

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

THE OSCE AT TWENTY: ITS RELEVANCE TO OTHER REGIONS



November 13-14, 1995

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FOREWORD

The FY 1996 legislation appropriating funds for the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) instructed the Commission to "prepare an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the structure of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe and ascertain the feasibility of that structure in other geographic regions, including the Asia/Pacific region."

Responding in part to this request, the Helsinki Commission, on November 13-14, 1995, convened a seminar to examine whether the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) holds lessons for other parts of the world. The day-and-a-half long seminar featured six moderated panels, comprised of OSCE and regional experts, academics, and non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives who examined potential relevancy of the OSCE in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

The following document is a compilation of seminar transcripts and supporting documentation. An executive summary provides a brief synopsis of some salient points raised during each panel. Appendices include written statements submitted by some participants and biographies of participants.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Panel One: OSCE at 20: Strengths, Weaknesses—Promises and Peril

Helsinki Commission Chairman Chris Smith's (R-NJ) opening remarks pointed out that the OSCE has already served to impact upon multilateral processes in the Middle East and in Africa. He posed the question of whether the model could be applied in regions which did not share a similar Western Judeo-Christian heritage and which did not face the geopolitical alignments of the Cold War.

Moderator Samuel Wise of the Helsinki Commission, and panelists Jean-Claude Joseph from the Embassy of Switzerland, Ambassador Jonathan Dean of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and Neil Kritz of the U.S. Institute of Peace, discussed possible changes in the OSCE structure, including a higher profile and more political secretariat, a change in the consensus rule, and establishment of a management council similar to the UN Security Council. Most panelists believed such changes, even if desirable, would be difficult to achieve due to the lack of political will by many member nations. Panelists pointed to a large gap between what the OSCE could do and what its members would allow it to do, especially in areas related to security. They felt procedural mechanisms were vital to the OSCE to maintain equal footing among nations through a process of rotating chairpersons and other means.

Explicit "linkage" between human rights, security, economic and other issues was considered an important OSCE achievement and an element with universal relevance. Panelists believed advances of the OSCE process partly reflected the dynamic of Cold War tensions which yielded self-enforcing agreements between states. In this regard, it was pointed out that similar models with legally non-binding provisions, might be hard to develop in regions lacking such dynamic tension.

Panel Two: Asia

The Asia panel, entitled "Market Driven Reform or Repression?" was introduced by Congressman Jim Lightfoot (R-IA). Mr. Lightfoot believed an OSCE-like process should be considered in Asia and that an organization like the Helsinki Commission be created to monitor such a process. The panel was moderated by Professor James Clad of Georgetown University, a former foreign service officer and journalist in Asia. Panelists generally agreed that while the OSCE model held some insights for Asia, including an enhanced role for NGOs, it would be difficult to envision its effectiveness in the vast and varied Asia-Pacific region. They each emphasized Asia's distaste for Western interference and imposition, as well as an unwillingness to turn to Western models for solutions to regional problems.

Mr. T. Kumar, Asia-Pacific Government Program Officer at Amnesty International USA, believed Asia's colonial experience made it distinct from Europe. He challenged, however, the notion that "Asian values" were different from accepted human rights norms. He believed NGOs could do a great deal to combat abuses arising from cultural differences, as in the area of women's rights. He stated that international NGOs need to play a larger role in securing political and civil rights due to the fact that national and regional NGOs often become victims themselves when confronting rights abuses.

Dr. Stanley Weeks, a security model analyst, discussed existing Asia-Pacific structures including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), its "unofficial" outgrowth, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Dr. Weeks believed regional security in Asia could be enhanced by further development of the ASEAN process, subregional and bilateral relationships and maintenance of traditional U.S. bilateral ties. He thought Asian governments would be more reluctant than European ones to adopt formal regional institutions, but would rather move towards such structures informally. Dr. Weeks stated that while some links between existing regional structures are needed, a rigid OSCE-like organization would not be effective in Asia where bi-lateral or sub-regional dialogue has been the most widely accepted and effective method of multilateral cooperation. He pointed to the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), which is a process as opposed to an organization, as a possible model for comprehensive regional cooperation. Dr. Weeks stressed that NGOs could play an important role in this regard, reemphasizing the potential of unofficial "track two" activities in the region.

Mr. John Kamm, Chairman of Market Access, Ltd. and longtime China businessman, discussed NGO and business involvement in human rights monitoring activities. He stated that his experience demonstrated that promoting respect for human rights in the workplace is good for the productivity of the workforce and creativity of management. Thus, business people, he argued, have an interest in promoting human rights and should be encouraged to do so. Mr. Kamm urged business people to establish and enforce codes of conduct for their foreign enterprises and to lobby foreign governments for the release of political prisoners using resources and connections uniquely available to them.

Panel Three: Africa

Entitled "Conflict, Compromise and Managing Chaos," panel moderator Ambassador Chester Crocker, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, contended that the U.S. had no concrete Africa policy. He believed outside powers, except France, had disengaged themselves from Africa just at a time when Africans were becoming more self-assertive and when limited donor funds were proving very useful. He believed NGOs should play a prominent role in African development and that Africa has experienced "mixed results" with democracy, with some governments and individual politicians viewing elected office as an opportunity to loot. He pointed to a reemergence of ethnic conflict and increasing differentiation between winners and losers in Africa. While multilateral initiatives, such as the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), were still "embryonic," Ambassador Crocker cited more developed conflict management efforts and the formation of African multilateral peacekeeping groups, such as in Liberia.

Ambassador Ola Otunla, acting director of the African Leadership Forum (AFL), noted that AFL's founder, General Olesugun Obasanjo, was currently imprisoned in Nigeria. AFL had been the primary organizer of the CSSDCA, a process borrowing much from the CSCE model. While regretting that the process emerging from the 1991 CSSDCA conference in Kampala had been stalled due to "big brother" government in much of Africa and a "one-on-one" style typical of African diplomacy, Ambassador Otunla believed that an "among the people" emphasis could revive the process. He indicated that AFL planned to hold conferences in Africa in 1996 to continue the CSSDCA process. He believed that an OSCE-like process could help build political will and responsive leadership in Africa.

He emphasized the need to encourage Africans to deal with African problems, citing often poor responses to Western initiatives.

Janet Fleischman, Washington Director of Human Rights Watch/Africa, observed that the end of the Cold War meant that Africa had ceased to be a puppet in the U.S.- Soviet rivalry. She believed comparisons could be made between Eastern Europe at the inception of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and present-day Africa. She believed a window presently existed for NGOs to ensure that human rights components were included in peacekeeping mandates. She acknowledged that few observers foresaw the excesses—and even genocide—that developed so quickly in Liberia, Nigeria, and Rwanda. Ms. Fleischman urged foreign governments to publicly chastise autocratic leaders, because many African governments ignore quiet diplomacy. Moreover, she asserted that officials should be held accountable for past abuses and expressed her concern over very tedious legal action in this regard.

Gabriel Negatu, Director of the Federation of African Voluntary Development Organizations, stressed that African governments have to strike a balance between human rights concerns, economic development and stability. He believed there was no clear delineation regarding the timing of economic or political development, but suggested that the U.S. and other outsiders could and should support “civil society,” increased trade, and development of the private sector. He decried the fact that, despite the wave of elections in Africa, many pursued political power only to enrich themselves as “economic gatekeepers.” The emergence of “predatory states” could not be forestalled until people believed they had a stake in their nation’s future. Mr. Negatu argued, despite consistently upholding OAU founding principles, NGOs have been largely shut out from the multilateral problem solving process. The African Leadership Council, prominent among 600 active African NGOs, waited years to obtain OAU observer status. He believed the West should aid human rights and labor groups in support of civil society and suggested that companies doing business in Africa develop a code of conduct in conjunction with such organizations as the African Business Council.

Panel Four: Latin America

The Latin America panel, entitled “Trade + Democracy = Security & Human Rights?” was introduced by Senator Bob Graham (D-FL). Mr. Graham cited three aspects of the Helsinki process with particular relevance in Latin America: the role of NGOs in building civil society; linkage between security, economics and human rights; and multilateralization of issues. He believed an OSCE-like process could help counter threats to democratic governments, including: growing disparities between rich and poor individuals and nations; unchecked population growth; drug trafficking and corruption; environmental degradation; civilian control of the military; and government suppression of human rights.

Senator Graham introduced Professor Thomas Buergenthal, George Washington University Law Center, and President of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights. Professor Buergenthal believed that much greater reform of the Organization of American States (OAS) system would be necessary before member states would be willing to use the OAS to deal with issues as the OSCE does in Europe. He pointed out that the OAS was lacking a built-in “institutional rights lobby” such as the Council of Europe.

Panelists discussed on current structures in the Inter-American system and expressed a desire to see member countries give the Inter-American Court and the Inter-American Commission more economic and political support and greater authority to implement decisions. Each panelists stressed the importance of NGO participation in the region. Pointing to extensive NGO participation in the OSCE, panelists believed that a similar level of participation would be advisable in Latin America as well. Some believed the OAS needed grant NGOs observer status.

Ambassador Sonia Picado of Costa Rica believed that many states remain unwilling to join multilateral processes with human rights elements because of implied diminishment of sovereignty. She believed poverty and the role of the military were significant obstacles and that while governments were willing to talk about human rights, they were less willing to comply with the system that protects those rights.

Ms. Kelly McBride, special advisor on human rights to the OAS Secretary General, stated that the Organization of American States (OAS) is trying to foster the growth of civil society through outreach to NGOs and indigenous groups. She outlined recent initiatives culminating in the December 1994 Summit of the Americas which have strengthened the OAS role in promoting human rights, democracy, economic integration and the environment. She indicated that further measures were being considered to strengthen existing inter-American institutions and open the OAS process to "civil society actors."

Ms. Vivianne Kristicevic, Director of the Center for Justice and International Law, stated that the strengthening of NGOs within the OAS process was central to progress in human rights. She argued for greater transparency in the inter-American human rights system and called for stricter enforcement of judgements of the Court and recommendations of the Commission. Ms. Kristicevic outlined numerous human rights problems in Latin America.

General John Ellerson, Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board, compared the inter-American security system with the European model. He indicated that military leaders around the region were realizing that national defense issues extended beyond national borders. He believed Latin American militaries were slowly subordinating themselves to civilian leadership. General Ellerson pointed out that there was no formal link between the Inter-American Defense Board and the OAS and opined that such a link should be considered.

Panel Five: Middle East

Helsinki Commission member Representative Ben Cardin (D-MD) opened the session, citing the positive impact of CSCE in bringing peaceful change to Europe. He cited his efforts and personal contacts with Middle Eastern leaders to promote creation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME). Calling Prime Minister Rabin's assassination the "loss of a giant in the peace process," Mr. Cardin pointed out that Israel had finally "arrived on the international scene as a full partner." He underscored the presence of numerous Palestinian and other Arab officials at Rabin's funeral. He suggested that the United States, Russia and other European powers would have to play an active role to ensure the success of multilateral diplomacy in the region.

Alan Makovsky stressed that the proximity of the Middle East to Europe tied Mediterranean security closely to European security. He noted several promising developments concerning multilateral frameworks, including the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, which

drew the participation of Lebanon, Libya and Syria; multinational meetings since January 1992 including Israel, Palestine, and 13 Arab nations (10 of which do not have relations with Israel); proposals by Jordan in 1993 to have CSCE-like meetings of resident countries of the Middle East; and the specific mention in the October 1994 Israel-Jordan Treaty to tie security to cooperation in a CSCE-type framework for the Middle East. He pointed out that Turkey has promoted a CSCE-like process in the Middle East. Turkey could be a key player in some proposed multilateral solutions, including those related to water, arms control and refugees. Makovsky concluded, however, that Turkey would not be eager to address human rights concerns as it has well-known human rights problems of its own. Mr. Makovsky suggested that NGOs could campaign for human rights improvements but might not be appropriate participants in current multilateral meetings.

Ms. Fatima Ziai of Human Rights Watch/Middle East, read a statement prepared by Helena Cobban, a journalist and researcher, which noted the failure of the present Arab-Israeli peace process to include a human rights dimension. She addressed the relationship between "universal" human rights principles, as agreed upon by all regional signatories (except for Saudi Arabia) to the U.N. Charter, and the tenets of traditional religions in the area. She regretted that neither the government of Israel nor Egypt had pushed for human rights concerns to be included in the Madrid negotiations, and that neither the Bush nor the Clinton administrations had pushed either. She argued that the lesson of the OSCE process, in so far as it could be applied to the Middle East, was that a stress on human rights is a necessary concomitant to, rather than a possible afterthought of, the "traditional" agenda of diplomacy. And even if the model could not be used easily in the Middle East—and she admitted it would be harder to implement than in Europe—she claimed that "the atmosphere within every one of the region's countries except Saddam Hussein's Iraq is considerably more fertile to the growth of NGOs, including in many instances human rights organizations, than were the countries of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe at the time of the CSCE negotiation."

Ambassador Basheer noted major differences between the situation in the Middle East and in Europe, especially on territorial issues. NGOs, he said, have a positive role to play in the region, particularly in instances where parties would not talk on a government-to-government basis (he noted that, for example, Israel does not accept talking about nuclear issues, but that it would have to follow the rest of the region if it wants to have a nuclear-free zone.) He argued that parties both within and outside the region would have to accept that gradualism is not a "give-away", that issuing public decrees often poisons the atmosphere, and that gradual and non-public approaches can and do work. He suggested that human rights standards could be invoked when territorial issues were not involved but that some human rights issues should continue to be avoided, such as equality of women in the Middle East. All countries in the region would have to be included to make the multilateral process work. Arms sales, he declared, have had a serious destabilizing effect in the area.

Panel Six: OSCE and the Future of Multilateralism

Mike Hathaway, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Helsinki Commission, representing Senator Alphonse D'Amato, opined that the OSCE's biggest test was going to be defining its role in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moderator Bob Hand, echoing a theme heard throughout the seminar, stressed the importance of political will as a factor determining the success or failure of peacekeeping and conflict prevention.

Dr. William Korey reflected on OSCE's high point during 1990-91 after the collapse of totalitarian governments yet pointed to the recent warning of philosopher, Sir Isaiah Berlin that "nationalism and racism are the most powerful movements in the world today, cutting across many social systems." Describing the linkage and trade-off between security and human rights at CSCE's founding, Korey questioned the applicability of the process to other regions, stating that there was no "rich culture" of the respect for human rights outside of Europe. He credited CSCE success to American leadership, the activities of Ambassadors Goldberg and Kampelman, the Solidarity movement, President Havel, Yuri Orlov, and to the effectiveness of the Helsinki Commission in Washington. Likewise, he cited activities by NGOs as a key to CSCE success, but maintained that very few governments in Asia, Africa, or Latin America would permit such extensive activities in support of human rights.

Professor Thomas Buergenthal touted linkage between security, human rights and economics and suggested it extend to include development, and pointed out that more than 140 countries have ratified the UN Covenant on Human Rights. He believed that regional organizations, such as the Council of Europe, whose Parliamentary Assembly has been important in promoting human rights, and the Organization of American States, could profit from greater NGO roles. Dr. Buergenthal felt that consensus decision making was helpful to smaller countries sometimes disappointed with the role of the UN Security Council. He saw international law as being more relevant as small states view it as a form of protection. He believed the "genius" of the CSCE process lay in its reliance on politically binding decisions, as opposed to legally binding ones, which take years to ratify. He also spoke of the need to define the roles between regional and universal institutions that are involved in peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Professor Buergenthal was not so skeptical about increasing institutionalization in OSCE and suggested that the OSCE could introduce more specific procedures related to decision making, the progressive handling of issues, and linkage.

Professor William Zartman stressed that the CSCE model could not be a template imposed on other regions without consideration for regional mores and traditions. He suggested that membership should be universal in whatever regions choose such a regional multilateral framework and that members should decide among themselves whether to temporarily exclude disruptive members. He also believed that each region would have to determine whether to make decisions by consensus or by majority vote, and whether to make decisions politically or legally binding. Professor Zartman acknowledged the importance of U.S. leadership to the success of the OSCE, and indicated that while regional leaders might hold new CSCME and CSSDCA conferences in 1996, that it was up to those leaders, not the United States, to determine the timing for such meetings.

OSCE AT TWENTY: RELEVANCE TO OTHER REGIONS

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1995.

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Washington, DC

Panel One: OSCE at Twenty: Strengths, Weaknesses, Promises and Peril

The commission met, pursuant to adjournment, at 1:00 p.m., in room 628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Honorable Christopher H. Smith, Chairman of the Commission, presiding.

Mr. Smith. I would like to welcome everyone today, and especially thank our seminar participants who will join us on a broad yet important topic. On the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the Helsinki Commission has invited experts to consider the relevance of the experience of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as a model for other regions.

Over the 2 days of the seminar, we hope to identify both strengths and weaknesses, successes and failures of the OSCE and determine which, if any, aspects of that process might be applicable to other regions of the world.

Six panels will examine the potential relevancy of the OSCE in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Several of my colleagues who have worked in these areas will introduce each of those panels.

For 15 years, from roughly 1975 to 1990, the Helsinki process managed to bring to the negotiating table representatives from two opposing blocs of countries, each of which was armed with enough nuclear weapons to annihilate not only each other, but the world. Moreover, these blocks represented political, economic, and philosophical perspectives that were fundamentally irreconcilable.

The Helsinki process is portrayed today as a potential model for other regions of the world. The process could serve as a model because it is rightly credited, not merely with sustaining a multilateral dialog among these profoundly antagonistic countries, but also with contributing to the European human rights revolution that bridged their differences and continues to this day.

In fact, the OSCE has already influenced the Middle East peace process and has been the subject of proposals by political leaders and the NGO community in Africa. This seminar will reexamine regional cooperative frameworks which address human rights, security, and economic issues. Reflecting the basic characteristic of the OSCE process, we have asked panelists to synthesize the relationship between human rights and the rule of law

issues, military and economic security issues, and conflict prevention and resolution efforts, as well as the role of existing regional structures.

In addition, we have asked some panelists to look at the increasingly complex and important role that NGOs play within multilateral diplomacy today. Because individual and collective experiences of OSCE participants are not replicated in other countries or regions, direct comparisons are often difficult. I would, however, pose two questions which can perhaps provide a context for our examination.

First, in spite of the political differences which defined Europe during the cold war, the countries participating in the Helsinki process shared, generally speaking, a Western Judeo-Christian heritage. Some have wondered whether, in regions of the world which have been marked by more pronounced religious, cultural and other differences, a Helsinki-type process can work.

Second, some have suggested that the prominence given by Western countries to human rights in the Helsinki process was a by-product of the confrontational relationship created by the cold war itself. Without the confrontational setting in Europe or elsewhere, will there be a political role to raise and address human rights problems?

The Helsinki Commission has used this seminar as an opportunity to invite many individuals and groups who are not on our traditional mailing list. We are delighted, therefore, to have so many new faces in the audience. After our panelists have completed their remarks, moderators will invite members of the audience to ask questions, and again, we want to thank our distinguished panelists and guests for joining us today and hope that they will find this seminar beneficial.

Ambassador Sam Wise, who is director for our international policy at the Helsinki Commission, will be the moderator for this afternoon's presentation. I'd like to ask Sam if he would take the chair and I look forward to hearing our panelists. Again, I want to thank them for joining us here today.

Let me point out that this record will be widely disseminated and hopefully will be a starting point or continuing point, in some cases, to this important work of trying to expand Helsinki-type mechanisms throughout the world. Sam?

Mr. Wise. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your being able to come over and begin this series of seminars today and stay as long as you can. I know you have some other business, and we'll look forward to seeing you as long as you can stay.

This series of seminars comes at an interesting time in the history of the CSCE, now the OSCE, from conference to organization. This year in many places, there have been commemorations of the 20th anniversary of the CSCE. Such commemorations have taken place in Helsinki, where some of the original signers of the Helsinki Final Act returned, including President Gerald Ford; and in Geneva, where the Swiss government recently held a commemoration of 1 day of old-timers and new-timers in the CSCE process; and most recently, in Prague, where the Open Media Research Institute, the successor to the Radio Free Europe Research Institute, organized a meeting on the 20th anniversary of the CSCE as well.

Generally, the views of the people who have attended these commemorations—I've attended the latter two myself—was that the CSCE in the Communist days, the Communist phase of the CSCE's existence, made a positive contribution to the changes that have taken place in Europe and the disappearance of the Communist system.

On the new CSCE or the OSCE as it's now called, there are different judgments, mixed judgments. There's a feeling that some new political impulse, some new impetus needs to be given to the OSCE, and various suggestions have come up such as the installation of a more high profile political secretary-general. We're just moving from our first secretary-general now, who is a career civil servant, to a second one who will be chosen to take office next spring.

At least those who were formerly active in the CSCE and others have suggested that a high political profile would be useful to give the CSCE a greater push. There have been other suggestions, such as changing the consensus rule, which was one of the great strengths of the CSCE in the past. Another one is to create a management counsel, something similar to the U.N.'s Security Council, to concentrate certain power in fewer hands.

Now, none of these ideas seem close to adoption at this point, but they do give some flavor of the thoughts that people are having for the OSCE of the future. In the past, CSCE had no institutions. It was a process, a series of meetings.

Nevertheless, with the creation of permanent institutions, it has lost some of its political drive, and there's a tendency by participating states to pass on some of what should be their responsibility to the bureaucracy to handle. In this way, the political force of the OSCE, in my view, has diminished.

I think we're very fortunate today to have a panel that is in a good position to discuss some of these questions and other things that will come to their minds. I think we'll have an interesting and stimulating discussion and examination of what the OSCE has to offer to the rest of the world, given the background that I have just explained, that it's really a different organization now than it was in the past.

I would point out, that of the four of us that are sitting up here today, two, Ambassador Dean on my left and Mr. Kritz at the end of the table, bring an informed outside perspective to the discussion, while the other two, Mr. Joseph and myself, have participated directly in the CSCE process.

With that, let me introduce our first panelist, Ambassador Jonathan Dean. Ambassador Dean is currently arms control advisor for the Union of Concerned Scientists. Previously he served as the deputy director of the Office of the United Nations Political Affairs, Department of State, where he worked on peacekeeping and economic sanctions. He also acted as deputy U.S. negotiator of the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and served as deputy U.S. representative and then U.S. representative to the NATO Warsaw Pact Mutual Balance Force Reduction negotiations in Vienna at the time, the famous MBFR. After leaving the foreign service, Ambassador Dean joined the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as resident associate for arms control and European security issues.

Ambassador Dean.

Mr. Dean. Thanks very much, Sam. I wanted to thank you and the commission for putting on this program. The thing that struck me most about the 20th anniversary celebrations was what 20 years had done to the views of President Gerald Ford, who was brought to Helsinki with considerable reluctance at the time of the original Helsinki accords, 1975, and now was—justifiably, in my view—full of praise for the achievements of this organization over the past 20 years. That is an attitude change which I think others have followed.

Looking at the OSCE after a history of 20 years, I think two conclusions may strike most observers. The first one is something that Sam Wise has alluded to in part. It's the wide gap between the potential of the OSCE, what it could do, and what its member governments permit the OSCE to do.

This gap is especially prominent in the security field, the focus of my remarks today. The second conclusion is that, despite this gap, the OSCE has managed to achieve a great deal and many things it has achieved can be applied elsewhere. Before discussing these conclusions further, I want to comment more generally on today's international situation, which provides the framework for the work of the OSCE and other regional security organizations.

I think most of us might agree that the end of the cold war and the peaceful way it ended created uniquely favorable conditions for moving toward a more peaceful world. As we know, neither the cold war itself nor its end has meant a stop to organized killing. Nevertheless, the statement remains true. Never in recorded history has there been a better opportunity to reduce armed violence by cooperative action.

Part of this has been the fact that epochal political change in Europe has taken place virtually without bloodshed, thanks to gifted leadership and cooperation between the West and the then-Soviet Union. There has been revolutionary change in the entire area once covered by the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination, German unification with membership in NATO, and the peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union itself.

All of this encourages us to believe that even further major political change can take place without conflict. These developments also made possible other positive events. One of them was the liberation of the United Nations from its long cold war paralysis, and the emergence of a widespread, although still rudimentary, network of regional security organizations.

Another positive circumstance is that for the first time in centuries, no conflict is brewing among the world's major powers. To the contrary, the United States, Russia, India, China, the countries of the European Union, and Japan all support the concept of global peacekeeping and are cooperating to resolve conflicts. The extent of their cooperation is insufficient, but it is cooperation.

Another favorable development is that because our time has been the bloodiest in history and because it threatens to become infinitely more lethal through a nuclear Armageddon, our century has broken with the tradition of accepting war as an incurable human affliction. A broad range of measures has been developed to prevent conflict, to reduce the effects of conflict when it occurs, and to end it more rapidly.

This antiwar armory—much of it developed by the OSCE itself—includes confidence building and transparency measures, restrictions on the deployment and activities of armed forces, negotiated force reductions and limitations, controls over weapons production and proliferation, conflict prevention, mediation, and resolution, and multilateral peacekeeping in various forms.

Even if these measures are applied more systematically, we cannot hope to end armed conflict everywhere for all time. Total world peace remains a distant goal. However, it has become feasible—I think this is the important product of the way the cold war ended—to think in a hardheaded way about using these measures more widely and

more systematically to prevent specific disputes from erupting into war or to shorten wars when they do occur.

Consequently, the incidence of organized armed violence throughout the world can be gradually reduced, and existing zones of no-conflict can be expanded, like those in North America and Western Europe. This should be our aim. In their own areas, regional security organizations can be major agents of this process. Regional security organizations are closer to the problem, they get better early warning, and they can often act more rapidly than the United Nations.

An effective network of regional security organizations, coordinated by a United Nations whose own peacekeeping capabilities have been improved, a network of regional organizations equipped with good communications, early warning measures, and experience in applying the devices of peacekeeping I described, could greatly contribute to lowering the level of organized armed violence in the world and to expanding the zones of no-conflict.

This is full justification for interest in what the OSCE has achieved in this field. First, we must ask how far has the OSCE come in becoming a fully fledged regional security organization? Throughout most of the history of the CSCE, now the OSCE, the United States' relationship with the organization has been constructive and supportive, although the United States has never given the OSCE top priority in its European policy.

Moreover, this assignment of low priority for the OSCE is not restricted to the United States. Other large members of the OSCE have followed a similar course and have given other multilateral organizations higher priority, a circumstance which accounts for the organization's relative weakness today and for the gap between potentiality and current capability to which I referred at the outset. We all know it. NATO remains Washington's favorite vehicle for American policy in Europe.

Nevertheless, despite this enduring priority, the United States has made an essential contribution to the OSCE's three main areas of strength: human rights, military security, and confidence-building, and conflict prevention and mediation.

While top American political leaders and senior government officials have sometimes shown disinterest, talented working-level American officials have understood the OSCE's potential and have played a key role in building it up. This is a picture which I think we see repeated in other major countries.

Washington's preference for NATO over OSCE is likely to continue as long as there is a possibility at some future point of serious trouble with a resurgent Russia. The United States is not alone in placing greater reliance on NATO than on the OSCE. Most of the European countries take the same position.

That position is disappointing for those of us who wish to develop the OSCE more rapidly toward its long-term potential. However, viewed objectively, until the existence of a dependable democracy in Russia has eliminated the possibility of re-emergence of Russian imperialism and the related needs for cohesive Western security cooperation to ensure against that possibility, it is common sense for Western countries to give priority to a functioning NATO over a manifestly weaker OSCE.

For example, Germany gives clear priority to the expansion of the European Union and of NATO over building up OSCE. France gives preference to the European Union and to the Western European Union. For their part, although they often referred to the need to increase the authority of the OSCE, many smaller member states are erratic in their

support. They consistently reject the strengthening of its decisionmaking, something which the OSCE very much needs in the interests of all members.

Russia has repeatedly provided the most extensive proposals to buildup the OSCE, but as soon as it became evident that implementation of these proposals would bring some increase in OSCE authority to Russia's near abroad, Russia backed away and argued that the possible Commonwealth of Independent States' peacekeeping operations would have to take priority over OSCE action.

It is evident that this Russian argument—that the Commonwealth of Independent States organization must come first—closely parallels the United States' argument that strengthening the OSCE must not interfere with NATO.

In a moment, I will review the evidence for arguing that, as it enters its third decade, the OSCE definitely has the potential to become the primary security organization in Europe. Nevertheless, we can also conclude from what I've been saying that this potential is likely to remain unrealized for a considerable time because of the conflicting motivation of all its major members, and indeed, most of its small ones.

Essentially, the problem is that the OSCE's main mission, which I believe to be the integration of Russia into the stable European security system with all its risks and its difficulties, is too large a task for the OSCE in its present form to accomplish and requires the help of stronger organizations, including the European Union and NATO as well as bilateral relationships.

For these reasons and others, OSCE is not yet a full-fledged regional security organization. As it someday will be written: these big power priorities fade. However—and this is its most important achievement—OSCE has served as a busy and highly creative laboratory for devising procedures and mechanisms for preventing conflict.

The products of the OSCE laboratory include a very impressive battery of confidence-building measures, providing for broad reciprocal authorized access to military information in order to head off exaggerated apprehensions and competitive arming—what's often called transparency.

Some striking examples are the provisions for detailed exchange of information on size and deployment of forces, for pre-notification of military activities and their observation, and for pre-notification and discussion of military budgets as well as for pre-notification of deployment of new weapon types.

The Open Skies Treaty, with the right to observe military activities anywhere in the member countries, and the CFE treaty, with drastic cuts of conventional arms, are also a product of this OSCE laboratory of security and peacemaking measures. As we know, the OSCE has also produced well-developed conflict prevention measures, ranging from the reports and recommendations of the high commissioner for national minorities, procedures for discussing and observing potential violations of human rights, and extensive procedures for mediation and arbitration, to a series of mediation missions in the field in areas of tension like the Baltic states, former Yugoslavia, Moldavia, Georgia, Tajikistan, as well as a possible peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh.

In the last decade, OSCE measures have covered, in one way or another, every area of human activity that could lead to possible conflict. These measures seek to deal with basic problems of human motivation—group antagonisms, historic suspicions, the effects of excessive military secrecy, and nurturing apprehension, and the sometimes baseless

counteraction. These motives and feelings are, I believe, universal to all humanity. For that reason, most of the OSCE measures also have broad geographic applicability.

This is what makes the OSCE conflict-prevention laboratory of such interest for the whole world and such a valuable resource in contributing to the building of a network of regional security organizations that with the United Nations can, some not too distant day, develop into a global security system capable of lowering the incidence of conflict all over the world and expanding the zones of non-conflict.

I find it very encouraging that the Helsinki Commission has taken the initiative to convene this forum which I know can increase understanding of the wide usefulness of these OSCE measures and of OSCE's many other achievements. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wise. Thank you very much, Ambassador Dean. That was a nice upbeat beginning to our panel today.

Now I'd like to turn to our next panelist, Jean-Claude Joseph, of the Swiss embassy in Washington. He is the No. 2 man at the embassy, the so-called chief of mission. He previously held positions in the Federal Department for Foreign Affairs in Bern, Switzerland, and was Swiss delegate to the European Space Agency before taking a position as Swiss delegate to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which took place in Vienna beginning in 1986 and ending in 1989. That's where Mr. Joseph and I first became acquainted and, in fact, became working colleagues. At the time, he occupied the exalted position in the old CSCE of gridmaster. The gridmaster was the delegate chosen from one neutral country to prepare the schedule for the meeting, and that sounds like a simple technical task, but in fact, it was a highly political task which the Swiss had for a number of years, and when Mr. Joseph arrived in Vienna, he was assigned this work. He had to work with the East side and the West side to try to get agreement on how we would pursue our schedule. I think he will remember that procedure in those days was substance as well as the procedure itself.

Mr. Joseph.

Mr. Joseph. Thank you very much, Sam. By the way, thank you for inviting me to this panel. I would also like to thank very much Ambassador Dean for his introduction. This introduction was particularly interesting for me because it covered, I would say, almost all the political aspects of the institution, of an organization like OSCE, they can expect what from the organization, and more or less why it is not in effect today.

Now, my intention, as introductory remarks, was to speak about the two phases of the CSCE, ending now in the OSCE, and to show how it is impossible to begin in a politically complex region a process which can evolve with time. Having said that, I should also be precise from the beginning on that, even if I have an official function at the embassy and if I were the Swiss delegate to the CSCE during 7 years, I here speak purely personally.

By the way, it is to your advantage because if I were only representing the interests of my government, I would certainly be boring and I hope not to be.

Well, as you said, Sam, there were the two CSCEs: one during Communism and one after, and, in fact, the first phase of the CSCE ended in 1990 and the new one began in November 1990 with the Paris Charter, but was looking for itself during many years and is always looking for itself now. One doesn't know exactly how to work or how to improve procedures to be more efficient, what will be the weight of a secretary-general, et cetera.

Nevertheless, to understand the way in which a CSCE-type of organization could be useful in other regions of the world, I think it is very important to see what basics of CSCE were between 1972 and 1990, because these basics are, in my view, fundamental before going further and before imagining something a bit different like a real security organization. The basic CSCE rule was based on several fundamental elements—I will not make a long speech on that—but there are some fundamental elements.

The first element, I think, which was very important was to take a global approach. That means not only security, not only human rights, not only economies, not only exchanges of personnel and ideas, et cetera, but trying to make progress in all areas together. By the way, as for negotiation, making progress is much easier if you have to deal with several areas because some bargaining is possible from one area to another. So having the global approach was both necessary and useful.

The second element which was very important was that each meeting decided on the next one, a bit farther, 2 or 3 years later, and during that time, it was expected from each participant that it would improve the situation inside the country, and that he would fulfill the commitments it had taken. If it were not the case, the next meeting was very useful to say, "You didn't do what you took the commitment to do." At the beginning, it was not very successful, but at the end, it was rather successful.

The third very important element was that the decision was taken by consensus, and here I have to develop the idea of consensus. Of course, if one asked everybody around the table to agree with one commitment, with one idea, and those countries are not in agreement with each other, it is very difficult to get consensus, and the result is often disappointing. One can say we should have done better. So it is going against the ambition of the more ambitious to have decision by consensus.

But—there is a great "but"—once you have a decision by consensus, even if it is a modest decision, a modest commitment, each has taken the commitment to fulfill what was decided, and if he doesn't, you have the right to say some years later, at the next meeting, "You have not done what we expected from you and what you took the commitment to do. So you are guilty." And that is very important.

The process of creating and improving the commitment, the fact that the decision is taken by consensus is very important. Why? Because it gives rights to the others to—yes, why not to say it—to make some interference in the internal affairs of the others, but not from outside, not artificially, but just because the commitment was not fulfilled.

Now I come rather quickly to the question of procedure. I think when you begin to think of the CSCE for the new regions, procedure is very important. The rules of procedure established in 1972 were fundamental for the success of the CSCE. These rules of procedure were based mainly on the equality and on the sovereignty of the states. That had some impacts on the way of doing.

For example, we had one chairman per meeting and the chairmanship was rotating, so no one had the feeling that some country is leading. Each had the same weight. Other aspects of the sovereignty were, of course, that the CSCE was not always clearly explicitly meeting outside the blocs, outside the military alliances, so each one was an individual country in face of others. I will not go more into detail, but that is very important.

Now, with the collapse of Communism, some had the feeling that the CSCE had finished its work. By the way, if I can speak personally, it was my feeling and in my view, the best thing CSCE could do in 1990 was to kill itself, but not before giving a legacy

to a new organization which would have another name which would deal with security in Europe in a new framework.

OK, that was not possible. It was perhaps too ambitious, and the fact is that the new CSCE, by the Charter of Paris, evolved slightly in the direction of a new organization. Probably this evolution is not over, but where I am a bit critical with the new CSCE, which became only last year OSCE, by the way, is that it adopted a method of work and a system whose model was mainly the European Union—at the time European Community—function. There were some exceptions, of course. It was for example out of the question to have a powerful secretariat like the European Commission in Brussels.

However, for the rest, the evolution went in the direction of the European Community institutions with more or less permanent presidency, at the beginning 6 months but now 1 year, and with a permanent committee. At the beginning, it was not totally permanent, but quickly it became permanent like the COREPER (Permanent Representatives Committee) in Brussels. Well, I would say that were the main elements.

What was maintained or kept from the old CSCE? Two important things. The first one was the consensus and the second one was the fact that the commitments taken in the framework of CSCE are politically binding and not legally binding. Here I must explain what the difference is, because this difference could seem a bit awkward, but it is a great, great difference.

When you sign, or negotiate and sign, and ratify a treaty, it is understood that from the date a country has ratified the treaty, its legal system inside the country must comply with the treaty. From the day of the ratification, it must comply. That is the effect of a legally binding treaty or document.

If a document is only politically binding, it is a sort of clause or best effort. The effect is so to say, "Yes, I will go in that direction. I will try my best to arrive to that and that result. I cannot tell you that it will be done from 1 day to another, but at least I will try honestly to go in that direction." That gives a bit more flexibility to the country to adopt their own legislation to the commitment taken.

Now, this new CSCE was shocked after some months of existence, exactly 6 months of existence, by the events in former Yugoslavia, and I must say that has probably not killed, but put the CSCE in great danger and great difficulty, because the task of trying to avoid war between the different parties in the Yugoslav conflict, which was an impossible task given the situation on the ground, had probably suppressed the hope that some government has put into the CSCE.

It was not the right organization, and it was taken coldly with an impossible task. Therefore, the idea came that instead of managing crises, because CSCE in its actual form is not able to manage crises, it would be better to try to prevent crises, and therefore came the idea of prevention of crises, which is, by the way, a purely diplomatic exercise.

The task of preventing or of restoring democratic values after conflict is mainly a task of persuasion. You have to persuade parties not to fight each other. You have to convince them that it would be useful to adopt laws, internal laws, which are respectful of the right of minorities, et cetera, et cetera. It is always a problem of persuasion beginning by bringing the parties together around the table, and that is also typically a diplomatic effort.

This role can be fulfilled anywhere, but why not in Vienna covered by and helped by all the delegations? It can be in the field. Therefore, with that idea in mind, CSCE

sent several missions all around Europe where they were needed, and with the help of the high commissioner for national minorities working very closely with the different missions. I hope that today we hear about the effectiveness of such missions since we have a good witness in the room of one of these missions.

I do not think—here I speak personally—I do not think that in the future it would be easy, at least, to conceive a CSCE with enforcement capabilities for two reasons. The first one is that we have in Europe all necessary enforcement troops which would be needed. I don't know how they would be engaged, and that could be an interesting point to discuss, but anyway, there are such forces.

If we maintained the rule of consensus, and I believe it is essential for the reason I described before, I do not see how CSCE could engage in enforcement efforts. I think that CSCE should continue, persevere, and improve its capability in preventing crises and in bringing some help when the crisis is over. It should try to bring parties around the table to discuss with its mediator. That would be a possibility to restore peace after the crisis.

In conclusion, I would have a question regarding the rule of consensus. What do you think can be done against a country which is part of the organization if this country is, first, not willing to accept something and, second, has the necessary means to combat victoriously for its ideas as wrong as those could be? Are we to remain modest in our scope inside the OSCE, modest but efficient, or ambitious and disappointing?

Thank you, Sam.

Mr. Wise. Thank you very much, Mr. Joseph. That was, I think, a very helpful run-down of the main features of the CSCE, which I think helps put the discussion into a good perspective. Now I'd like to turn to our other panelist, Mr. Neil Kritz. Mr. Kritz directs the rule of law initiative at the U.S. Institution of Peace. He specializes in advancing peace through the development of democratic legal and governmental systems.

He organized and coordinated a review of the draft Russian constitution at the request of the Russian Constitutional Commission, and has prepared curricula on international law and the promotion of democracy for the Department of Defense. He also focuses on the advancement of the rule of law to the OSCE and other regional organizations.

Last but not least, Mr. Kritz is one of those alumni of the commission who have gone on to more interesting—I don't know about more interesting, but anyway—different and more diversified work in other organizations. We are very happy he was with us for a while. Mr. Kritz?

Mr. Kritz. Thank you, Sam. My affiliation with the commission in its early years was, at least from my perspective, one of my most noteworthy accomplishments. I'll apologize in advance: I just returned last night from Rwanda, and if my comments are a little bit garbled, I'll at least use that as an excuse.

I will also use it to note that, in conversations I've had the last couple of weeks on this trip, there has repeatedly been a recognition that existing international institutions have been inadequate for purposes of conflict prevention, or for the advancement of human rights and the rule of law. Rwanda is obviously a particularly powerful example of this, and there is a very keen interest in searching for new institutions—new frameworks—that can be more effective in pursuing these objectives. I think our present discussions regarding what OSCE has to offer is particularly important.

In my comments, I'll focus particularly on the human dimension aspects of OSCE and begin, at least briefly, with an evaluation of the use of linkage, which is one issue that panelists were asked to consider in preparation for today. Linkage has not merely been a positive incidental element of CSCE and then OSCE. It's been the very key to the success and effectiveness of the Helsinki process. The combining of human rights, the rule of law, security aspects, and trade created the momentum which has enabled the organization to accomplish what it has. It's integrally related, of course, to a second issue that we've been asked to address, namely the possible relevance and transferability of OSCE to other regions.

Some suggest that the homogeneity of most OSCE states and peoples are the basis for the organization's success. They argue that differences between peoples and political systems render other regions less viable candidates for an OSCE-type of framework. I would suggest that the premise is particularly flawed because, as has been implied by previous speakers, it's not the sameness of the 35 original members of CSCE which produced the remarkable results of the organization. It was their very differences that were perhaps the most important.

It was the dynamic tension that existed at the heart of CSCE which propelled and sustained the process. The adversarial nature of CSCE meant two things particularly pertinent to those aspects of the process which later came to be referred to as the human dimension.

First, it facilitated trading between the agendas of the West and the Communist blocs. Each side was forced to allow their counterpart's priority issues—be it human rights, security issues, technology, or trade—onto the table in order to get their own respective items on the agenda in exchange. It's this tradeoff which has enabled the OSCE to be effective and to have leverage in pressing its human dimension agenda without any legal or military enforcement mechanism.

Second, the adversarial nature of the arrangement meant that member states were willing to document and criticize their opponents' violations of the agreement, naming specific cases and demanding an accounting for all instances of non-compliance. During its first 15 years, this manifestation of the dynamic tension was essential to progress.

It also succeeded in elevating the status of human rights monitors and NGOs by giving them a ready audience. Western governments were eager to accept views and cite reports from the citizens of Communist member states—without any concern that such an arrangement might be diplomatically uncomfortable or might embarrass their counterparts at the review table. Given the opportunity, there obviously are many activists in Burma, Nigeria, China, and elsewhere who would certainly welcome the opportunity to fill such a monitoring function with the knowledge that foreign governments would use their reports and defend the monitors. That aggressive approach would be more difficult if the organization were simply a club of like-minded friends. In the context of the human dimension, other regions actually lack this dynamic tension, with all or nearly all of their countries fitting within a much narrower spectrum than was the case in the CSCE experience.

Some regions also lack member states so determined to make their neighbors' adherence to human rights and the rule of law such a priority issue that they are willing to pay the price of permitting other items onto the agenda which they view as less in their interests. Again, one success of the OSCE is this joining of issues, this powerful statement that human rights and the rule of law are essential elements of conflict prevention and

security. From the human dimension perspective, an OSCE-style framework will only be useful in another region if essential players in that region are willing to spend political capital to insist on that same equation. I suggest that Africa, with its present-day mix of emerging democracies and remaining tyrannies, may hold particular promise in terms of structuring that kind of dynamic tension.

In the case of OSCE, a regional body also embraced existing international standards with respect to human rights, integrated and then expanded upon them, ultimately reinforcing these international principles in the process. In the worst case scenario, however, regional approaches may pose the risk of serving as a vehicle for weakening these same principles. By rejecting the international quality of these principles, repudiating them as not universal but Western-oriented, and promoting a relativist regional approach—one which proclaims “we view human rights differently in our region and culture”—new regional frameworks, at least in some regions, have the potential of facilitating a reversal of the substantial progress of the past 50 years in the developments of some of these international standards. The refusal of individual governments to observe these standards certainly presents a challenge, but doesn’t do the same damage as a rejection or watering-down of the principles by a multilateral regional body. Recent tendencies in Asia manifest, for example, in the context of debates leading up to and during the World Conference on Human Rights, particularly highlight this concern. Ironically, the OSCE’s greatest success, the replacement of Communist totalitarian regimes with emerging democracies, has presented a new challenge with which the organization is still struggling. Much of that dynamic tension that I’ve focused on is, of course, gone. The OSCE is no longer divided in the same way into categories of friends and adversaries. With that new sense of unity comes an understandable reluctance to carry on the tradition of implementation through confrontation which was for so long a hallmark of the organization’s review meetings. A new message has been required and is still developing to address this need.

Two principal answers have emerged to date. The first involves one of the most significant recent contributions of the OSCE to the human dimension field. Although the Final Act obliged participating states to protect basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rights it articulated were not particularly novel in the context of existing international agreements. The rights mentioned were those already guaranteed in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

More pertinently, the Final Act was deliberately neutral as to the kind of political or governmental system within which those rights were to be protected. In principle, so long as human rights commitments were respected, any form of domestic system was acceptable. At Copenhagen, of course, that principle was radically reversed. The nature of the governmental and political system for participating states was removed from the discretion of individual states and transformed into a condition of membership in the Helsinki club.

In making pluralist democracy and the rule of law new requirements of the system, CSCE and then OSCE both reflected and gave impetus to an emerging international trend in this field: a recognition that fundamental guarantees of human rights already provided in international law can most effectively be secured by attention to the institutions and procedures through which these rights were to be enforced.

This really marks the transition of the OSCE from a focus on human rights to a focus more broadly on democracy and the rule of law. It reflects a broader international trend demonstrated in the U.N. and in a variety of fora. It has also been demonstrated by those in the human rights community who for many years focused on individual cases and then came to the realization that if they were to be most effective in protecting individual prisoners of conscience and others, the structure of the legal and political system increasingly needed to be the focus of their attention.

On the one hand, this complicates the tradition of confrontation of non-compliance by member states. It's far more complicated and far less dramatic to sit at the review table and call to task a member state because of some aspect of their administrative law system than it was in the old days, to call them to task regarding a large number of political prisoners who would be identified by name.

By providing technical assistance, seminars, training and education in these matters, however, the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is carrying on, in a new, less-confrontational mode, the OSCE's efforts to promote adherence to the human dimension principles. This is also very much related to the shift in OSCE from standard-setting in this area to implementation of the standards that have already been developed.

The second principal response to date to the loss of the adversarial willingness to criticize the shortcomings of other member states is the recent assignment of authority to the new OSCE organs to take some initiative instead. On the down side—this relates to one of Sam's opening comments—it would be unfortunate if the result is that states completely leave what should be their responsibility to the new OSCE bureaucracy.

On the positive side, however, the charge to the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to monitor compliance with human dimension requirements, and the parallel charge to the chairmen-in-office to raise concerns of human dimension compliance in the Permanent Council, based on input from ODIHR and from the High Commissioner for National Minorities, is, in fact, a positive step. It is one helpful response to the new unity of the OSCE providing an opportunity to continue to apply pressure and scrutiny in the human dimension field.

Finally, in the context of the discussions of the next day and a half, I would suggest that in each region of the world, the trend is in the direction of expanded creation and use of multilateral regional structures. The question is not whether they will be created. The question is how they will be created and in what way OSCE will be relevant. In the context of the human dimension field, I would suggest that the OSCE experience of the last 20 years offers a number of lessons, both positive and negative. Thank you.

Mr. Wise. Thank you very much, Neil. I think that's an excellent overview of the human rights dimension of the OSCE, which from the beginning has been a primary or the primary focus of our own commission. To describe its transition from the old CSCE to the present day, I think, is a useful contribution for our further discussions throughout the remaining seminars.

At this point, I will turn to you in the audience and offer the opportunity to ask questions of our panelists. I ask that you identify yourself by name and organization, if appropriate, and that you indicate to whom you are directing the question. Those who ask questions, I ask to come up to the microphone in the middle of the room and speak into the microphone because we are having a recording of the proceedings here and we want to

get all the questions and names and everything correct for the final product. So at this point, I'll ask for questions.

Yes?

Questioner. My name is Lazlo Pasztor, and I am the president of National Organization of American Hungarians, and I'm involved with the CSCE process for the last 10 years. I'm very happy to say that as an NGO who participated at least in maybe 9 or 10 different international meetings of the CSCE and now the OSCE, there has been great progress in the area which really goes to the heart of those who care about the collective rights of national minorities.

In *Copenhagen*, big progress was started in that respect and there is still development and hope that the OSCE will be able to resolve actually the problems according to certain extent the instability and, as is happening in Yugoslavia, actually armed conflicts between the different nationalities living in a country.

My question would be, and very hard to address it to anybody in particular, because all of you touched on the importance of the organization, but my question is that how do you imagine that the OSCE could become more effective in guaranteeing the rights of the national minorities? For instance, you have what is now pending in Slovakia with the language law, including language police; the education law in Romania; the expansion of the penal code in Romania forbidding even in churches to sing the hymns if they are the same as the National anthem of Hungary; et cetera. Frankly, it's hard to name anybody, but maybe I would like to ask the Ambassador, you know, to give us his views because I know that the Carnegie Institute is also very active in trying to avert on the NGO side to have an influence, you know, on the whole process. Thank you.

Mr. Wise. Anybody like to comment first?

Mr. Dean. Well, I was singled out here unfairly, I think, but I think you pointed out, Hungary is the worse problem in this field, as we all know, because so much of its population is outside its national borders, and that creates many, many difficulties for the Hungarian government and for the government of the host country.

I think they have made progress and they will make more. I think the education law that you spoke of is being shifted or has been shifted from its original basis, has been modified, and I would see some prospect of change in Slovakia.

What you say, though, does remind me of one trend in OSCE thinking, and Minister Joseph referred to it: the idea of political binding. Many people do believe today that the OSCE and its commitments should be placed on a contractual treaty basis. That would, I suppose, be at least a partial answer to your question, but I think I will pass on to you, gentlemen, further effort to answer it.

Mr. Wise. Mr. Joseph, do you have a comment?

Mr. Joseph. Which aspect? If it is on the treaty, I could—

Mr. Wise. No, it's—

Mr. Joseph. But it is a very important question. I personally am convinced that if we try to transform CSCE and OSCE commitments in a treaty, we will have to renegotiate them and probably to attenuate them. We have a good example if you compare the U.N. Convention on Human Rights and the OSCE commitment. There is a tremendous difference in quality because the first one was negotiated between '62 and '64, when at that time the Soviet Union and all the Communist bloc were trying not to have commitments—or to have commitments which could be ignored—loopholes.

That would be my answer to that question. Now, regarding the National minorities, the fact is that the question of national minorities is probably the most difficult thing to be solved in our society, and I do not know one example where such a problem was solved in a satisfactory manner.

You have always two tendencies. You have the first tendency saying, OK, when you have foreigners living in great numbers in a certain country, the best way would be to integrate them slowly, not with force, of course, but by persuasion. At the end, after two, three, four, five generations, they will be like all others. That is, of course, in perfect contradiction with the right those minorities feel to maintain their culture, to maintain their language, to maintain their religion, et cetera.

If you maintain these as islands in a country, you will have problems all along because it is a fact that people who are not of the same culture, the same origin, the same language, et cetera, have problems inside one nation. I think, unfortunately, the recent history in Europe shows that. It is highly regrettable, but it is also highly difficult to solve.

Mr. Wise. Mr. Kritz, you want to comment?

Mr. Kritz. Only briefly. With respect to the principal question, I think I have little to add to what my two colleagues have already said, namely, I think there has been some progress. The mechanism of the high commissioner, with some of the other mechanisms and discussions with the permanent council, I think, are leading in the right direction.

With respect to this issue of legalization of the OSCE commitments, I would suggest that it is far preferable to allow these evolving principles to remain political commitments within the OSCE, while taking note of the concurrent process that is occurring outside the organization. As I mentioned earlier, through the articulation and advancement of these principles in the context of political commitments, the OSCE has contributed, and continues to provide, significant impetus to an ongoing process of the evolution of norms of international law. Particularly in the human dimension field, one can look to the work being done in any of a number of U.N. committees, or in the International Law Commission of the United Nations, to see explicit reference made to the principles developed in the OSCE. Strength is drawn from those OSCE principles in moving forward and drafting new declarations and new treaties that are legally binding. This occurs on a separate plain.

The two processes reinforce one another. The most effective approach, it seems to me, is to allow the OSCE to continue with its political process.

Mr. Wise. Thank you. I would just add a word from the point of view of the commission to Mr. Pasztor's request for advice on how the OSCE can better help protect minority rights. One thing that we do on a very systematic basis is to try to find instances where minorities are discriminated against or not treated in a fair manner.

We bring these cases to the attention of OSCE, to the attention of the State Department, and together we try to have these issues raised as matters of serious consideration at the OSCE meetings. Next question? Let me go to another one and then I'll come back to you, all right? Yes, sir.

Questioner. I try not to over-Hungarianize today's event. I'm the minister and deputy chief of mission of the Hungarian embassy, but I try to stick to broader OSCE/CSCE related problems as the distinguished panel has covered.

You touched upon several elements which, in my view, would be quintessential for the future of OSCE in Europe, in the Transatlantic region, as well as the applicability of its strength rather than weaknesses to other regions, and there is indeed enforcement and implementation.

I believe I tried to not make a statement, but come to my question, but I should sort of throw a little in which I believe would be intellectual. In '72, the CSCE was created as a political-security organization to cut across the already existing ideological, military, security, and economic blocks on the continent.

It worked pretty nicely out promoting the ideals, values which were to be shared. I think I can agree that was the first very important place. However, the military-security element on the continent at the time was left to the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. Now, those disappeared, and I tried to make a jump in connecting to Mr. Joseph's shaving off the history of the OSCE.

I believe the next very crucial important phase we will face in the history of OSCE will be after the Bosnia peace agreement is implemented, and they'll work it out. Why? I would say it will be a dramatically new element because it will be based on a contractually, legally binding basis, which is now going on in Dayton, that will not be really politically binding, the implementation of which could be averted or be circumvented from political considerations, and it will have a very strong implementing force that is NATO and the military troops, IFOR, behind it.

So my question is, how do you imagine the applicability of this OSCE model in other regions which will be covered in this panel—Asia, Latin America and Africa? How would you imagine such an organization growing out from an already existing structure like the Organization of African Unity in Africa or ASEAN in Asia or—I'm not a learned fellow of Latin American affairs, but wouldn't it be more advisable to try to build atop from a structure which, in a way, would immediately be able to guarantee implementation and enforcement as well?

If I look at the example of Grozny, which is a historic and very much political example of OSCE's function, finally it seems to be coming to face serious problems because it was not legally binding, and because those six-man missions were facing crucial non-implementation in the enforcement problems. So to a certain extent, unfortunately, the Grozny mission is seemingly fading.

The second one, very briefly, you very eloquently covered all sorts of elements of security, and one hears more and more often that security should be looked at and observed from the widest possible interpretation. None of the distinguished panel has covered the economic element.

However, in Western European and American terminology, whether it's integration, reintegration, NATO enlargement, EU enlargement, social and economic barriers to security as related to Central and Eastern Europe (and I would just distinguish between the two regions) very eloquent—I always count it as negative counter-productive possible element.

There were phases in OSCE's history, like I think it was '80 something that Bonn—was it the Bonn economic summit which had sort of—whatever, doubtful sort of result. Now the Prague economic forum tried to add to that momentum.

And the third one, at the end of this 2-day working session and debating and asking and thinking together, would you envision that in early December we'll see a ministerial

meeting in Budapest? The concluding document should include any hints, ideas, and proposals regarding the applicability of OSCE's effort to work with other regional organizations regarding the applicability of the OSCE model, which hopefully will present a functional, tangible, practical and strong example for other regions after the post-date and implementation process. Do you think it's the time? Do we have enough experience to go into that element as well? Again, I'm sorry for being too long.

Mr. Wise. Well, you've thrown a good series of questions at us. If I understood the first question in the sense that you asked it, I certainly don't feel qualified to answer. We've been given a temporary answer, a tentative answer because I think that sort of question which gets to the applicability of the OSCE in whole or in part to other areas is what we'll hopefully develop during the other panels. However, you also put in the question of binding versus legal commitments as well, so let me ask if other members of the panel want to comment.

Mr. Joseph?

Mr. Joseph. Perhaps to——

Mr. Wise. Let's do one question at a time.

Mr. Joseph. OK. On the first one, I have no answer to the third question, I must tell you immediately. On the first question, if I understood you, you were wondering if it would not be better to create another CSCE elsewhere having immediately a legally binding enforcement capability.

I can answer only personally. I think no. I think it is important, when you are beginning something in a certain region, to give confidence to the participants in that region, and that, in my view, should follow a very progressive approach. If you try to create immediately something very ambitious, because what you said was something very ambitious, you will have two consequences.

The first one will be that some will be afraid to participate, and the second is that you will find on your way very quickly the question, who is going to enforce implementation, and with what sort of decisionmaking process. In my view, if you have not the habit to work together, to know each other sufficiently well, you have no chance to solve the problem.

Mr. Wise. Any other thoughts? Ambassador.

Mr. Dean. Well, I think the existing regional organizations are rather varied. Some are treaty-based and others are not. My idea of their further development is that they would themselves develop local capability in conflict prevention and confidence-building, and in peacekeeping, perhaps not in peace enforcement, but what the OSCE has done is to have developed a remarkable spectrum of measures which, in my opinion, cover the whole range of human activities.

We haven't talked so much about economics, but all of these actions, including the actions in human rights, the military confidence-building ones, mediation, and some form of peacekeeping, belong in the same spectrum of things which I call peacemaking in the largest sense of the term.

It is that which I hoped would be transmitted from OSCE to other organizations which have made their own beginnings in most of these fields, but have not always gone very far. There are some areas without any security organizations. South Asia, where many countries have attempted to urge India, Pakistan, and China to form an organization; Northeast Asia, where there's a crying need for such an organization.

But in Northeast Asia, the OSCE example is particularly well-known through Japanese participation as an observer and through the actions of the two Korean states in viewing what OSCE has done and trying to apply it to their own situation. In recent documents of the Organization of African Unity, the general approach to mediation and confidence-building measures developed by OSCE is adapted to local conditions.

One sees already a lot of intellectual diffusion going on, even without treaty-based organizations. I personally see benefits in giving the OSCE a treaty base, but I accept the restrictions and costs which this would bring. These factors have led me to conclude that a move to a treaty basis will happen only in the future because of building up informal politically binding capabilities to a point where other organizations like NATO may then find that they are no longer necessary and OSCE can take over and then on a treaty basis. However, that's very far in the distant future.

Mr. Wise. Mr. Kritz, do you want to comment?

Mr. Kritz. I would just add briefly that building on existing structures obviously is advantageous, if possible. In the other regions, where there has been some progress, what that means is that each region and organization will bring its preexisting emphasis into the picture.

In the Asian context, for example, whether it's ASEAN or APEC, the emphasis is on economic aspects of relations. That's the basis on which they will build, and the question that needs to be addressed in some of those cases: is it politically feasible, within those existing frameworks, to bring in some of the other emphases of OSCE to create the kind of equation, the kind of linkage that exists within the Helsinki process?

In the case of Latin America, the OAS has certainly expanded in the sense of moving—again in the human dimension field—from simply guaranteeing human rights and creating regional structures for human rights, to the broader notion of a focus on democracy and the rule of law, encouraging the development of appropriate structures and institutions within its member states, in many ways parallel to what has been happening in OSCE in the last few years.

Mr. Wise. I'll just say a word on your second question about the economic dimension. The economic dimension of the CSCE and the OSCE has never had the prominence that the human dimension, human rights or the political-military dimension has had. This, I think, was true historically in the days of the Communist regimes because of the question about Afghanistan. With Afghanistan and the Soviet involvement there, Western countries, particularly the United States, had cutoff economic commerce with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe generally, and the economic arm of the CSCE just never developed.

In more recent times, there have been efforts, particularly by the United States and a number of the less-developed countries, less-developed emerging democracies, to have a strong economic component to the OSCE, but this has not been very strongly supported, we feel, by a number of the Western European countries who place more reliance on the existing economic structures that are in place in Western Europe. So it's still something that is active in the OSCE, but I'm not sure what sort of a future we can see.

Other comments? Mr. Joseph.

Mr. Joseph. I have a feeling I speak all the time, but anyway, no. However, be sure that at least one European—sorry—one Western country is supporting very strongly the economic aspect in the CSCE. It is the United States of America.

Now I would add something. We have the feeling in Europe generally that OSCE is not a fantastic tool to tackle the economic issue, and I will tell you exactly why. Basically CSCE/OSCE is the framework for government to take commitments, and economic is mainly a problem of, in our word at least, and in yours also today, of private enterprises investing, going, exchanging, making joint ventures, et cetera, and governments are not able to take commitments for them.

What is possible, and in that area, I think that many countries would urge OSCE to progress, would be to create in all the countries the necessary infrastructure to facilitate exchange of economic, of investment, of joint venture, et cetera, ensuring the security of businessmen and a lot of infrastructures like telecommunications and other which would help entrepreneurs to go and to do something efficient and useful.

But this part of the story is felt in Europe as being probably better in the hands of European Union.

Mr. Wise. All right. If there are no further comments from the panel on that question, we'll go to the last, which I remember was whether we expect that the Budapest ministerial meeting in December would make some reference or take notice of the possible applicability of the OSCE to other areas of the world.

I'm not so vain to think that they will draw some conclusions from our particular seminar here. They have a lot of concerns, but in the high level communiques of the OSCE, either at a ministerial or heads of state meeting, there is generally attention paid to other areas of the world and to the observer states that are becoming increasingly a part of the OSCE, Japan and Korea in the Far East, the non-participating Mediterranean states, and others.

So the attention of the OSCE is certainly not totally inner-focussed. It also looks out at the rest of the world. It is a dimension that I think will grow. Any other comments on that?

OK. Next question, please. Yes, sir.

Questioner. My name is Ur Akinci. I'm Washington bureau chief of Turkish Daily News. First, let me apologize to the panel for being late for this very important meeting, but I had another meeting. I couldn't make it in time. So if they have asked this question before, please let me know so I can just sit back. If not, I would like to pose a question on Turkey.

As you know, Turkey has been on the human rights radar screen of OSCE for quite a while, and in the last 6 months, Turkey has passed a series of laws according to which the Constitution has been amended, the infamous Article 8 has been amended, and I think about 90 prisoners have been released. They were in there for various pro-Kurdish-related sentences.

Have the OSCE made a recent reassessment of Turkey's overall score from the point of view, not only from human rights, but from the subject, topic of this meeting? There's a linkage between human rights security and economic issues, especially on the eve of Turkey's possible accession to European Customs Union or is the panel as pessimistic as the wife of a prominent U.S. congressman who, in a letter printed in Christian Science Monitor, said that she believed Turkey's membership in Customs Union would justify carrying out the Kurdish struggle in Turkey, which means beyond just mere words.

That was, I guess, clear reference to use of force as a cost of Turkey's becoming member of European Customs Union. I would like to get your assessments on the recent situation. Thank you.

Mr. Wise. Gentlemen, who would like to go first?

Mr. Dean. I don't think any of us, except you perhaps, can answer that.

Mr. Wise. Well, I can make a comment, but I would like my more distinguished members to say something first.

Mr. Dean. Well, you're asking us what the OSCE thinks today of the Turkish performance and the recent changes in human rights, and that is something that is difficult for any of us to answer. We would have to know in advance what is going to be reported on this at the December OSCE ministers' meeting, where there is going to be a report on the human rights performance of most member countries. I don't know that. Maybe you do.

Mr. Wise. Well, I'll say a word if I may, Mr. Joseph, and then you'll have something to add. I don't think there will be any formal report adopted by consensus on the activities of a particular country. That is generally not the way it's done, but there can be statements about the human rights and other commitments that Turkey and other countries have subscribed to and how they are actually carrying out those commitments. That sort of thing is the bread and butter of the OSCE.

We could expect some such comments, and there may be comments even in the OSCE, about whether Turkey should be permitted to join in any European Customs Union or other activities. But apart from the fact that an assessment, overall assessment or not, I think that it's mainly up to the individual countries. Our own look at the recent improvements which you described, at the Commission at least, is that they are welcome as improvements.

Frankly, they don't go far enough. We still feel that there's no reason to have this famous Article 8 because we think it denies freedom of expression, and that by trying to improve it and reduce the sentences of years in prison that people get for violations of this article is not a solution, not a real solution. It's an improvement, but not a solution.

We welcome the fact that they have released a lot of people from jail. We feel many of those people should never have been in jail. So that would be the short answer from one side. Mr. Joseph?

Mr. Joseph. I think I can go along with you. By the way, what you said is good because it gives the audience an idea of what can be an implementation debate in the OSCE. You say in the good old times, I don't think it is always the case.

Now, coming to your question and the way it was presented gives me opportunity to say something. You asked what were the opinion of the OSCE. There's almost never an opinion by the OSCE. You have normally 53 opinions. If former Yugoslavia is not present, 52. In a good case, 38 opinions. And in the best case, three or four. But one OSCE opinion doesn't normally exist.

Mr. Wise. Other questions? Mr. Pasztor, I cut you off before. Would you have your second question?

Questioner. I'm sorry to come back, but the second part of my question, I was waiting for a little bit because I was hoping to get some kind of illumination to the fact which was explained very well by the members of the panel that there has to be a consensus of everything, what the CSCE and now the OSCE decides.

They also pointed out that there's a big difference between political commitment and legal commitment, and if I may go back to the original question about the dealing with the nationality problems, national minority rights problems, being ideally on government used as a plus in announcing the bilateral agreement with Slovakia that the Copenhagen agreement and the European Council's Resolution 1201, if I'm correct with the number, included in the bilateral agreement.

If it is ratified by Slovakia, this would make it legal and it could be enforced or requested that it should be enforced. Mr. Laslow Kovac, when he was talking about the problems of Hungarians with the Romanian government dealing with the national minority issues, the human rights of the Hungarian minority, especially, pointed out that the Romanians are fearful in signing a similar agreement which includes this international consensus agreement, you know, whether it was the Copenhagen agreement or the agreements reached in the Council of Europe.

My question concerning this problem is, do you foresee any time in the future that maybe consensus could be reached also that what about the participating states in a consensus agree on should be ratified actually by the member countries? Is there any possibility that there would be some progress in this respect?

Mr. Dean. Well—

Mr. Wise. Ambassador Dean.

Mr. Dean. It's my understanding that this effort was indeed made in the context of the Baladur initiative in the treaty on cooperation which was reached as a result. An effort was made there to codify individual understandings reached on an individual basis and it was stated that that effort would continue.

Now, this is an area which represents a compromise between points of view expressed here. In other words, you first develop a certain understanding by consensus methods and then convert it into a contractual agreement, a partial agreement. That does seem to me to be a possibility in the case that you mentioned.

I have been struck by something which other members of the panel have taken for granted here: in recent years, individual countries are getting what amounts to report cards or descriptions of their performance in the human rights field. These are raised in a rather systematic way and discussed at meetings of the permanent council and probably by the ministers, also.

This is a very important advance and one which bears on the point that you raised about Turkey.

Mr. Wise. Neil Kritz?

Mr. Kritz. Well, I would just say that, absent the transformation of OSCE decisions from political to legal obligations, there can't really be a uniform approach developed by which consensus decisions are then legally implemented in each country.

That said, the process of integration of OSCE consensus views into domestic legislation does, in a sense, occur more subtly. One can look, for example, at a number of difficult situations that have been negotiated by the High Commissioner for National Minorities. In some citizenship laws, for instance, there has been extensive back and forth negotiations, through the intermediary of the High Commissioner, between individual states and a large number of the member states within the existing institutional framework, applying pressure and ultimately resulting in a reformulation of domestic legislation.

Mr. Wise. Yes, sir?

Questioner. Thank you very much. I'm Martin Nye from the German embassy. I would only like to offer a small comment on this question. There's already an example of where a known part of the normal framework of the CSCE has been taken into bilateral agreements and then turned to legally binding obligations. There are two treaties between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia which have been incorporated and then made legally binding.

The unique feature in that one is whatever the OSCE will adopt in the future will automatically then become legally binding in those bilateral relations, and that perhaps is also an example of where one could look ahead where other states could adopt a similar approach.

It is, of course, very easy that a participating member state of the OSCE takes politically binding obligations and turns them into legally binding, but it could also work that they use this laboratory of security and look from the outside of the OSCE to this lab and decide, "This set of norms could serve our regional purposes," and then take them into legally binding obligations among themselves. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wise. Mr. Joseph.

Mr. Joseph. Just one thing: the main problem here is to know what is leading to a treaty, inside OSCE negotiations. OSCE can always provide a sort of framework. Ambassador Dean some minutes ago mentioned the CFE and Open Sky. I would just add that CFE and Open Sky negotiation were open only to the member of military alliances or of former alliance, and Neutral and Non Aligned were excluded. It was therefore not purely a CSCE exercise—

Mr. Dean. You can sign up with the treaty now if you want to.

Mr. Joseph. No, no, no, we can't.

Mr. Dean. Open Skies when it comes in.

Mr. Joseph. Wait. For the time being, we can't and you know there is a specific problem regarding Southeastern Europe, which is probably avoiding or hampering a neutral country to become participating states in Open Sky. Other example, yes, you are right, a later initiative led to some bilateral agreement.

Another example is the conciliation convention, a convention for conciliation arbitration negotiated inside the CSCE on a voluntary basis by states. Some ratified and some not. It was not necessary that all ratified for the agreement to enter into force. So there are such examples, but they are always, I would say, on free basis.

Mr. Wise. Other questions? There don't seem to be any more at this time. Are there any final comments any of you would like to make?

Mr. Dean. I have a short comment.

Mr. Wise. Ambassador Dean, please.

Mr. Dean. Minister Joseph suggested that the Yugoslav experience nearly killed the OSCE because of the OSCE's failure to perform better there. True, but the point should be made that Yugoslavia and Bosnia have killed almost every security organization involved, including NATO, at least up to this time; including the U.N.; including the European Union; and including the Western European Union.

All these organizations are going to have to climb out of the ashes of failure. That is one very important reason why I believe and hope that the Dayton discussions will bring an agreement and that NATO will then move to help its implementation.

The problem, of course, that we all face when we talk about regional organizations is that both they and the United Nations are weak now. The only thing that we can do with the OSCE and with the United Nations is incremental small step improvement. However, I think there is enough interest and hope in the future to bring about a steady process of improvement.

One thing that really does characterize the OSCE is the ingenuity and creativity which its member states have shown. They have extracted from the whole European experience in this tragic century—and the North American experience that was so tightly linked—out of this cornucopia of sorrow, they have devised at least a theoretical answer for nearly every aspect of human behavior which can lead to conflict. This has been a remarkable achievement, one which states will grow to appreciate more in the future, and then, I think, they will change their view of which organizations should have the priority and give it to OSCE.

Mr. Wise. Are there any further comments down there? **Mr. Kritz?**

Mr. Kritz. Briefly on this question of the impact of the Yugoslav conflict: it has been said before, and I think it's without question, that one principal thing that the Yugoslav conflict demonstrated with respect to the OSCE is that the organization's strength lies in its role as a forum for conflict prevention and not as a body that can be nearly as effective once that effort has failed.

The OSCE's strength—and probably the principal lesson that it provides for replication in other regions—is in its ability to create a complex of creative structures and procedures, overlapping and dealing with an integrated variety of subjects and issues, to create an overall environment in which conflicts can be headed off at the pass before they, in fact, become violent.

After that stage, many OSCE's current mechanisms are useful, but are simply not as effective.

Mr. Wise. **Mr. Joseph?**

Mr. Joseph. Yes. I will look for the future, if you'll allow me. One question you asked us to deal with, which was a very interesting question on the two pages regrouping 25 questions, retained my attention. It was the question of homogeneity or heterogeneity. You asked if the homogeneity inside the Euro-Atlantic framework is one key to explain the success of the CSCE, and would another original organization have the same benefits of homogeneity.

Here I would say, can you imagine a better heterogeneity than we had between communist and capitalist countries in the years '70 and '80? I don't think it is possible in any other region of the world. So I would say a priori, in any region of the world, you will have, at the worst, the same heterogeneity and probably a better homogeneity. The only point is if something like that has to be created, it should be at the initiative of the region itself, through an existing organization or some government taking the initiative to invite countries and, if possible, all the countries of the region.

I wouldn't believe that the absence of Albania was catastrophic for the evolution of CSCE at first, but I think it is good that Albania is now a participating state. Another question would be the expulsion of a country. Very frankly, I think we can do a better job when all the people are around the table instead of knowing that some people are at home and out of the organization.

Anyway, everyone should be invited, and hopefully if such an organization or an institution was created somewhere else, I hope it will work, but a prerequisite for that is to approach the problem very progressively. Thank you.

Mr. Wise. Well, thank you all. I thank you most sincerely for this first session of our series of panel seminars on the applicability or relevance of the OSCE to other areas. I thank you in the audience for coming. We are going to have another session, the first one on the geographic area of Asia, at 3:15 here in this same room.

Regarding our panels scheduled for tomorrow, I'm told because of the government shut down, we're trying to find another place for tomorrow's seminar. We suggest those of you who are interested, please call the Commission for further information later this evening or tomorrow morning. Thank you all for your attendance.

[Applause]