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COOPERATION IN EUROPE

UNITED STATES CONGRESS

PHASE III AND IV

(Including Speeches during PHASE IV)

OF THE

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IN EUROPE

MAY 5—JULY 31, 1987

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Phases III and IV
of the
Vienna Review Meeting of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe

May 5—July 31

and

September 22—December 18, 1987

The main activity of the Vienna Meeting throughout Phases III and IV was the presentation and negotiation of proposals for inclusion in the concluding document of the meeting. The number (over 160), complexity and controversial nature of many of these proposals led to the extension of the Vienna Meeting well beyond its target closing date of July 31. These factors, along with other elements such as continuing major shortcomings in the implementation of existing commitments, are largely responsible for the continuation of the Vienna Meeting into 1988.

PHASE III

The slow pace of progress already evident in Phase II continued through the next phase. Each side defended its own proposals but showed little disposition to begin the process of compromise which could lead to the conclusion of the meeting. The main procedural development during this phase was the appointment of coordinators from the neutral and non-aligned states to guide the work of the drafting groups. This development provided greater order and structure for the proceedings but did little to advance the drafting work or to induce compromises.

Other major developments during this phase were the introduction of the long-awaited Western proposal on military security and the tabling of a comprehensive compromise proposed in Basket III by two neutral delegations, Austria and Switzerland. Both proposals were put forth at the very end of the phase and thus did not have much impact until the next phase.

The Western (NATO) proposal on military security questions was designed as a response to the Eastern proposal which envisioned two main objectives: another round of negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to build upon the successful Stockholm meeting and the initiation of negotiations on conventional disarmament, both within the same CSCE forum. The Western response to this proposal was delayed primarily because of United States and French differences over the connection between the conventional arms negotiations and the CSCE process, the

French arguing that the negotiations should be an integral part of the process and the U.S. insisting that they be independent. The issue was resolved by agreement that the negotiations would be "within the framework of the CSCE," but should remain autonomous.

An Austro-Swiss compromise on Basket III—human contacts and humanitarian matters came as a surprise initiative to other delegations and was circulated on the next to last day of the third round. The comprehensive draft proposal of the two neutral countries contained 56 paragraphs covering virtually every subject under discussion in this drafting group. The paper contained many points favorable to the Western point of view, which was to be expected since these neutral countries shared most of these views. At the same time, the draft also contained points which would be difficult for the West to accept. All in all, however, the Austro-Swiss initiative represented a step forward in that it concentrated the attention of all the participants on a single set of proposals.

PHASE IV

The last phase of the Vienna Meeting in 1987 (September 22-December 18) continued the slow progress of the preceding phases but came far from producing a final result. The greatest drafting progress registered by the end of the phase was in the area of military security where the Soviets, anxious to advance this priority area, agreed to a number of Western proposals. Nevertheless, several major differences remained to be resolved including the inclusion or exclusions of tactical nuclear weapons in the conventional arms negotiations and the exact relationship of the conventional negotiations to the CSCE process. High-level political decisions will be required to resolve the issues, and it is expected that these could come at any time.

In the human rights area, on the other hand, progress was much slower. The Soviet Union and its allies, somewhat surprisingly, agreed to take the comprehensive Austro-Swiss proposal as a "point of departure" in the drafting negotiations in Basket III. At the same time, the East deployed a strategy to undermine the Austro-Swiss effort by introducing over 200 amendments to the neutral paper. The West, in an attempt to maintain the integrity of the paper, offered only a handful of suggestions. Romania exceeded even the Soviet Union in its objections to the proposal. A second part of the Eastern strategy which surfaced toward the end of the phase was to persuade the neutral coordinator to introduce a comprehensive paper of his own which the East hoped would be more to its liking. At the same time, the Eastern countries hinted that a proposal with the coordinator's imprimatur would find more acceptance in their capitals. With only three paragraphs out of a total of 56 in the Austro-Swiss proposal having received provisional agreement by the end of the phase, the Swedish coordinator did decide to present a comprehensive proposal of his own at the end. Although this proposal took into account the preceding discussions on all the points at issue, it hewed closely to the Austro-Swiss draft in virtually all important points including freedom of travel and a reduction to a minimum of exceptions to this freedom.

In the Principles drafting group, the Eastern countries appeared somewhat less intransigent than in Basket III, possibly because the commitments being discussed were less specific. Nevertheless, on many critical questions such as freedom of travel, freedom of religion, Helsinki monitors and rights of minorities, they continued to show little flexibility. Unlike Basket III, the Principles group did not have a common text to consider. Instead, the discussions focused on the various proposals put forward by the different sides. At the end of the phase, however, the Austrian coordinator put forward a comprehensive paper recapitulating the areas of agreement and the areas still in dispute. The latter were much more numerous than the former although there was considerable progress in some sections such as terrorism and persons in confinement. Finally, while there was no actual drafting progress on the major Western proposal for an ongoing mechanism for the resolution of human rights problems including a meeting and a conference to assess the results of the mechanism. While the Soviets appeared to accept the idea of a mechanism in principle, their version of the mandate for the mechanism was woefully inadequate. Furthermore, the Soviets seemed also to insist that their acceptance of the mechanism and subsequent assessment meetings or conferences depended on Western agreement to their proposal for a human rights/contacts conference in Moscow. To this idea, there was strong silence from the West.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

The Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting which began in November 1986 remained a major focus of the Commission during Phases III and IV. Chairman Hoyer made several trips to the meeting during the course of the year and also visited the Soviet Union and a number of East European countries for discussion of human rights and other matters related to the Vienna proceedings. He also participated in meetings of the North Atlantic Assembly in Canada where further discussions on the Vienna Meeting were held.

In August, Chairman Hoyer led a Commission delegation to Romania and Bulgaria. He was accompanied by Commission members Bill Richardson (D-NM) and State Department Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Richard Schifter. Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), also a Commissioner, participated in the Romanian portion of the trip and visited Poland and the USSR as well. Representative Jim Moody (D-WI) joined the delegation in Romania before leaving for the Soviet Union. A considerable part of the discussions during these visits centered on the Vienna Meeting as well as human rights concerns across the board.

Among the party, government and parliamentary leaders which the delegation met with were, in Romania, President Ceausescu, Foreign Minister Tutu and the Foreign Trade Minister and in Bulgaria, the delegation met with President Zhivkov, the Foreign Trade Minister and the Senior Deputy Foreign Minister. In Romania, the delegation concentrated on religious freedom and, in both countries, the rights of national minorities.

In October, the Chairman led a delegation composed of Representatives Benjamin Cardin (D-MD), Jan Meyers (R-KS) and Larry

Smith (D-FL) to Vienna and the German Democratic Republic. In Vienna, Chairman Hoyer addressed a plenary meeting emphasizing the link between human rights and military security. The delegation had extensive meetings with the Soviet and Bulgarian delegations on a wide range of CSCE matters. Human rights was a main concern. Senator Timothy Wirth (D-CO), also a Commissioner, participated actively in the Vienna program and remained a few days longer for further discussions.

Other members of the delegation visited Berlin (East and West) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) October 10-13. They had meetings with religious leaders, peace and human rights activists and national leaders including GDR Party Secretary Axen and Foreign Minister Fischer. Again, the discussions focused on human rights and other concerns directly related to the Vienna Meeting.

DRAFTING GROUPS

BASKET I—MILITARY SECURITY

The subsidiary working Body "S" continued to serve as the focal point for the discussion of military security issues at the Vienna Meeting. Much of the discussion during the early part of the summer focused on the Eastern proposal (WT.1), tabled by Poland on December 8, 1986, which provides for parallel negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and conventional force reductions. Under the Eastern proposal both sets of negotiations would take place within the 35-nation CSCE. The long awaited Western security proposal (WT.129) was tabled by the 16 NATO delegations on July 10.

The Western proposal, the product of arduous debate within the alliance, was based in large part upon the Brussels Declaration issued by the NATO Foreign Ministers on December 12, 1986. While endorsing further negotiations on CSBMs within the CSCE, WT.129 calls for negotiations on conventional stability among the 23 member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to also take place "within the framework of the CSCE."

Considerable controversy has arisen over the relationship between the two sets of negotiations and the CSCE. The East has held firm to its position that both sets of negotiations should be open to all 35 CSCE signatory states. The neutral and non-aligned states, for their part, have insisted that there be a close link between the conventional stability negotiations and the CSCE. Sweden and Yugoslavia have each introduced proposals in an attempt to further define the mechanism for the exchange of views and information between the 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact nations and the neutral and non-aligned countries.

Meanwhile, representatives of the 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries intensified their work on a possible mandate for negotiations on conventional stability through a series of informal biweekly meetings.

The signing of the United States-Soviet Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in December 1987, prompted renewed interest in addressing existing disparities and asymmetries in conventional forces in Vienna.

Although more drafting progress was registered in military security than in other areas by the end of Phase IV, the language that has been agreed to, concerns relatively non-controversial subjects such as the assessment of the results of the Stockholm Meeting. The difficult issues such as Soviet attempts to include tactical nuclear issues and naval and air activities in the CSBMs are yet to be resolved, but, if necessary, they could be put off to the negotiations themselves. The one issue that must be resolved at the Vienna Meeting is the linkage between the two sets of negotiations and the CSCE process.

BASKET I—PRINCIPLES

Progress in the Principles drafting group during the last two rounds of the Vienna Meeting has been very meager despite hints from the Soviet side of a willingness to make significant commitments in the area of political and civil rights in exchange for increased Western commitments in economic and social rights. The Soviets have also intimated a more forthcoming attitude toward religious freedom, minority rights and freedom of movement. So far little concrete has emerged.

The negotiations in the Principles drafting group have focused on sharply differing sets of proposals put forward by East and West. The Eastern proposals have stressed economic and social rights and a collective view of society. The Western proposals have emphasized the primacy of political and civil rights and the role of the individual. The neutral coordinator (Austria) has tried to strike a balance between the two concepts while trying to insure that Western values remain the cornerstone of the negotiations. Throughout the process, the coordinator's technique has been to extract the maximum flexibility from the Eastern position in favor of individual human rights. Nevertheless, despite the pronouncements of *glasnost*, *perestroika* and *democratization* issuing forth from Moscow, there is as yet little concrete reflection of this so-called new thinking in the Principles drafting group. So far there are only hints of what the Soviets in time might be willing to agree to.

At the end of the fourth round just before the year-end recess, the coordinator produced a comprehensive draft of what has been provisionally agreed upon and what had not. It was immediately apparent that on the important issues very little had been agreed to. In addition, the coordinator indicated what paragraphs he believed might be close to agreement. In this latter category, the coordinator included a significant segment of the issues vital to the West. The next round of the Vienna Meeting will see how much of these core issues the Soviets and their allies will be willing to accept. For the time being at least, the Western countries can take satisfaction from the coordinator's efforts to preserve basic Western objectives.

BASKET II

In Basket II, which focuses on issues relating to East-West economic cooperation, scientific exchanges, environmental protection and several other topics, delegates met in informal sessions and contact groups in order to negotiate language for inclusion in a

concluding document. They worked from papers produced by the Swiss coordinator which were taken from key proposals of both Eastern and Western delegations.

Turning first to environmental issues, work proceeded slowly, due to the complicated nature of many of the issues involved as well as disagreement on what measures the Participating States can actually commit themselves to take. Several neutral countries pressed for strong language on air and water pollution which went well beyond what most others could accept. Western delegates pushed for commitments on those issues of common importance to them, including air and water pollution, protecting the ozone layer, industrial accidents and the transport of hazardous wastes. Eastern delegates continued to reserve on commitments regarding compensation in the case of industrial accidents and protection of the ozone layer in particular. They added that their acceptance of commitments in the field of environmental protection would be dependent on Western willingness to facilitate the exchange of environment-saving technologies. At the conclusion of the first read-through of the environment, consensus was given to texts on hazardous waste, hazardous chemicals, and natural resources, flora and fauna.

The delegates then turned to the paper on economic cooperation. The Soviet Union and several East European countries sought Western commitment to promote East-West joint ventures and argued for language forbidding the application of controls on the export of high-technology, economic sanctions, and technical standards which can restrict trade. Western delegates refused to accept such language, maintaining that Western policies in these areas are reasonable and necessary. Moreover, they argued that the major factor limiting trade was the inability of Eastern goods to compete in Western markets. They asserted that Western language on contacts between potential commercial partners, the quantity and quality of statistics and commercial information, and how to deal with problems created by countertrade could do much to improve the conditions for economic cooperation between East and West. As a result of the divergent views on these and other economic topics, delegates reached agreement only on language regarding commercial arbitration and marketing during the first reading.

When the Vienna Meeting resumed in January, the Eastern delegates as expected continued to push for greater government involvement in promoting the exchange of scientific information and technology. Western delegates, on the other hand, are pressing for more direct contacts among individual scientists without the need of governmental endorsement, as well as respect for their human rights. On "Other Topics," Western delegations will call for commitments to reduce obstacles to East-West tourist travel.

Several proposals have been tabled in Vienna calling for specialized CSCE post-Vienna Meetings on Basket II topics. Among them are two proposals, one submitted by Czechoslovakia and the other by member-states of the European community, for a forum or conference on economic cooperation. The Italian delegation has submitted a proposal for a second CSCE scientific forum, and, in December, several neutral delegations tabled a Non-Paper containing

a mandate for a follow-up meeting on various aspects of environmental protection. The United States has not co-sponsored any of these follow-up proposals, although it has not excluded the possibility of agreeing to one or more of them in the end if there is—first, agreement to commitments in areas of priority to the West, the mandate for the meeting is acceptable, and it is clear that the meeting is warranted in terms of achieving an overall balance in the CSCE process.

BASKET III

The lack of progress in Basket III during the last two phases of the Vienna Meeting has been the most disappointing of all. The hopes of most Western and neutral/non-aligned countries were raised at the end of Phase III (July 30, 1987) by the introduction of a comprehensive Basket III draft by two neutral states—Austria and Switzerland. This draft, while taking into account many Eastern concerns, constituted a detailed compilation of the specific commitments in human contacts desired by the West. As such it was a bold initiative by the two neutral states which not only went far to meet the expectations of the Western countries but it also expressed the aspirations of the two authors and other neutral/non-aligned states as well.

It was not known until the beginning of the fourth phase in September what the Eastern reaction would be. Rather than reject the Austro-Swiss initiative outright as many expected, the East agreed to treat the neutral draft as a "point of departure." In fact, this turned out to be an acceptance of the Austro-Swiss paper as a basis for negotiations. Nevertheless, the East spent the entire fourth round trying to amend the neutral draft with the practical result of a stalemate by the time of the year-end recess.

In an effort to break the impasse, the Swedish coordinator at the end of the round responded to requests by both East and West to produce a draft of his own for the human contacts portion of the Austro-Swiss paper. The Eastern countries had hinted that even if the content were virtually the same as the neutral draft, they would be able to sell it more easily to their capitals as a truly neutral effort. The implication was that then the Eastern delegations would be able to come back to Vienna in round five able to agree to what they had not been able to agree to before.

The coordinator's draft compromise in fact was a close restatement of the contents of the Austro-Swiss paper and sacrificed virtually nothing of importance. The coordinator introduced some cosmetic changes and attempted to iron out some ambiguities, but overall he maintained the ambition of the previous paper. Whether his efforts will contribute to progress in the stalled Basket III negotiations remains to be seen.

FOLLOW-UP

During the third and fourth phases the "Follow-Up" drafting group continued the discussion of procedural issues relating to follow-up activities while the substance of the more than 30 proposals for such activities await further discussion in the other subsidiary bodies. When the delegates agreed to meet informally, with a

Yugoslav delegate as coordinator, they set up a list of topics for further discussion. Among them were the length and timing of preparatory meetings for the main follow-up meetings (such as Vienna), a proposal by San Marino for a CSCE documentation center, and a more flexible application of the rules of procedure in order to facilitate discussion in such meetings as the Budapest Cultural Forum, where the East insisted on strict adherence to the rules so as to maintain as much control of the discussion as possible.

Discussion of WT.19, the Western proposal for follow-up activities in the humanitarian dimension, was discussed in the subsidiary group dealing with Basket I—Principles. The Soviet and other Eastern delegations accepted the idea of a follow-up mechanism on human rights and other humanitarian issues within CSCE, as detailed in the Western proposal, although their comments indicated that their idea of a mechanism is not much different from bilateral discussions which already take place on these issues. The ideas contained in WT.19, for example, which would establish a notification procedure allowing Participating States to refer particularly difficult human rights cases to other Participating States and, which would give every Participating State the possibility of requesting and securing on short notice a special meeting of the 35 to discuss and resolve specific cases were not positively addressed by the Soviets. They did express, however, a willingness to have meetings on humanitarian issues in several different locations, provided that the proposed Moscow Humanitarian Conference was part of the package.

On the Moscow Conference, U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmermann detailed in a speech on July 28 what the United States would need to see before it could accept such a proposal. He made clear that the Soviet Union had to meet a certain standard of human rights performance well above what exists at present. Furthermore, the Soviets would have to provide assurance that they would adhere to the standards and practices that have been established by previous CSCE meetings as regards access to the meeting by non-governmental organizations, journalists, groups and individuals, including both citizens of the USSR and of other Participating States. The Soviet delegation rejected these demands as unprecedented in CSCE. Ambassador Zimmermann has also informed the Soviets of other substantive requirements for U.S. agreement to the Moscow meeting. These requirements all relate to Soviet performance on human rights questions before the end of the Vienna Meeting.

PROSPECTS FOR NEXT PHASE

Theoretically, at least, the negotiations on a concluding document have the possibility to move at a faster pace during the next phase than has been the case during the past two rounds. There are a number of reasons for this. First, there is a growing feeling in the West that the meeting has already been extended too far beyond its original target closing date of July 30, 1987. Second, there have been indications that the Eastern side would like to wrap things up without much more delay. Third, with the tabling

of a draft compromise by the neutral coordinators in both the human rights and human contacts areas, the machinery is now in place for faster negotiating progress. However, whether faster progress is actually achieved is an open question. There is still a wide gap between the positions of East and West virtually across the board.

In the area of military security, the differences are not so numerous as they are deep. The fact that no new drafting has been agreed since last October is somewhat misleading since the sticking points are fewer but in many cases more substantial than in some areas. Nonetheless, if progress were to accelerate in the human rights negotiations, things could fall into place very quickly in military security. All issues except one could either be decided on the spot or remanded to the actual negotiations themselves. The only issue that will have to be decided at the Vienna Meeting is the question of the linkage between the CDE negotiations, the conventional arms negotiations and the CSCE process itself.

There has not been great progress in the Basket II negotiations either, but then too there is a recognition that things can move quickly once the pace of the rest of the Vienna Meeting picks up. Similarly, the Mediterranean and Follow-Up drafting groups are lagging behind but could be speeded up if there was a breakthrough in the major areas—human rights and military security.

In both the Principles and the Basket III drafting groups, a framework is now in place which the Soviet Union and its allies can use if indeed they want to end the Vienna Meeting in the near future. The compromise drafts produced by the neutral coordinators provides the face-saving device which these countries say they need to move forward. Western expectations are high in the areas of human rights and human contacts and there is a determination to be patient. Thus, if the Eastern countries are not serious about their hints of a willingness to agree to far-reaching commitments in these areas, the meeting could be considerably prolonged. If this is the course the Soviet Union has in mind, we are likely to see renewed efforts to dig in and try to water down the neutral and Western human rights proposals. This approach would also likely involve a campaign to induce the neutral and nonaligned countries to come out with a series of new compromise texts, each one at a lower level than the one before.

In addition to the text of the Vienna Concluding Document, there is the matter of the some 30 proposals for follow-up activities between the end of Vienna and the beginning of the next review meeting at a time yet to be determined. The negotiations to winnow these proposals down to a realistic number (there were six such activities between Madrid and Vienna) has barely begun. The West has insisted that such activities cannot be a substitute for action and firm commitments now before the end of the Vienna Meeting, especially in the area of human rights.

A prime example is the Soviet proposal for a humanitarian meeting in Moscow which is touted as an opportunity for future progress in a broad range of human rights questions. The United States and other Western countries refuse even to consider such a meeting unless the Soviets agree to two sets of requirements. One is that the environment in which a Moscow meeting would be held,

must be equivalent to the free atmosphere which characterized previous CSCE meetings held in such places as Madrid and Vienna. In a speech in July, Ambassador Zimmermann addressed a series of 10 questions to the Soviet delegation detailing specific requirements which would be expected, such as, freedom for the press and for non-governmental organizations. So far Moscow has not indicated it will provide assurances on these points or on the other set of requirements which involve a high standard of human rights performance and commitment before the end of the Vienna Meeting.

The Soviet refusal, so far, to respond to these requirements not only puts the fate of the Moscow meeting in serious doubt but complicates the situation with regard to other proposed human rights meetings. This includes the Western proposal for human rights meeting and conference as a part of a standing mechanism to resolve human rights problems. The one thing that seems certain, however, is that whatever happens to the Moscow proposal, the West will insist that post-Vienna meetings and other activities in human rights be sufficient to balance whatever is agreed in the area of military security.

SPEECHES DURING PHASE IV

As the focus of the Vienna Meeting has moved away from review of implementation and toward negotiations on the content of a concluding document, there has been a corresponding drop in the number of formal speeches given by the respective delegations. At this point, most formal speeches are delivered in the weekly Plenary Session although occasionally some are given in one or two of the drafting groups.

Considering the small number of formal speeches given by the American delegation during the fourth phase, we have decided not to issue a separate volume but to include the texts as a part of this report. Speeches during Phase III (May 5-July 31, 1987) have already been printed under separate cover (CSCE 100-1-15). The texts follow.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

Opening Statement

Plenary Session

September 22, 1987

It has been an eventful summer. In the relatively short time since the Vienna meeting recessed July 31, we have witnessed potentially significant progress toward the objectives of the Helsinki Final Act:

--Erich Honecker's historic visit to the Federal Republic of Germany has been accompanied by the prospect that during this year three million citizens of the GDR will be permitted to visit relatives in the West--the highest number in over a quarter century.

--In the Soviet Union there have been encouraging signs of attention to the need to deal with the abuse of psychiatry for political purposes; and there has been some additional progress on individual emigration cases.

--And Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's discussions in Washington last week with President Reagan and Secretary Shultz have produced an agreement in principle toward the first major nuclear arms reduction treaty in history, and have spurred renewed efforts to achieve a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms.

As we reconvene, therefore, both the importance of our work here in Vienna and the prospect of its successful completion have been intensified. The imminence of a treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles will heighten concentration on the problems of conventional defense and conventional arms control. The CSCE process has a significant role to play in the latter area.

In the field of human rights as well there is a growing basis for hope. The positive movement in bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, in particular the progress on arms control, can have a catalytic effect in the human dimension of our relationship. But arms control cannot and should not be expected to carry the weight of other elements, including human rights. That was the lesson we learned in the 1970's. The pursuit of human rights objectives should be guided, not by derivative factors, but by the direct obligations undertaken freely by sovereign states in the Helsinki Final Act and in other instruments.

That is why the United States has placed, and will continue to place, so much emphasis on the cardinal importance of fulfilling the commitments of Helsinki in the human dimension. That is why we have stressed, and will continue to stress, the need for specific progress in human rights and the need to institutionalize that progress. That is why we have underlined, and will continue to underline, that--while the language of our final document and the meetings that will follow Vienna are both important--respect for commitments already made is even more important.

As we resume our work, all the elements are in place for a successful completion to the Vienna meeting, even this year. Textual proposals for a final Vienna document are all on the table; we are ready for drafting, beginning immediately. The importance of implementing prior commitments has been stressed and, I believe, understood. We need now to summon the collective political will to drive our Vienna project to a productive conclusion. On behalf of the government of the United States, I pledge our will in cooperative endeavor with our 34 partners.

HON. STENY H. HOYER

VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE CSCE
AND
CHAIRMAN OF THE
U.S. COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
PLENARY

OCTOBER 9, 1987

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IT HAS NOW BEEN NEARLY A YEAR SINCE I FIRST HAD THE PRIVILEGE OF ADDRESSING THIS MEETING. MUCH HAS CHANGED DURING THAT TIME. WE HAVE WITNESSED A NUMBER OF SIGNATORY STATES UNDERTAKE SIGNIFICANT REFORMS DESIGNED TO LIBERALIZE THEIR SOCIETIES.

SINCE THEN, I AND MEMBERS OF THE HELSINKI COMMISSION HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, ROMANIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. AND I HAVE PERSONALLY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV, CHAIRMAN ZHIVKOV, PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF HUNGARY AND THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. I MUST SAY WE WERE RECEIVED GRACIOUSLY IN ALL OF THESE SIGNATORY STATES.

THE PURPOSE OF OUR VISITS WAS TO WORK TOWARD ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE SET FOR EACH OF OUR NATIONS IN PRINCIPLE IX OF THE FINAL ACT "... TO DEVELOP CLOSER RELATIONS AMONG THEMSELVES ON AN IMPROVED AND ENDURING BASIS FOR THE BENEFIT OF PEOPLES."

OUR VISITS CAME AT A TIME OF RENEWED PROMISE AND HOPE FOR PROGRESS ON THE HELSINKI AGENDA. THAT AGENDA ENCOMPASSES INCREASED SECURITY AND STABILITY BETWEEN US; ENHANCED ECONOMIC COOPERATION AMONG US; MORE RESPECT AND FREEDOM FOR INDIVIDUALS WHO COMPRISE NOT ONLY OUR OWN NATIONS BUT OUR COMMUNITY OF NATIONS; AND A MORE FAITHFUL ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES THAT THE HELSINKI ACT SETS FORTH AS GUIDING OUR RELATIONS WITH ONE ANOTHER.

FOR THOSE OF US IN THE UNITED STATES THIS RENEWED HOPE IS CREATED BY THE PROMISE WE SEE IN THE POLICIES ENUNCIATED BY GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. WE HOPE WE SEE A COMMITMENT TO CHANGES WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR MORE OPEN AND SELF-CONFIDENT SOCIETIES IN THE EAST; SOCIETIES MORE PROSPEROUS ECONOMICALLY; AND SOCIETIES MORE WILLING TO ACCORD TO THEIR PEOPLE THE FREEDOMS THAT WE BELIEVE ARE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF HELSINKI.

THERE EXISTS NOW A HOPE, AN EXPECTATION. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN SOME PROGRESS AND CHANGE, MUCH HAS ALSO STAYED THE SAME. MOST SIGNIFICANT IS THAT A WIDE GULF OF SUSPICION REMAINS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. IT IS A SUSPICION THAT LEADS TO DISTRUST AMONG NATIONS AND ULTIMATELY UNDERMINES EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND COOPERATION.

PERHAPS NOTHING CONTRIBUTES TO THIS SUSPICION MORE THAN THE OBSESSIVE CONCERN FOR SECURITY WHICH CONTROLS SOME OF THE HELSINKI SIGNATORY STATES. IT IS A SECURITY THAT INFUSES EVERY SECTOR OF SOCIETY, EVERY ISSUE RELATED TO THE HELSINKI ACCORDS. AND IT IS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO THE CENTRAL GOALS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS -- TO BREAK DOWN THE BARRIERS THAT DIVIDE NATIONS, TO FOSTER COOPERATION AMONG THEM, AND TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS.

IN AN IDEAL WORLD THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR SECURITY BETWEEN NATIONS -- OR FOR SECURITY BETWEEN A GOVERNMENT AND ITS CITIZENS -- AND IN FACT IN AN IDEAL WORLD, PERHAPS THERE WOULD BE LITTLE NEED FOR THE HELSINKI ACCORDS.

BUT THIS IS NOT AN IDEAL WORLD. NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS MAKE THE NEED FOR SOME SECURITY AN UNFORTUNATE REALITY. NO NATION IS IMMUNE TO IT. EVEN THE NATIONS WITH THE GREATEST AMOUNT OF POLITICAL FREEDOM MUST GUARD AGAINST ITS POTENTIALLY CORROSIVE INFLUENCE.

THE PROBLEM IS THAT SOME OF THE HELSINKI SIGNATORY STATES HAVE INSTITUTIONALIZED SECURITY TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT IT NOT ONLY ENCREACHES UPON THEIR DEALINGS WITH OTHER NATIONS, BUT ALSO ON THE RIGHTS OF ITS OWN PEOPLE. IT IS IN PARTICULAR THIS MONOLITH OF SECURITY WHICH BLOCKS THESE NATIONS FROM TAKING SIGNIFICANT STEPS TOWARDS COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR HELSINKI COMMITMENTS.

PERCEIVING A NEED TO SECURE STATE SECRETS, THEY LIMIT THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION AND CONTROL THE FREEDOMS OF THEIR OWN PEOPLE. EXTREME BECOMES JUSTIFIED FOR THE GOOD OF THE STATE. PERHAPS MR. ELGIN IS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS.

FOR MANY YEARS WE IN THE WEST WONDERED HOW SUCH STATES COULD FUNCTION UNDER THE CRUSHING WEIGHT OF SO MANY SECRETS. WE HAVE WONDERED HOW SUCH SECURITY COULD BE JUSTIFIED. PROPOSED CHANGES SUGGEST THAT THIS SECURITY WAS CLEARLY SELF-DEFEATING AND INHIBITED ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

IN APRIL OF 1986 THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SOVIET UNION CONFRONTED THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS SECURITY DURING THE CHERNOBYL INCIDENT. IN MANY WAYS THE FALLOUT FROM THE SECURITY AT CHERNOBYL SYMBOLIZED THE COSTS TO A SOCIETY THAT HAS ALSO STIFLED MANY OF ITS BEST ARTISTS, WRITERS AND SCIENTISTS, WE WOULD SUGGEST, BECAUSE OF IMAGINARY SECURITY CONCERNS.

AND SO, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE LOOK WITH GREAT INTEREST AT THE REFORMS NOW UNDERWAY IN THE SOVIET UNION AND MANY OF ITS EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES. THESE REFORMS DEMONSTRATE NEED FOR CHANGE, AND SUGGEST THAT THESE NATIONS ARE BEGINNING TO UNBURDEN THEMSELVES OF STATE CONTROL IN AT LEAST SOME ASPECTS OF LIFE.

THERE ARE CHANGES TAKING PLACE WHICH NO ONE THOUGHT POSSIBLE ONLY A YEAR AGO. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS BEEN OBSERVED HAS GIVEN FILMMAKERS, JOURNALISTS, AUTHORS AND ARTISTS

MORE LICENSE THAN THEY HAVE HAD IN PREVIOUS YEARS. SOME 200 POLITICAL PRISONERS HAVE BEEN RELEASED. WE BELIEVE ALMOST 500 REMAIN. THERE IS EVEN WORD OF IMPENDING LIBERALIZATION IN SOVIET RELIGIOUS LIFE.

IN THE SPHERE OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS WE SEE SOME NATIONS MAKING EFFORTS TO DECENTRALIZE THE WAY DECISIONS ARE MADE, TO BREAK AWAY FROM ABSOLUTE CONTROL BY THE STATE AND THE PARTY. I, AND MEMBERS OF MY DELEGATION WERE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT WHAT WE SAW IN BULGARIA.

AND IN MILITARY MATTERS, WE HAVE JUST SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED THE FIRST ON-SITE INSPECTIONS UNDER THE STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT. MEMBERS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS WERE ALSO PERMITTED TO VISIT THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR FACILITY, AS WELL AS THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AT CHERNOBYL. AND IT WAS RECENTLY AN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION OF A SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS PLANT.

AS A RESULT OF THESE EFFORTS THE WHOLE WORLD IS ENCOURAGED, BECAUSE A MORE OPEN SOVIET UNION IS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE OVERALL REDUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS.

BUT, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE MUST BE CAUTIOUS NOT TO LET OUR HOPES GET THE BETTER OF OUR JUDGMENT. GLASNOST, THOUGH SIGNIFICANT WHEN MEASURED AGAINST THE STANDARDS OF A CLOSED SOCIETY, REMAINS MORE A REVOLUTION OF EXPECTATIONS THAN REALITY.

IN ENGLISH WE HAVE BECOME SO ACCUSTOMED TO DEFINING GLASNOST AS "OPENNESS" THAT WE FORGET THAT IT REALLY MEANS "MAKING PUBLIC." IT DOES NOT MEAN OPENNESS AS WE KNOW IT IN THE WEST. WHAT THE STATE GIVES IT CAN STILL TAKE AWAY. IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IN VARYING DEGREES THROUGHOUT EASTERN EUROPE, IDEAS ARE STILL PRESUMED GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT. SECRECY CONTINUES TO BE THE BASIC PREMISE OF THESE SOCIETIES.

CONSIDER THE DEGREE TO WHICH SECRECY PERMEATES THESE HELSINKI SIGNATORY STATES. IT IS ACROSS THE BOARD, ON EVERY HELSINKI ISSUE, UNDERMINING CONFIDENCE AND UNDERSTANDING AMONG NATIONS AND PEOPLES.

BASIC HUMAN CONTACTS ARE RESTRICTED AS TELEPHONE AND MAIL COMMUNICATIONS ARE MONITORED AND INTERFERED WITH BY AUTHORITIES. IN THE SOVIET UNION INDEED ENTIRE CITIES ARE CLOSED AND ISOLATED -- SUCH AS GORKI, WHERE ANDREI SAKHAROV SPENT SEVEN LONELY YEARS OF BANISHMENT.

WE ON THE U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION SAW THE POWER OF SECRECY AND STATE SECURITY FIRST HAND. I HAVE VISITED THE SOVIET UNION AND HAVE LED DELEGATIONS TO OTHER EAST EUROPEAN NATIONS AS I SAID WITH THE GOAL OF ESTABLISHING CONTACTS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PRIVATE CITIZENS.

BUT IN THESE HELSINKI SIGNATORY STATES WHICH WE VISITED, OUR ATTEMPTS TO TALK WITH PRIVATE CITIZENS WERE AT TIMES FRUSTRATED BY THE CONSTANT PRESENCE OF OFFICIALS AND THE FEAR THAT THESE CITIZENS HAD OF OFFICIAL RETRIBUTION.

SECURITY ALSO LIMITS THE BASIC RIGHT OF THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION. IN THE SOVIET UNION 70,000 CENSORS COMB PUBLICATIONS FOR STATE SECRETS. WESTERN JOURNALISTS HAVE FEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDEPENDENT TRAVEL IN THE EAST TO GATHER MATERIAL. MILLIONS ARE SPENT ON RADIO JAMMING. LAST MONTH FIFTY BOOKS WERE SEIZED AT THE MOSCOW BOOK FAIR. AND JUST LAST WEEK AUTHORITIES DETAINED TWO EDITORS OF THE INDEPENDENT JOURNAL GLASNOST AND CONFISCATED COPIES OF THEIR MAGAZINE.

FURTHERMORE, MODERN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IS SEEN AS A POTENTIAL SECURITY THREAT AS AUTHORITIES RESTRICT ACCESS TO COPIER MACHINES AND COMPUTERS.

SECURITY CONCERNS HAVE BECOME SO INSTITUTIONALIZED THAT THEY EVEN PERVADE THE ECONOMIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE, MUCH TO THE DETRIMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. IN MOST EASTERN NATIONS, RESTRICTIONS ON ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION AND ON WESTERN BUSINESS CONTACTS HAVE HAMPERED THE DEVELOPMENT OF LASTING TRADE TIES WITH THE WEST. DECREES IN SOME OF THESE NATIONS EVEN PROHIBIT CITIZENS FROM TRANSMITTING THE MOST RUDIMENTARY ECONOMIC INFORMATION TO FOREIGNERS.

EVEN IN MILITARY MATTERS, WHERE CERTAIN SECURITY CONCERNS ARE UNDERSTANDABLE, AN EXTREME OF SECURITY EXISTS -- AN EXTREME THAT BREEDS SUSPICION AMONG OUR NATIONS. NEWS FROM AFGHANISTAN IS SHROUDED IN SECURITY. AND IT'S NOT ONLY PRESIDENT REAGAN WHO CALLS FOR MORE OPENNESS IN THE SOVIET MILITARY -- TWO SOVIET JOURNALS HAVE EVEN QUESTIONED WHY THEIR GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO KEEP INFORMATION ABOUT SOVIET MILITARY BUDGETS SECRET.

MR. CHAIRMAN, SO WE SEE HOW THE VEIL OF SECURITY COVERS ALMOST EVERY ASPECT UNDER THE HELSINKI ACCORDS -- COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION, TRADE AND MILITARY SECURITY.

BUT NOWHERE/NOWHERE IS IT MORE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THAN THE WAY IT IS APPLIED IN THE HUMAN DIMENSION. IF SECURITY CAN BE USED TO JUSTIFY DIVIDING SPOUSES -- IF SECURITY CAN BE USED TO EXPLAIN EMIGRATION REFUSALS -- THEN IT CAN BE USED TO JUSTIFY ANY OTHER EXERCISE OF STATE POWER, AND THUS IT BECOMES AN OBSTACLE TO INTERNATIONAL TRUST.

SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR, AN INCREASING PERCENTAGE OF EXIT VISAS HAVE BEEN DENIED IN THE SOVIET UNION ON THE GROUND THAT THE APPLICANT HAD ACCESS TO STATE SECRETS. ENTIRE FAMILIES ARE NOW PREVENTED FROM LEAVING BECAUSE A RELATIVE SUPPOSEDLY POSSESSED SECRETS.

NAUM MEIMAN, A RENOWNED MATHEMATICIAN, LAST WORKED WITH SECRETS THIRTY YEARS AGO -- YET HE CONTINUES TO BE DENIED PERMISSION TO LEAVE, AND HE WAS EVEN PROHIBITED FROM ATTENDING HIS WIFE'S FUNERAL IN THE UNITED STATES EARLIER THIS YEAR.

VLADIMIR SLEPAK, ALEXANDER LERNER AND SIX OTHERS WERE TOLD THEY WOULD NEVER BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE OF ACCESS TO STATE SECRETS. LERNER LAST WORKED WITH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN 1964 TWENTY-THREE YEARS AGO.

OR, MR. CHAIRMAN, CONSIDER THE CASE OF LEV ELBERT, WHO HAD REPEATEDLY BEEN DENIED PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE FOR ELEVEN YEARS BECAUSE OF ALL THE STATE SECRETS HE SUPPOSEDLY LEARNED WHILE CONSTRUCTING A SWIMMING POOL NEAR AN OFFICERS' CLUB.

THIS, MR. CHAIRMAN, IS SECRECY IN ITS MOST DISTORTED AND DESTRUCTIVE FORM. IT IS ARBITRARY. IT DEFIES LOGIC AND HUMAN DECENCY. IT IS USED DELIBERATELY TO DESTROY PEOPLES' LIVES.

IT REMINDS ME FRANKLY OF FRANZ KAFKA'S BOOK, THE TRIAL, IN WHICH THE PROTAGONIST, JOSEPH K., WAS TRIED AND CONVICTED OF A CRIME EVEN THOUGH HE WAS NEVER TOLD WHAT THAT CRIME WAS. WITH SUCH SECURITY RESTRICTIONS ON EMIGRATION, THERE ARE MANY JOSEPH K'S IN OUR WORLD TODAY.

GLASNOST HELPS, IT IS PROGRESS -- BUT IT IS NOT ENOUGH. SECRECY ALL OUT OF PROPORTION TO REALITY CONTINUES TO UNDERMINE OUR CONFIDENCE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THERE ARE PROPOSALS THAT HAVE BEEN TABLED AT THIS MEETING WHICH ADDRESS SOME OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT SECRECY.

I REFER TO PROPOSALS IN THE HUMAN DIMENSION THAT ADVANCE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (WT.22, 23, AND 24) -- END THE SECRECY RATIONALE FOR DENYING EMIGRATION (WT.132) -- PROTECT PEOPLE FROM ARBITRARY ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT (WT.39) -- AND UPHOLD INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON POSTAL AND TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION (WT.74).

IN THE AREA OF INFORMATION THERE ARE PROPOSALS THAT, IF IMPLEMENTED, WOULD END RADIO JAMMING AND INCREASE OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIVIDUAL TRAVEL BY JOURNALISTS (WT.56 AND 44).

ON BASKET II MATTERS, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE SUPPORT PROPOSALS WHICH ENCOURAGE AN OPEN ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT BY ELIMINATING RESTRICTIONS ON BUSINESS CONTACTS AND REDUCING THE SECRECY SURROUNDING VITAL ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION.

THESE PROPOSALS ARE A BEGINNING. BUT COUPLED WITH FURTHER AND SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARDS OPENNESS BY THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER NATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE, THEY COULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARDS BREAKING DOWN THE WALLS OF SECRECY THAT DIVIDE US.

AND IN THE PROCESS THEY WOULD MAKE MUCH OF OUR SOCIETIES MORE SECURE -- BECAUSE A NATION THAT ENCOURAGES DIVERSITY SHOWS THAT IT IS STRONG ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE IT.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD NOT WANT TO CONCLUDE MY REMARKS WITHOUT BRIEFLY COMMENTING ON THE HELSINKI COMMISSION CONCERN REGARDING THE GROWING FOCUS ON SECURITY ISSUES -- INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL STABILITY NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE PROCESS.

WITH THE PROBABILITY OF AN INF AGREEMENT, THE IMPORTANCE OF ADDRESSING DESTABILIZING IMBALANCES IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES WILL INEVITABLY AND NECESSARILY GROW. IT WILL ALSO BE IMPORTANT TO PURSUE AND STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES.

THE CONCERN OF THE HELSINKI COMMISSION AND THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS IS THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE OBJECTIVES NOT OBSCURE OR DIMINISH THE IMPERATIVE OF ACHIEVING SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS THAN WE HAVE ACHIEVED SINCE AUGUST OF 1975.

AS WE STATED REPEATEDLY IN BERN AND HAVE REITERATED HERE, WE BELIEVE THAT PERFORMANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO MOVE FORWARD. AND WE BELIEVE IT CRITICAL TO CONTINUE THE FOCUS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS ON THIS OBJECTIVE. PARALLEL PROGRESS ON SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE CSCE PROCESS IS ESSENTIAL TO STABILITY AND CLOSER COOPERATION.

AS A CONTINUING FORUM, THE CSCE CAN PLAY AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND IN PROVIDING INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURE FOR OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SIGNATORY NATIONS. BUT CSCE MUST NOT DIVORCE ISSUES OF NATIONAL SECURITY FROM THOSE OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. HISTORY HAS TAUGHT US THAT SUCH A ROAD LEADS TO CYNICISM AND DISASTER.

MR. CHAIRMAN, LET ME END BY SAYING AGAIN THAT I BELIEVE WE MEET AT A TIME OF PROMISE AND OPPORTUNITY. LET US HOPE THAT ALL OF US ARE PREPARED TO PURSUE THAT PROMISE TO ITS LOGICAL CONCLUSION -- PROGRESS IN CSCE AND A SAFER AND FREER WORLD COMMUNITY.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
 Chairman of the United States Delegation
 to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

MONITORS

Plenary Session

Vienna, Austria
 November 13, 1987

No participants in the Helsinki process are more important than those individuals, independent institutions, and organizations which devote their efforts to monitoring implementation of the principles and provisions of the Helsinki and Madrid documents. It was to protect and advance the rights of these individuals and groups that the United States and many others introduced a proposal, WT-38, which would ensure that they could organize, maintain contacts with colleagues at home and abroad, and carry out their monitoring activity unfettered.

Unfortunately, our efforts to win support for these concepts, so central to the objectives of Helsinki, have yet to succeed. Soviet and other Eastern delegations have argued that only officials and government-sponsored groups should be involved in monitoring implementation of CSCE commitments. In the area of military security, the Helsinki process has proved that on-site inspection by other states can make a significant contribution to confidence. How ludicrous it is, then, to argue that in the area of human rights the monitoring of commitments can be entrusted only to those responsible for carrying these commitments out.

Such a claim seems hardly in keeping with the words of General Secretary Gorbachev last week. Let me recall them: "In reorganizing our economic and political system, it is our duty to create, first of all, a dependable and flexible mechanism for the genuine involvement of all the people in deciding state and social matters. Secondly, people must be taught in practice to live in the conditions of deepening democracy, to extend and consolidate human rights, to nurture a contemporary political culture of the masses. In other words, to teach and to learn democracy."

"To teach and to learn democracy." Is there a better way to describe the function of monitoring the commitments of Helsinki?

I hope that we have not heard the last word on this subject from our Eastern colleagues. Indeed, there may be some indications that we have not. For example, the Soviet Union has invited the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights to Moscow in December. This important federation of independent Western organizations and individuals encourages

and carries out monitoring functions. Its U.S. affiliate, Helsinki Watch, monitors human rights performance on a global basis. It has issued reports critical of the Soviet Union and some of its Allies. It has issued reports critical of NATO members. And it has issued reports critical of both U.S. foreign policy and U.S. domestic policy. If the Soviet Union can welcome the International Helsinki Federation in person, why not accept the principles for which it stands on paper?

In advocating a Moscow conference on humanitarian cooperation, Ambassador Kashlev has assured us that the Soviet Union would be guided by the practices of access traditional in the Helsinki framework. These of course include access for non-governmental organizations and private individuals engaged in monitoring activities. An important test of that assurance would be Soviet acceptance of language in a Vienna Final Document that protects the activities of these very organizations and individuals.

In just one month will come another important test of the Soviet government's approach to independent monitoring activity. The Press Club Glasnost has scheduled a human rights seminar to be held in Moscow December 10-13.

The Press Club Glasnost describes itself as "a coalition of civil rights and peace activists that is dedicated to monitoring compliance with the Helsinki Accord and sees itself as part of the non-governmental element of the Helsinki process." By its own description it is a monitoring group within the framework of Helsinki. In recognition of this it has become an affiliate of the International Helsinki Federation.

The Press Club Glasnost is also a product of the new atmosphere in the Soviet Union. Its very name indicates that it is taking seriously the policy of glasnost that has been proclaimed at the highest levels of the Soviet leadership. Moreover, it has taken a positive attitude to the official Soviet proposal for a Moscow conference. In its appeal, dated September 2, 1987, to the CSCE participating states and to their international and national non-governmental organizations and private citizens, it said:

"We welcome the idea of holding in Moscow an international conference on a wide range of humanitarian concerns as was proposed by the Soviet delegation to the Vienna meeting of the participating states of the Helsinki Accords on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

"Such a conference, if successful, would most certainly promote the realization of peace, freedom and justice on our continent. The disarming of Europe could lead to humanitarian cooperation.

"However, even as we welcome the idea of a conference in Moscow, we must repeat that, for such a conference to be successful, a great deal of preliminary work must be done towards creating an atmosphere of international trust in the area of humanitarian affairs in general, and of human rights in particular."

The agenda for the December 10-13 seminar touches many of the issues of the human dimension with which we in Vienna are dealing. The subjects listed are as follows:

- International Trust and Disarmament
- Social and Economic Rights
- Nationalities Problems
- Freedom of Belief
- Freedom of Speech
- Human Contacts
- Humanitarian Aspects of Environmental Problems
- Rights of Disabled and Other Socially Dependent Minorities
- Juridical Basis for Human Rights Activity
- Public Defense of the Rights of the Individual.

This seminar promises to be a major event. As I understand it, private groups and individuals from CSCE participating states in both America and Europe are planning to attend. The organizers have asked the Soviet government to facilitate the work of the seminar. Thus, the Soviet government has an excellent opportunity to demonstrate its genuine attitude toward activities in the private sector dedicated to the advancement of the goals of Helsinki. Here indeed is a chance to show the peoples of all our countries what the Soviet Union means by the words "to teach and to learn democracy."

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

The Helsinki Process after 15 Years

Plenary Session

Vienna, Austria
November 20, 1987

The date is November 22, 1972 - 15 years ago. The scene is a technical institute on the outskirts of Helsinki. Diplomats from 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada have met for preparatory negotiations on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. At first the negotiations go well. Then, in the days that follow, argument turns into acrimony, debates into disputes. In exasperation the 35 governments withdraw their representatives. They never return. The Helsinki process dies at birth.

The description is fanciful but the issue is real. What difference would it have made if there had been no Helsinki process, no Final Act, no review meetings or experts meetings? Would it have mattered? On this anniversary occasion the temptation is for self-congratulation. I offer instead, in this city of Freud, self-analysis. The views are personal; they come from a full-time observer and part-time participant in the Helsinki process during its 15-year journey from birth to adolescence.

Had the Helsinki process not existed, what of value would we have lost?

One thing we would have lost is a common approach to important aspects of military security. The wisps of language in the Helsinki Final Act regarding military security have burgeoned into commitments on concrete measures which pioneer new standards for on-site inspection and which, fully implemented, will help reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. While the pace and extent of a disarmament process ultimately involving all 35 CSCE participants are open to debate, the Stockholm agreement shows that a military security forum at 35 can be feasible and productive.

The still-birth of the Helsinki process would also have deprived us of an all-European standard for human rights performance. Before 1972 approaches to human rights were individual, bilateral, and often random. Helsinki has given us a yardstick for evaluating human rights implementation, a forum for discussing problems, and a mechanism for ensuring that violations cannot be ignored. The CSCE process has helped many countries to find their voice on human rights and has compelled others to adjust to this heightened concern.

Without Helsinki it is doubtful that the fate of individual human beings would have been placed so high on the agenda of East-West relations. Moreover, there would have been less inspiration and less rallying ground for those extraordinary groups of individuals--the Helsinki Monitors, Solidarity, Charter 77, the Group to Establish Trust, the Jazz Section, Glasnost--who have given new meaning to the struggle of the oppressed for freedom.

Finally, the early death of CSCE would have stifled the spirit of belonging to a cooperative enterprise. Fellow delegates have described our collectivity as a house or as a boat; I prefer the image of the boat, since I can imagine it regularly crossing the Atlantic to pick up its passengers in the United States and Canada. But both metaphors suggest that we are a part of something which is larger than ourselves, which unites us despite our differences, and which gives us a common vision. Without Helsinki there would be no such bond.

These, then, are what we would have lost if we had not had a CSCE process. But candor compels the question: What have we, even with the Helsinki process, failed to gain?

Let us begin by admitting that the Helsinki process has failed to break down the barriers between East and West. Those barriers have been permeated by increased human contact across the divide, but they have not been destroyed. There remain physical barriers: walls, barbed wire, check-points. There are also psychological barriers: suspicion, distrust, deception. Openness is a slogan but not, at least not yet, a reality.

Let us also admit that the Helsinki process has played little discernible role in producing observance of the commitments which it has itself inspired. It is true that since 1972 there have been advances, mixed with retreats, in human rights. Some progress has even occurred since we began our work in Vienna late last year. But evidence is lacking that these advances derive directly from CSCE rather than from bilateral factors or domestic imperatives. In any case, nobody could rightfully claim that the Helsinki process has brought significant advances toward freedom of movement, freedom of religion, protection of minority rights, open communications, or respect for basic civil and political rights. This failure of Helsinki can become a mortal wound if allowed to fester much longer.

Against this 15-year assessment, how are we to judge the current state of the Vienna conference? Negatively, I believe. There is a growing malaise here in Vienna. It comes, in the large world outside, from continued infidelity to human rights pledges. It also comes, in the world of this conference, from the failure to register a single important commitment on human rights and human contacts. If we cannot even agree on a time frame for approving the travel of people applying to visit dying relatives abroad, how can we argue that this meeting has made even the slightest contribution to basic human needs?

The mottled history of CSCE, culminating in the current malaise of this Vienna meeting, leads me to suggest that we should mark this 15th anniversary but not celebrate it. A more favorable evaluation would require a major change--a change which must occur both inside and outside Vienna, a change in the attitude of the handful of states which trumpet their support for the Helsinki process even as they flout its precepts.

What of the next 15 years of CSCE? They are up to us, the 35 participating states. It is we who will determine how much or how little the Helsinki process can be. It can be an indoor recreation center for bureaucrats. It can be a travelling circus with different acts in different cities. It can be a playground for trivial pursuits. It can be a megaphone for minor achievements. It can be a mausoleum for broken promises. Or it can be more.

The original vision of Helsinki was a vision of ambitious commitments faithfully adhered to. There is no compelling reason why this vision cannot become reality. At no time in the history of the CSCE process are the conditions for progress better than they are now. So why not pledge the next 15 years of the process to fulfilling that vision, so that the next judgment on Helsinki can be more positive than this one? And why not begin today?

Thanksgiving Message by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
 Chairman of the United States Delegation
 to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

 American Thanksgiving Service
 Vienna Community Church

November 25, 1987

Vienna, Austria

 Thanksgiving is about a lot of things. One thing it is about is refugees. The Pilgrims who celebrated their first Thanksgiving in Massachusetts in 1621 were refugees from religious persecution in Europe, refugees to a new world where they could practice their Puritan religion freely.

It's sometimes forgotten that the first refuge for this small group of English Puritans was not America but Holland. They spent eleven years in Holland, and when they left for the New World it was not because they lacked freedom to worship but because they could not adjust to the poverty and customs of a strange country.

The 102 passengers who made the four month voyage in the Mayflower were gamblers. They were leaving a secure if difficult environment for an unknown one. Refugees today take similar risks and make similar choices. I would like to say a few words about some of those refugees who touch our lives here in Austria.

There are three large groups of refugees who currently seek to leave the Soviet Union--ethnic Germans, Armenians, and Jews. Nearly all the Jewish emigrants pass through Vienna on their way to Israel or America. Just as Holland provided a refuge for the Puritans in the early 17th century, it is the Dutch Embassy in Moscow which--because it represents Israeli interests in the Soviet Union--handles the emigration of these refugees today.

The Soviet Jews who come to Vienna are escaping from lives of extreme difficulty. They are discriminated against in culture and education, being limited in university and job opportunities and subjected to the anti-Semitism which has continued from Tsarist to Soviet times. If they are religious, they are prevented from learning or teaching Hebrew and are sometimes jailed if they try.

The government of Austria and the Austrian people have for decades welcomed these refugees from oppression. Some Jews remain in Austria; most go on to the United States or Israel. But all, I think, are grateful for the generosity of a country which represents their first important experience with the West.

Having lived for five years in Moscow, my wife and I have had Jewish friends who dreamed of seeking refuge in the United States. Let me tell you about two of them.

The first is Inna Meiman. Inna was was a teacher of philology and English in Moscow. She was the wife of Naum Meiman, a retired mathematician 20 years older than Inna. Naum had done sensitive nuclear research three decades ago; he had also been active in the independent human rights movement in the Soviet Union. For both reasons the Soviet authorities rejected the Meimans' application to emigrate, even though Naum has an American citizen daughter in Colorado. Inna suffered the fate of most Soviets who apply for emigration; she was fired from her job. During the time we knew Inna in Moscow, she learned that she had a cancer in her neck. She and Naum redoubled their efforts to emigrate, but in vain.

As with other exceptional people under stress, Inna's strength of character dominated her pain. In fact her courage and her humor warmed her small Moscow apartment and gave inspiration to her friends. It was as if knowing she was going to die had brought a new richness to her life and had helped her impart it to others.

Then, in January of this year, Inna finally got an exit visa. My wife and I met her at Dulles Airport in Washington and took her to the Georgetown University Hospital. There Inna's humanity, together with her insatiable curiosity about America, had everybody on her floor crowding around her bed. She was fascinated by the way the nurses and doctors really cared and by their candor not only about her illness but about their own lives. For Inna America was a remarkable experience. Unfortunately, it was a short one. The illness had gone too far to be cured; after only three weeks in the United States, Inna died.

The second story has a happy ending. It concerns Vladimir Feltsman, a talented Soviet concert pianist who, while still in his 20's, applied to emigrate. His reasons were artistic; he was sick of the control of the state and party apparatus over Soviet cultural life. As a result Volodya, as he is called, lost the opportunity to play in the major Soviet concert halls; he became a musical unperson. At a plenary session of the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting, I read out a letter written by Volodya to General Secretary Gorbachev; it called on the Soviet Union to recognize its artists, musicians and writers as the pride of Russian culture no matter where they lived, and to allow them freedom of travel. The Soviet delegation ridiculed both my remarks and Volodya's talent, calling him unknown and unimportant.

Nevertheless, last August Volodya, with his wife and four-year-old son, arrived here in Vienna en route to New York. His eight-year long effort to emigrate had succeeded. I was asked by Mrs. Reagan to meet him in Vienna and to give him a letter from her inviting him to play at the White House in September. A later concert was also scheduled for Carnegie Hall. I worried that, without a major concert in eight years, Volodya wouldn't be ready to face the critics. In fact, he had practised seven hours a day during those eight unhappy years, and he assured me that he had never been more ready. The concert at the White House went well and--two weeks ago today--he had a triumphant debut at a packed house at Carnegie Hall. The New York Times said that any doubts about his pianistic strengths or artistic instincts were "blown away"; Newsweek called his playing "wondrous."

Vladimir Feltsman and Inna Meiman are among the most recent in that unbroken line, stretching back nearly four centuries, of those who have sought and found refuge in America. They, like many refugees, are remarkable people. So, of course, were the Bradfords, the Brewsters, the Standishes, the Aldens, and the other Plymouth colonists. But refuge should not be open just to the remarkable. It is the right of everyone to leave his country in search of a new life. In the Vienna CSCE Meeting the United States, Austria, and many other Western and neutral countries are working to inscribe that right in our concluding document over the resistance of the Soviet Union and some of its allies.

No right has a higher value than the right of freedom of movement. It is pre-eminently a right affecting individual human beings, who are the primary subject of U.S. human rights policy and of the American approach to the Vienna meeting. In the Soviet Union the new leadership has allowed more people to emigrate, primarily Germans, Armenians, and Jews. But the pace is slow, and most of those who wish to emigrate are still caught between a world they cannot leave and a world they cannot enter. I think, for example, of Naum Meiman, Inna's widower--an old, sick man of 76 with heart disease and suspected cancer, and with nothing left to live for in the Soviet Union. It is hard to see why his departure should present an insuperable problem to the Soviet government.

It seems to me that this Thanksgiving eve is a good time to turn our thoughts to all who, like the first settlers on our American shores, seek refuge. It has been an important quality of Americans to open our arms to people in trouble and in need. This quality seems no less important in our personal lives than it is in our life as a nation. It seems only fair that we be judged both individually and collectively by how open we are to those who are--in that beautiful biblical phrase--"strangers and pilgrims on the earth."

Statement by Ambassador Samuel Wise
Deputy Head of the United States Delegation

HUMAN RIGHTS DAY

Plenary

December 11, 1987

Mr. Chairman, every year the celebration of Human Rights Day on December 10 provides us all with an opportunity and even a duty to assess the state of affairs in the human rights area. Such an assessment is particularly important in the CSCE where human rights are one of the main pillars of the Helsinki process and, in the final analysis, are the ultimate objective of all our efforts.

Last year on Human Rights Day Ambassador Zimmermann cited a number of courageous individuals whose very names were and are a symbol for human rights throughout the world. He talked about the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg who single-handedly saved thousands of human lives during World War II and who disappeared in the Soviet Union as the war ended. He spoke about Anatoliy Marchenko, a founder of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group and a fighter for human rights all his adult life. As we all know, Marchenko died in prison a little over a year ago protesting human rights abuses to the end. We all remember the stunning impact the news of his death had on this meeting.

Last year Ambassador Zimmerman mentioned names of other individuals whose human rights activism on behalf of others had brought grief and punishment on themselves. We are pleased to note -and it is clearly a sign of progress- that a number of these individuals including Andrei Sakharov are no longer in prison or exile in the Soviet Union and some have been allowed to leave the country.

We have seen other positive steps in the Soviet Union during the past year in the name of glasnost and new thinking -the release of over 200 persons imprisoned for their beliefs rather than their actions; a comprehensive review of the criminal code has been promised and is presumably underway; many problems of family reunification and divided spouses have been resolved; emigration figures have taken an upward swing compared to the recent past and a certain rudimentary if limited freedom of expression has occasionally been permitted. Recently for example, the International Helsinki Federation has been invited to visit the Soviet Union -a visit which has been postponed but seems likely to take place. At the same time, the Soviet authorities seem to have decided to permit the holding of a human rights meeting organized by the unofficial Glasnost Press Club -a meeting which should be taking place now. These developments are important. They are encouraging.

The problem is that these changes are not nearly enough and the total picture is far from rosy. Openness clearly has its limits. Soviet citizens traveling to the Glasnost Press Club meeting have been detained or otherwise prevented from attending. Today's report even speaks of the banning of the meeting. Demonstrations in the Baltic area and Moscow have been permitted to an extent and then broken up. Upwards of 500 known political prisoners remain in jail, including more than a dozen Helsinki monitors. Psychiatric abuse is still practised. Religious freedom is abridged. Minority rights are infringed. Families and spouses still remain to be reunited. Thousands of persons wishing to leave the Soviet Union for other lands are prevented from doing so. The right to leave one's country and return is not honored. The revision of the criminal code goes on but so do the arrests.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, what we have is a mixed picture. By comparison with the frozen past, enormous strides have been taken. By comparison with other participating states, there is still a tremendous way to go.

The same is true in one degree or another in the other states of the Warsaw Treaty. In Bulgaria, the authorities keep a tight rein on politics, religion and national minorities but occasionally let someone leave the country. In Czechoslovakia Charter 77 supporters continue to be harrassed. Some religious activists are released while new ones are arrested. In the German Democratic Republic, there is the expectation of a general amnesty with the release of all political prisoners and some forward movement for religious congregations. But recently there, the authorities took action against members of independent peace and environmental groups. In Hungary where the situation is generally better some members of the opposition have difficulty in securing permission to travel abroad and certain publishers of unofficial publications have been subjected to house searches and other harrassment.

In Romania too this picture is mixed, but the overall assessment is not encouraging. Bibles have been made available to and have been distributed by the Baptist General Union. At the same time, a number of Romanian citizens have been detained on political or religious grounds. There are still complaints about the treatment of national minorities. And, somewhat surprisingly, a number of Western correspondents were refused permission to cover the visit of Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. In Poland, the last year was marked by the release of political prisoners. But this welcome development has not signalled the end of continuing pressure against opposition groups through the use of searches, short-term detention and the imposition of sizeable fines.

Overall, we are pleased to note that, with notable exceptions, there has been some improvement in the lives of a relatively small but significant number of human beings in the last 12 months. But even with this improvement, the nagging questions remain. Why can't all the cases be solved? Why can't we wipe the human rights slate clean and turn our full attention to other urgent problems facing our states and the world? Why do we have to continue to spend so much time and energy on human rights problems which we agreed to resolve 12

years ago and which, as we have seen, can be resolved virtually overnight given the political will. Furthermore, despite fears to the contrary, it can be seen that the resolution of these problems causes no harm to any participating state. On the contrary, we are told by the leadership of the Soviet Union that the changes taking place there, including in the area of human rights, are designed to strengthen the system. So then, why is there hesitation to complete the job and to give each individual the full measure of rights guaranteed in the Helsinki Final Act?

Finally, there is the question of the gap between the human rights developments in the Soviet Union, limited as they are, and their reflection at this meeting. It is hard to understand this gap unless it is another example of bureaucratic delay or possibly an effort to hedge bets that glasnost may not be so irreversible as the Soviet leadership says it is whatever the reason, this gap must closed if we are to have a successful conclusion to our Vienna meeting and if the Soviet Union is to gain the image of credibility and fidelity to commitments which it seems to be seeking. Such an achievement, Mr. Chairman, would not only prove an advance for human rights but for every other area of human endeavor as well. Thank you.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

Plenary Session

Vienna, Austria
December 18, 1987

In Washington last week President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed a Joint Statement in which they "recognized the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union to search for realistic ways to prevent confrontation and to promote a more sustainable and stable relationship between their countries." As regards this Vienna meeting, they expressed their determination, together with the other 33 participants, to bring it "to a successful conclusion, based on balanced progress in all principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document."

The Vienna meeting has not yet felt an impulse from that bilateral commitment. But the five-week period of reflection which begins tomorrow will provide enough time to translate words into actions. On behalf of the United States, I pledge our readiness to work with the Soviet Union and all other participating states toward a result which will advance the Helsinki process and the great principles which animate it.

-- We will work to bring a new era of conventional arms control. With the signing of the INF Treaty and the progress to which we are committed in strategic negotiations, concentration on the conventional area will become even more vital for true security throughout Europe.

-- We will work to ensure that these major steps in military security are balanced by genuine progress in human rights and human contacts. This was the collective commitment undertaken by the Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries just a week ago. Improved implementation of existing commitments is the critical need. We recognize that some steps forward have been made during the life of this meeting. But our belief that progress is at last discernible does not replace our conviction that it is still insufficient.

-- We will work for a Vienna concluding document which must go well beyond the Madrid and Bern documents and which must reflect a new East-West climate and new thinking. A document devoid of substance would be no more acceptable to us than a document containing nothing but trivial undertakings. The excellent work of the neutral and non-aligned coordinators in all baskets has helped to put such a substantial document within reach.

-- We will work toward a balanced set of post-Vienna meetings devoted to those subjects most in need of attention. However, since the follow-up process can be exploited for the purpose of postponing current responsibilities, our flexibility on future meetings will depend on the quality of implementation and of textual commitments during this Vienna meeting.

The test of the capacity of our 35 states to bring the Vienna meeting to an early and successful conclusion will be our ability to deal with human rights, fundamental freedoms, and human contacts--areas where progress is most deficient. The issue here is not imposing alien values or telling others how to behave or driving people into a corner. The issue is following through on commitments which were not imposed but were freely accepted. The issue is winning trust abroad by earning trust at home. The issue is recognizing, as General Secretary Gorbachev put it precisely, that "the world cannot be considered secure if human rights are violated in it."

Statement by Ambassador Robert H. Frowick
on United States Report of On-Site Inspection

In the "S" Group
September 22, 1987

Mr. Chairman:

The United States unequivocally endorses and shares the interpretation of the *raison d'etre* of inspection requests set forth by our British colleague. In the case of the recent United States inspection, there were concerns regarding the precise size and scope of the military exercise which took place during the period August 25 through September 1 in the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the United States elected to exercise its right, in accordance with Paragraph (66) of the Stockholm Document, to request an inspection.

I should like to turn to my country's report of the on-site inspection conducted in the Belorussian Military District during the 48 hour period commencing 0845 GMT, August 28, 1987.

The United States team members completed their inspection at 0845 GMT, August 30, 1987, precisely 48 hours after it began. They immediately returned to their headquarters in the Federal Republic of Germany for a night's rest and thence to the United States for debriefings and preparation of their report. As can be imagined, there was considerable high-level interest in the conduct of this first-ever inspection under the Stockholm regime and several requests for face-to-face briefings. There were almost one thousand photographs which, once developed, required sorting chronologically, and collating with individual tape recordings of each of the four inspectors. Only then could a complete analysis of the inspection begin. This all, of course, took time. The final report of our inspection was completed only last week. By now, a copy of that report should have been provided to all CSCE capitals. I am circulating a copy of that report in each of your mailboxes as well.

I don't intend today to go into the details of the United States inspection report. However, I will share with you our principal conclusions.

First - The United States' inspection was successful in helping to resolve American uncertainties about the precise scope and size of this Soviet military activity.

Second - Based on observations and information gathered by the United States inspection team, the United States believes this activity did not exceed participation levels contained in the Soviet prior notification and, in fact, was considerably below those levels during the period of inspection.

Third - Based on the inspection team's findings, the United States also concludes that the purpose of the activity was in conformity with the purpose stated in the notification.

Fourth - While some questions of procedure and interpretation were raised during the course of the inspection, which will require further consideration, the United States is satisfied with the positive approach demonstrated by the Soviet Union in its treatment of the inspection request and of the inspection team.

Fifth - The United States indeed welcomes the spirit of cooperation shown by many Soviet officers and enlisted men toward the inspectors and hopes that this spirit will extend to others as participating states gain more experience in implementing the Stockholm confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs).

Sixth - This inspection has effectively demonstrated the significant and essential contribution which on-site inspection can make to the confidence- and security-building process. As the most effective means of resolving uncertainties about military activities in Europe, it reinforces all the other measures and is an integral component of the CSBMs regime.

Finally - The United States values the fact that one of the significant achievements of the Stockholm document is its contribution to the process of increasing openness and transparency in the military-security sphere in Europe. Full and unfettered implementation of the inspection provisions is a vital step in that process and a positive development in East-West relations.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Robert H. Frowick
Deputy Chairman, U.S. Delegation

Statement to "S" Group
on
Basket I-Security: U.S. Approach to Debate on CSBMs

October 12, 1987

--As a general proposition, the U.S. sees no need to belabor the task at hand in Vienna, which is simply to reach agreement on resuming work "to build upon and expand" the Stockholm CSBMs.

--The Madrid Mandate remains the foundation of this work.

--There is no need for a wholly new mandate. What is needed is an agreed understanding on how to proceed.

--We think a brief formulation along lines set forth in WT. 129 represents a logical approach to meeting this requirement.

--Our text on this matter should concentrate mainly on procedure. Our procedural language on CSBMs should be distinct from counterpart formulations relating to conventional stability.

--Any thoughts on substance, in our view, should be kept to the minimum. Substantive considerations should generally be left to the CDE negotiators when they resume work on CSBMs, presumably in 1988.

Statement by Ambassador Robert H. Frowick
in "S" Group, October 22, 1987

On U.S. Inspection of USSR Byelorussian Military District
August 28-30, 1987

Reasons For Requesting Inspection

In responding to questions particularly from Swiss rep Sharli regarding reasons which any CSCE participant state should present in requesting an inspection of another CSCE state, Frowick took the following line.

The United States is well aware of responsibilities of all CSCE participant states under paragraph 70 of the Stockholm document. He read the text of paragraph 7Q. Frowick pointed out that the U.S. cited the text of paragraph 66 of the Stockholm document as the reason for its inspection. Frowick stressed that reasons of "doubt", as set forth in paragraph 66 are the proper basis for inspections. We are all at work in the CSCE process trying to build confidence and security. However, doubts and uncertainties undermine the building of confidence. Accordingly they must be dispelled through inspections. Frowick then read his statement in the "S" group of September 22, which indicated U.S. concerns over the precise size and scope of the Soviet exercise and referred to paragraph 66 as the foundation for the U.S. request.

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Delay in Reporting

Frowick subsequently intervened in response to questions especially from Swedish rep Elmer regarding the delay in transmission of the U.S. inspection report. He noted that the inspection was completed on August 30. The inspecting team then proceeded to the FRG for rest. Subsequently, the team members returned to the U.S. There they were obliged to collate a massive amount of data, including over 1,000 photographs.

High level interest in this unprecedented inspection by the United States required the attention of the four inspectors there for some time. The U.S. inspectors wanted to be particularly conscientious and objective. They were able to complete their reports during the week of September 14. The U.S. inspection report was delivered at Vienna on September 22, the opening meeting of the "S" group in the Fall negotiating round.

The U.S. concludes that there was no inordinate delay in its handling of the report on this first time on-site inspection within the USSR. A good faith effort was made to issue the report as soon as possible. However, we can perhaps find ways to speed up the process as we gain more experience with it in the future.

COLONEL WILLIAM W. LOFGREN
MILITARY ADVISOR, U.S. DELEGATION CSCE
TO THE "S" WORKING GROUP

DECEMBER 10, 1987
ON
SOVIET INSPECTION OF EXERCISE "IRON FORGE"

MR. CHAIRMAN:

MY GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO ASSOCIATE ITSELF COMPLETELY WITH THE REMARKS JUST DELIVERED BY OUR DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUE FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. HIS COMMENTS ON THE INSPECTION REPORT AND ON GEN TATARNIKOV'S INTERVENTION LAST WEEK OF THE SOVIET INSPECTION OF EXERCISE "IRON FORGE" IN OCTOBER ADDRESSED POINTS OF CONCERN SHARED BY MY GOVERNMENT.

THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN GENERALLY ENCOURAGED BY THE MANNER IN WHICH INSPECTIONS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT AND REPORTED WITHIN THE STOCKHOLM CSBMS REGIME THIS YEAR, THOUGH THERE HAVE NATURALLY BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS.

THE MOST SERIOUS OF THE SOVIET REMARKS RELATE TO AN IMPLICATION THAT THE UNITED STATES MAY HAVE PURPOSEFULLY GIVEN ERRONEOUS TROOP-STRENGTH FIGURES IN ITS NOTIFICATION. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EXERCISE, THE SOVIET INSPECTION TEAM REQUESTED FROM THEIR FRG HOSTS, AND WERE PROVIDED, A LISTING OF FORCES BY STRENGTH AND NATIONALITY CURRENTLY WITHIN THE SPECIFIED AREA. INSPECTORS WERE TOLD THAT TROOPS AT THE GRAFENWOEHR AND HOHENFELS TRAINING AREAS WERE UNDERGOING ROUTINE FIRING TRAINING THAT WAS NOT PART OF THE EXERCISE "IRON FORGE" OCCURRING ALSO WITHIN THE SPECIFIED AREA.

DURING THE PERIOD OF INSPECTION, THERE WERE IN FACT, MORE U.S. FORCES IN THE SPECIFIED AREA THAN THE 11,650 NOTIFIED FOR "IRON FORGE." HOWEVER, THOSE ADDITIONAL FORCES WERE CLEARLY NOT PART OF THE "IRON FORGE" EXERCISE AND THE FRG HOSTS RELATED THIS TO THE INSPECTORS AT THE TIME OF THE INSPECTION. WITHIN THE GRAFENWOEHR TRAINING AREA, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WERE ON THE DATES OF OCTOBER 28TH TO THE 30TH, BETWEEN 3,500 AND 4,200 U.S. TROOPS. AT THE HOHENFELS TRAINING AREA, THE FIGURES APPROACHED SOME 2,000 TROOPS EACH OF THESE DAYS. THESE U.S. FORCES WERE ENGAGED IN LIVE-FIRE OR TRANSITION TRAINING, COMPLETELY UNRELATED TO "IRON FORGE."

WE WOULD NOTE THAT "IRON FORGE" WAS AN EXERCISE INVOLVING ONLY ELEMENTS OF ONE DIVISION, IN THIS INSTANCE, THE FIRST ARMORED DIVISION. BY FAR THE MAJORITY OF THE FORCES PERFORMING ROUTINE TRAINING IN GRAFENWOEHR DURING THE INSPECTION PERIOD WERE FROM ANOTHER DIVISION ENTIRELY, THE U.S. THIRD ARMORED DIVISION. BY CAREFUL COUNT, EXACTLY 268 MEMBERS OF THE FIRST ARMORED DIVISION WERE AT GRAFENWOEHR DURING THE INSPECTION, BUT THEY WERE ENGAGED IN TRANSITION TRAINING ON NEW EQUIPMENT TOTALLY UNRELATED TO "IRON FORGE."

IN FACT, SOVIET INSPECTORS WERE GIVEN ACCESS TO BOTH GRAFENWOEHR AND HOHENFELS CONSISTENT WITH SAFETY REQUIREMENTS, AS OUR GERMAN COLLEAGUES JUST INDICATED. IN OUR VIEW, THE INSPECTORS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT ACTIVITIES THERE WERE NOT RELATED TO "IRON FORGE." GEN TATARNIKOV'S INTERVENTION INDICATED THAT QUOTE THE SOVIET SIDE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRG THAT APPROXIMATELY 4000 TROOPS OF THE FRG, LOCATED AT THE TIME OF THE INSPECTION AT THE TRAINING AREA GRAFENWOEHR AND HOHENFELS, WERE ENGAGED IN A PLANNED TRAINING ACTIVITY AND WERE NOT TAKING PART IN THE EXERCISE "IRON FORGE", UNQUOTE. IT IS NOT CLEAR IN OUR MIND WHETHER SOVIET INSPECTORS WERE TOLD THAT THE FORCES TRAINING AT GRAFENWOEHR AND HOHENFELS WERE U.S. OR THOSE OF THE FRG, BUT IT IS SOMEWHAT PUZZLING TO US WHY INSPECTORS APPARENTLY CONTINUED TO COUNT THESE FORCES AS PART OF THE EXERCISE.

FURTHER, WE NOTED THAT SOVIET INSPECTORS WERE REPORTEDLY NOT SATISFIED WITH THE RESPONSES THEY RECEIVED TO QUESTIONS ON TROOP STRENGTHS, ALTHOUGH U.S. OFFICERS PRESENT AT THE TIME OF THE INSPECTION HAD NO SENSE OF THIS DISSATISFACTION. TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT AND SO THAT THERE CAN BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS EXERCISE, LET ME REAFFIRM AT THIS TIME THAT EXERCISE "IRON FORGE" WAS CONDUCTED AT THE LEVEL NOTIFIED OVER 42 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF THE ACTIVITY, AT 11,650 TROOPS. THERE WERE NO OTHERS PARTICIPATING IN THIS EXERCISE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, IN IMPLEMENTING THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AGREED AT STOCKHOLM, ALL OF US NEED TO APPLY A RULE OF REASON. IT IS NOT REASONABLE, IN MY JUDGMENT, TO INSINUATE THAT UP TO 4000 TROOPS ENGAGED IN ROUTINE LIVE-FIRING PRACTICE IN AN AREA SET ASIDE FOR VIRTUALLY ROUND-THE-CLOCK TRAINING SHOULD SOMEHOW BE COUNTED AS PART OF A SEPARATE, FINITE LARGE-SCALE EXERCISE THAT HAPPENS TO TAKE PLACE IN THE GENERAL PROXIMITY OF THE FULL TIME TRAINING AREA.

IN ALL THIS ACTIVITY, WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN INSPECTION PRACTICES WHICH MAY WELL SERVE AS AN IMPORTANT PRECEDENT FOR FAR-REACHING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN THE FUTURE. WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO DO OUR UTMOST TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH ONE ANOTHER TO ENSURE THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES ARE FAITHFULLY IMPLEMENTED IN ALL RESPECTS. IT IS WITH A BIT OF IRONY, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT WE FIND IT NECESSARY TO CLEAR THE RECORD HERE WITH REGARD TO THE "IRON FORGE" INSPECTION AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT IN HISTORY WHEN OUR RESPECTIVE U.S. AND SOVIET LEADERS, LESS THAN 48 HOURS AGO, USHERED IN A NEW ERA IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT. TAKING OUR CUE FROM THE SPIRIT OF WASHINGTON, LET US ALL REAFFIRM OUR COMMITMENT TO THE OBLIGATIONS WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT AND TO ITS FAITHFUL IMPLEMENTATION.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.