

**Report on  
The U.S. Helsinki Commission Delegation to  
Romania, Macedonia, Kosovo (Serbia) and Vienna (Austria)  
April 1993**

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**ROMANIA**  
*April 16-17, 1993*

**Objectives**

The Commission delegation's visit to Romania, the first since April 1990, had two main objectives. The first was to assess, through meetings with a broad spectrum of non-governmental and official actors, Romania's current level of democratic and market reform. The second was in recognition of Romania's critical role in the effort to enforce U.N. sanctions against Serbia and Macedonia, and the broader political and strategic role of Romania in the Balkans.

The Commission delegation aimed to focus on issues that have been of concern to the U.S. Congress in anticipation of the restoration of Most Favored Nation trade status to Romania: protection of human rights; parliamentary oversight of the intelligence and security forces; and safeguards for an independent media, particularly television. To that end, the delegation met with non-governmental human rights and civic organizations, media representatives, members of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense, Public Order, and National Security, and President Ion Iliescu.

On April 17, the delegation traveled to Giurgiu, on the banks of the Danube, to take part in a ceremony commemorating the transfer of six U.S. speed boats to the Romanian and Bulgarian customs authorities in connection with sanctions enforcement efforts. The ceremony included high level Romanian officials and members of the U.S. diplomatic corps, including U.S. Ambassador John R. Davis, Director of Customs Mihai Panzariu, and Minister of Finance Florin Georgescu.

**The Context of the Visit**

The Commission arrived in Bucharest at a time of insecurity and crisis in the region, insecurity that was palpable in Romania as well. With the conflict in the former Yugoslavia raging unabated and Russian President Boris Yeltsin facing a serious challenge from conservative forces, Romania's sense of vulnerability was particularly acute. Indeed, in the months and weeks prior to the Commission's visit, Bucharest had undertaken a flurry of diplomatic activity, including signing bilateral agreements with Turkey and Greece, to secure its footing in the troubled neighborhood. Yet continued economic deterioration at home, with declining living standards and growing public discontent, served as a constant reminder that Romania's internal challenges were great as well.

Even so, as the first official Commission delegation to visit Romania since April 1990, the delegation was able to conduct an important assessment, and, in some cases, positive re-evaluation, of Romania's current stage of political and economic reform. The delegation was impressed by many of the changes that were visible since 1990, from the growing number of commercial enterprises in Bucharest to the energy and organization of the non-governmental human rights community to the ambitious motivation of independent media representatives to the openness with which Romanians in general spoke to the delegation of their work, opinions, and aspirations. While the delegation did not fail to raise and explore areas of continued concern, neither could it fail to notice and appreciate the positive trends underway.

Romania held free, multiparty parliamentary and presidential elections on September 27, 1992. These were the first general elections since May 1990, when President Ion Iliescu and the National Salvation Front (FSN) were swept into power. The 1992 elections resulted in a second strong victory for President Iliescu; the parliament, however, was fractured among a number of parties, including two nationalist parties and the former communist party, presaging a contentious legislative environment for the next four years.

President Iliescu's party, the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN -- the conservative wing of the FSN, which split in March 1992), formed a minority government led by a little-known economist, Nicolae Vacaroiu. The opposition, meanwhile, essentially refused to participate in policy-making, apparently banking on the likelihood that the economy would continue to falter and the present government would fall. With little consensus on how to govern the country, much of the public remained skeptical of any party- or individual's ability to steer Romania toward prosperity.

At the time of the Commission's visit, the sharpest issue on everyone's mind was the terrible state of the economy and the social unrest that was expected to accompany the May 1 lifting of price subsidies on basic foodstuffs and resources. Prime Minister Vacaroiu had submitted his government's four-year economic program to parliament in March 1993, and been immediately attacked by both sides of the political spectrum. While his plan, in principle, continued the free-market reforms initiated by previous governments, including lifting of price subsidies, the opposition claimed that it failed to mention specific measures and timetables for implementing the reform ideas. The conservative wing of the FDSN, meanwhile, complained that it lacked sufficient emphasis on social welfare, a key component of the FDSN's electoral platform. Vacaroiu survived an opposition-initiated no confidence vote on March 19, but it was clear that support for his program remained tenuous.

Despite a tarnished human rights record in the years immediately after the fall of Ceausescu, by the time of the Commission's visit, respect for human rights and democratic institutions had clearly improved, as demonstrated, for example, in the much-improved preparation and administration of the general elections. The strong showing of nationalist parties in these elections gave cause for concern, nonetheless, as Romania, with its large Gypsy and ethnic Hungarian minorities, is certainly not immune to extremist or xenophobic

appeals. Indeed, President Ion Iliescu's decision to visit Washington, DC, in the days after the Commission's visit for the opening of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum was the subject of bitter attacks in the extremist press at the time of the Commission's arrival.

The volatile situation in Cluj, where ultra-nationalist Mayor Gheorghe Funar has deliberately circumscribed the rights of ethnic Hungarians, was perhaps the most visible example of continuing tensions between ethnic groups in Romania at the time of the Commission's visit. The Government's recent decision to appoint ethnic Hungarian prefects to Covasna and Harghita, the two majority Hungarian counties in Romania, had also provoked massive demonstrations and outrage from the ethnic Hungarian community. A positive development that coincided with the Commission's visit, however, was the establishment of an intergovernmental Consultative Council on National Minorities, to explore ways of promoting inter-ethnic cooperation.

Additional areas of Commission concern included the continued absence of an effective system of parliamentary oversight for the Romanian Intelligence Service, and the apparent lack of accessibility -- and, consequently, accountability -- of the Parliament itself.

The ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia had already had significant ramifications in Romania by the time of the Commission's visit. Serbia has traditionally been one of Romania's friendlier neighbors and trading partners, and Romania had variously been accused of violating the sanctions, breaking the arms embargo, and so on earlier in the crisis. Much criticism was levied in February 1993 after five barges loaded with thousands of tons of oil evaded Romanian and Bulgarian customs authorities and steamed down the Danube to Serbia. Nevertheless, most analysts agreed that Romania was enforcing the sanctions as best it could, under difficult conditions and at great cost. A U.S.-led team of international sanctions monitors arrived in Romania in late 1992 to assist in compliance.

### **The Delegation Visit**

Following the country-team briefing covering political, economic, and social issues at the U.S. Embassy, the delegation proceeded to the U.S. Cultural Center for a roundtable meeting with representatives of human rights and civic organizations: the Romanian Helsinki Committee, Pro-Democracy Association, League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADO), and the Romanian Independent Society of Human Rights (SIRDO).

Two primary topics were covered in the course of the meeting: continued barriers to effective public participation in the policy-making process, as illustrated by the efforts the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were making to lobby against two pieces of draft legislation that would circumscribe basic rights, and the general need for continued civic and political education in Romania, a need many of the NGOs were trying to address with programs in schools and prisons as well as by organizing town meetings between elected officials and constituents.

When asked about the obstacles NGOs encountered in their efforts to influence policy-making, many lamented the difficulties of getting draft pieces of legislation in advance. Often they became aware of pending legislation only as the debate got underway. Debates in the parliamentary commissions were closed, and access to the Parliament building was complicated in and of itself, further limiting the public's ability to offer timely recommendations or express concerns. Some felt that secret voting and the party list system by which members were elected eroded the sense of accountability that parliamentarians felt to their constituents.

The NGO representatives provided the Commission delegation with substantial written material, including information regarding the two draft laws in question. One of the bills proposed the establishment of a government body to oversee private legal organizations, such as NGOs, political parties, and unions; the government body would theoretically have the authority to monitor private groups' activity and to impose fines or restrictions if it felt such punitive action was warranted. The second bill proposed banning "armed demonstrations"; the definition of "armed," however, amounted to the presence of two persons bearing instruments that could be used as weapons. The Romanian Helsinki Committee, in particular, was conducting its own comparative legal work and analysis to demonstrate how these two bills -- which had been submitted to the parliament by the executive -- failed to protect basic rights.

From the NGO roundtable, the Commission delegation traveled to the home of U.S. Embassy Public Affairs Officer Richard Virden for a luncheon meeting with media representatives. The guests included print and electronic media journalists, both national and local, as well as members of the National Audio Visual Council. Representatives of Romanian Television were present, including the assistant director of minority language programming, as well as representatives of independent stations. The Commission delegation was able to talk with a wide variety of individuals and to gain a broad range of perspectives on the current state of the media in Romania.

Among the impressions the delegation took away was the sense that many of the obstacles currently confronted by Romanian media stem from a lack of resources. Independent broadcasters who had received licenses for local stations needed to scramble to find the transmitters and other equipment necessary to keep a show on the air. Print journalists were stung by the high cost of paper, and forced to rely on state delivery systems for distribution. Nonetheless, the delegation did not hear the kind of reports that were common in earlier years that independent or opposition newspapers were thrown off trains or left undelivered in the stations. Indeed, the delegation was impressed by the upbeat and energetic attitude of the journalists present.

Prior to the Commission's departure for Romania, numerous concerns had been raised regarding the appointment of Paul Everac, a noted nationalist, xenophobe, and anti-Semite, to head Romanian Television. In a conversation with the assistant director of minority language programming at RTV, a member of the Commission staff was told that

Everac's efforts to restrict minority language news broadcasts had failed; the order had been adopted but never enforced. Others the delegation spoke with commented critically on Everac's weekly appearance on RTV, which they seemed to feel was self-promoting and intrusive, but did not complain that he was spreading anti-Semitic or anti-Hungarian rhetoric. The mood regarding his appointment as head of RTV seemed to be one of frustrated resignation.

Following the media luncheon, the delegation departed for the Romanian parliament building for a meeting with the parliamentary Committee on Defense, Public Order, and National Security. The meeting was attended by the respective Committee heads of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, Radu Alexandru Timofte and Petre Roman, as well as two junior members, one from the Peasants Party and one from the Democratic National Salvation Front. Helsinki Commission Chairman DeConcini, who is also Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, invited the Romanian parliamentarians to describe what kind of oversight they had over the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), particularly with regard to setting the budget, requesting information, and confirming the appointment of an SRI director. He stressed the critical role that parliamentary oversight can play in ensuring that intelligence and security services are performing their important job without exploiting their privileges or abusing individual rights.

The parliamentarians explained that the SRI was formed in April 1990, under a provisional government and a provisional parliament, and that the law on the SRI had been promulgated in February 1992. Up until the present, however, there had been virtually no parliamentary control of the SRI, even though according to the law, the SRI should be under much greater parliamentary authority than simply budgetary. A joint committee for parliamentary control of the SRI was envisioned but as yet unformed.

With regard to access to information, the delegation was told that during the previous parliament, SRI Director Senator Virgil Magureanu had been unable to present his report on the SRI's activity because the legislative calendar had been too tight. The Committee hoped, nonetheless, that the SRI Director's report would be a priority for the current parliamentary session.

When asked about their perspective on the necessity of an oversight framework, both Committee leaders were emphatic in their agreement that parliamentary oversight was essential and overdue. Deputy Roman mentioned continuing allegations that SRI was involved in political activity; Chairman DeConcini raised the Iran/Contra scandal as an example of similar experiences in the United States, but pointed out the critical role that Congressional Committees had played in exposing the abuses and wrongdoings. When asked when they estimated the joint committee would be established, the Committee leaders speculated spring or summer.

The Commission delegation also posed a number of general questions regarding the present possibility for oversight, the tools of the envisioned oversight committee, and the current status of the former Securitate files.

Senator Timofte began by noting that the oversight committee's main lever of control would be the SRI budget. Also, based on the many complaints his committee had received concerning the SRI, he expected that they would conduct their own investigations. The U.S. system would serve as an important model for their work. Currently, the SRI is subordinate to the executive National Council for Defense, and theoretically to parliament as well. Magureanu had provided the Committee information on two occasions last year; Timofte hoped that in the future it would be a monthly practice. Concerning the appointment of a director, the joint commission was responsible for forwarding the president's recommendation to the parliament. Timofte believed that if the joint commission gave a negative recommendation, the nominee would no longer receive consideration. Finally, on the Securitate files, Timofte asserted that the SRI had no control over them and that they were being stored by the Ministry of Defense. He did note, however, that it was his suspicion that some of them had been reviewed by the SRI.

Deputy Roman suggested that in post-revolutionary Romania, the allegiances and machinations of the former Securitate remained a heavy burden to be dealt with. It was difficult, for example, to evaluate the reports the committee received about alleged abuses of the SRI -- Was it the old Securitate, or new elements in the new structure? As a former prime minister who never had control of the SRI, Roman declared, the greatest challenge lay in appointing a new head, who would be "democratic from top to toe." Given the hierarchical structure of the SRI, strong, honest leadership would filter down. With regard to the Securitate files, Roman pointed out that while the hard files were archived with the Ministry of Defense, all the computerized information remained in the hands of SRI.

In closing, Chairman DeConcini brought up the points the human rights and civic NGOs had raised earlier in the day. He explained that complaints continued to be raised with the Helsinki Commission regarding the openness of parliamentary activity, and stressed that the Commission believed the press and public need to be able to see how their representatives vote, in committee and on the floor, as well as to have access to the testimony of debate. He expressed sympathy for security requirements, but emphasized that unless national security is truly involved, the legislative process should be open. Raising the two draft laws that the Romanian Helsinki Committee had described, Chairman DeConcini acknowledged that the Members of Parliament might or might not pass the bills, but the point was that the debate should be open. The public needs to know where its representatives stand.

Deputy Roman agreed that, without any concerted effort on the part of the government or parliament, it was absolutely true that public access to parliament was limited. He mentioned the Romanians' lack of practice and experience in public relations, and said they needed to struggle for broader public access and exchange of views and



information. With regard to the draft legislation in question, it was true that they existed as bills. In Roman's view, however, they were absolutely unacceptable, and in fact, he asserted, his committee had informed the government that it would not consider the legislation unless the Minister of Defense came before the committee to testify.

In closing, the Commission delegation expressed thanks for the Committee's time and cooperation, and offered whatever assistance might be appropriate, at whatever stage of the debate or establishment of the oversight commission would be most useful. Chairman DeConcini stressed that this was the kind of responsibility that all parliamentarians share, and urged the Romanians to work with the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly as well.

Next, the delegation traveled to Cotroceni Palace for a meeting with President Ion Iliescu. After commending President Iliescu for his decision to attend the Holocaust Museum dedication, as well as for Romania's role in the effort to enforce the United Nations sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, Chairman DeConcini turned the discussion to some of the concerns that had been raised during the course of the delegation's previous meetings. Mentioning first the controversial draft legislation emanating from the government, and next the current lack of effective parliamentary oversight for the SRI, Chairman DeConcini noted that President Iliescu had an important strategic role to play in selecting the SRI director.

President Iliescu responded by stating that Romania was the only country in the region to abolish its security services following the events of 1989. He asserted that Romania had dismantled all the old Securitate prerogatives, and that 80 percent of the SRI staff was new. Moreover, he declared, parliamentary control had been established by law. He himself supported the establishment of an effective framework for parliamentary oversight of the SRI.

Commissioner Richardson, recognizing the important progress that had been made in building democracy in Romania, raised a number of issues of continued concern: SRI oversight; parliamentary openness; conditions in the orphanages and institutions; respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities; and the independence of Romanian Television, in particular, the need for a respected and objective individual at its head.

President Iliescu noted that he appreciated the Commission's comments and that he was glad the delegation had visited Romania because it was difficult to get an accurate picture from abroad. He explained that most Romanians had been stung by the U.S. Congress' denial of MFN until now; they didn't understand why the United States wanted to punish the people of Romania. Chairman DeConcini remarked that in the aftermath of the December 1989 events, and particularly following the miners' rampage through Bucharest in June 1990, Washington's perception of the democratic credentials and intent of the new Romanian authorities had been thrown into doubt. He emphasized, however, that it was important to maintain a dialogue and that the Commission delegation's visit was part of that effort.

The Commission delegation also asked about the economic prognosis for the immediate future, especially with the May 1 lifting of price subsidies. President Iliescu suggested that this was in some ways the hardest year Romania had faced so far, as they attempted to liberate prices and demonopolize industry. He noted that Romania currently has some 300,000 private companies, but that most are very small. Inflation is currently a terrible burden on everyone. He also pointed out the strains that the loss of the COMECON market and the imposition of the various UN sanctions and embargoes (against Iraq, Libya, and now Serbia/Montenegro) had placed on the Romanian economy.

Finally, Commissioner Richardson asked what President Iliescu suspected would happen in the upcoming referendum in Russia, and whether or not President Boris Yeltsin would survive. President Iliescu admitted that from Romania's perspective, Yeltsin was the best Russia had to offer, but he expressed concern that Yeltsin might not navigate the delicate transition period successfully, and sympathized with Yeltsin's difficulties in satisfying a frustrated population that had expected democracy to bring prosperity in tow.

After a brief press conference, the Commission delegation attended a reception in its honor at the residence of U.S. Ambassador John R. Davis. The guests included parliamentarians, political party leaders, NGOs and journalists, and representatives of U.S. organizations currently doing human rights or civic work in Romania.

The following morning, April 17, 1993, the delegation traveled to Giurgiu, on the banks of the Danube, to participate in a ceremony commemorating the transfer of six U.S. speedboats to Romanian and Bulgarian customs authorities. Though poor weather prohibited the planned meeting with Bulgarian officials in the middle of the Danube River, the ceremony on the Romanian side was well-attended by official representatives and the press. Chairman DeConcini, U.S. Ambassador John R. Davis, Romanian Director of Customs Mihai Panzariu, and Romanian Minister of Finance Florin Georgescu made brief statements while the speedboats, operated by members of the U.S. Coast Guard, conducted exhibition exercises on the river. Chairman DeConcini stressed the importance the United States placed on the sanctions effort, and expressed his appreciation for Romania's contribution. Noting that the delegation had come to Romania to assess progress in democratization and respect for human rights, he emphasized how pleased the United States was to cooperate in a law enforcement mission with Romanian and Bulgarian authorities, and that he believed this would lead to further cooperation in other areas as well.

Following the sanctions ceremony, the delegation returned to Bucharest and boarded the aircraft for Macedonia.

## MACEDONIA

*April 17, 1993*

### Objectives

The Commission delegation travelled to Macedonia essentially to complete the itinerary of a visit to the area in November 1992, which had to be cut short because of inclement weather conditions. Indeed, the signs of the oncoming winter which the Commission saw at that time led it to raise concern over the deteriorating conditions which Macedonia and the tens of thousands of Bosnian refugees residing there faced. These conditions were a result of the collapse of the Yugoslav federation of which Macedonia was a constituent part, and the subsequent undesired -- and from the November delegation's view, undeserved -- political and economic isolation of the former Yugoslav republic internationally. The April 1993 visit afforded a useful opportunity to see firsthand the extent to which it had satisfactorily coped with these deteriorating conditions and the prospects generally for the stability and democratization of an independent Macedonia.

A second purpose for visiting Macedonia was, similar to Romania, to examine the extent to which economic sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro by the United Nations were being enforced, especially since these sanctions were so far the strongest measures taken by the international community to compel those responsible for the aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina to stop that aggression. Prior to the visit, there were reports of regular violations of the sanctions.

### The Context of the Visit

The republic of Macedonia is about the size of the state of Maryland with a population of just over two million, the majority of which consider themselves ethnic Macedonians, 25-40 percent ethnic Albanians, 5 percent Turks and 2 percent Muslims, Gypsies and Serbs respectively. While Macedonians, along with the small Serb community, are primarily Eastern Orthodox Christians, most of the remaining population is of Islamic faith. The republic is located in the center of the Balkan peninsula and was the southernmost part of the former Yugoslav federation, having borders with Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Kosovo and Serbia proper. Its capital is Skopje.

At the time of the visit, Macedonia still had, as its primary preoccupation, achieving international recognition of its own independent statehood. Following the de facto break-up of the Yugoslav federation in late 1991 and early 1992, Macedonia opted for its own independence on the basis of a popular referendum held in September 1991. The Macedonian Government applied for the recognition of the European Community (EC) member states, who were at that time still spearheading the international response to the Yugoslav crisis, that December, and was subsequently declared by the EC Arbitration

Commission to have met the necessary criteria, including those relating to human rights. Greece, an EC member, was nevertheless blocking recognition by the Community, as well as Macedonian membership in the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Greek officials objected to the former Yugoslav republic's use of the name "Macedonia," which, they alleged, implied territorial ambitions vis-a-vis Greece, and claimed that the Macedonian national identity was a communist creation. Other Greek complaints included Macedonian constitutional provisions which were interpreted to substantiate fears of territorial claims, the adoption of a flag with the sixteen-pointed star of Vergina used by Philip of Macedon (father of Alexander the Great and a central figure in Greek history), as well as "propaganda" emanating from Skopje which was supposedly reinterpreting regional history to the detriment of Macedonia's place in Greek history and heritage. Behind these complaints, of course, was the "Macedonian question" itself, the cause of considerable violence and warfare throughout the twentieth century. At issue was the actual identity of the Slavic people inhabiting historic Macedonia, and Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian claims to some or all of the territory to which this names applies.

Regardless of the contrasting historical claims, by late 1992 the refusal of virtually the entire international community of Macedonia was becoming politically destabilizing for Macedonia, encouraging nationalist elements to challenge the moderates in power and, on the opposite side of the ethno-political spectrum, separatist tendencies among the Albanian community, based largely on complaints of human rights violations and a sense of being denied equal treatment in the republic. Exacerbating this problem, and most evident to the Helsinki Commission delegation which visited Macedonia in November 1992, was the economic isolation of the republic. Already devastated by the breakup of the Yugoslav economy on which it was so dependent, Macedonia was subjected to a Greek economic blockade imposed under the guise of ensuring enforcement of the sanctions on Serbia. Meanwhile, Macedonia was having difficulty obtaining any meaningful assistance for the tens of thousands of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina within its borders.<sup>1</sup>

During the winter months of 1992-93, the international community increasingly saw the need to prevent a spillover of the conflict which continued to rage in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such a spillover could come directly from Serbia, which was believed to have at least some consideration of territorial ambitions regarding Macedonia. Indeed, there were signs that the relatively small Serb community in Macedonia was being stirred up by radical forces with roots in Serbia itself, and incidents along the Serbian/Kosovo border involving

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<sup>1</sup> For a fuller treatment of the "Macedonian question," the Republic of Macedonia's attempts to achieve international recognition of its statehood, and the implications of continued non-recognition, see: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Report on the U.S. Helsinki Commission Delegation to Hungary, Greece, Macedonia and Croatia (CODEL DeConcini)*, December 1992, pp. 7-17.

Albanians from Macedonia added to inter-ethnic squabbling in the republic. A more immediate threat, however, was the possibility of an outbreak of massive violence in an already highly tense Kosovo, which could cause tens of thousands of Albanians to flee to Albanian-inhabited regions of Macedonia and draw neighboring Albania itself into the fighting. Regardless of the scenario, the United Nations decided in December 1992 to deploy a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) of seven hundred in Macedonia, virtually, all from Nordic countries, with a mandate to monitor developments along the border with Serbia/Kosovo as well as with Albania. A much smaller, multinational spillover monitoring mission under the auspices of the CSCE, with a more political and republic-wide mandate, had already been in place in Skopje for some months prior to UNPROFOR's arrival.

In addition, as with every country bordering Serbia and Montenegro (except Bosnia-Herzegovina, itself), a multinational team of primarily customs experts was assembled and sent to Macedonia as a Sanctions Assistance Mission (SAM) under joint CSCE/EC auspices, in order to help improve enforcement of economic sanctions through cross-border controls. Such a mission was viewed as particularly important for Macedonia, since its border with Serbia/Kosovo had only recently become an international frontier which needed patrolling.

Meanwhile, although the differences between Macedonia and Greece continued to be profound on many fronts, there was some easing of the situation between them. Greece, for example, released oil it was holding which Macedonia had already purchased and desperately needed during the winter. Fuel shortages gradually became less of a problem. Toward Spring 1993, Greek-Macedonian compromises led to agreement to permit Macedonia to become a United Nations member in April, albeit under the designation of "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." Subsequently, several European countries, including Denmark and the United Kingdom, recognized Macedonia bilaterally on the basis of its UN membership. Moreover, under the auspices of International Conference of Yugoslavia co-chaired by Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, Greece and Macedonia began a two-month schedule of confidence-building talks designed to address still outstanding issues. Macedonia continued to be blocked from full membership in the CSCE, not only by Greece but by Albania on the pretext of the human rights situation for the Albanian community in Macedonia. Nevertheless, it was granted observer status.

### **The Delegation Visit**

Arriving at midday on Saturday, April 17, the first delegation activity was a luncheon meeting with the heads of the CSCE, UNPROFOR and SAM missions based in Macedonia. Discussion centered on the various duties of each of the international teams, as well as their perspectives of the situation in Macedonia. The luncheon was followed by a meeting with the President of the Republic, Kiro Gligorov, a visit to the Tabanovce border-crossing with Serbia about one half-hour's drive outside of Skopje, and a meeting with Macedonian Assembly President, Stojan Andov.

The first impression the delegation had was that the situation in Macedonia had improved markedly compared to the situation only a few months ago. As winter passed, the fuel situation had returned largely to normal, and the enhanced international presence appeared to have a stabilizing effect. Moreover, the visit came on the heels of Macedonia's UN membership and the government's survival of a no-confidence vote over the compromise name designation which made it possible.

President Gligorov and Assembly head Andov both expressed appreciation to Chairman DeConcini for the efforts he has undertaken as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission on Macedonia's behalf, including advocating the international recognition of the republic. Chairman DeConcini, in turn, noted the positive developments that were taking place and expressed hope that remaining problems could be addressed in the near future and that the United States would recognize Macedonia soon. As time passed, he commented, compromises such as that made for the UN designation would be insignificant compared to what the compromises achieved. President Gligorov nevertheless noted that there were limits to the further compromises that could be made, adding that Macedonia felt it was continually having to give-in to the demands of others.

Following-up on this point, Representative Richardson explained that he had come to Skopje with an open mind but that there were concerns regarding Macedonia as far as the existence of extreme nationalist elements and respect for human rights, especially for members of the Albanian community. He also noted that, besides the well known effectiveness of Greek lobbying in the United States, Greece is an important ally whose genuinely felt views had to be taken into account. Nevertheless, Representative Richardson concluded, the world was moving in a direction favorable to Macedonia, which hopefully could soon join the international community. Chairman DeConcini also inquired about the existence of a human rights commission in Macedonia, as the possibility of such a commission, which would have the objectivity and authority to deal effectively with human rights complaints, had been raised during the November 1992 Commission visit.

Andov and Gligorov noted that the rector of St. Kiril and Metodij University, Professor Tomislav Chokrevski, had organized a forum for human rights.<sup>2</sup> Andov nevertheless indicated that a parliamentary commission would also be considered. Andov also agreed with the concerns about expressions of extreme nationalism, which do not help Macedonia, but he said he felt that support for nationalists was no very strong. As far as

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<sup>2</sup> Information describing the Forum for Human Rights was forwarded to the Commission through the CSCE Monitoring Mission subsequent to the Commission's visit. It was founded in 1989 and has focused on developing a culture of human rights, on which it had achieved some successes, and working on individual cases, on which its accomplishments were more limited. The CSCE Mission has indicated an interest in helping the Forum and the government develop their abilities to monitor human rights violations and enforce international human rights standards.

Greece, Andov admitted that the United States, under a new Administration, was moving too far in the direction of Greece instead of taking an objective position. President Gligorov opined that contacts with the Clinton Administration were not as good as the Macedonian Government would like.

Enforcement of UN economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro was a major concern of the delegation during the course of its visit. With the assistance of the Sanctions Assistance Mission in Macedonia, the delegation travelled to the Tabanovce border crossing just north of Skopje to see how vehicles entering Serbia were being inspected. The crossing was busy and somewhat chaotic, with only a single lane (i.e., no inspection lines) at the Macedonian checkpoint. While there, a truck with license plates indicating that it was from Serbia attempted to cross the border; it only received a cursory inspection and then was turned around on the basis of having improper papers. A rather frustrated and candid Macedonian customs officer explained the difficulties in thoroughly monitoring the traffic which passes through, noting that the border with Serbia was only an administrative one, with no checkpoints, until Macedonia proclaimed its independence just over one year earlier. As a result, he explained, there not only is a shortage of trained customs personnel in Macedonia, but a lack of proper equipment for inspection of cargo. A similar situation exists just a few hundred yards away at a railroad checkpoint.

Chairman DeConcini and Representative Richardson raised the reports of sanctions violations and what they had seen at Tabanovce with their Macedonian interlocutors in Skopje. Both President Gligorov and Assembly head Andov admitted the difficulties in enforcement. This was not the cause of a lack of intent on the part of the Macedonian authorities, they explained, but a lack of equipment and personnel to staff crossing points of borders which were only recently and rather hastily created. They did note, however, the severe consequences the sanctions were having on the Macedonian economy, which was closely tied to Serbia under the former Yugoslav federation and still isolated from alternative foreign markets by the lack of international recognition. Gligorov explained that, for sanctions to be properly enforced right away, Macedonia would simply have to close the borders completely. Andov noted that industrial production was already below 50 percent of the 1990 level in Macedonia, with 30 percent unemployed. A full enforcement of the sanctions, he predicted, would lead to almost a 50 percent increase in the number of unemployed workers. Finally, threats against Macedonia made by Serb extremists, who were making inroads among Macedonia's Serbian population, were mentioned, indicating a potential threat to Macedonia's national security.

It was clear from these conversations that Macedonia was committed to cooperation with the international community in bringing an end to the Yugoslav crisis and the war it has caused, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but that continued isolation due to non-recognition left the former Yugoslav republic not only the most directly affected by the sanctions but the most vulnerable as well, with the fewer options than other countries to mitigate their consequences.





## **KOSOVO**

### ***April 18, 1993***

#### **Objectives**

The purpose of the Commission delegation's visit to Kosovo was to observe firsthand the volatile situation there. This situation is a matter of considerable international concern given the chances for the war in nearby Bosnia-Herzegovina to have a spillover effect in which the tensions which exist between the Serbian authorities and the majority Albanian population could erupt into violence, either by intent or by spontaneous incident. The delegation wanted to hear the views of the authorities as well as of the leaders of the Albanian community, and to raise its concerns, particularly to the authorities regarding human rights. Finally, the delegation wanted to learn about the activities of the CSCE Mission of Long-Duration based in Kosovo to monitor developments in the area and to ease tensions in society.

These were also the goals of the Commission when it planned to visit Kosovo in November 1992, but inclement weather had compelled that Commission delegation to cancel its visit. The last Commission delegation to visit Kosovo was in April 1990, although members of the Commission staff had visited the province since.

#### **The Context of the Visit**

Kosovo -- considered by Serbs to be an integrated province of Serbia and by its Albanian population to be an independent republic -- is a region slightly smaller than the state of Connecticut bordering Montenegro and Serbia proper within the new, self-proclaimed Yugoslav federation, as well as with Macedonia and Albania. It has a population of about two million, approximately 90 percent of which is ethnic Albanian, 6 percent Serb, 1.5 percent Montenegrin and the remainder primarily ethnic Muslim, Gypsy and Turk. The Albanians, along with the Muslims and Turks, are primarily of the Islamic faith, while the Serbs and Montenegrins are Eastern Orthodox Christians. Pristina is the capital of Kosovo.

Kosovo and its status has been a matter of considerable dispute and, in many ways, was a catalyst for the ethnic passions that grew to the hatred and violence causing Yugoslavia's ultimate demise. The situation there, in fact, was a central issue on which Slobodan Milosevic focused as he rose within the ranks of Serbian politics. Formally considered a province of Serbia, ethnic Serbs live in Kosovo and consider it to be the center of their medieval kingdom and the cradle of their culture. Ethnic Albanians, however, have made up a majority of the population for decades, and their percentage has increased to 90 percent as a result of their own high birth rates and of Serb outmigration, claimed to have been caused by Albanian harassment but due also to economic conditions.

Along with Vojvodina, the other province in Serbia, Kosovo was given considerable autonomy as a result of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. When increased educational and cultural opportunities for Albanians were not accompanied by successful economic development, reviving Albanian pride turned to nationalist protest demanding separation from Serbia. Demonstrations caused a crackdown in 1981, with further arrests through the remainder of the decade. Resurging Serbian nationalism, in turn, caused the Serbian authorities under Slobodan Milosevic to assert greater control over the affairs of the province, and, in 1990, to take away its autonomy completely. Ensuing unrest led to further violence and increased repression of the Albanian population, including the massive firing of Albanians from their jobs and the imposition of a Serb-oriented school curriculum. In response, Albanian community leaders organized themselves, held their own referendum in late 1991, and declared Kosovo an independent republic, electing their own leaders in May 1992. Ibrahim Rugova, head of the Democratic League of Kosovo, was elected President of the self-proclaimed republic.<sup>3</sup>

Since then, with the violent collapse of the Yugoslav federation that includes the current aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo has been at a stand-off between the Albanian population and the Serbian authorities. The latter have continued to control the affairs of the province, and instances of police brutality and other human rights violations are frequently reported. During the second half of 1992, the government of the new federation, led by Milan Panic, engaged in some dialogue with Albanian leaders, particularly regarding education, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. His departure from the scene following the flawed federal and republic elections in December 1992, decreased the possibilities for compromises to be achieved. Albanian leaders, meanwhile, have proceeded to follow a policy of passive resistance to Serbian authority and to organize independently their own affairs. They boycotted the December 1992 elections, just as they did for the first multiparty elections in Serbia in December 1990.

The international community has been concerned about the possibilities for a spillover of the Bosnian conflict into Kosovo, with potentially explosive consequences for neighboring Albania and Macedonia that could lead to a full Balkan war. This concern was deep enough to cause U.S. President George Bush, in the waning weeks of his Administration, to warn Serbian President Milosevic that an aggressive action in Kosovo would prompt a direct U.S. response, a message which was repeated by President Bill Clinton soon after he assumed office in January 1993.

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<sup>3</sup> For a fuller account of the situation in Kosovo up to 1991, see: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Minority Rights: Problems, Parameters and Patterns in the CSCE Context*, Summer 1991, pp. 117-128.

In addition, as part of the larger effort to contain the conflict, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) established Missions of Long-Duration to Kosovo -- as well as to two other regions of the new, self proclaimed Yugoslav federation with ethnically mixed populations (Sandzak and Vojvodina) -- with an essentially two-fold mission to report objectively and regularly to the CSCE States on the situation and to seek to ease tensions by fostering dialogue among various parties. A CSCE Mission office was established in Pristina, with branch offices in the cities of Pec and Prizren. Some thought has been given to the deployment of United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) in Kosovo as well, but Serbian authorities had only grudgingly accepted the presence of the relatively small CSCE mission -- the only permanent international presence in Kosovo -- and has expressed no willingness to internationalize the Kosovo situation further and to their own perceived detriment. The world community has repeatedly and strongly condemned Serbian repression in Kosovo, which some view as tantamount to an apartheid system in Europe, and has called for the restoration of the autonomy which was undemocratically taken away from the province. At the same time, only Albania has formally recognized the Albanian population's self-proclaimed separation of Kosovo from Serbia and its emergence as an independent republic.

### **The Delegation Visit**

The Commission delegation travelled by bus from Skopje, Macedonia, to Pristina, Kosovo, on April 18, 1993. After a wait at the border, which was lengthy but without incident, it met first with members of the CSCE Mission of Long Duration to Kosovo, specifically with Maurice Bonnot of France, Friedrich Krekeler of Germany and John Erath of the United States. Also in attendance were Robert Sorenson of the CSCE Mission to Sandzak, and Jorn Ludvigsen of Denmark, who was working in the CSCE Mission's coordinating office in Belgrade after being stationed for several months in Sandzak as well.

Following the meeting and a luncheon with the Mission, the delegation met with representatives of the Albanian community in Kosovo, hosted by Ibrahim Rugova, head of the Democratic League of Kosovo and, to Kosovar Albanians, President of the Republic of Kosovo. Also in attendance were Fehmi Agani, Anton Kolaj and Edite Tahiri representing the Democratic League; Adem Limani of the Peasants Party; Bajram Kasumi of the Parliamentary Party; Lazer Krasniqi and Pjeter Rapi of the Democratic Christian Party, Hydajet Hyseni of the Council for the Defense of Human Rights; Gazmend Pula of the Kosovo Helsinki Committee; and Jusuf Dudushaj of the Albanian Red Cross of Kosovo.

The final delegation meeting in Kosovo was with Yugoslav and Serbian authorities, hosted by Milos Simovic, Chief Executive of the Kosovo District. The Yugoslav federal government was represented by Margit Savovic, Minister for Human and Minority Rights, while that of Serbia was represented by Zoran Arandjelovic, Deputy Prime Minister, and Dobrosav Vejzovic, Deputy Foreign Minister. Following this meeting, the delegation returned to Skopje for its departure to Vienna, Austria.

The general picture of Kosovo which emerged from these meetings was a place where officials, on the one hand, and the majority of the population, on the other, went about their business without acknowledging the authority of the other. This fairly complete polarization in society had been stabilized by a small degree of mutual acceptance. For the Albanian community, whose leaders expressed a commitment to passive resistance, there is little choice but to tolerate a Serbian presence that is backed-up by a well-equipped police force and the Yugoslav military. On the Serbian side, there is fairly complete control of the levers that run society, but also a reluctant tolerance of the activities of the leading representatives of the majority Albanian population, including their own press and organizations, albeit only within certain limited parameters.

In both cases, however, there is a strong effort to deny the granting of any legitimacy to the other side. For example, the Albanian population has continually refused to participate in elections held under Yugoslav and Serbian auspices, despite the fact that their demographic situation gives them an opportunity to win many seats. At the same time, the Serbian authorities have threatened to stop any attempt by the Albanians to convene their own, self-proclaimed Kosovo parliament. Although the initiation of talks on the critical issue of education in Kosovo indicated an earlier desire to find some common ground, the lack of progress also indicates the unwillingness to make compromises that could be interpreted as acceptance of the authority of one side by the other. And as each side pushes to get its way, the potential for a violent showdown grows as the other feels compelled to do the same.

That said, clearly the primary responsibility for the high potential for conflict spillover into Kosovo rests with the Serbian authorities. First, it is they who have imposed the current repressive system which discriminates against the overwhelming majority of the population based on their ethnicity. Second, it is they who are in control of the police and armed forces in Kosovo that could provoke violence. While in Kosovo, for example, the delegation heard of the regular occurrence of police brutality in which Albanians are the victims, enraging the local communities in which these incidents occur. Given Belgrade's nationalistic and undemocratic policies, the Albanian population in Kosovo has little leeway, and no incentive, to come to any terms with it.

In meeting with the Albanian community leaders, the delegation heard that the situation in Kosovo was getting worse, and that there was a need to establish Kosovo as a UN protectorate and to deploy peacekeeping troops. While the independence, sovereignty and neutrality of Kosovo has been declared, a meeting of the Kosovo parliament has been postponed because of the threats of the authorities to break it up and arrest the participants. The delegation responded by stressing that its primary concern is the poor human rights situation, noting the limited international support for Kosovo's independence. Asked whether the restoration of autonomy and a dramatic improvement in the human rights would be sufficient, at least in the short term, the Albanian leadership acknowledged that it would be a positive step since Kosovo is at the edge of war. At the same time, autonomous status has lost any meaning based on previous experience with Serbia.

Much of the remainder of the meeting focused specifically on human rights problems, with statistics given on the large number of reported arrests, sentences, home searches and other instances of police brutality in late 1992 and early 1993. The delegation received considerable written documentation regarding these violations. Albanian representatives also raised the inability for certain humanitarian relief supplies to be delivered to Kosovo, and stressed the importance of the CSCE Mission's presence in Kosovo.

In the meeting with Serbian and Yugoslav officials, many of these same issues were raised by the delegation. The officials claimed that the world is only worried about Albanians, with 76 separate international delegations having recently been to Kosovo, as well as the CSCE Mission of Long Duration. They noted that the Albanians had a chance to participate in the election in process, but chose not to do so. In response, Chairman DeConcini said that he wished he could discuss cooperation and issues other than human rights violations but that he regretfully could not. He urged the governments in Belgrade to take a "new look" at things based on what the world is saying to them, and to act in accordance with Helsinki principles and provisions. Representative Richardson also responded, noting that there is disagreement on many aspects of dealing with the Yugoslav crisis and conflict but that the U.S. Congress and the Clinton Administration all feel very strongly about human rights. He added that Serbia is isolating itself from the rest of the world and that it should restore full autonomy to Kosovo.

Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Arandjelovic, like Chairman DeConcini, expressed regret over the absence of the friendly relations which existed with the United States for a long time, although he blamed this fact on sanctions and changing American attitudes, not Serbian policies. He asked the Commission to remain in Kosovo for a longer period of time to see what the situation was really like. The federal Minister for Human and Minority Rights said that the sanctions were unfair, and pointed to 650,000 refugees in the new Yugoslav federation, 20 percent of which are not Serbs, who allegedly get very little help. They also noted a severe medicine shortage in Serbia and Montenegro resulting from the sanctions.

Representative Richardson had also raised the case of Ejup Statovci, of the "parallel Kosovo University," who was allegedly serving a 45-day sentence for demanding the return of the University of Pristina. The officials responded that he had been responsible for a disturbance, and that Albanian professors are still working at the university. Chairman DeConcini pointed out that Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch and the CSCE itself all documented human rights abuses, and the Serbian authorities must accept the obvious consequences of the fact that the world does respond to such clear abuses. He noted that the Helsinki Commission has criticized U.S. policies and hope that the federal Minister for Human and Minority Rights would actively pursue the complaints made by Albanians in Kosovo. District Chief Executive Simovic claimed that all violators of the law are punished, not just Albanians.

The meeting concluded with Representative Richardson calling for a "gesture of reconciliation" by reopening the university to Albanians, releasing Statovci,<sup>4</sup> and letting the Albanian convene their Kosovo parliament without incident. Chief Executive Simovic explained the official position on each of these points, and Deputy Prime Minister Arandjelovic added that efforts are being made, and again offered the Commission to return to Kosovo.

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<sup>4</sup> It was reported in early May that Ejup Statovci had been released subsequent to the Commission delegation's visit.

## VIENNA (Austria)

*April 19, 1993*

### Objectives

Having visited several of CSCE's preventive diplomacy and sanctions enforcement missions, as well as several areas in transition, the Commission delegation finished its trip in Vienna, Austria, to meet with the U.S. delegation to the CSCE. Vienna is becoming the CSCE's operational center, with the Conflict Prevention Center, which provides logistical support to the missions, as well as the on-going arms control and security forum, the Forum on Security Cooperation (FSC), and regular meetings of the participating states.

### The Delegation Visit

The delegation was briefed Ambassador John Kornblum, head of the U.S. delegation to CSCE, and by Ambassador Lynn Hansen, head of the U.S. delegation to the FSC as well as to the consultative bodies implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Open Skies Treaty.

In his briefing, Ambassador Kornblum pointed out the great change which had overtaken the CSCE in the past year; from a standard-setting process, and even from the procedures for peacekeeping and mission-sending envisioned in its documents, it had become an action-oriented body, making quick decisions to put people on the ground with the goal of facilitating dialogue among parties and preventing or solving conflicts in early stages. So-called missions of long duration were on the ground in the minority populated regions of Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina in the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;" in Macedonia; in Estonia; and, within the former Soviet Union, in Moldova and Georgia. Additionally, the CSCE had recently set a representative to Tajikistan and was considering further involvement there; ongoing efforts under CSCE auspices to secure a cease-fire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were continuing.

Stressing the low cost to the United States of CSCE initiatives, as the U.S. share of the budget is only nine percent, Kornblum noted that the organization is still finding its feet structurally and managerially. Operations to date have been done on shoestrings, and the United States hoped to continue cost-efficiency while improving overall efficiency. He mentioned the now-approved European Community initiative to appoint a Secretary-General as one step toward greater administrative coherence. In sum, he said, the CSCE represented an effective way for the United States to pursue its interests in promoting democracy and human rights -- "a value-oriented agenda" -- in concert with the Europeans, leading them as necessary.

Ambassador Hansen reviewed for Senator DeConcini and Representative Richardson the ongoing work in the implementation of agreed arms control treaties -- mainly in straightening out the obligations of the Soviet successor states -- and new initiatives in the security field. The most prominent of these was the proposed Code of Conduct for the military, which the United States viewed as a way to strengthen civilian control of militaries and to enforce norms of behavior for soldiers. Other countries, however, looked to the code to provide something approximating security guarantees in times of uncertainty. Other initiatives included more transparency in arms transfers and defense planning, and harmonization of existing arms control obligations.

A common thread in both presentations was the continuing need for strong U.S. leadership in the face of European uncertainty.

In response, the delegation had high praise for the work of the missions which it had seen, and encouraged the United States to pursue them, particularly in regard to Kosovo. Senator DeConcini expressed the Commission's support for the CSCE's work in human rights and urged that any subsequent re-structuring not obscure the centrality of human rights nor develop excessive, unnecessary bureaucracy. Both Senator DeConcini and Representative Richardson warned against the expense of bureaucratization at a time of shrinking budgets in the United States.



## APPENDIX 1

**STATEMENT OF HELSINKI COMMISSION DELEGATION  
TO MACEDONIA AND KOSOVO**

Vienna, April 18, 1993: On April 17 and 18, a delegation of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe -- the Helsinki Commission -- visited the Republic of Macedonia as well as Kosovo in the new Yugoslav federation. The delegation was led by Senator Dennis DeConcini (Democrat-Arizona), the Commission's Chairman, and Representative Bill Richardson (Democrat-New Mexico), a member of the Commission. At the end of their visit, Senator DeConcini and Representative Richardson made the following statement:

"The delegation of the Helsinki Commission came to Macedonia with a threefold purpose. First, we wanted to see how the domestic situation had developed since the Commission visit in November of last year. At that time, with winter coming on, the economic crisis brought on by Macedonia's undesired isolation in the world was creating severe hardships for the people of Macedonia. The country was faced with the added burden of caring for the tens of thousands of refugees from the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Second, we wanted to know the extent to which the international sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro were being violated by commercial traffic through Macedonia. Finally, we wanted to learn how effectively the CSCE Monitoring Mission, the UN Protection Force and the Sanction Assistance Mission were dealing with problems in the first two areas. We met with representatives of each of these international efforts in Macedonia, visited a customs checkpoint at Tabanovce, Romania, and met with the President of the Republic of Macedonia, as well as with the President of the Macedonian Assembly.

We were pleased to find that the situation in Macedonia had, in fact, improved somewhat since November. The recent admission of the former Yugoslav republic into the United Nation has opened new doors that, we hope, will lead to the quick and full integration of Macedonia in the world community. We believe this will enhance stability in the southern Balkans and we commend Greece and Macedonia for the progress they have made in finding workable compromises. We hope they will continue to build on this initial good-faith effort and pursue needed confidence-building measures.

In Skopje, we received candid and forthcoming answers to questions we raised regarding extreme Macedonian nationalism. In addition, in responding to our human rights concerns, especially regarding Macedonia's Albanian population, Macedonian officials indicated a willingness to seek the establishment of a commission, perhaps through the Assembly, with the independence and enforcement power to deal effectively with human rights complaints. In our opinion, such an approach would warrant international assistance to Macedonia in building democratic institutions and reforming its economy.

We were dismayed, however, at the lack of enforcement in Macedonia of international economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. While the causes of this are complex and also suggest the need of international assistance, we encouraged Macedonia to do all that it could to prevent violations from continuing. While our Sanctions Assistance team is made up of dedicated professionals, it is obvious that Macedonian officials are not putting procedures in place to stem the flow of goods to Serbia and Montenegro by train and vehicle. We cannot stress enough the importance of both greater Macedonian cooperation and more responsive assistance from the international community.

The delegation also traveled to Kosovo, which has been undemocratically denied its autonomy as a province of Serbia. Our main interest in Kosovo was to learn the extent of the on-going repression against the Albanian population, the potential for conflict it creates, and to judge the ability of the only permanent international presence in Kosovo, the CSCE Mission of Long Duration, to encourage real action to correct this explosive situation. We consulted at length with the CSCE Mission and are extremely encouraged by this innovative approach to conflict prevention. We also had informative talks with leading figures in the Albanian community. We concluded our visit by meeting with the Serbian chief of the Kosovo region, the Yugoslav Minister for Human and Minority Rights, a Serbian Deputy Prime Minister, and the Serbian Deputy Foreign Minister.

We condemned the continuing violation, on a massive scale, of human rights in Kosovo. These include instances of police brutality, the frequent searches of homes, and clear discrimination against Albanians in employment and education. We noted that the entire international community, regardless of our personal and perhaps differing views on Kosovo's eventual status, has pointed to these violations with great concern. In continuing its undemocratic and nationalist policies, Belgrade has regrettably chosen to become the pariah of Europe. We call on Serbian authorities to end these violations and to restore Kosovo's autonomy. We also call for the return of Pristina University to its normal status and the release of Dr. Statovci, who was imprisoned for urging the government to act on this. Further, Serbian authorities are flagrantly violating their CSCE obligations by denying ethnic Albanian leaders their right to peaceful assembly, including meetings of their Parliamentary group. Above all, we call on everyone to seek solutions peacefully and encourage Albanian leaders to respond to any positive moves made by Yugoslav or Serbian authorities to find practical solutions to Kosovo's many problems.

We have nothing but high praise for the international missions in Macedonia and Kosovo that we met, and appreciate the time their members took to explain the situation in their areas and to describe their work. The CSCE Monitor Mission and the United Nations Protection Force in Macedonia, as well as the CSCE Missions of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina all are highly useful efforts in preemptive diplomacy which can play a valuable

role in preventing Bosnia-Herzegovina's horrible war from spilling into other parts of the former Yugoslavia. Similarly, the Sanctions Assistance Missions we met in Macedonia and Romania are extremely useful in encouraging the implementation of economic sanctions and in locating shortcomings in this implementation. While nothing can replace more direct efforts to bring the Yugoslav conflict to an end, these efforts on the margins of the conflict are crucially important. They deserve not only our full support, but also the provision of personnel and resources which are urgently needed to effectively carry out their mission.

The Commission is convinced that the international community must continue to demonstrate its concern regarding this region of the world. Both the presence of CSCE missions and visits by foreign delegations are needed to reduce tensions and promote stability. We are glad that the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly will have a visiting delegation to the southern Balkans. The Commission, for its part, plans to return to Kosovo sometime in the near future.



## APPENDIX 2

**NEWS**

From U.S. Senator

Arizona

**DENNIS DeCONCINI**

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:  
Tuesday, April 20, 1993

WASHINGTON--The following is a statement by Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona), Chairman of the Helsinki Commission and the Senate Intelligence Committee, regarding his recent trip to Africa and Europe with Representative Bill Richardson (D-New Mexico), also a member of the Helsinki Commission.

"In Europe, the delegation focused primarily on the Yugoslav conflict and the efforts being undertaken through the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the United Nations and other international bodies, in response to the conflict. In Romania, for example, the delegation visited a checkpoint on the Danube for the enforcement of the sanctions on Serbia. We then travelled to Macedonia and to Kosovo, both parts of the former Yugoslavia.

"My principle conclusion from this trip is that we need now -- and have needed all along -- air strikes to take out the ability of the Serb forces to wage their cruel war on innocent civilians. The line the United States has drawn regarding conflict in Kosovo, must be moved forward, to the front lines of eastern Bosnia.

"Europe and the United States have so far sadly acquiesced to Serbian aggression. As long as they permit Serb militants to continue their genocidal acts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is only a matter of time until this conflict spreads into a wider and more dangerous Balkan war, despite the preventive measures taken to date. Tightening of the sanctions, which I fully support, will not stop Slobodan Milosevic and his minions. Lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina, which I fully support as part of this U.N. member's rights to self-defense, also will not stop them alone.

"The reasons for taking forceful action now are moral; when we say "never again" in response to the Holocaust we commemorate this week, we must mean it. The reasons for doing so also relate to our national interests. As this thing spreads and the Europeans fail to stop it, it will inevitably draw our involvement. The longer we wait, the more difficult it will get.

"When we were in Macedonia, which continues to face many difficulties despite its recent and welcomed admission in the United Nations, I was continually convinced that recognition is the right thing to do, and that the United States should follow some European countries and do so bilaterally now. In the meantime, we pressed the Macedonians on respect for human rights, including those of the large Albanian population there, and on counterproductive expressions of nationalism among some Macedonians. We also discussed improving Macedonian enforcement of the sanctions imposed on Serbia.

"In Kosovo, the severe repression of ethnic Albanians continues unabated. Unfortunately, we did not receive any real indication from the authorities we met that they intend to change their nationalistic and undemocratic course, set for them by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. While we encouraged both sides to settle their differences in Kosovo peacefully, personally I feel that Belgrade's policies demonstrate that it has no intention to govern Kosovo responsibly, in accordance with today's democratic standards, and that the people of Kosovo therefore deserve the autonomy or even independence they need to attain those standards themselves.

"We saw what the international community is doing in these places that I find crucially important, and I want to praise those dedicated individuals who are involved with these efforts on the ground. Specifically, I am referring to the CSCE Monitoring Mission and the U.N. Protection Force in Macedonia, as well as the CSCE Missions of Long-Duration to Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina. These are useful exercises in preventive diplomacy that should be enhanced so that fighting will not spread to these tense areas, especially in Kosovo. I am also referring to the Sanctions Assistance Missions in Romania and Macedonia, who are following closely the extent to which the host countries are enforcing the sanctions and helping them to correct things when they fall short."

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