are wasting this opportunity, why we are callously disregarding the welfare of human beings who seek to come to this country, why we are refusing to save their lives, why there is no action month after month after month.

It's unconscionable. It's disgraceful. It's cowardly.

I am sick of it, sick to death of it.

What about these other 33, Mr. Ambassador, about whom Ms. Goodwin tells us? Are we aware that they are seeking political asylum?

Mr. SCHIFTER. Senator, I answered that. I answered that question.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Are we aware of it?

Mr. SCHIFTER. We are.

Mr. HUMPHREY. What are we doing?

Mr. SCHIFTER. I have indicated before, Senator, that we have a law, passed by the Congress of the United States, that we are seeking to enforce in a fair manner.

As far as I'm concerned, Senator, it would be great to allow a lot of people in here. There are 4 million refugees from Afghanistan. If the U.S. Congress is prepared to let any large number of them come to the United States, by all means the law will be enforced.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Why aren't these——

Mr. SCHIFTER. But the point, Senator, is that given the limitations imposed by the Congress of the United States, the administration has set up a scheme under which people qualify. The point here is that by just getting on an airplane and presenting oneself at JFK Airport in New York, this cannot be permitted to allow somebody to jump the line unless there is a special situation.

Mr. HUMPHREY. All right.

Thank you. I will look into the details of that.

But getting back to the matter of Soviet defectors, Ambassador Helman. I recall reading in someone's testimony, I'm not sure whose it was, perhaps it was Ms. Goodwin's, that there are probably many other Soviet defectors in the hands of the "mujahideen" who would come here if we had an active policy of accommodating defectors.

Are you aware that there are others who would defect—or who—that is who would come here—who have defected and who would come here if they were given the opportunity?

Mr. HELMAN. We've had a variety of reports that there are anywhere from 100 to 200 Soviet prisoners of the "mujahideen."

It's very difficult to pin down the exact number.

All I can say is that those Soviet soldiers in the hands of the "mujahideen" who have presented themselves to us for parole into the United States have been paroled to the United States.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Oh, please, don't give us this crap——

Mr. HELMAN. No. I have——

Mr. HUMPHREY [continuing]. About presenting.

Mr. HELMAN. It's——

Mr. HUMPHREY. It's so callous. It's so disgusting. Cut it out, will you?

How do you expect them to present themselves? Are they supposed to sprout wings?

We should be finding ways to facilitate it, Mr. Ambassador. That is my point.

What are we doing to find ways to facilitate the transport of these people so that we can give them political asylum in order to encourage further defections in order to undermine Soviet morale, the opportunity of which you say the task force is aware? What are we doing?

Mr. HELMAN. Senator, if you'd like to discuss this, if I could brief you privately, I will do so.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I wish you to do it publicly. That is why I'm asking you——

Mr. HELMAN. That is——

Mr. HUMPHREY [continuing]. In this forum.

Mr. HELMAN. That is what I find it difficult to do without making it that much——

Mr. HUMPHREY. All right.

Mr. HELMAN [continuing]. More difficult——

Mr. HUMPHREY. All right.

Mr. HELMAN [continuing]. To bring them out.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Thank you.

And, Mr. Cochairman, I ask further that we consider subpoenaing records and administering the oath to future witnesses so that we can investigate this matter of defections with respect specifically to these 4 and with respect to the—the—the number of 100 to 200 to which Mr. Helman has alleged.

I think it's just unspeakable that we are 6 years into this war, we have done virtually nothing to encourage defections. If anything, by our inaction and our callous treatment, have discouraged defections.

It's just senseless. It's stupid. It's cruel. It's unbelievable.

I, for one, am just fed up with it.

I apologize for losing my temper, but I lose it on behalf of the Afghans whom we have wronged.

Cochairman HOYER. I thank the Senator.

We will look into the request, certainly. I would think that that's a matter that we ought to bring up before the Commission itself. It will be brought up, and we will proceed accordingly.

Mr. Ritter.

Mr. RITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to associate myself with the substance of the remarks of the Senator from New Hampshire in regards to the active pursuit of Soviet defections.

Do we have at present, through our various radios, some program underway to speak directly to Soviet Armed Forces at the Afghan—in Afghanistan or at or near the Afghan border in central Asia?

Mr. HELMAN. Yes, we do. Our Voice of America is picked up, usually, quite well in Afghanistan. The Voice of America carries broadcasts about the war in Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, I sus-

pect that the interviews that Mr. Movchan gave to the Voice of America at the time he came over to this country, were broadcast and were heard loud and clear by the Soviets inside Afghanistan itself.

So, we do have an active program. We have active programs that broadcast also to the Afghan people themselves.

Mr. RITTER. In other words, we are broadcasting in—basically, I suppose, in Russian to—

Mr. HELMAN. Right. In a variety of languages. Primarily in Russian to the Soviet troops.

Mr. RITTER. Yes. To Soviet troops—

Mr. HELMAN. Yes.

Mr. RITTER [continuing]. Inside Afghanistan.

Mr. HELMAN. That's correct.

Mr. RITTER. That is a Voice of America program?

Mr. HELMAN. That's correct.

Mr. RITTER. Does that program go into the travesties of the Soviet Government and the Soviet troops and the atrocities? Does that program go into those things—

Mr. HELMAN. They do.

Mr. RITTER [continuing]. In broadcasting to the Soviet soldiers?

Mr. HELMAN. They do.

Mr. RITTER. How many hours a day do we broadcast to Soviet soldiers inside of Afghanistan?

Mr. HELMAN. I think the regular VOA broadcast goes to them. How many—how much time in those broadcasts are spent on Afghanistan itself I don't know, but it's easy enough to find out.

Mr. RITTER. All right.

I would like, on behalf of my colleagues in this Commission, to ask for the record, the number of hours a day that Soviet soldiers inside Afghanistan are receiving broadcasts on the conduct of their conduct of the war.

Mr. HELMAN. Certainly. [See app. 3.]

Mr. RITTER. Excuse me a minute.

Cochairman HOYER. Let me say to the witnesses and to those who have already testified that three of us are going to have to leave in about 10 minutes.

I doubt seriously whether we will be able to reconvene.

I apologize to Mr. Smith and to Mr. Ritter for, therefore, probably cutting their questions short, but a vote is coming on the floor, Mr. Ritter.

Mr. RITTER. I will try to make my questions as expeditious as possible.

You will provide, then, the documentation on the amount of time spent broadcasting to Soviet soldiers inside Afghanistan or at the border regions in central Asia on the war—not just VOA broadcasts—but on the conduct of the war itself, how many hours per day that we do that?

Mr. HELMAN. Yes.

Mr. RITTER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Have we in these broadcasts ever encouraged—and I'm sure this would have to be done in an extraordinarily subtle way—but have we ever encouraged Soviet soldiers to consider laying down their

arms for a noncombative future some other place? Have we ever discussed that issue?

Mr. HELMAN. Not to my knowledge.

Although, as I say, those who have come to the United States, such as Mr. Movchan, have been interviewed, and those interviews have been extensively broadcast at that time—

Mr. RITTER. I submit that—

Mr. HELMAN [continuing]. To Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

Mr. RITTER [continuing]. That there are really three prongs to this fork. One prong is communications. The other prong is, as the Senator from New Hampshire has so emotionally pointed out, the incentive—and there can be no incentive while this, their future, their situation as defectors, is uncertain.

Lord knows, their world there is uncertain enough. So, it would seem to me that clearing up the incentives and the atmosphere surrounding Soviet defectors should be a major priority of the task force. And that from—from the filmmakers' comments, we're not going to win this war with the guns. We may increase the costs. But we have to be more creative on the software if we can't be more creative on the hardware.

And, so, I am asking and I'm—I'll be discussing this with my colleagues on the Commission—that our Commission take a very active role in assisting policymakers to devise strategies for communications, for encouragement of defections.

The third prong is to establish a working pipeline to move Soviet troops out of Afghanistan.

I would like to also add that some of the Soviet troops fighting in Afghanistan are not of Russian descent; they are of Ukrainian descent; they are of Baltic descent; and they are of central Asian descent. We've recently been reading about a new influx of central Asians having to bear their own burden in this larger war that Mr. Gorbachev is promoting.

I would like your task force to take under advisement the idea of using some broadcast time toward the other nationalities, other than the Russian nationalities, because we know that counterpart groups here in the West, in the United States and in Western Europe can be very useful, can be very helpful—national groups who could assist the development of messages and proper broadcasts to these people in encouraging the potential for defection.

Cochairman HOYER. If I may—

Mr. RITTER. Yes.

Cochairman HOYER. I recognize Mr. Smith, and note that Senator Humphrey has to leave.

Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I'll keep it short, Mr. Chairman, knowing that we have to vote.

Ambassador Helman, how extensive were the discussions between Secretary General Gorbachev and President Reagan on the issue of Afghanistan? Perhaps more importantly, what is contemplated? What steps are being discussed within the State Department by the administration to resolve the so-called regional conflict, a glib category that Afghanistan has been placed into?

Mr. HELMAN. Well, I don't know exactly how much time was spent in Geneva on Afghanistan.

The State Department, however, has been giving thought to what next steps might be taken. We are looking toward the proximity talks, which reconvene in Geneva under U.N. auspices the week of December 16, to see if there's further evidence of more flexibility in the Soviet position.

I think it should be clear from the President's speech to the United Nations last month on regional initiatives and the strong effort the United States has made down through the years in support of the Afghan cause that we will pursue every angle to bring about a political settlement.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

I yield back to the Chair.

Cochairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, could I just break in for one additional comment which I'd like to have on the record here? I'll make it very brief.

We're very concerned about the Pakistani Government and this policy of fining "mujahideen" who take foreign journalists around.

There's sufficient cause for concern about the limited amount of material, and information getting out of Afghanistan. I think that could be devastating. I would hope that we make it very clear to the Pakistanis that this is not acceptable. And, in fact, in the authorizations that would come up on Pakistani assistance in the next round of foreign aid activities on the floor, I think this would be an extremely poor recommendation for the assistance program to the Pakistanis.

I thank you.

Mr. HELMAN. Let me add, if Ms. Goodwin will give me more information, I can assure you we will follow up on it.

Cochairman HOYER. All right.

Ms. GOODWIN. I'd like——

Mr. HELMAN. Well, why don't we wait until afterward?

[Following are the full texts of Ambassadors Helman and Schifter:]

Prepared Statement of

Gerald B. Helman

Deputy to the Under Secretary of State

for Political Affairs

before the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Congress of the United States

Washington, D.C. /

December 4, 1985

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE

The Soviet Union's unprovoked invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 caused one of the world's most serious ongoing humanitarian crises. The tragedy continues despite global revulsion. The international community has responded in a number of ways. From the beginning of the crisis, the United States and many other countries, western and non-aligned, have made generous contributions of money and food for the Afghan refugees. We have also joined other countries in providing increasing amounts of humanitarian assistance to war-affected Afghans inside Afghanistan. Our efforts have been a matter of public record. I would like to take this opportunity to give you an overview of how we see the humanitarian needs of the Afghans' inside Afghanistan, and how we are responding to those needs.

Humanitarian Situation in Afghanistan

The Soviet invasion and continued attempt to subdue Afghanistan have caused widespread tragedy in that country, and a thoroughgoing violation of the human rights of the Afghan people. The increasingly heavy fighting has resulted in the death and wounding of hundreds of thousands of Afghans. The

continuing conflict forced more than two and half million Afghans to become refugees in Pakistan and Iran. Indiscriminate Soviet military attacks have internally displaced perhaps a million other Afghans within their own country, with many seeking safety in the major cities. Other Afghans seek primitive shelter in the mountains and hills. Estimates cannot be precise. But about one-quarter to one-third of Afghanistan's pre-war population has been driven into exile, killed, wounded, or internally displaced. The Soviet people, who recall their own tragic losses during World War II, should be in the best position to understand the magnitude of the tragedy that their government has visited on Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the Afghan people and their resistance fighters, the Mujahidin, continue their valiant opposition to the Soviet invaders and their local collaborators. The Soviet response has been directed against the Mujahidin and at the civilian population in areas where the Mujahidin operate. The loss of civilian life and destruction have been extensive, largely as a consequence of indiscriminate attacks.

#### War-Related Food and Medical Problems

We can only make rough estimates of the food and medical



situation in Afghanistan. In a country where diet traditionally has been at the lower scale of adequate, and medical care marginal at best, the situation has obviously deteriorated. Soviet bombing and Soviet/DRA ground attacks disrupt cultivation and destroy even basic farm implements and livestock. While this has not produced a general famine country-wide, there are severe regional food shortages. Food distribution is erratic at best, and the potential for catastrophe remains. The ravages of war have seriously eroded the capacity of the ordinary Afghan farmer and herder to deal with unexpected shortages of snow or rain and disruption of transportation. Except for timely rains this spring, the cumulative destruction of the fragile irrigation networks and traditional farming system could have created an even more disastrous situation. This has not helped maintain the quantity and quality of livestock, traditionally the Afghans' last reserve against starvation. Herds have deteriorated seriously through destruction and, because of the absence of even primitive veterinary services, through disease. Tens of thousands of people in the countryside already suffer from serious localized food shortages. Women, children and the elderly suffer the worst. The people displaced from the Panjsher valley and other areas of heavy fighting by successive Soviet attacks are especially vulnerable, and their sufferings increase terribly during the winter.

The Soviet invasion and continuing conflict have wrecked most of Afghanistan's limited medical infrastructure. Most Afghans, civilian and mujahidin, have no access to even minimal kinds of modern medical care. While a variety of "medicines" are sold in the bazaars, local "pharmacists" and traditional healers are the sole source of medical care for most of the sick and wounded. The war has also wrecked the limited public health efforts in the country. Vaccinations and immunizations are seldom given even in provincial towns. Measles, mumps, malaria and other common diseases have returned with a vengeance and afflict many thousands. Western visitors report many deaths from childhood diseases complicated by poor nutrition. Again, people displaced by the fighting suffer the worst. Soviet mines are a special hazard. "Toy" or "butterfly" mines that wound adults, maim and kill children. Infected wounds and low resistance to disease from poor diet kill many people who might otherwise have survived.

The Soviet directed war has also caused the destruction of most of the limited education system and social services in Afghanistan. Most rural schools have been destroyed in the fighting. The Soviets/DRA regard the few surviving rural schools operated by the local religious leaders and the Mujahidin as especially dangerous to their efforts to control the country, and make every attempt to destroy them. The DRA

has forced schools in the towns and cities to follow Soviet models of education in an attempt to indoctrinate a new generation of Afghan youths in an alien ideology. The Soviets have also taken thousands of Afghan children, including primary school age children, to the USSR for education and indoctrination. Kabul University is a facade reserved for the children of collaborators. Its students are supposed to support Soviet goals. Social services are limited to a few token orphanages and homes for the elderly and disabled. The DRA does not even seriously try to take care of its own disabled soldiers. The DRA reserves real social services to a small segment of the urbanized population that has thrown in its lot with them and with the Soviets.

#### The Afghan Response

The Afghan people and their resistance fighters have shown extraordinary resourcefulness in coping with these hardships. Some people farm several extra-small plots on hillsides rather than more productive large fields in open spaces where much of the fighting occurs. Others work larger fields but only between dusk and dawn. The rural people obtain food, medicine, clothing and agricultural supplies on the informal local markets. And the Mujahidin bring their people supplies when

they can. Many Mujahidin leaders on their own and with traditional local leaders have established primitive "clinics," schools, and food distribution networks. These efforts exist in most provinces, albeit in very different forms. Some people have even discussed the concept of a "Mujahidin Social Service" to care for the great majority of the Afghans in the countryside.

#### The Pakistani Response

Since the beginning of the conflict in Afghanistan, the government and people of Pakistan have responded generously and on their own initiative to the humanitarian needs of the Afghans. The Pakistanis have accepted more than two million Afghans into temporary refuge, the largest refugee population in the world. Pakistani medical personnel, teachers, engineers, social workers, and civil servants provide most of the relief assistance required to support the Afghan refugees. While the United States and the international community have contributed much of the funds and food in-kind needed by the Afghans, the Pakistanis have also provided significant amounts of funding and food from their own resources. For a developing country with problems of its own, the Pakistani response has been especially noteworthy. The Pakistani Red Crescent Society has played an important role in the relief effort.

Western Humanitarian Assistance

As is traditionally the case in humanitarian crises, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was among the first to respond to the plight of the Afghans. It operates an evacuation chain for wounded and sick Afghans reaching the Pakistani frontier and treats them in ICRC hospitals in Peshawar and Quetta. It also operates a paraplegic clinic and runs first-aid training courses for Afghans who return to care for their people inside Afghanistan with ICRC provided medical supplies. This ICRC effort along the frontier is the essential basis on which other related medical and humanitarian efforts can build.

A number of European voluntary agencies also have been providing important humanitarian assistance for several years to the Afghans inside Afghanistan. The best known are the French doctors whose medical teams often spend up to six months inside Afghanistan. But other French groups, along with British, Scandinavians, Belgians, and more recently German counterparts have been providing medical care, food, and some education aid. Private American groups have helped to raise funds for some of the Europeans and for local Afghan voluntary agencies. Other Europeans and Americans have helped to

publicize the plight of the Afghans, arrange special medical care in the West for some when required, and assist in other ways. But all of this falls short of what is needed.

#### The U.S. Effort

The United States also is now well along in implementing a program of emergency humanitarian assistance for the Afghan people inside Afghanistan. As with the Europeans, our effort is in addition to our continued support for the Afghan refugees. Our program is designed to help sustain the Afghans in their own country. We began this humanitarian endeavor with the Vice President's trip to Pakistan in May 1984. At that time, we used refugee program funds to provide approximately \$1 million in medical and related assistance for the Afghans. Later in 1984, the Congress earmarked \$2 million for medical and medically related assistance for the Afghans for use by the end of March 1985. This year the President has twice exercised his extraordinary authority under the Contingencies provision of the Foreign Assistance Act to make available a total of \$6 million for emergency food, medical and other humanitarian assistance. The Congress also acted again this year to authorize in the Foreign Assistance bill not less than \$15 million annually in humanitarian assistance for the Afghans commencing in FY-1986.

The Emergency Assistance Effort

We are implementing the ongoing emergency humanitarian assistance effort by working with the Pakistani government and with American and international private voluntary organizations. The \$8 million we have available (\$2 million designated by Congress for medical related assistance and \$6 million from funds previously appropriated for other purposes) has been broadly allocated as follows:

- for support of medical clinics inside Afghanistan and medical facilities which treat sick and wounded Afghans. \$2,634,000
- for medical training of Afghans to serve inside Afghanistan (this includes funding of the International Medical Corps and Freedom Medicine). \$1,460,000
- for food to be provided to deficit areas inside Afghanistan. \$2,614,000

Through this program, we have significantly met a number of important objectives:

-- We have fully funded all of those organizations needing our assistance who are actively providing medical assistance to Afghans inside Afghanistan or on its frontier.

-- We have provided sufficient food assistance to deficit areas to see the population through the winter. We have learned that our initiative has evoked substantial matching contributions from European sources.

-- We have initiated programs of medical training which by next year should substantially augment the number of Mujahidin with useful medical skills.

#### Looking Ahead

We have projects under preparation for additional food and medical help and a smaller project for education inside Afghanistan. We are also actively considering projects to provide para-veterinary and agricultural self-sufficiency training and assistance to Afghans for use inside their country. We want to increase the Afghans' capacity to help themselves. This would include providing seeds, small farming implements, cooking utensils, shelter materials, household supplies, and para-veterinary kits. There also are some simple, new techniques to care for livestock and increase food production.

#### The Longer-Term Effort

This achievement has been significant, but constitutes just a start on the broader, longer-term program authorized by the Congress. We must work in fullest cooperation with the Pakistani government, the Afghan resistance, and the private voluntary organizations. Several weeks ago Agency for International Development (AID) Administrator Mr. Peter



McPherson explained, in letters to the relevant Congressional committees, that AID is well-advanced in planning for the funds earmarked for FY86. These plans will continue to respect Afghan sensitivities and cultural traditions. As with the emergency effort, simplicity and flexibility will be our guides in implementing the longer-term program.

Two small teams of American experts from non-profit organizations are already in Pakistan to design longer-term projects in medical care and education. The teams' goals are to explore ways to expand support of medical care of Afghans by Afghans in as many areas as possible. The emphasis will be on providing basic health care, including emergency care, and as much public health-training and aid as is practical. The teams' goals are also to explore ways to support, improve and significantly expand existing primary and other education efforts by Afghans including providing text books, school supplies and teacher training. The teams will be consulting closely with Afghan leaders in these fields, voluntary agencies already assisting the Afghans, the Pakistani government, and other experts as well. We expect the teams' reports by about the end of the year.

The next phase in a stepped-up, longer-term humanitarian assistance program will be to develop further projects for agricultural and commodity assistance for the Afghans. AID hopes to send additional American experts to Pakistan to design these projects in the first quarter of 1986. Every practical means will be explored to help the Afghan people.

### Conclusion

You may be assured that we share your desire to provide all possible humanitarian assistance to the Afghans and to encourage other countries to do the same. You may also be assured that we will continue to keep the Congress informed of developments in this important program as we proceed. We are confident of the continuing support of the Congress and the American people.

The United States remains committed to support a negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan question which will produce a free, independent, and non-aligned Afghanistan, governed by Afghans themselves and no longer occupied by foreign troops, an Afghanistan to which the millions of refugees now abroad may return in safety and in honor. We will continue to speak out against the brutal repression of the Afghan people by the Soviet Union's occupying army, and we will work closely with the UN and all freedom-loving nations for an early withdrawal of Soviet forces.

Prepared Statement of

Richard Schifter

Assistant Secretary of State for

Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

before the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Congress of the United States

Washington, D.C.

December 4, 1985

Mr. Chairman:

Of all the human rights violations committed in the world today, none are as brutal, pervasive, and massive as those perpetrated by the Soviet Union and its local puppets against the people of Afghanistan. As in other such situations that have occurred in history, the intensity and scope of human suffering in Afghanistan is so great as to be difficult if not impossible to fathom.

To put the problem in a context in which it can be systematically analyzed, I shall distinguish among three sets of human rights violations. First, there are those which are committed by Soviet combat forces in the context of the military operations, for instance clearly in violation of the relevant standards of international conventions, violations directed against the Mujahidin fighters as well as against the civilian population. Second, there are gross and massive violations of the human rights of the civilian population in areas under Soviet control, violations consisting of severe repression of civil liberties, large scale incarcerations, arbitrary executions, and torture. Third, there is the effort to stamp out the Afghan native cultural heritage and incorporate the country de facto into the Soviet Union.

Today, close to six years after the initial massive entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, one hundred and fifteen thousand Soviet soldiers are stationed in that country, supported by an additional thirty thousand to thirty five thousand soldiers in the contiguous Central Asian region of the USSR. There has been no let up in the fighting during the last year. And, as before, the Soviet troops have carried the battle to the civilian population in the rural areas which have not allowed themselves to be conquered. Thus, after unsuccessful attempts over the past six years to take the strategic Panjsher Valley, the Soviet air force has during the last year resorted to indiscriminate high altitude saturation bombing. This scorched-earth tactic has resulted in untold death and injury to innocent civilians and dramatic damage and destruction to homes, agricultural fields, and livestock.

On the ground, Soviet and Soviet-directed forces have continued during the past year their war against the civilian population. In mid-March, Soviet soldiers were reported to have murdered over 1,000 civilians during punitive strikes against villages in Laghman province, in Northwest Afghanistan, in retaliation for their support of Mujahidin fighters who were operating in the area. In May, again in Laghman province, some 100 innocent civilians, mostly children and old women, were slaughtered when marauding bands of Soviet soldiers attacked

the village of Qarghan'i. A group of women and children who attempted to flee were pursued by Soviet soldiers and killed in a Mosque where they had taken refuge. Other reports of old men, women, and children being rounded up and shot are common. .

Large scale Soviet-led military operations in the Logar Valley, also in Northwest Afghanistan, caused massive destruction to villages located East of Asadabad and created another influx of several thousand refugees into neighboring Pakistan. Two large military ground operations into the Panjsher, added to the devastation wreaked on villages and agricultural facilities there during two similar assaults last year and by this year's bombing attacks. Soviet and Afghan troops were reported to have destroyed systematically many of the smaller villages in the north of the Panjsher Valley. Latest reports indicate homes and fields which had theretofore escaped damage were destroyed methodically often with bulldozers.

Although fighting is a daily occurrence in Afghanistan, there are no known prisoner-of-war camps or facilities for resistance fighters. Summary executions of captured members on the battlefield are commonplace.

As I have already noted, soviet counterinsurgency tactics target civilians as well as the Mujahidin. In addition to direct attacks by ground troops or from the air, the Soviet forces systematically employ particularly cruel types of anti-personnel explosives in an effort to terrorize the populace and restrict the movement of resistance forces. Butterfly mines and explosive devices disguised as household objects or toys have been strewn along trails and paths in the Southwest and Eastern parts of Afghanistan. Many of the large number of leg and foot injuries seen on the streets of Kabul are said to be the result from such explosive charges.

As I noted earlier, the terror in the areas of military conflict is accompanied by the terror in the areas under the military control of the Soviet Union and its puppets.

Under Soviet rule in Afghanistan, there are no constitutional, legislative, or legal safeguards against secret arrests or detention. Other fundamental freedoms such as free speech and press do not exist. All Afghans in areas controlled by the occupiers live in constant fear of unwarranted seizure by the secret police. Persons are often picked up for questioning on the word of Afghan secret police informants and are not told of the charges against them. Warrants are not used, nor is the right of habeas corpus or the general rule of law respected. Many prisoners have languished incommunicado in

Afghan prisons without any knowledge of the charges, if any, against them. Others have been paraded before the media, offered televised recantations which were followed by a show trial and swift execution.

For Afghanistan's many prisoners, torture and psychological intimidation remain among the main techniques used by the security services to extract information or confessions from detainees and to inflict punishment. Survivors of Afghan prisons continue to recount gruesome tales consistent with a general pattern of torture including electric shock treatment, beatings, extraction of fingernails, burning of genitalia and deprivation of sleep. Women, children, and other family members have been threatened or killed by Soviet and Afghan troops in an effort to extract information or confessions from villagers during house-to-house searches.

Brutal treatment of prisoners is not new in Afghanistan; however, only since the 1978 coup has the use of torture become widespread and systematic in interrogation. Though the police and the prisons are run by Afghans, there have been consistent reports from former inmates, detainees and prisoners of the presence of Soviet "advisors" at interrogation sessions. Some prisoners have alleged that Soviet officers have taken an active part in interrogations, including torture. Amnesty International in its report Torture in the Eighties, Helsinki Watch in its report Tears, Blood and Cries and most recently the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Afghanistan have detailed grisly treatment of prisoners at the hands of the Afghan security apparatus.

Through their continuing military effort and their repressive police measures, the Soviet Union and its local allies seek to deal with the problem of Afghan unwillingness to submit to domination by the invaders. At the same time, we are witnessing an effort by the Soviet Union to look beyond these years of conflict and military strife. Side-by-side with the efforts to subjugate the country by force of arms continues a Soviet campaign against independent Afghan political activity, Afghan economic institutions and Afghanistan's cultural heritage and national traditions.

What we can witness is an attempt to create, at the de facto level, yet again another "union republic" operating as an integral part of a Russian-dominated Empire. Since the 1979 invasion, Soviet advisors have moved into controlling positions in Afghan government ministries, the army, and the security apparatus. They now either directly make, or are deeply involved in, all significant political, military, and social decisions.

The local regime and its Soviet supervisors have seen the education system and the mass media as essential instruments in realizing their long-term objectives of Sovietizing Afghan society and of overturning all traditional Afghan social and political institutions. Examples of this effort include Soviet attempts to replace traditional Afghan writing with Soviet writing and alphabet, the introduction of Soviet culture and political ideology into the Afghan school system, and the dispatch of thousands of Afghan students to the U.S.S.R. for training and indoctrination in Communism and the Soviet way of life.

The current regime tolerates no expression of ideas which has not been carefully weighed, judged, and approved by the party and its Soviet ideological supervisors. Every effort is taken to stifle and suppress opposition viewpoints. Criticism of the local regime or the Soviet Union is swiftly punished. Censorship, surveillance, and oppression mark the means employed by the regime to ensure that all publicly expressed views conform to the party line.

All media are owned and controlled by the regime and tightly supervised by Soviet officials. The press, radio, and television are used solely to convey regime policy and Soviet interpretation of world events. Soviet films and entertainment programs are frequently featured on Afghan television to reinforce that interpretation. Forbidden are the unlicensed import and sale of foreign video and audio tapes, magazines, books, posters, and other publications.

The great majority of new books on sale in Kabul, irrespective of language, are Soviet-published and Soviet-censored. Afghans are guarded in their private conversations, even among friends and colleagues, lest anti-regime or anti-Soviet remarks be reported to the secret police. Western radio broadcasts, in the local languages, are regularly jammed. Fortunately some programs do get through to Afghan listeners and constitute their only source of uncensored information. But by listening to such programs they risk severe punishment.

This, then, is the state of human rights in Afghanistan as we approach the sixth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of that country. The picture, as you can see, is a grim one. It is essential that we continue to make concerned people throughout the world aware of what it is that has been going on in that most unfortunate country and what continues to go on. These hearings, I'm sure, play a highly useful role in that context.

Cochairman HOVER. In light of the fact we're on record, I want to reiterate the point made by the Chairman with respect to that question; that is the delicate situation in which Pakistanis find themselves vis-a-vis the Soviets regarding Afghanistan.

I think that's a valid consideration that must be kept in mind and obviously, cannot ignore it.

My thanks again to Mr. Movchan, Hamed, and Tor for being with us. Ms. Goodwin and Mr. Lobek, thank you for the compelling testimony that you both presented this morning.

Let me apologize to Ambassador Helman and Ambassador Schifter, who properly and preferably should have been accorded more time to make formal statements and engage in a question and answer period.

Although Ambassador Helman, I do not know you as well as I happen to know Ambassador Schifter, I share the view that the Chairman stated earlier that we both have faith in your commitment and focus.

I think legitimate questions have been raised here as to the vigor with which our Government is pursuing some avenues that could help, not necessarily solve, but certainly help alleviate the suffering that is occurring in Afghanistan.

We hope that you will report to us. I think the private conversations that may ensue as a result of this hearing will also be helpful to this Commission.

Clearly, Afghanistan yields some very significant issues relating to humanitarian concerns. This Commission, unique in its role vis-a-vis Congress and the executive branch of the United States, is focused on issues of humanitarian concern.

That a signatory nation to the Helsinki Final Act is egregiously, frontally, and without any constraints, savaging the human rights and humanitarian concerns of the people in Afghanistan is a concern of this Commission. To that extent we certainly think it is an appropriate focus of this Commission, and in our pursuit of answers, we would appreciate your help and your keeping us informed. We intend to consult with both of you, that is with the State Department, and with the administration in the future.

With that, I want to thank all of those in attendance and conclude this hearing.

[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 1:32 p.m.]

[The following material was subsequently received for the record:]



## APPENDIX 1

Дорогая Люси!

Мы с вами не имели возможности поговорить наедине. Но как православные христиане вы должны помочь нам попасть в Америку. ~~Если вы это~~

P.S. Надеюсь, что вы можете нам в нашем стремлении попасть в Америку. Мы хотим приехать в Африка некое государство.

Сергей Мешчеряков  
Гриша Сулейманов  
Федор Хасанов  
Акрам Файзулаев

Напишите ответ.  
Когда вы уезжаете?

(Excerpt from note given to Ludmilla (Lucia) Thorne from four Soviet POW's in Afghanistan)

Dear Lucia,

We did not have the opportunity to speak with you on a one-to-one basis. But you, who are Orthodox Christians, must help us make our way to America.

P.S. I hope that you will help us in our striving to come to America. We want to become American citizens.

/s/ Sergei Meshcheryakov  
Grisha Suleymanov  
Fedor Khasanov  
Akram Fayzulayev

Write us an answer. When are you leaving?

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## Soviet POW's who wish to come to the West:

Pvt. Sergei Meshcheryakov, Russian, from Voronezh.  
Sgt. Grisha Suleymanov, Azerbaiddzhani from Dagestan.  
Pvt. Fedor Khasanov, Uzbek from Fergana.  
Pvt. Akram Fayzulayev, Uzbek from Karsh.  
Pvt. Mansur Aladinov, Crimean Tatar from Tashkent.  
Master Sgt. Sergei Nasurlyayev, Russian/Tadjik from Leningrad.  
Pvt. Sergei Andreyev, Russian from Rostov-on-Don.  
Sgt. Andrei Skoropletov, Russian, from Pervomaysk.  
Nikolay Shevchenko (civilian), Ukrainian, from Kiev.  
Pvt. Vladislav Naumov, Russian, from Volgograd.  
Pvt. Sergei Busov, Russian, from Perm.  
Pvt. Vadim Plotnikov, Russian, from Moscow.  
Pvt. Igor Kovalchuk, Russian/Ukrainian, from Kharkov.  
Pvt. Nikolay Golovin, Russian.

## APPENDIX 2



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Senator D'Amato:

During the CSCE Commission's hearings on December 4, you asked whether I would look into the allegation that a State Department official had said that one of the reasons for not applying more resources within Afghanistan was because the Afghans were uneducated. Ms. Jan Goodwin, a reporter and one of the witnesses before the Commission, said the remark was made to her. At your request I agreed to look into the matter if the name of the official were provided to me by Ms. Goodwin.

On December 6, I called Ms. Goodwin to remind her that I was obligated to the Commission to follow up on the matter, if she would give me the name of the official. She replied that she would not do so on the grounds that the attitude the official expressed was characteristic of the State Department as a whole and consequently it would be unfair to single out one individual.

I pointed out to Ms. Goodwin that I was under an obligation to the Commission and that I would have to inform the Commission of her unwillingness to provide me with the name. I asked Ms. Goodwin to put her refusal in writing, which she undertook to do. To date, I have not received her promised letter.

I would like this letter to be made part of the Commission's record. I remain willing to look into the allegation if I am given a name. As I stated to the Commission on December 4, I believe the attitude ascribed to this unnamed individual does not represent either U.S. policy or practice.

Sincerely,

Gerald B. Helman  
Deputy to the Under Secretary  
of State for Political Affairs

The Honorable  
Alfonse M. D'Amato,  
United States Senate,  
Washington, D. C.

## APPENDIX 3

United States Department of State  
Deputy to the  
*Under Secretary of State*  
*for Political Affairs*

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 12, 1985

Dear Senator D'Amato:

At the hearings before the Helsinki Commission on December 4, I was asked to provide information on Russian language broadcasts to Afghanistan by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. This letter responds to that request.

Both VOA and RFE/RL broadcast in Russian to Soviet Central Asia. Despite efforts at jamming, the radio signal does spill over into Afghanistan. As regards the Russian service of VOA, information on Afghanistan was the subject of 17.5 hours worth of programming during the last three months. This included correspondents' reports, editorials, opinion roundups, backgrounders, articles adapted from the press, interviews and special reports. This figure does not include newscast items and references to Afghanistan in speeches by the President, administration officials and others. Three and a half hours of this programming dealt with Soviet/Mujahadeen military operations, and six and a half hours with Red Army defections. In the past, VOA has carried interviews with Soviet military defectors.

VOA is now preparing to mark the sixth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Russian service will devote its half-hour Forum show for the last week of December to Afghanistan and will repeat the show four times. In cooperation with the Dari and Pashto services, the Russian service is planning a series of interviews with eyewitnesses to and victims of the Soviet invasion to be broadcast this month and in January. In addition, the Russian service will re-broadcast a twenty-part series that puts the Afghan situation in historical perspective. It will also feature this series on its new morning broadcast to Central Asia.


The Honorable  
Alfonse D'Amato,  
United States Senate.

As regards the Russian service of Radio Liberty, which is on the air twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, its top news priority is coverage of the war in Afghanistan. RL reports every reliable scrap of information about the conduct of the war. As of a year ago, it has had a correspondent in Islamabad reporting war news full-time. While we do not have a statistical breakdown of the number of hours RL/Russian devotes to Afghan war news, the ratio of war coverage to total air time is believed to be comparable to that which obtains at Radio Free Afghanistan.

Radio Free Afghanistan, which is part of RFE/RL, was established pursuant to Section 303 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (the Humphrey Amendment). It broadcasts only in Dari for fifteen minutes, twice a week, although it plans to add a limited Pashto service soon. It has been on the air a total of five hours since its establishment on October 1, 1985. RFE/RL estimates that the Russian service of RL devotes about 10 percent of its broadcasts to Afghan news. To give more precise figures about RL/Russian's coverage of the war would require a substantial research project as that service is on the air non-stop. We will be happy, however, to request that RFE/RL undertake such a project should you so desire.

It is our hope that upon completion of the President's program to upgrade and modernize VOA and RFE/RL's facilities, the strength of our signal into Afghanistan and elsewhere will attract an even more substantial audience.

Sincerely,



Gerald B. Helman

## APPENDIX 4

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN HEINZ

December 4, 1985

William Shakespeare likened the world to a stage, and its peoples to players.

At Geneva, on center stage, we saw a Soviet Union, serious about peace, committed to dialogue, and eager, even avid, to share its views and its actions with the people of the world through the hundreds of journalists that attended that summit meeting.

Today, this Commission hearing will pull back the curtain on a far corner of the stage to reveal a different Soviet Union, engaged in atrocities against civilians, spurning discussions, and suspicious, even paranoid, about the minimal media coverage the Soviets cannot block of their actions in Afghanistan.

Let there be no mistake, the drama unfolding on that hidden corner of the world stage is not grand theater but desperate tragedy, awful to contemplate and terrible to behold.

Some estimate that between four and five million Afghans, somewhere between 25% and 33% of the population, have fled the carnage in their country to become refugees in Pakistan. The magnitude of displacement is comparable to seeing a similar percentage of U.S. citizens, between 62 and 83 million Americans, crossing the borders to live in poverty and despair.

What of those that remain in their home country? They are subject to what the Helsinki Watch has called "indiscriminate warfare...combined with the worst excesses of unbridled state-sanctioned violence against civilians."

We have all seen reports on how the Soviet military has used its high technology weapons, such as the HIND attack helicopter, to wipe out entire Afghan villages. How can the free world ignore the fact that the Soviet Union is currently using Afghanistan, and the flesh and blood of the Afghan people, to test its newest and deadliest military equipment?

Helsinki Watch, an organization set up to monitor compliance with the Helsinki accords (or in the Soviet case--noncompliance), has described in bone-chilling detail exactly how barbaric the Soviet's human rights violations have been.

There is the story of two blind brothers, aged 90 and 95, who had dynamite tied to their backs by Soviet troops and were subsequently blown up. Plastic "butterfly" mines, deviously disguised as pens, birds, and harmonicas, have been dropped from helicopters and are intended to maim, not kill, Afghan children. Is this the mark that a "peace-loving" nation leaves on society?

To a civilized society, these stories seem too ghastly to believe. First hand evidence, however, is in this city; an 8 year-old Afghan boy who is currently being treated at Georgetown University for serious wounds he received when the Soviets indiscriminately bombed his village home, killing many in his family.

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our distinguished witnesses as to the conditions in Afghanistan as well as their recommendations on ways that the policy of the United States can help improve the situation of the Afghan people.

## APPENDIX 5

Statement by Senator Malcolm Wallop, Helsinki Commissioner, for  
the Helsinki Commission Hearing on Soviet Violations of the  
Helsinki Accords in Afghanistan, December 4, 1985

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Six years ago this month the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and by so doing, stepped over yet another line which had divided East and West since World War II. That 1979 Soviet take-over of Afghanistan changed the geopolitical situation on the perimeter of the free world and we must never forget that fact. That bold and aggressive act revealed once again what the Soviet Union will do if opportunities present themselves for territorial aggrandizement. This we cannot forget whenever we sit down at negotiating tables to deal with them, whether in the Helsinki process or otherwise.

Mr. Chairman, since 1979 the Soviet Union has maintained a continuous hold on Afghanistan solely by military force. Moscow has maintained over 320,000 occupation forces in Afghanistan and another 40,000 troops along its border. The record of that Soviet occupation is one which must be brought to the attention of the American people and held up to the light of world public opinion. I applaud the Helsinki Commission for holding this



hearing today, so close to the date marking the six long years of illegal Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Much has been written concerning the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and I do not propose to review the past six years here. However, it is my expectation that today's hearing will air the important subject of the Soviet record of humanitarian and human rights abuses in Afghanistan, including Soviet use of chemical and biological warfare against the Afghan people in flagrant violation of international law and Soviet "commitments" to the world community. I urge this hearing to investigate the magnitude of the refugee problem - some fifteen million - created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the extent of the refugee problem for Afghanistan's neighbors such as Pakistan.

Mr. Chairman, I know this hearing also will review the refugee relief effort and make clear just how inhumane Soviet actions towards the millions of Afghanis has been. Civilized people must know that the Soviet Union has created one of the worst refugee problems the world has ever witnessed and that the Soviet Union has blocked international efforts to provide relief to the refugees within the borders of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union, for example, has prevented the International Red Cross from entering Afghanistan, either as observers or as providers of relief and medical assistance to the Afghan people. The Soviet Union, in effect, has blocked nearly all efforts of any type to relieve the terrible suffering of the Afghan people under the Soviet occupation.

Mr. Chairman, I expect this hearing also to review the fine record of the Afghan resistance fighters, the Mujahideen, in their struggle for liberty and freedom from the oppression of the Soviet invaders. It is imperative that we consider their needs with a view to finding ways to grant them additional support and encouragement in their valiant struggle against communist occupation..

Mr. Chairman, I understand that again this year, as in past years, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghan soil. This year, however, that resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority. The vote is witness to the outrage of the international community with respect to developments in Afghanistan. I know that the General Assembly this week received the completed report it had requested on Soviet human rights violations in Afghanistan. That report is also to be brought to the attention of the American people in this hearing and it is my

hope that other governments will assure that it is widely circulated in their countries as well.

Let us not forget what the Soviet Union did to the American Embassy in Kabul this fall, either. What business did they have surrounding our Embassy with Soviet troops and turning off the power? Was that not yet another flagrant violation of international law and common practice among nations? While that incident is not a subject of today's hearing, it, too, should not be forgotten, for it is one more example of Soviet behavior in occupied Afghanistan.

The foregoing speaks for itself regarding Soviet adherence to the Helsinki accords in Afghanistan. Given Soviet performance under those accords how can we expect the USSR to perform any better in other fields? Is the Soviet Union the kind of nation we or any other nation can trust to fulfill its promises to us in future in other vital areas such as arms control?

I look forward to hearing the testimony of the many witnesses present today and want them to know that their testimony will have a wide audience among the American people. I thank you.

