

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

# TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)



FEBRUARY 20, 1997

Briefing of the  
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe  
Washington, DC

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# CONTENTS

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## WITNESSES

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1997

	Page
His Excellency Ambassador R. James Woolsey, Former Director of Central Intelligence .....	2
Michael Guhin, Deputy Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] .....	5
Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist, Congressional Research Service .....	9

## APPENDIX

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Flank Agreement and Treaty Adoption .....	17
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Implementation, Adaptation, Implications .....	22
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements .....	38

# TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE [CFE]

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1997

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Washington, DC

The Commission met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:30 a.m., in room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Michael Hathaway, Chief of Staff, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Stanley Sloan, Senior Specialist in International Security Policy, Congressional Research Service, presiding.

Mr. *Hathaway*. Good morning. My name is Mike Hathaway. I am the Chief of Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and on behalf of the Commission's Chairman, Senator Alfonse D'Amato and the Commission's Co-Chairman, Congressman Chris Smith, I would like to welcome you to today's briefing on the status of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.

The Commission has sponsored this briefing with the Congressional Research Service (CRS) under the security portion of our statutory mandate. This is part of our focus this year on European security and NATO enlargement. Many of you know that the Commission is planning to have a series of hearings on NATO enlargement. We have invited the administration to send witnesses to such a hearing, but we have not been able to resolve scheduling difficulties yet.

I wanted to say a few words to some of the representatives of prospective NATO candidate countries. I see people from various embassies in the audience here. You have probably heard that the Commission intends to take testimony from official representatives of candidate countries. As soon as our scheduling becomes more firm in terms of what we are going to do and when we are going to do it, we will let you know. So if you have people who perhaps want to come from your capitals to present your position, they will have the opportunity to do that.

With that, I think I will turn the floor over to Mr. Stanley Sloan of the Congressional Research Service, who will moderate today's panel.

Mr. *Sloan*. Thank you, Mike. I have to admit that I have not spent a lot of time on CFE in recent years because it has not been a main preoccupation of the Congress for some time. As I returned to the subject, I thought CFE makes me think a little bit about a class reunion where the class member who, some 5 years ago appeared young and vital now shows up with graying hair and disheveled clothing and walks with a limp.

CFE certainly has aged, perhaps more than its years would have warranted. The bloc-to-bloc aspects of the treaty have certainly been overtaken by events as has the framework of balance, which was part of the conceptual framework of the treaty. But, of course, much of that was foreseen when the treaty was signed in 1990 and was even clearer when the treaty was ratified in 1991.

Nevertheless, many elements of the treaty remain important today, particularly the goal of avoiding destabilizing concentrations of forces in Europe and the goal of creating greater transparency and promoting information exchange among governments in Europe. The timing of today's session could not be more appropriate. We all know the contemporary setting of the CFE treaty revision is strongly influenced by NATO's plan to enlarge its membership in the near future.

Secretary of State Albright, having consulted with the NATO allies, today is in Moscow trying to convince the Russians to make a deal with NATO, and NATO's proposed adjustments to the treaty are being tabled in Vienna today. We are very fortunate to have such a well-qualified panel to lead our discussion of CFE adaptation this morning.

Jim Woolsey brings a wealth of credentials to this table, not the least of which is the fact that he led the U.S. team that negotiated the CFE treaty, and then also helped guide the treaty through the ratification process on the Hill. Following a brief return to his law practice at Shea & Gardner, he returned to the executive branch when he was appointed Director of Central Intelligence in 1993. He now is back at Shea & Gardner, but he remains an influential voice in discussions about defense and foreign policy.

Michael Guhin is the Deputy Assistant Director of the Multilateral Affairs Bureau of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Mr. Guhin has had a long and distinguished government career, including service on the National Security Council, twice I believe, the Department of State, and a variety of senior positions at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He was the senior ACDA representative on Ambassador Woolsey's team in Vienna.

The third member of the panel is my colleague, Lou Fisher. Lou is one of America's leading experts on separation of powers. He is the author of numerous books on constitutional issues, including a 1995 book on presidential war powers. Lou is here to address questions concerning congressional/executive relationships that may arise in the process of adapting the CFE treaty.

I would also like to acknowledge the presence of my colleague, Steve Bowman, who prepared the CFE report on Congress and the status of CFE that you probably all picked up as you came in today.

So without further ado, let me turn to Ambassador Woolsey.

Amb. Woolsey. Thanks, and I am glad you did not say that CFE, in returning to the class reunion, had lost its hair.

There are about a half-dozen important overall points I would like to make about CFE.

First of all, the people who were negotiating MBFR in Vienna for years did a very valuable thing, as did the administrations who supported them—Democratic and Republican. Namely, they did not sign a bad treaty.

Over those years of diligence and what the Soviet Union called *recalcitrance* on the part of the West, though we did not recognize it as such, we were *hiding our time* for a remarkable period; for a remarkable Soviet leader, Gorbachev, and a remarkable develop-

ment, the fall of the Berlin Wall; and a time when we really could negotiate a treaty that produced equal levels for NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces rather than the longtime Soviet position which would have, in one way or another, produced unequal levels.

The second thing that I want to stress is that the negotiation of the mandate by my predecessor, Steve Ledogar in 1988–1989 was absolutely crucial to the outcome of the CFE treaty. It was the mandate, for example, that excluded naval forces; it was the mandate that created the structure which made possible the relatively rapid negotiation of the treaty from essentially the summer of '89 until the fall of 1990.

It was also more than fortuitous, it was dramatically important that just as the negotiations were getting started, and (as chance would have it) 5 days after I arrived in Vienna to take over from Steve, the Berlin Wall went down. So, for the year that I was negotiating the treaty with Mike's and others' able help—from the fall of '89 to the fall of 1990—the Warsaw Pact was collapsing, and under the influence of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, the Soviet Union was coming to be almost daily more and more willing to enter into a balanced agreement.

The one recalcitrant institution by the end of the period was (and I believe is recalcitrant yet) the Russian military. We will get to that in a moment. Just a couple of quick war stories about the developments in Vienna and the Alice-in-Wonderland character of the personal relationships during that incredible year from the fall of '89 to the fall of 1990 as the governments changed throughout the Warsaw Pact.

Poland was represented in the negotiations by an ambassador who was an intelligence officer of the old communist regime. During the year Solidarity took over, a majority in the Parliament, the chairman of the parliamentary committee, the Sejm in Warsaw, was a man named Onyszkiewicz; he later went on to become Minister of Defense—a marvelous man, a mathematician, a member of Solidarity from early on. When he came to Vienna, now in the position of overseeing the work of the Polish intelligence officer from the old regime, the three of us had coffee and my first words were, "Chairman Onyszkiewicz, it is very nice to meet you; I have had a Solidarity bumper sticker on my truck for many years." And we grinned at one another and then turned and smiled at the intelligence officer, who was on his way out before too many weeks for other reasons.

I visited East Germany in the spring of 1990—as chance would have it, on May Day—to finish up some discussions with the still-existent East German regime. The deputy East German Defense Minister was, as was the case with many of those who were in ministerial positions in East Germany during that period, a protester and demonstrator from the churches in Leipzig. He was bearded, young, and clearly uncomfortable being surrounded by all of these East German generals and colonels in their uniforms. As he and I sat down, I said, "I have been a civil rights demonstrator and a protester against the Vietnam War. There are many Americans in senior positions who have been protesters and demonstrators. I'm glad to see that is now true here." He and I grinned at one another and then turned to all of the East German generals, who were looking rather glum.

It was a remarkable period in European history, and vignettes are one of the ways, I suppose, to capture what was happening. Of course, what was happening, in most important terms, was the very rapid democratization of Eastern Europe, and even a movement in that direction in the Soviet Union. It really was that development—and I would say, also, the very deft management of the unification of Germany by the Bush administra-

tion—that made possible the concatenation of events which created the possibility of a treaty of this kind.

There is a lesson here: a country—the United States or any other—needs to be ready to seize the moment when something of the historic importance of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the transitions in the Soviet Union occurs, and when an opportunity thus exists to create a structure that can last a long time.

There will need to be some amendments and changes to CFE—there have been all along. But it is very important, I think, to hold onto what one has and to amend it, rather than scrapping it and starting over. CFE's levels—the level of forces of battle tanks, artillery, fighter aircraft and all the rest—are less important than is the fact that the levels exist, that there is a rule under the treaty which prevents offensive dominance by any single country, and that the numbers are essentially the hook upon which a verification regime is hung.

In some ways, the numbers exist in order to be able to have the verification structure. Stan alluded to this point, but I think it is important to emphasize something that he said. It eluded neither Mike's notice nor mine, nor other peoples' that the Berlin Wall had fallen and the Warsaw Pact was dissolving while the treaty was being negotiated. Everyone connected with this—at least on the American delegation and increasingly on others—realized that within the framework of the mandate negotiated, we had to give maximum flexibility to nation states because we well might have the possibility of East European states joining NATO.

We had discussions about that in the NATO caucus and in the American delegation. So the structure of national levels for holdings, as they are called, under the treaty does permit a great deal of flexibility. The verification regime, which is structured in such a way that a former Warsaw Pact country and a NATO country may together inspect another former Warsaw Pact member and vice versa, also puts a maximum level of reliance on nation state operation.

The charge that this treaty is obsolete because it is structured under a bloc-to-bloc system is a mantra that is repeated by the Russian military and sometimes unthinkingly by others, but there is very little truth to it. The only bit of truth to it is that the bloc-to-bloc numbers originally helped or were what drove the creation of the total numbers for the Warsaw Pact, and NATO sides. But adjustment of numbers is a relatively simple matter. Within relatively broad ranges adjustments of numbers will not substantially affect the defense dominance of the treaty, which is its main importance, together with the verification regime.

Finally, the most pesky issue during the negotiations after the treaty was signed and during the first half of 1991 and during the last year until the summer of '96 has been the Russian military's concern about the Caucasus and about the flank limitations which were part of the treaty, principally at the insistence of Norway and Turkey. The treaty had originally been structured to deter a concentration in the center of Europe. As it became clear that this produced a situation in which any country that had territory across the entire front of Europe—and the then-Soviet Union was the only one that did—would therefore be driven by the treaty to move its forces not only to the rear as reductions occurred, but also to the flanks. Norway and Turkey, since they bordered the Soviet Union, wanted some guarantee that the flanks would not be loaded up by Soviet troops. Consequently, we successfully negotiated a set of rather complex but workable flank

limitations. These were never favored by the Soviet military; they did, albeit grumpily, formally sign off on them.

This issue stalled the final presentation of the treaty from late '90 to the middle of '91, in the form of the naval infantry caper. The Soviet Union sought to put about four divisions worth of tanks and artillery into the Navy and say that they did not count under the treaty because naval forces were excluded. This was essentially the same caper that the Russian military was working on during '95 and '96, for about the same number of forces, in an effort to get out from under the flank limitations.

I think that the Clinton administration, after it got around to working closely with Turkey and Norway and proceeding with the Russians only on issues and on solutions which were acceptable to our NATO allies, negotiated a perfectly reasonable emendation of those flank limitations. For the present writing that suffices.

Now the issue is how one can change to some extent the philosophy and to some extent the numbers to accommodate a Russia that is concerned about NATO expansion. It is possible as long as one works by not scrapping what one has unless and until one has a substitute for it. I think that as long as we end up with a treaty that maintains the principle of defense dominance and maintains and even expands the excellent verification regime that is in the treaty now, we will continue to have something that is at the heart of security and stability in Europe.

Thank you.

Mr. *Sloan*. Thank you, Ambassador Woolsey. I am glad that you referred to MBFR because 24 years ago today I was in Vienna on the original MBFR delegation, and your stories also remind me that even back then in those days of the Cold War there were some foretastes of the future. The Polish delegation in 1973 always had the most interesting ideas of any of the Warsaw Pact representatives about where arms control should go in Europe, and they were always interesting to talk to at cocktail parties and informal discussions.

Another foretaste that is perhaps even more interesting and curious is the fact that the Romanian delegation, in the fall of 1973 during the first formal round of negotiations, would come to the U.S. delegation before a plenary session and ask us to look at their plenary statement and give them comments. This was how they indicated their independence from the Warsaw Pact. So perhaps that is an interesting precursor of the current Romanian position and desire to become a member of NATO.

Without any more of that reminiscing, let me turn the floor over to Mike Guhin.

Mr. *Guhin*. Thank you very much, Stan. First I would like to thank you very much for having me here today to discuss this very key issue. It is a real honor for me to follow Ambassador Woolsey on this panel because it reminds me of the honor that I and many of us had in working with him in Vienna in what he correctly described as a very remarkable time.

The one thing he has not noted, I think, is his role in that very remarkable time, which for all of us there at any rate we still look at him as one of those who really was able to "seize the day," as the phrase goes, in Vienna. It is easy to look at treaties in hindsight and say, "Well, it was sort of natural that we achieved it," and believe me, this was not the case.

This was not only a remarkable time, it was remarkable that one was able to craft a treaty and complete a treaty in this time; and I think it is one of those times when



you say there was a window and that window was not open for a very long time. Jim has summarized, we had problems not only immediately after the signing, there were problems all the way up until entry into force. Of course, the Soviet Union disintegrated even after we solved the naval rules, et cetera. So there was one issue or problem after another.

The fact that this treaty was completed and the fact that it has survived so many travails, in my mind, only underlines two points: one, the success and accomplishments of those that put it together; and two, as Ambassador Woolsey has underlined, the continuing importance, I mean, the criticality of this treaty to the political and security structure in Europe.

I would like to stress, I could not agree more with what Ambassador Woolsey has stated about the importance of the treaty and, of course, what we are about now. We will never scrap this treaty. We are in a process now of endeavoring to try to, as we say, adapt it, change it, to modify it in some respects which I will come to shortly.

But, of course, underlying all this is that this treaty remains a key cornerstone and will remain a key cornerstone. It will be changed somewhat by these adaptation negotiations, but it will not go away and will continue to be a critical part of this structure.

Before coming in to exactly where we are today, and I hope to be very brief about that, as was also underlined here, we need to look at CFE as part of the broader picture. CFE, like many arms control agreements, is not just an arms control agreement. In fact, as was correctly noted, the precise levels, the exact zones and how things were arranged are far less important than the fact of what it accomplishes in terms of reflection of wills and reflection of objectives and reflection of the direction in which Europe wants to go, and importantly, codifying the fact that you cannot reverse that direction.

I was in a little think tank not long ago, and I started hearing words that CFE was becoming obsolete and et cetera and why do we have it. It gave me shudders that this would come from what I thought were otherwise knowledgeable people. One need only travel, shall I say, or talk in Europe a bit and it will become apparent immediately that this treaty is a much-valued instrument, not for the past and not just for today, but for the future that we are trying to build.

As you all know—we can talk, and I will not spend much time—the circumstances have changed dramatically in Europe, as has just been summarized. Now some of the major events, among others besides the dissolution of the Soviet Union, was the coming down of the Wall, all of that change, and now the NATO enlargement. As Secretary Albright has stated, and as others have noted, NATO enlargement is going to happen. The Russians are not happy about it and, of course, we have extended, and others have extended, our partnership, respect and movement in working with Russia. But the fact of the matter is that this will not stand in the way of NATO enlargement.

Now, CFE is one key element. CFE probably would have been adapted in some form or other without NATO enlargement, I would suspect. But the fact that we are faced with looking at NATO enlargement, I think, provides an additional and a very key incentive. The reason I say that is that CFE is one mechanism by which the United States and NATO allies can help assure or provide Russia with greater confidence that NATO expansion is not going to be threatening to them.

I would stress that it is only one instrument. All that CFE deals with basically is heavy ground armaments and combat aircraft and attack helicopters, located within the

area of application in Europe. It does not deal with other kinds of stationed forces; it does not deal with nuclear issues; and it does not deal, of course, with the broader political questions and security questions. That is why you see the administration in a multi-faceted approach, working with Russia and others on the question of NATO enlargement on several fronts.

You have all read about it and understand there is work going forward on basically a NATO/Russia kind of council. That is one way of bringing them into the consultative process. There also have been public statements on no reason, no plans, no intention to put nuclear weapons in new NATO member states. That is another key ingredient or part of this. There is work in the OSCE to see how the role of the OSCE might be enhanced further in terms of helping build this architecture and bringing Russia in closer.

So there are a lot of elements in this strategy. I would hasten to add there is also working with Ukraine to ensure, and working with the Baltics to ensure that NATO enlargement takes place and occurs in the way that it should. Let me stress here, and it has been stressed by the leadership, this has to be done rightly. It is a difficult, delicate issue, and it has to be done correctly. If not, it would be difficult for all of us.

So what are we doing in CFE? Well, it is not a very complicated picture right now. We announced at the May review conference last year that we, all the parties, said we wanted to adapt this treaty. At the Lisbon Summit in December, by the summit leaders, of course, it was not only confirmed that we would be adapting CFE, but a set of what we call "scope and parameters" were set out for elements that we might look at in adapting CFE. NATO has, since December, been working very hard on coming up with a proposal. We will be tabling this today if it has not done so already.

There are very few key elements to this proposal, but they are very important. The first is a call for lower equipment ceilings throughout the area of application. So it is calling on all parties. I would hasten to add, it is not saying to every party, "You must reduce," because different parties have different interests, obviously. But it is saying that when we adapt this treaty, we should end up with lower levels of equipment throughout the area of application, consistent, of course, in our mind with the need for NATO flexibility, et cetera, et cetera. We've also announced that the overall number for NATO will be lower and that lower number will include a reduction in U.S. entitlements.

Now, let me stress the word "entitlements." The treaty allows people to be at certain levels. The U.S. and many other allies are not at those levels today in terms of their holdings. They do need some headroom for reinforcement in potential crises or difficult times. So I would stress that these will be reductions in entitlements. Reduction in entitlements is very important because it then sets the cap, it sets the new ceiling, and these will be lower for the United States and for NATO overall.

That is intended, of course, to be a very important message to Russia. It also calls on Russia and others, of course, that we envision reductions throughout the area of application. So this is something that we would hope all countries would be looking at and taking reductions that they see fit.

The treaty structure, as Jim correctly said, is bloc-to-bloc in some senses, but in other senses it is not at all bloc-to-bloc. I mean, this treaty is very flexible. This treaty, in fact, can be as flexible as the parties wish to make it. But we are taking a look at the bloc-to-bloc structure that is there and basically will propose to replace that with national ceilings. There will be national ceilings and really, in many ways, as we said,

we all have national maximum levels today. What this says is we will do away with the bloc-to-bloc structure of coming to those levels and we will establish the levels in the treaty itself.

The zones—and there are papers that have the zones and show the treaty is divided into zones to prevent destabilizing concentration of forces—we would propose to be basically replaced by a system of territorial ceilings. This gets a little complicated, but let's simplify it. What national ceilings would say is that any country would have a national ceiling and can never have more than that amount of equipment anywhere in the area of application. It does not matter whose country it is in, by whose approval, but you can never exceed that number.

A territorial ceiling will say in Germany or in the individual states—that is, on their own territory you can never have more than a certain number. Now, those numbers will not be synonymous because you will have station forces, you will have the right for station and forces as NATO has, et cetera. So the territorial ceilings, in many instances, at least in some, will be higher, of course, than the National ceilings to take account of station and forces, et cetera.

Combined with this, there will be a proposal of what we call a stabilizing measure. What that will say is we recognize that particularly in light of NATO enlargement, the geographic region in Central Europe is sensitive. So there will be a measure that would basically say that the territorial ceilings of Belarus, Kaliningrad (which is part of Russia) and Ukraine and then Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland and Slovakia, that their territorial ceilings, once set, could not increase and that those territorial ceilings will not be higher than what they would be entitled to have today.

The political message here, I think, is very clear. It was summarized by the Secretary, of course, in Brussels. It provides the message there will be no NATO buildup in new members and that NATO will not take advantage of its enlargement to threaten Russia. That is the key message that is involved there. That does not, let me hasten to add, say that there will no stationing in those countries. It very clearly does not say that because one of the key important factors in NATO enlargement is that new members should have full rights and privileges just like old members. In fact, there would be no second-class citizens. So that in the CFE context, we have no intention and will not allow second-class citizenship to be applied to new members. But it does say there's a limit and that limit is not going to increase in time, and that is a very clear message.

Then to mention quickly, we will seek enhanced verification and information exchange provisions. These are critical in the treaty and we will try, where possible, to improve those. As was also stressed, it is important, in our mind, to move ahead deliberately, but also quickly. There's a lot of negotiation left. I've given our proposal; let me stress the Russians have their proposals, some aspects of which are clearly not acceptable. For example, they would very clearly like to establish second-class citizenship for new NATO members and they would very clearly like to codify a prohibition against any area stationing of forces. Those, of course, are not acceptable.

So there's a lot of negotiation left, but I think we have now sent very clear political and security messages to Russia which, overall, should be quite reassuring to them.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Sloan. Thank you, Mike. In a few minutes, we will get to the question—and-answer portion of the program, but we do not want to neglect a very important part of

conventional arms control in Europe, which is the congressional/executive relationship in this context.

If you will recall, this congressional/executive relationship does go back to MBFR because Henry Kissinger, in 1973, was accused of having invented MBFR with the alliance and with the Russians mainly to block a successful Mansfield amendment in the Congress. Senator Mansfield was attempting to legislate unilateral reductions of U.S. forces in Europe, and there was speculation that one of Henry Kissinger's main objectives was to make the argument that because there was an ongoing negotiation, no unilateral cuts should be made.

In fact, administrations did use that argument for several years after the beginning of MBFR and, I must say, successfully. As in 1973, congressional/executive relations today remain an important aspect of conventional arms control negotiations.

I now turn to Lou Fisher who will briefly address some of those perspectives. Lou.

*Dr. Fisher.* Let me talk about the issue of how do you modify a treaty. Do you have to go back to the Senate and get two-thirds approval or can you modify a treaty by going to Congress and getting a simple majority in the House and Senate? Last November, the Justice Department, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), did an extensive memo on this, and they concluded that you could modify a treaty by going to Congress as a whole, both houses, and getting a majority vote. It is a well-reasoned memo as you would expect from OLC, but it is not the last word on this at all because there's nothing in the Constitution that gives anyone a convincing reason to come down on one side or the other, and much of the resolution depends on political will and political interests in the Senate as to what its institutional interests are. I will reinforce that point after I finish with the treaty issue.

This is at least the third time we've had a dispute as to what the President can do with treaties, the third time in the last two decades. The first time was President Carter's termination of the treaty with Taiwan. Over history, we've terminated treaties in so many different ways, sometimes by unilateral presidential action, sometimes by treaty, sometimes by statute, and the Senate started to challenge Carter saying at first that if you are going to terminate a treaty, just as you terminate a law, you need the Senate—in this case with the treaty—to act. But the Senate also considered that you could terminate a treaty by joint action in Congress, by a simple majority in the House and the Senate.

The courts got involved and at first the courts thought that the Senate had confronted the President, but then realized that under Senate procedures, it had never taken a final vote, and that was very important for the courts. In the end, this is one that did go to the Supreme Court in Goldwater against Carter, and the justices were all over the lot on the big question as to how you terminate a treaty. But it was convinced that in this case the Senate had not gone to the mat. Justice Powell said if the Senate chooses not to confront the President, it is not our duty to do so. So there's a signal there that, if Congress wants to protect its prerogatives, it has to do it, has to do it up front. So we still do not have any final word on how you terminate a treaty.

The next issue in the Reagan years was, as you recall, the reinterpretation debate. Can the executive branch reinterpret a treaty on its own? If so, the Senate would be threatened. It would have agreed to a treaty and suddenly it means something else through reinterpretation and it has no role in the process. The Senate got involved in that. It is a very technical area, as to what kind of reinterpretation might be modest and

would not require Senate action or congressional action, what would definitely require congressional action.

In the end, Congress has always had the power to play hardball and in any threat that the Reagan administration might want to deploy in some sense an SDI system, you could, and they did, put language in a statute saying that no money appropriated shall be used to deploy any system. That was the end of it. You did not have to get into a very difficult debate over the treaty power. On whether you could modify a treaty is a little bit of an extension of the reinterpretation debate. The administration is admitting that it cannot modify this on its own through unilateral action; it has to come back. But it says it can come back just to the two houses and get a majority vote.

All these questions on the treaties, on termination and reinterpretation and modification, cannot be resolved by looking to constitutional language. That won't get you there. I will make that point in a different way. When you do look to the Constitution and find something that is solid on the Presidential side, that does not get you there either, and what I'm going to mention is the President's power to make recess appointees, which is an absolute power given to the President. No question about it.

But if the President were to use that power in an aggressive way, he would threaten the Senate because the Senate would not have an opportunity to hold hearings or to confirm nominees. These people would be put into a position on a recess basis for a year, year and a half, and you are skirting the Senate. So the Senate has been concerned about this.

In the Reagan years, Senator Byrd, when he was majority leader, felt that the administration was using recess appointees too aggressively and simply said that, as majority leader, "All your other nominations that you would like to get through, they are dead in the water unless you stop this." And the administration stopped it. This is hardball again, something that the Senate can do if it wants to protect its prerogatives.

Just take that a step further. On recess appointees, can you use a recess appointment power to put an individual on the Federal court, district court, appellate court, U.S. Supreme Court? Well, President Eisenhower did it three times on the U.S. Supreme Court, including Earl Warren. The Senate was concerned about that, passed a resolution. It is just a Senate resolution; it is legally not binding. But it said, "Stop this unless there's a terrible emergency; we want you to go through the regular confirmation process; we do not want someone on the Federal bench, instead of having a lifetime capacity, who's there for a year and a half, has to worry about getting nominated again, confirmed. It is not the kind of independence we want on the court." And we've never done it since for the Supreme Court.

President Carter did it once, a recess appointee for district court out in Hawaii, and that was litigated and finally got to the 9th Circuit in California. A judgment by the full bench upheld the recess appointment power for courts. But that did not stop the matter. The Senate is still concerned, and the President is still concerned. The warning is that if you were to do this again, once that person completed the year, year and a half in office, there is the threat, I hope a good threat, that the Senate would, when the person is nominated, and up for confirmation, defeat the person 100 to zero and say that we want these people to come through the regular process.

So in this matter of the treaty, the Senate, for itself, has to decide how much its prerogatives and institutional powers are threatened by modification of a treaty, and if

it decides that it is, then it has to protect itself and it has to do so in a forward way, in a confrontational way if necessary, because no one else is going to protect the Senate except itself.

Thank you.

*Mr. Sloan.* Thank you, Lou. This is a question that obviously finds somewhat different perspectives in the House and Senate sides of the Hill. The other day when Madeline Albright was testifying before the House International Relations Committee, her statement said that, of course, the flank agreement adjustments would require the approval of the Senate. When Mr. Bereuter had his opportunity to speak, he made note of the fact that the administration had said that they'd be seeking implementation legislation from the House and the Senate, and Secretary Albright's statement was then corrected to reflect what Mr. Bereuter had noted.

So let me now open the floor to questions, and if you would, please, rise to ask your question, identify yourself, and also identify to which panel member or members you are addressing the question. We have a very convenient lectern here that you can move to, please, and even a mike.

*Questioner.* Thank you. I'm Larry Chalmer from National Defense University. Prior to my colleagues asking the more specific details, I wanted to ask one that would ask you to carry forward a little bit. I want to look at approximately 5 years downstream. NATO has enlarged, the new members are coping with whatever we have crafted in '97 and '98. We are looking at potentially a very different map territorially. Particularly for you, Ambassador, and you, Mr. Guhin, how would you envision where we'd be in the arms control process after this next iteration of NATO enlargement?

*Amb. Woolsey.* Arms control process as a whole?

*Questioner.* Yes.

*Amb. Woolsey.* Well, I will tell you what I think. I think this is an important endeavor, getting CFE right. With some good will on the part of the Russian military, I think it could be done relatively quickly. I do not anticipate such good will, so this may be a rather long, drawn-out affair. But the framework Mike presented seems to me to be a reasonable approach and a relatively straightforward set of amendments to the treaty.

I believe the most troubling arms situation in Europe, including in Russia, is the somewhat hair-trigger nature of the command and control for Russian military forces with respect to nuclear weapons. When we have the situation that Russian leaders virtually brag about how they went to alert because a Norwegian sounding rocket was launched a year or so ago—and I would refer you particularly to some of the writings of Bruce Blair at Brookings on these issues which are really quite good and the best things I've seen in public on these questions—I think we have a troubling situation. The Russian military is virtually poverty-stricken, is more and more disorganized, is low in morale, and is in custody of a set of nuclear weapons that are operating under a command and control system which—let's put it this way—seriously needs to be calmed down.

The public statements on this issue from the administration about how important it is that no missiles are aimed at the United States because of this agreement with the Russians to de-target, first of all assumes that the Russian military has actually done the de-targeting. That may be true. Regardless of what their national leaders have said, it is possible, though that they have not.

But in any case those systems can be re-targeted within seconds. It is a little bit like my saying I'm not pointing my finger at you right now. It's relatively easy for me to change. So, in spite of the somewhat rigid division in Washington along political lines—of the conservative view that what we need is lots of defensive systems and ballistic missile defense, and the more liberal view that what is really important is to reduce numbers of offensive systems down to zero—I think there ought to be a possible accommodation here in which we focus hard on reducing alert rates. I would not say that should mean taking weapons off American submarines. I believe those should remain at sea in some fashion.

But three elements would be a reduction in alert rates negotiated with Russia; a reduction in levels of offensive systems, but I do not think getting these down to zero is practical or wise for a whole set of reasons; and a deployment of some level, perhaps not a massive level, but some level of defensive systems.

I think there's a confluence of interests there in which some moderation in all three of those goals are consistent with a rather more stable posture between Russia and the West than now exists. That is, I believe, the No. 1 arms control issue of today.

Mr. Sloan. Mike, would you like to add to that?

Mr. Guhin. I would. I think Ambassador Woolsey has correctly noted that when you look at arms control down the road, my immediate thoughts were, of course, on the basic and strategic arms control realm when you think of Russia. So that brings us back into this broader context that we are all dealing with. I think that is absolutely right and I could not have said it anywhere near as well as it has just been presented.

In terms of looking at the European conventional issue, we hope very much, of course, to have this conventional arms control negotiation well behind us. I would say years in advance. A lot of it will depend, as has been noted, on whether the Russian military is going to be recalcitrant or whether it is not. That is a key ingredient and that is an unknown at this stage. How much the political leadership will be able to maneuver and work this.

Our goal—of course, we have no deadline—but our goal is to move out, as I said, very promptly. We would hope to have at least an understanding on the elements of what we are doing and what we are going to do this year. Certainly by the time of the Madrid Summit we would hope to have a good understanding on how we are going actually to start putting this structure again together.

So in my mind, that is something that we want behind us in this timeframe and you are going to be looking at a whole variety of issues. It's going to be a lot in the strategic realm. It is today and it will continue to be in that timeframe. I do not know what lingering conventional issues may or may not be in that timeframe because it depends on how this thing evolves overall in terms of European security.

If it is managed well and NATO is enlarged in a way that is accepted by Russia, et cetera—maybe not willingly as such but that they acquiesce in—then one can see a relatively positive outlook. But that is going to depend on political situations and positions far beyond conventional arms control.

Could I use this opportunity to add one thing? I noticed it always happens. It does not relate directly to this question, but I had noted in my little notes as we were talking here and I did not say it, and it is a little note. It says flank agreement and it is something that was out of my presentation and it did come up, of course, in Lou's comments.

The flank agreement, as you know, we completed some time ago and in our NATO proposal for CFE adaptation, one element which I had not noted is, of course, that the substance of the flank proposal remains unchanged. We are not proposing to reopen that agreement which was just concluded. Now, the provisional application of that flank agreement ends on May 15th and the administration remains committed to trying to get congressional approval of that agreement by May 15th. We believe it is important to get that approval and we are working on ways of doing it.

What we are reviewing now, of course, is how best to secure it—how best to secure congressional approval of the flank agreement and that is something that the administration will be working with and consulting with Congress. That is where we are, and that decision has to be made because as I understand, at the end of last session when it was not acted on, et cetera, it is basically back in the administration's court.

*Questioner.* My name is Sean Kay. I'm a visiting scholar at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, also at the National Defense University. I would like to ask a question related to the NATO enlargement issue, and if you could elaborate a bit on the perspective of some of those countries that will not be invited to join accession negotiations, but nonetheless have a deep interest in the CFE negotiations, particularly the Baltic countries and your view of their place at the table, Mr. Guhin, and also, Ambassador Woolsey, if you have anything to add from a more historical perspective on that.

You somewhat answered my question just now, but also the perspective of Norway and Turkey, Mike, if you could elaborate on that a little bit because their historical interests have not just disappeared. Thanks.

*Mr. Guhin.* Let me, if I may, be brief. Ambassador Woolsey will speak to the past, but in speaking of the present and the time since he left Vienna, it is remarkable to me how much of this work that goes on among, at one stage, 22 countries then and now at 30, is shared and worked with many other countries outside this agreement. I say that as an introduction here. There is a strong recognition on the part of the United States and NATO partners and others that not only are there key interests to the parties themselves, but that what we do inside this treaty can have critical effects on people outside this treaty.

People like the Finns, the Swedes, et cetera, the Baltics, are not shy in reminding us of this fact at all and, in fact, we work quite closely and consult quite closely with them on these kinds of issues. So there are ongoing consultations with many countries outside the CFE family, as such, but which certainly have interests in that regime.

Turkey and Norway, of course, are critical players in this process and that is one of the reasons I mentioned not reopening the flank agreement. A key interest of Turkey and Norway is that that agreement not be reopened because the Russians could come in and ask for more, which would not be acceptable.

So I would just say that those will continue, those consultations, where it is well-recognized that what we do in certain areas is sensitive to the Baltics, to the Nordics, et cetera, and others and we will continue to consult with them. Sometimes we consult in advance and, of course, we consult with all of the treaty partners. I mean, there is no such thing as east/west in terms of consultation. There are NATO positions, we develop those in NATO. But I'm stunned by the degree of change and cooperation.

One story: I remember when I came to Vienna and I heard a Hungarian speaking up. The first day, I think, I was there I heard a Hungarian supporting a Western proposal



and I almost fell out of my chair. Sometime later it was the West German delegation now who was sitting next to Ambassador Woolsey and not the East German one. This underlines that all of the state of flux and what is changed is amazing, an amazing time period.

But we will work closely with those countries and try to factor, to the extent we can, their interests in the kinds of things that we are looking at or considering.

Mr. *Sloan*. European security was a moving train when Ambassador Woolsey and Mike were negotiating in the late '80's and early '90's and that train has not stopped moving. Still there are a lot of variables, particularly the Russian one, but also with regard to other countries and their relationship to the European security system and to the Western alliance system.

Amb. *Woolsey*. I blame this whole mess on the French farmers.

Mr. *Sloan*. Blame it on the French.

Amb. *Woolsey*. Particularly the French farmers. It is politically a serious matter in Russia if, say, the Baltic states were to be taken into a NATO expansion, or Ukraine, and it is not only people who are inclined to give Russia the benefit of the doubt that think that way. I testified before the House National Security Committee last summer with Richard Pipes and you will find that he has serious doubts, is opposed, in fact, to any NATO expansion, but is particularly concerned about the Baltics because of Russian reaction.

So this is a delicate and difficult thing. I believe that it is useful and NATO can and should go ahead and expand to the three countries that are in the cards here, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. But it would have been and it still would be much better, in terms of the geopolitics of Europe, if the European Union were to concern itself more with broadening than deepening and would begin to integrate Central Europe and even into Eastern Europe into the economic structure of Europe.

Now, the main reason it cannot do that is because if you look at what the European Union actually spends money on, it is the world's most illogical agricultural policy, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and some other things. But the majority of the money is actually spent on the CAP. Although the United States has had in the past a rather wasteful agricultural subsidy system—and we have a less wasteful one because there have been some changes made—at least it is not one that builds up surpluses and actually keeps other people's goods, agricultural goods, out of the United States. But that is the purpose of the CAP.

So in order to protect first and foremost French farmers, and also some others, Europe has what I consider to be an absolutely loony agricultural policy and it is one which poses severe and, indeed, the major problems for the EU's expansion to the east. If the EU would abandon that and begin to look seriously and fairly upon the needs of their fellow Europeans to the east, I think those countries' emergence into a modern industrial era would be substantially enhanced by their being able to sell their agricultural goods in Europe. They could then buildup capital investment in order to make the other transitions that need to be made. Politics might then follow economics, and strategy at some point, and military alliances, could follow politics. That, to my mind, would be the most reasonable way for this all to proceed. It would also give time for Russia to accommodate itself to a number of these developments, and economically, if Russia decided to move closer to the EU, a lot of these other issues would be less serious.

But Europe has not chosen to do that. The EU has chosen to, in a halting fashion, move toward a monetary union and a deepening of relationships rather than broadening, and I think that is a very bad thing. I think it is a bad thing for the future of Europe, I think it is a bad thing for long-term stability in that part of the world, and I think it is the source of much of the uncertainty and angst on the part of the Central European states who now want to find something to belong to. The only entity that they can find to belong to is the one that essentially the United States is the big daddy rabbit of, NATO, because we are more accommodating on these matters than the Europeans.

It is a shame—that is the path our European friends have taken—because they have put us and, indirectly, Russia due to a lot of historical reasons, into a bit of a box. We are trying to work our way out of it. I think these rather modest movements toward NATO expansion are reasonable under the circumstances, but I think they should be combined with a rather vigorous American position to attempt to move the European Union, insofar as we have any influence with that body, toward a policy of looking more toward broadening than deepening their relationships.

*Mr. Sloan.* Who would have thought that a meeting on CFE would turn into a discussion of the common agricultural policy? Just to add to that tangent, though, no one should expect the French government, which has serious political problems and economic problems right now, to commit suicide by doing much different from what it is doing.

*Amb. Woolsey.* Well, one might not expect it, but one could urge it.

*Mr. Sloan.* I think there's another factor that needs to be mentioned and that is the fact that the countries that want to come into the alliance want it not just to be part of any organization, but there is something special about NATO and that is that the United States is a member—

*Amb. Woolsey.* Exactly.

*Mr. Sloan* [continuing]. And they want that link to the United States, as well as the EU link, which I agree is desperately needed by all of these countries.

*Questioner.* I'm Bebe Bell and I'm a Southern gal who's now become a steel magnolia. I was a NATO wife. I was the NATO wife in charge of hospitality at SACLANT. My husband is a special operations intelligence Marine who was sheep-dipped into the Marine Corps and who has disappeared, by the way. He was chief of staff under Al Gray, who was commandant, and he kept a diary which I've read and have been doing research on, and I have a question for all of you from a lot of the wives, and I know this is a little bit silly and I'm not grandstanding, but I'm really dead serious.

The question regards the unconditional—excuse me—unconventional warfare and our 40-year involvement with the state of Israel, which was the military which was founded by a general, an army general, and the funding, the money which has been going under the table, army generals and admirals to send weapons to countries like both of the Kurds, the Iraqis, the Iranians, and as an American patriot, as a wife, why are we not—why are we doing this? Why is there such a charade?

When you are talking about command and control issues—particularly with regard to Israel—the Israelis, together with the company called, I believe, TRW, have a joint venture and they are able to send missiles our way. I know this is a little bit outrageous, but I would like to know what our position is with Israel, and I wish you could help me understand that because the French know about it, the Danes know about it.

I work with international visitors all the time, and everybody in Europe knows about this. They know about the bank deals, they know about everything, and how can we, as a nation, look people—especially the French—in the eye, or anyone in the eye, as we are doing this kind of thing and bullying the Palestinians and so forth.

*Mr. Sloan.* It is a very serious question, one that goes a little bit beyond the purview of the panel, but do you want to address that?

*Amb. Woolsey.* I will be glad to, sure. Why not? I do not believe that Israel is a threat to the United States. Israel has no missiles that can reach the United States. Whatever programs they are involved in with American defense contractors, I think, are defensively oriented. I do not believe that the American/Israeli relationship is one that is involved in bullying Palestinians at all.

I think the United States has been a good broker of agreements, increasingly, between Israel and the Palestinians, and I just do not see our relationship with Israel, apparently, ma'am, anywhere close to the way you do. I think I will leave it at that.

*Mr. Sloan.* Please.

*Questioner.* I'm Aija Straumanis from the Joint Baltic-American National Committee. Last year under the CFE treaty, in the Pskov region along the borders of Latvia and Estonia, the number of Russian armored combat vehicles increased. I would like to know a bit more, if you can give me some specifics, about what types of adaptations you envision in this region.

*Mr. Guhin.* Well, as I said earlier, that what you are referring to is, of course, part of the flank region and we do not, as I said, we do not envision reopening the agreement that has already been made. We do not envision changing the substance of that agreement that has been made. So, in effect, we see no changes to be made.

Now, I think, if I may try to clarify one point, the flank agreement, I think you were referring to that sort of the flank agreement, that in effect, would allow Russia to hold more armored combat vehicles in the Pskov Oblast, for example, as your primary or one of your concerns. While, in effect, its entitlement in that oblast went up, its holdings have not gone up. I think one of the keys—I mean, as this was negotiated—there is a difference between negotiating entitlements for “contingencies” and what one actually plans to do.

Now, I stand to be corrected (I'm speaking off the cuff and I have my statistical person here), but my understanding is that those holdings have not really increased and, in fact, in some areas have gone down. So I think one has to keep this in mind. This is a little bit out of the scope, but we once wondered why the Russians had requested a number which did not appear to coincide with what their plans were, and to be quite honest, they did not come out with any—this was after the fact. But they did not come out with any plans or any ideas that they planned in any near term at all to increase the actual holdings of what they had there.

So I think one has to watch what is done. When we talk with the Baltics and the Nordic friends, we are very much concerned about buildups or any potential buildups in that area and what the Russians are doing. We watch their figures quite closely, as do others.

*Mr. Sloan.* Are there any further questions? If not, I will turn the floor back over to Mike Hathaway.

*Mr. Hathaway.* Let me bring the briefing to a close. Thank you all for coming.

[Whereupon at 12:10 p.m., the Commission adjourned.]

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CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE):  
FLANK AGREEMENT & TREATY

by STEVE BOWMAN

*Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division*

SUMMARY

States parties to the CFE treaty have entered negotiations to “adapt” the treaty to the military-political situation in Europe following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The last several years have seen some modifications already: the Tashkent Agreement allocating responsibility for the former USSR’s military equipment among its successor states; and the Flank Agreement permitting greater Russian equipment deployments primarily in the Caucasus in acknowledgement of the region’s instability.

At the May 1996 CFE Review Conference, it was agreed that broader range negotiations were needed to re-shape the treaty’s provisions in accordance with a very different political-military environment. These negotiations will take place over the next four years, concurrent with the expected expansion of NATO membership. And, it is in the context of these potentially difficult negotiations that current NATO nations, the countries of Eastern Europe, and Russia will seek to establish a military force structure throughout Europe that can provide security and stability for all CFE states parties.

At the May 1996 Conference, consensus was also reached on the Flank Agreement, which has been held to be provisionally in force until May 15, 1997, to allow each nation to carry out its approval procedures.

BACKGROUND

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed in November 1990, and entered into force two years later. The product of almost two decades of negotiations between the 22 nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, CFE placed alliance-wide, regional (zonal), and national ceilings on specific major items of military equipment. (See Endnote 1.) The purpose of the treaty is to promote stability in Europe not only by reducing armaments, but also by reducing the possibility of surprise attack by preventing large regional concentrations of forces.

The CFE treaty also provides for

- 1) very detailed data exchanges on equipment, force structure, and training maneuvers;
- 2) specific procedures for the destruction or redistribution of excess equipment, and
- 3) verification of compliance through on-site inspections.

Its implementation has resulted in an unprecedented reduction of conventional arms in Europe, with over 50,000 treaty-limited items of equipment (TLEs) removed or destroyed, and is assessed by almost all to have achieved most of its initial objectives. (See Endnote 2.) The CFE states parties now face the challenge of sustaining the treaty's achievements while acknowledging a significantly altered geo-political reality.

The CFE treaty did not anticipate the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, let alone the expansion of NATO membership to include East European countries. Consequently, recent years have been occupied with efforts to adapt the treaty to the new security environment of its members. The first of these was the so-called "Tashkent Agreement", signed in May 1992, which allocated responsibility for the Soviet Union's TLEs among its successor states—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia. It also established equipment ceilings for each nation and the implied responsibility for the destruction/transfer of equipment necessary to meet these national ceilings. The total equipment level under the Tashkent Agreement does not exceed that assigned the former Soviet Union under CFE.

#### THE CFE REVIEW CONFERENCE AND THE "FLANK AGREEMENT"

Under the CFE treaty all equipment reductions necessary to comply with overall, national, and zonal ceilings were to have been completed by November 1995. As this deadline approached, it had been evident for some time that Russia would not meet those requirements, particularly in the so-called "flank zones". The "flank zones" include the Leningrad Military District in the north, and the North Caucasus Military District in the south, and a small portion of southeastern Ukraine. The outbreak of armed ethnic conflicts in and around the Caucasus, most notably in Chechnya, led to Russian claims for the need to deploy equipment in excess of treaty limits in that zone.

Russia placed this claim in the context of broader assertions that some CFE provisions reflected old Cold War assumptions and did not fairly address its new national security concerns. It questioned the appropriateness of being limited in the stationing of its military forces within its own borders. It pointed out that no other CFE nation (with the exception of a small portion of Ukraine) is under such restrictions, and suggested this was an unacceptable infringement on its national sovereignty. Russia also maintained that its military activities in the Caucasus, and hence the need for additional stationed forces in the "flank zone", responded to a legitimate national security concern. Accompanying these assertions were also claims that national economic hardship was making restationing unaffordable in some cases.

Though initially not all states parties viewed the Russian position sympathetically, (Norway and Turkey, which border the Russian "flank zone" voiced significant reservations), a consensus was reached in November 1995 to examine ways to alleviate the Russian complaints. This effort, conducted within the CFE's Joint Consultative Group (JCG), resulted in the Flank Agreement. This agreement was signed by all states parties at the CFE Review Conference on May 31, 1996. The Review Conference also stipulated that the agreement would be provisionally in force until May 15, 1997, while states parties completed their formal approval procedures. Originally, the Administration submitted the Agreement to both the House and Senate for simple majority approval. However, during negotiations over the Chemical Weapons Convention ratification, the Senate successfully pressed its claim that the Agreement was a treaty modification requiring only the advice and consent of the Senate by two-thirds majority. On May 8, 1997 the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee voted unanimously (17-0) to report the Flank Agreement favorably to the Senate.

In its essentials, the Flank Agreement removes several Russian (and one Ukrainian) administrative districts from the old "flank zone", thus permitting current flank equipment ceilings to apply to a smaller area. In addition, Russia now has until May 1999 to reduce its forces to meet the new limit.

To provide some counterbalance to these adjustments, reporting requirements were enhanced, inspection rights in the zone increased, and subzone district ceilings were placed on armored combat vehicles to prevent their concentration.

The Flank Agreement also permits the reallocation of national equipment quotas among the USSR successor states through "free negotiations". In practice, this could allow a nation whose equipment holdings are below its allotted number to cede this "excess" allotment to another nation. The Tashkent Agreement also provided this flexibility, but conditioned it upon consensus of all Tashkent signatories. The Flank Agreement appears to supersede this by permitting reallocations through bilateral negotiations. This has raised concerns that small USSR successor states, e.g. Georgia, would be open to coercion by Russia to cede part of their allocations. The United States has sought to mitigate this concern by indicating its willingness to mediate any reallocation negotiation to ensure its fairness. This action does not address the concern over bilateral rather than consensus negotiations among Tashkent signatories.

The Agreement also reiterates the CFE provision allowing the "temporary" deployment of equipment on the territory of other states parties with their permission. There is now concern that the CFE Treaty and Flank Agreement do not define "temporary", and that this provision could lead to deployments that are essentially indefinite in nature. Consequently, some have argued that a more stringent understanding of "temporary" must be established. It has also been pointed out, however, that though a strict definition could serve to reduce Russian military operation in its border regions, it could also hamper operations that NATO may wish to undertake, such as the U.S. transit/staging operations in Europe seen during the Persian Gulf War.

Though most the most attention has been paid to the southern section of the Flank Zone, the Agreement's provisions also permit larger numbers of equipment in the Pskov region adjacent to the Baltic nations (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia). This has exacerbated these countries' worries about how the West intends to address their security concerns. Geographically vulnerable, militarily weak, and not offered membership in any defensive alliance, these nations are seeking reliable assurances that they will be protected from Russian encroachment. The Flank Agreement, in their eyes, appears to ignore these concerns.

## CFE ADAPTATION NEGOTIATIONS

Perhaps the most significant decision taken at the 1996 CFE Review Conference was to begin negotiations in January 1997 for further adaptation of the treaty in light of the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, and the probable extension of NATO membership to some East European nations. It is intended to complete these negotiations within the next four years, though it is hoped a negotiating framework will be agreed to by mid-summer. The following topics are expected to come under discussion.

- Re-examination of the treaty structure and limits which were based on the existence of both NATO and the now-defunct Warsaw Pact
- Effectiveness of the CFE zone limits in preventing concentrations of military forces
- Crisis management procedures
- Enhanced verification procedures

Most CFE states parties do not want to engage in a complete renegotiation of the treaty; stating concern over losing CFE accomplishments in reducing intra-European tensions. Current NATO members, in particular, would prefer minimal adaptations. Russia, however, has a stronger interest in broader revisions. Its military situation is markedly difficult than ten years ago. The Soviet Union has ceased to exist, resulting in a loss of military resources. Moscow's only military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, dissolved and Russian forward stationing of troops in Eastern Europe is no longer possible. Economic dislocation has adversely affected military morale and readiness, while ethnic uprisings in the Caucasus have challenged its governmental and military capabilities. The most serious Russian focus is, however, on the contemplated enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe and how CFE can be adapted to mitigate what many Russian policy-makers see as an encroaching threat. Despite NATO assurances of the alliance's defensive nature and NATO's refusal to establish a specific link between CFE and NATO expansion, Russian leaders perceive a significant shift in the balance of military power, and are adamant that any CFE adaptation take this into account.

Ironically, a preeminent Russian desire is to maintain what many consider an anachronistic element of the current CFE structure: the alliance-wide equipment ceilings. Russia reasons that NATO should not be allowed uncontrolled growth in military equipment as it expands its membership into Eastern Europe. An alliance-wide cap on NATO would presumably force adjustments of national holdings as the alliance grew, and it could be expected that such adjustments would not favor new member nations close to Russia's borders. NATO, not unexpectedly, argues that negotiations must move beyond the old "alliance-to-alliance" structures of CFE, given the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, and would prefer to focus on regional and national equipment ceilings.

It is expected that the negotiations will result in additional overall armaments reductions in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region, but the size of such reductions remains at question. Some Russian spokesmen have suggested up to a further 20 percent, but NATO members have suggested 15 percent as more consistent with robust national defense force structures. Most NATO members are also concerned with maintaining forces capable of meeting emerging "out-of-area" threats to European security are not related to Russia, e.g. Bosnia.

Originally, the CFE treaty was most concerned about preventing a high-intensity conflict in the center of Europe. It is probable that NATO members, and those nations aspiring to NATO membership, will seek to redirect this focus to allow greater flexibility in central zone military force structure, in the event of alliance enlargement, to provide reasonable national security. Russia is likely to find this inimical to its interests, and has already expressed a desire for new types of limits in the central zone. These include prohibitions on: 1) stationing U.S. or West European NATO troops in East European countries; 2) construction of new military infrastructure (e.g. airfields); and 3) restrictions on deployment of nuclear-capable aircraft. Russia has indicated that it considers political

assurances on these issues inadequate, and will seek legally-binding commitments within CFE. (See Endnote 3.)

The CFE Adaptation negotiations will be on-going as NATO begins its anticipated membership growth over the next several years. This will confront negotiators with a dynamically changing landscape, and with challenges stemming not only from military considerations, but also from national domestic political concerns. The concurrence of these two processes, however, perhaps offers a unusual opportunity to deal with potentially destabilizing tensions in an immediate fashion, rather than allowing hard-line adversarial positions to re-emerge.

#### ENDNOTES

(1) The CFE treaty limits battle tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. Other types of equipment, while not limited by the treaty are subject to operating restrictions and reporting requirements: primary trainer aircraft, unarmed trainer aircraft, combat support helicopters, unarmed transport helicopters, armored vehicle-launched bridges, armored personnel carrier "look-alikes" and armored combat vehicle "look-alikes".

(2) Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, December, 1996.

(3) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Stresses Seriousness of New CFE Proposals, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Document No. FBIS-SOV-97-017.



**TREATY ON  
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES  
IN EUROPE (CFE)**

***IMPLEMENTATION, ADAPTATION, IMPLICATIONS***



Dorn Crawford  
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Washington, DC 20451

February 12, 1997

## ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

*Objectives* (mandate, January 1989):

- establish a stable and secure balance of forces, at lower levels
- eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and security
- eliminate capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action

*Context* (signature, November 1990):

- Two opposing alliances whose members defined “groups of States Parties”: NATO, WTO
- Equal limits on major categories of conventional equipment: battle tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft
- Zones nested around central Europe

*Enduring Threads* (entry into force, November 1992):

- National maximum levels
- Extensive and intrusive verification scheme
- Notifications and information exchange
- Regional security measures

# CFE ZONES


and geographical limits on groups of States Parties

Zone 4.4




Zone 4.4			
	Tanks	Artillery	ACV
Active	7500	5000	11250

Zone 4.3



Zone 4.3			
	Tanks	Artillery	ACV
Active	10300	9100	19260

Zone 4.2



Zone 4.2			
	Tanks	Artillery	ACV
Total	15300	14000	24100
Active	11800	11000	21400


Zone 4.1 (the ATTU)



Zone 4.1 (group totals)			
	Tanks	Artillery	ACV
Total	20000	20000	30000
Active	16500	17000	27300
	Helicopters		Aircraft
Total	2000		6800

ACV sublimits: 18000 AIFV & HACV, of which at most 1500 may be HACV

Zone 5.1 ('the flanks')



Zone 5.1 ('the flanks')			
	Tanks	Artillery	ACV
Active	4700	6000	5900

Equipment not in active units must be stored in Zone 4.2, except, at most:

- southern part of Leningrad MD (below 60°15"N): 600 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, and 800 ACV (300 'any type', remainder APC)
- former Odessa MD: 400 tanks and 500 artillery pieces



with limited exceptions for temporary deployments

# CFE TREATY ENTITLEMENTS


## North Atlantic Treaty Group

	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Turkey	UK	US
Tanks	334	77	353	1306	4166	1735	1348	743	170	300	794	2795	1015	4006
Artillery	320	38	553	1292	2705	1878	1955	607	527	450	1310	3523	636	2492
ACV	1099	277	316	3820	3446	2534	3339	1080	225	430	1588	3120	3176	5372
Helicopters	46	0	12	396	306	30	139	50	0	26	90	103	371	431
Aircraft	232	90	106	800	900	650	650	230	100	160	310	750	900	784

## Budapest/Tashkent Group

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech Rep	Georgia	Hungary	Moldova	Poland	Romania	Russia	Slovakia	Ukraine
Tanks	220	220	1800	1475	957	220	835	210	1730	1375	6400	478	4080
Artillery	285	285	1615	1750	767	285	840	250	1610	1475	6415	383	4040
ACV	220	220	2600	2000	1367	220	1700	210	2150	2100	11480	683	5050
Helicopters	50	50	80	67	50	50	108	50	130	120	890	25	330
Aircraft	100	100	294	235	230	100	180	50	460	430	3416	115	1090

Note: Iceland, Kazakhstan and Luxembourg have no treaty-limited equipment in the area of application



# CFE TREATY REDUCTIONS

compiled informally after the Treaty Review Conference, 4 June 1996

## North Atlantic Treaty Group


	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Turkey	UK	US
Tanks	28	0	146	39	2566	1099	324	0	127	0	481	1060	183	639
Artillery	58	0	0	149	1623	517	205	59	17	0	88	122	0	5
ACV	284	0	0	570	4257	447	537	261	57	0	0	5	30	0
Helicopters	0	0	0	66	0	0	57	91	0	0	0	0	5	0
Aircraft	0	0	1	0	140	76	0	0	0	0	0	115	0	0

## Budapest/Tashkent Group

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Georgia	Hungary	Moldova	Poland	Romania	Russia	Slovakia	Ukraine
Tanks	0	13	1773	794	1123	0	510	0	1130	1591	3188	578	1974
Artillery	0	42	3	410	1409	0	207	0	770	2423	660	679	0
ACV	18	274	1341	332	1217	0	212	59	935	973	5419	443	1551
Helicopters	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	99	0	0
Aircraft	0	0	130	100	57	0	28	0	121	78	1029	30	550

## Total Reductions:

Tanks	19366
Artillery	9446
ACV	19222
Helicopters	318
Aircraft	2455
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>50807</b>



# CFE TREATY HOLDINGS AT SIGNATURE

reported as of 19 November 1990 (corrected by 15 February 1991)


## North Atlantic Treaty Group

	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Turkey	UK	US
Tanks	359	77	419	1343	7000	1879	1246	913	205	146	854	2823	1198	5904
Artillery	376	38	553	1360	4602	1908	2144	837	531	343	1373	3442	636	2601
ACV	1381	277	316	4177	8920	1641	3958	1467	146	244	1256	1502	3193	5747
Helicopters	0	12	3	418	258	0	168	91	0	0	28	5	368	243
Aircraft	191	45	106	699	1018	469	577	196	90	96	242	511	842	626

## Budapest Group

	Bulgaria	CSFR	Hungary	Poland	Romania	USSR
Tanks	2145	1797	1345	2850	2851	20725
Artillery	2116	1566	1047	2300	3789	13938
ACV	2204	2538	1720	2377	3102	29890
Helicopters	44	56	39	29	13	1481
Aircraft	243	348	110	551	505	6611

Note: Iceland, Kazakhstan and Luxembourg have no treaty-limited equipment in the area of application



# CFE TREATY HOLDINGS

reported at annual information exchange, as of 1 January 1997


## North Atlantic Treaty Group

	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Turkey	UK	US
Tanks	334	0	343	1156	3248	1735	1283	722	170	186	725	2563	521	1115
Artillery	312	0	503	1192	2058	1878	1932	448	246	320	1230	2843	436	612
ACV	678	0	186	3574	2537	2325	3031	610	199	346	1194	2424	2411	1849
Helicopters	46	0	12	326	205	20	132	12	0	0	28	25	289	126
Aircraft	166	0	74	650	560	486	516	181	74	105	200	350	624	220

## Budapest/Tashkent Group

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech Rep	Georgia	Hungary	Moldova	Poland	Romania	Russia	Slovakia	Ukraine
Tanks	102	270	1778	1475	952	79	797	0	1729	1375	5541	478	4063
Artillery	225	301	1533	1750	767	92	840	155	1581	1466	6011	383	3121
ACV	218	557	2518	1985	1367	102	1300	209	1442	2091	10198	683	4847
Helicopters	7	15	71	43	36	3	59	0	94	16	812	19	294
Aircraft	6	48	286	235	144	6	141	27	384	372	2891	113	940

Note: Iceland, Kazakhstan and Luxembourg have no treaty-limited equipment in the area of application



# Treaty-Limited Equipment in the Former Soviet Republics

## Transformation

Holdings of Soviet Successor States, January 1997


	Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	Helicopters	Aircraft
Russia	5,541	6,009	10,198	824	2,891
Belarus	1,778	1,533	2,518	71	286
Ukraine	4,063	3,121	4,847	294	940
Moldova	0	155	209	0	27
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	79	92	102	3	6
Armenia	102	225	218	7	6
Azerbaijan	270	301	557	15	48
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,833</b>	<b>11,436</b>	<b>18,649</b>	<b>1,214</b>	<b>4,204</b>

Soviet Holdings, December 1988


Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	Aircraft
41,580	52,400	57,800	8,395

(helicopter assets not reported)

FSU Holdings,  
January 1997



Soviet Holdings,  
December 1988



(same scale  
used throughout)




## MILESTONES

- Nov 90: Treaty signature
- Jul 92: Concluding Act (CFE1A) signature
- Jul 92: Provisional application
  - treated as entry into force
  - Concluding Act implemented
  - 40-month reduction period begins
- Nov 92: Formal entry into force of the Treaty
- Nov 95: Residual validation
  - reduction period ends
  - 120-day period to validate results
- Jun 96: First Treaty Review Conference
  - 'flanks' agreement signature
  - commitment to consider Treaty adaptation
- Jan 97: Treaty adaptation negotiations begin


# TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

## the 'flanks' agreement, 31 May 1996



*new limits under the agreement:*




	Russia:
	<i>original 'flanks'</i>
	Tanks Artillery ACV
	1800 2400 3700
	and individual oblast caps
	shown on the map

(until 31 May 1999:  
Tanks Artillery ACV  
1897 2422 4397)

	Ukraine:
	Odessa Oblast
	Tanks Artillery ACV
	400 350 400

*residual Treaty limits:*

	Russia*:
	Zone 4.2
	Tanks Artillery ACV
	5700 5135 10900
	<i>remaining 'flanks'</i>
	Tanks Artillery ACV
	1300 1680 1380

	Ukraine:
	Zone 4.3
	Tanks Artillery ACV
	3400 3150 4700
	<i>former Kiev MD</i>
	Tanks Artillery ACV
	2250 1500 2500
	<i>remaining 'flanks'</i>
	Tanks Artillery ACV
	680 890 350



### Treaty 'flexibilities' cited in the agreement:

- consultations to convert DPSS to active unit accounts
- Russia:*
  - maximum use of temporary deployments, with host consent
  - maximum use of TLE reallocations, as freely negotiated
  - accounting for equipment listed as "to be removed"

\* Sums of these limits exceed maximum levels for holdings because Russia declared duplicate figures for DPSS in zone 4.2 and the 'flanks'

### Additional transparency measures:

- Russia:*
  - semiannual information exchange on original 'flanks' area; quarterly for Kuschchevskaya depot facility
  - up to 10 added inspections a year in areas removed from the 'flanks', or sites holding equipment listed as "to be removed"
- Ukraine:*
  - unit strength changes in Odessa oblast notified at 5% level
  - one added inspection a year in Odessa oblast

## COMPETING OBJECTIVES

### Undertake to:

- move past group structure
- de-emphasize a zone array focused on central European confrontation
- preserve flexibility for stationing alliance forces
- consider additional equipment reductions
- consider means to enhance transparency

### While continuing to:

- limit European holdings of conventional armaments
- inhibit threatening concentrations of military equipment
- accept constraints that convey reassurances
- sustain alliance defense commitments
- strictly observe current Treaty provisions

## CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES

- Loss of the 'balance' metric
- Residual 'correlation of forces' mentality
- Tit-for-tat bargaining dynamics
- Post 'group' collective action, e.g. inspection regime
- And, of course, NATO enlargement

# CFE AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

*from necessity, to practicality, to reassurance*

- Limits, *sans* metrics
  - current national maximum levels?
  - “current” holdings (as of when?)?
  - agreed reductions?
  - desired increases?
- Zones
  - inescapably *geographic*: a regional security measure for one is an isolation mechanism for another
  - given national limits, zones are fundamentally about where stationed forces can go
  - but, they also justify dividing entitlements within national boundaries
  - the ‘flanks’
- Stationing
  - under zone limits (as now)?
  - under national/territorial caps?
  - with stabilizing measures?
- Sufficiency
  - for individual states (as now)?
  - for alliances?

# **CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)**

## ***A REVIEW AND UPDATE OF KEY TREATY ELEMENTS***



Dorn Crawford  
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Washington, DC 20451

January 1997

## INTRODUCTION

The signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, or CFE, in Paris on 19 November 1990, punctuated a transformation of European security whose end state is still difficult to discern. The 34 nations convened there under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or CSCE, have grown to 55. The 22 original parties to the CFE Treaty, signatories of either the erstwhile Treaty of Warsaw or the North Atlantic Treaty, are now 30. Despite sporadic ambiguities and uncertainties of detail, the CFE Treaty has effected an unprecedented reduction of conventional armaments in the region from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The CSCE is now the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, reflecting its maturation as an international institution.

*The CFE Treaty itself entails twenty-three articles and associated protocols, with the full English text issued by the US Government at signature running to some 110 pages. This overview focuses largely on the statistical features of the Treaty and associated documents, comprising equipment and manpower limits, holdings, and military sites. It reprises and updates a pamphlet originally composed and published at the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency in June 1991, whose tables and graphs also appeared in S. Hrg. 102-288, *The CFE Treaty*, pp. 301-314; periodic updates have since been produced at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.*

This work presumes, as it always has, that a picture is still worth a thousand words. The object is to portray in a handful of graphics and commentary the key statistical features of the CFE regime, providing the reader a quick periodic survey and reference. The presentation draws upon key reports rendered pursuant to the Treaty's Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information:

- ✓ data exchanged at Treaty signature on 19 November 1990, and any corrections up to 90 days after;
- ✓ 'entry-into-force' data compiled as of 15 July 1992 in connection with full provisional application of the Treaty;
- ✓ accounts provided at the end of the Treaty's reduction period, with limits consequently in full effect, on 16 November 1995;
- ✓ the most recent annual information exchange, with data as of 1 January 1997.


The commentary aims to take brief account of major Treaty-related policy developments and implementation issues as well, to the extent publicly accessible.

Two supplements to this pamphlet have been compiled separately. One contains complete summary statistics for all the eight Treaty information exchanges conducted to date, some of which are omitted here in the interest of brevity. The other portrays the States Parties' detailed declarations of ground equipment entitlements by zone and levels for permanent storage, which were issued shortly before Treaty limits took effect in November 1995.

More friends and colleagues have contributed to the course of this work than can properly be acknowledged here. What faults remain can only testify to the author's chronic neglect of a wealth of good advice.

# THE ATLANTIC-TO-THE-URALS AREA

*and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe*



- the map lists the 55 OSCE participating states, including the 30 States Parties of the CFE Treaty
- shaded territory depicts the area of application of the CFE Treaty
- the Central Asian republics without territory in the ATTU participate only in OSCE
- the United States and Canada are both CFE parties and OSCE participants



# CFE ZONES


and geographical limits on groups of States Parties

## Zone 4.4



Zone 4.4			
	Tanks	Artillery	ACV
Active	7500	5000	11250

## Zone 4.3




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Active	10300	9100	19260

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Zone 4.2			
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Total	15300	14000	24100
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## Zone 4.1 (the ATTU)



Zone 4.1 (group totals)			
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Total	20000	20000	30000
Active	16500	17000	27300
	Helicopters	Aircraft	
Total	2000	6800	

ACV sublimits: 18000 AIFV & HACV, of which at most 1500 may be HACV

## Zone 5.1 ('the flanks')




Zone 5.1 ('the flanks')			
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with limited exceptions for temporary deployments

Equipment not in active units must be stored in Zone 4.2, except, at most:

- southern part of Leningrad MD (below 60°15'N): 600 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, and 800 ACV (300 'any type', remainder APC)
- former Odessa MD: 400 tanks and 500 artillery pieces



# CFE TREATY ENTITLEMENTS


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## Budapest/Tashkent Group

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Aircraft	100	100	294	235	230	100	180	50	460	430	3416	115	1090

Note: Iceland, Kazakhstan and Luxembourg have no treaty-limited equipment in the area of application



# Treaty-Limited Equipment in the Former Soviet Republics

## Allocations Adopted at Tashkent, 15 May 1992


	Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	Helicopters	Aircraft	TOTAL
Armenia	220	285	220	50	100	875
Azerbaijan	220	285	220	50	100	875
Belarus	1,800	1,615	2,600	80	260	6,355
Georgia	220	285	220	50	100	875
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	0	0	0
Moldova	210	250	210	50	50	770
Russia	6,400	6,415	11,480	890	3,450	28,635
Ukraine	4,080	4,040	5,050	330	1,090	14,590
Total	13,150	13,175	20,000	1,500	5,150	52,975
Limit	13,150	13,175	20,000	1,500	5,150	52,975

## Sublimits on Active Units


	Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	TOTAL
Belarus	1,525	1,375	2,175	5,075
Russia	4,975	5,105	10,525	20,605
Ukraine	3,130	3,240	4,350	10,720

## Derived Portions of Limits Allocated to Storage

	Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	TOTAL
Belarus	275	240	425	940
Russia	1,425	1,310	955	3,690
Ukraine	950	800	700	2,450



Totals allocated/  
FSU limits



# Treaty-Limited Equipment in the Former Soviet 'Flanks'

*Allocations Adopted at Tashkent, 15 May 1992*


	Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	TOTAL
Armenia	220	285	220	725
Azerbaijan	220	285	220	725
Georgia	220	285	220	725
Moldova	210	250	210	670
Russia	1,300	1,680	1,380	4,360
Ukraine	680	890	350	1,920
Total	2,850	3,675	2,600	9,125
'Flank' Limits	2,850	3,675	2,600	9,125

*Portions of Limits Allocated to Storage*

	Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	TOTAL
Russia (northern flank)	600	400	800	1,800
Ukraine	400	500		900

*Derived Limits on Active Units*

	Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	TOTAL
Russia	700	1,280	580	2,560
Ukraine	280	390	350	1,020



# TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

## the 'flanks' agreement, 31 May 1996

*new limits under the agreement:*

Russia:	
original 'flanks'	
Tanks	1800
Artillery	2400
ACV	3700
and individual oblast caps shown on the map	


(until 31 May 1999:  
Tanks Artillery ACV  
1897 2422 4397)

Ukraine:	
Odessa Oblast	
Tanks	400
Artillery	350
ACV	400

*residual Treaty limits:*

Russia*:	
Zone 4.2	
Tanks	5700
Artillery	5135
ACV	10900
remaining 'flanks'	
Tanks	1300
Artillery	1680
ACV	1380

Ukraine:	
Zone 4.3	
Tanks	3400
Artillery	3150
ACV	4700
former Kiev MD	
Tanks	2250
Artillery	1500
ACV	2500
remaining 'flanks'	
Tanks	680
Artillery	890
ACV	350



*Treaty 'flexibilities' cited in the agreement:*

- consultations to convert DPSS to active unit accounts
- Russia:*
- maximum use of temporary deployments, with host consent
- maximum use of TLE reallocations, as freely negotiated
- accounting for equipment listed as "to be removed"

\* Sums of these limits exceed maximum levels for holdings because Russia declared duplicate figures for DPSS in zone 4.2 and the 'flanks'

*Additional transparency measures:*

- Russia:*
- semiannual information exchange on original 'flanks' area;
- quarterly for Kuchevskaya depot facility
- up to 10 added inspections a year in areas removed from the 'flanks', or sites holding equipment listed as "to be removed"
- Ukraine:*
- unit strength changes in Odessa oblast notified at 5% level
- one added inspection a year in Odessa oblast

# BATTLE TANKS

comparing reported holdings at key points in the life of the Treaty


## North Atlantic Treaty Group

	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Turkey	UK	US
signature	359	77	419	1343	7000	1879	1246	913	205	146	854	2823	1198	5904
in force	362	76	499	1335	7170	1971	1232	913	205	146	858	3008	1159	5163
40-month	334	0	343	1289	3061	1735	1162	734	170	174	630	2608	662	1254
current	334	0	343	1156	3248	1735	1283	722	170	186	725	2563	521	1115
ceiling	334	77	353	1306	4166	1735	1348	743	170	300	794	2795	1015	4006

## Budapest/Tashkent Group

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Georgia	Hungary	Moldova	Poland	Romania	Russia	Slovakia	Ukraine
signature	258	391	2263	2145	1198	850	1345	155	2850	2851	10333	599	6475
in force	∅	134	3457	2269	1803	77	1345	0	2850	2967	9338	901	6128
40-month	102	285	2320	1475	953	∅	835	0	1720	1375	5492	478	4026
current	102	270	1778	1475	952	79	797	0	1729	1375	5541	478	4063
ceiling	220	220	1800	1475	957	220	835	210	1730	1375	6400	478	4080

Note: Iceland, Kazakhstan and Luxembourg have no treaty-limited equipment in the area of application



# ARTILLERY

comparing reported holdings at key points in the life of the Treaty


## North Atlantic Treaty Group

	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Turkey	UK	US
signature	376	38	553	1360	4602	1908	2144	837	531	343	1373	3442	636	2601
in force	378	32	553	1436	4735	1975	2013	837	544	354	1368	3107	534	1973
40-month	316	6	552	1251	2056	1878	1939	580	246	320	1210	3125	536	854
current	312	0	503	1192	2058	1878	1932	448	246	320	1230	2843	436	612
ceiling	320	38	553	1292	2705	1878	1955	607	527	450	1310	3523	636	2492

## Budapest/Tashkent Group

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech Rep	Georgia	Hungary	Moldova	Poland	Romania	Russia	Slovakia	Ukraine
signature	357	463	1396	2116	1044	363	1047	248	2300	3817	7719	522	3392
in force	Ø	126	1562	2154	1723	0	1047	108	2315	3942	8326	861	3591
40-month	225	343	1533	1750	767	Ø	840	155	1581	1471	5680	383	3727
current	225	301	1533	1750	767	92	840	155	1581	1466	6011	383	3764
ceiling	285	285	1615	1750	767	285	840	250	1610	1475	6415	383	4040

Note: Iceland, Kazakhstan and Luxembourg have no treaty-limited equipment in the area of application



# ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES

comparing reported holdings at key points in the life of the Treaty


## North Atlantic Treaty Group

	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Turkey	UK	US
signature	1381	277	316	4177	8920	1641	3958	1467	146	247	1256	1502	3193	5747
in force	1383	136	316	4387	9099	1432	3774	1445	124	280	1223	2059	3206	4963
40-month	704	0	303	3556	2679	2324	2986	1002	203	367	1199	2450	2574	2238
current	678	0	286	3574	2537	2325	3031	610	199	346	1194	2424	2411	1849
ceiling	1099	277	316	3820	3446	2534	3339	1080	225	430	1588	3120	3176	5372

## Budapest/Tashkent Group

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech Rep	Georgia	Hungary	Moldova	Poland	Romania	Russia	Slovakia	Ukraine
signature	641	1285	2776	2204	1692	1054	1720	392	2377	3136	16589	846	7153
in force	0	113	3824	2232	2515	28	1731	98	2396	3171	19399	1258	6703
40-month	285	835	2984	1985	1363	0	1540	209	1516	2073	10372	683	4919
current	218	557	2518	1985	1367	102	1300	209	1442	2091	10198	683	4847
ceiling	220	220	2600	2000	1367	220	1700	210	2150	2100	11480	683	5050

Note: Iceland, Kazakhstan and Luxembourg have no treaty-limited equipment in the area of application





# ATTACK HELICOPTERS

comparing reported holdings at key points in the life of the Treaty


## North Atlantic Treaty Group

	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Turkey	UK	US
signature	0	12	3	418	258	0	168	91	0	0	28	5	368	243
in force	8	0	12	366	256	0	176	90	0	0	28	11	389	349
40-month	46	0	12	317	225	6	137	0	0	0	28	20	342	150
current	46	0	12	326	205	20	132	12	0	0	28	25	289	126
ceiling	46	0	12	396	306	30	139	50	0	26	90	103	371	431

## Budapest/Tashkent Group

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech Rep	Georgia	Hungary	Moldova	Poland	Romania	Russia	Slovakia	Ukraine
signature	7	24	82	44	37	48	39	0	29	13	1035	19	285
in force	0	9	76	44	37	0	39	0	30	15	1005	19	271
40-month	7	18	79	44	36	0	59	0	92	16	826	19	270
current	7	15	71	43	36	3	59	0	94	16	812	19	294
ceiling	50	50	80	67	50	50	108	50	130	120	890	25	330

Note: Iceland, Kazakhstan and Luxembourg have no treaty-limited equipment in the area of application



# COMBAT AIRCRAFT

comparing reported holdings at key points in the life of the Treaty


## North Atlantic Treaty Group

	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Turkey	UK	US
signature	191	45	106	699	1018	469	577	196	90	96	242	511	842	626
in force	202	28	106	695	1040	455	542	176	89	92	178	360	757	398
40-month	169	0	75	667	578	489	524	182	75	105	188	387	640	222
current	166	0	74	650	560	486	516	181	74	105	200	362	624	220
ceiling	232	90	106	800	900	650	650	230	100	160	310	750	900	784

## Budapest/Tashkent Group

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech Rep	Georgia	Hungary	Moldova	Poland	Romania	Russia	Slovakia	Ukraine
signature	0	124	650	243	232	245	110	0	551	505	4161	116	1431
in force	0	15	390	335	228	0	143	30	509	508	4624	114	1648
40-month	6	58	335	235	187	0	144	27	400	373	2986	114	1008
current	6	48	286	235	144	6	141	27	384	372	2891	113	940
ceiling	100	100	294	235	230	100	180	50	460	430	3416	115	1090

Note: Iceland, Kazakhstan and Luxembourg have no treaty-limited equipment in the area of application



# CFE TREATY REDUCTIONS

compiled informally after the Treaty Review Conference. 4 June 1996

## North Atlantic Treaty Group


	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Turkey	UK	US
Tanks	28	0	146	39	2566	1099	324	0	127	0	481	1060	183	639
Artillery	58	0	0	149	1623	517	205	59	17	0	88	122	0	5
ACV	284	0	0	570	4257	447	537	261	57	0	0	5	30	0
Helicopters	0	0	0	66	0	0	57	91	0	0	0	0	5	0
Aircraft	0	0	1	0	140	76	0	0	0	0	0	115	0	0

## Budapest/Tashkent Group

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech Rep	Georgia	Hungary	Moldova	Poland	Romania	Russia	Slovakia	Ukraine
Tanks	0	13	1773	794	1123	0	510	0	1130	1591	3188	578	1974
Artillery	0	42	3	410	1409	0	207	0	770	2423	660	679	0
ACV	18	274	1341	332	1217	0	212	59	935	973	5419	443	1551
Helicopters	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	99	0	0
Aircraft	0	0	130	100	57	0	28	0	121	78	1029	30	550

## Total Reductions:

Tanks	19366
Artillery	9446
ACV	19222
Helicopters	318
Aircraft	2455
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>50807</b>



# CFE TREATY HOLDINGS

reported at annual information exchange, as of 1 January 1997


## North Atlantic Treaty Group

	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Turkey	UK	US
Tanks	334	0	343	1156	3248	1735	1283	722	170	186	725	2563	521	1115
Artillery	312	0	503	1192	2058	1878	1932	448	246	320	1230	2843	436	612
ACV	678	0	286	3574	2537	2325	3031	610	199	346	1194	2424	2411	1849
Helicopters	46	0	12	326	205	20	132	12	0	0	28	25	289	126
Aircraft	166	0	74	650	560	486	516	181	74	105	200	362	624	220

## Budapest/Tashkent Group

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech Rep	Georgia	Hungary	Moldova	Poland	Romania	Russia	Slovakia	Ukraine
Tanks	102	270	1778	1475	952	79	797	0	1729	1375	5541	478	4063
Artillery	225	301	1533	1750	767	92	840	155	1581	1466	6011	383	3764
ACV	218	557	2518	1985	1367	102	1300	209	1442	2091	10198	683	4847
Helicopters	7	15	71	43	36	3	59	0	94	16	812	19	294
Aircraft	6	48	286	235	144	6	141	27	384	372	2891	113	940

Note: Iceland, Kazakhstan and Luxembourg have no treaty-limited equipment in the area of application



# CFE DECLARED SITES AND OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION

reported at annual information exchange, as of 1 January 1997


## North Atlantic Treaty Group

	Objects of Verification	Declared Sites
Belgium	37	25
Canada	0	0
Denmark	55	29
France	159	134
Germany	153	142
Greece	112	72
Italy	168	156
Netherlands	44	31
Norway	22	19
Portugal	30	29
Spain	80	75
Turkey	121	108
UK	120	101
US	58	36

## Budapest/Tashkent Group

	Objects of Verification	Declared Sites
Armenia	20	20
Azerbaijan	26	24
Belarus	56	39
Bulgaria	102	85
Czech Republic	54	48
Georgia	11	11
Hungary	41	30
Moldova	8	6
Poland	135	111
Romania	136	106
Russia	349	214
Slovakia	35	27
Ukraine	170	134

Note: Iceland, Kazakhstan and Luxembourg have no declared sites nor objects of verification in the area of application



# CFE1A MANPOWER LIMITATIONS

ceilings compared to holdings reported in annual information exchange. as of 1 January 1997


## North Atlantic Treaty Group

	Ceilings	Holdings
Belgium	70,000	44,057
Canada	10,660	0
Denmark	39,000	29,629
France	325,000	281,647
Germany	345,000	285,326
Greece	158,621	158,621
Italy	315,000	245,575
Luxembourg	900	794
Netherlands	80,000	43,856
Norway	32,000	24,421
Portugal	75,000	45,731
Spain	300,000	180,063
Turkey	530,000	527,670
UK	260,000	224,351
US	250,000	107,481

## Budapest/Tashkent Group

	Ceilings	Holdings
Armenia	60,000	54,658
Azerbaijan	70,000	69,254
Belarus	100,000	83,817
Bulgaria	104,000	93,731
Czech Republic	93,333	61,647
Georgia	40,000	30,000
Hungary	100,000	49,958
Moldova	20,000	11,075
Poland	234,000	227,860
Romania	230,000	228,195
Russia	1,450,000	817,139
Slovakia	46,667	45,483
Ukraine	450,000	370,847

Note: Iceland and Kazakhstan have no military manpower in the area of application.




# Treaty-Limited Equipment in the Former Soviet Republics

## Transformation

*Holdings of Soviet Successor States, January 1997*


	Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	Helicopters	Aircraft
Russia	5,541	6,011	10,198	812	2,891
Belarus	1,778	1,533	2,518	71	286
Ukraine	4,063	3,764	4,847	294	940
Moldova	0	155	209	0	27
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	79	92	102	3	6
Armenia	102	225	218	7	6
Azerbaijan	270	301	557	15	48
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,833</b>	<b>12,081</b>	<b>18,649</b>	<b>1,202</b>	<b>4,204</b>



*Soviet Holdings, December 1988*

Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	Aircraft
41,580	52,400	57,800	8,395

*(helicopter assets not reported)*



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