IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

RESTRICTIONS ON ARTISTIC FREEDOM IN THE SOVIET UNION, OCTOBER 29, 1985; AND THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM, DECEMBER 11, 1985

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PUBLIC HEARING ON RESTRICTIONS ON ARTISTIC FREEDOM IN THE SOVIET UNION

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1985

COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
Washington, DC.

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 210, Cannon House Office Building, at 10 a.m., Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato, chairman, and Representative Steny H. Hoyer, cochairman, presiding.

In attendance: Commissioners and Senators John Heinz, Gordon J. Humphrey, and Dennis DeConcini; Commissioners and Representatives Dante B. Fascell, Don Ritter, and Christopher H. Smith.

Also in attendance: Michael R. Hathaway, staff director, and Mary Sue Hafner, general counsel of the Commission.

OPENING STATEMENT OF COCHAIRMAN HOYER

Cochairman HOYER. Ladies and gentlemen, I want to welcome you to this hearing on restrictions on creative freedom in the Soviet Union.

We have several distinguished visitors with us who will be testifying, and I want to welcome them and thank each one of them for participating in this hearing.

Senator D'Amato, chairman of the Commission, is at another hearing, presently, and, therefore, will be late. To my left is the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and formerly chairman of the Helsinki Commission, Representative Dante Fascell, who has provided outstanding leadership over the years in the cause of human rights.

To my right is Senator Gordon Humphrey, a new member of the Commission, but who is giving the Commission new vitality, and we very much appreciate working with him.

The Commission is fortunate to have such an eminent group of witnesses before it today.

This hearing has been called to receive testimony on restrictions on creative freedom in the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that there are major impediments to free artistic expression in the Soviet Union. The artist has little, if any, scope to operate independently. He or she struggles constantly day after day, some for years, others for a lifetime to create and get that work to the public.

It is for them a constant state of despair. We are going to hear comments about that. We are indeed honored to have three very

prominent artists with us today. Their presence here in the United States is an artistic gain for us, and has contributed substantially to the arts in the United States, but also, of course, represents a great and poignant loss to the peoples of the Soviet Union.

While we are here receiving testimony on restrictions on creative freedom in the Soviet Union, a cultural forum is currently being held in Budapest, Hungary, as I am sure all of you know. This forum is one of six specialized meetings called for in the Madrid Concluding Document by the 35 participating states of the CSCE.

Since the inception of the Helsinki process, the United States and its allies have consistently asserted the view that promoting respect for fundamental human rights is an essential part of the process of obtaining peace, cooperation, and security in Europe. We have insisted that progress toward implementing the human rights provisions of the Final Act is as important to obtaining progress as the security or trade-related provisions of the Final Act. Human rights is an integral aspect of the Budapest Cultural Forum as well.

Chairman Fascell, Chairman D'Amato, and myself, as well as other members of the Commission have made that point clearly with the U.S. representatives in Budapest.

At this moment cultural figures from all 35 participating states are meeting in working groups to express their views on conditions that foster or hinder artistic creativity.

The Commission has called this hearing to coincide with the Budapest Cultural Forum so to contribute to the discussions taking place there. It is our hope, also, to expand public understanding of the nature of the restrictions on creative freedom in the Soviet Union and what those restrictions mean to the individual.

The Soviet Government through fear, intimidation, force, and incarceration in labor camps, prisons, and psychiatric hospitals is engaged in cultural strangulation in an attempt to break the human spirit.

We believe that the right to create is a human right. The Commission believes that it is important to bring to the attention of the Congress, to the people of the United States and, indeed, the peoples of the world the commitments undertaken by 35 states at Helsinki in August 1975, for those undertakings speak to the highest and best values that we, in the West, rely upon as the very basis of our societies.

I want to add that in an effort to focus attention on the issues being raised in Budapest, the Commission did a mass mailing to jailed cultural activists, as well as religious teachers, writers, and other cultural figures in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, informing them of the Budapest Cultural Forum and of its mandate.

It is the Commission's intent through such efforts as this hearing and the mass mailing to keep alive the promises that underline the commitment undertaken by the 35 states at Helsinki.

At this time, I would like to yield to my colleague, the Senator from New Hampshire, Senator Gordon Humphrey.

Senator Humphrey.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR GORDON J. HUMPHREY, NEW HAMPSHIRE

Mr. HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, I commend you for this latest in a series of hearings to probe the working of the Helsinki process, so-called.

Mr. Chairman, 2 weeks ago in Hungary, the Budapest Cultural Forum began, the first Helsinki CSCE gathering, held behind the Iron Curtain. The meeting was anticipated with great hope and fanfare. It seemed the Hungarians would follow through on their promise of a free and open conference. As is customary, among the Soviet bloc countries, the Hungarian Government ultimately reneged on its promise to allow nongovernmental human rights organizations to meet publicly, once again making a total mockery of the Helsinki process.

Did this surprise us? Of course not. After 10 years of making concessions to the Soviet bloc, and hoping that our good will would be returned in kind, the West has very little to cheer about. Helsinki Watch members in Eastern bloc countries have been arrested, imprisoned, and tortured by their governments almost from the moment of their group's inception, despite their government's signed pledges for a freer flow of information, ideas, and people.

What is surprising is that it has taken 10 years for many American policymakers to realize that we are time and time again being duped by the Soviets and their client states.

I also find it not only surprising, but distressing and outrageous that despite all of the broken promises, despite the continued acts of suppression against ideas and people on the part of the Soviet Union and its client states, the United States continues to pretend the Helsinki process is working. Our Government is actually rewarding the Soviets and their clients for treaty violations.

Despite the continued persecution of Soviet Jews and other minorities, false imprisonment of Jewish refuseniks, we have rewarded the Soviets by renewing the previously suspended U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on cooperation in agriculture, for one example. Despite the Soviets' continued policy of systematically trying to russify non-Russians in their own country, and their continued suppression of any cultural forms not sanctioned by the Communist Party, the United States has opened negotiations with the Soviets to resume commercial air service between our two countries, which were terminated as a result of the crackdown in Poland and the downing of KAL flight 007.

I might note, Mr. Chairman, that we are also in the process of restoring air rights to the government airline of Poland. I haven't noticed any improvement in the human rights record of that regime.

This year we announced that we would resume activities of the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission, which activities were suspended in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As one who has devoted a great deal of effort to the cause of freedom in that country, I can assure the members of this Commission that the Soviets have done nothing to suggest that they are pulling out of the land which they have utterly devastated.

In fact, their bombing and acts of barbarity against the Afghan people is so great that the U.N. Human Rights Committee roundly condemned the Soviets by name in what has come to be known as the Ermacora Report which will be the subject of a separate hearing, I understand, and I am glad to learn, later this year. The General Assembly will takeup that report later this year.

Mr. Chairman, it is no wonder the Soviets and their puppet states continue to ignore the call for human rights and fundamental freedoms outlined in the Helsinki accords. They know and have learned they can violate their commitments at will, and not only get away with it, but find themselves rewarded by this administration. I can only describe that as a cynical and callous disregard for human rights on the part of the Soviets.

The administration has failed miserably to backup its commitment to the human rights effort in the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union, failed miserably to backup its words with actions. The administration will continue to fail to influence the Soviet Union's behavior as long as we continue to pretend the process is working and to continue, in effect, to reward the Soviets for their crimes.

The process has failed because we have failed, the process has failed because we have failed to show the courage to confront the Soviets with their violation and to insist upon changes in their policy. Indeed, to force changes in their policy by restoring linkage, without linkage the Helsinki process is a very cruel and cynical joke on the hapless, oppressed people of the Soviet Empire. A very cruel joke for which the United States is responsible.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Cochairman HOYER. I thank the gentleman for his statement.

At this time I would like to recognize the former chairman of the Helsinki Commission, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Honorable Dante Fascell of Florida.

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE DANTE B. FASCELL, FLORIDA

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I had not planned on making any statement, but both of you have made such strong statements, that I am compelled to say a little something.

You both may be right, and we are fortunate, it seems to me, that we have the outstanding witnesses that we have before us today. And while I can't stay for their testimony, unfortunately, because I am due in another committee, I assure you I will read it.

But when you hear from people who are creative, who are artists and recognized, you are touching the soul of the people. Now, maybe that should tell us something.

I am not sure that the power of any nation, in terms of its military capability, or its economic capability, is telling us anything in a philosophical sense. I understand power and the use of power, and so do the Soviets. Once we have said that, I am not sure we have uncovered anything that is new.

But looking into the hearts of people and into the souls of people might tell us something. Perhaps, these witnesses can tell us something that hasn't been told before in a way that will provide a key to answer the frustration which has been spoken about so eloquent-

ly by the Senator. We all feel that frustration. There is a tendency, however, in my judgment, to maybe overlook the obvious, and maybe that is what we have done in this entire relationship with the Soviet Union, we have overlooked the obvious.

Maybe there is a key here today with this testimony. I certainly hope so.

So, we look forward to hearing it and discussing it. What makes the leaders of the Soviet Union act the way they act and what we should do about it, that's the fundamental question, it seems to me.

Cochairman HOYER. I thank the chairman for his comments. Certainly there is nobody, I think, who has been about the business of trying to find out the answers to those questions and to place pressure on the Soviets and other Eastern bloc nations to comply with the undertakings at Helsinki more than Chairman Fascell has done over the years.

Mr. Chairman, we understand that you do have other commitments, and, thus, have to leave now. However, we very much appreciate you coming at the opening.

We have just been joined by my good friend, the Senator from Arizona, Senator Dennis DeConcini, who is one of the leaders of the Senate and certainly has been one of the most active, conscientious and committed members of this Commission. We appreciate your presence here, Senator DeConcini.

Mr. DECONCINI. Thank you very much. I appreciate your comments. Mr. Domenici and myself, being Italian-American extraction, we all look alike.

I have no opening statement. I am just glad to be here with you.

Cochairman HOYER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Humphrey.

Mr. HUMPHREY. May I say just a few more words before we call upon our witnesses. I know you are anxious to go forward. Let me just observe that, at least from the point of view of this Senator, there has been enough talk about the Helsinki process. I think it is time to—in addition to these hearings, to invite high administration witnesses to come—Secretary Shultz, for example, to come before this Commission and to explain why we have such a sorry record, why we have achieved such a sorry record in enforcing the Helsinki agreements.

I would say further, and observe further that, at least in the view of this Senator, that perhaps it is time that members of this Commission and its staff began looking for ways to draft legislation, bills and resolutions, to achieve—to move us toward enforcing these agreements, because it looks as though we cannot depend upon the administration to do that for us.

Cochairman HOYER. Again, I want to thank the Senator for his comments. I think he reflects the frustration and anger that many share with respect to the hypocrisy that has been found when reviewing the Soviet Union's and Eastern bloc states' record in implementing the Helsinki accords. And I agree that a principal responsibility of ours is to heighten focus on human rights violations and bring to the attention of the American public and the Congress the failures of either this administration or the Congress in demanding compliance with the Final Act.

Before we call upon our distinguished witnesses, I would like to introduce the junior Senator of the State of New York, the chairman of this Commission, Senator Alfonse D'Amato.

Senator D'Amato.

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN D'AMATO

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you very much, Cochairman Hoyer.

Let me first say at the outset that I am sorry I was unable to be here to open the hearing. I want to thank you for opening this Commission hearing. I was over at the Judiciary Committee, testifying on one of our Commissioner's bills, Senator DeConcini's bill dealing with money laundering. I understand he is going to be leaving to testify there.

But let me ask that the full text of my remarks be included in the record, as if read in its entirety. It seems to me that in our daily lives every American takes freedom of speech in all of its forms for granted. Where artistic endeavors are concerned particularly, we assume that these freedoms are normal and natural.

The denial of these freedoms would be unnatural and inhuman. The particular Soviet system of thought control—and that's what it is, thought control—works through denying Soviet citizens access to information which is not state approved. The control and denial process is both a positive and negative process. It mandates the creation and dissemination of art and literature which reflects the party line and it prevents the creation and dissemination of art and literature which is not.

I am pleased to be holding this hearing so that we can get direct testimony from those who have experienced the trauma of having their works censored or banned, of being imprisoned, and of losing citizenship rights and all that goes with them. I think it is important that our people get a fuller appreciation for what takes place within the Soviet system.

So, I think these hearings are most timely, as we prepare to go to Geneva. I don't think we should put aside these vital questions of human rights and the rights of people to pursue their artistic endeavors.

[The entire written statement of Chairman D'Amato follows:]

29 OCT 85

SENATOR ALFONSE D'AMATO
OPENING STATEMENT
CSCE HEARING ON
SOVIET CULTURAL LIFE

THIS HEARING OF THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE IS CALLED TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE CONDITIONS OF CULTURAL LIFE IN THE SOVIET UNION. THIS HEARING IS PARTICULARLY TIMELY BECAUSE ANOTHER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS WHICH COMPRISE THE HELSINKI PROCESS IS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN BUDAPEST, HUNGARY. THE BUDAPEST MEETING IS THE CSCE CULTURAL FORUM.

ON OCTOBER 17TH, COMMISSIONERS AND OTHER INTERESTED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WERE INVITED TO MAKE REMARKS ON THE FLOORS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE HOUSES TO MARK THE OCCASION OF THE OPENING OF THE CULTURAL FORUM. DURING THE SPECIAL ORDER, A NUMBER OF US CONDEMNED THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT'S BAN ON PUBLIC ACTIVITIES BY THE INTERNATIONAL HELSINKI FEDERATION IN BUDAPEST IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FORUM.

WE HAD HOPED WE WOULD HAVE POSITIVE NEWS TO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE CONCERNING HUNGARY'S

ADHERENCE TO THE FULL MEANING OF ITS PROMISE TO RESPECT THE MADRID PRECEDENT WHEN THE CULTURAL FORUM CONVENED IN THE HUNGARIAN CAPITAL. NOT ONLY WERE OUR HOPES DISAPPOINTED, BUT THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT UNDERMINED ITS OWN CREDIBILITY THROUGH THE BLATANT LIES IT PUT FORWARD IN JUSTIFICATION OF ITS ACTION AGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL HELSINKI FEDERATION.

SPECIFICALLY, THE MADRID PRECEDENT WAS THAT BOTH OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL ACTIVITIES WOULD BE ALLOWED IN BUDAPEST UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS EXISTED IN MADRID FOR THE CSCE REVIEW MEETING WHICH ENDED IN 1983. BY DENYING THE INTERNATIONAL HELSINKI FEDERATION, A FEDERATION OF PRIVATE HELSINKI MONITORING GROUPS INCLUDING THE U.S.-BASED HELSINKI WATCH, PERMISSION TO HOLD ITS LONG-SCHEDULED SYMPOSIUM IN LONG-RESERVED BUDAPEST HOTEL MEETING ROOMS, THE GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY BOTH IMPLICITLY THROUGH ITS ACTION -- AND EXPLICITLY IN THE TEXT OF ITS NOTICE TO THE FEDERATION -- REJECTED THE ROLE OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HELSINKI PROCESS.

THIS SITUATION, COMBINED WITH SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AT THE CULTURAL FORUM, HIGHLIGHT THIS MORNING'S TOPIC. THE SOVIETS, AT BUDAPEST, ARE STRESSING TWO THEMES -- STATE-TO-STATE CULTURAL COOPERATION, AND PEACE THROUGH CULTURE. THROUGH THE MECHANISM OF AN APPARENT EAST BLOC FILIBUSTER, COMBINED WITH SOME CLEVER PROCEDURAL MANEUVERING, THEY HAVE MANAGED TO KEEP ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THEIR OWN AGENDA WHILE BLOCKING ANY

MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION OF THOSE TOPICS WHICH ARE OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST.

OUR FOCUS AT THE CULTURAL FORUM IS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF CULTURE. SPECIFICALLY, WE WANT TO TALK ABOUT THOSE TOPICS CALLED FOR BY THE FORUM'S MANDATE -- PROBLEMS OF CREATION, DISSEMINATION, AND COOPERATION IN THE VARIOUS FIELDS OF CULTURE. NOTE THAT WORD -- PROBLEMS.

THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WE WANT TO RAISE ARE DENIAL OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, OF CENSORSHIP AND JAMMING, OF OFFICIAL SUPPRESSION OF ARTISTS, WRITERS, ACTORS, AND MUSICIANS WHOSE IDEAS DIFFER FROM THOSE OF THE STATE. WE WANT TO TALK ABOUT THE USE OF OFFICIAL UNIONS OF ARTISTS, WRITERS, ACTORS, AND SO FORTH TO PREVENT UNAPPROVED PEOPLE OR IDEAS FROM RESPECTIVELY PURSUING THEIR CAREERS OR REACHING THE PUBLIC.

THE SOVIET UNION PREACHES SCIENTIFIC MARXISM-LENINISM AS THE ONLY TRUE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND HISTORICAL DOCTRINE. THEY ARE AS FANATICAL AND AS ABSOLUTIST IN THIS FAITH AS THE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IS IN HIS. JUST AS ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS REJECT THE FREE FLOW OF PEOPLE AND IDEAS ON RELIGIOUS GROUNDS, THE SOVIET UNION BLOCKS THEM ON POLITICAL GROUNDS -- AND MUCH MORE EFFECTIVELY.

IN FACT, THE SOVIET UNION SERVES AS THE MODEL FOR ITS EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITES. WHILE SOME FLEXIBILITY IS PERMITTED, THE BASIC FORMS ARE CLOSELY OBSERVED IN ALL EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. EVEN THE MOST LIBERAL OF THEM, LIKE HUNGARY, HAVE LAWS IMPOSING CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR "SLANDER" AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OR AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF ANY FRIENDLY SOCIALIST STATE. CRITICISM OF THE STATE IS PERMITTED, BUT ONLY IN OFFICIAL MEDIA -- AND THEREFORE ONLY BY OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN IN RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT POLICY DIRECTION.

THIS MORNING, WE WILL HEAR FROM AN EXPERT IN SOVIET CENSORSHIP, THREE PROMINENT SOVIET ARTISTS WHO ARE NOW LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES, AND AN EXPERT ON JAMMING. BETWEEN THEM, WE WILL LEARN BOTH THE TECHNICAL DETAILS AND THE PERSONAL EXPERIENCES WHICH FORM THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF DENIAL OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.

Chairman D'AMATO. Now, Mr. Cochairman, I see that Congressman Ritter is here. Congressman, would you have an opening statement?

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE DON RITTER, PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. RITTER. It is a pleasure to be here, and it is timely for me as I have just returned from the Soviet Union, where I spent 5 days with the delegation looking toward scientific cooperation and technological cooperation in space. Of course, the free flow of information and the free flow of ideas is crucial to that.

Just a few insights. We noticed that certain individuals, fairly high level individuals were wearing little "znachki," little pins, and there was a picture of Stalin on the pin. And at one point in a meeting with President Gromyko, we mentioned certain of the problems that the United States had with the actions of the Soviet Union, which may have led toward the consideration of the strategic defense initiative, which he was berating us for.

One of the things we mentioned was the kind of re-Stalinization that we were witnessing going on in the Soviet Union, and the death of the Helsinki monitors imprisoned, and the decimation of an entire country in Afghanistan. And it was interesting, President Gromyko's response to this was that he said, "I pity you, I pity you because you are believing this disinformation that is coming out of your media."

He accused our media of conducting a disinformation campaign. Lord knows the free flow of information given this kind of attitude on behalf of the President is more important than ever.

We met, in addition to our official meetings, we met with a group of some 13 refuseniks, including Aleksander Lerner and Victor Brailovsky, and Alexander Ioffe, and Yakov Albert, and we also met with the independent peace movement, led to some extent by Dr. Medvedkov.

The impression that we got was that people-to-people contact, individual contacts, the flow of communication and information between people in the West and Soviet citizens is absolutely essential to their survival.

So, Mr. Chairman, these meetings are extremely timely, considering the upcoming summit and considering the absolute dependence of Soviet citizens on Americans and other Westerners who make the other than official contacts with their peace movement, or with refuseniks, or with Helsinki monitors, or with intellectual dissidents.

So, I thank you for the opportunity to be here.

Chairman D'AMATO. Senator Heinz.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN HEINZ, PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. HEINZ. First, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my entire statement be a part of the record.

Chairman D'AMATO. So ordered.

[The entire written statement of Senator Heinz follows:]

News from Senator John Heinz

Release October 29, 1985

Contact Richard Bryers (202) 224-7754

HEINZ STATEMENT REGARDING SOVIET ARTISTIC FREEDOM
HEARING OF THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding hearings this morning on the restrictions placed on artistic freedom and creativity in the Soviet Union.

Art has served over the centuries as one of the most effective means of communication. Indeed, artists are best able to portray the highs and the lows of the human condition. Leo Tolstoi, a Russian, once defined art as "a human activity having for its purpose the transmission to others of the highest and best feelings to which man has arisen."

It is sad testament to their true nature that the Soviet Government does not have enough faith in its own people to allow them to experience those things which artists are so capable of commmunicating.

Diversity, originality and freedom of expression in the arts are such integral parts of western culture that it is difficult to imagine our society without them.

The Communist Party carefully monitors and controls the work of its greatest artists, composers and authors so that their art conforms to Soviet ideology. If it does not conform, the probability of having it published, performed or exhibited openly becomes remote.

The Soviets do not fear art in and of itself. They fear art because of the ideas that works of art represent; they fear art because it competes with their self-imposed monopoly over the minds of individuals. The right to freely communicate ones views to others is an inalienable human right which the Soviets have chosen to trample on. If I may paraphrase Edward Bulwer-Lytton, "works of art are mightier than the sword."

The harassment, imprisonment and often the exile of artists who do not conform to Soviet "standards" has a depressing effect upon the repressed artists. Many of the world's most promising artists are thus discouraged or prevented from making their contribution to society.

Yet the Soviet people have continued in their quest for non-government sponsored works of art. Their desire for underground books and the risks that they are willing to take to obtain them is an inspiration to us all. In addition, the enthusiasm surrounding the Western exhibits at the recent Moscow Book Fair is an indication of how badly the Soviet people desire independent works of art.

I would also argue, Mr. Chairman, that Soviet artistic repression deprives the entire world of the work of peoples whom through history have made some of the greatest contributions to music, literature, and art.

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our highly distinguished witnesses who have experienced first-hand the repression of the Soviet government. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HEINZ. I want to commend you and Congressman Hoyer for once again holding these hearings on the restrictions placed on artistic freedoms in the Soviet Union.

It is clear, I think, to most of us that art has become, over the centuries, one of the most effective and profound means of communication; and indeed, artists are best able to portray the highs and lows of the human condition. Leo Tolstoi defined art as a human activity whose purpose is the transmission to others of the highest and best feelings to which man has arisen. And it is a sad testament to the Soviet Government that it doesn't have the faith in its own people to allow them to experience those things which artists are so capable of communicating.

It is, therefore, no accident that when a delegation from the Soviet Union heads home, such as the women who left yesterday, one of their last stops in the United States is to buy a pocket-sized shortwave radio. These are inevitably sold out in every store when a Soviet delegation passes through.

I would just conclude by saying, Mr. Chairman, that it is my view that Soviet artistic repression deprives not just the people of the Soviet Union but the entire world, of the work of a people who have, throughout history, made some of the greatest contributions to the arts. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you very much, Senator Heinz. Our first witness is Michael Scammell.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SCAMMELL

Mr. SCAMMELL. As an Englishman I might be considered a member of the fourth wave of the emigration, but I will try to make myself clear.

This testimony is based on a study that I am carrying out of the emigration of creative and performing artists from the Soviet Union over the past 25 years. Under emigration I include both defection and expulsion, as well as emigration proper, since the net result and the consequences for culture are the same.

My starting point is the incontrovertible fact of the reluctant or involuntary departure from the Soviet Union of large numbers of creative and performing artists over the period specified, the extremely high quality of many of them, and the grievous loss to Russian culture occasioned by their departure. This loss is difficult to quantify, since insufficient data are available, but certain facts can be cited.

For example, at a conference on the literature of the "third wave," that is to say of the Russian emigration in Los Angeles in 1983, the organizers were able to list no less than 101 ex-Soviet writers now living and working in the West, and that number has since grown by at least a couple of dozen.

In music, the number of performers of professional standard must be four to five times as great, while in ballet, the theater, the cinema, and the visual arts the numbers lie somewhere in between.

However, what is even more striking than the quantity is the quality. I do not wish to overburden you with names, but just to give an idea of the importance of this emigration for art and culture, let me mention just a few.

In ballet: Rudolf Nureyev, Natalia Makarova, Mikhail Baryshnikov, the Panovs; in music: Vladimir Ashkenazy, Mstislav Rostropovich, Galina Vishnevskaya, Maxim Shostakovich; in literature they include Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Joseph Brodsky, Andrei Sinyavsky and Vasily Aksyonov; in theater, there is the outstanding director, Yuri Lyubimov; in movies: Andrei Tarkovsky; and in the visual arts, the sculptor, Ernst Neizvestny.

For every famous individual I have mentioned here, there are dozens of less famous, but nonetheless extremely talented artists who have followed them out of the Soviet Union.

The question I am posing in my study is, "Why?" There are, of course, individual motives that are impossible to generalize about. But beyond these it is possible to identify certain forces and factors in Soviet society that have placed severe limitations on freedom of creativity and that have, in effect, driven these artists out of their country in search of self-realization. I will try briefly to indicate the most important ones.

First, there is the party control of the artistic process at every stage of its realization. The mechanisms whereby this control is realized are, I think, well known, and consist of a network of committees and functionaries responsible to the Ideological Department of the Central Committee. Without the express permission and approval of these committees, no play, no ballet, no opera, or exhibition can be staged, and no publication released to the public.

Second, apart from this network of controls there is censorship. Even when permission has been granted, every work of art, every production, every exhibition, and every publication is subject to censorship and can be changed, or stopped at any moment, even after they have been made available to the public.

The organization and methods of the censorship are an official secret, but are, again, well known, particularly to creative and performing artists at every level.

Third, a system of informal rewards and punishments is applied to artists to ensure conformism and obedience. The most obvious example is the granting or withholding of foreign travel, but the system also controls tours within the Soviet Union, and other countries of the Soviet bloc; the size and the distribution of editions in the case of writers; the location and the frequency of exhibitions for visual artists; and the number of plays or films a director can work on. It even extends to the assignation of roles in the case of actors, dancers, and singers.

In a short presentation like this, there is too little time to go into detail. I will offer here just a few examples, to serve as illustrations of the above in various fields.

In art, for instance, the most extreme example was when a group of painters tried to set up an exhibition of their works in a vacant lot on the outskirts of Moscow in 1974. This exhibition was torn down by bulldozers and water cannons. The majority of the artists who participated in this exhibition have since departed for the West.

In ballet, the most obvious, because the first example is that of Rudolf Nureyev, who had mixed far too freely with French and other Western dancers and critics in Paris, after his debut there in 1961. He was dropped from the tour's continuation in London, and

ordered back to Moscow. He defected, thus, creating a very important precedent.

In cinema, Andrei Tarkovsky is by common consent the most distinguished Russian film director since Eisenstein, and is world famous. Yet, in his 24 years of moviemaking, he was allowed to make only 6 movies. Most of these were given a severely restricted showing in the Soviet Union, and some were not shown there at all. Last year he defected.

In theater, Yuri Lyubimov is certainly, to the Soviet theater, what Tarkovsky is to the movies. He was undoubtedly the most famous and successful director in Moscow, yet after innumerable bannings of his productions, he reached a state of almost total frustration. While visiting London to direct there, after 5 years of negotiations to get him there, he decided to defect.

Naturally, I could multiply such examples indefinitely. I will do so in my book, and it is clear to me that many are known to the members of this Commission. The point is that no artists in the Soviet Union, not even those that operate in the most apparently nonpolitical spheres, such as music, for instance, are free to create or to perform their works without interference and without some form of control. Nor are they allowed to receive information unhampered from abroad, nor to travel freely to meet, or to see fellow artists and to exchange experiences with them.

This cage in which they are obliged to live and perform no longer has such solid bars, perhaps, as in Stalin's time, but these bars are real enough and have very little flexibility. The emigres and defectors I have been discussing have dramatized this situation by voting with their feet.

Chairman D'AMATO. Let me thank you for your testimony, and I note that Congressman Smith has joined us.

I am going to try to hold this down and just pursue one line of questioning with you. It would appear from your testimony that what you are clearly saying is that the Soviets are really exercising total dominance of art through the party apparatus. Is it that they are fearful of art, or is it more your impression that it is the dominance to demonstrate that the party line must be adhered to? If you want to move along in your professional career, you will either adhere to it and be almost a functionary of the party, otherwise the Soviets will punish you—they will revoke your privileges, you won't be able to make your film, you won't get an opportunity to perform?

What is the Soviet's major motivation?

Mr. SCAMMELL. Well, this is a subject that has been much discussed. In my opinion, it is partly a question of fear, certainly. The artist in Russian society, traditionally, and still in Soviet society, is regarded as some kind of a representative figure, the highest kind of figure.

I think it is fair to say that he is regarded with more reverence than is usually the case in our society, and therefore, his voice, in whatever art form that it is expressed, carries a greater weight. Therefore, the artist is potentially the main possible source of an alternative view of the world to that of the party.

Solzhenitsyn summed it up memorably in a phrase in his novel "The First Circle," when he said, "A great artist is like an alterna-

tive government," the point being that the artist does have this kind of authority. So, undoubtedly, there is fear.

I think the second aspect interwoven with this, the reason that the party must not only keep control, but be seen to keep control, is the sense that the artist could create a precedent. In other words, if they are allowed greater freedom, if they are allowed to express themselves, the fear is that this is the kind of—well, to use the party view, I think a sickness, which could spread among other members of society.

So, the two are interwoven.

Chairman D'AMATO. Cochairman Hoyer.

Cochairman HOYER. Thank you very much.

I have a number of questions, but I am going to ask only two so that we will have ample time for the other witnesses.

First of all, based upon your observations over the last 10 years, have you seen any perceivable change for the better, as a result of the Helsinki accords?

Mr. SCAMMELL. I cannot say that I have seen much change for the better in the official performance of the Soviet Government. In terms of the population, there was a change among that small portion that was able to understand the accords. That is to say, it seems to me that the very publication of the accords was a considerable achievement, when they were published in the Soviet press.

There were small groups among the intelligentsia who tried to put these things into practice. I think this was an important psychological breakthrough.

On the other hand, the Government was able to quarantine these people and by policies that have already been alluded to here, by trying them, sentencing them, jailing them in the Gulag, putting them into psychiatric hospitals, to limit the influence of these people and, virtually, to eliminate them.

So, I would say that initially there was some hope and that it has gradually been extinguished in the years since.

Cochairman HOYER. Could you foresee any circumstances, short of the Soviet regime's fall, that would change the fact of censorship, or the character of the censorship that exists in the Soviet Union?

Mr. SCAMMELL. Yes, certainly: I think it is wrong to regard the Soviet system as—it may be correct in the general sense to call it monolithic, but it is not monolithic in the sense of unchanging or being indifferent to pressures of various kinds.

If we look back over the years, certainly since the death of Stalin, it is quite clear that there have been twists and turns in policy. In the area we are discussing, there has been greater and lesser liberalization.

I would like to use the opportunity of this question to make the point that in the area of culture, our response, perhaps, might be slightly different from what it might be in questions of strategy, or foreign policy. That is to say, I don't think that cultural boycotts work, though for a while it might be a temporary expedient to show displeasure. My study shows that the more exchanges there are of information and of artists, and even if they can only be one way, even if it is only of Americans and Europeans going into the

Soviet Union, this is an immense force for good and for possible change.

Of course a two-way travel is even more important. So it is an area in which, it seems to me, we have absolutely nothing to lose. That is to say, Russian culture can only benefit and has benefited from the visits of Western artists, Western theater groups, Western orchestras, et cetera.

We, quite clearly, have benefited from their visits. And, unfortunately, from the fact that so many of those artists chose to stay behind, which is what I am describing.

But in general, I would say that I personally would urge this Commission to press for exchange as something that is possible, which may or may not affect Soviet policy on a government level with regard to its external relations, or even, indeed, with regard to economics and other important questions.

But in the field of culture, I think it makes an enormous difference, and is an area where I suspect the present Government may be susceptible to pressure from us.

Chairman D'AMATO. Senator Humphrey.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Scammell, is there greater or lesser artistic freedom in the Soviet Union today as opposed to about 4 years ago?

Mr. SCAMMELL. How many years ago?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Four or five?

Mr. SCAMMELL. I would say it hasn't changed very much.

Mr. HUMPHREY. It hasn't gotten any better, but it hasn't gotten any worse, in your view?

Mr. SCAMMELL. Not in that period; no.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Well, then how would—you say it has been relatively static, but how would you characterize the situation with respect to the artistic freedom in the Soviet Union?

Mr. SCAMMELL. At the moment, I would say it is very bad. But, may I add to that remark? I think it is very bad, but I think the fact of the exchanges in the past, the fact that more information has come into the country, has changed the psychological climate inside.

In other words, while many of the external—most of the external pressures in the form of censorship and the control of these ideological committees remains the same, the individuals themselves, the artists, the writers, the performers and so on, I think have a more independent psychology; they are more anxious to break out and more willing to do so the moment they get the chance.

In this sense, I think there has been what I hope is an irreversible change of psychology among Soviet artists.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Well, you say the situation is very bad, hasn't gotten appreciably worse, or appreciably better, but is very bad, and yet you seem to urge that we continue, at least with respect to the arts, that we continue—this Government continue on the same course. What have we achieved? Why should we remain on the same course?

It seems not to be working.

Mr. SCAMMELL. I am not sure what course you are alluding to. I am not suggesting you stay on the same course. I suggest that you change course and go for more exchanges, that this is an area

where we have nothing to lose, in terms of security, in terms of economics, in terms of espionage.

We have a culture which all Russians, in my experience, admire and wish to learn more about. Any influence that this culture exerts on them can be beneficial.

Therefore, it seems to me—I cannot see any arguments against it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Very well, outside of the arts, what do you suggest we do to bring about compliance with the Helsinki agreements, in all respects, including artistic freedom?

Mr. SCAMMELL. Well, I think that is a very tough nut, and I am not sure I have any immediate answers. In the area with which I am familiar, I would suggest as a minimum, that when Mr. Gorbachev has an interview in the Western media, that it is on the condition that a similar interview is granted in the Soviet media. I know because of our pluralism, this is difficult, but it would be nice if each time the Washington Post, or the New York Times publishes a commentary by Mr. Arbatov, a similar commentary is published in Moscow by James Reston, or whoever you want to name.

I think small reciprocities like this could be insisted upon. But in the long run, I can only speak for the field that I know best, the arts, and it really does seem to me that in seeking, as it were, "to punish" the Soviets by withholding delegations, or visits of artists we, in fact, are strengthening the Soviet Government and not Soviet culture.

Mr. HUMPHREY. What meaning then, if we follow your advice, which is to continue our present activities, in fact, to increase our artistic exchanges, what meaning then do the Helsinki accords have? Are we not overlooking the central question which is the artistic freedom, the human rights of persons in signatory countries?

You are suggesting evidently that we just overlook these violations and continue blithely going our way as we have.

Mr. SCAMMELL. I am not suggesting that we overlook them, and I am certainly not suggesting that we soft-pedal these violations, or try to look the other way. I think that we should make as much noise as we can about them, and do our best to try and get them changed. The question is, "by which methods?"

Does it secure greater adherence to the Helsinki agreements—we are talking about Basket III, I take it, particularly the human rights accords—by cutting off exchanges, or does it aid this process by continuing them?

I accept that there can be different points of view. My point of view is that the very fact of these exchanges of people going in and out is a kind of realization of some sort of limited, but effective, exchange of information. If they are not going in and out, in either direction, then that is a violation of the Helsinki accords.

We are making it easier for the Soviet Union to cordon off its people and to cut off its sources of information. But I do not think a corollary of this is to keep quiet about the violations, or in anyway to be soft.

My view is that it is also in the interest of the Soviet Government, in one sense, to promote these exchanges as well.

Mr. HUMPHREY. You see no way then to hold the Soviets accountable for violations in the area of artistic freedom?

Mr. SCAMMELL. Well, I don't know. We are dealing with matters of policy, in which you are more expert than I am. The American Government has shown itself frustrated time and time again in trying to secure adherence to much more important things than cultural freedom.

It seems to me that unless you are prepared to use your power in what are regarded as impermissible ways, there is a limit to what you can do in this area.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Would it not be better then to avoid these kinds of treaties which are a charade, if we have no means of enforcing compliance? Don't we engage in intellectual dishonesty to be talking about the Helsinki process, when, to hear your testimony, there is no way to enforce compliance?

Mr. SCAMMELL. Well, that is a very good question. I assume that a deal was struck in Helsinki because the parties felt, or thought, that they were getting something from it.

However, as I say, I would point to a paradox here, I felt the way you feel when the accords were first agreed. That is to say, I thought it was a sham and a charade, and an exercise in hypocrisy, because I could foresee that they were not enforceable, and I could foresee even from the fine print that the Soviets were not intending to comply.

What I had not foreseen, as I mentioned earlier, was the impact of the publication of these accords in the countries. And as we know, the impact was even greater in some of the Eastern bloc countries, in Czechoslovakia and Poland, in particular, I think the Helsinki accords were taken—I mean by certain groups, that is—very seriously.

One might take as a gain the fact that for better or worse, the very words human rights got on to the pages of Pravda for the first time. And although the Soviets have developed an interpretation of human rights which to our mind is perverse, to say the least, and does not tally with our view, in my opinion, they have been put very much on the defensive in this area; actually getting them to discuss the question is a kind of victory, and I think a real one, not a pyrrhic one.

So, my answer to the question is mixed, I am sorry I can't be categorical, but I do feel that there are two sides to the question.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I only wish, may I say, Mr. Chairman, in closing that we could have the counter testimony to Mr. Scammell's point of view from a few imprisoned Soviet artists.

I respectfully disagree with the witness, but I thank him for his testimony nonetheless.

Chairman D'AMATO. Senator DeConcini.

Mr. DECONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Scammell, I wonder if you would comment if there is a back door to the Soviet self-imposed blockade and restriction on arts and humanities and intellectual freedoms in the Soviet Union through the Eastern bloc countries? Have you approached that, or studied that, or done any analysis on the influence that first comes into the Eastern bloc countries, such as Hungary, or East Germany, and then is permitted to filter in, either officially or unofficially into the Soviet Union?

My travels in the Soviet Union indicate that there is a great deal of reliance for cultural exchanges in entertainment and that sort of thing from their aligned countries. And, indeed, those countries have, or appear to have—my question is, "is that correct, they appear to have far more intellectual freedom and cultural ability to exercise that freedom?"

Can you comment?

Mr. SCAMMELL. Yes, I think your point is extremely well taken. There are two parts to this. Certainly it is my experience that a great deal of exchange of information and works of art, in the sense that they are transportable, does take place through countries of Eastern Europe, and continues to. This is sometimes a very fruitful way of going about making contacts with Soviet artists, and a lot of people have taken advantage of it.

Secondly, I think some of your other witnesses are obviously more expert than I am, having lived in the Soviet Union and being ex-Soviet citizens. But my sense is, too, that the countries of Eastern Europe act as a kind of—on the one sense as kind of a clearinghouse, and secondly, as a kind of bellwether for Soviet intellectuals. That is to say, they do get a lot of their information about what is going on here, or what is going on in Western Europe, from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, et cetera.

I did have direct experience with Czechoslovakia before and after 1968, and I do know of the enormous symbolic importance the Czech experiment had for Soviet intellectuals and artists; enormous hopes were, in fact, placed on that experiment. And one of the biggest psychological blows to the Soviet intelligentsia, to the Soviet creative intelligentsia, was the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was regarded as a very bitter experience and a very bitter symbol of what was awaiting them.

So, I do agree; yes.

Mr. DECONCINI. Would you suggest or recommend that our policies of the United States do more to encourage more exchanges with the Eastern bloc countries, than we do now, or do you think it is adequate? I don't know how much it is, to tell you the truth, so I am asking several questions—whether or not you are aware of what it is, and whether or not it should be increased?

Mr. SCAMMELL. Well, I am limited in my knowledge of exactly what the level of exchanges is at the moment. I know something of what has gone on in the past. I think I have made fairly clear, perhaps I was over-eager to do so, but I don't think there can be enough exchanges.

Mr. DECONCINI. In both set of circumstances, the Soviet Union or——

Mr. SCAMMELL. Yes, I personally don't think that—well, in a sense to use culture as a weapon is to already fall prey to a certain Soviet approach. I don't think it reflects our society or our view of culture, in the first place.

Mr. DECONCINI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman D'AMATO. Senator Heinz.

Mr. HEINZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Scammell, as we sit here two things are taking place. One is the preparation for the summit between the President and Mr. Gorbachev. The other is the meeting in Budapest on the cultural

forum. And, as I think most of us are aware, until the participants in Budapest sat down, it had been traditional for nongovernment sponsored participants to enter into the discussions on how culture is created or disseminated.

At this forum in Budapest, however, the Hungarians would not permit nongovernmental participants to attend and enter into the discussions. That meant that a number of Eastern bloc exiles were simply excluded from any participation.

The agenda for the summit is very full—arms control and nuclear weapons, of course, is a major topic. Second will be regional conflicts and, hopefully, their more peaceful resolution. By that I mean Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, the question of Soviet support for terrorism or countries that aid and abet terrorism, and freedom of emigration from the Soviet Union. Within this general sphere of human rights arises the question of artistic freedom and expression, and lessening the amount of censorship.

The latter, to the best of my knowledge, is probably not very high on the agenda at this point in time. Do you believe it should be raised much higher on the agenda, and if so, should it be given equal weight with arms control, or with the regional conflicts, or with emigration? To what extent should the administration and the President give weight to these questions at the upcoming summit?

Mr. SCAMMELL. Well, the latter part of that question is the hardest part to answer. If you ask me should it be given weight, should it be included, then I would say absolutely yes, without question.

I would say on the subject of the Budapest meeting, by the way, that I would not at all advocate a soft line in such meetings, and I would not, myself, have been against the U.S.A. and other countries threatening to pull out under such conditions. I think it is scandalous that the NGO's were not admitted. I think it is scandalous that the conditions were changed, and if they were agreed in advance, such conditions, then I think that that meeting should not have been proceeded with under those conditions. And I don't think this contradicts my other point, in other words, if the exchanges can't be proceeded with through the Helsinki process, I would still advocate proceeding with them by other means.

So it is not just a question of leaning over backward, or trying to accommodate the Soviet Union at whatever the cost.

As to the actual weight given to this question, it is very hard for me to answer. Off the cuff I would simply say that I would suggest that statesmen and governments should concentrate their discussions on agreements and treaties, on areas in which they can exercise some kind of control. In other words, they should discuss things that they can exercise influence on.

If by discussing regional—let's say regional conflicts—the Americans can say, well, we will, or will not send troops, or we will, or will not back such and such an army against your army, then they have a real sanction.

Mr. HEINZ. Well, let me just stop you right there. What you are really talking about is verifiability and the ability to have an influence.

One area where you can have a great deal of influence and where verification in a sense is quite practical is in jamming.

Mr. SCAMMELL. Yes.

Mr. HEINZ. I gather the last witness, if we ever get to him, will discuss this. Nonetheless, it is an instrument of cultural depravation.

Mr. SCAMMELL. Yes.

Mr. HEINZ. It seems to me that that is an area where the United States could take a very hard line, where we have credible threats. We could put a satellite over the Soviet Union and broadcast down at a high energy level. That is pretty difficult for anybody to combat, no matter how sophisticated a jamming system they have, unless they want to create a blizzard of noise that interferes with a lot of other important transmissions as well.

Why wouldn't this be something for maximum attention?

Mr. SCAMMELL. Well, I think it would be wonderful. I would say do it, I would say do it right away. And I agree with you, I think jamming is reprehensible and to the extent that one can exercise influence on it, then I would say get rid of it. But, you see, that is a very practical step.

What I am saying is you achieve nothing by banning a visit of the New York City Ballet, or forbidding Norman Mailer to visit the Soviet Union, which seems to me the kind of response that has been discussed. In other words, you are doing something by a very practical measure.

I would say, in fact, sending even Norman Mailer to the Soviet Union is in the same league as putting up a satellite—the more we can send to——

Mr. HEINZ. We could always send them punk rock——

Mr. SCAMMELL. You could send Norman Mailer into space——

Mr. HEINZ [continuing]. Until they ask us to stop.

Mr. SCAMMELL. In any case, I agree with you, where you can take practical steps, I am totally in favor.

Mr. HEINZ. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank our witness. I have another hearing I have to attend. I deeply regret that I won't be here to welcome and question Maxim Shostakovich, Oleg Vidov, and Vasily Aksyonov, all of whom really are, in a sense, our centerpiece, but I do want to commend you both for this hearing.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you, Senator Heinz.

Congressman Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Scammell, I have a few questions, but I will keep it brief, in the interest of time.

Most artists, as we all know, are not proficient at birth, a talent must be nurtured, usually over the course of many years, in order to be truly successful, whether it be in literature, performing arts, or whatever. I wonder if you can tell us what impact censorship has, or how pervasive is censorship in the elementary and secondary schools?

For instance, for those artists who do make it, where did they get their information? Was it from international broadcasting or literature that perhaps was not destroyed?

Mr. SCAMMELL. Well, when we talk about censorship being more or less total, that is to say, it has the potential to control just about all of the information reaching the population one way or another. In fact, it is only exercised over a relatively small spectrum of in-

formation. That is to say, if you were to ask, as you may, ask Vasily Aksyonov where did he get his information. Among other things, he would probably tell you from the classics.

In other words, the whole of classical literature, the whole of classical culture, is available to Soviet citizens. This is a very important teacher in the realm of culture.

The censorship usually applies much more to the present day than to the past, although it does touch the past. And it applies to areas that come within the realm of politics, or that can be construed as such.

So, yes, there is very strict control of textbooks in Soviet schools, and the teachers are thoroughly indoctrinated and certainly do not dare to go outside the—certainly the elementary schools, and mostly in the high schools—outside the realm of strictly permitted curriculum. But the higher up the education system you go, first of all, I think the more flexible the teachers.

Secondly, it depends on the psychology of the person. An artist is by definition someone with an inquiring mind, and very often a determined temperament. So that this information then, with great difficulty, can be gleaned in the larger cities, either by listening to radio broadcasts, by obtaining clandestine literature that circulates—"Samizdat" is the best known.

In the case of artists, by looking at books of reproductions and so on. If we take the case of an artist who would learn about the past by going to the art galleries, but if he wanted to learn about the present, then he would learn about it from books, or as has been the case, from visits by Western artists, or by exhibitions of Western art that are held very occasionally in the Soviet Union.

Mr. SMITH. Does the flexibility of the teachers you just mentioned have any relationship to the proximity of their university to Moscow? For instance, as you go further from the city, is there a relaxation?

Mr. SCAMMELL. This works two ways, I think. Again, I don't want to pretend to be more expert than I am, but in one sense, in Moscow, as in many countries, the capital concentrates many of the very best minds and brains, able to think on the most sophisticated levels. So, you have a high concentration of talent.

On the other hand, the control is strictest, because it is closest to the center. What you suggest is true, but in some of the provincial cities, and particularly where there are concentrations of scientific excellence, where there are concentrations of scientists, you tend to have a greater—far from Moscow—you tend to have a freer intellectual atmosphere.

Mr. SMITH. One final question, could you give us an idea how many artists and intellectuals have in some way challenged the Soviet system, either through their writings, or their art?

Mr. SCAMMELL. Goodness me, I really don't—I have to offer what I hope doesn't sound too glib. Any artist worth his salt challenges the system he lives in. The rest, I wouldn't call artists. So anyone who merits the name in the Soviet Union, even many who have contrived to live relatively—relatively is the important word—normal lives have challenged the system in some way or another.

Of course it is the rare individual who is willing to risk his or her welfare, family, whole future by an outright challenge. What is

so impressive, if you like, is the large number of people who actually place their lives and their livelihood on the line. This certainly runs into thousands, but I couldn't put a proper figure on it.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you very much, Mr. Scammell, we appreciate your insights and your suggestions.

At this time I would like to call as a panel the artists that we are talking about. The Soviet film star, who arrived in the United States just last month, Oleg Vidov; a Soviet conductor, and son of the famous composer Dmitri Shostakovich, Maxim Shostakovich; and one of the most popular Soviet novelists and screenwriters, Vasily Aksyonov.

I would like to ask if we couldn't have Mr. George Jacobs, who is an expert on jamming, retired in 1980, after 31 years of Government service—I would like to ask him to come forward and join the panel.

We will start with Oleg Vidov. We would like to welcome Mr. Vidov here, and thank him for his testimony today. We look forward to hearing his testimony.

STATEMENT OF OLEG VIDOV

Mr. VIDOV. It is really a great obligation to talk about your Nation, about your past, and about your position. Although it can be subjective because it is my experience, but also I suppose my experience has objectivity about the question that you ask.

The one thing that is very important that publicity prevents danger, when you talk loudly about something, then people hear it. So, I am here today because the Soviet film industry functions according to different rules from those in the West. In the Soviet Union an actor is not only an artist, but a soldier on the ideological front, as officials call us, whose purpose is to help the Government disseminate ideas to the masses. Artistic or creative freedom, as it is known in the West, is not guaranteed. All of my colleagues know this and even if they don't like it, they accept it, otherwise they wouldn't be allowed to work in the profession they so love.

A series of conflicts with the film authorities, stretching over 15 years, came to a head when I became a film director. Unfortunately, I was unable to compromise or conform. Some of the conflicts were large, some small, and some simply differences of opinion. But a few were so much against my personality and philosophy of life, that, in the end, I fled. I left behind my aging mother and aunt, a people and a country that I love very much, and a large community of moviegoers to whom I had dedicated my professional life.

I came into the industry naively, excited about the chance to entertain people. My first shock came when a Swedish/Danish/Icelandic production offered me the lead in a film called "The Red Mantle." My participation marked the first time a Soviet actor had ever been cast abroad as another country's hero. It was a great moment and I was very proud. I made the movie and returned home.

Then the Swedes invited me to return to Stockholm for the opening night. To my surprise the film authorities refused me permis-

sion to go. When I said that I think that such a meeting with the Swedish film industry can build a bridge between nations, they said "You are wrong, you don't think, we think what you must do."

So, you see, in the Soviet Union there are official and nonofficial artists. An actor who gives a mediocre performance will become important, get extra money and privileges, if he is in harmony with the Communist Party. Because he works in propagandistic films, he will be treated with more respect by the official critics, press, and Government.

An actor who makes good entertainment films will be loved by the people. Most actors compromise by making both types of films. I didn't. I always felt accountable to the Soviet masses and was therefore unable to make movies that whitewash history and the system.

As you can imagine, those who dare to challenge the film administration do not work as often as those who go along with the system. A director who succeeds in making a film that expresses his personal point of view has usually fought a long and difficult battle with the dogmatic bureaucrats. The experience often makes them bitter.

To properly understand the Soviet film industry, you must know about Socialist realism, a philosophy first born during the Stalin era. In simple terms, Socialist realism dictates that whatever the Government and the system do and say are true and good. Anyone who does not agree with the party is an enemy.

Many scripts have been rejected for failure to conform with the principles of Socialist realism. Sometimes entire movies are shelved because only after they are finished do the bureaucrats, those watchdogs of Socialist realism, understand that the message is not in keeping with the party line. So many films are just never shown to audiences, but a great deal of money is spent on them.

In 1975, I decided to become a film director. I wanted to write and direct my own scripts, to convey to my people my own vision of society and maybe become a catalyst for change. I returned to the state film school. My final project at the state school was a 20-minute short feature that I wrote about a situation I had seen every day for 20 years in the small town outside Moscow where my mother lives.

Three hundred meters from our house was a railroad line that intersected the main road which leads to Moscow. Before a train came the barrier would be lowered to keep cars from crossing the track. Hundreds of trains passed through our town daily. As a result, traffic would be held up for hours, cars backed up for kilometers.

The official opposition to my film and its message was tremendous. The director of Mosfilm Studio, a former police officer, had been on vacation when my script was approved. He then said that had he been present, such a story would never had been given the go-ahead.

In the end I had to compromise and soften an already mild ending. But my message was still there.

Interestingly enough, after the film was shown, a government office was opened to clear up congestion at railway crossings

around the country. The first town to get a bridge was my mother's.

The straw that broke the camel's back was the Film Ministry's decision to cancel my first full-length feature film, after I had worked for 1 year on the script and was already searching for locations in the Caucasian Mountains.

The highest levels of Government had pressured the Ministry to end my career as a director. They had also ordered other directors not to cast me in lead roles. The Filmmakers Union, as usual, had no power to help me.

The problem was inability to conform, my attempt to win more artistic freedom, and incredibly enough, the political machinations of an ex-wife. Probably without pressure from my ex-wife the Government would have ignored me. There are many more difficult filmmakers in the Soviet Union. But my ex-wife's closest friend is Galina Brezhnev, daughter of the then Secretary General of the Communist Party.

As a proud Russian with a deep love for his country and people, I am ashamed that I had to stand, or sit before you today reading and reciting my story which not only documents the fact that there is little, or no artistic freedom in the Soviet Union, but shows how easily political power is abused by our leaders.

[The entire written statement of Oleg Vidov follows:]

STATEMENT OF OLEG VIDOV
HEARING ON SOVIET CULTURAL LIFE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
OCTOBER 29, 1985

Like so many of my American colleagues, I discovered cinema as a child and spent all my money each week buying movie tickets. I was living in Alma Ata, a city on the Chinese-Soviet border; the films I loved came from America, France, Italy, China and the Soviet Union.

For as long as I can remember, my dream was to be a part of that very special family of men and women, living in practically every country of the world, whose passion is making movies -- giving our fellow citizens the chance to dream, laugh and cry for two hours, to come into brief contact with otherwise remote cultures and ideas, to learn something new about history and society.

I was lucky. At the age of eighteen, competing against hundreds of others for a single place, I was accepted by the Soviet state film school, acting department. Most movie actors in my country are products of this state school, which teaches not only acting techniques and film history, but also Communist Party history, ideology, and the official Soviet world vision.

By 21, I had already played the lead role in a film. By 23, I had been proclaimed one of the leaders, of a new generation of Soviet actors. By 29, I had made a movie which, I understand, was seen by 300 million people.

In Western countries, my career as an actor would have been guaranteed, provided I continued to turn in good performances and make films that drew respectable audiences.

I am here today because the Soviet film industry functions according to different rules. In the Soviet Union, an actor is not only an artist but a soldier on the ideological front, whose purpose is to help the government disseminate ideas to the masses. Artistic or creative freedom, as it is known in the West, is not guaranteed. All of my colleagues know this, and even if they don't like it, they accept it -- otherwise they wouldn't be allowed to work in the profession they so love.

Unfortunately, I was unable to compromise or conform. A series of conflicts with the film authorities, stretching over 15 years, came to a head when I became a film director. Some of the conflicts were large, some small, and some simply differences of opinion. But a few were so much against my personality and philosophy of life, that, in the end, I fled, leaving behind my aging mother and aunt, a people and a country that I love very much, and a large community of movie goers to whom I had dedicated my professional life.

I came into the industry naively -- excited about the chance to entertain people. My first chance came when a Swedish/Danish/Icelandic production offered me the lead in a film called "The Red Mantle." My participation marked the first time a Soviet actor had ever been cast abroad as another country's hero. It was a great moment and I was very proud. I made the movie and returned home. Then the Swedes invited me to return to Stockholm for the opening night. To my surprise, the film authorities refused me permission to go. I asked why, pointing out that my being in the film had brought a lot of positive publicity for our actors, our industry and our country. I said: "I think I've shown that actors can be a bridge between nations." The film officials told me: "It's not your job to think, it's ours." For really the first time, I understood that in the Soviet Union actors are only supposed to have a personality on screen.

That incident was a shock, and not the only slap-in-the-face I received as a result of participating in the Scandinavian production. "The Red Mantle" was well-received in Europe and America. At the Cannes Film Festival, several top international directors saw my performance and asked the Soviet film committee permission to work with me abroad. I was excited. What actor doesn't dream of working with filmmakers like Federico Fellini and Karl Reisz, who know how to make actors stretch and grow artistically?

Once again, the committee said no. It was not important to them that I improve professionally -- if it meant going West. It was against the rules for a Soviet actor to become a star in the western world.

You see, in the Soviet Union, there are "official" and "non-official" stars. An actor, who gives a mediocre performance, will become important -- get extra money and privileges -- if he is in harmony with the Communist Party. Because he works in propagandistic film, he will be treated with more respect by the official critics, press and government. An actor whomakes good entertainment films will be loved by the people. If he makes personal appearances -- "two-hour one-man shows" in which he tells about his life and his thoughts -- thousands of people will pay hard-earned money to see him.

Most actors compromise by making both types of films. I didn't. I always felt accountable to the Soviet masses and was therefore unable to make movies that white-wash history and the system. I think this is because my upbringing was somewhat unorthodox. I grew up in Mongolia, Kazakstan and a small town near Moscow, among the unprivileged. For me, they have always been my audience, and I have always tried to make films they would appreciate, well aware that they know the difference between the truth of life and lies on the screen. Also I have always hated injustice, I think because of the story of my

uncle who died because he had been imprisoned in a Stalin camp, accused of a political crime he never committed.

As you can imagine, those who dare to challenge the film administration do not work as often as those who go along with the system. A director who succeeds in making a flim that expresses his personal point of view, has usually fought a long and difficult battle with the dogmatic bureaucrats. The experience often makes them biter. Several years before I defected, Andrei Tarkovski, a man whose talent is internationally recognized and one of our best directors, settled in the West. He was very much respected by the conformists and non-conformists in the film industry, but because of his ideas, he was not allowed to make many pictures. And like other leading directors such as Grigori Chukrai, Elem Klimov and Marlen Khuciev, Tarkovski had the sad experience of seeing one of his best films, "Andrei Rubluv," shelved for five years by the powers that be.

To properly understand the Soviet film industry, you must know about "social realism," a philosophy first born during the Stalin era. In simple terms, "social realism" dictates that whatever the government and the system do and say are true and good. Stalin killed many of our best artists, directors and writers.

Many scripts have been rejected for failure to conform, with the principles of "social realism." Sometimes entire movies are shelved because only after they are finished, do the bureaucrats -- those watchdogs of "social realism" -- understand that the message is not in keeping with the party line.

Once I went to Kazakstan to make a film called "Blood and Sweat," written by Andrei Konchalovsky. He wrote a story, set during the revolution, about the Red Army's successful attempt to stop the White Army from reaching the Caspian Sea. Along with some of our most talented actors, I played a white officer. The relationship between our characters -- the white officers -- was probably the most interesting asepct of the film.

Once "Blood and Sweat" had been edited, the administration viewed it and was horrified. The Big Boss said: "What's that? The White Army officers are much more likeable, much better looking, much more intelligent and interesting than the Red Army officers. They look like drunks, with red faces and dirty uniforms."

The first idea was to shelve the film forever. The second was to save it -- but how? Someone had an idea. To make the Red officers look good, just eliminate from the film, as much as possible, the White officers. Ideologically the film was correct and the editors didn't have to worry about someone in the government or ministry being angry.

Just as the Soviet public knows how to read between the lines of books and newspapers, the moviegoers can discern what the director really wants to say, understanding, that if the message is not oblique, the film will probably not pass censorship. Sometimes the bureaucrats, who need to justify their existence, remove whole segments of movies. Sometimes they insist on changing dialogue -- even if it comes directly from a piece of classical Russian literature. This was the case of the film version of "Inspector General," the Gogol play written in 1836. The director was told "to rewrite certain speeches" because they could be construed as criticism of the current system.

Some subjects are taboo, such as the Stain Camps. Only a minority of the new generation even know that Stalin signed a peace pact with Hitler, that Stalin killed millions of our own people. A very good film about the Stalin camps, made by our excellent director Grigori Chukrai, could give information, but it disappeared into the vaults of government some 20 years ago, never to be screened again.

You can't criticize, of course, anyone in the party, except low level regional secretaries and then only gently. Even if they are corrupt. "All the Kings' Men" was made in the USSR, but it was also about the American Senator. As one American said to a Russian, "We are so free that we can criticize our President - and the Russian answers, "We also are free to criticize your President."

Our directors are always searching for new ways to outsmart the administration. A story is told about the director who inserted into the final version of his film several illogical scenes filled with images of white dogs. The ministry officials were furious. "Don't you understand," they said, "that these scenes with the white dogs are ruining your storyline." "Really?", asked the director. After a battle, he "allowed" the ministry to remove all the white dog scenes, ending up with exactly the film he had originally hoped to make.

In 1975, I decided to become a film director. I wanted to write and direct my own scripts, to convey to my people my own vision of society and maybe become a catalyst for change. I returned to the State Film School. By the time I graduated, I understood that I had chosen a very difficult path. As an actor, even though I had my differences with the authorities, I wasn't a threat. My job was to act, to entertain, to interpret. Now I was presenting my own ideas. Immediately I found myself doing battle with the film administrators, fighting for creative freedom. All I wanted was the possibility to tell the truth, to help improve life for my people, to change the laws whch stagnate my country.

My final project at the state school was a 20 minute short feature, that I wrote, about a situation, I had seen every day for 20 years in the small town outside Moscow where my mother lives. Three hundred meters from our house was a railroad line, that intersected the main road which leads to Moscow. Before a train came, the barrier would be lowered to keep cars from crossing the tracks. Hundreds of trains passed through our town daily. As a result, traffic would be held up for hours, cars backed up for kilometers. The cost to the people and the state was enormous in terms of wasted gas, wasted time, nerves and productivity. I documented this situation (which is common all over the Soviet Union) in my film and had the characters petition the government, asking their leaders for a bridge or a tunnel.

The official opposition to my film, and its message, was tremendous. The director of Mosfilm Studio, a former police officer, had been on vacation when my script was approved. Now, he said, that had he been present, such a story would never have been given the go-ahead. The Film Minister, Filip Ermash, a political appointee with no cinema background, and his cabinet, began a major offensive against my small film, insisting that it was not my business as a filmmaker to criticize the transportation system of the Sovet Union. In the end, I had to compromise and soften an already mild ending.

Interestingly enough, after the film was shown, a government office was opened to clear up congestion at railway crossings around the country. The first town to get a bridge, was my mother's.

The straw that broke the camel's back was the Film Ministry's decision to cancel my first full-length feature film, after I had worked for a year on the script and was already searching for locations in the Caucasian Mountains. There was nothing wrong with the script -- four yers later it was filmed by another director for another studio.

The highest levels of government has pressured the ministry to end my career as a director. They had also ordered other directors not to cast me in lead roles. The Filmmakers Union, as usual, had no power to help me.

The problem was inability to conform, my attempt to win more artistic freedom, and, incredibly enough, the political machinations of an ex-wife. Probably without pressure from my ex-wife, the government would have ignored me -- there are many more difficult filmmakers in the Soviet Union. But my ex-wife's closest friend is Galina Brezhnev, daughter of the then secretary-general of the Communist party.

My government's willingness to destroy me professionally, rather than disappoint my ex-wife's powerful friends, killed whatever illusions I still had about my individual rights in the Sovet Union.

As a proud Russian, with a deep love for his country and people, I am ashamed that I had to stand before you today and recite this story, which not only documents the fact that there is little or no artistic freedom in the Soviet Union, but shows how easily political power is abused by our leaders.

I can, however, end on a postive note. I had already left the Soviet Union when Gorbachev because Secretary-general. But I applaud each time I read in the newspapers that he has succeeded in throwing out another high-level bureaucrat who is a relic of the Stalin-Brezhnev era; who for years blocked progress and liberalization in the Soviet Union. I believe that most Soviet people share my reaction.

And when I read in the New York Times last Saturday that Gorbachev had rewritten the Communist Party program to emphasize practical economic goals, eliminating many of the meaningless ideological ideas, I had hoped once again for our cinema industry.

It's too late for me. I'm already here. But I believe that if Gorbachev continues making his reforms, we may see a significant change in the quality of life in the Soviet Union, and, therefore, a new era in the history of Soviet filmmaking.

Chairman D'AMATO. Mr. Vidov, your testimony is a powerful indictment of the Soviet system. Your eloquence about the plight of artists who are not willing to conform and those who fight for their artistic freedom, really leaves no question in my mind. There is no doubt as to how and why censorship and state control take place. It is a system that is frightened of the truth. Truth is the artists, expression to the public, making concrete his feelings and his vision. An artist will speak the truth through his art whether in or out of his country, whether he is a great music conductor, or like yourself, an actor.

We deeply appreciate the poignant message that you send to this Commission. We are hopeful that others will listen to your story of what this dehumanizing system has done, and is doing.

I think we will try to move on as quickly as we can.

Mr. Shostakovich, Maxim Shostakovich.

STATEMENT OF MAXIM SHOSTAKOVICH

Mr. SHOSTAKOVICH. Good morning. I don't have a prepared special speech, but I will tell you a few things which are important for me to tell.

I try to speak English, but my English isn't very good, sorry.

Chairman D'AMATO. Your English is coming through your music.

Cochairman HOYER. You ought to hear the chairman's and my Russian, if you think your English is bad.

Mr. SHOSTAKOVICH. First of all, let me talk here especially about censors in Russia. First of all, I think the presence of censorship is the sign of the absence of democracy.

I know Karl Marx said censorship is the moral evil which can have the most evil consequences. But this thought also exists under censorship in Russia, not many students can read this——

Chairman D'AMATO. Mr. Shostakovich, if I might suggest—Ms. Cosman, why don't you take the microphone and you can translate for Mr. Shostakovich. Thank you.

Mr. SHOSTAKOVICH [translated]. Even the works of Lenin, not only Karl Marx, are also censored. Censorship can be pro and con, because everything that is against power is prohibited, but that which supports power, Government supports this kind of art.

I think power reaches—I think the Government is unsure of itself—I think the government which is unsure of itself, a structure which is unsure of itself, is very afraid of culture and will always control it, to one degree or another, because culture forms public opinion.

One should also remember that there is censorship of taste, in general, in a country simplification of taste, others decide for people what they should like and not like, what is dear to them, and not dear to them.

I should mention that all Jewish theaters are closed with one exception, and all books published in Hebrew are forbidden, or there are no books published in Hebrew. The same applies to Jewish music, except for "Hava Nagila," which you can order, you can pay for in restaurants, to be played. But only after the rest of the program has already been played.

Very often, under the guise of concern for the Soviet person, there is censorship. Certainly the Soviet person is not allowed to see cruelty on the stage, for example, and of course killing should also not be seen, although it depends on who is being killed, if it is to the advantage of the Soviet state, the killing of the person, then it is permissible for the Soviet person to see that.

I remember at a film festival a Spanish film was being shown, and there were many frivolous sexual scenes, nothing was cut out. The only phrase that was cut out of the film, or the only scene that was cut out of the film, was when the heroine says to the hero, "I can't see you tonight because I am going to hear a concert by Rostropovich."

But music, nevertheless, is in an advantageous position because it speaks a language which is not understandable. However, when language is added, or when words are added to music, that's another question. A person will never hear an opera composed to works by Solzhenitsyn, for example, or works by the poet Akhmatovoa, or certainly no Soviet composer could write a work based on—a work of music based on Mr. Aksyonov's writings.

Also, music which is connected to anything spiritual, religious, is not allowed. In regard to the works of Bach, even though some of his Masses are sometimes performed, the Russian listener is lucky. But certainly some of the spiritual works of Rachmaninoff, for example, and Russian composers, in general, are not performed.

These kinds of censorships exist because these works would lead people into areas that the authorities don't like, namely spiritual life and religious life, and it is not to the advantage of the authorities. Also, very contemporary works of music are not performed; they are in the same situation, although they can be heard in special music clubs, particularly the House of Composers. People are acquainted with the fact that under Stalin, for example, many works were simply forbidden to be performed under any circumstance, including the works of my father, Prokofiev, and others, not to speak of Western composers.

An assistant of mine was saying something that I well remember from my student days, and this was as recently as the 1970's. A music student who wanted to hear certain works, namely the kinds of works that I have mentioned before, had to get special written permission from the director of the school. Then he could sort of sneak off and go and listen to some of this music.

It is very similar to what happens with literature or written works, in general. There are special archives, especially at the Lenin Library in Moscow, where these archives are closed to everyone, except for people with special written permission to get access to these archives.

The functioning of censorship begins at the creative union, in other words, the union of writers, composers, et cetera. In this way the creative unions, such as the Union of Composers, is in charge of making sure that the censorship procedures are followed.

First of all, they have to be absolutely certain not to allow that various so-called bad works are performed, but they also have to make sure that other censorship procedures are observed, and people are not allowed to listen to these works.

I would like to repeat that, "A power structure that is unsure of itself fears culture." Real democracy is founded on completely different principles.

I am listening with interest to the current debate here in America about rock music lyrics and what lyrics are good and what are bad, and all of that. I came to the conclusion that even though it might be good to apply some censorship in some of these cases, nevertheless, I decided it could lead to a breaking of the actual foundation of democracy. Therefore, I think it is probably better to be tolerant of these things, even if one doesn't like them, so as to avoid eventually confronting a greater evil.

So the basic foundation of democracy would not be disturbed, and there could be such a danger.

Thank you.

Chairman D'AMATO. A very powerful closing. We thank you for your testimony.

Mr. Aksyonov.

STATEMENT OF VASILY AKSYONOV

Mr. AKSYONOV. Good morning.

I am going to talk today about the Metropol Affair, which was denounced by the Soviet officials as the "Trojan Horse," behind the walls of Socialist realism, so you can hear this today from the "Trojan Horse's" mouth.

A notorious campaign set in the Union of the Soviet Writers in 1979-80 is an eloquent example of the Soviet abuse of the independent creative activity.

By the late 1970's, the warmth of the thaw had become no more than a distant memory. The newest "new times" were beginning to resemble the oldest "old times" of Stalin. In spite of that, or because of that, many of us writers felt a desperate need to achieve at least a minor degree of autonomy within the colonial empire of the Soviet literary establishment. This rather vague desire eventually brought about a project of an independent literary almanac which unified 23 authors and 3 artists.

We decided to make no deals with literary officials, since we knew perfectly well that if we went to the Writer's Union for assistance, they would crush the project on the outset, or at least disfigure it beyond recognition.

To remain within legal limits, we produced only 12 homemade copies of the almanac, more than 1,000 pages each. Any more would have constituted illegal book production. These 12 volumes looked like pre-Gutenberg folios, each approximately the weight of 20 pounds and the size of a gravestone. Bulky as they were, we nevertheless right away managed to smuggle two copies out of the country just for safety.

The next step in this mysterious literary event was to be a large brunch—champagne, caviar, and hot pretzels—at the Rhythm, a Moscow cafe. We had invited some important personalities of Soviet science and culture, as well as jazz musicians, top models (moving bouquets) and journalists from both West and Soviet press, in accordance with the principles of parity.

Only after this gathering we planned to go to the State Committee for Publishing and offer them a volume of our almanac. We hoped to remain within the framework of Soviet officialdom, but with the only condition: no censorship, or better, none of their editing. Success in publishing, even a small edition of this unusual collection, we believed, would manifest a magic breakthrough in the history of Soviet literature.

Alas, a week before the Rhythm brunch was to take place, the alarm bell began to ring on the upper deck. The cafe was closed for sanitation. Contagious champagne ideas, indeed! The infamous Metropol Affair was launched by the ideological apparatchiks.

What did this Trojan Horse "Metropol" contain? Who were those voices threatening the fortress of Socialist realism?

First of all, we were very different from those esthetically unified innovators, the members of small groups of the 1920's which were dispersed for the sake of the one and only Union of the Soviet Writers. Unlike them, we were united more by ethical, than by esthetical and artistic principles. The ethic was simple: leave literature alone.

Esthetically "Metropol" contained multitudes, realistic prose and modern "black prose," traditional poetry and avant garde verse, the new religious philosophy and the ideas of neopositivism.

We ranged widely in age as well; our youngest contributor was 44 years. Among our ranks were well-known favorites of the Soviet intellectual world, as well as the less known, those whose literary destiny, despite their substantial accomplishments, was doomed by official neglect. That, perhaps, was our major goal: to show the rich variety of Russian literature, whether above or underground, and to stress its contrast to the boredom of official Soviet literature.

I should add that we were extremely moderate on our selections. We shunned work that posed too direct a challenge to the ruling ideology. However, I believe authorities were far less upset by the content of the almanac, than by the action itself, by our solidarity and disregard for the usual literary bureaucratic procedure.

It is hard to say for sure who have orchestrated the anti-Metropol campaign, but the role of the first violin was given to the first secretary of the Moscow branch of the Writers Union, Mr. Kuznetsov. Outside the union's paper Moskovsky Literator, which has a very limited circulation, there was little evidence of conflict. There was almost no indication of the endless secretarial sessions and party rallies, meanwhile the orgy of intimidation, blackmail, arm twisting, and rumors were in the full swing. This was, as one French journalist put it, "Trench warfare inside the Union of Soviet Writers."

I was denounced as a ringleader and mastermind of the conspiracy. That acquisition was intended to let others off easy, as long as they went along with the party line. This is the oldest technique of colonial control, divide and conquer. But they had badly underestimated the sense of solidarity among our authors. It might have been the first time in Soviet literary history that the authorities failed to find a single turncoat in an opposing group, at least as far as I know.

Later, we learned that "Metropol" was being used as a sort of litmus test of loyalty. The apparatchiks tried to force union mem-

bers to condemn "Metropol," even those who had never seen it. If a certain writer was reluctant, he or she was reminded that his or her book was soon coming up for publication, or that his or her request for a new apartment, a new car, or a trip abroad was now coming up for consideration.

Kuznetsov, himself, seemed particularly preoccupied by possible leaks to foreigners. At the first session of the Board of Secretaries, he pursued his question in the best KGB interrogatory style: "Have any foreigners seen this volume?" Who knows, we shrugged. There are about 100,000 foreigners in Moscow on any given day. Our interrogators appeared to be overwhelmed by the number of potential suspects.

The next step was rumor-mongering, definitely carried out by certain disinformation centers. According to the rumors, all "Metropol" contributors were Jews, though anti-Semites, homosexuals, and agents of Western subversive centers. Andrej Bitov's real name was Von Bitoff, and Aksyonov, that was just a pen name for Ginzburg, who incidentally had $1 million in a Swiss bank, and had formulated the whole affair as a publicity stunt, hardly caring that he had dragged innocent people, even though those innocent ones are devious, self-interested Jews.

There is a unique side of Soviet mentality, they willingly believe the myths created by themselves.

Somebody took care of supplying us with discouraging information. The "Metropol" case is handled by the State Investigator of Extreme Anti-State Crimes. It was brought up in Politburo by Full Member, Comrade Kirilenko. All of our talks are monitored by the Secret Service. The idiocy had reached its peak when hero of the Soviet Union, the writer Karpov, demanded publicly that we be considered for the firing squad.

This clumsy and indecent campaign which lasted all told about 2 years, resulted ultimately in expulsion of two younger writers from the union, resignation of several others, and in my departure from the Soviet Union. I was later deprived of my Soviet citizenship.

A journalist once asked me how we managed to create such a tempest in a giant teapot. I could only say in truth that we had not intended to. Our intentions were limited to open a few windows, to air out the musty house of Soviet literature, to give people a chance to breathe something other than Socialist realism. The whole turmoil was created, in fact, by authorities. Why did they act so violently?

As a matter of fact, that was the typical response of the provincial and ignorant ideologists to the threat of literature. On the other hand it provided an occasion for them to promote themselves as guardians of Socialist ideals.

By all signs, it appears as though the top echelon of the party is seeking a final solution to all literary problems. From this we might conclude that any attempts at even moderately independent literary activity in the U.S.S.R. are doomed to failure. But perhaps we, like the Soviet leaders, are too hasty with conclusions. Have both sides overestimated or underestimated the Russian literature's stamina? The question mark is disproportionally large.

Thank you.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you very much for your most powerful statement, Mr. Aksyonov. I think your coming together as you did with your fellow writers, certainly was an inspiration, and hopefully, will be an inspiration to those who seek to continue this struggle on behalf of people who seek human rights and the ability to express themselves, not only in the area of art, literature, and music, but in other areas.

It would seem from the testimony that every one of you have given, that the Soviet state feels an overriding paranoia. This is one of the reasons they try to demonstrate total control and power through the creation of the reward and punishment system that the Government of the Soviet Union practices.

I am wondering if we might not ask our last witness, Mr. Jacobs, who has a distinguished record of service in the area of electronics, in jamming, et cetera, if he might not summarize his statement? We will insert his full statement in the record to save time, so that we can ask our witnesses some questions.

I know my cochairman, Congressman Hoyer, and Congressman Smith have questions.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE JACOBS

Mr. JACOBS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must say that I want to thank you very much for letting me share this table with such talented, young, distinguished and articulate young artists, and who told you so eloquently of their own personal deprivation, cultural deprivation in the Soviet Union. How glad we are to have them with us today in this country where our basic human rights, the right of free expression, the right of freedom of information is guaranteed by our Constitution, as it is in most other democracies of the world.

Cochairman HOYER. Including the Soviet Union.

Mr. JACOBS. In the Constitution of the Soviet Union; yes, it is, but not in practice, unfortunately. Also, in the Helsinki accords, but not in practice unfortunately.

The paranoia you just mentioned of the Soviets having their citizens exposed to cultural, or other events, different from what they want them to be exposed to, extends to the ordinary citizen in his home. The Soviets do what we call jamming, or interfering—deliberate interference with radio signals, which prevents citizens of the Soviet Union from tuning into foreign broadcasts where they can hear uncensored news programs, and entertainment and cultural programs that are denied to them within the Soviet Union.

I am going to keep my talk short this morning, because time is running out, but what I would like to do—a demonstration may be worth 10,000 words—is to play for you—and I know it is going to bring back sad memories for these gentlemen here—just a very short sample of Soviet jamming, where you will hear a program in Czech——

Mr. AKSYONOV. This will be torture for us.

Mr. JACOBS. I know it will be torture, please bear with it for 1 minute, so the rest of us can know what you have gone through, or what the average Soviet citizen goes through in his own home.

You will hear the program in the clear for a moment, then you will hear a jammer zeroing in, and if you want, I can tell you just a little bit about what they are doing. [Tape played.]

Mr. JACOBS. One jammer just came on to distort the program, but you can still hear it. Now, a second jammer comes on to further make listening difficult; then a third powerful jammer comes on to completely obliterate the broadcast.

What more is there to say?

Mr. SHOSTAKOVICH. I think in Russia, one guy told to another guy, "Give me a bottle of vodka and I will tell you what I listened to tonight on the Voice of America." He gives him a bottle of vodka, and he answers him—[beep-beep-beep]—the roar of jamming.

Mr. JACOBS. Since 1948, when the Soviets initiated the jamming system, they have assigned very, very high priority in manpower, resources, and electronic equipment, and at one time, in very, very scarce communication circuits, to establish this system which extends throughout the length and breadth of the Soviet Union. Every major city, every city with over 500,000 population is ringed by these jamming stations. Superimposed on these are powerful jammers that jam over great distances. The total number of jamming stations, considering the number of cities involved, is estimated to be between 2,000 to 3,000.

We are beginning now to notice jamming installations in cities of 250,000 and even in some cities as small as 100,000. The main point is the system is increasing, not decreasing, despite the Helsinki accords.

Interference caused by Soviet jamming stations is now so bad that it extends far beyond the Soviet borders. Not that the Soviets necessarily intend it to, but the nature of radio propagation is such that these signals are reflected by a layer in the Earth's atmosphere called the ionosphere, and they travel hundreds, and even thousands of miles. The jamming signals now are interfering with radio broadcast reception in Africa, Asia, and other areas.

There is great concern about this and a survey has recently been undertaken by the International Telecommunication Union in Geneva, to try to assess the damage that this interference is doing to the radio spectrum and to pinpoint officially the source of the interference. The results of this study could be very advantageous to us.

My statement contains more information on the technicalities of jamming. I think it is more important, however, that you continue your discussion with these young talented men. But I am here to answer any questions you must have.

[The entire written statement of George Jacobs follows:]

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TESTIMONY ON SOVIET JAMMING OF RADIO BROADCASTS

BY

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STATEMENT OF GEORGE JACOBS, P.E.

Mr. Chairman, I have devoted almost my entire professional career, which spans forty-five years, thirty- four of which were spent in the service of our government, to preserving and promoting the unrestricted flow of information across international borders through broadcasting. I am most thankful, therefore, to this Commission for inviting me here today to reflect upon my personal experiences and involvements, both technically and politically.

Freedom of information is a basic human right. It is guaranteed by the First Amendment of our Constitution, and it is an essential feature in any democratic society. It is also guaranteed to all the peoples of the world, regardless of what political society they may be living under, by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which states that " Everyone has the right of freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

It is further guaranteed by the Convention on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1966, which states more emphatically that " Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; that right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, of through any media of choice."

But of direct concern to this Commission, this human right was recognized by the signatories of the 1975 Final Act of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which states that participating countries shall act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The signatories also agreed to " make it their aim to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds." The Act also stated that " the participating states note the expansion in

the dissemination of information broadcast by radio and express hope for the continuation of that process, so as to meet the interests of mutual understanding among peoples."

It is my unhappy task to inform this hearing today that by deliberately interfering, or jamming broadcasts,four signatories, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland are flagrantly violating these solemn pledges.

International broadcasts, which take place primarily on the high frequency or shortwave bands, consist of programs transmitted from one country but intended for an audience in another country. Unlike TV, FM or standard band broadcasts which can be received over relatively short distances, shortwave broadcasts are reflected over great distances. This is made possible by a region of rarified gas in the earth's upper atmosphere called the " ionosphere". It is the ionosphere, acting much as a mirror does with light, that makes it possible for shortwave broadcasts to cross frontiers, span oceans and bridge continents.Shortwave is the only broadcasting medium with global reach. More than 80 countries broadcast internationally on the shortwave bands every day, and it is estimated that the total audience exceeds 200 million.

In the field of human communications, shortwave broadcasting today plays a very important and unique role. These broadcasts can be received directly on radios in the homes of listeners. The signal does not have to go through an earth station as do satellite signals, they need not be rebroadcast over local radio facilities, and they do not require, in a true demonstration of the free flow of information, any prior approval by the listener's country.The choice is solely up to the listener. Shortwave broadcasts, therefore, never intrude. They must always enter a listener's home as an invited guest, to be admitted or rejected by the simple flick of a switch or the turn of a dial.

It is this choice that the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria deny their citizens. These countries are presently attempting to block reception of broadcasts from the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, the BBC, Deutsche Welle and Kol Israel.

Deliberate interference to western broadcasts, or jamming, is produced electronically by placing other transmitters on the same frequency as the broadcast that is to be blocked out. Not only is there interference between the transmitters, but Soviet scientists have developed irritating sounds and noises that are psychologically and physically debilitating to listen to for any period of time.

Soviet jamming of VOA Russian language broadcasts began in 1948. Since then, a massive, sophisticated system has been developed, spanning the entire Soviet Union, in an attempt to block reception of unwanted broadcasts. More than 250 very powerful "skywave" jamming transmitters, located in clusters throughout the country, attempt to intercept Western broadcasts in the ionosphere, so that the interference is already mixed with the broadcast when the signal reaches the listener's radio. These transmitters have great reach. For example, a cluster of skywave transmitters located near Leningrad, can place a uniform blanket of interference over most of the southern half of European Russia, and beyond. Reenforcing the blanket of interference created by the skywave jamming transmitters are upwards to 3,000 lower power transmitters which ring the large population areas with intense interference. Every city in the Soviet Union with populations in excess of 500,000 and many with populations as low as 250,000 are ringed by these groundwave jamming transmitters, so-called, because their interfering signal travels relatively short distances, on the order of 10 to 20 miles, along the surface of the earth. Recently, groundwave jamming installations have been appearing in cities as small as 100,000 inhabitants.

To hear for yourself how jamming can block reception listen to the following tape recording of an RFE Czech langauge broadcast made in Prague. Note how clear the program is for a few seconds. Then note various noise jammers coming on the frequency, probably skywave jamming. The program can still be heard through the interference, albeit with difficulty. Then note that a powerful noise signal, a groundwave jammer, comes up to obliterate the signal in this example.

The human and technical resources required for the jamming system, particularly the interconnecting circuitry and communication channels between monitors who listen to how successful the jamming is in an area, with control centers which guide the jamming transmitters, demonstrates the high priority assigned to this effort by the Soviets. A new, unannounced frequency brought into sudden operation by a Western broadcaster is often located and jammed within a matter of minutes.There is evidence that the Soviet military play an important role in the operation of the jamming system. Estimates made in the west place the costs for running the jamming system at more than $300 million annually.

Western broadcasts in the languages of the Soviet Union,and in Polish, Bulgarian and Czech and Slovakian are jammed at the present time, as are Hebrew language broadcasts from Kol Israel and broadcasts in the languages of Afghanistan. While Soviet jamming is now of unprecedented intensity, Soviet broadcasts beamed to Western countries are never jammed, and they can be received clearly.

Soviet jamming of broadcasts is clearly a flagrant violation of human rights. It is a direct and conspicuous attempt to prevent entry of uncensored information via the airwaves, and to deny listeners the right to freedom of information guaranteed to them by the United Nations and by the Helsinki Accord . Unlike other human rights violations, the Soviets cannot hide this one. All one need do in the Soviet Union, or almost any place in the world for that matter, is to tune in a shortwave radio and listen to it.

Since shortwaves do not stop at frontiers, the Soviets cannot confine their jamming signals to their own territory. The ionosphere cannot distinguish between a broadcast and a jammer, and both are reflected over great distances. So, a jamming signal intended to block reception in Odessa, can also cause interference to a local broadcasting station in Africa; jamming intended to be heard in the Soviet Far East, can also cause interference throughout Asia. The interference caused to other countries not directly involved in the east-west political debate, but making them indirect

victims of Soviet jamming, has reached a staggering level. The European Broadcasting Union has recently estimated that Soviet jamming is at times denying the use of up to 80% of the channels available for shortwave broadcasting. At a time of spiraling demand for access to the shortwave broadcasting bands, Soviet jamming is polluting the radio spectrum with noise and interference. This deliberate interference is a violation of the Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, to which the Soviet Union, Poland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia are signatories.

The situation is so grave, and it may indeed threaten the viability of the international radio regulatory regime, that the member states of the International Telecommunication Union recently voted to undertake comprehensive worldwide technical observations in order to determine more precisely the extent to which jamming (called harmful interference) wastes precious broadcast channels, and to pinpoint from where the jamming originates. It is no wonder that a French member of the European Parliament referred earlier this month to Soviet jamming as " piracy and terrorism on the airwaves."

There is, unfortunately, no technical panacea for overcoming jamming. Western radio organizations have spent close to one billion dollars since 1948 for transmitting equipment in an attempt to break through the curtain of interference. But the greater number and more powerful broadcast transmitters appear to have been matched by a corresponding increase in the Soviet jamming system. The cacophony of broadcasts, interference and jamming noises continues to increase, and the entire world of broadcasting is the worse for it.

How successful Soviet jamming is in preventing reception of Western radio broadcasts depends on the time and place one is listening. There are times, primarily during the twilight hours, and there are places, mainly in rural areas, where jamming is more of a nuisance than a constraint. At other times, and mainly in the large populated areas, it is extremely difficult if not often impossible to receive Western broadcasts that are jammed.

The basis for Soviet jamming lies primarily in the political climate between the Soviet Union and the Western countries. A chronology of Soviet and East European jamming shows that it has varied in accordance with major changes in east-west relations, and particularly in consonance with crises, internal and external.

The Soviets initiated jamming of Western broadcasts in 1948, at the time of the Berlin Blockade, and the beginning of the Cold War.

The first real break in jamming occurred during 1959, when Chairman Khrushchev visited the United States. Informal bi-lateral discussions led to the end of most jamming against the VOA and BBC, except for selected news items and commentaries.

In 1963, following President Kennedy's famous American University speech, which many historians credit with the end of the Cold War and the beginning of detente, the Soviets completely stopped jamming the VOA and other Western broadcasters, but continued to jam Radio Liberty, which at that time was not operated openly by the United States. Romania ceased all jamming in 1963, followed by Hungary in 1864.

Intense Soviet jamming resumed on Western broadcasts in 1968, coincident with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In September, 1973, in what was believed to have been a concession to the then upcoming initial meetings in Helsinki of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Soviets again ceased most of their jamming efforts, except those directed against Radio Liberty.

In 1977, possibly as a result of CSCE interest, East Germany ceased jamming RIAS Berlin broadcasts.

By 1978, almost all Soviet and East European jamming had ceased, except for that directed against Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. For the first time, consideration was also given to discussing in Moscow the possibility of ending jamming against these two organizations as well, since they were now openly funded by the United States.

The Soviets resumed full and massive jamming of Western broadcasts during August, 1980, following their invasion of Afgahnistan and at the time that the Solidarity Movement was proclaimed in Poland. Jamming of Polish broadcasts were intensified in 1982 with

the increase in political tension. In 1982 jamming was initiated on Western broadcasts beamed to Afghanistan.

Incidentally, I actively participated in the bi-lateral discussions that led to reductions in Soviet jamming in 1959, 1963, 1977 and 1978.

Following the Egyptian- Israeli War of 1973, the Soviets intensified jamming Soviet language broadcasts from Kol Israel, as well as broadcasts in Hebrew and Yiddish. Jamming of these broadcasts continue unabated.

While there have been periods when Soviet jamming has been reduced drastically, the technical apparatus has always remained in place, to be brought back into service on short notice.

From the past history of Soviet jamming, it is evident that even if only temporarily, the Soviets have recognized a certain international political climate in which they apparently feel secure enough to allow their citizens the free choice of listening to foreign broadcasts in their native languages. Can such a situation happen again? The answer to this complex question, I believe lies to a very large degree in the efforts of this Commission. I am convinced from my experiences that if there is to be any solution to the jamming issue, it must come through appropriate political and diplomatic intercourse and not from technical innovation.

Let me take a few moments to report to you how your colleagues in the European Parliament meeting in Strasbourg, France earlier this month resolved to handle this issue.

They critized the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland for their jamming of Western radio stations. They passed a resolution which condemned jamming as a breach of human rights and a violation of the Helsinki Accord. The vote was 84-23, with 21 abstentions.

The Parliament said that the Foreign Ministers of the ten European Community nations should urge the four guilty countries to dismantle their jamming equipment. The resolution also praised the efforts of Western broadcasting organizations to give listeners free access to information that they are deprived of by their own governments.

The Resolution itself is quite short. Because of its importance I would like to read it in its entirety.

" The European Parliament...

A. Mindful of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 1948,

B. Having regard to the many resolutions of the U.N., and particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

C. Having regard to Article 48 of the Montreux International Telecommunications Convention,

D. Having regard to the Final Act of the CSCE Conference, of which the free exchange of information is a cornerstone,

E. Whereas the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland systematically jam Western radio broadcasts, thereby not only depriving their own peoples of information and comment but also, on occasion, causing considerable disruption to reception in areas near their frontiers,

F. Whereas freedom of information is not only an essential feature of democracy,but also an indispensable element of any genuine peace policy,

1. Protests against the continued use of jamming stations by the governments of the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, which make it extremely difficult and often impossible for the people of Central and Eastern Europe to receive Western radio broadcasts;

2. Condemns these measures as a clear breach of human rights, as incompatible with the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference and as an extension of the Cold War which is inimical to detente;

3. Welcomes the efforts of numerous Western broadcasting organizations to provide people deprived of free access to information by their governments, where possible, with news and opinions to assist them to make their own judgements on political matters;

4. Expects the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to make immediate representations to the governments of the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland urging them to dismantle these jamming stations in accordance with their obligations in International Law;

5. Instructs its President to forward this Resolution to the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation and to Governments which signed the Final Act of the CSCE Helsinki Conference."

Because of the human rights issue involved, and the significance of the upcoming summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, I urge the U.S. Congress to follow the lead of the European Parliament with a similar resolution.

What is at stake here is more than the privilege of turning a radio dial and listening to someone's voice from another country. What is at stake is a fundamental human right; the freedom of an individual to decide what to listen to or what not to listen to, what is true and what is not.

Thank you for the privilege of addressing this Commission this morning.

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Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Jacobs, and thank you for your demonstration. I am sorry it brought back such memories to our witnesses.

Let me just ask—I want to ask Mr. Jacobs one question, if I may. Senator Heinz mentioned the possible use of satellites to beam information and radio and television transmissions into the Soviet Union. What would be the effect of using satellites for this purpose? Have we developed techniques that could then make it much more difficult to jam U.S. transmissions?

Mr. JACOBS. Well, sir, I am an engineer, and I have spent most of my professional life, which spans 45 years, 34 of them with the Government, developing technical systems, in an attempt to overcome jamming. I have to tell you with heavy heart that there is no magical panacea, no technical magical solution.

Whatever we develop here has been up until now, matched by an increase, or an improvement, or an alteration in the Soviet jamming system. There are new techniques on the horizon, some of them may permit broadcasts from foreign countries to be heard in the Soviet Union. But, based on my own past experience, I must take a pessimistic view and say that for whatever is developed on one side, there will be a counterdevelopment, unfortunately, on the other side. The nature of radio and television is just that way.

It is why I feel—and I should stress this here today—that if there is ever to be a relaxation of not only jamming, but the other depravations we have been speaking about today, it is going to have to come about through diplomatic efforts, not through technical efforts.

Chairman D'AMATO. I am wondering if I might ask a question of our other witnesses, Mr. Vidov, Mr. Aksyonov, or Mr. Shostakovich. What do you hear through your sources, through artists and others you maintain contacts with—what is the reaction of the Soviet people, not the artists, but the people to this suppression of artistic talent?

Are they aware that it is taking place?

Mr. AKSYONOV. I am not sure that the majority of the people are aware that artists are suppressed by these measures. Most are just taking that for granted, the restrictions imposed on the artists, and they don't have any other model for comparison.

They are absolutely sure, for instance, not the movie production must be the way they see it, or the novels they can buy in the bookstores should be exactly of the same level, boring stuff.

So, in a way they are already the people who are deprived of understanding of basic censoring of artistic values. They show some signs of gluttony for the books, for instance. They are just hunting for books without any understanding of what kind of a book they are hunting for.

But on the other hand, the great minority of the people—I would say the minority which might be calculated at several million people—understand. They know everything and they understand everything, and they are absolutely aware of the reality of the situation.

Chairman D'AMATO. Mr. Shostakovich.

Mr. SHOSTAKOVICH [translated]. I don't like to divide into categories or into groups artists and the people. In each group, or in each

so-called group, there is both positive and negative potential. It seems to me that, throughout the course of Soviet history that all strata of Soviet society have been forced to learn the rules of the game, and to learn what they can and what they cannot do.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you. Mr. Vidov.

Mr. VIDOV. I would like to describe an interesting experience that came from distribution of films in the Soviet Union. It was about 4 or 5 years ago, I suppose, the Soviet people, when they came to cinema to see foreign, Western films. It was a great sign that they stopped to pay for a lot of Soviet productions. Why?

What they show on the screen is not true. So, it became the great conflict between masses and the ideological programs. That's why they don't want to see Soviet films.

They really come to the film, to see the film with several ideas, if they can see something good.

I suppose that all nations, all people who can come to cinema, they will, because they really like to see truth and they know when it is true. They are against the lie.

So, this process will grow.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you very much, Mr. Vidov.

Cochairman Hoyer.

Cochairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Again, I want to express my thanks to all four of you for testifying. I want to ask just a couple of questions because our time is short.

Mr. Vidov, in the conclusion of your statement you refer to the changes that you see in the Soviet Union, being affected by Mr. Gorbachev. I have two questions:

First of all, in the last 10 years, have you seen any changes whatsoever for the better as the result of the Helsinki Final Act?

Second, what effect has that had internally?

Mr. Scammell spoke briefly to that, but I would like to have your views.

In particular, in your opening statement you expressed some optimism that perhaps there will be an opening up or greater flexibility under Gorbachev. Could you please expand on that as well.

Mr. VIDOV. My experience came from really being close to my people, especially by personal appearances, I was in Siberia, in Kazakhstan. So, I met people and I knew what it is. And during 10 years the Government, the Brezhnev Cabinet, were really very silent people, it was terrible. In 1983, it was an atmosphere of no hope in art, no hope in writing, no hope in economics, no hope—people have no smiles, people are very hungry and depressed. It was really depressing and it was terrible feeling when you could see people like this.

The Russians without hope cannot be happy. They really need ideas. The Soviet Government without control, can do what it wants. They made slaves, because they have all the power. The system gave them the possibility to be like that, to arrest people and to frighten them.

So, we felt, everybody felt the impossibility to be and exist as a free person. No free person.

Cochairman HOYER. Would it be fair to observe that in light of that, you did not see any progress from 1975 to 1983?

Mr. VIDOV. I just saw when Andropov came, I was very lucky, because when Andropov came and Brezhnev died, it was apparent that everybody was afraid they would lose their chairs, so they didn't care about me. And they gave me permission to go to my work. I was happy, I was in Yugoslavia and I got information about what was happening in Soviet Union.

When Chernenko came to power, it was again the old generation of these old people who don't understand anything. It was the party who were not economists, not scientists, it was absolutely people who just pushed dogma.

You know it is like a tractor without driver, it just goes.

When I heard about Gorbachev, I heard that he come to Hungary, to study Hungarian agriculture, the Hungarian agriculture is really at a very good level. They have different things, you know, with agriculture, they work very well—they separate from the pressure of government and party.

They said that we liked to bring such an idea to the Soviet Union, but if you bring it, then you know the people will be much happier. They won't have to depend on the Government and they will be more free.

But when Gorbachev came, a new generation, I count his age and from history, he is a person who was educated under Stalin era.

Mr. AKSYONOV. Let's keep in mind that he joined the party in 1952, when Stalin was still alive.

Mr. VIDOV. And I just hope that he is better than they were before.

Mr. AKSYONOV. No doubt about that.

Cochairman HOYER. I would like to hear from Mr. Shostakovich.

Mr. SHOSTAKOVICH [translated]. I think in Russian history many times it was a little better, a little worse, it depends on your taste. But the situation in relation to the Government and arts, it depends on the economic success. They try to find out all the time who is guilty. I think sometimes it is better, sometimes it is worse, but we never have a special way to be more democratic and more free. Nobody does this.

Cochairman HOYER. Were there any changes in 1975–85, for instance, any loosening of censorship, or greater interchange of ideas? Or did it escalate?

Mr. VIDOV. I don't think so. It was worse.

Cochairman HOYER. Mr. Aksyonov.

Mr. AKSYONOV. I would have some reservation to what my friend says. It seems to me that we benefited a little bit from the Helsinki accords, because no doubt the men like Brezhnev and Chernenko, and the others were obsolete and the monsters of the 1930's. They didn't have any idea of modern reality.

But the only point they were concerned with the international public opinion and the Helsinki accords. They did violate them, but any day after signing this—but they were a little bit reluctant to go to action against the creative people of Russia. The situation in the creative world was coming to the greatest climax, to conflict because all of us are none other than remnants of the previous period. We had developed our abilities, creative abilities during the post-Stalin renaissance.

They were leading the whole society in the opposite direction and that was sort of two-way traffic. The harsher they were toward us, the tougher we were toward them.

So, if they wouldn't observe completely the Helsinki accords, I would say that we would hardly be here today on the Hill in Washington, DC. Maybe we would find ourselves absolutely in a different place.

Cochairman HOYER. I very much appreciate your comments and observation because, as you know, there is a controversy as to whether the Helsinki process has resulted in real progress. Your testimony is an eloquent "yes."

Thank you very much.

At this time I would like to recognize Mr. Smith and then Mr. Ritter.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It seems very clear that at the heart of this censorship is not only distrust, but a paranoia, a fear of people, of ideas, of cultural exchanges, of all that helps to, as Mr. Vidov mentioned, give people hope and allow them to strive for more than their material surroundings.

Before I ask any questions, I would like to commend all of you panelists. You certainly are an inspiration to us on the Commission, and when these hearings are assembled and disseminated among our colleagues, I am sure that they, too, will benefit greatly from your comments this morning.

As I think many of you know, there is an ongoing process, the Budapest Cultural Forum, part of the Helsinki process. If there was one idea that we could convey to the Soviets at that conference, what would it be? Would it be jamming? Would it be—you know, rather than just a general idea, of well, let's see more cultural freedom, is there one specific thing that you think we could look to, or try to achieve at that conference?

Yes, Mr. Jacobs.

Mr. JACOBS. I wouldn't want to limit it to one specific item, but I do want to call something to your attention—action that your colleagues in the European Parliament took last week. They passed a resolution which criticized the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland for their jamming of Western radio stations, a resolution that condemned it as a flagrant violation and breach of human rights, a violation of the Helsinki accords, the vote was 84 to 23, with 21 abstentions. The Parliament also instructed the foreign ministers of the 10 European Community countries that make up the Parliament to urge the 4 guilty countries to dismantle the jamming equipment.

The resolution also praised the efforts of Western broadcasting organizations to give listeners free access to information that they are deprived of by their own government. I am not going to take time to read the resolution, but it is in my written statement to the Commission.

Mr. SMITH. I would appreciate you highlighting that.

Mr. JACOBS. I would suggest that if the European Parliament could take such an action, then our U.S. Congress should consider a similar resolution, either at Budapest or for the upcoming summit meeting.

Mr. SMITH. Anyone else on the panel?

Mr. SHOSTAKOVICH [translated]. I am in favor of the reinstitution of cultural exchanges, but on an equal footing for both sides.

Mr. AKSYONOV. It seems to me that we should encourage this rather slim layer of liberalism which still exists in the official Soviet cultural world. It is getting slimmer and slimmer, year by year. But it still exists and we should be very selective and very flexible in our attempts to maintain the cultural contacts with the Soviet Union. But we should keep on going with it, in that direction.

Mr. SHOSTAKOVICH [translated]. A meeting about culture, or about all the Helsinki accords?

Mr. SMITH. Well, the focus will be on culture, of course the Helsinki process is on all the human rights, and on security matters, but the focus would be on culture.

Mr. VIDOV. Also, I think that film coproductions are good in which America brings ideas to Russia. The first meeting is always very good, and it then became trouble, as in the film "Cossacks and Cowboys."

I suppose such coproductions can really help people to understand each other when they work together, when they do something together.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Jacobs, I was disturbed a moment ago when you said that jamming was actually on the increase, it is not level—it is not declining, it is actually increasing. In addition to the diplomatic efforts, what can be done technically to mitigate their jamming procedures?

Mr. JACOBS. It is on the increase, but I should make an important observation, that after the Helsinki accords were signed in 1975, there was a considerable decrease in jamming on the part of the Soviet Union. In fact, by 1978 it had stopped completely, except against one radio organization, which we call Radio Liberty, or Radio Svoboda, against which it continued all of the time.

It resumed in 1980, right after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and at the time of the solidarity movement in Poland, and it has been increasing ever since.

Now, as far as the answer to your second question, it is not easy. There are technical devices and systems that do for a time increase our ability to get through jamming, higher power transmitters, more transmitters and different locations. But as I mentioned before, the history up until now has been that this has always been followed, in a relatively short period of time, by a corresponding increase in the Soviet jamming system.

This, again, indicates—and these gentlemen at the table can probably confirm it better than I—the great importance that is placed by the Soviet Government in their jamming system, and assigning resources to it, manpower, equipment, and money. The difficulty is that as we develop in the West more techniques, more powerful transmitters, and they develop in the East more powerful jammers, the rest of the world suffers from the cacophony of interference.

The broadcasting bands are not just allocated to East and West, they are allocated to the entire world. Eighty countries presently participate in international broadcasting. International broadcast-

ing is a broadcast originating in one country intended for listeners in another.

Soviet jamming is now directed against the transmissions of four Western countries: the United States through the VOA, RFE, and Radio Liberty; the British Broadcasting Corp.; the Deutsche Welle, the Voice of Germany; and KOL Israel, the Voice of Israel. The confrontation between the broadcasters and jamming is so great now that the entire world is affected by it.

So, it is unlikely, in my view—there may be other views on this—but in my view, as an engineer, it is unlikely that we will come up with any magical solution. There is no answer to completely overcome jamming from a technical point of view.

Whatever progress we make—and we have made some progress, and as these gentlemen probably can confirm, it is possible to hear Western broadcasts in the Soviet Union, albeit difficult and tortuous. We have made some progress, but whatever progress we have made is detected, since nothing can be held secret on the airwaves. When Soviet monitors hear our programs coming through, they orderup more jammers.

I have to be very pessimistic, but candid, in telling you I don't believe that there is a technical solution to jamming. All the more important why the dialog of the Helsinki accords, or meetings between heads of state, the dialog and diplomatic approach may, in the end, be more fruitful. We can hope so.

Mr. SMITH. To your knowledge, has the United Nations ever taken a leadership role in this area?

Mr. JACOBS. The United Nations has taken a leadership role in this area, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights originated in the United Nations. The United Nations has condemned the Soviets many times—well, it has condemned jamming, never the Soviets by country, but it has condemned the interference of broadcasting.

But the United Nations, through a sister organization, the International Telecommunication Union in Geneva, is taking a major role now, which I referred to before. The spillover effect of Soviet jamming, which interferes with broadcasts of many innocent countries, that is countries that are not involved in the East-West conflict, is now becoming so great that a resolution was passed last year. It authorizes the International Telecommunication Union to officially monitor the airwaves four times a year, and to determine the degree to which what they call officially harmful interference, what we call jamming, is affecting the radiowaves, not only between East and West, but throughout the entire world.

More importantly, the International Telecommunication Union has the assignment, and it is going to be a very difficult assignment for them, because we already know the answer—of pinpointing through direction-finding devices and other means, from where the interference originates. That report should be finished in 1 year.

We, as members of the International Telecommunication Union, and the United Nations, are looking forward to its publication with considerable interest.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I do have one final question.

Mr. Aksyonov, you indicated that the classics were somewhat available to the average Soviet citizen. Is that just the Russian classics, or are other nations' classical literature also available? What about the Bible, is that also available?

Mr. AKSYONOV. The Bible is a stumbling block for them. There is not an official ban on the Bible, but they are always looking for a Bible everywhere, throughout the Soviet border. For instance, they are very preoccupied that the Bible could be smuggled from Poland to the Soviet Union.

But with regards to the classical literature, they published a lot of them, and they are doing better and better in this field, I would say. Because you know that besides the Soviet officials and stupid apparatchiks, there are a lot of talented and well-educated people who are working in this field. And they are trying to do their best to publish the most they can.

But there is some censorship even imposed on the classics, most preposterous censorship, I would say, in the publication of the classics. With regard to just one single word "God," "Bog"—it is never allowed to be published using the capital letter. They even correct the classics like Gogol, Dostoevski, and Tolstoi and everywhere the word "God" is corrected, from the capital letter to the small letter.

There are some other censorship or restrictions imposed on classics, but I should say that the publication of classics are now getting better and better. They have even published some authors who were persecuted during Stalin's time. I remember Marina Tsvetava and even some emigre authors, like Ivan Bunin, the Nobel Prize winner. Ivan Bunin, who was an outspoken anti-Soviet author, he is now considered a classic and published there.

It is not thanks to the Soviet ideology, it is despite it.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Aksyonov.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, I have just one short question. As I mentioned recently, in the Soviet Union there were some people wearing Stalin pins on their lapel, and I just wondered what your feeling is about this re-emergence, at least of the images of Stalin and what that means for the arts and culture?

Mr. AKSYONOV. Were they self-made?

Mr. RITTER. No, reproduced in mass production.

Mr. AKSYONOV. Produced by the industry?

Mr. RITTER. That was in a research institute.

Mr. VIDOV. And you can buy them?

Mr. RITTER. I couldn't—I mean, I was there for 5 days——

Mr. VIDOV. Do they sell it, or do they give it to——

Mr. AKSYONOV. Do they sell it in the shops?

Mr. RITTER. I don't know if they sell them.

Mr. SHOSTAKOVICH. For example, in Georgia, many, many——

Mr. RITTER. No, this was in Moscow.

Mr. SHOSTAKOVICH. Maybe it was a joke.

Mr. RITTER. It was not one of your private little party constructions, I mean, it was shiny and well made, and it obviously had that look of mass fabrication.

Mr. VIDOV. But in Russia they can do it by a small factory underground, because if it is official, then it is an impossible situation—it is a terrible indication, if you know it exists officially.

Mr. AKSYONOV. But as for as I know, they officially condemn the so-called Cult of Personality in the recent party papers. But despite that, they could encourage these post-Stalin feelings, and they are really spread widely——

Mr. RITTER. Does this have any impact on the cultural life, or is it more kind of a symbol of worker discipline?

Mr. AKSYONOV. This is a symbol of order, law and order. In the minds of absolutely confused people, you know. There are, I would say, two levels of the Soviet reality: one is the official one which is depicted by Pravda or Soviet television, it looks like a wholly defined totalitarian system of cogs. You know, they are marching along Red Square and they are waving their flags, and it does exist in reality, but it is very thin on the surface layer, on the surface. But inside there is an absolute ocean of confusion, disappointment, disillusionment, and everything like this. And people are absolutely confused by what is going on in reality, they are under unbearable press of propaganda but they can see that the new life is absolutely unsimilar to the official picture of the society.

Millions of them might be compared to blind kittens. So, I would say that this involved emotions—positive emotions toward Stalin, just a blindness because they never articulate really what Cult of Personality means. This is absolutely an opposite notion for millions, but they know that my father fought nazism under Stalin, and during Stalin we had order, he was tough, he was a real leader. He reduced some prices, prices for—not for vodka, he never did—but for plastic combs, or something like that.

But they are still under the impression of that because of lack of information, because of lack of real knowledge, because of the enormous pressure of propaganda. They just look for something new and because it is in the frame of official propaganda, they couldn't see the real picture of Stalin. They are not mentioning him.

Mr. SHOSTAKOVICH. Who knew?

Mr. AKSYONOV. People are looking for something which is different from this false reality, the official propaganda created. So they look for some idols and some of them even cherish Stalin's memory, that's right.

Mr. RITTER. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I know I am speaking for all my colleagues on this Commission, when I present a very well-known proverb in American culture, and that is "Every cloud has its silver lining" and it is obvious that the great cloud that hangs there is somehow lined with silver here, because we, as Americans have been graced by the infusion of people of your caliber, by the hundreds, by the thousands. Certainly you are making a major positive contribution to our society, to our culture and to our understanding, and for that I thank you very deeply.

Cochairman HOYER. Thank you, Congressman Ritter. I think Mr. Ritter certainly expresses the sentiments of Chairman D'Amato, who had a 12:30 meeting and had to leave, but who asked me to express his regrets as well as his thanks.

You have graced the United States with your talents and the Commission is honored that each of you took the time, as I said at the outset of this hearing, to come and be with us, and to give us

your observations and thoughts with reference both to the Helsinki process and to the current status in the Soviet Union.

We have benefited greatly from that. We assure you that our colleagues in the Congress will also have the benefit of your views, as we distribute your comments.

I want to thank Mr. Scammell for joining us and for his excellent overview of Soviet restrictions on artistic creativity. Mr. Jacobs, we thank you for sharing your expertise with respect to jamming, and your thoughts with respect to the importance of that issue.

Thank you all very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:51 p.m., the Commission was adjourned.]

PUBLIC HEARING ON THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1985

COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
Washington, DC.

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 538, of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, at 11 a.m., Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato, chairman, and Representative Steny H. Hoyer, cochairman, presiding.

In attendance: Senator Malcolm Wallop, Commissioner.

Also in attendance: Michael R. Hathaway, staff director, and Mary Sue Hafner, general counsel of the Commission.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN D'AMATO

Chairman D'AMATO. This morning the Helsinki Commission will hear testimony on the most recent international meeting in the Helsinki process, the Budapest Cultural Forum.

We welcome Ambassador Walter Stoessel, who led the U.S. delegation to Budapest, and we look forward to hearing his report on the course of the meeting.

On behalf of the Commission, I also welcome Janet Fleischman, of the Helsinki Watch, Mr. David Ives, and Mr. Billy Taylor, who were private sector delegates to the Forum. From them we will hear about the treatment the Hungarian authorities accorded the International Helsinki Federation.

We will also hear the views of these private U.S. cultural figures who figured so prominently in the activities of the Forum.

This morning's hearing is important because some critics of the Helsinki process have treated the Budapest Cultural Forum as the second failure of the process this year. By failure, they mean no final document was agreed upon by the participants.

On the contrary, both the Ottawa Human Rights Experts' Meeting and the Budapest Cultural Forum ended with agreed Western positions, sustaining alliance unity, and setting the stage for next year's Vienna Review Conference. This is no small achievement.

Also, the 10th anniversary commemoration in Helsinki and, to a lesser extent, the Ottawa and Budapest meetings helped sustain public pressure on the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. This public pressure is the lifeline to the West for dissidents, refuseniks, and anyone behind the Iron Curtain struggling for freedom.

I ask that the balance of my statement be recorded in the record as if read in its entirety, so we can hear the testimony of the Ambassador and our other panelists.

[The full statement of Senator D'Amato follows:]

SENATOR ALFONSE D'AMATO, OPENING STATEMENT OF HELSINKI COMMISSION, BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM REVIEW HEARING

This morning, the Helsinki Commission will hear testimony on the most recent international meeting in the Helsinki process, the Budapest Cultural Forum. We welcome Ambassador Walter Stoessel, who led the United States delegation to Budapest, and we look forward to hearing his report on the course of the meeting.

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Would Yelena Bonner be in the United States without public interest and pressure? Unquestionably, No! Would Anatoly Shcharanski still be alive even though he is in prison without our interest and pressure? Again, No!

There are those who want an agreement, any agreement, just for the sake of agreeing. They place a premium on concepts like "creating a positive atmosphere" and "preserving diplomatic momentum."

Focusing only on agreements is a tactic which plays into the Soviet's hands. One of their major objectives in the Helsinki process is to destroy the balance established among the interests of the participating states within the Final Act. If we do not resist this Soviet approach, soon all of the provisions of the Final Act we fought so hard to gain will be ignored.

Since the Soviet Union prevented consensus on any concluding document at the Ottawa Human Rights Experts' Meeting, the meeting which was arguably the most important of the single topic meetings, we must take this Soviet position into account in other single topic meetings. Otherwise, the Soviets will be able to disjoint the Helsinki process—achieving progress only in the areas important to them while they block progress in areas which are important to us.

Let me remind everyone that the Madrid Concluding Document pledged all of the participating states to seek balanced progress in all provisions of the Final Act. Thus, the Soviet tactic of dividing to conquer is, in itself, a violation of the spirit of the process.

The Soviet Union employs the same tactics across the spectrum of its foreign affairs. At Geneva, we responded to their attempt to hold the focus on arms control by insisting on balance—at the summit, it was balance among arms control, regional issues, bilateral issues, and human rights. While we had trouble achieving this balance in the outcome, our efforts to counter Soviet divide and conquer tactics were successful.

The emphasis on agreement is also misplaced because it presumes the existence of a condition which does not exist—a good faith intent on the part of the Soviet Union to comply with agreements it signs. If there is one inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the first decade of the Helsinki Final Act, it is that the Soviet Union is in flagrant, open, and continuing violation of its commitment to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Soviet's failure to comply with this key aspect of the Final Act destroys Soviet credibility in all other areas.

This is an essential point. Those who believe "progress" in the process means "agreements" ignore Soviet noncompliance with past agreements and cynical Soviet

exploitation of the process for their own ends. After all, they know we keep our commitments. In a free society, we do not sign international agreements we do not mean to honor. If we fail to honor our obligations, our citizens will hold our Government responsible at the polls.

There is no equivalent mechanism in the Soviet system to hold their leaders responsible for dishonesty, deception, and hypocrisy in their conduct of Soviet foreign affairs. Accordingly, Soviet behavior is measured by the standard of truth and fairness only in the public media of the West.

The United States is obligated to take these facts into account in our conduct of the Helsinki process. We have to recognize the continuing pattern of Soviet violations of the human rights provisions of the Final Act. We have to recognize their tactic of attempting to disjoint the process—to pursue only those parts of the Final Act which they view as advantageous to themselves.

We have to continue to fight for compliance, to retain balance in the process, and for the values which are most important to us. In order to be effective in this process, we must recognize the critical importance of public diplomacy and public information, in addition to traditional diplomatic activity.

Public diplomacy and public information are important not only as weapons against Soviet lies and deception, they are also tangible evidence of continuing public concern about and support for human rights activists behind the Iron Curtain. Without the pressure of public opinion—which is in critical part generated and sustained through public diplomacy and public information—dissidents, refuseniks, members of divided families, cultural figures seeking creative freedom, and persons seeking the freedom to worship as their consciences command would feel lost and abandoned. As a matter of cold fact, acts of repression against them would grow in ruthlessness and effectiveness if the authorities thought we were no longer interested in their cause.

The Budapest Cultural Forum took place against the background of these considerations, among others. This morning, we will examine the preparation for and the conduct of U.S. diplomacy at the Forum. Some of the key issues we will examine are liaison with nongovernmental organizations, planning for and conduct of public diplomacy, and interaction with the private sector delegates who were a major part of our efforts.

Before proceeding to those issues, I now turn to my distinguished Cochairman, Congressman Steny Hoyer of Maryland, for any remarks he may have.

Chairman D'AMATO. At this time, before I turn to Ambassador Stoessel, I will ask Senator Wallop if he would like to make some remarks?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MALCOLM WALLOP, WYOMING

Mr. WALLOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a statement which I would ask unanimous consent that it be put in the record in its entirety.

Chairman D'AMATO. So ordered.

[The full statement of Senator Wallop follows:]

STATEMENT BY SENATOR WALLOP FOR THE HELSINKI COMMISSION HEARING ON THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, Distinguished witnesses, ladies and gentleman.

We meet here today in the aftermath of the Geneva summit to review the results of the Budapest Cultural Forum which took place under the CSCE process in Budapest, Hungary, this fall. That meeting was the first ever since the signing of the Helsinki accords 10 years ago to be held in a country within the Soviet bloc. While the meetings may have served some useful purpose, they must be viewed as bitterly disappointing to the West and to the United States. We were and must remain aware that our Helsinki Watch Committee was not permitted by the Hungarian Government to carry on its activities at the Budapest Cultural Forum as it was clearly entitled to do. While I have heard that the Hungarian Government did some behind-the-scenes to work out a reasonable compromise arrangement for our Helsinki Watch Committee at the Budapest Cultural Forum, the fact remains that restrictions were placed upon its activities. We had the right to expect more.

I must ask again the question I raised here before the Budapest meeting opened last fall, can we really expect anything better from the Soviet Union and the East bloc at any time? If it was not possible to find common ground at a meeting such as the Budapest Cultural Forum during the period of high hopes raised by the Geneva summit, when will it ever be possible to do so? I am not at all surprised that the Soviet Union and the East bloc states were not able to agree with the West on subjects such as freedom of cultural expression, the free flow of ideas, information and people or other basic human rights as embodied in the principles of the Helsinki accords. Their intransigence at Budapest, in my view, was fully predictable. Principles of cultural freedom are totally alien to their way of thinking even while their leader makes summit commitments on cultural exchanges. They agree to hold meetings such as the Budapest Cultural Forum to lull the West into false sense of expectations and hopes that their system may be changing for the better or that they may truly be willing to open their societies to scrutiny by the rest of the world on such principles as basic freedoms of speech and free, artistic expression. It is absurd to hope for what we know they will not do. We are the fools by self proclamation.

Perhaps Ambassador Stoessel will outline for us in some detail here today what the true circumstances at Budapest were with respect to the Hungarian Government's treatment of our Helsinki Watch Committee and what steps our delegation took to rectify that situation. We must note for the record and for future CSCE meetings how that situation was treated and what the United States can and must do to prevent any repetitions of the Helsinki Watch Committee restrictions by the Soviet Union and East bloc in the future at other CSCE meetings.

The United States is rightly angered that the Budapest Cultural Forum was unable, due to East bloc intransigence, to produce a final document. This is indeed a sad commentary on the effort by the East to work with us in the spirit of the Helsinki accords. While there were smiles and promises of cooperation at the Geneva summit, at the level of a working-level meeting between West and East on the promises of cooperation made at Helsinki in 1975, the East did not and could not, in accordance with its well-known policies against basic freedoms, cooperate with us. Ladies and gentlemen when will we express righteous anger instead of the diplomatic language of fudged principles when faced with no results at such meetings.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that the U.S. delegation at Budapest was able to cite the victims of cultural repression in the East. It was a fine move that U.S. cultural leaders were able to single out cultural human rights problems in Romania. It is commendable that overall, the West was able to note Soviet and East bloc violations of cultural freedoms from a platform behind the Iron Curtain. But who will proclaim that these citings will have any impact at all on continued cultural repression in the East? Is there any utility in continuing such meetings? Is there any reason to believe that the Budapest Cultural Forum could have encouraged dissidents in the East bloc to come forth, or would such a development lead only to more acts of recession of basic freedoms by the totalitarian systems of the Soviet camp?

Mr. Chairman, I urge today's hearing to focus on the lessons of the Budapest Cultural Forum and their meaning for the future of the CSCE process. I know we will highlight for the American people and the press the abuses of Soviet power in cultural fields in order to make clear that the Soviet system is unchanged and remains committed to the ultimate destruction of the fundamental freedoms we cherish in the West. I welcome today's witnesses and look forward to hearing their testimony.

Thank you.

Mr. WALLOP. I think that one observation that has to be made is that while General Secretary Gorbachev, who was in Geneva, was making a cultural agreement with the President of the United States and in general trying to make the world believe that he is some sort of deathbed conversion, we find their behavior with regards to a cultural session totally intolerable.

It should not come as a surprise. Any student who has observed any summit between the United States and the Soviet Union would find that within weeks there has always been a thumb of the Soviet nose at the West immediately thereafter, the rock throwing that they do to us, and we I think, continue to indulge in the hope that has no basis in history, any indication that they do intend to contemplate human rights, to complete free cultural exchange, to

contemplate the indulgence of their artists and what they think and what they might produce.

I am, as is no surprise to the Ambassador and others, just bewildered by why we do not say publicly what we know in our hearts to be true. We continue to pay lip service to a process which, all right, comes back home and makes us feel good because we point out that we weren't allowed to do what we were entitled to do, and that shows that they haven't learned and the process is working.

I don't see where the process is moving at all. I do hear from European friends that it was very helpful, that last session in Madrid, the time that we go to make the points that we made, and that it helped move the European intellectual community to the right, with a recognition of what they are. But it wouldn't have seemed necessary had the obvious been continually restated that, make that intellectual awareness remain in the forefront of the West, which values artistic freedom and values the freedom of speech, which values the right to emigrate and to vote, to choose, to do all those things.

It wouldn't seem that we would have to have a process of failure continually in front of us to prove what we already know.

We go back and give them some sort of credence in the Helsinki process which they have simply never subscribed to.

Now, I am glad I am on this Commission because it gives me the chance to say that. I don't know that it really accomplishes a thing. We know what we know and it is foolish of us to pretend that we know something different, or to pretend that the hope that we have will be realized in any near timeframe.

Thank you.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you, Senator.

Ambassador Stoessel.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WALTER J. STOESSEL, HEAD OF DELEGATION TO THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM

Ambassador STOESSEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate this invitation to appear before the CSCE Commission to discuss the results of the Budapest Cultural Forum.

I have already made a report available for consideration by you and members of the Commission, so I would like to confine myself, with your permission, in my oral remarks to some general observations about the Forum itself and the CSCE process as part of the administration's foreign policy approach.

I am, of course, prepared to answer any questions you or your colleagues may have on the report and on the Forum itself.

Let me say at the outset that the interest that Congress and the CSCE Commission demonstrate in the CSCE process and in this instance in the Cultural Forum was a source of great support to the U.S. delegation at Budapest.

Whether the issue being discussed was cultural repression in its various manifestations in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, or the failure of the Hungarian Government at the outset to abide by the Madrid precedents regarding NGO activities, I could say always with confidence that the strong stand we were taking in the Forum on these matters reflected solid support at home.

In fact, one of the themes we stressed at Budapest was that as a nation of immigrants, many of whom have roots in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the public is legitimately concerned about developments in these countries.

We were able to point out that this concern and interest is reflected in the work and responsibilities of the CSCE Commission and by the numerous NGO's that make known their views on CSCE matters to the Commission.

Mr. Chairman, in assessing the results of the Forum, I would like to set out briefly what the central issues were, as we saw them, and what we hope to accomplish.

The Forum was in many ways a unique undertaking in that it was the first such session devoted to the cultural aspects of the Final Act, the first meeting to be held in a Warsaw Pact state, and the first one which consisted predominantly of cultural personalities rather than diplomatic and government officials.

However, in the final analysis, it was an integral part of the CSCE process.

As such, our approach to the Forum centered on a discussion of implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and on those issues that could move the process forward in a way that would benefit the individual.

We were also mindful of the need for balanced progress in the CSCE process as a whole and in the Cultural Forum, in particular.

Therefore, with respect to the Cultural Forum, we thought it was essential to engage in a balanced discussion of the interrelated problems of creation, dissemination and cooperation, as called for by the mandate of the Forum, and to discuss impediments to these activities.

We think we did so effectively and we were joined in this by many Western and neutral delegations.

We addressed such issues as jamming of radio broadcasts, censorship, denial of the individual's right to travel and to meet together for professional or personal reasons, access by individuals to archives and cultural developments in other countries, and the rights of national minorities to cultivate all aspects of their cultural and religious heritage, including the teaching of language, to name only a few of the issues raised.

Now, much has been said in connection with the various CSCE experts' meetings and about the importance of the concluding document.

The mandate for the Cultural Forum referred to drawing up conclusions, a less precise formula than a concluding report, as was the case with the Ottawa Human Rights Experts' Meeting.

There was a strong interest at Budapest on the part of delegations to work for a concluding document. Many were concerned that the absence of a document could have a negative effect on the process and on the Vienna Review Meeting next year.

Our position about a final document, both before and at the Forum, was clear. We were prepared to work for a meaningful and substantive one, but we felt that no document was better than a bad one.

Therefore, the U.S. delegation worked hard with our NATO allies to achieve a document that would identify problems of cul-

tural creation, dissemination and cooperation, and propose solutions to these problems.

The East tried to avoid these issues and refused to see them reflected in a final document. As this became clear to us and our NATO allies, we tabled a Western draft final report which clearly set out the problems.

We believe that the final draft document the West tabled can serve as a useful basis for discussion of these issues at the Vienna Review Meeting next year.

You have in the material submitted to you the draft proposal submitted by the West.

In addition to a frank discussion of implementation of the cultural provisions of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document, we thought the Cultural Forum would serve a useful purpose if it resulted in increased contacts of cultural personalities in the East and the West.

Our cultural personalities took a very active role in this process. In doing so, they discussed a variety of professional interests and laid a basis for contacts that I am convinced will serve their and our efforts in the coming months and years.

Mr. Chairman, allied unity is an important ingredient if we are to be effective in advancing Western interests in the CSCE process.

I am pleased to note that we were successful in this respect at the Cultural Forum. For example, we received enthusiastic NATO support for our proposals that were intended to strengthen observance of cultural rights and freedoms, even though there was a strong desire to emphasize cooperation on the part of some delegations.

Our Western allies were also supportive of the fact that the European cultural heritage includes the United States and Canada, and they were careful not to fall into the Eastern trap of trying to split North America from Europe on the importance of cultural cooperation.

As a result of the high degree of unity in the NATO group, the Soviets and their Eastern European allies were on the defensive in terms both of the substantive as well as the procedural issues that occupied our attention at the Forum.

Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few brief comments on the Hungarian Government's decision to deny public space for the symposium which the International Helsinki Federation had planned during the opening day of the Budapest Forum.

Long before the Cultural Forum began we made clear on a number of occasions to Hungarian Government authorities our understanding of their obligations to follow the Madrid precedents regarding the activities of NGO's at Budapest.

We were particularly insistent on this matter because of the important role NGO's play in the CSCE process and because this was the first experts' meeting to take place in a Warsaw Pact country with its implications for the future of CSCE precedents.

Therefore, when we heard at the Forum that the Hungarian Government had raised questions with the International Helsinki Federation representatives about their planned symposium, we promptly contacted Hungarian officials privately to express our

concern and to reiterate our understanding of Hungarian commitments, and to register support for the Helsinki Federation and its planned program.

When the Hungarian authorities nevertheless denied space to the Federation's meeting, I immediately protested this action publicly and officially, and I am pleased to note that other delegations expressed similar criticism in various ways publicly and privately.

It is quite possible, I feel, that this strong stand publicly calling the Hungarians to account for violating their commitment to follow the Madrid precedents regarding the activities of NGO's resulted in the Helsinki Federation being able to carry out its program in private apartments without harassment and in the full light of media coverage.

As you know, members of the American and other delegations attended these private sessions as observers, a fact which I am confident was not lost on the Hungarian authorities.

To ensure that the Hungarians and others knew how seriously we would view further misinterpretations of the Madrid precedents, I devoted another plenary statement on the matter shortly before the close of the Forum.

Let me note, Mr. Chairman, that I appreciated very much the letter of support from you and Cochairman Hoyer on the matter of how the U.S. delegation handled this question of the Hungarian decision.

Thank you very much for your attention. I would be pleased to try and answer any questions you may have.

[The full statement of Ambassador Stoessel follows:]

Testimony of Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

December 11, 1985

Mr. Chairman:

I welcome the opportunity to testify today before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to present my assessment of the Budapest Cultural Forum to you and your distinguished colleagues. With your permission, I would like to request that this statement and attached documents from the Forum itself, including U.S. plenary statements, be made a part of the record of this hearing.

The Cultural Forum -- held in Budapest October 15 through November 25 -- was the most recent of a series of CSCE experts' meetings agreed at the Madrid Review Conference. It was the first such meeting devoted to the cultural content of the Helsinki Final Act, the first to bring together hundreds of distinguished individuals from different fields of cultural activity in the 35 participating states of Europe and North America, and the first to be held in a Warsaw Pact state. It was a unique gathering that produced both achievements and

disappointments. I will try to give you a flavor of both, along with some firsthand observations on the conduct of the meeting itself.

I would first like to acknowledge the debt the United States Government owes to the 25 private American citizens who took time out from their professional and private lives to participate at Budapest. They gave willingly and freely of their vast expertise in exchanging views on professional topics with their counterparts. They repeatedly demonstrated the serious attitude of our country toward respect for CSCE commitments and repeatedly raised important problems of cultural communication and cooperation. We can be proud of our delegates' contributions, as well as respectful of their integrity. I also want to express my sincere appreciation to the staff members of the CSCE Commission who so competently and energetically contributed to the performance of the U.S. delegation.

In summarizing the results of the Cultural Forum, I must acknowledge that not all hopes were met. Western delegates, for instance, chafed under formal CSCE procedures that regulated discussion through use of a set speakers' list. Although the West pressed for revised procedures to promote

free debate among the cultural figures, the East said no, except on two brief occasions. Also frustrating for delegates was the fact that in the two large working groups several distinct fields of culture were under review at the same time. Most delegates participated for only a week at a time, having relatively few chances to take the floor. Nonetheless, cultural personalities from 35 countries met, conversed, exchanged ideas, and opened new horizons for each other -- demonstrating the value of direct contact among people. They made many unofficial proposals for improving and expanding East-West cultural relations.

Another problem at the Forum was that the 35 participating States were, as you know, unable to reach consensus on a concluding document. None was specifically required, although the demand and efforts for a written result ran high among most delegations. My own view is that the lack of consensus represents the reality of the gap between East and West on matters concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms, pertaining in this instance to the conditions for cultural activity within and among states.

The mandate for the Cultural Forum was to discuss the interrelated problems of creation, dissemination and cooperation in the different fields of culture. The U.S. and

its NATO Allies insisted, therefore, that a final document -- to be acceptable -- would have to give balanced treatment to these three themes and reach conclusions and recommendations pertinent to the problems discussed. The criteria applied by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact Allies to a final document were quite different. They wished to avoid stipulation of problems and concentrate solely on further plans for cultural cooperation.

I do not think that sort of document -- one lacking substance -- would have done the CSCE process much good. Despite exhaustive efforts by the West and the neutral countries to identify common ground in accordance with the mandate, the East refused to budge from its unacceptable position and created the choice -- as at the Ottawa Human Rights Experts' Meeting -- between a bad document and no document. I trust you will agree that the major obstacle to progress in the CSCE process is the lack of compliance with existing documents, not the lack of new ones.

When intense negotiations revealed that a substantive document was not within reach, Hungary proposed a short statement of the fact that the 35 states had met to discuss the problems of the mandate and had expressed different and at times contradictory views. This alternative to a substantive document, while not ideal, would at least have acknowledged the

disagreements between East and West at the Forum. Romania blocked consensus on the Hungarian initative, perhaps reflecting bilateral strains between the two countries.

The U.S. approach to the Cultural Forum was straightforward: to adhere to the excellent mandate in identifying problems relating to cultural activity and communication and to suggest possible solutions. We sought to ensure attention to all three themes of the mandate, to focus attention on specific problems and on possible avenues of resolution, and to promote productive discussions among the cultural figures. I think it would be instructive to mention some of the problems we considered most important to the deliberations of the Forum and how we handled them.

The legitimate role of non-governmental organizations in the field of culture was a primary concern of the U.S., our allies, and many of the neutral countries, especially in light of the experience in Budapest of the International Helsinki Federation. I will return to this matter. Several NATO countries joined us as co-sponsors of an official proposal on the role of NGOs. This was one of the principal themes of the comprehensive draft document agreed by the Western nations at the Forum and a regular topic of discussion by U.S. and other Western delegates.

U.S. delegates brought attention during formal sessions of the Forum to conditions of cultural repression in the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania by raising the names of known victims of repression and the generic situations that produce such victims. Numerous delegates from other Western countries did likewise. We reinforced our public stance in private bilateral meetings with the delegations of the USSR, Poland, and Romania. The U.S. delegation also took occasions to meet with and therefore show support for local dissident cultural figures.

In plenary speeches and interventions in the working groups, U.S. delegates emphasized the right of national minorities and religious groups to preserve and develop their particular cultures, including language instruction and the preservation of cultural and historical monuments. These interventions and a strong Western proposal on the issue made it an important theme in the Forum's deliberations, to the discomfort of the USSR and Romania in particular. Even a Hungarian delegate got into the spirit by referring publicly to the problems of the Magyar minorities in neighboring countries, making it clear he meant Romania and Czechoslovakia.

Censorship, jamming, restrictions on travel and impeded access to cultural products were addressed repeatedly by the U.S. and other Western delegations in the working groups, plenary sessions, and numerous formal proposals. Since Western

cultural figures have in many cases had direct experience with barriers to the free exchange of people, ideas and information in the East, their interventions were especially eloquent.

Our NATO Allies were broadly supportive of the U.S. approach in Budapest, although initially not as forthright as U.S. representatives in the working groups and more receptive at times than we to the East's emphasis on cooperation. We received enthusiastic NATO support for our official proposals that were intended to strengthen observance of cultural rights and freedoms. Common Western cultural values and a joint determination that the Cultural Forum produce meaningful conclusions are amply reflected in the draft final document that the Western Group (NATO plus Ireland) tabled when negotiations with the East stalemated. This document distills the Western negotiating position and sets out the results we think should have been reached at the Cultural Forum. I believe that the document will usefully serve as one of the bases for Allied participation in next year's CSCE Review Conference in Vienna and hope it will gain currency among the concerned publics of Europe and North America.

The Eastern approach to the Cultural Forum involved procedural inflexibility, a preference for long speeches listing cultural accomplishments, emphasis on the "historic

responsibility" of artists for peace, opposition to Western defense (especially nuclear weapons) policy, and avoidance of the numerous aspects of the Forum's mandate where Eastern performance falls short. The Soviets and some of their Warsaw Pact allies also sought to drive wedges in the Western position by referring none too subtly to a European cultural unity, implicitly excluding North America, and by constantly asserting that it was the U.S. delegation which opposed a final document. Neither theme found much support from Western or neutral delegations.

When the West raised relevant issues of cultural rights and freedoms, the East responded (sometimes with outlandish invective) that we were trying to disturb rather than contribute to the work of the Forum by introducing extraneous political matters. Stressing the need for greater cooperation among the CSCE states, the Soviets and their allies made many suggestions for increased exchanges and joint projects of experts and students in the different fields of culture, under official or quasi-official sponsorship and control.

Cooperation was a popular theme at the Cultural Forum, since it was part of the mandate and since all Eastern and some Western delegates often found it more congenial to consider fresh ideas for working together across borders than to tackle

resistant and established obstacles. Our view, one that permeates the Western draft final document, is that true cooperation among states derives from the ability of their citizens to choose freely how, when and where to express themselves and to share the fruits of their creativity. Governments have no business controlling cultural cooperation but should rather ensure that the conditions for such cooperation are optimal. The proposals for cooperative action contained in the Western document are set in this context.

At the Cultural Forum, as at other CSCE meetings, the neutral and non-aligned countries played a key role in trying to bridge the differences between East and West. Delegates from these states played an active role in the working groups, often independently confirming points made by the West regarding the importance of freedom for individuals and groups to pursue their cultural interests. Toward the end of the Forum, the neutrals informally presented to both East and West a draft final document that synthesized the discussions in a way they hoped would satisfy the interests of both sides. We considered the neutral draft a positive though not entirely adequate effort. We entered into negotiations with the East on the basis of this paper, hoping that our primary concerns could be accommodated.

The Eastern approach to the neutral paper was much less forthcoming and ultimately destructive to the chances of reaching consensus. The Soviets said the neutral paper was "West-leaning" and insisted that it could be a basis for negotiation only if a long series of distorting Soviet amendments were accepted.

It is important to consider events outside the Forum that had a bearing on those within in order to get a full picture of what was and was not achieved. I regret -- and at the time strongly protested publicly and privately -- the decision of the Government of Hungary to prevent the International Helsinki Federation from conducting publicly a by-invitation-only symposium in Budapest during the first week of the Forum. This decision violated Hungary's commitment as host to follow the precedent of the Madrid Meeting concerning the important relationship of non-governmental organizations to the CSCE process. Other delegations felt as we did and expressed their criticism in various ways, public and private.

Aware of the issues at stake, we followed developments closely, noting that the Federation was able to conduct its scheduled activities in private locales, without interference or harassment, and with Western media representatives in attendance. U.S. and other Western delegates also attended the

symposium as observers in a show of solidarity and shared copies of manuscripts presented there with other interested delegates at the Forum.

There were two concerns that flowed from the circumstances confronting the Federation: one was that there be no official repercussions for Hungarians who chose to attend, and the other was that Hungary's action not constitute a precedent for subsequent CSCE meetings. I spoke directly on these issues during plenary meetings and in private conversations with Hungarian authorities and believe there can be no doubt about how seriously the U.S. would view further misinterpretations of the Madrid precedent. The significance of NGOs to the CSCE process is well reflected in the Western document, in the formal proposal submitted by several Western delegations, and in numerous interventions made by U.S. and other Western delegates.

There was substantial media interest in the U.S. and Europe in the Cultural Forum, as the large number of journalists attested, but not nearly as much coverage as all of us would have liked. My interviews before and during the meeting -- especially in the New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, and Washington Post and with the wire services -- presented our positions to the American public. Coverage by VOA, RFE/RL and

RIAS in West Berlin reached audiences in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In addition, I gave interviews to Hungarian and Western European print and electronic media. The problems of the International Helsinki Federation during the first week of the Forum and the closing of the conference generated articles here and in Western Europe, and European colleagues in Budapest informed me that media interest in their countries was sustained throughout the Forum, primarily on account of the participation of the eminent cultural figures. The press spokesman for the U.S. delegation briefed the VOA, RFE/RL and other correspondents at least twice a day on the Forum's proceedings and arranged numerous interviews with U.S. cultural figures.

In addition to the participants from the U.S. in the International Helsinki Federation symposium, some 20 individuals and representatives of NGOs from the U.S. visited the U.S. delegation. We benefited from their expertise, as we did from the rich supply of materials sent to us by NGOs before the Forum began. For our part, we assisted those NGOs who came to Budapest with information about the conference and practical advice and initiated a series of mailings to interested parties in the U.S. to keep them abreast of statements by U.S. delegates. We have in the mail to them now the draft Western document and I intend to circulate this statement as well.

In drawing up a balance sheet on the Cultural Forum, I must candidly say that I wish it had accomplished more -- that the 35 participating states had been able to do something to resolve the real problems that affect cultural creation, dissemination and cooperation. However, if we continue our commitment to the CSCE process as an incentive for change over time in Eastern behavior, as I believe we must given the lack of feasible alternatives, then the absence of breakthroughs in Budapest should not disappoint us. In this light, I think we might reflect on the following results of the Forum:

-- The cultural figures from the 35 participating states, whatever their frustrations with the Forum, built bridges among themselves that promote mutual understanding across borders;

-- Soviet and Eastern European delegations had no choice but to hear about their shortcomings in the cultural field from exceptionally articulate private citizens from the West, whose opinions carried irrefutable moral authority;

-- Western attention to the problems and cases of cultural repression and insistence on compliance with the provisions of the Final Act give sustenance to the victims of such repression and others in the East who want their governments to uphold Helsinki commitments; and

-- Although no consensus document was reached (because a good one was not possible), the West has an agreed text that can serve our common interests at the Vienna Review Conference.

I will not attempt to oversell these results, but I do consider them positively and believe they represent the honest fruit of collective efforts by Western delegations at the Forum.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you, Ambassador.

Senator Wallop.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your statement, and let me once again express my admiration for you in what must be a genuinely frustrating job.

Perhaps you could share with us your thoughts on what the fear of cultural freedom is, you know, what drives it to where we get the Soviet and East bloc repression of those freedoms? What is it that they are unable to accept about cultural freedom?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Senator, I feel that this problem and this fear, as you call it, goes to the heart of the differences in our systems, and I think reveals the basic insecurity of the regimes of the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.

Whenever we speak of the freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom to publish, freedom to join independent organizations, this strikes a very sensitive nerve for the representatives of regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union because it affects, in their view, their ability to completely control all aspects of information, association and activity on the part of their citizens.

They very much fear, for example, such things as the Xerox machine. This, in their view, is a very dangerous instrument because it permits the possibility of rapid distribution of documents without government control.

They very much fear free, unhindered access to radio broadcasts. This was a question we raised constantly at Budapest, the jamming of radios, and they said very frankly that they felt they had to protect their population from the type of information which was conveyed by these radios. Of course, they describe the information as misinformation and disinformation and lies. But they are clearly afraid of a free access to information.

As I said at the beginning, I think this goes to the heart of their problem of control and this is the basis of their fear of really free cultural exchange.

Mr. WALLOP. Well, not only do they not permit freedom of association, they don't permit anybody to associate. I mean, you can't even form it to do that. But given that insecurity, what reason is there to imagine that any change is anywhere in the offing?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Well, in my own experience with the Soviet Union, which covers now almost 40 years, I have seen some change. Change comes very slowly in the Soviet Union. But I think it is possible.

Mr. WALLOP. This kind of change is not likely to take place because when you govern by imposing government and not governed by the selection and the will of the people, you know, it is inconceivable that they would open that society to any kind of cultural freedom.

Ambassador STOESSEL. Well, I would certainly be the first to say the prospects are discouraging. But I think we should keep trying and we should keep the spotlight focused on these problems. There is some response to pressure on the part of the Soviet Union and on the part of Eastern European regimes. And I think it is also helpful to convey to the populations of these countries that there is an interest in this type of freedom, and this gives sustenance and support to those brave people in those countries who wish to expand this type of activity.

So, I think that also is important.

Mr. WALLOP. I was struck by looking at the list of the participants in the summit. Each delegation was permitted five people to sit in on the meetings between the General Secretary and the President.

The second Soviet listed, and one presumes in most of those things one does it by order of importance or rank of some kind, was their Minister of Propaganda. It is just curious that the press didn't pick up on that.

In your statement you say "when the West raised relevant issues of cultural rights and freedoms, the East responded sometimes with outlandish invective." And then it goes on to say, "stressing the need for greater cooperation among the CSCE states, the Soviets and their allies made many suggestions for increased exchanges and joint projects of experts and students in the different fields of culture."

My question is, do they have a culture if it is state imposed? However creative the Bolshoi may be, however expert a violinist may be, however articulate writers may be, is it a culture if it is done by imposition and by constraint?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Well, I would say, Senator, it is a culture and we have to recognize that they have many cultural achievements. Of course, their greatest achievements, as we see in the ballet and much of their music, represent achievements of a previous regime, not of the Soviet regime. But these people are talented and they perform very well.

Mr. WALLOP. Yes, but talent isn't a culture. I mean, culture, if nothing else, is the ability of the minds of man to expand and achieve under its own generated powers, not those imposed by others, not those whose talent must be as well selected by their physical ability, in the case of a dancer, their ability to perform with a violin or an instrument, in the case of a musician, or anything else, but by, as well, their adherence to a doctrine that restricts that very creativity.

So, it strikes me, as we go on in the statement, it said, "cooperation was a popular theme at the Cultural Forum since it was part

of the mandate and since all Eastern and some Western delegates found it more congenial to consider fresh ideas for working together across borders than to tackle resistant and established obstacles, which I can see, but I count that as totally intellectually dishonest."

And that is trying to say that what I know to be the case, I wish weren't the case, and we will just pretend it is not there so that something we can do across the border tomorrow is better than all the things which we can't solve today.

I guess my big problem is, that I don't see what there is to exchange any more than when we signed the agreement with the Soviets to exchange agricultural technologies. We need Soviet agricultural technology like we need a drought, you know.

I guess my whole purpose in all of this, it is fine to give heart and encouragement and hope and symbols and signals to those who wish to be free and, in some manner or another, express that freedom under the cover of darkness, and for that reason I can see some purpose. But I cannot see any honesty in us trying to engage in cultural exchanges when I don't see a culture.

Those with whom we could exchange cultural exuberance, if you will, real creativity will never be permitted to be a part of those exchanges.

Ambassador STOESSEL. Senator, I would say you have made a lot of the points which we tried to make at Budapest, and we felt indeed that stress on simple cooperation was superficial and misleading, and that is why we tried to keep the focus on some of these basic problems.

So, I certainly agree with your point there. I must say, however, that I feel that with regard to formal exchanges of the kind we have just concluded with the Soviet Union, there is still some value to these exchanges, even though they are state-to-state arranged.

I think there is value in having Soviet artists travel abroad and see something of another country and another system.

In other respects, I think we benefit, too, by such exchanges in that, for example, in the exchange agreement we have signed there is provision for exhibits on a mutual basis. We are able to put American exhibits into the Soviet Union, have them travel around, thereby giving the Soviet population some idea of certain aspects of American life and culture of which we are very proud. And the people, the guides, the American guides accompanying those exhibits make a lot on contacts and they learn a lot, which is useful, and they can pass on views to Soviets with whom they come in contact, which I think has a utility.

The same with regard to agricultural technology. It is a two-way thing, and one of the problems in all of this is that the Soviet Union is such a closed society, and if we have an agreement on technological exchange or agricultural exchange, it also gives our people a chance to get into the Soviet Union and learn things which we would not learn otherwise.

So, you have to look at those aspects, too, I think, of these agreements in trying to judge them.

Mr. WALLOP. I don't quarrel with that except that I quarrel with the idea that is put forward in these things in the name of creating a good climate.

Ambassador STOESSEL. Now, that can be misleading.

Mr. WALLOP. Then we duck what the reality of it is. That is my only point.

I salute you for the efforts you make over there but it strikes me that we in this country have an almost overpowering desire to forget what it is that separates us. We have a desire that tries to make us moral equivalents in the world, and we see just in today's television news yet another example of what it must be like to live in that regime when somebody on Human Rights Day in the Soviet Union, went to the statue of Pushkin to read a poem and was brutalized by plainclothes KGB people.

There is value in doing what we do only insomuch as we decide what it is that we can find.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you, Senator.

Ambassador, I have to confess to you that I was extremely upset by the Hungarian Government's handling of the International Helsinki Federation. Their actions broke every normal standard of diplomacy related to nongovernmental organizations and their role in the Helsinki process. The Hungarian Government harassed IHF and denied them an opportunity to hold their sessions in hotel rooms they had reserved, so they had to use accommodations in private homes which were obtained at the last minute.

I have a feeling that were it not for a strong protest from this Commission, from my cochairman, Congressman Hoyer and myself, for the fact that we chastised the Hungarians publicly, and on the floor of the Congress, and that there were questions raised with respect to their most-favored-nation status which they now receive. The Hungarian Government would not even have permitted this restricted level of IHF activities. I want to ask for the record for your response to this Senator's suggestion that the Hungarians should not have most-favored-nation treatment.

I am particularly outraged by the Hungarian Ambassador's letter to Speaker O'Neill in which he attempts to say that according to provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, he quoted that the working methods and rules of procedure for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe should be applied to future meetings.

He goes on to indicate that they are not bound by their promise to Ambassador Kampelman to abide by the full Madrid Precedent. He states that they didn't violate the Precedents. I mean this is utter nonsense, utter nonsense.

I let Senator Wallop and others take the lead because I am afraid once I get rolling people will say I am not objective.

But, you know, the Senator is right. One of the problems we have is that the State Department does not stand up to the Soviets publicly, and I wonder what we say to them privately.

We are just encouraging them to continue this pattern. Obviously the Hungarians, when they canceled the accommodations of people, did this with the complicity, with the knowledge and maybe even under the direction of the Soviets.

Now, when do we let them know that we are not going to just take this kind of conduct? Why do we always say, "Well, that is the way they are," and accept it without a reaction?

Why would it not be appropriate for us to review Hungary's most favorable nation treatment, given their systematic violation of human rights and given this latest affront to the United States, to the process, and to the Helsinki accords?

Isn't that something we should consider? And wouldn't that review send a message that we are not going to play this kind of game with you, we are not going to allow you to make promises and then to violate them openly and scornfully in the face of world opinion? Why shouldn't I proceed and why shouldn't Senator Wallop—or why shouldn't I join Senator Wallop—I will let him carry it—in a move in the Senate to deny most-favored-nation status for Hungary?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Mr. Chairman, let me say first, as I have said in my statement and as you know, at Budapest we too were shocked by this Hungarian denial of space to the International Helsinki Federation.

And I have said in my statement and I said in my oral remarks, we worked very hard with the Hungarians to prevent this. When the action was taken we made a very strong protest privately and publicly, and a press statement was also made, which is part of the record.

I certainly would wish to note that the action taken by you and the Cochairman and by the Commission vis-a-vis this whole incident was very helpful in making our view unmistakably clear.

Chairman D'AMATO. Let me ask you this, Mr. Ambassador. It has been brought to my attention that the State Department has indicated that the floor statements which were made by Congressman Hoyer and myself during our Budapest Cultural Forum special order were bad, considering "the deal" that the United States had with the Hungarians. What was that deal?

Ambassador STOESSEL. I am not aware of that statement or any kind of a deal. That is news to me.

Chairman D'AMATO. You see, this is the kind of thing that takes place. These faceless, nameless gnomes in the bureaucracy say, "Oh, no, you shouldn't have done this," or, "Senator so-and-so, that was bad, we had this thing taken care of through some kind of deal." Now, this is what was indicated to my staff, that the State Department was not happy about our discussing this issue publicly.

I think we have an obligation to deal factually with the public. Are we supposed to make believe this didn't take place? If we want to save some money, I will tell you how I can save you some money. Get rid of half the people over there, if we are going to save some money. Under Gramm-Rudman, I am going to suggest we make some personnel cuts over there. We won't miss any programs which might be cut. You know, I am not referring to you, but I am just suggesting too many people over there are afraid to rock the boat. That is not your case.

I think the people should know that the Ambassador is a pretty tough guy and he has faced lots of tough issues.

But I have to tell you, you have got a cadre over there that is absolutely amazing. They tell us. "Oh, you shouldn't have said that," or, "the Commission shouldn't do that, we had a deal."

So, that is why I wanted to ask you, the person who was over there dealing directly with the Hungarian Government, if you know of any deal we have with the Hungarians?

Ambassador STOESSEL. I certainly do not, and I don't think this was at all reflected in any official statement by the State Department. I don't know what you might have heard unofficially, but this was not consistent at all with what we know.

Chairman D'AMATO. Well, we have another panel we must hear from this morning. However, I want to ask you this one thing. Maybe you can't answer the question. But I intend to pursue this with my colleagues and to review the situation in light of what I consider to be the most recent affront to this Nation. When the Hungarian Government, in such a bold manner, cancels arrangements to attempt to make it impossible for the International Helsinki Federation to conduct their planned activities, it seems to me that they are pushing us to see how far they can go.

That is what this Hungarian action is, an attempt to see just how far they can go. In and of itself you can say, "Gee, Senator, don't get upset about that, you are right," but it is a deliberate testing of our will.

I see it as a testing of our will. Will we endure this Hungarian action, because if we will endure this, why won't we endure something else? They are conditioning us. It is like Pavlov's experiments. You keep beating a dog, and he learns to cringe when you pick up the whip.

Well, they do this and they know we are going to pull back.

Why shouldn't we show the people there, who are experimenting on us, that there are some people who say, "If you are going to undertake these actions then you must understand there will be a penalty that you will pay. We are not prepared to give to you most-favored-nation status."

While I mention the Hungarians, this is only the most recent of these incidents. Why shouldn't I go to the Senate floor and line up some of my colleagues to bring their most-favored-nation status into question?

Do you think they would get the message?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me say my own reaction to this is that you certainly have every right to do this.

Chairman D'AMATO. I understand that.

Ambassador STOESSEL. And this should be considered as part of the whole. Now, MFN for Hungary is part of our whole relationship with Hungary, which contains many strands and many aspects.

Chairman D'AMATO. Maybe when we have our next meeting in another Eastern bloc nation, that nation wouldn't be so quick to do that kind of thing.

Ambassador STOESSEL. Well, I think that I myself would be reluctant to take a judgment right now as to whether this is the right thing to do or not, but that it should be considered, and I would have no objection.

I would also note that Secretary Shultz will be visiting Budapest in the next few days and that this could be a subject for his discussions when he is there.

Chairman D'AMATO. Maybe that is what they meant by the deal.

Ambassador STOESSEL. I am not aware of any deal.

Chairman D'AMATO. Well, I don't know. Maybe that is what they meant by the deal. You didn't say that, you were there on the battle lines. But this is what was coming out of State. Maybe we should hold a hearing on the issue of most-favored-nation status. Perhaps we should review both how we are proceeding with those nations that receive most-favored-nation status, and the overall policy as to most favored nation treatment.

Malcolm was suggesting that maybe the question of most-favored-nation status should be the subject of a hearing. Such a hearing would let us review what those nations' human rights records have been. We should look into that and build a consensus.

We would send them a messsage. I believe that this rhetoric of theirs and the business about the cultural exchanges raises serious questions. Then they thumb their noses at the Helsinki Final Act. They make a mockery of it when they treat people like that. We haven't even gotten to the issue of their violations of the human rights of their citizens. You know, we haven't even gotten into that.

I think we ought to consider sending them a message. I don't think that is a cold war mentality. If the Hungarians want most-favored-nation treatment then they must act in the human rights area to justify that treatment.

Maybe that is the only way that we will ever have a chance of helping the millions of people who are enslaved, whose rights are violated systematically.

So, I think we ought to at least have a hearing on that.

Ambassador, thank you for being with us and thank you for your continued work in this area.

Ambassador STOESSEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator.

Chairman D'AMATO. Our next panel is David Ives, a member of the delegation to the Budapest Cultural Forum, Mr. Billy Taylor, eminent jazz composer and pianist and member of the U.S. delegation to the Budapest Cultural Forum; and Janet Fleischman, representative for the International Helsinki Federation.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. Chairman, before we begin, let me just say that I don't know who was responsible for picking Billy Taylor as one of those, but they couldn't have done better. I admire his work and I admire his piano playing and have had the opportunity to hear it several times.

Chairman D'AMATO. Only several times?

Mr. WALLOP. Only several times. But that was enough to assure me of the quality of that as a delegation to the Cultural Forum, and I welcome you here.

Chairman D'AMATO. Let me say at the outset that your prepared statements will be printed in the record as if read in their entirety. We would appreciate you highlighting those areas in your statements of deepest concern to yourselves. We appreciate your giving this Commission the benefits of your thoughts. We certainly are pleased with your participation today and we want to commend you for your work in the area of human rights.

Mr. Taylor.

STATEMENT OF BILLY TAYLOR, JAZZ COMPOSER AND PIANIST, CULTURAL FIGURE TO U.S. DELEGATION TO BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is nice to see my Senator working, but he works very well. Thank you.

Jazz is America's classical music and it takes all the diverse elements in our culture and puts them into a unique musical perspective which eloquently states who we are and what we are as a people.

So, as a jazz pianist, one of the things that fascinates me is to the kind of traveling that I have been doing for the last 3 months, of which Budapest was one of several places. I went to Singapore in September and went to Dakar, Senegal in Africa in October. Late October and early November was Budapest, and then we went on to Japan and China.

Now, in doing all that traveling the one thing that I was able to do was to look at some of Senator Wallop's concerns in terms of what is possible and what does all this mean? Are we spinning our wheels in terms of the possibilities of cultural exchange if people are not really serious about this? Is this merely some kind of window dressing?

What I found is that on a 1-to-1 basis, as the Ambassador was saying a moment ago, it is possible to begin many things and to really assure some of the artists and some of the people who work in the various cultural areas that their efforts are not going unheard. To reassure them that it is indeed possible for them to do what they do but with more support than they seem to be getting from their own government and in their own personal surroundings.

This is a lesson that is not always possible to learn, or a statement that is not always possible to make, but backstage, for instance, at the gala in which I took part, all 35 nations had sent classical pianists and dancers and singers and so forth, and my trio played jazz. We were the only group on the program that played jazz.

Now, I was very well received. We were very happy about that. But backstage, where we didn't speak the same language, where you needed a traffic cop to get on and off stage with nearly 1,000 people who were involved in this particular gala, there was a tremendous lack of egotism and a tremendous amount of cooperation. The prevailing attitude was; here is someone else who is going to do his thing so let's make it possible for him to shoot his best shot.

This doesn't happen, I must tell you, here in the States where we all speak the same language and adhere to the same culture. Backstage quite often you run into something that is totally different.

It was fascinating to find that the way this particular gala was handled by the Hungarians, the way it was set up, their care and their obvious intention to give everybody a chance to do what he or she did best and present that without—well, with a minimum of interference to a very broad Eastern European audience.

That was quite heady stuff and I think most of the people, those of us from the West who were involved, were conscious of the fact

that we were going to be doing something for this audience, perhaps for the first time, in this particular context.

Now, the point was made by one of the delegates from Poland that young people in his country were very highly influenced and very responsive to jazz and indeed were, at the moment we were meeting in Budapest, having an international jazz festival.

This acknowledgment of the importance of jazz led me to believe that we don't use jazz properly in the States. I was delighted to be asked to perform in Budapest because I thought it gave me an opportunity to show how jazz could fare when presented on the same program with European composers and with symphony orchestras and opera singers and so forth. We do it a lot here in the United States and in other places, but rarely on that level.

We do not use music which says eloquently who we are and what we are about in the way that, I believe, it must be used to get across some of the points that you and Senator Wallop have been making about cultural exchange.

It is a very strong weapon. It is one which is often used better by the Soviets, who have tried to co-opt us.

I mentioned the fact that I was in Dakar, Senegal. The Soviets are teaching jazz to the Senegalese. We are not, the Americans are not teaching our own music. We are allowing others to do that.

I was both surprised and distressed to find that out. We have dropped the ball there and in many other places around the world.

The kinds of discussions that I had with other cultural figures, teachers, performers and so forth in Budapest, showed me how they were using jazz. They gave me books on jazz, I was given a listing of the Eastern countries that teach jazz, the schools in which they teach it. It is quite a comprehensive list. It is available to anyone who wants it.

They are using something of ours because they recognize its appeal. I believe that they are changing it because some of the elements that I hear in the Hungarians playing jazz are not comparable to what I hear in the United States. They are not saying the same thing musically that American musicians are saying. One must live in our culture to express it from our particular perspective.

So, I think, in our self defense, we must reclaim something which by default is being utilized in a way that is not to our best advantage.

Jazz is one of the best means of communication. We have used it well on the Voice of America and we have used it well in many other ways, yet we don't use it as well as we might in cultural exchange. We send ballet dancers, symphony orchestras, opera singers and many others, who represent the best in European culture but we do not send the best in American culture as our contribution to cultural exchange.

Good music is good music. I have no brief against ballet or any of the great artists we have sent to represent us in foreign countries. In many cases, they are world class artists.

But I just think we are missing a bet and it is one that in my statement I try to address. Thank you.

[The full statement of Mr. Taylor follows:]

BILLY TAYLOR'S STATEMENT

Jazz is America's classical music. It takes all the diverse elements in our culture and puts them in a unique musical perspective which eloquently states who we are and what we are about as a people. As a jazz pianist, composer and an educator, I have travelled extensively around the world participating in cultural exchange. For example, in September, I represented the United States at the Fourth Annual Singapore Jazz Festival. In October, I was the musical director of a week long cultural exchange which took more than 400 Americans to Dakar, Senegal. In addition to providing unique opportunities for social and business contacts and interaction the sponsoring organization, the Jackie Robinson Foundation, awarded several educational scholarships to Senegalese children. I was very surprised to find the Russians teaching the Senegalese jazz. Why are we not teaching our music instead of leaving it to someone less qualified? I asked. No one had an answer.

I interrupted my normal touring schedule to attend the Cultural Forum in Budapest and then in November I spent three weeks in Japan and China meeting with city, state and cultural officials and discussing cultural exchange and specific ways to use jazz more effectively in the educational process as well as in cultural activities. At the invitation of the Shanghai Conservatory of Music and the Conservatory of Chinese Music in Beijing I gave lecture demonstrations, master classes and met with composers, teachers, school administrators and cultural officials in order to discuss teaching techniques, resources, new technology and jazz history and new developments in the field. This is the kind of cultural exchange I have found to be most effective.

When I was asked to be a member of the U.S. delegation to the CSCE Cultural Forum I naturally assumed this would be a rare opportunity to take a giant step in the direction of more effective and meaningful cultural exchange. I hoped the delegates would find some common ground on which we might begin frank discussions of some of the problems which are currently prohibiting consistent and effective cultural exchange on a worldwide basis. Even though I was warned in my briefing that it would be difficult to engage my fellow delegates in meaningful dialogue, I was not prepared for the formal, boring, unproductive and frustrating series of meetings I attended. I would have been a much more effective delegate if I had been given a clearer and more accurate idea of what the inflexible rules were and what the Russians and others were prepared to do to prevent open discussion of real issues. I mistakenly believed that open discussion was possible and found much to my chagrin that even when it was partially achieved not much was accomplished because it was off the record. This stimulated many private conversations and exchanges of business cards and promises to explore some of the ideas advanced on a one-to-one basis. It was rather like a trade convention with people making deals in hallways and over coffee or a drink.

Despite my impatience with the protocol and my frustration with the process, I was both honored and delighted to represent the United States on the radio and television gala which was produced, broadcast and telecast live to millions of people in Eastern Europe by Hungarian radio and television. All through the rehearsals and throughout the live broadcast the Hungarian artists and technical people set the tone of international cooperation by giving hundreds of performers, speaking and performing in many diverse styles an opportunity to present their cultural expressions to the people of the many countries who broadcast and telecast the gala as a live special. I wish all of the delegates and the decision makers could have been present at the rehearsals and backstage during the show to observe for themselves how cultural exchange can bring people together with mutual respect, admiration and understanding.

Even when the pace of the program was interrupted while the piano tuner replaced a broken string, the artists and the technical people were most supportive of one another and extremely cooperative with our Hungarian hosts. There was a minimum of egotism and temperament displayed and I was personally gratified by the warm response my trio received from the children who participated in the program. They were talented youngsters who only responded when the music moved them. Like children everywhere they had lots of questions and language was not a barrier because they seemed to always be able to find someone who spoke enough English to converse with me and my two colleagues. Respect, admiration and genuine interest are not faked by children so you always know where you stand with them. They are honest. I guess that is why I love to perform for them.

Creation, dissemination and cooperation—These three goals were masterfully achieved in the gala. The meetings, as I have already indicated, were another matter. I believe each delegate should have been asked to prepare one or two papers

which stated his or her ideas clearly and succinctly so that we could have shared more effectively our concerns as well as our experiences with our fellow delegates. Even if we did not read the papers we would have organized our thoughts in a way that was better suited to the format we were locked into.

I urged the delegates to consider a more global approach to the filming and taping of artists and their work since film and tape provide a unique historical reference. I spoke of radio as the portable media of choice of people, old and young, all over the world and I reminded the delegates of the fact that we have an unparalleled opportunity to create more imaginative and effective musical programs using the new digital and laser technology currently available. I have no problem thinking on my feet, I do that everytime I improvise at the piano, however more preparation would have helped me state my ideas more clearly.

I was prepared to introduce all of the proposals which were in my briefing package but was advised to hold off until the other NATO delegations were polled so that we could present a unified approach to the Forum. I am sure this advice was based on a clearer understanding of the process than I had but I felt frustrated and ineffective and I thought I might provoke a response and in that way engage someone in a dialogue. I am not a diplomat.

I had many informal conversations with members of other delegations and I met with several artists and teachers. They provided me with a great deal of information outlining the similarities and differences in our various approaches to cultural expression. I learned quite a lot about radio broadcasting in the Soviet Union, in France, in West Germany, Austria, in Great Britain and in Canada. As enlightening as it was I wish it could have been in the Forum rather than at lunch or over coffee.

I believe it is important for everyone to recognize the fact that do not live and work in a vacuum. Radio, films, television and other media are responsive to well established tastes as well as quickly changing tastes. Young people in every culture have developed their own standards and their communication networks. Sometimes their leaders have to march in double or run to stay in front of them (i.e. Jazz festivals are presented all over Eastern Europe because there is a well defined audience for them. This audience was initially built by the Voice of America broadcasts. As time went on it was expanded by jazz fans and jazz organizations which were organized into networks by Polish jazz fans.)

The Iron Curtain countries understand the importance of jazz as a medium of personal expression and since they have not been able to diminish its appeal they are now trying to co-opt it. The United States does not recognize the importance of jazz as an expression of our culture so we are allowing them to use it as a weapon against us. In my view this is not only intolerable it is stupid. We invented a music which has universal appeal, a music which speaks eloquently of our culture and we are allowing people who disagree with us philosophically to define it.

For me, the Budapest Cultural Forum was a learning experience and I am glad I was able to participate. It was a pleasure to work with David Ives and Cliff Robertson. Mr. Ives was well prepared and took excellent notes during the meetings. His knowledge and experience commanded the respect of our colleagues from other delegations and his insights were most helpful as we tried to deal with the formal structure of the meetings and the rather pointed remarks of some of the delegates. Ambassador Stoessel and Sol Polansky were very helpful in their daily briefings and Guy Coriden carefully guided Cliff, David, and me through the maze of regulations and protocol and helped us better understand how what we were doing was supposed to fit into the "big picture". It was difficult for me to be patient and I wish I had said more about my concerns for the individual artist and human rights but in the format we locked into it was difficult to find the "right" time.

I am glad David Seal convinced me to make room in my schedule for this important event. It was well worth the time and the effort.

Because of its potential for creating a climate for better international understanding, I hope the Helsinki Commission will prevail on the State Department to arrange for better media coverage of future activities. Members of Congress and other Americans need to know more about the nature and substance of these important efforts to stimulate and encourage more effective cultural exchange and the important gains already made. To do better we must be better informed.

Chairman D'AMATO. Billy, thank you very much. I must agree with you that we need to send the best of our artists on these exchanges. We should send those who are truly liberated, who can give their expression total freedom. There is no finer way to do this than through music. American jazz epitomizes the soul and the

heart of America and captures its creativity. It is a method, I think, by which we can build bridges with people of these lands regardless of the views of their leaders.

I want to thank you for being here and thank you for your great contribution not only to this effort but as one of our great leaders in the entertainment area. You have given me many wonderful hours.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

Chairman D'AMATO. Mr. Ives, thank you for being here. We deeply appreciate your efforts in Budapest and we appreciate your previous outspokenness. We look forward to hearing your observations.

STATEMENT OF DAVID O. IVES, VICE-CHAIRMAN OF WGBH (BOSTON), CULTURAL FIGURE TO U.S. DELEGATION TO BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM

Mr. IVES. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think Billy is being too modest when he said his trio was very well received at that gala in Budapest. It stopped the show. Young people on the stage who were behind him—there were lots and lots of them on the stage—burst into applause three or four times during his presentation. It was clearly the hit of the evening.

I don't think there is any question whatever that export of jazz music to young people is a very powerful American weapon.

I have a prepared statement but would just enter it for the record.

There was an interesting comparison, I thought, at the Conference between the attitude of the Soviet delegation and the attitude of some of the others.

For example, we did raise at one point a suggestion that the Soviets carry out a study of American television, along the same lines as is being done at Columbia University, who have students watching everything that the Soviets actually broadcast during a day to their own people and thus getting an extremely close look at what the Soviet culture really is.

Chairman D'AMATO. That has got to be a very interesting study.

Mr. IVES. Well, I think it is a very interesting study and I think it is something—I hope the Congress is very much aware of it because they are learning a great deal about it. I mentioned this at the Conference.

Chairman D'AMATO. Are you doing anything in connection with that, Mr. Ives, yourself?

Mr. IVES. No, I am not. I just happened to have read about it and I took it over as an idea for them to—I suggested that the Soviets do a similar thing with their students watching all of American television. They could never watch all of it but——

Chairman D'AMATO. I am going to ask my Commission to try to plug into that, to learn what the observations are. It would seem to me that we should get some information.

Mr. IVES. There is a lot of good information to get.

Chairman D'AMATO. Yes.

Mr. IVES. They are discovering that Soviet television is far better than they thought it was as well as being far worse. There are

some good things about it and some very bad things about it. They are discovering that some of the news broadcasts in the Soviet Union are quite straight and some are heavily anti-American. And the most interesting thing, of course, is that they are all looking at the world from a Soviet perspective, rather than an American perspective.

So, we suggested during the Conference that they set up a similar study and then, say, annually, the students who had been studying each other's television get together, and if they did get together they would have so much in common that there would be a very lively exchange because they would have been watching what each country is receiving every day.

The Soviet response to that—they came and got the article that I referred to right away after we mentioned it—and the next day they responded very quickly by saying they were very much interested to see that this study was going on and that American students were finding good things about Soviet television.

They mentioned nothing, of course, about the bad things they were discovering. And they also then said, "but, of course——

Chairman D'AMATO. They sound like typical politicians, people who could be from this country.

Mr. IVES. They also said, "they were a little annoyed that it was being done without their permission."

Chairman D'AMATO. Oh, my God!

Mr. IVES. Well, that is one response. Then we did, as Ambassador Stoessel mentioned, talk a little bit about jamming and about the importance that we put on free flow of information. And I devoted my prepared statement to quite an interesting—I thought it was an interesting—exchange with the delegate from East Germany, who wanted to ask a good many questions about what we meant by free flow of information.

They were not very confrontational questions, but in a sense, he was asking, are you trying to tell us what our system of communication should be about. And so then, as you know, in these conferences it takes you a day or so to get on the list to get back to speak, but we did get back and we, in essence, said that simply the American ideal is that people should decide for themselves.

Well, then he came back after that with another comment, saying in effect that the freedom to choose is limited by the things that are actually made available, and you have to recognize that television, particularly, is an enormous industry and that a country like East Germany doesn't have an enormous television industry. So there was a danger, was there not, that their country would be simply overwhelmed by television and broadcasts from the other side.

Then I responded again saying, yes, in effect that was true because American television isn't terribly varied yet. There is public television, which is an alternative to commercial television, but what you see on commercial television is very, very similar and it has very, very little foreign films, for example, on it. You don't see much of that in America.

On the other hand, it is changing, as cable proliferates and as video, home video cassettes are coming into more and more households. It is coming up to 30 percent, I think, that VCR's are avail-

able in the population, and growing by leaps and bounds. And the market for foreign films is growing in this country, and the market for the product that East European nations might have in the way of films is getting bigger.

And then I had a little private conversation with that same delegate afterwards in which he said, "You know, this whole subject of free flow of information is quite interesting to us and it might be something that could be pursued in some other way in our country."

Well, I didn't know what to make of that and it just seemed to me like a tiny, tiny potential crack that I might try to widen in some way.

But that is a big difference from the attitude of the Soviets, which I thought was very flat.

On the other hand, as you probably know, a public broadcasting group has been to Moscow recently, and although I didn't go on that trip, there does seem to me some likelihood that there will be an exchange of at least some sort of cultural programming as a result of that trip, with some Soviet stuff coming here and some United States stuff going there, but of course under strict government control, not any freedom such as we were talking about.

One other point I would like to make, and that is all, is that it seemed to me it is too bad that we don't have a filmmaker here who was with us. We did have Cliff Robertson, but he was not a filmmaker as such and he could only be there a short time.

But the filmmakers of all countries have an awful lot in common, it seems to me. They are all the same kind of prickly independent people who think that their film's are the best ever made and they want them preserved forever, and they insist that they ought to be heard and seen in every country. And the kind of sympathy they had for each other was very marked as against the kind of bureaucratism that characterized the broadcasters from the other countries.

Chairman D'AMATO. Probably because the filmmakers here in the United States face limits to their artistic endeavors. Some limits are capital formation, the high cost of capital, and limited numbers of outlets, et cetera. So, they probably share a bond, you see.

Mr. IVES. Exactly. They all do, they all do. And when there was an actual informal exchange after they finally battered down all the rather clumsy rules, in one afternoon an exchange was allowed without all this getting on the list, just back and forth by raising hands, and the filmmakers had a great deal in common in that, and you could sense that they did.

And my sense of that was that that is an area that might be worth exploring because the filmmakers themselves are so eager for more freedom of information flow, for doing more things. Some of them are very gloomy about it.

I think it was a Hungarian that said, a rather elderly filmmaker who said that the world of filmmaking is now terribly gloomy because all of us are just caught between the two great powers, and if anything could be done to loosen that up and to create a further flow—film is a tremendously influential medium, particularly

among the young people, and that was one of the notions I took from him.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman D'AMATO. Mr. Ives, thank you for your work in this area and for being here today.

[The full statement of Mr. Ives follows:]

Testimony of

David O. Ives

Chairman, National Association of Public Television Stations

and vice chairman, WGBH, Boston

Mr. Chairman, my name is David Ives. I am vice chairman of WGBH, the public television and radio station in Boston. I am also the current chairman of the National Association of Public Television Stations.

I was privileged to be one of the U. S. delegates to the Budapest Cultural Forum. It was the first such experience I had had and it was a thoroughly interesting one. I have one or two observations about the process.

In our briefings, we were told that the exchanges in the open sessions would probably be less fruitful than the talks we might be able to have with other delegates outside the meeting room over a meal or a drink. To some extent that was true because a large amount of time was taken up with tedious speeches by representatives of countries desiring to display how much cultural exchange they already engaged in.

But I also found that there was some useful discussion on the floor, and especially toward the end of the week when the set speeches had been gotten out of the way. Some of these took place among the filmmakers, who it seemed to me, had more to say to each other than the broadcasters, many of whom appeared to be bureaucrats in charge of their government-controlled television or radio systems. But there was also an occasional exchange which seemed to me to contain the germ of some future action, and one of these took place between me and a delegate from East Germany on the subject of free flow of information. My written statement reports on this exchange in some detail, but I will simply summarize it quickly now.

In the middle of the week, I talked about jamming of broadcasts and urged that the nations assembled endorse the resolutin agreed to at the WARC Conference calling for three observation periods of "harmful interference." I reported that the first such observation period in September of 1984 had uncovered more than 9,500 such instances of such interference. I deplored it and said the US stood for free flow of information across borders.

The next day, a delegate from East Germany addressed that point and asked several questions. He asked "what is this free flow of information? This is not an unchallengeable idea. There can be questions on financial and intellectual imperialism. Free flow of information could mean letting the cat devour the pigeons. Aren't you just bandying about a phrase? Every country has the right to choose its own flow of information. We don't jam anything. But what flows from my country back into the United States? What stand do you have on that question? Is the flow of information to be used

to impose on us your ideas? Are you denouncing our form of communication? Are you just interested in expansion of the American market? Please help me with the answers."

The next day I tried to answer by saying that we mean by free flow of information just what it says. We believe that greater understanding among peoples can only be achieved when there is the maximum possible freedom for the citizens of all countries to obtain what they happen to want -- whether it is in the form of books, newspapers, magazines, technical journals, films, poems, religious tracts, radio and television broadcasts or anything else, whether its source is domestic or foreign and whether or not the information is agreeable to those who govern the country in which the citizens live.

I answered the rest of the questions in about the same way, repeating that, in every case, whatever the individual wants he should be able to obtain.

As to bandying about the words "free flow of information," I said this was emphatically not the case. I said that freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of information, and their corollaries -- absence of censorship, absence of restrictions, absence of any official orthodoxy -- are absolutely basic to our American ideals. I said we are convinced that all persons in any part of the world want such freedoms and that when they are available to all, understanding among all peoples will be within reach.

Later, the same East German took up the theme again, saying the individual may be free to choose in a theoretical way, but what can he really choose? Only, he said, among what the producers (in this case of television and radio programs) make available to him. He said broadcasting is an industry and only those countries having a well-developed industry can produce much material, while those who are on the receiving end can only choose among certain things. He asked, "Can citizens from the U. S. really choose freely, or must they, too, merely choose from what is offered to them?"

He went on to say, however, that the dialog on these points should be continued. He said the basic point was, how can the freedom of the individual to choose be reconciled with what the station or the network chooses to produce? He suggested that, with continuing discussion, it might be possible to come to reasonable

proposals we could agree on without placing into doubt the views of others.

There was one more exchange on this point. I got the floor and agreed with the East German that, until recently, the average American had not had much choice of television programming but had been pretty well confined to the products of the three commercial networks plus the products of the non-commercial or public system, which offered at least one significant alternative. But I also noted that, with the spread of cable and especially with the spread of home video cassettes, the choice of tv programming to Americans was becoming broader. It still consists mostly of movies from Hollywood, with very few foreign films, but as more and more Americans are buying VCR's, the market is continually growing for different fare, and especially for programming that will appear to narrower interests. Added to the distribution of foreign films now available in the cinema houses in most American cities, I suggested it would not be long before the demand for foreign language films would be large enough to create a considerable market for them in video stores.

Thus, I said, though it is correct to say that there are practical limits to choice even in America, these choices are increasing and we believe such choices would increase wherever government impediments to them were removed. When that happened, it would greatly increase the flow of information across national borders and therefore improve mutual understanding among people of different cultures.

Finally, I had a quiet talk with my opposite number from East Germany, who said he had found the exchange very interesting and he thought there would be a good deal of interest elsewhere in his country in a continuing dialog of this sort.

Chairman D'AMATO. Janet Fleischman, a representative for the International Helsinki Federation.

Janet, good morning.

STATEMENT OF MS. JANET FLEISCHMAN, ASSISTANT TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, HELSINKI WATCH COMMITTEE

Ms. FLEISCHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to thank Mr. Taylor and Mr. Ives for the important contributions they have made here and especially at the Forum in Budapest.

I would like to say before I start that the principal officers of Helsinki Watch who were in Budapest, Jeri Laber and Aryeh Neier, were unable to be here today. Jeri Laber is out of the country. Aryeh Neier is on the west coast.

So, as the staff assistant who was in Budapest, I have been asked to testify here today.

As you may know, from October 15 through 17, Helsinki Watch, in conjunction with the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, the IHF, sponsored an independent cultural symposium in Budapest.

Our symposium was held at the same time, but separate from, the opening of the CSCE Cultural Forum in Budapest.

As has been mentioned here today, despite the fact that nongovernmental organizations had staged public events in the Western capitals of Madrid and Ottawa at previous Helsinki meetings, the Hungarian Government forbade the IHF to use the public facilities that had been reserved for its meetings.

In our view, the Hungarian Government's action violated the 1975 Helsinki accords, which it signed, and the Concluding Document of the Madrid Conference, which it approved.

However, with the help of many Hungarian intellectuals, our meetings were relocated to private apartments and went ahead without further obstruction.

It is important to note that this was the first time that independent citizens from East and West met openly in a Warsaw Pact country to discuss such topics as writers and their integrity and the future of European culture.

The panelists in our symposium were from the United States, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany, Yugoslavia, and exiles from Czechoslovakia, and additional countries were represented by the IHF, including Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, and Austria.

In many respects, at our meetings in Budapest, the Helsinki spirit was as alive as it has ever been. Our symposium drew vast attention. It was even acknowledged in the official Hungarian press, and focused attention both on the official Cultural Forum and on the limits of official Hungarian tolerance.

The outcome was therefore contradictory. On one side the Hungarian Government violated its commitments under the Helsinki accords and the Madrid Concluding Document, and on the other side we were not prevented from going forward with our meetings and thereby succeeded in injecting life and meaning into the Helsinki process.

Without the existence of the Helsinki process, the only ongoing East-West Forum in which human rights are discussed, our independent symposium could never have taken place.

The lifeline that we were able to bring to the members of the Hungarian opposition gave them the encouragement of international attention to continue with their activities.

In addition, just prior to the opening of the Forum, in an effort to demonstrate its good will, the Hungarian Government lifted George Krasso's house arrest and informed Janos Kis and Janos Kenedi that they could have passports.

An essential part of the Helsinki process involves the contact between the citizens of the participating states. This was recognized by the signatories of the Madrid Concluding Document when they committed themselves,

> To ensure satisfactory conditions for activities within the framework of mutual cooperation on their territory, such as sporting and cultural events, in which citizens of other participating states take part.

In the view of Helsinki Watch and the International Helsinki Federation, the independent symposium that we planned is precisely the kind of activity contemplated at the agreements reached at Helsinki and Madrid.

Nevertheless, the fact that our meetings did go forward without further hindrance raises another issue. Those meetings probably would never have been able to take place in any other Warsaw Pact country, and even given our problems with the Hungarian authorities, they were allowed to take place in Budapest.

The Cultural Forum provided a unique opportunity for Hungarian citizens to talk openly about the complicated system of censorship in their country and about the persecution that the Hungarian minority is subjected to in neighboring Romania.

Writers and intellectuals from East and West discussed writing under repression as well as in exile, ethnic identity, censorship, and the future of European culture in a divided continent.

By any standards, it was an extraordinarily dynamic intellectual exchange. But given the fact that it was happening in a place where such discussion is rarely permitted, the event took on even greater importance.

However, any importance that the independent forum may have acquired must be viewed within the context of the Helsinki process.

The process was given meaning because Hungarian citizens were willing to take considerable risks for the sake of Helsinki, a process that they obviously do not think of as futile.

The Committee of Culture of Underground Solidarity prepared a report for the Cultural Forum, which we released, on culture in Poland; Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia addressed an appeal to the Forum and worked to compile a book on culture in Czechoslovakia, a copy of which I have here today; Hungarian activists wrote reports about culture in Hungary and about the cultural repression of the Hungarian minority in Romania.

Clearly, none of these human rights activists in repressive countries felt that the process was futile. To them, Helsinki is a framework for hope.

It is our responsibility as people concerned with human rights in the West to support their efforts, to call attention to their plight, and to devise ways to open channels or communication and exchange.

Attached to my written testimony is a list of approximately 30 publications that carried major articles about our independent forum, as well as a sample of one of those articles from the London Times which seemed to capture the significance of the Forum.

This international press attention suggests the value of independent activities that can be organized around the Helsinki process in order to draw attention to the human rights practices of the signatory nations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you very much, Janet.

[The full statment of Ms. Fleischman follows:]

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Holly J. Burkhalter
Washington Representative

Testimony of Janet Fleischman
on the Budapest Cultural Forum
Before the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
December 11, 1985

My name is Janet Fleischman. I am the Assistant to the Executive Director of the U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, a nongovernmental organization that monitors compliance with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki accords. I am here today to discuss the Budapest Cultural Forum.

On October 15-17, Helsinki Watch and the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), a nongovernmental organization with national committees in ten countries, sponsored an independent cultural symposium in Budapest. The meeting was held at the same time -- but separate from -- the opening of the CSCE/Cultural Forum in Budapest. Despite the fact that nongovernmental organizations had staged public events without obstruction at Helsinki meetings in the Western capitals of Madrid and Ottawa, the Hungarian government

Helsinki Watch is affiliated with the Fund for Free Expression and with Americas Watch.
The Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights is Counsel for Helsinki Watch.
Helsinki Watch is a founding member of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights.

forbade the IHF to use the public facilities that had been reserved for its meetings. In our view, the Hungarian government's action violated the 1975 Helsinki accords, which it signed, and the Concluding Document of the 1980-83 Madrid Conference, which it approved.

With the help of many Hungarian intellectuals, however, our meetings were relocated to private apartments and went ahead without further obstruction. This was the first time that private citizens from both East and West had met openly in a Warsaw Pact country to discuss such topics as "writers and their integrity" and "the future of European culture."

In many respects, the Helsinki spirit was as alive as it has ever been for those few days in Budapest. Our independent symposium drew attention both to the official Cultural Forum and to the limits of official Hungarian tolerance. The outcome was therefore contradictory: on one side, the Hungarian government violated its commitments under the Helsinki accords and the Madrid Concluding Document by denying us permission to use the facilities we had reserved to hold our citizens cultural forum; on the other side, we were not prevented from going forward with our meetings and succeeded in injecting life and meaning into the Helsinki process. Without the existence of this only ongoing East-West forum, our independent symposium could never have taken place. The lifeline we were able to bring to the members of the

Hungarian opposition gave them the encouragement of international attention to continue with their activities. In addition, in an effort to demonstrate its good will just before the opening of the Forum, the Hungarian government lifted George Krasso's house arrest and informed Janos Kis and Janos Kenedi that they could have passports.

An essential part of the Helsinki process involves the contact between citizens of the participating states. The signatories of the Madrid Concluding Document recognized this when they committed themselves "to ensure satisfactory conditions for activities within the framework of mutual co-operation on their territory, such as sporting and cultural events, in which citizens of other participating States take part." In our view, the citizens cultural forum that we planned is just the kind of activity contemplated in the agreements reached at Helsinki and Madrid.

Moreover, the fact that our meetings did go forward without further hindrance raises another issue; those meetings would probably not have been allowed to take place in any other Warsaw Pact country, and despite our problems with the Hungarian authorities, they were allowed to take place in Budapest. Due to the Cultural Forum, an opportunity was provided for Hungarian citizens to talk openly about the complicated system of censorship in their country and about the persecution which the Hungarian minority is subjected to in neighboring Romania.

Writers and intellectuals from East and West discussed writing under repression as well as in exile, ethnic identity, censorship and the future of European culture. By any standards, it was an extraordinarily dynamic intellectual exchange, but given the fact that it was happening in a place where such discussion is rarely permitted, the event took on even greater importance.

Nevertheless, any importance that the independent forum may have acquired must be viewed within the context of the Helsinki process. The process was given meaning because Hungarian citizens were willing to take considerable risks for the sake of Helsinki -- a process that they obviously do not think of as futile. The Committee of Culture of Underground Solidarity prepared a report for the Cultural Forum; Charter 77 addressed an appeal to the Forum and worked to compile a book on culture in Czechoslovakia; Hungarian activists wrote reports about culture in Hungary and about the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania -- none of these human rights activists in repressive countries felt that the process was futile. To them, Helsinki is a framework for hope. Accordingly, it is our responsibility as people concerned with human rights in the West to support their efforts, to call attention to their plight and to devise ways to open channels of communication and exchange.

Attached is a list of some of the publications that carried

major articles on the independent symposium in Budapest sponsored by Helsinki Watch and the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights and a sample of one of the articles that appeared.

This international press attention suggests the value of independent activities that can be organized around the Helsinki process in drawing attention to the human rights practices of the nations that signed the 1975 Helsinki accords.

PUBLICATIONS THAT CARRIED MAJOR ARTICLES ON INDEPENDENT SYMPOSIUM IN BUDAPEST SPONSORED BY HELSINKI WATCH AND THE INTERNATIONAL HELSINKI FEDERATION

USA

The New York Times
The Washington Post
Time Magazine
The New York Times Book Review
The New York Review of Books

Austria

Die Presse
Profil

England

The London Times
The Sunday Times
The Economist
The Observer
The Spectator

Finland

Aamuleht

France

Le Monde
Liberation

Sweden

Aftonbaldet
Expressen
Tempus
Politiken
Svenska Dagbladet
Dagens Nyheter

Switzerland

Neue Zuricher Zeitung
Die Weltwoche

West Germany

Die Welt
Frankfurter Allgemeiner
Frankfurter Rundschau

International

The International Herald Tribune

THE TIMES TUESDAY OCTOBER 22 1985

FREEDOM VIA CULTURE

To judge from the opening week of the Budapest Cultural Forum it may make a significant contribution to that slow and painful attempt to heal some of Europe's multiple fractures which we call the "Helsinki process". The initial statements of delegation leaders from the 35 signatory states did not conceal the gulf which separates the Soviet socialist concept of culture, most lethally expounded (in Russian) by the representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, from all the other concepts of culture represented at the Forum. As Mr St John Stevas put it in an admirable speech, "the freedom of the individual is the seminal idea that lies at the heart of the European idea of culture . . . the freedom to read, to write, to compose, free from any kind of fear or censorship". In this "Western" view, the role of the state must be to encourage and support cultural activity and not as in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia today to prescribe and proscribe it. Because of this great divide, the Budapest Cultural Forum will almost certainly not end with one comprehensive agreement about the role of signatory states in promoting cultural activity and exchange. But it may yet produce a number of more modest agreements, some formal, some informal, some multilateral, some bilateral.

There is, for example, the important West German proposal to allow all participant states to establish cultural institutes in each other's capitals. There is the question of translating the lesser known European literatures into more widely known languages. There is the problem of some of the best artists from Eastern Europe not being allowed to travel to the West. If any progress is made on such issues, the inter-governmental proceedings may be accounted a success.

Equally important, however, is the success of what quickly came to be known in Budapest as the "unofficial forum", a fascinating three-day meeting of intellectuals from East and West organized by the non-governmental International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights to complement the official meeting. The Hungarian government debarred this unofficial meeting from its planned venue – a hotel conference room – but did not prevent it from going ahead in a private flat, where it was open not only to foreign guests and journalists but above all to Hungarians. Beside the extraordinary fact of it happening at all, the importance of this "unofficial forum" did not lie mainly in the western participants' contribution. There was nothing they said there which they could not have said as delegates to the official forum, and much of it will indeed be said many times by western official delegates over the next few weeks.

Its importance lay rather in the contributions from countries whose cultures are not truly or fully represented at the official forum. Here, Hungarian intellectuals could speak freely about the intricate net of censorship and self-censorship inside which they have to work, and about the plight of their persecuted compatriots in neighbouring Romania. Here, exiled Czech writers could describe the massacre of Czech and Slovak culture since 1968, a massacre carried out by precisely those dreadful bureaucratic hacks who now – as in a macabre parody – purport to represent Czechoslovak culture at the official forum.

This is why the "unofficial forum" was an essential complement to the official one. As the Foreign Secretary has repeatedly emphasized, the "Helsinki process" is only of value if unofficial as well as official people have a full part in it: and that is doubly true in the world of the arts, which states may hinder or foster, but individuals alone create. Both the official and the unofficial Budapest forums are a "first" in the history of Eastern Europe. It is to be hoped that they will not also be the last, but may be repeated in other capitals and on other themes.

Chairman D'AMATO. Let me first indicate to you that my statements—and I even suggest Senator Wallop's statements—though he has to speak for himself—are not and should not be read to mean that we are opposed to the process.

If anything, I have been a rather staunch defender of this Commission, its activities in the Helsinki process, the cultural exchanges, and imprisoned human contacts.

But I don't believe that we serve the interest of this Nation, our citizens, or those very brave people who have come forward under very difficult circumstances to make these exchanges possible if we do not speak out. This is especially important to those who hosted the IHF forums in their own homes at great personal sacrifice. I will give you some information that you may or may not have.

That is not, I believe, why Senator Wallop raises the issue. He's asking how we can best help those brave citizens who seek, under very, very severe restrictions, to keep the Helsinki process alive. He wants to give some form of hope to the millions who are deprived of their human rights.

Now, let me pose this question. The Hungarian poet, Sandor Lezsak, conducted open meetings of an artistic, not a political nature. Recently we have heard that he was dismissed from his job as a result of this activity.

Now, knowing that and knowing the incredible harassment that Lezsak and the others faced, I'd like to hear your opinion. I sometimes think that you might be somewhat defensive because you may feel that we want to end this whole process. That is not the case. What we want to do is to give meaning and strength to the process, and strengthen those who are there.

How could we best help these Hungarian citizens? How can we best help Sandor Lezsak, who was dismissed from his job for organizing an unofficial poetry gathering at the exhibition?

Now, do we just keep quiet about that? What kind of message does our silence send to the other participants? What do they think when we remain quiet after they have come forward to participate, only to be brutally suppressed? Don't we really do a disservice to them? Aren't we betraying them if we simply do nothing? That is my question.

Ms. FLEISCHMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the best ways that we can support them is to take part in these international meetings as nongovernmental——

Chairman D'AMATO. You are missing the point. Look, I have heard a lot of people talk now. I haven't done too much talking. Just let me ask you the question.

Ms. FLEISCHMAN. OK.

Chairman D'AMATO. You have a fellow over there by the name of Sandor Lezsak. That is a living, breathing, loving, caring person who participated in the Helsinki process and opened his home for a cultural exchange. After everybody goes home from the formal Cultural Forum, and they say, "Boy, it was wonderful"—but, we know Lezsak has lost his job. We don't know how many others who participated will also suffer.

Now, don't we have an obligation to do something? Don't we have an obligation to call the Hungarian Ambassador and say, "My God, what are you doing?" Shouldn't we tell the Hungarians that

the Congress of the United States and Ambassador Stoessel, is outraged. Shouldn't we tell them that the Chairman of the Helsinki Commission said,

> We want to know what is going on, and if we don't hear from the free press that something has been done to redress Lezsak's mistreatment, you are going to see legislation introduced to cut off most-favored-nation status for Hungary.

Why shouldn't we do that? Should we just keep quiet and let those people be axed after the meeting is over?

We are all happy. We are all here. We say, "It was wonderful to meet in Budapest." But those poor souls who raised their heads are persecuted. Now, what do we do?

Don't tell me that we should continue to have meetings. I want to know about this fellow and cases like that.

Ms. FLEISCHMAN. In response to your question, Mr. Chairman, I think the most important thing that we can do is to be aware of these cases of persecution, to raise these issues, to use every forum that we have to make sure those people are not forgotten.

Chairman D'AMATO. What are we to do about Sandor? Should the State Department do something?

Ms. FLEISCHMAN. They should raise a protest. You should raise a protest. We should not keep silent, by any means.

Chairman D'AMATO. Have you raised a protest?

Ms. FLEISCHMAN. We just found out about Mr. Lezsak's case yesterday, Mr. Chairman, and we intend to raise a protest.

Chairman D'AMATO. Ambassador Stoessel, it is very unusual. What have you done, what has the State Department done regarding this development?

Ambassador STOESSEL. I am not aware of any action they have taken, but I agree, it should be raised.

Chairman D'AMATO. Mr. Ambassador, would you report this discussion? I know the State Department is aware of this case if we are. Could you report to this Commission by letter, explaining exactly what is taking place? Because I want to tell you, I am going to move forward on this.

Now I am going to ask my good friend, Billy Taylor—I make him my good friend—Billy, don't we have to step forward in this kind of situation? Wouldn't we just be betraying those people who had the courage to come forward if we allow this to take place without raising our voices or doing something?

Mr. TAYLOR. I think the only people that can do anything for someone in that situation is someone outside of the situation, such as a U.S. Senator or the Helsinki Commission.

Chairman D'AMATO. And the State Department?

Mr. TAYLOR. And the State Department, of course.

But it would seem to me that in terms of sticking one's neck out, as this person has done, as you pointed out earlier, if that message that we send back to them, he stuck his neck out and we chopped it off and no one said anything——

Chairman D'AMATO. By our silence, I suggest we are chopping his head off.

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, I would agree. I would hope that we can do something which would keep the spotlight on them and say, here is something which is contrary to what you have signed up to do, by

your signing this particular document you have said you will not harm your own people or anyone else like this.

So, perhaps if the Commission can keep it alive and certainly give it the kind of dimension in human rights that we have been talking about, this certainly is, I think, a very clear-cut case.

Chairman D'AMATO. Our Cochairman has just joined us. Let me, before time runs out, in terms of the panel give him an opportunity to speak. I know he has votes, we will all be voting all day.

Congressman Hoyer. There has been no greater champion in the cause of human rights and no greater leader on this Commission than my Cochairman, Congressman Steny Hoyer.

Cochairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I first want to apologize, Mr. Ambassador, to you and to the other witnesses for my inability to be here earlier. We had a vote on the rule for the Tax Reform Act of 1985. It involved issues that are of great concern to not only my constituents but some 20 million people across the country. The Chairman asked me what happened. The rule on the tax bill went down, it failed. I was against the rule and for the bill. I am not sure that the Chair and I share the same view.

Despite the fact that the rule failed, we are making a record. In that respect, the bill moves forward. It treats Americans more fairly, it brings rates down, and for the same reason that President Reagan wants it moved forward, I would like to see it move forward.

Chairman D'AMATO. This is a nonpolitical Commission. [Laughter.]

Cochairman HOYER. I raise the issue simply to explain my being late, but I am prepared to followup on it.

I am particularly sorry that I was not here earlier because this is a very important hearing. I regret that we don't have more members of the Commission here. All of the House Members are on the floor because of the tax bill and we are in the last 3 days of session supposedly. Perhaps we should have scheduled this at some other time. But that is hindsight.

OPENING STATEMENT OF COCHAIRMAN HOYER

My initial reaction, if you would allow me to make just a few opening statements, was that we had not been as successful in Budapest as we had been in Ottawa.

Clearly, there was no difference with respect to a concluding document. We were unable to reach a concluding document at both meetings. In either event, I do not necessarily view that as a failure.

As I indicated in the hearings with respect to Ottawa and as Ambassador Stoessel has pointed out in his statements and I am sure all of you found out at Budapest, it is clear that there are significant and, in some cases, unresolvable differences between the East and the West philosophically.

In light of that, until there is a radical change in the East or in the West, which I certainly don't hope for in the West and don't expect in the East, it is going to be difficult to arrive at meaningful concluding documents.

I have had the opportunity of meeting with the members of our staff who were in Budapest. I want to say to a number of you who were very concerned that Commission members and other Members of Congress did not go to Budapest that I share that frustration. I want to express my regret at our inability to go to Budapest.

I don't know that that will mollify your concerns, and perhaps ought not to. It would have been better had we had the opportunity to go to Budapest to show our commitment to the process. Although I haven't been here, I understand that there have been some pointed questions raised, as there have been throughout the series of hearings that we have held this past year, about the value of the process if, in fact, we don't have specific, tangible, in-hand results from pursuance of that process.

Notwithstanding that, I think the process would have been strengthened by attendance of Members at those meetings.

I want to say to all here today and particularly those who represent nongovernmental organizations, that I am very hopeful and am working toward that end, that in Bern and at Vienna, the United States has significant representation from the Congress of the United States and from this Commission. I believe that is important and I want you to know that. I regretted that we could not follow through on that feeling in Budapest, impossible due to the congressional schedule, and for that I am truly sorry.

Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate the statement that you have made of appreciation to the staff members of the CSCE Commission, who as you state, "so competently and energetically contributed to the performance of the U.S. delegation."

I will tell you that I am not surprised by that statement, because that same competence and energy is demonstrated here at home. We think we have one of the finest staffs assembled, and certainly we believe there is probably no group in the United States or perhaps the world any more knowledgeable, competent or experienced in the workings of the CSCE process.

I would make the comment now, Mr. Ambassador, and I intend to pursue it with Chairman D'Amato in the future that a greater formal involvement of the CSCE staff within the U.S. delegation at Bern and in Vienna would be helpful to the United States. I think such involvement would be beneficial to the Western Alliance, and would prove to be a strong voice for the issues about which the Commission feels so strongly.

I want to thank Ambassador Stoessel. I know I am speaking longer than I might otherwise, but I want you to know that there is a perspective on this Commission, if it is mine alone, that, Mr. Ambassador, you and the delegation responded positively to the letter sent by Chairman D'Amato and myself which urged you to be as tough as was possible with respect to raising the issue of human rights within the framework of the Cultural Experts Meeting.

It was clearly done and we appreciate that. I share the frustration and the anger, as all of us do, that the East does not respond to specific cases raised or live up to their general commitment to the Helsinki undertakings.

I think it is critically important that we press on undeterred by our frustrations, that, in fact, we strengthen our efforts.

I also think it is important that members of this Commission, who frankly have much more credibility with the administration than I do, support the administration much more than I do and therefore presumably have more "stick" with the administration than particularly our Chairman, who has a lot of "stick" with the administration, continue to pressure the administration on the issue of human rights. However, this administration is not unlike previous ones, whether Carter, Nixon, Ford, or Johnson, in that it is much easier, it seems to me, for Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan, when they are running for President and do not have the responsibility, to say that we ought to be tough, we ought to push them back, we ought to demand and we ought to make this happen.

The reality of it is that independent nations in a world that is unprepared or unwilling to go to war to enforce its demands ultimately will be frustrated by nations which do not comply with their undertakings.

I believe, Mr. Ambassador, that you and others who were kind enough to give of your time and talent to the United States to go to Budapest, are to be thanked profusely by this Commission, the Congress of the United States and the administration.

Now, with that opening statement, which was short in terms of being a State senator for 12 years. You get used to talking for long periods of time, and I apologize for that.

Now, let me, if I may, Mr. Ives, start with a few questions for yourself, sir.

Chairman D'AMATO. I am going to, first of all, once again concur my Cochairman's remarks to Walter Stoessel. I have known Ambassador Stoessel since I came to the Congress and he has assisted me greatly in a whole variety and host of matters. If there is one man who can be tough to the area of human rights, it is Ambassador Stoessel.

I don't believe all his colleagues back at that building can be or are as tough. I don't think they have expressed sufficient resolve in these areas.

Second, we have got to press even further on these issues. To those of my colleagues who suggested that the process should perhaps be abandoned, that argument is a vast oversimplification. That is exactly what the totalitarian states would love for us to do. Then those poor people who have been enslaved throughout the world, even those living in nonsignatory nations who are not covered by the Helsinki accords, have little if any light, have little if any hope.

Because these times are frustrating, I think my colleague's statement that we must persevere takes on added meaning.

I have another hearing that I have to attend. I am going to ask Cochairman Hoyer to close the proceedings. I want to thank our witnesses not only for being here but for their work. We pledge to you that the Commission will continue its efforts. I think we are a very important part of the process of keeping the human rights issue in the forefront where it should be on the world agenda as well as our national agenda.

Now, let me say this: I understand that there is a representative here today from the Hungarian Government. I am not going to ask

him to identify himself. But I am going to say that I hope that he faithfully reports to his government our discussion of Hungary's most-favored-nation status. There are a growing number of Senators who are deeply distressed over the problems at the Budapest Cultural Forum. In this connection, I want to make certain that the Hungarian Government realizes that we are watching their treatment of their citizens who attended the International Helsinki Federation symposium. We are going to hold the Hungarian Government fully responsible for the health and the safety of these people.

Now, that is a simple fact. It is not a threat, it is a fact. We are certainly going to be looking at the case of Sandor Lezsak in particular.

If there is not a positive resolution of this matter, if he is not returned to employment, or if the government finds other ways to harass him, that is not going to sit well with the Senator. I can only speak for one Senator, but I will assure you that at the very least I am going to move to cut off most-favored-nation treatment for Hungary. I am sure that you are going to inform your Ambassador and other officials of my comments. They will run over to the State Department and the State Department will say, "Oh, you shouldn't do it." But I want to tell you something. We cannot allow this kind of treatment to take place.

More than one individual participated in these unofficial events. If one individual is being persecuted, if he is being harassed simply because of his conduct, if we are going to allow that persecution to take place, then maybe we should stop participating. Otherwise, what we are doing is inducing people to believe that something really exists that doesn't exist—human rights. Those who take the chance and step forward will indeed be victimized in the long run. If we are not there to raise our voices, to try to do something about it, we are abdicating our responsibilities. This is certainly something that we can do something about.

I hope that you will make that report to your Ambassador and to your Government, because I don't believe we can tolerate that kind of action any longer.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, and I thank all our witnesses.

Cochairman HOYER. I apologize. The bell, as you heard, just rang, and we have another vote. I am going to wait to leave—we can try to go another 8 or 9 minutes.

Let me say to Senator D'Amato before he leaves, that as Chairman of this Commission, he has done what I think needs to be done. That is, he has pulled Democrats and Republicans together. There are clearly ideological, philosophical, and political differences among the Commission members. Clearly, Senator D'Amato and I represent differing political philosophies with respect to certain matters that come before the Congress.

However, under his leadership, we have been absolutely united in our commitment to making sure that this Commission is vigorous in the prosecution of its function. The Chairman has unified the staff and both parties in that effort. Senator, I want to congratulate you for those efforts and say that it is a privilege to serve with you on this Commission.

Chairman D'AMATO. Thank you very much.

Cochairman HOYER. Mr. Ives, I have read your statement, regarding the free flow of information which you delivered on October 31. Your observation that it should be the right of the individual and not that of the government to limit the flow of information, I believe, succinctly sums up a basic difference between the East and the West.

I have been told that your participation in the performing arts subsidiary working group was a substantial contribution to the efforts of the U.S. delegation.

Mr. Taylor, as far as you are concerned let me say that I understand that perhaps more than anyone you demonstrated both the richness of American culture as well as the benefits of cultural and artistic freedom through your masterful performances.

As a matter of fact, everybody that came back said that you were super and, boy, they sure were glad that you were there!

Obviously, everyone on the delegation enjoyed you being there and I can tell you that all of the Commission staff enjoyed you being there.

I thank you both.

Ms. Fleischman, I also want to thank you for appearing on behalf of Helsinki Watch. The Commission is always grateful for the work of Helsinki Watch. We appreciate your testimony.

I want to say that I was particularly interested in your observation that without the existence of this only ongoing East-West Forum, the symposium—and I believe Ambassador Stoessel, you made a similar point—put on by the International Helsinki Federation could have never taken place. I think it is important for us to remember that.

I regret that there is not time to ask you any questions because of the fact that I have a vote on the other side of the Hill, but before I leave, I want to reiterate the Commission's thanks to each one of you.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you again for your assistance to the NGO's.

I did not know there was a representative of the Hungarian Government here. We were obviously concerned about the fact that the Hungarian Government had made certain representations that were not fully complied with from our perspective. We realized that there were problems existing and I understand that has been addressed already.

Suffice it to say that all of the Commission members will review your testimony, and I will urge them to do so. Perhaps we will have the opportunity of talking with each one of you, individually, as we prepare for Bern and Vienna. We would be interested in getting your suggestions as to how we may be more effective at these meetings.

We are going to be urging the State Department to include more private sector people on the delegations, as well as staff of the Commission.

Again, I apologize for not being able to spend more time with you, but that probably is not something for which I need to apologize. It is like the teacher saying class is going to be over early.

It is not because of a lack of concern. It is because of a scheduling problem of which I am sure, you are understanding.

There goes the bell again. I have 10 minutes to get to the House side to vote.

I want to thank all of you very, very much for appearing before the Commission today and hope to be working with each of you as time goes by and as we work toward achieving progress within the Helsinki process and on the objectives of the Helsinki accords.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the hearing was concluded.]

APPENDIX 1

WORLD CONGRESS OF FREE UKRAINIANS
СВІТОВИЙ КОНҐРЕС ВІЛЬНИХ УКРАЇНЦІВ
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
КОМІСІЯ ПРАВ ЛЮДИНИ
2118-A Bloor Street West Toronto, Ontario, Canada M6S 1M8 Tel.: (416) 762-1108

December 12, 1985

Honorable
Alfonse M. D'Amato
Chairman
Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe
237 House Office Building, Annex 2
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Senator D'Amato:

Thank you for your letter of November 19, with the invitation to submit a statement to be included in the record of the October 29, 1985, public hearing on artistic freedom in the Soviet Union.

I am enclosing our statement as well as a copy of the brief which we provided to the participants of the "Cultural Forum" in Budapest, for your office.

We appreciate this opportunity to be of service in this important undertaking, and we congratulate you, Cong. S. Hoyer and the CSCE Commission for your diligence in the CSCE process. Best wishes in the New Year.

Sincerely yours,

Christina Isajiw
Executive Director

CI/ck
encls.

WORLD CONGRESS OF FREE UKRAINIANS
СВІТОВИЙ КОНҐРЕС ВІЛЬНИХ УКРАЇНЦІВ
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
КОМІСІЯ ПРАВ ЛЮДИНИ
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ARTISTIC FREEDOM IN THE SOVIET UNION

The following documentation demonstrates that the USSR govenrment has systematically implemented discriminatory policies against the national and cultural life of Ukrainians, resulting in the denial of their basic human rights, particularly the right to the cultural development and practices of a distinctly separate nationality.

Since the much publicized 1965 trials of two Moscow writers, A. Sinyavsky and Yu. Daniel, the trials of writers and intellectuals in the USSR have vividly brought forth the issues which have alienated the intelligentsia from the present regime. In late August and early September 1965, a week or so before the arrests of Sinyavsky and Daniel, numerous arrests of young Ukrainian intellectuals took place in Ukraine, but unlike that of the Moscow writers, these trials were shrouded in secrecy and nothing at all was known about them in the West until early April 1966. In Moscow, the case for the "literary prosecution" which, even though biased and distorted, had some fragments of fact and was stated in the press before the trial. In Ukraine, on the other hand, no direct use was made of the press to publicize the prosecution's case; instead, false information began to be spread soon after the arrests by high to middling official sources, about the discovery of alleged underground nationalist organizations, complete with American dollars, printing presses and even arms; when the absurdity of such stories became too obvious, they were replaced by ones about "massive anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.".

In this same vein, when we talk about the lack of artistic freedom or a "brain drain" from the USSR, it is important to note that the discriminatory policies of Moscow, not only dictate artistic output in Ukraine, but virtually preclude a possibility of emigration. Although there are several Ukrainian painters who were fortunate to leave

the USSR in the last ten years, Ukrainian writers, musicians, actors etc., unlike Jews or Russians, are not allowed to leave. (It is well known that most Ukrainians who were able to emigrate in the last decade have done so with the help of an Israeli visa.) Ukrainian dissent is treated with disproportionate severity and all artistic expression is suspect.

While the dissident movement in Ukraine is a reaction to long-standing grievances, it is noteworthy that most of its spokesmen were young people who had been educated in "Soviet patriotism," and were, in some cases, members of the Komsomol or the Communist Party. The attempts of the regime to discredit them by linking them with the violently anti-Soviet movement are unconvincing. Furthermore, the Ukrainians who are insisting on their constitutional rights and the Helsinki and other international agreements, are accepted, supported and in many ways helped by many segments of the Russian community, as legitimate allies in their struggle for civil liberties.

Perhaps the most poignant description of the initiators of this dissident movement was written by Vyacheslav Chornovil who documented the KGB operation of 1965; he compiled biographies of the victims, and outlined their professional careers and political activities. The documentation included letters that the accused had written to their relatives. In his preface Chornovil wrote: "If it were possible to compile a typical biography of the average person convicted in 1966 for 'anti-Soviet nationalistic propaganda and agitation,' it would look as follows: the convicted N. was twenty-eight to thirty years old at the time of his arrest. He came from a peasant's or worker's family, graduated with honors from secondary school, enterd university (perhaps after serving in the army), where he actively participated in scientific discussion groups. Being an excellent student he obtained a good position, wrote a postgraduate dissertation (or succeeded in defending one), and his articles were published in periodicals (or he even published a book). Even if his profession was a technical one, he took an interest in literature and art and grieved for the state of his native language and culture. He is still unmarried or was married shortly before his arrest and has a small child... This time the authorities were dealing with people of high education

who were brought up in Soviet conditions and who were able to grasp the essence of Marxism-Leninism from original sources and not second hand through quotations. They were dealing with people who had not learned from the bitter experience of the thirties and forties. Notwithstanding the harsh conditions of camp existence, all the convicted continue to develop their intellectual potential and to worry about the same unsolved problems that concerned them before their arrest."

Ukraine is by far the largest non-Russian nation in the USSR. According to the 1982 government census figures, it has a population of 50.3 million, of whom 73.6 percent or 37 million are ethnic Ukrainians. In addition, about 5.8 million Ukrainians live outside the Ukrainian SSR in other parts of the Soviet Union.

Ukrainian is a separate East Slavic language with roots in the medieval state of Kievan Rus which arose on the banks of the Dnieper River and its tributaries in the 9th century. In 1979, 82.8 percent of the some 42 million Ukrainians living in the Soviet Union claimed Ukrainian as their native language.

Despite the predominance of this language, the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR does not state that Ukrainian is the official language of the Republic. This differs from the practice of other Soviet republics where native languages are expressly recognized as the official languages. The constitutions of the Armenian and Georgian SSR each, state that Armenian and Georgian are the official languages of the respective republics. This conspicuous omission from the Ukrainian Constitution is an important component in the deliberate policy of discrimination against the Ukrainian culture in favor of the Russian. There is substantial evidence that such discrimination is increasing:

Book publishing statistics reveal that there is drastic decline in the Ukrainian language. Ukrainian writers complain that they are told their books cannot be published because of an alleged "paper shortage." Since 1972, the number of titles and size of press runs of Ukrainian language books published in the Ukr.SSR has declined while the corresponding statistics for Russian books has increased substantially. By 1980, the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian titles in in the Ukr.SSR approached three to one.

On a comparative basis, UNESCO statistics show that in 1979, of the ten largest Slavic language speaking peoples, Ukrainian was in seventh place according to the number of titles published. This was only slightly more than that of Slovenia, a nation of less than 2 million. If one considers the proportion of titles per million speakers on a national basis, it becomes clear that both Ukraine (88.9 titles per million) and Byelorussia (58.9 titles per million) fare very poorly compared to Russian speakers (427.2 titles per million), or compared to other Slavic language speakers in the neighboring socialist republics of Eastern Europe. Since 1970, the situation has grown worse. In 1979, the 2,414 titles produced constitute only 66.3 titles per million Ukrainian speakers.

The apparent official policy of promoting Russian, while discouraging Ukrainian, is also reflected in the number of issues of journals published in the two languages. For example, the Ukrainian language pedagogical journal, Ukrainska Mova i Literatura v Shkoli, was published in an edition of 44,900 copies in January 1984, while the Russian language pedagogical journal, Russkiy Yazik v Srednykh Shkolakh, was published in an edition of 40,750 copies in November 1984. In addition, between January 1980 and January 1984, Ukrainian language journals have shown significant percentage decreases in the press runs of its editions that are published: Vsesvit - 36.98%, Dnipro - 46.06%, Ranok - 35.73%, Narodna Tvorchist' ta Etnohrafiya - 35.22%, Ukraina - 48.37%, Vitchyzna - 30.30%.

Since there are 26,000 public libraries in the republic (according to the report of the Ukr.SSR in 1983), some basic Ukrainian journals have print runs so low, they cannot be puchased by each library in Ukraine. The widespread use of the Russian language as the language of instruction within Ukr.SSR is further demonstrated by textbook publication policies. A check of the 1965 catalogue of technical and scientific books published by Tekhnika publishing house in Ukraine shows that not one Ukrainian-language textbook was slated to come out that year for higher educational institutions and technical schools. The catalogue of Kharkiw University of 1965 lists 15 textbooks authorized for higher educational institutions - all of which are in the Russian language. Reference books in libraries are also predominantly in Russian. For example: in January 1965 the Kiev Gorky Pedagogical Institute listed a total of 326 new books, of which 205 were in Russian and

and only 31 were in Ukrainian. Finally, many eyewitnesses have confirmed that the language of instruction in most classes in the institutions of higher learning in Ukraine are in Russian. This trend is grossly disproportionate to the population make-up of the Ukr.SSR. While ethnic Ukrainians constitute the overwhelming majority of the republic, census figures show that Russians form only 21.1% of the population.

In addition, government data shows that over the past twenty years, the number of Russian language schools has doubled in the Ukr.SSR, while Ukrainian language schools have declined. According to the 1979 Soviet census, there were 27,500 secondary schools in Ukr.SSR. Of these, according to Mr. Lipatov, a representative of the Ukr.SSR to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD/C/SR 601, March 11, 1983), 17,000 schools are Ukrainian language schools (with mandatory Russian language) and 4,000 are Russian language schools where the Ukrainian language is also taught. The data presented by the government representative does not coincide with the 1979 census. What is the language of instruction in the other 6,000 schools in Ukraine? In 1983, the government representative asserted there were 213 schools providing instruction in languages of the national minorities. There,of course is no data providing a detailed background, by city, of the number of Ukrainian, Russian and other national minority language schools for 1984.

Although there are no published reports on the degree of instruction in Ukrainian at higher levels of education, it is evident that most higher edication in Ukraine is conducted in the Russian language. In 1962, Lviv University published a bibliography of the works of all academic personnel at the University from 1944-1960, listing titles of their theses and the language in which each was written. This source revealed that out of 365 theses, 312, or 85.2% were written in Russian and 53, or 14.5%, were in Ukrainian. A report for 1966 indicated that a total of 25 theses were presentad in the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr.SSR. All were in Russian.

Moreover, in order to be admitted into a higher education institution in Ukraine, students must first pass entrance examinations that are in Russian. This places students

attending a Ukrainian-language secondary school at a clear disadvantage. This is consistent with the USSR policy of Russification. In Byulletin Ministerstva Vyshchogo i Srednego Spetsialnogo Obrazovaniya, No. 2, 1979, p. 20, the director of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education implementing the Council of Ministers' decree, indicated that course work in higher educational institutions should be more often written in Russian.

There is clear evidence that the Russian language has a priveleged position in the social and cultural life of the Ukrainian SSR and that the government, in an effort to maintain this status, has begun educational reforms, making it obligatory to learn and use the Russian language in schools. One has only to read the secret document which has now been published in the West: RESOLUTION OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR, a 1983 CC CPU decision #268, "About organizing efforts for implementing in the Republic the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of May 26, 1983, #473."

The predominant use of the Russian language in Ukrainian institutions can be further demonstrated by the television broadcasting policy. The newspaper Komsomolets Zaporizhiya of August 12, 1983, reveals that 27 hours, 10 minutes of television programs were in Russian, while only 12 hours, 40 minutes were in Ukrainian. Data given in the newspaper Evening Kiev on 16 July 1983 showed that on July 17, 28 hours and 15 minutes of all programs were in Russian, while 12 hours and 40 minutes in Ukrainian. By checking the listings in the newspaper Radyanska Ukraina (published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine), on 20 February 1983, one finds that there are two "All-Union" programs broadcasting in the Russian language which are aired in Kiev, the capital and largest city of Ukraine. There is one program of the Ukrainian television broadcasting system. In total hours of broadcasting time on February 20th, there was a total of 27hours and 40 minutes of Russian language time and only 11 hours and 30 min. in Ukrainian. Again, this two to one ratio of programming, favoring the Russian language, is disproportionate; seventy percent of the population of Kiev is Ukrainian.

On the question of Ukrainian drama, there have been many candid statements made in the Ukrainian press. Some articles pointed out that for a population of some 50 millions, there were only three or four dramatists; some pointed out that the years 1976-9 had not produced a single play of any merit. The Ukrainian plays accounted for only a quarter of the republic's repertoire in 1978. The majority of the plays which had runs for over 100 performances were pre-revolutionary classics and according to articles in Literaturna Ykraina, much of the contemporary production was "trash." Other articles in this publication noted that the last tragedy to have appeared was O. Levada's Faust i Smert in 1960, that satire was no longer being produced, and that theatres were afraid of putting on comedies or political plays with any contemporary themes. Pondering the reasons for this deplorable state of affairs, one critic ingenuously suggested that it had something to do with the "timidity of some authors and theatres toward making use of the sharp weapon of satire and humor" because they were constantly glancing over their shoulder for fear that "someone would misunderstand them or take offence, or perhaps even recognize himself and take the laughter as directed at his institution or person."

Due to the lack of proper statistical information this data is by no means comprehensive. Nevertheless, it serves to clearly illustrate the powerful forces of the nexus of relationships between Moscow and Kiev, the merger of nations formula characteristic of the Soviet nationalities policy in the early 1960s coupled with the hardening of the official line toward the nationalities and the emergence of the "sovetskii narod" (Soviet people) concept, and their thrust to achieve the systematic annihilation of Ukrainian cultural consciousness. The driving force behind that policy remains Moscow's determination to attain the greatest possible degree of ideological, social, economic and cultural unity of its vast multinational population. Ukrainian national identity remains a serious impediment and its enduring dissent an acute immediate threat. One has only to read through the case studies of some forty currently persecuted Ukrainian poets, journalists, writers, artists and philologists, to see the extent to which the has commited its agencies to destroy the Ukrainians' will for self expression.

The last two decades have shown a rapid intensification of artistic obstinacy on the part of the fine artists in the Soviet Union. Unable to deal with the artificiality of Socialist Realism as the one and only accepted manner of creating art, artists set out to privately pursue their artistic interests, relinquishing all artistic duties to the state. Dispensing with the dictums imposed on them by the government, they began to deal with art for the sake of art, thus forfeiting official recognition within their own country. Consequently, within the last decade, the West has witnessed a gradual influx of Soviet nonconformist art which has made its way to Europe and the U.S. by means of various channels.

Ukrainian artists, because of their isolation from centers with Western contacts, have had minimal exposure in the West. Some have tried to emigrate, a few moved to Moscow or Leningrad, several artists have been imprisoned and those who completed their terms are barred from studio space as well as artists' supplies, and forced to work as manual laborers. Through the efforts of a small group of emigres, a catalogue of contemporary art from Ukraine appeared in 1980. Twenty artists are represented, most of them from Odessa, four of whom are now living in the West.

The Odessa Group formed a cohesive unit within the scope of contemporary Ukrainian art and in 1967 staged a spontaneous outdoor exhibition in front of the Odessa State Theatre of Opera and Ballet. The exhibition lasted only three hours before the militia disbanded it. This hardly known (long before the famous bulldozing of Russian dissident artists in Moscow, September 1974, when foreign correspondents were run down by Soviet officials), yet significant event, emphasized the strong distinction between official and unofficial art in Ukraine. Unable to display their works publicly, the artists were, nevertheless, compelled to communicate with a public. Thus began a series of apartment exhibitions in Odessa. Such efforts were not meant to be anti-official manifestations of protests. Their guiding force was an intense interest in professionalism and a need to communicate with others. These apartment exhibitions were a true reaction against the unhealthy official stance toward individual human expression. The uncompromizing attitude of the artists, however, forced them to work in solitude, without recog-

nition. In keeping with the individual apartment exhibitions, the Odessa artists issued two catalogues in 1976, the first included 74 works of almost all artists of the region, the second included 99 works of Liudmilla Yastrub's one-woman show.

The importance of these catalogues, as well as the apartment exhibitions, lies in the fact that they bear witness to the extremely well organized artistic ambiance in Odessa. Through these unofficial shows, the artists were able to capture the attention of buyers of unofficial art as well as some Soviet bureaucrats who found the work fascinating even though it does not exhalt the Soviet State.

In essence, what binds these artists is the fact that they not only consider themselves part of the Odessa Group, but they mainly identify themselves as Ukrainian artists. The climax to this important distinction came about in the winter of 1975, when four Ukrainian artists initiated a show in the apartment of a Moscow collector. The show itself brought much acclaim among the Soviet art lovers. They also saw that, to show in Moscow made it possible to make contact with the foreign diplomatic community which encourages and patronizes the arts. Such a recognition, although miniscule, played a significant role in the development of the Ukrainian group, who continue to have no other contacts with foreigners. In March 1976, another showing was held in the same apartment, this time the goup increased tremendously, to include the majority of the Odessa artists.

The Odessa artists have divested themselves of all political nuances of Soviet life, and directed their attention to the physical setting of the area where they live and work. It is noteworthy that the female form reoccurs prominently in the works of these artists. Excluding the universal treatment, many show a direct link with the totemic "stone woman" images. These "stone women" dotted the steppes of Ukraine and are plentiful as archeological finds in the museums of Odessa. Other links with tradition are evident in the formal associative value with ancient Rus' and Ukrainian icons. In the final analysis, contemporary art of Ukraine appears much more resolute and complex when one takes into account the restrictive and limiting circumstances in

which these artists are forced to work.

A few years ago an Amarican scholar wrote: "The role of Ukraine is fraught with imponderables and even risks - as it has been in the past - but it is also the embodiment of promise. Such a nation as the Ukraine has had to be both refractory and resilient in order to survive, and in surviving it makes possible the ultimate fulfillment of its hopes."

APPENDIX 2

L. Terlitsky, A.I.A. · Architects
36 West 82nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10023 212-757-2484

October 28, 1985

The Honorable Alfonse M. D'Amato, Chairman
Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
House of Representatives
House Annex 2
Room 237
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Senator D'Amato:

I would like to submit my testimony to the Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe hearings on suppression of artistic freedom in the Soviet Union and ask you to include it in the proceedings. You are familiar with the case of my family that has been denied permission to leave the Soviet Union since 1976, and I am very grateful for your support of their plight.

The hearings of your commission provide an opportunity to look at this matter from another perspective. I would like to cite specifically the case of my brother, Mark Terlitsky, an architect currently residing in Moscow, USSR.

First of all, I would like to mention that I was born in the USSR, graduated from Moscow Institute of Architecture in 1974 and left the Soviet Union in 1976 after practicing architecture in Moscow for two years. I came to the United States in 1977 and I am presently engaged in private practice in New York City. I am intimately familiar with all aspects of architectural practice in the Soviet Union. I have been in continuous contact with my brother by telephone and by mail, and I am fully informed of his situation.

I would like to point out that although the practice of architecture requires a great deal of technical knowledge, it is nevertheless a form of art, perhaps the most complex to produce and appreciate. Throughout history, architecture, at least in its best examples, has served the aesthetic needs of society by developing projects that, while built for specific utilitarian purposes, also created strong artistic images. This is how architects still see the ultimate goal of their profession. In fact, in addition to technical disciplines, architectural schools everywhere, including the Soviet Union, devote a substantial part of their curricula to the studies of art history, drawing, painting, scuplture, and aesthetics.

The practice of architecture in the USSR is, like everything else, controlled by the government, which maintains a network of large architectural offices under the aegis of the USSR Ministry of Construction, the Committee on Construction and Architecture of the USSR Council of Ministers, and their agencies in the 15 republics comprising the Soviet Union. Large municipalities, such as Moscow and Leningrad, have their own architectural offices that report to the local authorities and work on projects in those localties. Thus, the government puts itself between the client and the architect in every project built in the Soviet Union: it controls not only the distribution of commissions to the architectural offices and financing of the projects, but also their aesthetic aspects through a system of regulations

and government review boards. For example, after Leonid Brezhnev proclaimed at the Twentieth Communist Party Congress government's intentions to turn Moscow into "an exemplary communist city of tomorrow", the Moscow City Soviet issued a regulation that required all new buildings in the city to be white.

Since the government controls the construction industry in general, it also dictates planning decisions affecting social and artistic implications of design solutions. Although involved in an ambitious construction program, it severely limits a range of design options available to an architect. Almost 80% of all construction in the country is produced from prefabricated concrete building elements using stock designs. This policy encompasses all types of buildings, such as housing, schools, hospitals, shopping and recreational buildings etc., with the exception of very large public buildings and industrial facilities. Quite often such prefabricated buildings are put in place against the recommendations of architects, with utmost disregard for the environment, without any respect for local traditions and styles. The quality of these mass market prefabricated structures is generally poor; only facilities for high-level party officials are built using custom designs, reflecting the hierarchical structure of the Soviet society.

These conditions leave little opportunity for an architect to exercise artistic freedom. Perhaps 50% of all architectural graduates do not even enter the field, and the subsequent dropout rate is also high.

Since any information concerning water and electrical supply, telephone communications, and sewage disposal is classified, architects involved in projects in large cities must obtain security clearance from personnel departments in their offices. These departments are staffed, as a rule, by KGB officers, who enforce discipline in the offices and control promotions and hiring.

My brother, Mark Terlitksy, was born in 1937 in a Moscow suburb. Upon graduating from high school with honors, in 1954 he entered Moscow Institute of Architecture.

After graduation in 1960, he joined an urban design office "GIPROGOR" in Moscow, then a firm responsible for construction of shopping centers, "GIPROTORG". In 1966 became Director of Architecture for a research institute developing agricultural production facilities. In 1968 he joined "MOSPROJECT", a firm which designs about 95% of all projects in Moscow. He worked in a department responsible for large public and government projects in the city. As an assistant department manager he was in charge of several projects including a government office building and comprehensive renovation of the Kremlin. This project, completed in 1973, encompassed restoration of several ancient buildings and walls, improvements to public and service areas, design of permanent museum exhibits, decorative nighttime lighting of the Kremlin walls and towers and improvements to the reviewing stand on Red Square. Design materials for these projects were widely available, and did not contain any information that, if revealed, could harm the security of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, when in 1976 my brother and his family were denied an exit visa to Israel, the reason given to him by the authorities was "possession of secret information."

My brother's wife, Svetlana, lost her job as soon as they submitted their

application to emigrate. My brother was first demoted to junior draftsman and then, in March 1976, he was laid off -- in a clear violation of Soviet labor law that prohibits to lay off a head of a household if the household has no other source of income. He tried to bring a lawsuit against his employees, but the case never made it to the courts.

He tried to find employment in other architectural firms but no one would hire him. In a country where the right to work is written into the constitution, which boasts of 100% employment for its citizens, and which suffers from a shortage of qualified professionals, an architect with 16 years of experience, a person of the highest personal and professional integrity, has to work as a garage watchman to support his family.

My brother has been renewing his applications to leave the Soviet Union every six months invariably receiving a negative answer, the most recent rejection dating from last September. The reason for the refusals remained the same: "possession of secret information". Applied to an architect who did not work in his profession for 9 years, and never knew any "secrets" in the first place, it sounds totally ridiculous. Unable to practice architecture, he had a succession of odd jobs that never lasted very long, and when on a few occasions he was able to work on architectural projects, it was possible only because his friends were able to keep the fact of his participation from the authorities.

Architecture is different from many other art forms in that it requires constant actualization of its creations. While a writer doesn't need a publisher to write and an artist can paint without selling his works, an architect must build to remain a member of his profession. If an architect is barred from building for nine years, as has been the case with my brother, it may mean a professional and artistic death. I would like to stress that the Soviet authorities never had and do not now have any legitimate reason not to allow Mark Terlitsky to leave the Soviet Union, nor do they have any right to deny him artistic and professional expression.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that this testimony attempts to describe two levels of violation of artistic freedom in the USSR in application to architecture. On one hand, it details the way the government regiments and restricts the practice of architecture in general, and on the other it describes a specific case when an architect has been denied the right to work because of his desire to leave the Soviet Union.

Artistic freedom cannot be separated from human freedom. Only by recognizing that, will the Soviet government be able to give Soviet artists, musicians, dancers and architects an ability to express their true creative spirit.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Leonard Terlitsky, A.I.A.
LT:aoh

APPENDIX 3

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY COMMISSION COCHAIRMAN STENY H. HOYER, TO WITNESSES PARTICIPATING IN THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM HEARING, DECEMBER 11, 1985

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 16, 1986

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant the testimony of Mr. Walter Stoessel, before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, on December 11, 1985, questions for the record were submitted. Please find herewith the responses.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William L. Ball, III
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

Enclosure:
As stated

The Honorable
Steny Hoyer, Co-Chairman,
Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe,
House of Representatives.

THE HON. WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. Q: In your view, was the Hungarian Government's banning of the IHF Symposium from a public venue in keeping with its image in the West as a relatively liberal member of the Warsaw Pact?

A: The Hungarian Government's decision to prevent the International Helsinki Federation from conducting its symposium in a public space was indefensible. I made strong protests both in public and in private, as did other Western delegations. Hungary's action violated the undertakings it made to serve as host for the Cultural Forum. At the same time, the Federation's unique gathering of intellectuals from East and West took place in private -- an unlikely event in most other Warsaw Pact countries -- and representatives from other NGO's who came to Hungary in connection with the Forum were accorded correct treatment.

2. Q: In light of the experience with IHF and other difficulties encountered by NGOs during the opening week of the Forum, will the U.S. Government ever again give consensus to the holding of a CSCE meeting in an East Bloc country?

A: The U.S. does not consider the actions of the Hungarian Government toward the International Helsinki Federation to have set a precedent for CSCE, a point I emphasized in two plenary statements at the Forum. The legitimacy of NGO access to CSCE meetings and of NGO activities outside such meetings will remain an important component of U.S. policy. When venues for future CSCE meetings come to be negotiated, the NGO issue will continue to be one of our primary concerns.

3. Q: Considering the principles at stake at Budapest and the inherent draw of prominent cultural figures, how do you account for the scanty press coverage of the Forum? Were there active efforts to transmit material to the Vienna-based press during the middle weeks of the Forum? What plans does the State Department have to improve press coverage at Bern, Vienna, and future CSCE Meetings?

A: Much as we would prefer the contrary, the American media do not consider the CSCE process and the conduct of CSCE meetings to be a matter of daily interest to their audiences. Press coverage of CSCE in Europe has been much greater. Overcoming this fact is a constant challenge for those who take seriously the issues at stake. As detailed in my formal statement, I think we did a good job of attracting media interest in the Cultural Forum during an intense period of East-West relations outside the CSCE context. Interest was understandably greatest at the beginning and end of the Forum, but in between the delegation had frequent contact by telephone with correspondents who were not able to be present in Budapest. For the duration of the Forum, the delegation provided briefings at least twice a day to the correspondents from VOA, RFE/RL and assorted European media who were present. I think our experience at Budapest will help us to stimulate greater media coverage of future CSCE meetings, although there is no ready-made solution.

4. Q: According to reports from Agence France Presse, the week after the Forum concluded, Hungarian poet Sandor Lezsak was dismissed from his job for organizing an unofficial poetry gathering and exhibition of graphic art in the city of Lakitelek on October 22. The presentation, which was artistic, not political, in content, was conducted in an open manner. AFP said that Lezsak's recent dismissal may be an indication that the Hungarian Government is tightening controls now that the Cultural Forum -- and the international spotlight -- has left Hungary. Has the State Department taken any action on Lezsak's behalf?

A: The State Department also saw a report of Sandor Lezsak's dismissal and sought further details through the U.S. Embassy in Budapest. Mr. Lezsak has apparently been punished for organizing a poetry reading at the regional cultural center he directs that angered authorities for seeming to commemorate -- through photographs and perhaps thematic content -- the 1956 Revolution. Sanctions against artists whose creativity is not judged to be in the service of the state violate the letter and spirit of the Final Act and are just the kind of problem that Western delegations condemned in clear, strong terms during the Cultural Forum. The State Department has made these points to the Hungarian Government.

5. Q: The U.S. Delegation far outstripped the others at the Forum in illustratively citing victims of cultural repression by name. We note that most of the early U.S. intercessions, both official and by cultural figures, were broadly cast. However, the specific and detailed references to problems and individual cases increased significantly as the meeting progressed. How do you explain this apparent initial hesitation to raise cases and problems? To what do you ascribe the sluggish start?

A: From the beginning of the Forum, the U.S. delegation spoke frankly about the problems we believed the participating states had come to discuss -- barriers to cultural expression and cooperation. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies resisted substantive discussion of such issues -- hoping to deflect criticisms and focus the meeting on less controversial subjects. Our tactics in dealing with the problems of cultural creation, dissemination and cooperation became, therefore, more pointed as time went on and included an increase of specificity to buttress our case against unacceptable Eastern performance. Also, certain areas of cultural activity (such as literature and preservation of cultural heritage) better lent themselves than others to the citation of cases.

Meetings such as the Cultural Forum develop their own dynamic, to which participants contribute and respond. We made a special effort to prepare the successive groups of U.S. cultural figures before they arrived for the specific situation they would encounter, to enable them to participate as effectively as possible. This counseling itself became more effective as the meeting progressed.

6. Q: As you know, U.S.-based non-governmental organizations submitted extensive material to the U.S. Delegation pertinent to human rights concerns in the cultural field. How did the U.S. Delegation make use of this material?

A: The U.S. delegation drew heavily on the material prepared by non-governmental organizations in connection with the Forum, as we formulated our policy approach beforehand and in the preparation of statements for plenary and working group sessions during the conference itself. The delegation established a reading room of this material, which a number of interested Hungarians and other visitors used. When the Forum concluded we made arrangements to have the material distributed in Hungary to interested parties. In reporting last month on the results of the Cultural Forum to the NGO's, Assistant Secretary Ridgway acknowledged the usefulness of the material they submitted and requested a similar effort from those interested in the Bern Human Contacts Experts' Meeting.

7. Q: The Commission applauds the U.S. cultural figures for raising cultural human rights problems in Romania. The destruction of cultural and historical monuments and the persecution of Hungarian minority rights activists were appropiate topics for discussion at the Forum. We note, however, that in the official interventions given by you and Mr. Polansky, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland were identified as countries where cultural human rights problems exist, but Romania was not listed among them. How do you explain this discrepancy, particularly in light of Secretary Shultz's trip this week to Bucharest, where it was announced he will raise congressional human rights concerns?

A: No discrepancy was intended, since most of the problems we emphasized in the course of the Cultural Forum are generic to all of the Warsaw Pact countries to some degree or another. I think this point was well understood by the participants. The U.S. delegation publicly pointed out some of Romania's most egregious offenses and engaged the Romanian delegation privately in a series of bilateral meetings focused on our human rights concerns. We judged this mixture of public and private diplomacy to be the best way to proceed. A number of the proposals tabled by the U.S. and other Western delegations -- for instance, regarding respect for persons belonging to national minorities and the free distribution of religious materials -- were conceived with the human rights practices of Romania much in mind.

8. Q: Will the comprehensive Western document BCF. 116, together with OME. 47 from Ottawa, serve as a foundation for a unified NATO negotiating position going into Vienna?

A: The U.S. certainly expects that the agreed Western draft concluding documents from the Ottawa and Budapest meetings will be a starting point in formulating the West's position for Vienna. It is worth noting that the Budapest document owes a substantial portion of its content to the earlier Ottawa document, and that NATO preparations for Vienna will be similarly cumulative, especially since neither meeting reached East-West consensus on a final document. The NATO delegations at Ottawa and Budapest worked hard to produce the Western documents -- which embody values at the core of our societies and demonstrated our serious approach to the meetings and our desire to make progress on the problems under discussion. We have circulated both documents in the U.S. and are exploring with our Allies ways of publicizing them further.

9. Q: Were there serious differences among the NATO allies as to what the Western approach to the Forum should be? If so, were these resolved and how?

A: The NATO Allies were firmly agreed on the need to discuss the problems of cultural creation, dissemination and cooperation at the Forum, to make practical proposals for the resolution of these problems, and to accept a final document only if it dealt substantively with such discussion and problems. This agreement produced a thorough Western review of Eastern implementation, in which many of our neutral friends joined, as well as the Western draft concluding document referred to above. There were also occasional differences of view within the Alliance over the tactics and tone best suited for advancing our common objectives -- differences that were resolved as befits NATO through an unhibited exchange of views among the Alliance partners.

10. Q: The presence of so distinguished a group of cultural figures lent prestige to the U.S. Delegation. They served admirably and the Commission is grateful. Once again, we have evidence that non-governmental expertise can enhance the effectiveness of U.S. Delegations. Therefore, the Commission once again urges that public member experts be appointed to our Bern and Vienna delegations. Will the State Department take this proposal into serious consideration?

A: I concur in the positive evaluation of the contribution made by the cultural figures on the U.S. delegation and emphasized this point in my formal statement December 11 and more directly in a report I made to them on the outcome of the Forum. I have shared this judgment with my colleagues at the State Department and have been assured that participation by distinguished public members in future CSCE meetings is being fully considered.

11. Q: Do you see any implications, long-term or otherwise, flowing from the disagreement among the Warsaw Pact nations regarding Hungary's attempt to propose a concluding document at the last minute, and do you perceive this "rift" as a result of the CSCE process?

A: Romania's lone opposition to the Hungarian proposal for a short, factual final document should not be ascribed too much significance, either in terms of its impact on the Forum or on the broad relationship among the nations of the Warsaw Pact. The document as proposed was little more than an acknowledgement that the participating states agreed to disagree on the matters before them. I think the Romanian position is best understood in terms of bilateral relations between Romania and Hungary, quite apart from the CSCE context in which their interests on this one point diverged.

12. Q: At Ottawa and Budapest, the U.S. took the position that no document was better than a bad document. Yet, agreement at Budapest had been considered by the Neutral and many Western governments as more feasible to achieve than at Ottawa. The Human Contacts Meeting next Spring in Bern, where difficult issues such as emigration will be discussed, would appear to present even less of a chance for agreement. What does this portend for progress in CSCE as a whole?

A: The absence of documents at Ottawa and Budapest is not a true measure of success or failure. We were able -- as detailed in my prepared statement to the Commission -- to achieve several important, meaningful results. The vitality of the CSCE process depends more on compliance with existing commitments than on agreement to new pieces of paper. Several years from now, Ottawa and Budapest may perhaps be seen as having encouraged participating States to improve their respect for Helsinki Final Act commitments. What really matters is the ultimate impact of the CSCE process on individuals. We will have to assess future CSCE meetings similarly.

HELSINKI WATCH

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U.S. CITIZENS' COMMITTEE TO MONITOR THE HELSINKI ACCORDS
KOMITEE DER U.S.-BÜRGER ZUR EINHALTUNG DER HELSINKI VERTRÄGE
COMITATO DEI CITTADINI DEGLI S.U.A. PER IL CONTROLLO DEGLI ACCORDI HELSINKI
COMITÉ DES CITOYENS DES E.U. POUR LA SURVEILLANCE DES ACCORDS D'HELSINKI
COMITE DE CIUDADANOS DE LOS EE.UU. PRO VIGILANCIA DE LOS ACUERDOS DE HELSINKI
ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫЙ КОМИТЕТ С.Ш.А. ПО НАБЛЮДЕНИЮ ЗА ВЫПОЛНЕНИЕМ ХЕЛЬСИНКСКИХ СОГЛАШЕНИЙ

Robert L. Bernstein, Chairman
Orville H. Schell, Vice Chairman
Aryeh Neier, Vice Chairman
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December 17, 1985

The Honorable Steny H. Hoyer
Co-Chairman
Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe
237 House Office Building, Annex 2
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Hoyer:

In response to your letter of December 11, I have enclosed my answers to be submitted for the record. I found your questions both interesting and thoughtful.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your important contribution to the work of the Helsinki Commission. I look forward to working with you and the Commission in the future.

Sincerely,

Janet Fleischman
Assistant to the
Executive Director

Encl.

JANET FLEISCHMAN, HELSINKI WATCH

1. Q: The Hungarian authorities and the Eastern press wrongly characterized the IHF Symposium as a "Counter Forum". What was the real attitude of the IHF Cultural Symposium participants to the CSCE Cultural Forum?

A: The purpose of the International Helsinki Federation's Cultural Symposium was to complement and enhance the CSCE Cultural Forum. We had no intention of disrupting the official proceedings; indeed, our symposium was designed in accordance with the principles established at Helsinki and Madrid, i.e., that the Helsinki process is not only furthered by contacts between governments, but that it is also furthered by contacts between citizens of the participating states. The participants in the IHF's symposium hoped to draw attention to the official proceedings, and, if necessary, to the limits of official Hungarian tolerance.

2. Q: To what do you ascribe the Hungarian Government's decision to ban the Symposium from a public venue on the one hand, yet permit it to continue on private premises?

A: From what we have been able to ascertain, it appears that the Hungarian government was pressured by its Warsaw Pact allies -- particularly the governments of Czechoslovakia and Romania -- to prohibit the IHF from staging its independent symposium. These governments were highly disturbed at the prospect of Czechoslovak exile participating in our symposium, such as Pavel Kohout, Jiri Grusa and Frantisek Janouch, and of sensitive issues being discussed, such as the Hungarian minority in Romania. The fact that we were allowed to move the meetings to private apartments and go forward without further obstruction may be construed as the Hungarian authorities' tacit permission to hold our symposium, as well as the government's desire to limit the bad publicity that its initial actions had provoked.

3. Q: What is the position of Helsinki Watch on the outcome of the Cultural Forum? Was it a success, a failure? Would you see a value to future meetings of this sort?

A: Helsinki Watch and the International Helsinki Federation believe that the very existence of the Cultural Forum was a positive step in the Helsinki process. It is difficult to measure the success or failure of such a meeting, although the inability of the participating states to agree on a Concluding Document underlines the vast differences that exist between the participating states. Nevertheless, future meetings of this sort are extremely important, for they represent the only ongoing East-West forum in which cultural and human rights issues are discussed. In addition, the individual contacts that are made at such meetings are a significant contribution toward any future East-West understanding. As far as nongovernmental organizations are concerned, such meetings are essential because they enable us to organize independent activities around the Helsinki process, thus drawing attention to the human rights practices of the participating states.

4. Q: In your thoughtful and well-presented testimony, you observed that: "The outcome was, therefore, contradictory -- on one side, the Hungarian Government violated its commitments under the Helsinki Accords and the Madrid Concluding Document by denying U.S. permission to use the facilities we had reserved to hold our citizens cultural forum; on the other side, we were not prevented from going forward with our meetings and succeeded in injecting life and meaning into the Helsinki process. Without the existence of this only ongoing East-West forum, our independent symposium could never have taken place." I think this is eloquent testimony that speaks to the value of the CSCE process. In your opinion, was this a one time only effect of the CSCE process that could only have occurred in Hungary as opposed to other East bloc nations, or is it an indication of what we may reasonably expect to occur in the future? Also, would Helsinki Watch recommend that future CSCE meetings be held in any Warsaw Pact nations?

A: It is our hope that nongovernmental organizations will be able to hold public meetings at other Helsinki conferences, as we have done in the Western capitals of Madrid and Ottawa. Hungary, with its relative liberalism, was the obvious place to begin. Prospects in other Warsaw Pact nations are difficult to assess. I can assure you that the International Helsinki Federation will do its utmost to test those limits. Accordingly, we hope that the Helsinki signatory nations will support nongovernmental groups seeking to further the Helsinki process, and, when preparing for future intergovernmental meetings, will seek firm assurances that peaceful citizens meetings will be permitted to take place.

APPENDIX 4

OPENING PLENARY STATEMENT AT BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM, AMBASSADOR WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR., OCTOBER 15, 1985

Mr. Chairman. Distinguished fellow delegates, ladies and gentlemen.

On behalf of the U.S. delegation, I would like to join those who have spoken before me in expressing our appreciation to Dr. Hermann and his colleagues in the Executive Secretariat for the excellent facilities we will be working in and enjoying. I want to thank the Government of Hungary for hosting the Cultural Forum, a significant and unique undertaking in the CSCE process. I hope that, in the weeks ahead, we will have the opportunity to enjoy the distinctive national culture of Hungary and the many beauties of Budapest, a country and city which have experienced and participated in so much of our world's history.

Our task at hand is to engage in an examination of one of the nobelest activities of mankind: Culture in its many dimensions. In a very real sense, we are about to explore that aspect of the human experience which elevates us as a species and gives our daily lives a sense of beauty and proportion. Equally important, the issues on our agenda have a direct bearing on better mutual understanding among our peoples.

What we will be discussing here has an immediate relationship to a more peaceful, secure world. There are many ways to contribute to this goal. One way to contribute to better mutual understanding is through the free flow of information about our respective cultures. Without effective communications, it becomes difficult and more dangerous to deal with the increasingly complex problems confronting the world today. These problems call out for new, creative thinking, and we hope that our efforts here will contribute to improve communications and understanding. I can think of no challenge that has greater meaning and importance for the peoples we represent.

The United States is largely a nation of immigrants. Every country represented at this Forum has seen its sons and daughters emigrate to my country. As a consequence, the cultural life of the United States owes a great debt to every other country here, for so much of your culture has influenced our own. And whose culture has not been enriched by the many writers, composers, painters and artists from all parts of the European continent and North America? If we take only one of the newer forms of artistic expression, the art of film, for example, my country owes a debt of gratitude to such pioneers as George Cukor and Michael Curtiz, both of whom came from Hungary.

Although not alone in this regard, the United States has long served as a sanctuary for artistic talent and crucible for cultural creativity. We have welcomed those who, for reasons of persecution or repression of artistic expression, were compelled to leave their native countries. Some were fortunate enough to be able to return to their homelands to continue their creative work in freedom. Others remained in my country, enriching our cultural life. We hope that the legacy of what they have given to my country will one day also be shared freely and fully by their own countrymen. For their creative talents reflect the cultural heritage from whence they came.

The mandate that brings us here today and for the coming weeks resides in two documents: The Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document. Had the cultural provisions of the Final Act been better implemented, the Budapest Cultural Forum would not have to discuss the inter-related problems of creation, dissemination, and cooperation, including the expansion of contacts and exchanges.

But it is a tragic fact, as Secretary Shultz noted on the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, that Europe is a divided continent. The visible barriers that exist are, in fact, the tangible evidence of deeper divisions, divisions over what man can think and create. How else are we to understand such statements as "too many foreign plays are being performed on our stages," or "artistic creation outside of politics does not exist."

We take seriously the mandate of the Madrid Concluding Document, to discuss inter-related problems of creation, dissemination and cooperation. It is our desire that this discussion should be conducted in a balanced and constructive manner. Our goal is a positive one. We seek to lift the barriers to cultural creativity and cooperation. At the same time, we will not shirk our responsibility by failing to deal with the fundamental problems that affect the cultural issues we are here to explore. We believe it is essential to explore the impediments to creativity, dissemination, and cooperation.

Because we believe strongly in the innate right of an individual to express him or herself freely, including in artistic and cultural endeavors, we think it is important to search for ways to remove obstacles to self-expression. The same holds true for dissemination and cooperation. Moreover, we believe that all peoples and national minorities should have the unquestioned right and opportunity to pursue and develop their cultural heritage in all its dimensions, including the teaching of language as an integral part of self-expression.

How can one advocate the importance of cultural interchange for peace and better understanding, and at the same time deny the right of an artist to accept an invitation to exchange ideas and experiences with colleagues from other countries, or prevent his or her works from being published or performed? These are the questions, together with exploring ways to expand cooperation, that deserve our serious attention and efforts in the weeks ahead.

Let me say clearly that we want greater and more diverse exchanges and contacts at all levels between our peoples and countries. Toward this end, we will be submitting proposals aimed at lowering impediments to contacts and improving our ability to communicate more directly and effectively. If we can move in this direction, the value of our efforts here will be beyond doubt.

The mandate for the Forum also states that leading personalities in the field of culture will attend. In keeping with our belief that cultural creativity is inherently an individual endeavor, best left untouched by the hands of government, we have no Ministry of Culture. Therefore, our cultural representatives have no instructions. They will be expressing their own views and experiences on the questions under discussion. They may well disagree among themselves on how to approach particular issues. We think this is the natural order of things, including in the sphere of culture. We hope their efforts here will not be burdened with bureaucratic procedures, or drafting responsibilities. On the contrary, we hope they will grapple seriously with the problems confronting us, that they will find new, untried ways to think creatively about how we can solve them.

It is fortunate that some know each other already through visits and cultural missions; some are even close colleagues who have worked to promote the goals of the Helsinki Final Act. Others will be meeting for the first time, and we hope they will form direct, close friendships in a common cause. Seldom, if ever, have so many leading cultural figures come together to discuss mutual problems, experiences and ideas. That is the most unique and promising aspect of the Budapest Cultural Forum. Let us hope and work for an atmosphere in which our leading cultural personalities can do their share in seeking to lift the barriers to genuine, unfettered cultural creativity and cooperation.

We know from the Holy Scriptures of old and from a Soviet novel of our time that man does not live by bread alone. To surmount the travails of existence, we need inspiration that expands our intellect, that fires our imagination, that nourishes our soul. Distinguished colleagues, as we begin this Forum, let us pledge ourselves to a frank and substantive exploration of the issues our mandate has set before us. Let us together find the means by which we can remove obstacles to freedom of expression, direct cultural contacts, and uninhibited cultural development. We owe it to ourselves, we owe it to mankind.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

PLENARY STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR., OCTOBER 18, 1985

Mr. Chairman, during the opening plenary sessions of the Cultural Forum, all delegations expressed the hope of our nations and peoples for cultural interchange; cultural interchange which increasingly will serve as a bridge between peoples and nations; cultural interchange which will be an important factor in the building of peace and cooperation. Indeed, we believe that it is only under conditions in which freedom of cultural expression and of the human spirit flourish that true cooperation and, ultimately, peace, can be achieved.

Next week the distinguished individuals who personify the rich cultural diversity of Europe and North America begin meeting. They will be able to do so because the 35 participating states recognized at Madrid that such interaction would foster the mutual understanding essential to making the CSCE process work. Interaction between these cultural personalities is but a small step towards this goal. If we are sincere in stating that cultural contacts between our peoples are essential to mutual understanding, then we must apply this principle in practice to cover all persons, inside and outside this Forum.

The Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document both explicitly recognize the relevant and positive role that institutions, organizations, and persons, as well as governments, have to play in furthering cooperation and mutual understanding. The Final Act in addition calls for "encouraging direct contacts and communications among persons engaged in cultural activities." There are also the precedents of other meetings concerning the activities of these persons. I want to make clear that my government strongly supports these principles and precedents. I am pleased that a number of distinguished colleagues have expressed similar views concerning the role of institutions, organizations, and persons. I also wish to express my agreement with the viewpoint of the distinguished representative of Switzerland that persons who have engaged in direct contacts and communications should not be subject to any harmful consequences.

Mr. Chairman, in the discussions which begin next week, our cultural personalities will have the opportunity to conduct detailed discussions on the many issues, professional and philosophical, which are of concern to them. We trust that these discussions will cover the entire range of problems associated with cultural development. We trust also that the discussions will be conducted in a balanced way as agreed at the preparatory conference last year. That is, the three themes of creation, dissemination and cooperation should be given equal weight and attention in each working group. Further with regard to the conduct of the working groups, I wish to support the suggestions advanced by the distinguished representative of Sweden.

The Government of Hungary in its opening statement referred to the essential role cultural interchange and cooperation can play in creating an international climate conducive to the building of peace. A number of other delegations have also spoken, sometimes in pessimistic terms, about the threat of nuclear war. Clearly, we all share this concern. I do not, however, share the pessimism implicit in some of the statements we have heard. In recent months we have seen a substantial increase in direct contacts and in efforts to turn back the arms race. Serious arms control negotiations have resumed in Geneva where next month President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will also meet. We look forward to that meeting with both a realistic appreciation of the difficult problems which must be confronted and with a sense of hope.

The nuclear threat must not be used as an excuse for ignoring other serious problems, problems which deserve attention both in their own right and because their resolution could help develop the mutual understanding and confidence necessary to further the cause of peace. It is precisely because of the importance of freedom of expression in culture as a factor in building mutual understanding and confidence, that we of the Forum must examine and try to find remedies for the restrictions which exist on the right of individuals and peoples to develop and express their unique talents. The same applies to restrictions on the right of all persons freely to interact with others in the exchange of ideas.

The discussions which begin at the Forum next week should begin serious contemplation of ways to break down barriers to free cultural exchange, which all too often tend to become institutionalized. The United States delegation will, at a later date, have ideas to present aimed at reducing barriers to genuine cultural interaction between peoples. To cite only some examples, we would like to see steps taken to promote unhindered participation in bookfairs and direct contacts between individual cultural figures acting without state intervention. We support the establishment of cultural centers on the basis of reciprocity and of free access to them. Reciprocal exchanges of cultural television programs, an end to jamming of radio broadcasts, and the problem of censorship are also subjects worthy of consideration.

Removing barriers applies both to individuals and to groups. Both voluntary collections of individuals and nationality groups have the right to interact and to preserve and develop their unique identities. Mutual understanding, interaction, and cooperation between peoples applies within states as well as between states. Maintaining the language, cultural traditions, and monuments of national groups need not be seen as a threat to the culture and sense of identity of the state as a whole. In fact, as is the case in my own country, the preservation of a variety of cultures often serves to enrich the culture of a country as a whole. Some of our most interesting cities are those like New York, San Francisco and New Orleans, in which strong minority ethnic cultures flourish in all their diversity.

Mr. Chairman, as we move into Agenda Item III, let us hope that our distinguished cultural figures will shed national, political inhibitions and move into a fruitful, free-flowing discussion of the mandate. Let us hope their deliberations will demonstrate the great value of human creativity, and of ideas freely expressed and

freely shared. That is the essence of our mandate, which we should have the wisdom to fulfill.

I thank you for your attention.

PLENARY STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR., OCTOBER 25, 1985

Mr. Chairman, fellow delegates, during the past few days we have listened to presentations by leading cultural figures from our respective countries. Many constructive ideas and suggestions were advanced, some of them expressed in moving and inspired language. Alas, we have also listened to a great many statements which, in my view, were not always relevant to the issues and problems it is our duty to examine and discuss.

To speak frankly, several cultural personalities from the U.S. delegation have confessed disappointment and a sense of impatience because all to few of the speeches have dealt with the inter-related problems of cultural creation, dissemination, and cooperation in a balanced and specific way. Moreover, there has been an absence of lively, direct debate in the working groups because of the rigid format attached to the speaking order. If the Forum is to be a success we must see that a reasonable discussion of all three aspects of the Madrid mandate takes place in Budapest.

We should not have to spend our days listening to a litany of accomplishments intended to attest to how well some among us consider they have done their jobs. It is a delusion to think that a statistical analysis of every aspect of state-to-state cooperation absolves us of our responsibilities to address the very real problems that continue to impede or obstruct freedom of independent artistic expression. While state-to-state cultural relations are certainly an important part of cultural exchange, they have become so only because some governments insist on controlling every aspect of creative life. We feel strongly that individual exchange projects on the private level are also part of the CSCE mandate, and that they form the most solid foundation for genuine cultural cooperation.

There is no shortage of issues to command our attention. What can be more relevant than the crucial question of freedom of expression and its relationship to the creative process? It is the point from which all of our discussions must begin and it is an essential component of any examination of creation, dissemination and cooperation.

Government controls or restrictions on the creative process inevitably lead to a stifling of individual artistic achievement and, indeed, of that process itself. The ugly specter of government censorship is devastating to both the artist and his or her work. Governments which severely restrict freedom of expression call politically inconvenient artists and art forms "morally bankrupt, decadent or pornographic." In doing so, these governments demonstrate their opposition to the true creative process. They only create conditions under which cultural life is driven underground.

Creativity, so basic a part of the inherent dignity of the human person, cannot be suppressed by official decree. Ask a nonconformist artist taking part in an underground exhibition, or a playwright whose work appears in a Samizdat publication what he thinks of artistic freedom and official unions of artists and writers.

What a sad commentary on the state of freedom of expression in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia that great artists such as Dancer Rudolph Nuryeyev, Playwright Pavel Kohout, Theatre Director Yuri Lyubimov, and Sculptor Ernst Neizvestny are now living in the West and the reason is that they rejected or were rejected by a system which denied them the one thing crucial to artistic integrity: freedom of expression and the right to experiment and grow in one's profession. And how sad it was to hear a representative from Czechoslovakia report with pride a few days ago that young people in her country were "protected" by the state from the menace of contamination from the "decadent capitalistic music" of a rock concert.

How the Forum deals with the equally important question of freedom of movement must also command our urgent attention. What is the record here? On one level it is commendable that many fine state-to-state exchanges have taken place. But it is also disturbing that some governments represented here insist on laborously negotiated cultural agreements as a precondition for any cultural exchanges at all. Such agreements allow these governments to control whom they let out of their countries and whom they let in. Moreover, the practice in the Soviet Union of closing off large parts of its territory to foreigners, who include artists and cultural ensembles, is hardly consistent with cultural interchange and promoting better understanding.

In the opinion of my delegation, Mr. Chairman, our distinguished cultural personalities should be allowed in the coming weeks the widest possible latitude to discuss the removal of the barriers that inhibit cultural contact and development between and among countries. We should try to develop specific proposals which would address the problems of censorship, the free transmission of ideas, jamming, freedom to travel and to accept invitations, access to research facilities, free participation in international cultural events, and the establishment of cultural centers, to mention only a few ideas. Many here have spoken of the importance of exchanges among young people. We support this concept. I am convinced that, given the proper freedom to work, which must include travel and open contacts with other artists, young musicians, dancers, actors, and playwrights, make the very best ambassadors. They deserve our support and encouragement.

Fellow delegates, in my opening plenary statement I expressed the hope that our cultural personalities would find new, unexplored ways to advance the goals of the Helsinki process. We welcome the ideas and suggestions made this week. These, and other ideas I am confident will be made in the coming weeks, deserve our serious attention. In our view, we should examine them as a totality, not piecemeal, if we are to give coherence to our efforts. And these efforts must include the broader, more fundamental questions of cultural freedom many of us have been raising.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to close by restating the position of my government on the question of a final document. We do not oppose the adoption of a final document. On the contrary we, like many delegations to the Forum, favor a final document if it includes both serious commitments and concrete, practical projects which would truly advance us on the road to the removal of barriers and obstacles to free cultural expression and international cultural exchange. Less than that should not be acceptable to any of us. None of us should be willing to agree to a document consisting of hollow gestures and meaningless platitudes, and lacking balance among the three elements of our mandate. The opportunity to give real significance to the cultural dimension of the Helsinki Final Act is within the grasp of this distinguished body. Let us seize the moment and rise to the challenge that beckons us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PLENARY STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR., NOVEMBER 1, 1985

Mr. Chairman, fellow delegates, as we end our third week of debate the Forum reaches its halfway mark, and I would like to take a few minutes to assess our accomplishments and to look ahead to our work during the final weeks of our meeting.

In contrast to the preceding week the cultural personalities from the United States have noted some progress in the proceedings in the subsidiary working bodies. The discussion of issues became somewhat more flexible particularly in working group two and the resulting spontaneity of expression has made a positive contribution toward the work of the Forum. We appreciate the willingness of representatives to be flexible on procedure and I hope that the good example will be followed in the weeks ahead. Progress has been made on some important issues and my delegation is pleased that many constructive ideas and proposals have been debated. I am also pleased that significant problems such as the destruction of cultural and historical monuments, cultural repression, and the invaluable efforts of private citizens in some Western countries in the preservation of our cultural heritage have all been raised and discussed frankly and constructively.

During our discussions this week the medium of radio has also received attention. The use of radio as a powerful force in communications has long been recognized. Indeed it is so effective in crossing borders and lowering barriers to cross cultural communication that some governments, fearful of its impact, have resorted to the practice of jamming the airwaves. In our view, this is a waste and a sad commentary on the determination of such governments to shield their peoples from receiving a full range of information about world events and cultural developments.

Mr. Chairman, there is clear evidence that the practice of deliberate interference remains a serious problem. The World Administration Radio Conference [WARC] passed a resolution in 1984 establishing a worldwide monitoring process. The Soviet Union and all of the other members of the Warsaw Pact are signatories to that resolution. Yet, thousands of violations have occurred since the conference ended in January 1984. In the future we hope that all nations will respect the provisions of this important resolution.

Another problem, related to jamming, involves the refusal of some Eastern European nations to allow Western journalists and spokesmen access to their media.

Within the past week, however, there has been some modest progress in this area. The Soviet Union, for example, has agreed to publish an interview with President Reagan in the Soviet press.

We applaud this decision by the Soviet Government. We believe the cause of mutual understanding between our peoples can be significantly advanced by letting the Soviet people hear directly from our President. We hope this decision is a portent of an even greater opening up of the Soviet media in the months and years to come.

This week perhaps no topic has captured the imagination of speakers more than the question of the creative use of communications technology as a means of reducing existing barriers to cultural exchange. The potential for using technology to accomplish this worthwhile objective is highly exciting and distinctly possible. A member of our delegation referred to a project currently taking place at Columbia University in New York involving viewing of daily programming on Soviet television via satellite. The study will make a valuable and interesting contribution both to scholarship and international understanding. We think serious and objective projects of this nature ought to be encouraged and expanded. Particularly on a reciprocal basis. Rather than worry about what one of the distinguished delegates has referred to as the "Dictatorship of Technology." I submit that we should instead examine the myriad possibilities of the creative exploitation of communications technology. The forward march of science and technology will inevitably continue. Whether or not we are able to keep pace with the progress of technological development is perhaps the most awesome and important challenge which confronts us today.

Mr. Chairman, many exciting ideas and proposals have been tabled and discussed since our deliberations began. We are interested in many of them which we find both appealing and useful. In fact, one of the American cultural personalities on our delegation commented with satisfaction on how effective he found cross-cultural communication when individual artists used their own art form as a means of communication. Artists getting together with other artists are more than able to establish a highly effective channel of communication with one another. They do not need anyone, least of all a government, to tell them how to do it. I think we ought to take our cue from the many fine artists and performers who are members of our respective delegations. Cultural communication on an individual basis is a natural and logical development. Government should in fact encourage and support it, not organize, direct, or suppress it. Above all, artists who engage in independent creative activity, who produce and disseminate their work unofficially, who attempt on their private initiative to establish and maintain contacts with colleagues and audiences at home or abroad, should not be subjected to penalties by their governments.

Fellow delegates, let us allow individuals, and the organizations they may choose to join, to pursue freely their cultural interests and to maintain direct contact with each other, within and across borders. The U.S. delegation and several others are presenting a proposal today on this subject for your consideration.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

PLENARY STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR SOL POLANSKY, NOVEMBER 8, 1985

Mr. Chairman, fellow delegates, today I would like to return to the original themes that brought us to Budapest: The interrelated problems of cultural creation, dissemination, and cooperation. To speak of the creative process is surely to speak of freedom. For what is creativity without freedom? The right to create and share ideas is a basic human right. My country's position, Mr. Chairman, is that the Helsinki Final Act must benefit all citizens of all participating states. Not some of them, all of them. Not only the elite or those who enjoy official favor, all people. Without exception.

What then are we to do about chronic obstructions to free and open cultural exchange? How are we to react to the repression of cultural minorities? What should be our response to the destruction of architectural treasures and religious edifices? To the arrest and mistreatment of artists and writers who exercise their basic right to freedom of creativity and expression? We must insist that all the signatories to the Helsinki Agreement respect and implement their commitment to it. Can we do less?

Mr. Chairman, freedom of expression and cultural repression, problems which have been widely discussed at this Forum, were the subject of a recent hearing conducted by the CSCE Commission of the U.S. Congress in Washington. During the hearing exiled Soviet Writer Vassily Aksyonov recounted the story of the well-

known metropole affair. It offers a revealing insight into the limits to freedom of cultural expression in the Soviet Union. In the late 1970's a group of writers, including Vassily Aksyonov, independently created a literary almanac called "Metropole" without benefit of approval from the Writers' Union. The almanac was suppressed, its contributors vilified as anti-Semitic Jews, homosexuals and agents of Western subversive circles. Ultimately, two of the authors were expelled from the Writers' Union and Aksyonov was later stripped of his citizenship. And for what? In his own words, Aksyonov recounts. "A journalist once asked me how we managed to create such a tempest in a teapot. I could only say in truth that we had not intended to. Our intentions were limited: To open a few windows, to air out the musty house of Soviet literature, to give people a chance to breathe something other than 'socialist realism.'"

Sadly, in Poland too, some limitations on freedom of expression has deprived Polish readers of many excellent works by one of the greatest Polish writers, the Nobel Laureate Czeslaw Milosz. A Deputy Director of the Cultural Section of the Central Commission of the Polish United Workers Party reportedly suggested that there were already too many works of Milosz, who is not a party member and lives abroad, available to the Polish public. A good part of the work of Nobel Laureate, Jaroslav Seifert, one of the signatories of a September 1985 Charter 77 statement addressed to this Forum, has not been published in his native Czechoslovakia.

Many of our cultural personalities have raised fundamental yet troublesome questions to which we must seek answers if we are to discharge the duties entrusted to us under the CSCE mandate. Delegates from many countries, Sweden and Spain among others, inquired about what conditions governments must guarantee in order to assure that a writer is truly free to express his thoughts. In listing them, one of the speakers wryly noted that the mere presence of writers does not guarantee literature. Among the more important conditions governments must assure in order to fulfill their commitment to respect cultural rights are:

Freedom of speech, including the elimination of government censorship. Freedom to publish and to distribute their artistic works to the public. Freedom of movement, including the right to visit and maintain contact with colleagues and audiences at home and abroad. Protection of intellectual property by copyright laws that benefit the creators. Freedom to establish or join an independent writers association or union which is not a part of the official bureaucracy. Freedom from harassment and prosecution by government.

And I might add, Mr. Chairman, that the U.S. delegation is sponsoring several proposals for consideration here that would improve these conditions for citizens of all states who are signatories to the Helsinki Final Act.

No government should have the authority or power to determine what thoughts should be expressed, what books written or published, or what piece of music composed. Cultural exchange should recognize neither borders nor barriers to free expression. Further, no government should be allowed to suppress the cultural rights of minorities.

Borders and governments frequently change, but the soul of a people resides in its culture. We need only look to Polish culture for a splendid example of national culture which preserved, indeed flourished, in spite of the fact that there was no Polish state. Jewish culture offers another vivid demonstration of a people's consciousness which existed for centuries in the Jewish diaspora. Cultural identity exists in the realm of the spiritual and the ideal, and ideas cannot be divided and rearranged. The spirit of a people lies not in politics but in the kingdom of the mind.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation hopes that this Forum will be able to agree to a final document which has real substance and meaning for our peoples, and which addresses the crucial problems we have discussed during the past weeks. We support a final document which, inter alia, affirms the invaluable role of independent institutions, organizations and individuals in the Helsinki process. Such a document must recognize that they be given maximum encouragement and freedom without political interference or control. These important ideas are featured in the proposal (CFB. 35) alluded to earlier in this speech which is jointly sponsored by the United States, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

This week we heard of poets who died in labor camps, about works of high artistic merit which remain in desk drawers, of cultural figures who are not permitted to meet with their colleagues in other countries. Freedom of cultural expression and respect for artistic integrity are the bedrock upon which our three-fold mandate rests.

Mr. Chairman, we have all heard the cliche: art is truth. The pen is mightier than the sword. Yet, we have seen how courageous individuals, armed only with the force of ideas and a determined pen, have fought at great risk for their artistic integrity.

At another distinguished Forum last month a panel of writers offered eloquent comments on the nature of the creative process and of the problem of cultural repression. Timothy Garton Ash, author of a moving book on solidarity, put the crux of the problem in stark perspective by quoting Polish Poet Cyprian Norwid:

"Gigantic armies, valiant generals, trusted men and women of the police. And whom do they pursue? Just a few ideas; nothing new."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PLENARY STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR., NOVEMBER 15, 1985

Mr. Chairman, fellow delegates, as the discussions of the subsidiary working bodies draw to a close, I would like, on behalf of the American delegation, to express my thanks to the cultural personalities who have contributed to the deliberations at this Forum. Many thoughtful ideas and suggestions have been advanced, and I am pleased, in particular, to acknowledge my appreciation for the presentation by the Representative of the Holy See.

Mr. Chairman, to do justice to the efforts of the cultural personalities, I believe we must focus sharply and critically on the basic theme of this meeting: The interrelated problems of creation, dissemination and cooperation. I believe that means we must discuss the key issues of cultural expression, the creative process, freedom of movement, the elimination of barriers and obstacles to free and open cultural exchange, and the rights of minorities.

As the extensive discussions this past week in the working groups have shown, the fabric of a culture is woven from the threads of tradition, language and common historical experience. Existing restrictions on the exercise of religion, impediments to close contact with cultural homelands or communities abroad, inadequate opportunities for education in minority languages and history, efforts to force assimilation of peoples into the dominant society—all are problems confronting cultures in a number of participating states today.

Culture belongs to our peoples, it is not the property of governments. The blossoming of independent culture in Poland today is a lasting legacy of solidarity. The sustained and increasing interest of Soviet Jews in their culture, despite all obstacles, is another example of the importance peoples attach to their national and ethnic identities. Suffering should not be the price which is paid all too often by Balts, Ukrainians and others, that governments exact from citizens who attempt merely to know and act upon their cultural and other human rights.

These, Mr. Chairman, are only a few of the issues which confront us. Further, we must recognize and acknowledge the positive role that independent institutions, organizations, and individuals play in cultural development and in the protection and transmission of cultural heritage in their own states and internationally.

Many speakers have identified by name individuals who have suffered and continue to suffer in a number of Eastern bloc countries because fundamental human rights are ignored or not respected. The mandate of this conference is very clear in that regard and our representatives, as well as those from many other countries, have worked to remove these barriers and obstacles. It cannot be said often enough that true cultural cooperation is impossible to achieve until restrictions and abuses of human rights and freedom of expression have been eradicated.

From the tender and substance of the discussions we have heard during the past few weeks, it is clear that some in this Forum oppose this view and have asserted—too often in a confrontational and polemical manner—that efforts to document our concerns with specifics are somehow political and inappropriate to raise at this conference. Quite the contrary is true. The problems which we and some other delegations have raised and discussed are indeed real problems which relate to culture in the most profound sense. We cannot pass over them in silence, for to do so would give a false impression of the true state of cultural harmony and cooperation between East and West. Our mandate clearly requires us to discuss these problems and the work of this Forum will be unfinished if we avoid a full and open discussion of them.

To reiterate, as we begin the intensive work of reviewing and discussing the contributions of the subsidiary working bodies and the many proposals before us, we must not lose sight of our mandate: To address the problems of creation, dissemination and cooperation. The many proposals before us should be evaluated on the basis of how effectively they contribute to resolving these problems. And, as we work through the proposals, our efforts should be guided by the desire to produce a final document which will represent a balanced treatment of each of the areas of our mandate. If we are successful in accomplishing this objective, we will be able to

point with pride to the fact that our work has substantially advanced the Helsinki process and international understanding.

Mr. Chairman, fellow delegates, permit me a final word. In just a few days the leaders of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will meet in Geneva. No one can predict the outcome of that important meeting, but there is a sense of hope and anticipation in the air. I am confident that all of us here today ardently wish that these hopes and expectations will be fulfilled. In our work in this Forum, may we also be guided by this same sense of hope and anticipation of positive results in our own endeavors.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PLENARY STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR., NOVEMBER 22, 1985

Mr. Chairman, fellow delegates, today I would like to make a very brief statement concerning the role of nongovernmental organizations and private individuals at the Cultural Forum.

During the first few days of our stay in Budapest, the controversy over the legitimate role of nongovernmental organizations cast a shadow over our work virtually before it began. While we regretted that development, we noted, nonetheless, that independent cultural events were able to take place. At the same time, Mr. Chairman, I wish to make clear once again that we do not consider this outcome a precedent for future CSCE meetings.

The Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document both explicitly recognize the relevant and positive contribution that institutions, organizations, and persons, as well as governments, have to play in furthering cooperation and mutual understanding. The Final Act, in addition, calls for "encouraging direct contacts and communications among persons engaged in cultural activities." There are also other precedents, including Madrid, concerning the activities of these persons and organizations. I am pleased that a number of distinguished colleagues expressed similar views concerning the role of these organizations, institutions, and persons.

Mr. Chairman, our reason for coming to Budapest, to examine the interrelated problems of cultural creation, dissemination, and cooperation, was clear and precise. I am persuaded that what we have done here has helped to promote improved understanding and to lower barriers which inhibit cross cultural communication. We believe that more diverse exchanges and contacts are possible between our peoples and our countries. The role of private organizations and individual initiatives remains a promising area to pursue. I trust that we can find ways to explore these and other opportunities which are emerging.

Mr. Chairman, after the Geneva summit, President Reagan spoke of a "fresh start." As we conclude our work here in Budapest, let us, in his words, seek to find "openness, honest communications, and opportunities for our peoples to get to know one another directly."

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

PLENARY STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR., NOVEMBER 25, 1985

Mr. Chairman, fellow delegates, as the work of the Cultural Forum draws to a close, I wish to add, on behalf of my delegation, my word of thanks to the Government of Hungary and the Executive Secretariat for the excellent organization and support provided to all of us during our stay in Budapest. I would like to add a special word of appreciation to the translators, who have worked with exemplary patience, dedication and efficiency to support our endeavors in every way. Without them, quite literally, there could have been no communication whatsoever, and I am sure that I speak for all when I extend to the entire translating staff our sincere thanks for a job well done.

Mr. Chairman, in spite of the fact that we leave Budapest without a final document, the Forum, to its credit, has made an important contribution. That it has taken place at all is in itself a significant development. Many valuable contacts have been made and a host of ideas have been discussed. This, Mr. Chairman, is all to the good. Some of the problems we sought to discuss proved more intractable than others. Nonetheless, in the end it was possible to have a frank and open debate on many issues, even if the dialogue was not as productive as some had hoped. In my view, the impetus for a wider and more open discussion of our mandate came in large measure from our cultural personalities, and I am pleased to give them credit for a substantial contribution to the work of the Forum.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation had hoped that we could reach agreement on a final document, and we worked conscientiously until the very end to produce one. When it became clear that this would not be possible, the Western group submitted its draft proposal, which represents the full scope of the Western position on the interrelated problems of creation, dissemination and cooperation. It highlights our conviction that human rights and fundamental values relating to freedom of creation, expression and association are prerequisites to true cultural cooperation. The fact that this approach was not accepted serves to underline the basic disagreements which still exist between different systems and ideologies. Nevertheless, we believe that the discussions which have taken place here and the negotiations which have been conducted should contribute to an evolution favoring greater progress in the future in the direction of overcoming the impediments and obstacles which exist today in the area of culture.

I would be less than frank if I did not say that the extremely polemical remarks made at the Soviet press conference earlier today were not in keeping with the general tone of the discussions and negotiations during this Forum. This type of rhetoric is outmoded and certainly not in keeping with the atmosphere established at the recent summit meeting in Geneva between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. For my own part, I do not choose to engage in polemics on this occasion or to point the finger of blame at anyone for the lack of success in achieving a substantive final document at this conference. The United States tried its best to obtain such an outcome and regrets that basic differences made this impossible. Let us accept this as reality and turn our thoughts toward the future and the many possibilities which exist to promote true cultural development between all of the participating states.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I would like to associate myself with the thoughts expressed by the distinguished representative from the Federal Republic of Germany because I too believe that what has taken place in Budapest can have a constructive impact on the CSCE process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Press Release of Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., October 15, 1985

We deplore the decision of the Government of Hungary to forbid the planned October 15 meeting of the International Helsinki Federation. The Federation is an organization composed of private individuals who are citizens of a number of the participating states in the Budapest Forum.

This decision is a violation of Hungary's commitment made at the Madrid CSCE Review Conference to allow the same full range of activities for nongovernmental organizations in Budapest. This issue has been under discussion for several weeks between United States and Hungarian officials, and therefore, we are surprised by the decision.

I made an immediate official protest of this action to the Hungarian Government.

The Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document have recognized the relevant and positive role that persons, institutions and organizations play in the Helsinki process.

This Hungarian decision, consequently, harms the spirit of the Budapest Cultural Forum and is not conducive to furthering the aim of the CSCE process.

Statement Made by Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., at Raoul Wallenberg Wreath-Laying, November 23, 1985

We commemorate today the achievement of a remarkable man. Raoul Wallenberg was born in Sweden, carried out his noble work here in Hungary and became an honorary American citizen, but he belongs to all mankind.

This decent man, this "righteous gentile," rescued from catastrophe those belonging to a faith not his own. As Jews were borne away to annihilation in Auschwitz, Wallenberg established his safe-houses and protective passports, recruited a staff of 400 persons in various parts of Budapest, and worked tirelessly day and night to save those marked for death.

His humanity knew no bounds, for he saw these persecuted people, these fellow human beings, as his own. We can never know how many he did in fact save, for they number in the tens of thousands. But in those dark days of 1944, this courageous man, at the age of 32, accomplished more in the space of a few months than most do in a lifetime.

Today, with this wreath, we honor a man of uncommon valor, a man whom Elie Wiesel has called "a flame." And indeed, that flame still burns as Raoul Wallenberg continues to illuminate our lives.

APPENDIX 5

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF BELGIUM, CANADA, DENMARK, FRANCE, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, GREECE, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, TURKEY, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

REPORT OF THE CULTURAL FORUM OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

1. In accordance with

- the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

- the relevant provisions of the Madrid Meeting

- the report of the meeting of experts which took place in Budapest from 21 November to 4 December 1984,

the Cultural Forum took place in Budapest, Hungary, from 15 October to 25 November 1985. It was attended by leading personalities in the field of culture from the participating States.

2. After the formal opening of the Cultural Forum, participants were addressed by Mr. György Lázár, Prime Minister, on behalf of the Government of Hungary.

3. Under agenda item 2 of the Forum, opening statements were made in open plenary meetings by representatives of the participating States. The views of UNESCO were presented by a representative of that Organization.

4. Under agenda item 3 of the Forum, and in accordance with the mandate for the Forum, participants discussed, both in plenary and in subsidiary working bodies, interrelated problems concerning creation, dissemination and co-operation, including the promotion and expansion of contacts and exchanges in the different fields of culture.

5. The discussion of the above-mentioned interrelated problems was conducted in the context of the following fields:

- Plastic and Applied Arts

  painting, graphic and photographic arts, sculpture, design, architecture, preservation of cultural and historical monuments;

- Performing Arts

  theatre, dance, folklore, music, film, cultural programmes on radio and television;

- Literature

literature, publishing and translation, including reference to less widely spoken languages of the participating States;

- Mutual Cultural Knowledge

research, training and education in the arts, libraries, cultural heritage, preservation of and respect for the diversity and originality of the cultures of the participating States, museums, exhibitions.

6. The discussion covered a wide range of subjects in the cultural field. It also reflected the unique character of the Cultural Forum itself within the framework of the CSCE process and the vitality, strength and diversity of the various cultures of the participating States. The participants endeavoured to contribute to the discussion with a view to promoting further creation, dissemination and co-operation in the fields of culture. During the discussion different and, at times, contradictory opinions were expressed not only on matters of substance but also on the procedure of the meeting.

7. A large number of proposals were presented under agenda item 3 both in the plenary and in the appropriate subsidiary working bodies.

8. As a result of its proceedings the Cultural Forum concluded the following:

- In the course of its history, Europe has developed a cultural identity of its own which is also part of the North American heritage. This identity is reflected in a basic unity of cultural values which has survived and had proved its cohesion and resilience despite present political and ideological divisions.

- Since the signing of the Final Act, cultural exchanges and co-operation have proved to be a stabilizing factor in relations between States participating in the CSCE. They contribute to a better understanding between individuals and among peoples and thus help to promote conditions conducive to the building of confidence and the development of normal and friendly relations.

- International co-operation in the different fields of culture since the signing of the Final Act of the CSCE has been greater in some areas than in others. The present conditions for cultural creation and dissemination as well as for international exchanges and co-operation in the different fields of culture still require improvement in many respects.

- Such improvements should be sought and achieved by taking active steps to allow the full and unimpeded development of artistic creativity and the recognition of the role of individual artists and the integrity of their creation. They should also be sought and achieved by the unimpeded dissemination of cultural works through facilitating and supporting discussion and co-operation among individuals, groups and private organizations in the different fields of culture; through providing equitable opportunities for wider communication, more direct contacts and travel for personal as well as professional reasons. Similarly, improvements should be made at governmental and non-governmental level, bilaterally and multilaterally, through agreements between Governments and non-governmental organizations and international programmes, as part of a general expansion of cultural co-operation.

- This goal can, however, be reached only by respect for all the principles and by full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Act and the Concluding Document of the Madrid Follow-Up Meeting. It was stressed that there was a critical need to make immediate, tangible and balanced progress in such implementation, particularly with regard to creation, dissemination and co-operation in the different fields of culture. The participants in the Forum urged all participating States to observe the spirit and the letter of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document in this respect.

- It is furthermore emphasized that full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including cultural rights and freedoms, and including those of persons belonging to national minorities and regional cultures, by all States represents one of the basic principles for a significant improvement in their mutual relations, and in international cultural co-operation at all levels.

9. The participants in the Forum discussed, inter alia, the following specific problems relating to its mandate:

- The denial of opportunities in some participating States for individuals in the different fields of culture to form independent institutions and organizations and to play, as individuals or as members of these independent bodies, a full and unhindered part in the cultural activity of their own States and internationally;

- Limitations on access to and the use of information, publications and materials relating to culture;

- Restrictions on access to the cultural achievements of other participating States, e.g. through cultural institutes;

- The denial to persons belonging to national minorities and regional cultures of adequate protection, legal or otherwise, for the full development of their culture; and

- The need to support the efforts of individuals to reflect and promote the unity of European culture, which transcends the division of Europe.

10. The participants in the Cultural Forum urge the participating States to:

- Remove existing impediments which prevent individuals from forming or joining independent institutions and organizations in order to pursue and promote, as individuals or as members of these independent bodies, their interests in the different fields of culture, including the protection and promotion of cultural freedom and the respect shown by governments, including their own, for that cultural freedom;

- Ensure unimpeded communication, direct contact, and co-operation, such as the holding of meetings and exhibitions by private persons, institutions and organizations active in the field of culture;

- Facilitate for humanitarian reasons the provision of the fullest information to artists and others in the field of culture, who have attempted, without success, to contact their colleagues in another participating State;

- Remove legal and administrative measures, such as censorship, which constitute barriers to creation and dissemination in the different fields of culture;

- Remove, while respecting intellectual property rights, restrictions on obtaining, possessing, reproducing, publishing and distributing materials related to the different fields of culture, including books, publications, films and videotapes, as well as on the private ownership and use of and access to typewriters, word processors and copying machines;

- Ensure unimpeded access of individual believers and communities of believers to religious publications and related materials;

- Ensure unimpeded access to public archives, libraries, research institutes and similar bodies for scholars, teachers, students and others who wish to undertake research;

- Permit unimpeded reception of broadcasts and place no restrictions on the right of individuals to choose freely their sources of broadcast information and culture;

- Abstain from placing undue obstacles to access to direct broadcasting satellites transmitting radio and television programmes, including those of a cultural nature, and allow individuals and groups to acquire the necessary equipment;

- Ensure that individuals engaged in the different fields of culture are free to travel abroad, and, in particular, that those invited officially or privately to travel to other participating States have the opportunity to do so;

- Make it possible, on the basis of bilateral arrangements, for each participating State to establish cultural institutes on the territory of the other participating States and to guarantee unhindered public access to them; and

- Protect the unique identity of national minorities and foster the free exercise of cultural rights by persons belonging to them; ensure in practice unhindered opportunities for these persons independently to maintain and develop their own culture in all its aspects, including religion, cultural monuments, historical artefacts, language, literature; and to ensure unhindered opportunities for them to give and receive, individually or collectively, instruction in their own culture, especially through the parental transmission of language, religion and cultural identity to their children.

11. Therefore, the participants in the Cultural Forum recommend that the participating States encourage, facilitate and support the initiatives which official institutes, non-governmental organizations and individuals wish to undertake to promote the aims of the CSCE in the field of culture, e.g. meetings, symposia, exhibitions, festivals, research, training and co-production programmes in which scholars, specialists and artists of the participating States may freely participate and to which they may freely contribute, in order to realize progressively the objective of promoting knowledge and culture which transcend geographic boundaries.

12. In particular, the participants in the Cultural Forum recommend that the participating States:

- Facilitate the participation in international drama festivals of individuals, productions or companies chosen by the organizers and not replace them by any other individuals, productions or companies without prior consultation;

- Encourage invitations to conductors and individual performers from other participating States to perform with orchestras and choirs in their own States;

- Promote the exchange of members of art and music academies as well as of teachers and students of drama and dance schools;

- Take into account the important role that exchanges of teachers, students and material play in the education of young film makers, particularly through festivals and prizes;

- Remove barriers to participation in film festivals, including restrictions on public access to such festivals and censorship and control on what films may be shown;

- Might consider the possibility of a meeting of writers on the subject of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity in Today's World"; a symposium on the subject of "The Impact of the Discovery of America on European Culture"; and a meeting of historians and cultural figures on "Transmission of Culture Through Emigration";

- Remove barriers to unimpeded participation in book fairs, displays and exhibits by prospective displayers; restrictions on public access to such book fairs, displays and exhibits; and censorship and control on what books or publications may be displayed;

- Consider the aesthetic aspects of the environment in the preservation, reshaping and building of cities;

- Might identify historic towns and cities for conservation and restoration projects in which other participating States might join;

- Might consider the possibility of establishing an international folklore centre of States participating in the CSCE which would be responsible for the collection, systematization and publication of the folk heritage of the participating States for educational purposes;

- Explore the possibility of computerization and dissemination in standard form of bibliographies and of catalogues of cultural works and presentations, such as musical scores, contemporary public sculpture, films, videotapes, documentary programes shown on television, plays and the performances of artists and ensembles;

- Encourage the translation of research and literature, with special attention to bilingual editions as well as to the translation, publication and dissemination of literary works published in the less widely-spoken languages in the participating States;

- Might consider proclaiming a city in a participating State "Capital of European Cultural Heritage" for one year. In the course of that year, the participating State in question would endeavour to make a special contribution to European culture in all its forms by organizing events and taking other initiatives in the city in question, including works by groups of artists. All other participating States would be invited to take part;

- Facilitate the holding of exhibitions which have a special reference to present everyday life;

- Encourage co-operation in protecting and preserving film material;

- Encourage the acquisition, co-production and regular exchange of television and radio cultural programmes;

- Encourage the appropriate national and international non-governmental organizations to work out a general framework regarding cultural exchanges such as exhibitions, guest performances, etc., including general and administrative guidelines, the possible simplification of customs and other procedures, and ways of facilitating payment of fees to individuals and organizations where direct payments are rendered difficult by currency restrictions or economic constraints;

- Might consider the possibility of establishing a cultural foundation of States participating in the CSCE, which would aim at improving the conditions and opportunities of artistic creation; facilitating the dissemination of culture within and among States participating in the CSCE: and promoting cultural exchanges and co-operation among them.

13. The participants also considered a wide range of other proposals, not all of which have been reflected in this Report.

14. The participants expressed their appreciation of the effort which went into the preparation of these proposals, all of which will be recorded as they were submitted, annexed to this report, and sent forward for consideration in any further discussion of cultural questions within the framework of the CSCE.

15. The results of the Cultural Forum in Budapest will be taken into account, as appropriate, by the participating States at the next Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, scheduled for November 1986.

16. The participants expressed their gratitude to the Government of Hungary for the excellent organization of the Cultural Forum and for the warm hospitality extended to them during their stay in Budapest.

Budapest, 25 November 1985

APPENDIX 6

U.S. Cultural Personalities
Budapest Cultural Forum

Edward Albee	Playwright
Peter Blake	Architect
Daniel Boorstin	Historian
Trisha Brown	Dancer
Paul Caponigro	Photographer
Nancy Coolidge	Preservationist
Frank Conroy	Professor
William Ferris	Historian
Sam Gilliam	Painter
Nathan Glazer	Sociologist
Leo Gruliow	Author
Bess Hawes	Folklorist
Eugene Istomin	Pianist
David O. Ives	TV Executive
Allen Kassof	Professor
William Least Heat Moon	Author
Jack Masey	Designer
Jaroslav Pelikan	Professor
Susan Phillips	Museum Expert
Rudy Pozzatti	Printmaker
Ellendea Proffer	Publisher
Arthur Pulos	Designer
Cliff Robertson	Actor
William Jay Smith	Author
Billy Taylor	Musician