

# STATUS OF CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS IN EUROPE

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## JOINT HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

—  
JUNE 23 AND JULY 14, 1988  
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## STATUS OF CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS IN EUROPE

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THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 1988

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe met at 9:35 a.m., room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Hon. Steny H. Hoyer, Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.

### OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN HOYER

Chairman HOYER. I am going to call this hearing to order.

There will be other members coming, including Chairman Fascell, who is on his way.

We have had to reschedule this hearing as a result of the fact that the Prime Minister of Australia, Robert Hawke, will be addressing a Joint Session of the Congress at 11:00, and we want to all be there, obviously, for the purposes of hearing that.

As a result, we very much appreciate, Madam Secretary and Ambassador Lehman you rescheduling, so that you could both be here earlier than we had originally scheduled.

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe is very concerned about and interested in the possibility of CST talks occurring within the foreseeable future. Those conventional stability talks, of course, will be within the framework of the CSCE.

Senator DeConcini, the Co-Chairman of the Commission, and, in particular, Senator Tim Wirth, also just coming into the room, are both very, very interested in this subject, as is Chairman Fascell.

This is a joint hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Helsinki Commission both of which are very interested in the talks.

We have seen a heightened political awareness of the conventional force issue, particularly in the wake of the recently ratified INF Treaty. The Commission is, of course, very concerned that the human rights aspect of CSCE not be over-shadowed by CSCE's expansion to encompass conventional force negotiations and the developing overlap of the conventional stability and CSBM talks.

Balance among the different aspects of East-West relations is not, as all of us, I think, would agree, simply a rhetorical goal. It is

a political objective, explicitly set forward in the Helsinki Final Act.

It occurs to us, and we have expressed this concern, that at the Reykjavik NATO Meeting last June, the allies took a step which may jeopardize that objective. By permitting the expansion of CSCE to encompass such complex issues as establishing a balance of conventional forces at lower levels, we have effectively created an imbalance, in my opinion, that will probably increase over time with greater political emphasis being placed on the military security aspect of East-West relations.

In June, we effectively lifted certain military security issues out of CSCE, that is confidence- and the security-building measures, and addressed them at the ministerial level, thereby sending certain signals regarding our own priorities.

It occurs to me that this process could weaken the political leverage to exact human rights progress within the Helsinki process if what results is a steady dilution of political-will to exact those gains at the expense or in pursuance of security issues.

There are few opportunities in the world of East-West diplomacy that afford the type of political leverage structurally and procedurally inherent in the Helsinki process for demanding progress in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The fact is, there is no other forum like CSCE, which explicitly set forward as political goals of each of the signatory states progress in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms along with increased cooperation in the areas of trade, exchange and military security.

We all know and understand the difficulties associated with keeping human rights on the forefront of the foreign affairs agenda. The reasons, of course, are numerous and complex, but what is clear is that military issues tend to dominate the discussion. Such predominance, in my view, leads perhaps to the creation of false expectations about progress in East-West relations that cannot be achieved by arms control agreements alone.

Suffice it to say that we believe and I in particular believe, that the CST talks are critically important. We are interested in hearing the status of those talks, the status of the agenda in Vienna, and the developing relationship among all these talks within the CSCE process.

We would like your views on how our allies expect those developments to occur within the framework of CSCE. In that context, we very much appreciate both of our witnesses being here.

Let me now recognize the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who is the former Chairman of this Commission during its first 8 years of existence, and was one of the leaders internationally in the expansion and implementation of the Helsinki process, Chairman FASCELL.

Chairman FASCELL. Chairman Hoyer, the Foreign Affairs Committee is delighted to join the Commission in conducting these hearings.

It is a very important subject and one that I think we should address in tandem. I am not sure they can be divorced or should be divorced from what is going on, and, yet, the relationship between CST and the CDE and all the other initials with respect to the

multi-lateral efforts that we have had must be explored thoroughly and understood.

Clearly, the alphabet soup nature of these talks is one of the problems. Nevertheless, I believe we are getting there. At the same time, much more remains to be done. Perhaps the sheer dynamics of the meetings will resolve these problems. I do not know.

Obviously, an important element to these efforts is that we do not want to lose a momentum, if that is the correct word, with regard to the whole question of arms control. This momentum could serve to lessening of tensions, and as such, serve to stimulate honest discussions on the relationship of nuclear weapons and conventional weapons and armaments.

We have several matters that have to be taken in this context as we move forward with conventional arms talks. These include: reductions in cost; reductions in tensions; lessening the likelihood of potential confrontation; and continued efforts to achieve real and meaningful arms control. I am not sure, for example, that we can solve all our problems simply through bilateral negotiations with the Soviets. Nevertheless, these efforts must continue.

Obviously, in the area of conventional arms talks, we realize the need for multilateral negotiations. That presents a problem, however, as to how we proceed in that and achieving a balance with respect to the concerns about nuclear capability and the conventional balance that many experts feel is absolutely essential to peace and stability in Europe. That may be one of the reasons why MFBR stalled around for fourteen years and we did not get anywhere.

Perhaps we finally have the solution to the whole puzzle now that the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty has been agreed to and efforts to achieve similar reductions in strategic forces go on. I believe we have made a decision to separate tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons from these conventional talks. As such, I suppose I would have to agree with the logic of this conclusion at this time much as a result of its being both a political reality and necessity.

We have to concern ourselves with all of these issues, I just wanted to lay them out here with our witnesses in an effort to find out what they are doing with respect to these efforts. Here again, I am talking about what seems to be an insatiable drive to supply the whole world with advanced weapons systems, missile systems and other types of conventional arms. This is a matter that I have discussed frankly with the Secretary-General, in an effort to convince the super powers of their mutual responsibility in stopping this insatiable drive for the production and acquisition of arms and for the sale of arms to everybody in the world who wants them because of their perceived need. This dynamic impinges on the two super powers because there is always a danger that some small conflagration somewhere, whether it is conventional or not, might drag the two super powers into some kind of confrontation which neither one of them wants.

These are all important issues to explore with our witnesses today. We are delighted to have these experts who are here to start us on the road to consideration of these vital matters in the hope that the Commission, with its responsibility for the whole question of the Helsinki Accords, and the Foreign Affairs Committee, with

its efforts to try to be helpful with the Administration, in evaluating and formulating the implementation of a policy that will be successful in getting a broad base of support in the Congress and in the country.

[Chairman Fascell's prepared statement follows:]

## OPENING STATEMENT

THE HONORABLE DANTE B. FASCELL  
CHAIRMAN  
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

## JOINT HEARING ON THE STATUS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TALKS IN EUROPE

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 1988

The Committee on Foreign Affairs is meeting today in joint session with the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to consider the timely subject of the status of conventional arms talks in Europe.

The adoption of the treaty banning intermediate-range nuclear weapons from Europe has placed renewed emphasis on the urgent need to address the question of conventional military arms and forces in Europe. While there seems to be a generalized desire to move forward in this area, very few, it seems to me, have a real understanding of exactly where we are heading in conventional arms control. It is my hope that this hearing, the first of its type we have held, will help to shed new and illuminating light on the complex problems of conventional arms control in Europe.

At this pivotal moment, just when public attention is turning to the problem of conventional arms in Europe, negotiations on reductions in these forces are at a crossroads. The 14-year MBFR talks are moribund and seem about to be replaced by a new, much wider forum within the framework of the CSCE process. This new forum, called the Conventional Stability Talks or CST is to focus on reductions in manpower and armaments covering all of Europe including, for the first time, the entire European part of the Soviet Union to the Ural Mountains.



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In order for this new process to begin, however, we are told by the Administration that the Vienna CSCE Review Meeting must come to a successful conclusion. As we all know, of course, the conclusion of the Vienna CSCE Review Meeting is dependent upon the human rights performance of the Soviet Union and other signatory countries. It appears that -- for the first time -- human rights and arms control have been linked together.

Today we hope to learn what implications this new linkage has for the future of both arms control and human rights. We hope to learn what precautions are being taken to ensure that the military security aspects of CSCE do not overwhelm the human rights and other aspects of the Helsinki Final Act. We would like to know how the residue of the MBFR talks will be incorporated into the CST forum and how this new forum will relate to the continuation of the meeting on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, known by the acronym CDE. The question arises as to whether or not the insertion of conventional force talks into the CSCE process is like putting an elephant in the bathtub and whether or not -- by having a CSCE launching of the CST with total autonomy -- is not like throwing the baby as well as the elephant out with the bath water. In other words, is it not possible that we are putting too much into the military side of CSCE and then following that up by taking the most important military aspects of CSCE out of the process thus delinking it from human rights?

We also want to know what the sticking points in the CSCE negotiations are and how we hope to resolve them in order that the

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Vienna CSCE Review Meeting may come to a successful conclusion. As we all know, of course, after our recent experiences with the ratification of the INF Treaty and the continuing struggle over interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, we in the Congress are very leery about agreements which contain ambiguities to be wrestled with by later Administrations in lieu of tough bargaining to make sure that there are no future misunderstandings. In that context, we wish to know, precisely, what are the geographic boundaries of a zone that extends "from the Atlantic to the Urals" and whether or not the CST talks will include nuclear weapons.

Will these questions be resolved before the CST talks are launched or will we move into this larger, more complex forum on conventional arms leaving these questions unresolved or at least dealing with them through ambiguities which can be interpreted by each side in a different way?

We also want to know what our bottom line on performance is, particularly with regard to the Soviet Union, as part of the human rights package which will be required to end the CSCE meeting in Vienna. We have been told, on several occasions, that our basic requirements in that area are:

1. The resolution of all bilateral family reunification cases between the United States and the Soviet Union;
2. The release of all political prisoners in the Soviet Union;
3. The end of all radio jamming; and

4. A significant increase in emigration from the Soviet Union, particularly Soviet Jews.

We know from our previous experience that emigration from the Soviet Union is something that can be regulated and calibrated by the Soviet leadership when it suits their purposes. At the end of 1979, just prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, the emigration figures for Soviet Jews were at an annual rate of around 50,000 per year. After Afghanistan, there was a precipitous drop in these figures, down to a level of less than 1,000 in 1986. Even though the figures in 1987 were less than 9,000, and this year may well be double that number, that will still be a rate that is less than a third of the 1979 numbers.

What are we to make of this situation? Any effort to get conventional arms control back on track is to be welcomed, but is this new CST arrangement the best way to do it? The CST concept, as we have seen, brings with it many built-in problems. And these are the fundamental questions which must be addressed as we seek to formulate an effective conventional arms control policy. To assist us in this task, we have before us today two expert witnesses, the Honorable Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and the Honorable Ronald Lehman, Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy at the Department of Defense.

We look forward to hearing from them on just how we got where we are on CST, and what we and the NATO alliance can expect this new process to yield in the form of tangible progress towards the achievement of conventional stability in Europe.

Chairman FASCELL. That being said I shall turn to Ambassador Ridgway?

Chairman HOYER. If I may, Mr. Chairman, before we recognize Ambassador Ridgway, I would like to recognize the Co-Chairman of the Commission, Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona.

Senator DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and, Chairman Fascell, thank you for convening this joint hearing with the Foreign Affairs Committee.

I am pleased, as you are, to have Ambassador Ridgway and Ambassador Lehman here to bring us up-to-date and to provide us with the report and the progress of the negotiations.

In the wake of the milestone INF Treaty, much attention is now being focused on conventional arms control. Tension and fears of hostilities can be significantly reduced only if meaningful conventional force reductions, and confidence-building measures, are undertaken by NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

As the stalled Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks have demonstrated, this task will be a difficult one. Not only do differences between East and West need to be hammered out, but substantial differences, among our own allies have to be addressed, including the position of the neutral and non-aligned nations who play a crucial role in CSCE negotiations.

It is critical that we fully comprehend U.S. policy aims in having conventional stability talks within the framework of the CSCE.

The details involved in the complex negotiations are not the only obstacles to securing an agreement freeing Europe from the threat of war. An equally important consideration is the context in which these negotiations will take place. By placing the conventional stability talks within the CSCE process, a greater emphasis is accorded to the military and security aspects of the Helsinki process.

Along with recognizing the benefit of the conventional arms control progress, we must also be aware that the expanded scope of CSCE could weaken our political leverage in pressing for human rights progress. We cannot sacrifice human rights progress for the sake of an agreement on the military security issues in this Commissioner's judgment.

A balance needs to be struck and the CSCE process provides a unique opportunity to force such a balance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you.

If I can ask the other members if they would like to make very brief opening statements. As I said before some of you got here, the Prime Minister of Australia will be addressing a Joint Session of Congress at 11:00, and, so, we are going to adjourn this hearing at 10 minutes of. Senator Wirth?

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here.

I think all of us are concerned about the continuing momentum of arms control. We are pleased with the INF Treaty. We remain hopeful about START. We understand the real frustrations that are going to come up for Ambassador Ledogar's and the follow-on to MBFR, and I think the question that we face is, What are we going to do over the next 2 or 3 years with all of the public momentum and concern about arms control?

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the area of confidence and security-building measures is a logical one for us to pursue and to pursue hard. It is an area where we can get some very, very real results, and it fits in both with CST and CDE, as I understand them.

I would hope that we might look at the possibility of this group, CSCE, working together, perhaps with the Armed Services Committee, to have a hearing on confidence-building measures to look at some of the military aspects of this. I think expanding the overall purview is very important.

I want to thank you again for putting this together as rapidly as you all have, and I look forward to working with you in continuing the momentum and public and member education on the important issues of conventional arms control.

Thank you very much.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Senator Wirth, who has been a leader in this effort and has been to Vienna and discussed it with Ambassador Ledogar there and is pursuing this vigorously.

Congressman Bereuter, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. BEREUTER. I will forego an opening comment.

Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. All right. Congressman Smith, member of the Commission.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER SMITH. Since we are very short of time, I would ask that my comments be made part of the record.

Chairman HOYER. Without objection.

[Representative Christopher Smith's prepared statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE / HELSINKI COMMISSION HEARING  
June 23, 1988

Mr. Chairman, the signing of the INF Treaty by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in December 1987, and its subsequent ratification by the Senate, has helped breathe life into the decade-and-a-half old NATO-Warsaw Pact talks on conventional arms reductions. I am pleased that formal talks between East and West on acceptable levels of tanks, weaponry, aircraft, supplies and manpower are scheduled to begin in Vienna in the fall.

Much of the discussion and debate in the past has centered on the Warsaw Pact nations' reluctance to discuss inspection and verification procedures, and their insistence on equal force reduction. Mr. Chairman, these two positions must change if any real progress is to be made.

While it is difficult to pinpoint the numbers of deployed Warsaw Pact conventional forces, experts agree that they have a substantial advantage in real numbers. Western intelligence maintains that the Warsaw Pact has a manpower advantage of between 150,000 and 220,000 troops. Estimates of the ratios of battle tanks range from approximately 3 to 1 to 5 to 1 (Warsaw Pact to NATO). At the same time, Mr. Chairman, the Warsaw Pact has added geographic advantages merely because of their contiguous land mass versus the disconnected countries of NATO. Of particular concern, Mr. Chairman, is the fact that U.S. forces must cross the Atlantic Ocean and overcome the transportation and logistical problems in case of attack against NATO

allies.

Mr. Chairman, as I'm sure my colleagues would agree, achieving equality between East and West will require "asymmetrical" reductions in forces. Again and again the Administration has clearly stated its determination to focus the arms controls talks on the elimination of the NATO/Warsaw Pact imbalance in conventional forces "from the Atlantic to the Urals." To assess this imbalance quantitatively and qualitatively, counting procedures will have to be reconciled and accurate data bases established. I am hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that setting up these procedures will be a priority in the early negotiations because dependable numbers are essential for fair agreements to follow. In addition to reducing troop and equipment levels, measures which would beef up the verification regime and warning indicators are essential for an acceptable agreement.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that conventional arms reductions by the Warsaw Pact and NATO is the logical progression following the INF Treaty agreement. But, the proposals repeatedly offered by the Soviets calling for equal troop reductions would present clear disadvantages for the West. If instead, however, future proposals were to include an asymmetrical reduction program with honest and open verification policies, then -- and only then, Mr. Chairman, will we be able to achieve a real balance in conventional forces.

Chairman HOYER. Congresswoman Meyers?

Ms. MEYERS. I will also forego comments and look forward to the testimony.

Chairman HOYER. I thank the members.

Now, for the reason we are here, obviously, first of all, I want to introduce Ambassador Ridgway, our Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Ambassador Ridgway is also the former Ambassador of the United States to the GDR and has held numerous other high-ranking posts within the Foreign Service. A Foreign Service officer of the highest caliber for whom, on a very bi-partisan basis, the Congress has a great deal of respect and we appreciate your being with us.

Ambassador Ridgway.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROZANNE L. RIDGWAY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Thank you very much, Chairman Hoyer, Chairman Fascell, Senator DeConcini.

As I listened to your comments, I realized how essential it is that we begin this discussion of what this process of conventional stability talks, confidence-building measures negotiations, the CSCE, the CSCE process—that we begin those talks as quickly as we have. And if we run out of time today, I am going to do something that I suspect not many witnesses do, and that is volunteer to come back to finish this, because I can just tell that we have a long and complex road in front of us, and it is essential that we have some agreed appreciations of what this is all about.

Chairman HOYER. We accept.

**CSCE PROCESS**

Ambassador RIDGWAY. I understand your interest in the relationship of these new security negotiations to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and what we have called the CSCE process, and I would like to begin, since this is the beginning of this road, by talking to you about our conception, first, of the conference and then of what has come to be called the CSCE process.

I believe they are two different things. The conference, of course, is precisely what the name states. It is the on-going meetings of all thirty-five CSCE participating states to review implementation and enhance compliance with commitments undertaken in the Final Act, Helsinki, and in the Madrid Concluding Document.

Follow-up meetings or expert level meetings occur on specific CSCE issues, such as confidence and security-building measures. But the CSCE process or the Helsinki process is a much broader concept, and in the thirteen years since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, it has become associated with the full range of East-West contacts and with political activity and security activity, both within the conference and outside the conference.

That is, on any given day, all that is taking place in contacts between East and West on the political, economic, human rights, or security activities has come to be called the CSCE process.



Indeed, my experience with many of the smaller states of Europe, East and West, leads me to believe that for many of them, what has come to be called the CSCE process is the centerpiece of their respective foreign policies.

That process is not limited by the structure of CSCE. I have in my prepared testimony, and I regret it was late, but, as you know, I only, on Tuesday evening, returned from the Toronto Summit, expanded somewhat on this, and I am just taking some highlights out of that testimony, which I would hope, Mr. Chairman, could be—

Chairman HOYER. Without objection, your statement in full will be included in the record.

#### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Having made the distinction that we see between something called the CSCE process and the conference itself, I would also like, I think this is the moment to talk a little bit about the background that leads up in a historical sense to both CSBMs, that is the confidence and security-building measures, and these stability talks.

We have struggled since the 1960s with the question of how to move forward on force reductions, how to increase military transparency, and how to build confidence, and we have pursued a variety of avenues toward these objectives. With regard to force reductions, the focus has been on the MBFR negotiations, which began in 1973. Then, we have the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the conference and that took up the question of confidence-building measures, and the conference became the focus of our work in the area of confidence-building measures.

Then, at the 1983 Madrid follow-up meeting of the Helsinki Final Act, there was created another initial you referred to, CDE, that is the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. Now, that is the group that met in Stockholm. It produced a solid set of confidence and security-building measures in 1986, but, frankly, it brought with it a problem.

We believe that force reduction negotiations should proceed on a separate track from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Others have sought to use the fact of the Stockholm conference, that is the CDE conference, to bring arms control and confidence-building efforts together, and that has been one of the challenges in front of us.

Continuing with history, as the Stockholm conference was completing its work in the spring of 1986, both East and West were considering ways to reinvigorate conventional arms control efforts. They were bogged down in MBFR. No one will give you any other kind of a judgment on what happened to the mutual balanced force reductions.

In Halifax, in May 1986, against the background of interest, of increasing attention being paid in this area of conventional arms reductions, the NATO Foreign Ministers called for new steps in conventional arms control and they set up a high-level task force in NATO to develop a Western approach.

The idea was that the NATO-agreed arms control agenda of INF, START, and chemical weapons needed a conventional weapons complement.

The high-level task force formed at the Halifax meeting in May 1986 started about its work, and then we had another event. We had the opening of the CSCE follow-up conference in Vienna in November of 1986, and implicit in that was the need to look at the security basket of the conference and the overall balance between security and human rights.

When the decision was taken in NATO and announced in the December 1986 Brussels Declaration of the NATO Foreign Ministers, the decision was for two distinct negotiations on conventional security.

One would be among twenty-three nations of the two alliances, to be designed to strengthen stability in Europe at lower levels of conventional forces. The other would be within CSCE, that is, among all thirty-five CSCE states, and it was designed to build on and expand the work of the Stockholm Conference on CSBMs.

Whether the new conventional stability talks would have a relationship to CSCE in Europe prompted a lively debate in the alliance. Then and now, the U.S. concept of these talks has not changed.

We believe these talks must focus on the elimination of the NATO and Warsaw Pact imbalance, the balance in favor of the Warsaw Pact in conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals.

We believe that such talks must be limited to the twenty-three countries whose forces are under discussion. We recognize that the Armed Forces of neutral and non-aligned countries play a stabilizing role in the European security equation. We have no interest in seeing those forces reduced, but we did not want neutral and non-aligned states who have no chips on the table to have a right to a direct role in the negotiations on conventional stability.

We have made it very clear that the United States cannot accept such a role on the part of the neutral and non-aligned states.

The conclusion was, then and now, that the conventional stability talks must remain autonomous from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Now, negotiating flexibility was not the only reason that we insisted on autonomy for these forthcoming conventional stability talks.

#### BALANCE BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY ISSUES

Chairman Hoyer, you referred, as did Chairman Fascell, to the potential for these large-scale security talks to consume the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to consume our interest in human rights.

The protection of the balance between human rights and security issues within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe remains a significant long-term goal for the United States. We believe that two simultaneous security negotiations, one on confidence and security-building measures, one on this tough real post-World War II question of the reduction of imbalances, the elimination of imbalances and the reduction of forces in Europe,

that those two conferences, both fully within the Conference on Security in Europe, would overwhelm CSCE and they would overwhelm our efforts in the human rights area.

So, that is the judgment that was made, that one should be autonomous, the other would, of course, remain where it has always been, that is, within the work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

#### COMPROMISE FORMULA REACHED IN 1987

I said there was a lively debate in the alliance. There was. And what was said in June 1987 by the NATO Foreign Ministers in Reykjavik was a compromise formula.

According to that formula, the stability talks would take place, and here is the quote, the complete quote, "Within the framework of the CSCE process." I have described what we believe is the process, that it is not the conference, that it is the whole of the diplomatic and security interchange between East and West.

But that the stability talks taking place within the CSCE process would retain autonomy with regard to their subject matter, their participation, and their procedures and will make decisions without reference to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Now, this was not everything that we wanted, but it is the result of the negotiation with our Allies, some of whom did want a direct tie to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

We believe that we have a basis on which we can achieve our objectives, both for the stability talks and for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

I will skip over other parts of the testimony that perhaps are more theological and for different moments, and I do not wish to take up Ambassador Lehman's time. Let me tell you where we are now.

#### VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS

We have in Vienna negotiations going on on a mandate for the talks on conventional stability, and we have not yet agreed on language there on the mandate for those conventional stability talks.

There is a variety of opinion, not only within the conference itself, but within our own alliance as to the exact functional meaning of "within the framework of the CSCE process," and while we may have had some prior negotiations, many of these questions keep being reopened by those who have interests different than ours.

What we want to achieve in the mandate for the conventional stability talks is the following: independent scheduling, separate conference facilities, independent decision-making, separate procedures appropriate to the negotiations on conventional stability, and permanent autonomy. We do not want a right of review. We do not want oversight.

The draft concluding document for the Vienna conference, which was prepared by the neutral and non-aligned countries, is generally a good basis for work, but it is going to require some improvements, including on human rights. But when you get to the ques-

tion of autonomy of the conventional stability talks, that draft, in our view, is seriously flawed.

It acknowledges autonomy in principle, but then, as you go through the language, one sees that the procedures and the modalities would subordinate this negotiation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and it would provide a right of oversight to the neutral and non-aligned countries to review the decisions of the twenty-three.

We have agreed to take this draft, we have agreed with our Allies to take the draft as a basis for the final document. We are committed, you know, Mr. Chairman, from other hearings that you have had, we are committed to beefing up the human rights part of that NNA draft, but we are working then to protect these essential elements for autonomy on the securities side and that is exactly where we are at present.

#### WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

We have also been working with Allies on Western negotiating positions. What I have just described is a mandate for the negotiations, not the negotiations themselves.

We have been working on Western negotiation positions, and even though these deliberations are not complete, I think I can outline some of our broad objectives.

#### CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

On confidence and security-building measures, we want to focus on what we have come to call openness and predictability of military activities in Europe. We are looking at a number of measures. Some would improve existing provisions on forecasting, prior notification, and observation of military activities.

There is one initiative that is being examined which would relate to the exchange of military information on major combat units in Europe.

The work here is continuing and I think in this area, we look forward to working with both the East and the neutral and non-aligned states in this negotiation.

#### STABILITY TALKS

On the stability talks, the point of departure has got to be the challenge that NATO faces in the conventional sphere. At the March 2nd NATO Alliance Summit, the heads of government said the conventional imbalance in Europe remains at the core of Europe's security concerns.

They noted that the massive Soviet presence in Eastern Europe "at a level far in excess of its needs for self-defense directly challenges our security as well as the hopes for change in the political situation in Europe."

The challenge stems not only from massive forward-deployed Soviet armored forces, but also from large-standing forces in the Western portion of the Soviet Union. In addition to this quantitative superiority in key categories of combat capability, the Warsaw Pact enjoys geographic advantages over NATO and maintains a high degree of secrecy regarding its military activities.

We have used the mandate negotiations to prepare the way for the eventual negotiations themselves, to ensure that we will be in a position to negotiate the things that we want to negotiate in those eventual conventional stability talks.

Two-thirds of the mandate has already been agreed, and it says that the conventional stability talks will have the following objectives: strengthen stability at lower force levels, elimination of destabilizing disparities, and elimination as a matter of priority of the capability to launch surprise attack and large-scale offensive action.

In our view, this manifests itself, this latter capability, on launching surprise attack, manifests itself most starkly in the massive Warsaw Pact ground forces, particularly tanks and artillery, which are crucial to the ability to cease and hold territory.

#### NATO SUMMIT STATEMENT

So, the NATO Summit statement on conventional arms control calls for highly-asymmetrical reductions by the East and the elimination from Europe of tens of thousands of Warsaw Pact tanks and artillery pieces.

We know the Soviets have a different approach. They have been pressing for the inclusion of European-based nuclear forces in the conventional arms talks. They have been trying to get to this by getting in a specific reference to tactical nuclear weapons or the dual capable systems.

We refuse. NATO refuses to negotiate nuclear weapons in this forum and will negotiate on weapons systems only on the basis of their conventional capability.

So, that is where we stand, and I want to say that we are committed to working with the East, our Allies and with the East, to get a mandate and then to get into conventional stability talks which have an outcome which genuinely enhances stability and lowers force levels.

Obviously, our best efforts are going to have limits because, as you said, Mr. Chairman, arms control cannot eliminate the fundamental differences between Eastern and Western political orientation and between the nature of our two alliances.

Arms control is not going to eliminate the need for conventional force improvements to maintain the strong deterrent, and conventional arms control negotiations will not eliminate the need for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.

#### MBFR

Let me talk about MBFR for a moment. It has been with us since 1973, and as for its fate, we are going to have to wait and see, first, if a new negotiating mandate can be achieved, and, second, whether, once we have that mandate, we can get a balanced outcome to the Vienna talks that will allow us to go forward because, as we have said, we are not prepared to conclude the mandate negotiations and go on to conventional stability talks, except in the context of a balanced outcome to the Vienna follow-up meeting, to the Helsinki Final Act.

So, while we have very strong and, I think, clear views as to the autonomy of these talks, history can join them. There is a conjunction between the decision to seek to have such talks, and the Vienna follow-up meeting. That has given us an opportunity to ensure that we do not allow these talks to wander off and start up on their own without taking into account this fundamental relationship between security and human rights, without using the opportunity to see to it that there is a proper respect paid to a balanced outcome in the Vienna CSCE talks that are taking place.

And I cannot say anything except that the Allies remain firm in this position. It was discussed again at the Toronto Summit. If you have seen the political declaration from the Toronto Summit, you know that there was, I think, a reasoned and careful approach with respect to the East-West situation and the talks that led to that declaration make very clear an alliance, firm on standing strong in Vienna for the balanced outcome.

If we do get the balanced outcome and go on to these autonomous talks, how long will it take?

Ladies and gentlemen, I do not know. It is going to be tough. These are fundamental questions. We simply can only pledge our best efforts to be ready when the talks start with a good Allied position, and then to insist on those positions when we get into the talks, and be prepared to take as long as it takes.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me take so much time to present this, but as I said at the beginning, I could tell from the opening remarks that it is very important that we understand each other's views on some of these concepts and phrases and, as someone said, this proliferation of acronyms that will be part of our discussion and dialogue over the next months as we work on this.

Thank you very much.

[Ambassador Ridgway's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROZANNE L. RIDGWAY

Chairman Fascell, Chairman Hoyer, Chairman DeConcini:

Thank you for the joint invitation of the Committee and the Commission to discuss the military security aspects of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and our approach to a new negotiation among the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on conventional stability in Europe.

CSCE and the Helsinki Process

I understand your interest in the relationship of the new security negotiations both to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and to what we have called the "CSCE process." I might begin by describing our conception of both the Conference itself and the "Helsinki process."

Of course, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is precisely what the name states -- the ongoing meetings of all 35 CSCE participating states to review implementation and enhance compliance with commitments undertaken in the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document. This occurs both in

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). Meeting in Stockholm, the CDE produced a solid set of confidence- and security building measures (CSBMs) in 1986. However, CDE brought with it a problem. While we believed that force reduction negotiations should proceed on a separate track from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, others have sought to use the CDE to bring arms control and confidence building efforts together.

As the Stockholm Conference was completing its work in the Spring of 1986, both East and West were considering ways to reinvigorate conventional arms control efforts, which had become bogged down in MBFR. The NATO Foreign Ministers' statement at Halifax in May 1986 set the tone for future developments by calling for bold new steps in conventional arms control and for setting up a high level task force to develop a Western approach. This complemented the development of a comprehensive NATO arms control agenda which already included INF, START, and Chemical Weapons. In the same time period, another important event occurred, the opening of the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting in November 1986. Implicit in the CSCE opening was the need to reassess efforts within the security basket of the Conference and the overall balance between security and human rights.



imbalance in conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. Such talks must be limited to the 23 countries whose forces are under discussion. We recognize that the armed forces of neutral and nonaligned (NNA) countries play a stabilizing role in the European security equation, and we have no interest in seeing these forces reduced. At the same time, we did not want NNA states whose "chips are not on the table" to have the right to a direct role in the negotiations. We have made it clear that the United States cannot support such an NNA role. Our conclusion: the conventional stability talks must remain autonomous from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Negotiating flexibility is not the only reason we are insisting upon autonomy for the conventional stability talks. Protection of the balance between human rights and security issues within the CSCE constitutes a significant long-term goal for us. We believe that two simultaneous security negotiations, both fully within the CSCE, would overwhelm the Conference, and our efforts in the CSCE human rights area. I am sure that the members here are aware that it has long been the desire of the Soviets to turn the CSCE into a European Security Conference.

On the other hand, we have never thought that the stability talks could go forward in a vacuum. The negotiation must

will contribute to the broader objectives of the Helsinki process.

This approach reflects the importance of going beyond a narrow definition of security in U.S.-Soviet relations. In the long term, human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals will be just as important to security as military arrangements. In this regard, given the conjunction of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting with the new impetus to move forward on conventional arms control, we were able to establish a direct and appropriate link to the Vienna meeting in order to increase our leverage on human rights issues. We will allow the new security negotiations to start only in the context of a balanced outcome in Vienna that includes improved Eastern human rights performance and concrete new humanitarian commitments.

#### Where Are We Now?

Turning our concept into reality, however, has not been easy. We have not yet agreed on language in Vienna which would ensure the stability talks' autonomy. There are a variety of opinions within the Vienna conference and even within our own Alliance on how the stability talks should be related to the CSCE.

We have made clear to all that we regard the following as

Where We Want To Go -- In CSBMs

In addition to focusing on the nature of mandates for the security negotiations, we and our Allies have also been working intently on the Western negotiating positions for both the CSBMs and stability talks. Even though Alliance deliberations are not complete, I can outline some of our plans and objectives in broad terms.

On confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), the West will continue to focus on the objectives we successfully pursued in Stockholm -- to build confidence and security through measures designed to increase the openness and predictability of military activities in Europe. I believe the CSBMs adopted in Stockholm have advanced these objectives. Eastern implementation has been generally encouraging, including on on-site inspection. In fact, we have pressed the Soviets to demonstrate the same spirit in the implementation of their CSCE human rights commitments that they have shown for CDE.

There remain, however, important areas in which the CSBMs regime can be enhanced and expanded. Accordingly, the Alliance is looking at a variety of measures. Some would improve existing provisions on forecasting, prior notification and observation of military activities. In the interests of further

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secrecy regarding its military activities.

East-West discussions on a negotiating mandate, which began in February 1987 at NATO invitation, have shown good progress; fully two-thirds of the document has already been agreed, including the following objectives:

- strengthened stability at lower force levels;
- elimination of destabilizing disparities; and
- elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability to launch surprise attack and large-scale offensive action.

This latter capability, which the West neither has nor aspires to, manifests itself most starkly in the mass of Warsaw Pact ground forces, particularly tanks and artillery, which are crucial to the ability to seize and hold territory. This is why the NATO summit statement on conventional arms control calls for "highly asymmetrical reductions by the East and ... the elimination from Europe of tens of thousands" of Warsaw Pact tanks and artillery pieces.

We know that the Soviets have a different approach. They have pressed for inclusion of European-based nuclear forces in

meantime, we remain committed to NATO's December 1985 MBFR proposal, to which the East has yet to respond in any constructive way.

#### Timing

I've outlined U.S. views on both the procedural and substantive issues that confront us. The next logical question is when the new security negotiations will begin. Unfortunately, I cannot be categorical on this. Beginning the new talks is contingent on a successful conclusion of the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting. The prospect of an early conclusion of that meeting is in doubt because of the East's intransigence on human rights. We need to see improved Eastern compliance with commitments under the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document. There has been definite improvement since the meeting opened in November 1986, but more is needed. We also require a final document which provides for stronger, expanded human rights commitments and significant post-Vienna follow-on activities in the human dimension. We and our Allies are working hard toward an early outcome. I can't promise you a date, but I can pledge our best efforts. However, I must stress that we and our Allies have made it clear that we are prepared to stay in Vienna as long as it takes to achieve a balanced, substantive outcome.

Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Madam Secretary, thank you very much for your statement.

Also, thank you for volunteering to return because it is obvious that we are going to have to try to get back again in conjunction with Chairman Fascell and Co-Chairman DeConcini, and we will try to schedule that.

I would like to recognize three members who came in since my last introduction. Chairman Hamilton, one of the ranking members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, of course, Chairman of the European Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Congressman Bilbray, also a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and to my left, Congressman Gilman, one of the ranking Republican members of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

I now would like to introduce Ambassador Lehman, who is now the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

Ambassador Lehman chairs the NATO High-Level Group on NATO Nuclear Forces Policy, and was chief negotiator at the U.S. START delegation. He has served as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, routinely attends U.S.-Soviet Foreign Ministers meetings, and has been a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and, indeed, has taught arms control courses at Georgetown University.

We appreciate his agreeing to be with us this morning, to teach us something in the context of the opening statements that have been made and Ambassador Ridgway's statement.

Ambassador Lehman, we look forward to hearing from you.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Ambassador LEHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am very honored to be here, and I am very pleased, also, that you have begun this process.

I do not know how long this process will go on. What I do know is that it will be a process that requires the closest consultation between the United States and its Allies and the closest consultations between the executive branch and the Congress, and, so, we are pleased to be here.

I know that your time is somewhat limited today, and this will be an on-going process. Nevertheless, I think the sooner we begin the question and answer session, perhaps the better it will be.

I have a rather lengthy statement. It repeats much of what Ambassador Ridgway has said. So, I would offer to put that in for the record and perhaps make a few comments on the perspective from the national security point of view and then open it up for questions.

Chairman HOYER. All right. Without objection, your statement will be included in the record in its entirety.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When we talk about negotiations designed to enhance our security, we sometimes distinguish between arms control, arms reductions, and constraints on the one hand, where you are actually lim-

iting the size of forces and what they do, and confidence and security-building measures on the other hand, which are designed to, as we say, increase transparency, reduce the chances of miscalculation, of accidental war, to discourage conditions for first strike, things of that nature.

The dividing line between the two is not always as clear as one might think, and these particular negotiations inevitably have to take place in a broader context. Indeed, the context of the nature of the countries and nations of the world, the geography, and all of this.

#### HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS

These issues have a long history, and I will not repeat the entire history. I just thought I might go back to 1816, appropriately to the Congress of Vienna. The Czar, Alexander I, proposed that the victorious allies in the defeat of Napoleon fix their forces and begin the discussion on reductions or, as we say in the jargon today, he proposed a freeze, and then a discussion of reductions.

Lord Castlereagh, representing Great Britain, was concerned because this would lock in the size of the larger Russian army or, as we say today, it would have resulted in asymmetrical inequalities, that they would have been forward-deployed, as we say today, and that these would result in inflexibilities that would, as we say today, be destabilizing because it would upset what they referred to as the classical balance of power.

He was also concerned because Russia was a land power, Britain was a sea power on the other side of the channel, and, so, he was concerned with what we today call the problem of decoupling.

So, Castlereagh proposed that instead of fixing the forces of the sides, that, rather, they have an exchange of information on the locations and sizes of the forces or, as we say today, he proposed a transparency measure as a confidence and security-building effort.

Chairman HOYER. We thought MBFR was a long process.

Mr. LEHMAN. Well, as I said, this took place in the context of the Congress of Vienna and the framework of the Congress of Vienna, we might say today, and Metternich, speaking on behalf of the Austrians, said this was all a bad idea because, as everyone knows, you cannot trust the Russians or, as we say today, there was a verification concern.

Now, I know some of the people will argue that nothing has changed, but I think that we have seen in the years since then ups and downs in what we now call East-West relations, and I think we are in a period of improved relations, and in the arms control and confidence-building measures area, we have actually seen a great deal of progress, and sometimes we are asked whether this glass is half empty or half full because, on the one hand, we made a lot of progress, on the other hand, we have very serious security concerns that remain and we have a long way to go.

#### PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

Much of our progress that has captured the imagination has been in the area of nuclear arms control. In INF, we not only

achieved the zero option on long-range INF missiles, but we have a zero option in short-range INF missiles.

In START, we sought to reduce ballistic missile warheads to 5,000. We have a 300-page draft treaty that records agreement getting that down to 4,900. We wanted to distinguish between fast-flying and slow-flying systems to encourage stability, and we have done that, and we have had deep reductions in things like heavy ICBMs.

But the public and all of us should not lose sight of the other elements of the balance and of the calculations of security.

In the confidence-building measures area, we have also made considerable progress. In addition to the Stockholm agreement, which now permits us to conduct inspections of Soviet exercises within Warsaw Pact countries and in the Soviet Union, and, of course, they get to inspect exercises in Western Europe, we have had an upgrade in the hot line. We have had the creation of the nuclear risk-reduction center. We have had amendments to the accidents measures agreement. We have had improved capital embassy communications agreed to.

We are having a whole series of improved military to military and defense to defense contacts. We will be going back to Moscow in August for our third Defense Ministers meeting. We have made some progress, and, yet, I agree absolutely with what Ambassador Ridgway has said.

#### CONVENTIONAL ARMS

In the area of conventional arms, frankly, we seem to be at a stalemate. That is not to say there is not action. Indeed, the West made a major new proposal in MBFR and such that we believe that the only remaining issues to an agreement were verification issues and, as you know, the Soviet Union has gone far further than it ever said it would in the past in areas of verification and, yet, we now find that rather than being hopeful about MBFR, in fact, we are looking at two new negotiations. One to follow-up on Stockholm on confidence and security-building measures, and one to deal with the conventional arms balance from the Atlantic to the Urals.

#### FOCUS IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS

In short, I think it is safe to say that in the years ahead, the proper focus will be less on the nuclear arms negotiations in Geneva and more and more on the types of issues that are discussed in Vienna. That is to say, the issues of conventional forces, of confidence and security-building measures and, let me emphasize, human rights.

Because we have to remember that the forces exist, the troops exist, the weapons exist, but they exist because there are fundamental differences between East and West, and until we address those fundamental concerns, there will always be a threat to our security.

And, so, it has to be a balanced approach. Now, we have taken the position, and I think it is right to take the position, that while



all of these issues are inter-related, one should be careful about codifying rigid linkages.

At the same time, we have to recognize that you simply are not going to enhance your security if you push ahead only in one area. You have to have a balanced approach, and this is why we have insisted that in the CSCE conference, that we must have a balanced approach. We must not undercut our human rights efforts and we must not let CSCE become a Soviet-styled European security conference, rather than a real security conference that deals with all of the fundamental issues.

I offer this as a perspective because these issues are related. We will have to work closely together. We must avoid arbitrary linkages, but we must have a balanced approach, and that is the view of not only the Pentagon, but of the Administration, and I think of the United States and its Allies.

There are complexities here. We have to look out for the security interests of ourselves and our Allies because none of us is really any more secure than any of the others. In the nuclear age, we are all in this together, and the security of Western Europe is vital to the United States.

That is the kind of perspective I would like to provide overall, and I am prepared to stop there and be available for questions.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Ambassador, we thank you for your testimony, both your oral testimony and the written testimony that you have submitted, which is excellent.

I think both you and Ambassador Ridgway have described the complexity of the situation we face regarding relationship and linkage, realizing that we want to make progress on both fronts while grappling with the problem of how one does that without letting the balance be destroyed. As Ambassador Lehman points out, it was an objective not to destroy the link, the balance. But to have simply a security and disarmament conference in Europe was, of course, the Soviet objective early on, which the United States did not buy on to.

They bought on to a document which clearly adopts the premise that there is a direct relationship between the human rights treatment accorded a nation's citizens, and international security.

Let me say that we are going to adjourn at 10 a.m. Unfortunately—excuse me, 10 of 11. I want to recognize Chairman Fascell, then I am going to recognize—I was going to recognize Lee Hamilton, who was here, but who had to leave.

I am going to recognize Senator Wirth, Mr. Bereuter, and by that time, we will probably have to recess and reconvene at some later date.

So, Chairman Fascell.

Chairman FASCELL. Thank you very much.

[Ambassador Lehman's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RONALD F. LEHMAN, II

I am honored to appear today before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the House Foreign Affairs Committee to discuss U.S. policy objectives for two future negotiations: one that will further the accomplishments of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security- Building Measures (CSBMs) and the other that will seek to establish greater stability in Europe at lower levels of forces. As you are all aware, we may be fast approaching the endgame of the Vienna CSCE Review Conference and, come this fall, may well find ourselves involved in two new, separate negotiations within the framework of the CSCE. I would like to emphasize the word "separate" here. As you suggested in your invitation to testify today, the relationship between the follow-on talks on CSBMs and the new talks on conventional stability (CST) raises important policy questions that go well beyond strictly procedural matters. Therefore, before discussing our specific objectives regarding the two sets of talks, I would like to address the question of how and why they can and should be separate while at the same time remaining "within the framework of the CSCE."

There are four reasons why negotiations on confidence-building measures and negotiations on conventional stability are fundamentally different. They have to do with the evolution of the respective talks, their subject matter, the list of participants and the manner in which they agree to participate, and the broader security and foreign policy context of the talks.

With respect to the evolution of the talks, current preparation for negotiation on CSBMs is a direct result of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1986 Stockholm Accord on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe. It is an integral part of the ongoing CSCE process. Conventional stability talks, on the other hand, are a reinvigoration and improvement of what had become a moribund process. After years of Soviet intransigence in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) Talks, East and West are discussing a mandate for talks aimed at reducing conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. A combination of overdue public interest in the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe, prompted by the signing of the INF Treaty, and apparent Soviet readiness to expand the narrow Central European focus of MBFR have contributed to this reinvigoration. Conventional Stability Talks were not, as they say, born of the CSCE process.

The subject matter and the nature of participation in CSBM and CST talks are also very different. In the CSBM talks, thirty five sovereign nations focus on the identification of means to foster predictability and mutual understanding about routine military activities. The intent is to reduce miscalculation or

misunderstanding that could result in needless confrontation. The CST talks, on the other hand, are between two adversarial alliances and are, in short, about force reductions and limitations.

Even in the context of broad security and foreign policy objectives, the CSBM and CST talks are inherently more separate than similar. A fundamental U.S. policy objective with regard to the CSCE process has always been to maintain the integrity and balance of the human rights, economic and security baskets. In particular, we have consistently sought to protect the process from being overwhelmed by Warsaw Pact emphasis on the security basket and by Soviet efforts to transform the CSCE into the European security conference they have sought since the mid-1950s. Gorbachev's "common European home" is not new thinking, but merely a new rhetorical wrinkle on an old and dangerous idea. At each CSCE review conference, we resist this Soviet campaign and insist on balance in the concluding document. At this point, completion of the Vienna Conference, which will lead to a continuation of CSBM discussions as in Stockholm, is most dependent on further progress in the human rights basket.

By contrast, the broad security and foreign policy objectives of the conventional stability talks are directly tied to NATO's policy of conventional defense and nuclear deterrence upon which NATO's security rests. Our attention must be on the USSR's massive conventional forces, which it has used to intimidate both its allies and the West and which it could use to overwhelm Western Europe. As we look to nuclear reductions, we cannot afford complacency over Soviet conventional superiority. Balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact

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conventional forces, however, is not intended to substitute for nuclear deterrence. We do not suppose that a nuclear power can be deterred by conventional means.

I do not want, however, to deliver a sermon on NATO defense policy. The only point I want to make is that we face a tremendous challenge trying to negotiate both confidence building measures and conventional stability talks within the framework of the CSCE <sup>process</sup>. Whereas the former has proven to be an exercise well suited to the CSCE process, the latter introduces issues and interests that, to be frank, we have sought in the past to exclude from the CSCE. Furthermore, there is a difference in perspective among our own allies as to how closely the CSCE and the CST should be tied. In light of this difference, you may rightfully ask, then why the June 1987 agreement in Reykjavik to negotiate on conventional stability within the framework of the CSCE? In the end, deep cuts in Warsaw Pact conventional forces are a contribution to security in Europe, not just security for NATO alone. We are willing to recognize this philosophical link while maintaining that the issues to be discussed are practical issues dividing two alliances. We therefore demand a correspondingly practical autonomy. The CST will not have its mandate, procedures, progress or results "blessed" or "reviewed" by the CSCE as occurred, for instance, with the Stockholm Conference.

Let me now turn to the more straightforward questions of where we stand and where we are headed in our preparation for new conventional stability talks and further negotiations on confidence and security building measures. The main objective of the U.S. with regard to CSBMs is to improve the Stockholm Agreement. And, despite general consensus that the agreement and its implementation have so far been a success, there is plenty of room for improvement.

The most promising candidate measures are in the area of transparency or openness of military activities. Such measures are less likely to affect one party's security interest more than another's, and they are valuable. Recently, the Soviets have made a great deal of their willingness to publish force data. By the conclusion of the Stockholm Conference, however, they had not responded satisfactorily to our proposal on exchange of static information. If the Soviets have indeed had a change of heart on this issue, we can expect some fruitful negotiation in this area.

Another improvement would be to focus attention on activities "out of garrison." The Stockholm document refers to military activities in the field. Garrisons are essentially off-limits, both in terms of information and observation or inspection. Yet one of the things we are concerned about is the unexpected movement of forces from their peacetime locations. Related to that, of course, is the unannounced buildup of forces in these "off-limits" areas.

A third improvement would be in the area of inspections. Having set the important precedent for on-site inspection, CSBM negotiators must now work to refine and strengthen the inspection regime.

Personally, I think such improvements make up the core of a sound and substantive proposal. We expect, however, to hear complaints that the new talks must go further. Unfortunately, "going further" has usually meant offering proposals to constrain military activities. We continue to examine such measures, but have yet to find one that does not unacceptably constrain NATO. There are some basic reasons for this which I would like to enumerate briefly. The Warsaw Pact, with its large armies and operational reserves already present in peacetime, is not required to train in large-scale reinforcement exercises. NATO does not have that luxury. We cannot afford numerous small cross-Channel or cross-Atlantic exercises during the year; we do not maneuver until the crops are in; and, therefore, we depend on large-scale reinforcement exercises like REFORGER. Furthermore, we depend on sea and air transport for mobilization and reinforcement. The Warsaw Pact does not. Therefore, any measures which constrain the size of exercises or other mobilization activities or which affect air and naval assets are unacceptable.

To be frank, the ground for further negotiation of CSBMs in the context of the next Conference on Security and Confidence Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is less fertile than many would

hope or believe. On a more positive note, the whole notion of constraints makes more sense if applied to a situation of greater East-West parity. That is to say, if the imbalances in conventional forces in Europe were rectified, then constraints would apply more equitably to each side. For this reason, NATO has begun consideration of non-reduction measures in the context of the new Conventional Stability Talks. Such measures, in conjunction with significant Warsaw Pact reductions, would reinforce the verification regime and potentially enhance NATO's warning indicators. Note that enhancement of warning is mentioned in the context of large reductions -- perhaps the only reliable way to increase warning. There is no comfort in increased warning of our certain demise.

As I mentioned earlier, one of the fundamental differences between the CST and CSBM talks is that the former are about reductions whereas the latter are about routine military activities. The conventional force imbalance in Europe remains at the core of Europe's security concerns. It is a multifaceted problem that requires a number of different but coordinated responses. Arms control is one. Closer cooperation within NATO in the research, development, production and procurement of conventional armaments is another. Continued adherence to the principle of shared risks and responsibilities is the most fundamental.

It is important that defense and arms control policies be in harmony to ensure their complementary contribution to the security of the countries of NATO. Within this context, NATO members have identified three objectives of conventional arms control:



-- the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels;

-- the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and

-- the elimination of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large scale offensive action.

In order to meet these objectives, reductions must be not only highly asymmetrical, but also very large on the part of the Warsaw Pact, with particular emphasis on forward deployed armor and artillery forces capable of fast paced, high-intensity operations. Reductions must also apply to the large Soviet operational reserves west of the Urals which constitute the ultimate edge for the Pact in a sustained offensive against NATO.

To bring conventional force levels into balance through arms control is an ambitious undertaking that will appear one-sided. And there is always the basic question: why would the Soviets agree? The answer is not altogether clear. The East may hope to get some Western concessions for Eastern conventional force reductions that are planned in any case. And they undoubtedly hope to reduce our remaining nuclear deterrent forces in Europe by negotiating limits on our dual-capable systems. On the other hand, we are justified in calling upon

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the Warsaw Pact to reduce its ground forces. They represent a clear invasion capability -- particularly given Soviet operational doctrine -- and are far in excess of defensive needs.

I would like now to turn to the more practical and pressing questions of where we stand in the Vienna mandate talks and where we are headed in our Alliance consultations on a NATO conventional arms control proposal. In Vienna, the Warsaw Pact has agreed to the objectives outlined above. East and West have also reached agreement on the preamble and the verification and information exchange section. In total, approximately two thirds of the mandate is complete. This, however, is a poor indicator of the status of the mandate. Still to be decided are several critical issues. One is the scope of the new negotiations. The dispute here is over the role of dual-capable systems in the new talks. The Soviets have sought explicit reference to dual-capable systems in the mandate in an undisguised attempt to capture NATO's nuclear capable aircraft. To date, NATO has rejected any such explicit reference. Another critical issue is the zone of application. The question is how much, if any, Soviet and Turkish territory will be excluded from the negotiations in recognition of each country's security interests along their border .. with Iran and, in the case of Turkey, with Syria and Iraq as well. The third remaining issue is the relationship between the CST and the CSCE. As I hope to have made clear in the first part of my testimony today, we must have unambiguous language in the Vienna Concluding Document that will guarantee the autonomy of the CST.

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In the meantime, we are consulting with our allies to develop an initial NATO CST proposal. There is already consensus on the major elements of an approach. Given Eastern superiority across the board, negotiations will need to focus on ground forces such as tanks and artillery that are necessary to seize and hold territory. We should, of course, be willing to reduce NATO forces once Warsaw Pact forces have reached NATO levels. Without, however, a parallel commitment by allies to significant conventional force improvements, NATO cuts are unacceptably risky.

As members of this Commission and of the Foreign Affairs Committee are aware, prospects for completion of the CST mandate hinge not on the above three issues but on progress in the CSCE human rights basket. We must have a balanced outcome to the Vienna Review Conference. This includes actual improvement in Soviet human rights performance as well as documentation of future human rights steps. Unfortunately, at present, the Soviets appear reluctant to deliver on this question. However important our attempts to pursue greater military security in Europe through arms control negotiations, we remain committed to linking the start of further negotiations to successful completion of the Vienna CSCE Review Conference. This is the most immediate meaning of the agreement to place the two future negotiations "within the framework of the CSCE<sup>process</sup>."

Chairman FASCELL. Ambassador Lehman, I gather from your remarks that the statements that were made by Ambassador Ridgway with respect to the elements and the criteria on conventional stability talks are fully endorsed by the Department of Defense.

Ambassador LEHMAN. That is correct.

Chairman FASCELL. Now, let us see if I can deal with procedure here for a moment. MBFR, which has been going on for fourteen years, will either die a natural death or something else will happen, but as I understand your testimonies now, if a satisfactory document is reached, an understanding, whatever it is, with regard to the new process called conventional stability talks, we can forget about MBFR.

Am I correct?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. That is when the decision would have to be taken on the future. There are those—there is a range of views out there, Mr. Chairman, from those who would say at that time, it ends. Others will say it does not end till the next one starts up because you do not want to get caught in between with nothing, and some who say it has to be folded in.

So, that—

Chairman FASCELL. But, we are not there yet to make that decision. Presently, we have talks on MBFR which have not ended and CSCE, which has not started, and the conventional CDE within the framework of the Helsinki Conference which is doing its bit with regard to transparency and confidence-building measures. It's fairly confusing and I suppose we will crank up another set of negotiations somewhere as part of the Geneva talks on the whole range of disarmament.

I do not know why we did not put them in there to in the first place. They are all linked anyway. But what I am getting at is obvious. How many of these things are we going to have?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I think you can just about count, with only one footnoted. You can use the alliance arms control agreed priorities. The strategic arms reductions talks. There are the chemical weapons talks. There will be conventional talks. One in the character of confidence and security-building measures within CSCE and the other, which will be this autonomous conventional stability talks, with the twenty-three members representing the two alliances, and I think only the future of MBFR gives you a question mark as to how many others there might be.

It is true, however. You raised yourself, Chairman Fascell, some very real questions out there, for example, on the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and ballistic missiles themselves.

We discussed that in Moscow with the Soviet Union, to get their interest on it. We have an agreement with some of our Allies on this, and it may well be that over a period of time, some kind of discussion will have to take place internationally on this question.

So, there are other candidates out there to join them, but I do not think they are unnatural or forced. I think they will represent the real issues of the day.

Only MBFR, I think, is a floater that has a question mark around it.

Chairman FASCELL. Well, I was delighted to hear the reassurances from both of you that the relationship between the questions

of human rights and other matters within CSCE process and otherwise will continue to receive a high priority with both ourselves and our Allies. I believe the Soviets are fully appreciative of that, and I think we have seen some movement on that. While they may not like the linkage, the linkage is there whether they like it or not. It is a fact of life.

It is one of the dynamics of the process, but I just wondered about continuing confidence-building measures under the principles of the Helsinki Accords and the framework of a separate conference within Helsinki while we are dealing with conventional arms reductions in another place.

I find it very difficult to separate the two, although I can see that it can be done and that it has been done. Nevertheless isn't there some problem about putting the whole question of conventional discussions in one place?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. If I could try this first, Mr. Chairman, and I am sure Ambassador Lehman will have some views.

They are different creatures. You can have confidence and security-building measures at a time in which there are no changes in force structure, and absent those changes, one, nevertheless, wants to do what one can about feeling a little better, what do you know about them, what can you do looking at exercises and the rest.

And I think that my view is that if you put the two of them together, you could well lose the confidence and security-building measures where progress has been made. We have had a good experience. They would become victim to what is going to be a very long and very difficult process in the reductions of asymmetries and the like fields.

So, in order not to lose them, we have—and viewing them as two different things—we have kept them separate.

Chairman FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to both of you, we greatly appreciate your being here and the extraordinary professionalism reflected in the comments that both of you made.

I must say, Ambassador Ridgway, I agree with you that a lot of the discussion in the first part of your testimony does become a bit theological and I wish you well and all that. It is enormously important in sorting all of this out. You all do a wonderful job and I realize how important those frameworks are.

I would like to just ask one question related to what kind of change we actually have seen in the Soviet Union. Let me preface that by stating a couple of assumptions that I think are commonly held by the general public.

One is that we are experiencing a kind of euphoria following INF and the Summit. There is an assumption that the Soviets are today acting in a very significantly different fashion than they were a year ago or two or three years ago.

So, the first part of my question is, what have we seen in the area of conventional arms control and the behavior of the Soviets, say, in the areas that both of you addressed, that demonstrates any change from where the Soviets were two, three or four years ago?

The second part of the question is based on the widely expressed assumption that the Soviet economy is in such significant trouble that the Soviets have got to make dramatic changes and invest in areas other than the military, and that this will bring some really earthshaking changes in their military posture which, in turn, will lead to some very significant changes in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Do you share that view? Do you think that down the line, in the middle of the next decade, by the end of the century, we are going to see some very, very significant changes?

Now, I ask those questions based upon the assumptions I expressed which I think are widely held by the American public. A lot of that may be wishful thinking, may not be, but I think for the purposes of us in the Congress who have to make decisions on the military budget, who have to continue to absorb a lot of information and, I suspect, ask a lot of questions, that we have to have a pretty good handle on whether or not the Soviet behavior has changed. We need to hear from the best experts around what we can expect will happen in the future.

Ambassador RIDGWAY. I will go first. Perhaps Ambassador Lehman would like—or has his view.

First of all, I am aware of no change in the percentage of the Soviet budget which is given over to defense expenditures. It is very difficult for us to come up with a figure, but to the extent that there is any change at all, Senator, the experts are suggesting the percentage should be higher rather than lower.

So, we have seen no change that would suggest a policy decision to spend less, neither have we seen any change in the force disposition of the forces of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners in Eastern Europe.

We have seen the change in the language, sufficiency, defensive defense, and all those words that are out there. Our military authorities see no change in the on-the-ground situation.

With respect to the second part of your question, of course, you can dine out on that question these days, and many experts are.

My own view is that it is very dangerous to put U.S. and Allied defense decisions into a measure of what the Gorbachev objective is and the requirements on him to reduce defense spending.

I believe that his preferred objective would be an improved Soviet economy, which permitted him to have those defense expenditures at less pain and at less—consuming a smaller part of the budget.

I do not see anything that suggests that he will change his national security decisions simply because it is hurting, and I think we have to be very careful. I know it is popular for people to say the economy is in trouble, the Soviets, unless they get change, will be on their knees. They have got to come to the negotiating table. They have got to make these decisions.

I do not think those "gottas" exist at all, except in our own imagination. I have no idea what choices he will make, and I do not think we should try to guess at them.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator, the type of language we hear from the Soviet spokesmen today may be more sophisticated than

we have heard in the past, but the themes are not unlike the themes we have heard in so-called peace campaigns in the past.

Except that it has much more credibility and may well deserve more consideration simply because there are changes taking place in the Soviet Union, and anyone who denies that is simply trying not to see it.

The problem is that we do not know how deep these changes will go into the structure of society, how much it will permeate into the way the Soviet Union operates, how it invests in its military, what it will mean in the long run for its security policies.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has undergone an on-going process of economic failure, but they do not all see it that way, and that is something important to remember. Many people still think, well, I am better off than I was, and many of the people who see that, well, they are falling behind the West, are a part of an elite, a small group, not a large group.

Secondly, it is clear that they have been forced to look inward because they have had a series of diplomatic failure and military failures around the world and they have seen, for example, that we have cut off access to strategic technology in the West, and when they look inward and say, what can we do to keep up, they have seen that they are not well organized for it.

I think the military has seen that. I think there is no doubt in my mind that the Soviet military would be willing to take a smaller percentage of a larger budget. I am not sure they are willing to take major reductions in their force structure and I am not sure they are willing to take reductions in their ability to both occupy Eastern Europe and pose a military threat to Western Europe.

That is not to say they could not have force reductions of some sort, but I think they are not looking to become an insignificant body in Soviet society and in the world. On the contrary.

But there has been a great deal of candor that we have experienced from the Soviet Union about the nature of their society and the problems they face, but in the discussions of things like military doctrine, military forces, frankly, we have not gotten a lot.

Now, I have been out to Moscow eleven times in the last few years. I have met with Marshal Akhromeyev several times, with Secretary Carlucci, with Defense Minister Yazov several times. We have had efforts at candid discussion of Soviet doctrine, but when we ask, where is the tangible evidence of this defensive posture, the answer is, well, read the statements of our political leaders.

Frankly, we in the Defense Department are not prepared to simply read the statements and believe. We want to see tangible evidence and we are still looking for that. They sometimes say, well, watch our military exercises and you will see that we have a new defensive doctrine. They insist, of course, that the old doctrines were defensive, too, but this is just a new defensive doctrine, and they say, you will see we are on the defense.

But, if we look at exercises and under the old exercises, they attacked Western Europe and they conquer it. In the new exercises, they defend for a day, then they attack Western Europe and conquer it.

Now, from our point of view, from a security point of view, we do not feel more reassured. Nevertheless, we do support increased

military to military contacts and we do support a hard-nosed step-by-step process of improvement of relations and negotiations in the conventional area.

Senator WIRTH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. That is a dose of reality that is very important. I appreciate your having this very good hearing and our good witnesses.

Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Senator.

Congressman Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is an important dose of reality.

Ambassadors, thank you very much for your testimony.

About ten days ago, I was a panelist in a conference in Potsdam, sponsored by the East-West Institute for Security Studies, along with Senator Cohen, and Secretary Whitehead and Secretary Verity as well, participating for the United States.

I came back with evidence of—fresh evidence of concerns that I have had about what is happening in the post-INF Europe. I heard frequently reiterated, constantly almost, with a lot of metaphors, the theme of a common European home.

Most of the examples given were in the ecological area, which seemed to make sense to people and stretched over into peace, but I felt that it was an effort probably, it was an exclusionary term effort aimed at decoupling Canada and the United States from the NATO Alliance.

You make reference to it, Ambassador Lehman, on page 3, and I would ask you for a little more information about what you mean, when you say it is not new thinking, but merely a new rhetorical wrinkle on the old and dangerous idea.

That conference is to be followed up by a conference on nuclear-free zones, nuclear-free corridors, which Western and Eastern European nations will be participating. There was very significant evidence of the social democrats from the Federal Republic or the SPD having concluded arrangements and agreements as a party with governments of the Warsaw Pact.

There were, of course—there was attention to the remarks given by Federal Republic Minister Genscher. I think that those comments were somewhat exaggerated in our press, but, still, they did embrace a three-phase proposal that the Soviets clarified at that point through General Chervov, and they are—the three phrases would be to eliminate asymmetries and then, most importantly, reduction of 500,000 men on both sides of Europe and then moving to tactical nuclear weapons.

All I am going to suggest to you to get your comments is to suggest a warning, reiterate other peoples' warnings, that the public relations campaign now underway in this area is going to be very, very appealing. It is clearly aimed at trying to change attitudes in West Germany and West Europe, and it is going to be very difficult for us to counter unless we take some important steps in the NATO Alliance and in the United States and launch an informational effort as well.

I would like to have your reaction, Ambassadors, and, specifically, if you would enlarge, Ambassador Lehman, on the common European home rhetoric and what you think it is aimed at.



Ambassador LEHMAN. I would be glad to.

I think the Soviet Union's approach to arms control has to be seen in a broader geo-political/geo-strategic context.

Clearly, since the end of World War II, they have sought to negate our military advantages. Nuclear weapons. The arsenal of democracy and, increasingly these days, high-technologies that could be applied in both the nuclear and the conventional area.

At the same time, they have also tried to pry the United States away from the periphery of the Soviet Union. Not only in Western Europe, but in East Asia as well.

With respect to that second point, the notion of a common European home or the European house has been a political theme that has been basically designed to encourage Western Europe to look to the East and, in essence, to reduce American influence and American commitment, I might say, to Western Europe.

One of the great difficulties the Soviet Union has had in selling that theme has been that it is a totalitarian regime, and it is recognized as such.

It tries to divert attention away from that fundamental source of all of our insecurity towards the question of the military forces in Europe and, in particular, forward-deployed in Europe.

Now, they will often—by focusing on that security theme, they hope to build the kind of euphoria that Senator Wirth has described, so that we will neglect our defenses and that we as an alliance will see our ties weaken.

From a military point of view, let me address it from a military point of view since I am here from the Defense Department and Ambassador Ridgway will undoubtedly want to add some broader perspective, from a military point of view, the Soviet Union will frequently say to us, you have your forces in Europe and they are within striking distance of the Soviet Union, therefore, we need compensation.

But the reality we face is exactly the opposite, that our vital interests and allies are all across the ocean from us and within easy striking distance of a great variety of Soviet forces. That, in fact, geography has dealt us a very difficult hand, and we have to live with that.

Not only that, but the post-War displacement of troops means, in essence, that we have a defense in Europe, if I can use the example of American football, in which we have a goal stand with our backs to our goal line and a lot of our defensive players are on the other side of the end zone.

The Soviet Union not only would like to keep it that way and make it worse, but they would like to take as many of our players and get them outside—off the playing field as they can.

So, when I approach this from a Pentagon Defense point of view, we need to highlight the geographical difficulties as well as this political effort to try to get us out of Western Europe or weaken our commitments to Western Europe.

Mr. BEREUTER. Secretary Ridgway.

Ambassador RIDGWAY. I think that the European common home theme has some attractions in Western Europe and in Eastern Europe, as people in those two parts of Europe look at questions of

the environment, of the economy and, indeed, of a cultural and historical tradition in which they were together.

But I think that what the Soviet Union may not realize, at least what Europeans tell us, is that to the extent that there is an appreciation of something called the European common home, it has never in its tradition included the Soviet Union or Czarist Russia.

So, if there is any player reality to it, I think we will see it work in the future in an increased East-West European cooperation in these fields that we know are of interest to them, such as the environment and the East-West trade.

On the question of being in a good position to respond to Soviet initiative, such as the so-called Gorbachev conventional arms proposal, there is always a discussion going on, are we ready to respond, do we have initiatives of our own, what are going to say when these things are said, and I must say, Mr. Congressman, I think we would go crazy if we tried to respond to every proposal the Soviets had out there.

This particular proposal begins with data exchange, and we have been down that road. We have been exchanging arguments about data and MBFR for fourteen years, and, so, we do have a public posture on the question with respect to proposals that begin with this, and I think that informed publics are responsive to it.

On the others, on the elimination of asymmetries, equal reductions, he is picking up our language, but I think when we get into it, we will find, as the General Secretary made clear in his discussions with the President in Moscow, that they believe in total there are no asymmetries, that we will move quickly to equal reductions.

I agree, we must be aware of the propaganda campaign, but I do not think that it is having all of the impact that we might fear for because so many of the proposals are just so one-sided and for the Soviet Union to get up with a proposal that suggests that there is no imbalance, for example, in tanks and artillery is laughable. I think that over time one begins to hear the laughter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Would you care to comment briefly on the SPD context, the political party to national context?

Chairman HOYER. Let me say that, unfortunately, the Secretary cannot.

Mr. BEREUTER. OK.

Chairman HOYER. And the reason the Secretary cannot is—

Ambassador RIDGWAY. The SPD is glad we have run out of time.

Chairman HOYER. But that is an important question, and we will get back to it.

If I can recognize Chairman Fascell for just a brief comment, which is not a question, I understand.

Chairman FASCELL. It is not a question. I just wanted to express my appreciation to the witnesses. We have just started, obviously.

Pretty soon, we are going to have to get to the state of play, to the understanding of the respective positions that will be taken. We certainly need to get back to square one as far as I am concerned, anyway. I am still having trouble trying to understand why in the world we are fiddling around with CST and CSCE if we did not want it, and I do not understand why, if we do not want something inside of something, that we insist it is going to be autonomous and then, if we insisted on that, why did we do that.

Because I think that is fundamental to the political question we now face. We did something for some reason. It has led us to this place. It will, therefore, lead us to the next step, whatever that is, and, therefore, I want to be sure that I have a clear understanding of where this thing started, why it got there, why we did what we did, and why we are now doing what we are doing, before we ever get around to the state of play and to the respective positions on both sides.

I will assume, for example, there is a challenge to NATO, if geography and nothing else, and the number of people, if nothing else. Whether or not we have a qualitative or quantitative disadvantage in terms of steel and hardware and nuts and bolts and all that kind of stuff, I will even assume that, and we need to examine all of that very carefully as we take a position.

Now, the reason for that is not to look over your shoulder, but to understand the basis upon which some very vital political decisions are going to be made. Military ones are easy, you know. You either kill your enemy or you do not. The political ones are tough.

Chairman HOYER. That is a tough note to end on, but we are going to do that.

Questions posed by Chairman Fascell, I suppose, are the teasers to tune in next week. I do not know whether we will meet next week, but both of you have volunteered to come back as soon as we can schedule it, and I, frankly, would like to do it shortly after the July 4th break, so that we can discuss this while Vienna is still ongoing. Vienna may be going in December. I understand that and, hopefully, we are going to be there in December, if we do not get a balanced result.

But we thank both of you, Ambassador Ridgway and Ambassador Lehman, for being with us and look forward to continuing the questions, and we will also allow the members, if you can, to submit written questions, but we will look forward to further dialogue between us in the hearing atmosphere.

Thank you very, very much for being with us.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:52 a.m., the committee and commission adjourned to reconvene.]

## STATUS OF CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS IN EUROPE

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THURSDAY, JULY 14, 1988

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe met at 10:36 a.m., room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Dante B. Fascell, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Hon. Steny H. Hoyer, Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.

### OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN FASCELL

Chairman FASCELL. The committee and the commission will come to order.

We are meeting today in this joint session to continue the deliberations begun at our hearing on June 23rd, on the Status of Conventional Arms Talks in Europe. Once again, we have our previous two distinguished witnesses: the Honorable Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs; and the Honorable Ronald Lehman, Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy, the Department of Defense.

We need to get into more detail and that is the reason we continued these hearings on the record. We have a very complex issue before us, not the least of which is that we need to review how we got where we are and where we think we are going and why.

We also need to keep up with all of the proposals that seem to be floating around. The last one seems to have emanated in Poland when the Secretary General was there, and just for my own edification and the record, maybe we could start there first just to kind of bring us up-to-date and then we'll go return to the other.

So, if you could enlighten us as to whether or not that was a specific, was that a floater, are there any details on it, and what is it, if we know.

Ambassador Ridgway.

### STATEMENT OF HON. ROZANNE L. RIDGWAY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will start and perhaps Assistant Secretary Ambassador Lehman has something to add.

There were two proposals made by General Secretary Gorbachev in Poland in the course of his visit. They join a proposal that was made in the course of the—

Chairman FASCELL. Which proposal?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. The first more broad one was for an all European or pan-European—

Chairman FASCELL. Oh, excuse me. I thought you gave it a name.

Ambassador RIDGWAY. No, I have not. But a proposal for a pan-European conference on conventional arms control and along with that a proposal to withdraw analogous means of Soviet aviation, good Soviet language, if NATO withdraws the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing at present located in Spain from Europe.

Those two proposals join a third already on the circuit which came from the Moscow Reagan-Gorbachev summit which related to recommendations or procedures for a drawdown of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Chairman FASCELL. Would you just recast that second proposal again in short terms?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Let me put it in a different order than the Soviet language did because sometimes the way they put things is in itself a major challenge.

NATO has recommended that the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing at present located in Spain remain in Europe and Italy has responded to that recommendation—

Chairman FASCELL. Are talking about the F-16s?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Yes, that is right.

Italy has responded by saying that it is prepared to receive those F-16s in Italy. In Warsaw, General Secretary Gorbachev, speaking before the Polish Parliament, said that if you do not do that, that is if the 401st in leaving Spain returns to the United States rather than going to Italy, the Soviet Union would be prepared to withdraw and then I gave you a quote, "an analogous means of Soviet aviation".

Chairman FASCELL. Well—

Ambassador RIDGWAY. The F-16 proposal.

Of the three proposals, I might—I would place—I would put them all first in the same category by saying that it seems to me to represent, first of all, a reluctance to sit down and negotiate in Vienna on what will be the terms of a future conventional stability negotiation, and a desire to continue to play the issues of conventional stability or conventional reductions as the Soviets deal with them in a public forum, not at the negotiating table but in a public forum.

Second. They seem to, at least with respect to the F-16s, once again, reflect the Soviet desire to deal bilaterally with the United States rather than in—with the United States and its allies, because this is for us a NATO question.

We saw that as well in Moscow when the conventional proposal was put before us, that is the drawdown, and we said these are proposals to be considered by NATO. They are not U.S.-Soviet bilateral questions.

The reaction to the General Secretary's several proposals has a constant theme, and that is that the work that is to be done in the area of conventional stability in Europe, the implication of new negotiations and the area of stability at lower levels of forces, that that work is in Vienna. That negotiation must be carried on in Vienna among the twenty-three who are working there.

With respect to specifics concerning the aviation proposal, we have taken the same line that the new NATO Secretary General, Mr. Woerner, has taken, that the focus has to be on the causes of instability in Europe. There, the cause when you look at it is the massive forward deployment of Soviet ground forces in a mode that makes them clearly capable of launching a surprise attack or initiating large-scale offensive action.

We need asymmetrical reductions in those forces.

Chairman FASCELL. Ambassador, let me interrupt you for a moment. We have a vote on the rule on the DOD conference report, and we will have to temporarily suspend our discussions.

Nevertheless, it looks like all three of these negotiations and several others have been thrown out in the wind. Is that a fair assessment?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Yes.

Chairman FASCELL. They are throwaways. Otherwise, they would not be out there. At least that is the way it reads to me, and I will keep that opinion subject to some kind of change or until I see real progress being achieved.

But why do we have to play this game? We have some options. We can either say nothing and forget it and prepare our own proposals—keep our own counsel and do our own work. Or, we can decide to get involved with the propaganda effort for whatever reasons we want, if we think that is essential. Or, we can get down to the gut question, which is that nothing the Soviet Union is going to offer can be any good as long as we are talking about the fatherland because all their troops, all their airplanes, and all their equipment is already there. And in my view, there is no such thing as asymmetrical reductions as long as we are still confronted with that problem.

If that is what our problem is, we must think about it carefully and discuss it thoroughly, in order to know what are we going to do about it. Do we really want asymmetrical reductions based on some artificial line which happens to be the boundary of a country if what is involved is not just NATO and the United States and the Atlantic Ocean, but the mainland of the Soviet Union?

If you are not going to vote, you can stay here.

Chairman HOYER. We will go vote together.

Chairman FASCELL. We will take a temporary recess.

[Recess.]

Chairman FASCELL. Hear ye, hear ye.

Chairman HOYER. Oyez, oyez.

Chairman FASCELL. Ambassadors, sorry for the interruption, but please continue, Ambassador Ridgway.

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Your questions as you spoke just before the brief break are questions that we look at each time that we hear one of these proposals.

What do we do about the constant proliferation of Soviet proposals in an atmosphere in which people are looking to areas in which progress might be made in arms control?

For many of us who were around in 1986, what is happening at the moment is reminiscent of that time when we were getting a lot of nuclear proposals flying around.

We have to keep in mind what our interests are as we look at each proposal, and our interests remain still in rectifying the imbalance in this conventional field and rectifying the imbalance that exists in the relationship represented by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the conventional imbalance.

We need to keep in mind that this is not a bilateral proposition of the United States and the Soviet Union, but is of interest to our allies. We need to keep in mind that the challenge comes from forces on the ground.

We need also to keep in mind what is happening in Vienna, where we see a constant Soviet effort to try to capture elements of the military picture which we believe are not for negotiation—independent air-naval activities, aircraft, trying to make an equation between tanks and aircraft. In fact, one can almost predict what the Soviets will do each time we get to a tough spot in the Vienna negotiations. There is almost a palpable decision to call time out while they go play the public effort to alter the atmosphere and perhaps gain some advantage by confusing our publics.

The prescription for us then, you asked what should we do, is not to get involved in their game, but, rather, to stay with the very clear objectives that we have had, make sure we explain them carefully in public—and I think that we have—keep explaining very clearly and in simple language the nature of the challenge, and stay in Vienna for as long as it takes to get a new mandate, a good mandate for new negotiations.

In time, I think experience shows that firm alliance positions become a magnet for the Soviets to return to the table, and I think that is what we will see in this case.

Some of these proposals, I might say, in their own terms are rather bewildering. The proposal for a pan-European conference on conventional arms control was later described again as a pan-European conference on the Reykjavik model. I think, you know, that raises all kinds of questions as to what the role of such a conference would be and the kinds of decisions that would be made. For those in Europe who might have been inclined to find some attraction in the Soviet proposal, they look at Vienna and they say, wait a minute, we have got the right framework in Vienna, we do not need a new city, we do not need a new framework, we just need hardware at the negotiating table there.

What we need is confidence in our own proposals. Sometimes we lack that. We have a good game plan. We are following it. The allies are with us on it. The statements that have come out of Europe and elsewhere in response to the Gorbachev proposals show that responsible circles are not fooled.

Chairman FASCELL. Ambassador, do we have a game plan on the table that is public or are we talking about a game plan that is in the books that nobody has seen?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. No. I think there is a game plan on the table in public. Let me see if I can put the elements of it out.

We have, since the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Reykjavik in 1987, had an agreed alliance arms control agenda to include strategic weapons, chemical weapons and conventional weapons. We have, since the Halifax meeting of 1986, also agreed among the allies that conventional negotiations would have to be in an area broader than our previous experience in MBFR, which was just central Europe, and should be from the Atlantic to the Urals.

We have, since the NATO summit of March of this year, laid out the challenge of finding conventional stability at lower levels of forces to be achieved through asymmetrical reductions which address themselves to where the major challenge exists. As I said earlier, these are on the ground, and those kinds of forces which take and hold territory and which have the capacity for surprise attack.

So, that set of concepts is in public and is, I think, a sound framework.

From a procedural standpoint, we have believed that the Vienna follow-on conference with respect to the Helsinki Final Act provided us a very unique historic opportunity to write a mandate for a new negotiation in the broader context of CSCE in order to make sure that we did not just go marching down the security field with no—even a blink at the CSCE process, and, so, we have used that.

At such time as we have a mandate, at such time as the conventional stability talks proceed, get underway, and there are active proposals put down, the allies do not at present have a set of specific proposals to spell out these broad concepts I have described, we will then be deep into the negotiation, which is going to be full of detail and anguish and require patience and determination. It is not going to be an easy task.

Chairman FASCELL. Are you familiar with the report of an alleged German statement with regard to the start of CST in October?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. I have just learned of that. We have all had as our objective trying to finish and to push for the completion of the Vienna follow-on conference and the mandate for the conventional stability talks by July, but we have also said we are going to sit there as long as we have to to get the right outcome.

It is now July. You can get any view you want in town as and perhaps in other capitals of our allies, as to whether we are going to make July. We are still pushing for that. If we get it, then you would be looking perhaps at an October opening on conventional stability talks.

But without a concluding document, without a mandate, and we will not have one without the other, I do not see how you can predict when these talks will start.

Chairman FASCELL. Chairman Hoyer.

Chairman HOYER. Following up on Chairman Fascell's question, it is my understanding that Mr. Genscher had a press conference yesterday or issued a press release yesterday indicating that he believed that all 35 ought to be involved in those talks to begin in October.



Following up, I believe it was Ambassador Hartman who had a press conference yesterday, which said specifically that the talks will begin in October. Genscher has followed that up by saying that all 35 ought to be involved in those talks.

Have we had any communication with the Germans since then to find out where they are going?

I take it they have gone off unilaterally on this tack.

Ambassador RIDGWAY. I certainly have not seen the statement and I do not even know which set of talks they are talking about because within the Vienna follow-on conference concluding document, there will also be proposals with respect to continuation of our work on confidence- and security-building measures, and that anticipates as well the opening of negotiations with—among the thirty-five on those.

So, I do not know without a text which of the things he was addressing.

We have not—I have no reason to believe that there is a change in the policy and posture of the Federal Republic which is the alliance position that we will stay there until we get the right concluding document and until we get the right mandate and get the right conclusion, not just the document, but the performance, the right kind of follow-on activity with the right kind of balance.

No indication until at least this one interpretation of the statement yesterday that there was any change in the position of the Federal Republic.

Chairman HOYER. I presume we will be pursuing that obviously. Ambassador RIDGWAY. Yes.

Chairman HOYER. Let me ask you a follow-on question.

What is your perception and, Ambassador Lehman, if you want to respond to this, too, as to the status of the Vienna meeting since we met two weeks ago as to the question on balance and on, therefore, the prospects for conclusion?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. If I had been reporting in to you and those who are interested every day of the last fourteen days or so, the chart on a graph would look like a roller coaster. There have been moments of great optimism in Vienna that at last we were engaged and we are on our way. The next day, something would go wrong and people would say, well, perhaps we are not moving the way we want to move.

I think, my description is that we are engaged now in serious negotiation. I am going to add as evidence to that this proliferation of public proposals that are intended to get away from the tough questions that are on the table. To me, that is in its own way evidence that we are down to the tough issues.

Reports that I have from the delegation, specifically on the work on principles, work on Basket 3, are reports that show great activity among the NATO group, the East group and the NNA, but from that has not yet come any agreement on the specific outcome.

So, that would be a negative at the moment. It would be negative, but I see us engaged in a negotiating process which includes emotion, includes atmosphere. Some days are good, some days are bad.

I think we are on track, but the track does not have an ending station, as I was saying in answer to the Chairman. We are not

saying to ourselves, we have to be done by the end of July. We do not. We have to be done when we have got the right pieces to be agreed to. So, that may stretch it out.

Chairman HOYER. Well, we hope to go to the Soviet Union in November, and we have discussed the possibility of stopping in Vienna either on the way over or on the way back.

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Something will be happening in Vienna in November, Mr. Hoyer. So, that might be a good place to make a stop.

Chairman HOYER. Where do we stand with the French in the negotiations in the alliance bloc?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. We negotiate every day with the French and the alliance group, but I would say that it is a negotiation which is constructive. It represents what we all know is a compromise coming from the NATO Reykjavik Foreign Ministers meeting, an effort to accommodate a series of views, which have included those who wanted a very close relationship between the future talks and CSCE, those who did not, where we would put ourselves.

We reached compromise language there of talks that would take place in the CSCE framework, but there is another half to that. The other half to that bargain was that the CST talks, the conventional stability talks, would take place in the framework of autonomy, and the current discussions on the elements of autonomy are under discussion not only within the alliance but also within the Soviet and the East Bloc group.

And, so, it is a process and there are strong views on this issue. I think there is a solid central understanding of both some kind of a relationship to the other countries in CSCE and to the need for autonomy, but when you get down to the tough decisions of what time do you open, who hires, who fires on interpreters or paper producers, what time do you meet, who writes your schedule, where do you meet, those practical expressions of autonomy, then they are being worked on everyday.

Chairman HOYER. Ambassador Lehman, did you have any comments from your perspective on either of those two questions?

**STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Ambassador LEHMAN. No. I agree with what Ambassador Ridgway has said. We have a very good close working relationship with the French. They obviously have a French perspective on all of these issues, just as we have an American perspective, but we have to develop an alliance perspective, and I see no reason why, if the—as the talks progress, that the—a solution cannot be found to address both of our concerns.

I think we see how that can be done. The main issue here is for the Soviet Union to get on with the Vienna concluding document and with the mandate.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I have some follow-up questions, but let me yield to my colleagues.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassadors, I tried to begin eliciting your views at our last meeting about the agreements that the SPD and the Federal Republic are developing with the Warsaw Pact countries, particularly the GDR and Czechoslovakia. I wonder if you could enlighten me further as to, first, how far they have proceeded since they began this effort in Essen in 1984 at the party conference. Then they began to develop a kind of rapport and to make tentative agreements with these nations.

Secondly, how significant do you think these arrangements are to German-American relationships if, for example, the SPD moves into power in the Federal Republic by substantially increasing its membership in the German legislative bodies?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Well, Congressman Bereuter, frankly, we have serious misgivings about some elements of the current security posture of the SPD and the Federal Republic, and, in addition, there is an underlying concept, as you know, called common security, and we have misgivings about that.

We find it very difficult to see how their proposals, for example, the immediate cessation of nuclear tests and nuclear and chemical weapon free zones in central Europe, no first use of nuclear weapons in defense of Europe, we simply do not see how these proposals fit in the NATO strategy, which is forward defense, flexible response and extended deterrence. If you put them alongside of each other, I think the conclusion is inescapable that ideas like these confuse and are unhelpful to looking for effective, verifiable arms control measures that have real meaning.

We had an opportunity earlier this year to talk about these things with the Chairman of the SPD. Mr. Vogel was visiting Washington at the time, and we were candid in reviewing with him the difficulties that we had with their positions on these issues.

At the time, we were able to welcome the SPD support for the INF treaty, and we were able to welcome their support for continuing arms negotiations, but we had to express our difficulties on these matters, and I think I could say that the conversation just ended with his saying, well, he did not understand our views.

Those are substantive differences. You talk as well about a very important procedural innovation, if I can call it that, that has emerged, and that is the SPD practice of working out joint statements and joint positions with Warsaw Pact countries, that is, a party or parties. But we have to be very clear about the nature of the political party system in the Warsaw Pact states. Given their one-party nature, it is very hard to see how you can truthfully say these are just party to party talks, and that is especially true when these various statements emerge as draft accords.

Should we be worried? Well, the SPD does say that it continues to support NATO. The most recent draft that it came out with on peace and disarmament spoke also of NATO and looked at the question of a European pillar, but I must say it is really odd from a procedural standpoint to see how the SPD can concentrate its efforts on negotiating positions with the East, rather than first seeking to win support for their ideas at home and then with NATO's allies.

So, it is, if I can use a diplomatic word, it is an unusual situation, and I think it is one that is cause for concern. As to what would

happen in the event there were a change in the political picture which gave more direct influence to these views, one would have to see the extent to which these views then actually became part of policy, but they are troublesome.

We have an agreed arms control agenda within the alliance. We have a very solid alliance sense of confidence in those priorities, a very solid sense of alliance, confidence after INF that we know now how to negotiate with the East and this does not contribute.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Would you care to respond?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Yes. Again, I think it is imperative that we understand that many of the proposals put forward by the SPD, we do not believe, are in the security interests of the NATO alliance.

That makes it even more important that we ask why is it they would then want to further water them down in negotiating with the Warsaw Pact when the effect is agreements that simply undermine our own negotiations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

I think that we have proven that to be successful with the Soviet Union in real arms control, they have to deal with the governments that are empowered to act, and that is imperative.

The sooner we get arms control into real negotiations which deal with the real issues, the real security concerns of the country, the real verification issues and out of the political arena, the sooner we are going to get agreements that make sense.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will wait for another turn.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Torricelli.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Could you characterize for me any initial European reaction on the comments regarding the possibility of an exchange if the F16s were not redeployed in Italy? Has there been any early reaction from Western European nations?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. The initial reaction came from Italy and the United States. The Soviet Union presented its proposals more directly to us and both Italy and the United States have responded in the same fashion, that this is not a question for bilateral treatment, that this is a NATO question, that the problems of conventional instability or stability in Europe are far broader than questions of aircraft, and, indeed, in our view, they—

Mr. TORRICELLI. No other comments from them?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. No other.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Bonn or London or—

Ambassador RIDGWAY. No other direct comments on it, and I take it as supportive.

Mr. TORRICELLI. The French-German Brigade, as we now go ahead with the possibility of the next stage in discussions, is it a—could it be considered to be a complicating factor and has it played in a renewed—if not a complicating factor, has it played to provide some interest or incentive on the Soviet part in moving forward?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. With respect to complications, the organization of the Brigade, and Ambassador Lehman probably has more details on this than I, but the organization of the Brigade does not

complicate the NATO structure. The forces of the Federal Republic to be assigned to the Brigade are not NATO-dedicated forces. Of course, the forces of France are not a part of the NATO structure.

So these are forces outside of it, and it does not get in the way of the command situation.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Did it play a role in Soviet thinking in how they are now approaching the possibilities of reductions?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. It would seem to me that if you put the possibility of arms control negotiations in the conventional field into historical context, this positive development, and we consider it a positive development, the Franco-German dialogue shows the continuing growth in Europe. Let me put alongside of it something that I know is not part of today's discussion but certainly a part of the history.

The continuing growth of the European Community. The continuing political activity of the European Community and add to it then the Franco-German dialogue, the Franco-German military co-operation, surely the Soviet Union can see an increasingly strong, confident, politically-active Europe, and perhaps one of the conclusions to be drawn is that it is time, in fact, to sit down and address some of the problems.

Mr. TORRICELLI. So, indeed, it may have been helpful, possibly was a helpful element in moving Soviet thinking?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Marginally, but if I had to assign it anywhere, I'd put it on the plus side, yes.

Ambassador LEHMAN. I would share that assessment. I think one does not want to exaggerate the contributions of the Franco-German Brigade. On the other hand, we think that it is being done in an intelligent way, that it will not undermine the military command structure of NATO, and that it is a useful development.

Indeed, across the board, we believe that any bilateral or multilateral efforts within Europe, whether they involve the United States directly or not, can be helpful so long as they do not undermine the overall cohesiveness and direction of NATO.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Similarly, I assume that the Italians' immediate response in the willingness to accept the 401st also played a positive role in Soviet thinking. Undoubtedly, they were watching and waiting to see what would happen as the Spanish decision was made.

Could you characterize for me how it is that we approach and what our position is with regard to the possibility of the redeployment of any Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe to Asia in the event that an agreement were reached? Do we go to the—do we approach this with a current position that is reflective of Japanese or Chinese concerns?

Ambassador LEHMAN. The Soviet Union has often tried to play Europe against Asia and vice-versa. We saw this in the INF negotiations. It is a continuous part of their overall foreign policy strategy.

Our position, though, I think is quite—is based on common sense and quite clear. If they want to dismantle those forces, that is our first option and we prefer that.

If they want to withdraw them to where they do not threaten any of our allies and friends, why, I guess that is our second option.

But, clearly, we have to make an overall assessment. We do not want to sacrifice our security interests in one area for our security interests in the other.

Indeed, I think we have to be realistic in the modern age and the nuclear age, the world has become a very small place, and we have to look at security ultimately from a global concept.

Mr. TORRICELLI. So, a reduction in Europe that does not lead to a demobilization and presents the Soviets with the options of any significant movement of troops, even if they are not directly to the Chinese or Japanese border, raises real difficulties with the Administration?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Well, no. I think that if the Soviet Union were to withdraw all of its forces to the area around the Urals and make no reductions, I would have to rate that as a positive development.

Mr. TORRICELLI. It would if they were all on foot, anyway, I suppose.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Well, that would be helpful. You were talking about unilateral. Now, if you are talking in the context of reductions that we would have to take, then you have to measure very carefully that you do not get sold a pig in a poke, that they withdraw a few hundred kilometers and we withdraw a few thousand miles. It is really very fundamental.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Help me, if you could, with just two other issues which I am not completely clear.

Am I correct in that in Mr. Gorbachev's comments on the possibility of asymmetrical reductions, is that a significant corner that we have turned as it seems to be in my own mind? Have we ever been to this point before?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. We have not been to the point where he was using our language in these areas before, and that is important, that the concept that there is something asymmetrical in Europe in this area, that there is agreement on that is important.

But if you get into the several points of his proposal, then he has taken our language and applied it to an old Soviet position, which is that there should be asymmetrical reductions following the exchange of information. But in their view, the exchange and agreement on data will show that there are no asymmetries.

Mr. TORRICELLI. And which of those positions he is holding is unclear?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. It is unclear. That is right.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Has the Administration suggested to the Soviets that there are immediate changes in doctrine that would be reflected by deployments that in advance of any agreements or any progress would show a serious intent, be helpful, be positive that the Soviets could do initially?

Have we shared those views with the Soviets and outlined them to any detail?

Ambassador LEHMAN. We—the Soviet Union has taken the initiative to argue that they are adopting a new defensive doctrine. We have had numerous conversations with the Soviet defense and military officials on this issue, not the least of which have been Secretary of Defense Carlucci's meeting with Defense Minister Yazov in Berne, and again the meeting in Moscow. We just recently had

Marshal Akhromeyev in the United States, where he met with Chairman Crowe.

We have listened very carefully to their descriptions as to what this new defensive doctrine will mean, but they have not described anything that we find particularly more reassuring other than their general statements, which do not differ much from the political statements of their leaders about their benign intents.

Mr. TORRICELLI. But for those of us who are watching, is there not, however, then a signal in the next few months, if we were to see certain changes in Soviet deployments, either by means, equipment or geography, that would signal a seriousness that the Soviets had turned another corner, that you have suggested to them that you might share with us?

Perhaps there is not any such chance.

Ambassador LEHMAN. No. We have said precisely that, that it is fine to hear that they have got a new defensive doctrine, but how will we see it manifested in concrete terms. Will we see tanks removed, will we see a greater emphasis on defensive-type of preparations as opposed to the ability to strike and take and occupy ground?

They have said that we will not see it immediately, but that they would anticipate over time we would see it, but the examples they have given have often been things that are not very tangible. For example, they say, well, you will begin to see us conduct defensive exercises as opposed to offensive exercises.

But, of course, they then explain that defensive exercises include counter offensive operations. That is to say, they go on the defense for a few days and then they attack us.

Now, when will it be so tangible that we can say that the threat has been diminished? They have been very candid and straightforward. They have said perhaps not for quite a number of years.

Now, I do not mean to rule out the possibility that they might make some symbolic gestures. There has been a lot of speculation that they might do this. Indeed, just the Chairman has been discussing the recent initiatives or statements, and I think I agree very strongly with Chairman Fawcett's assessment.

I mean, these are basically political and tactical gambits, and we have to judge them not based on their quantity but their quality.

Whether or not some of these gambits will eventually involve movement of forces, reduction of tanks, things of that nature, on a unilateral basis, it remains to be seen. Certainly, we would welcome some actions, but we do not want to be misled by them as to whether or not they fundamentally change the security situation in Western Europe.

Mr. TORRICELLI. To conclude, Mr. Chairman, if I could, the million-man reduction goal that has been suggested, is it the conventional equivalent of the zero option, something that we hold—that is held out as a final, hopefully achievable, goal, rather than seeking incremental changes?

Is it realistic? Having suggested the zero option, frankly, was not realistic for some time, I am cautious to say that this is not, but is there a similarity in the going for everything rather than looking for incremental progress?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. I certainly think there is in terms of how it is being played in public, but, in reality, one of the lessons of MBFR has been that we are going to have to deal with this challenge in terms other than numbers of men. Those are exactly the most difficult thing to verify. You have to talk about equipment and units of some size and how they are deployed.

But if you are going to be out there in what I would call the public propaganda game with numbers that capture attention, then this is the way you proceed. So, I think there is a degree of equivalence as to what kind of proposal it is.

Mr. TORRICELLI. I take it the Soviets define numbers of men as well. It is not yet clear how those changes in overall force numbers would be applied in their minds among the different NATO forces. So, it is not clear when the American 300,000 get drawn down against the million in this new set of ideas.

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Mr. Torricelli, on this proposal, what you see is what we have got. I mean, everything that has been said in public is all that we know, and in the course of the Moscow summit, an effort was made by the experts who were there to probe Soviet thinking on how this would play out, how would the 500,000 be expressed, what did they have in mind in order to gain information as to what it was. There has never been more information than what is in public.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you.

Mr. Porter.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Because we on the Helsinki Commission do not get a chance to talk to Ambassador Lehman very often, I want to ask a question that is perhaps tangential to the point of the hearings today, but one that concerns me greatly.

The administration told us in 1982-3-4-5 that if we would build new chemical weapons, binary chemical weapons, that that would bring the Soviet Union not only to the bargaining table, but to an agreement to eliminate chemical weapons and we have built them. We are spending about \$46 million in the next fiscal year to build binaries that we cannot deploy anywhere because there is no where to place them, except here in the United States.

And I wonder if you could tell us what effect you see that having on the chemical weapons negotiations. A weapons system that is abhorred by the entire world, weapons that have been used in the Iran-Iraq war, to the horror of everyone.

Is there not a chance at this point for some kind of breakthrough in those negotiations, and what effect would that have upon the conventional arms negotiations that we hope to see proceeding?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Mr. Porter, first of all, I hope that in the days, months and even years ahead, that I will have more opportunity to meet with the members of the Commission.

With respect to the chemical weapons issue, I think we have been very candid in our presentations on the chemical weapons issue. This is an abhorrent weapon. Its existence is real. Indeed, its use is real.



That is a world that is very dangerous. For that reason, we must maintain our deterrent until such time as we can eliminate the threat of these weapons.

Now, as you are well aware, but I think not everyone is, the type of use that is taking place right now in the Middle East is banned. Indeed, some of the parties involved in the use are signatories to that ban.

So, in order to ensure that the arms control solution is effective, it is going to require a very strong verification regime as well as a very strong compliance regime.

We have been very candid also that of all of the arms control issues we deal with, there is probably none that is more difficult in the verification area than the question of a ban on chemical weapons.

Many of the materials that not only can be turned into chemical weapons but are, in fact, the actual chemical agent, are legitimate industrial chemicals. The delivery means for these systems are not banned.

So, one is faced with the prospect that there is a chemical factory here and there is a delivery system factory here and both are legal, the only thing that is illegal is putting the two together.

Now, I do not want to over-simplify it because we have really applied a tremendous amount of effort for innovation and verification procedures, in verification technologies, and we are making some progress.

But as we push out with respect to our ability to apply new technologies for verification and new procedures, we are also faced with a world that is also changing out there, that the types of chemical agents are becoming more complex, more difficult to control the potential ones, the ability to ensure that a party did not have that kind of capability is, in some ways, as difficult as ever.

So, we are working very, very hard with the Soviets, and this is high priority for us, and we are not only working with the Soviet Union but with other countries in the CD, in Geneva, to try to resolve these difficult verification questions.

Our goal is unchanged. The intensity of our effort has, if anything, increased, but the magnitude of the problem is tremendous, and I look forward to working with you and the Commission and other members of Congress on this very difficult issue.

Mr. PORTER. What would prevent us from looking at existing stockpiles, even without being able to verify that there is new production going on and reduce the stockpiles at least?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Well, there have already been some technical visits and exchanges.

Mr. PORTER. Exchanges of information as to where the stockpiles are located and I guess as to the size, although I am not sure about that?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Well, there has not been a—at least to my knowledge, we have not had the kind of detailed exchange that says here are the stocks and here is exactly where they are located.

We have talked about aggregate numbers and things of that nature.

Let me say that we do not know exactly where all of the Soviet stocks are and exactly what the amounts are at any locations, and,

so, that remains a tremendous problem, but, also, as is becoming increasingly apparent to everyone, they are not the only players in the chemical weapon area.

So, again, whether or not there are measures short of what we are seeking to do in the CD, there may well be, but we have not changed our policy. We are doing our very best.

Mr. PORTER. It seems to me that there is a kind of momentum in all of these things, and that when we find chemical weapons having been used for the first time since World War I and the abhorrent reaction to them by people everywhere, that if we can possibly find a way, and I agree it has to be verifiable, to get an agreement with the Soviet Union and eliminate our stockpiles and agree not to produce them, and at the same time perhaps put very severe restrictions on the export of certain chemicals to other countries that might be seeing them as the poor countries' nuclear weapon, that we could really make a substantial advance toward peace or at least a useful advance that might spill over into other areas.

I hope that we can redouble our efforts there. It seems to me that where we are now is that the Soviets still have a huge stockpile, we still have a huge stockpile, and now we are beginning a new stockpile of binaries that simply adds to the weight of the weapons everywhere and nothing really has been accomplished so far.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Mr. Porter, I think you have raised a very important point, which is even as we work diligently in the CD, that does not mean that that is the only means whereby we can try to address these issues.

You have talked about the transfer of chemical agents or the capability to produce chemical agents, and I think this is an area where we have tried to work carefully and closely with other governments, both allied and friendly governments, but also, indeed, with the Soviet Union, to try to cooperate in addressing the problem where we can.

Now, let me say that I do not believe that our binary program will, in the long run, contribute to greater stocks. On the contrary, we have made it very clear that as a result of our binary program, we will be able to significantly reduce our stocks and, so, with respect to what—

Mr. PORTER. Except the stocks that we are going to reduce are things that are useless anyway. There are tanks and spray apparatus, things that are in our inventory, but that are totally useless. Everybody knows they are useless and that is what we are reducing.

If we are building new binaries, we really ought to be—if we going to be reducing, we ought to reduce the useful part of our inventory, if that is the argument that you are making.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Well, let me say, first of all, that the stocks we will be reducing that you describe as useless could at a price, a price we would not pay, but a price, many of them could be made—put into a useful form.

But, also, no, it is our intent in time that, in fact, we will reduce other chemical stocks. I mean, the reason we want to develop a deterrent based on binaries as opposed to other forms is, in fact, so

that we can have reduced stocks, greater safety, a deterrent that is much more manageable at a reduced level.

Mr. PORTER. Let me say I agree with you that as long as the Soviet Union has massive stocks of chemical weapons, we have to have a deterrent. I would never argue with that. It just seems to me that our—the main thrust of our policy should not be to build new binaries but, rather, to find a way of getting a verifiable agreement with the Soviets to eliminate these weapons.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Porter.

Congressman SOLARZ.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Could either of you tell us when you expect NATO to formalize and finalize its position in the conventional arms control talks?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. My expectation from a practical standpoint, which is not necessarily the preferred standpoint, would be when there is more certainty as to when the talks themselves are going to take place and not before.

That is just the way people and institutions are.

Mr. SOLARZ. When does it look like the talks are supposed to commence?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. It is not clear at all. We had set as a working objective the conclusion of the Vienna conference and the completion of the mandate by the end of July, which had then a forecast of an October opening of the talks.

As July goes by, that calendar retreats into the future.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would it be fair to say that we are likely to have a position some time this year? We are talking about months.

Ambassador RIDGWAY. We would hope to, but if the CST talks retreat out into the future, I am sure that—these are tough questions—there will be a delay in when you get the allied position.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now, could you tell us what you understand the Soviet position to be with respect to the elimination of conventional disparities in Europe?

I realize they have probably made somewhat conflicting statements, but have they given any indication that they are prepared in principle to enter into an agreement which would provide for the elimination of conventional disparities with both sides at parity in the relevant categories of weaponry that would be included in such a negotiation?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. They have said that they are prepared to address the question of asymmetries in order to remove asymmetries, but then there is a second part. It is their view that when looked at from the Atlantic to the Urals, there are no asymmetries.

In fact, many Soviet representatives have said to us that we believe, and this is the background of the Gorbachev proposal, we believe that the West has been unfair in talking about asymmetries and imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union. We believe if there were an exchange of information across the whole of the region, that we would find that, in concept, in general, and throwing everything in, that there are no imbalances.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well in that conceptualization of the problem, what do they pick up that is ordinarily left out? On the face of it, it sounds palpably ludicrous, but perhaps there is an element to—

Ambassador RIDGWAY. It is palpably ludicrous.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well—

Ambassador RIDGWAY. But they have not gone beyond it. That is the position that is out there, followed by, as you know, Mr. Solarz, the next step, which is that, what we should be looking for is the reduction of 500,000 men on each side.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do we count the French manpower and materiel in calculations of the conventional balance?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Well, I think that the whole picture has to include it. We are talking the Atlantic to the Urals. Of course.

Mr. SOLARZ. So, including France and Spain, all the countries—

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Turkey and others, yes.

Ambassador LEHMAN. In that context, we do.

Mr. SOLARZ. Then taking the Atlantic to the Urals as the area in which a balance would be established, I assume it is our position that in virtually every category of weaponry, conventional weaponry, the Warsaw Pact has the numerical advantage?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. There is that position, but there is also accompanying it, because we have been down the road of doing numbers and it will take us nowhere, there is also the question of how are they organized and deployed and where are they.

Mr. SOLARZ. Fine. But it would be helpful to me if you can just answer the questions.

Is it our view that in every area of conventional weaponry from the Atlantic to the Urals, the Warsaw Pact has greater numbers than NATO?

Ambassador LEHMAN. If you say in every category of conventional weapon, I do not think that would be our position. But the position that the alliance has taken with respect to the conventional stability talks is that we should focus on those conventional systems which provide the offensive threat, the central system.

Mr. SOLARZ. Are there any categories of weaponry from the Atlantic to the Urals, in which we have a numerical advantage?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Our interest has been, in particular, in capturing tanks and artillery and in those areas, they have a tremendous numerical advantage. Let me say that the Soviet position is quite different.

They, for example, want to bring in tactical aircraft. The definition of tactical aircraft—

Mr. SOLARZ. Does the—

Ambassador LEHMAN [continuing]. Would—

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Ambassador, really, I am somewhat familiar with the issue, and it would really be helpful to me if you could just answer the questions I am asking you. I am more than happy to hear your views on a broader range of other issues, but I have a few questions I would like to ask and I would appreciate it if you could answer them. They are not difficult questions.

Are there any categories of weaponry from the Atlantic to the Urals in which NATO has larger numbers than the Soviet Union? That is all I am asking. If so, what are they?

Ambassador LEHMAN. I cannot think of a category offhand of a major end item that—in which we have an advantage, a numerical advantage.

Mr. SOLARZ. OK. Fine.

Ambassador LEHMAN. I will provide that for the record.  
[The information follows:]

The forces to be addressed by the new conventional stability talks will be the conventional forces of the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact that are based on land from the Atlantic to the Urals. Of all the numerous categories of conventional ground, air and air defense forces in this geographic area that are relevant to surprise attack and large-scale offensive action, there is only one in which NATO has a numerical advantage: antitank guided missile systems. This category is defined as all vehicular mounted, armored or unarmored, crew-served antitank guided missile launchers. It does not include ATGM-capable armored personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles, which are defined as armored troop carriers, nor does it include light antitank missile weapons that are unguided. Given the almost three to one advantage in tanks enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact, it is only sensible that NATO deploy as many antitank systems as it does.

The Soviets will assert that NATO has numerical superiority in aircraft. However, the Soviet approach to the aircraft count is to include aircraft not based in the agreed Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone and to emphasize qualitative differences, although it is not clear how they intend to quantify such differences. Based on a straightforward, Atlantic-to-the-Urals count, the Soviet assertion is patently false.

Mr. SOLARZ. OK. If you could, that would be helpful.

Now, what do you think is likely to be the position, to the extent you can offer a judgment on this, of the extent to which we would be prepared to make reductions in NATO weaponry short of a willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to move to parity in any given weapons systems?

In other words, if they were prepared to make very substantial asymmetrical reductions, but still not to a point at which absolute parity was going to be achieved, would we be prepared, do you think, in principle, to make some reductions ourselves, thereby providing for an agreement in which the imbalance was substantially reduced but in which some imbalance continued to exist. Or is it our position that we will not consider any reductions until such time as parity is achieved and then, in the context of parity, we are prepared to go in principle below where we are now if they reduce further themselves?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Clearly, any unilateral reductions are in our favor. If we are going to take reductions ourselves, then we have to look at what the impact is on stability.

For example, the Soviet Union has frequently over the years made proposals for non-nuclear zones or tank-limited zones and things of this nature. If the effect of the reduction is that we move thousands of miles and they move a few hundreds of miles, then those kinds of reductions, I think, would not be in our interests.

On the other hand, it is a negotiation, and you are going to have to recognize that for anything you get, you have to pay a price. But what you need to do is establish a principle and the principle ought to be equality and stability.

Mr. SOLARZ. Right. That is the direction in which we want to move, but I assume we are not rejecting out of hand any proposals which do not provide for the instantaneous establishment of parity, even though they may substantially reduce the existing imbalances?

Ambassador LEHMAN. I think that as one goes into these negotiations, one is always in a much better position if one agrees to the principle of equality.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, how do you interpret equality? As parity?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Well, the approach we have taken is that in the categories, such as tanks and artillery, there ought to be equality, and that is—

Mr. SOLARZ. Is equality parity?

By parity, I mean equal numbers.

Ambassador LEHMAN. If you mean by equal numbers, the answer is yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. OK. But I assume you have a somewhat more dynamic definition of equality, or is, in fact, equality in our negotiating position exactly equal numbers in each relevant category?

Ambassador LEHMAN. I think our position would be that there should be an equal ceiling in the categories, and we have said tanks and artillery.

Mr. SOLARZ. OK. And, once again, will we reject any agreement that does not provide for equal ceilings?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Go to Moscow, ask them their bottom line, and come back and tell us, and we will tell you if we are getting close. The—I cannot predict what we will or will not agree to in the final outcome of the agreement.

I am just telling you that it seems to me the principle of equality is a good one.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I agree. It is a very good one. It is a consummation devoutly to be wished.

The question is—equality would also be good in nuclear weapons, but we accept the agreements which provide or permit certain imbalances in different categories to exist if it is progress toward a goal.

Let me ask you this. Do we preclude the inclusion of dual capable systems in any agreement?

Ambassador LEHMAN. We believe they should not be included.

Mr. SOLARZ. All right.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Now, let me make it clear that there are systems, such as artillery, that have some nuclear capability that we believe should be included in these negotiations.

Mr. SOLARZ. We believe that some systems which do have a nuclear capacity should be included in the negotiations?

Ambassador LEHMAN. We said publicly as an alliance that artillery is an example.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes. Now, let me ask you just one or two other questions.

I know we rule out any linkage to nuclear reductions; we want this to focus just on conventional weapons. But let me ask you, in principle, if we could get a really significant conventional arms control agreement.

Let us talk, hypothetically, about going to parity or what you call equality, in every relevant weapons systems, which would obviously entail fundamentally asymmetrical reductions.

Let us say, for example, the Warsaw Pact came down to existing NATO levels and then we each went down from that, you know, a certain amount, so that we also made some reductions. That would

obviously be an enormously significant development in terms of reducing tensions and the Warsaw Pact threat to Western Europe.

If, as a condition for such an agreement, the Soviets called not for a third zero, but, rather, for a reduction to parity in remaining theater nuclear systems, would we be in principle opposed to such a linkage?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Well, I would not want to speculate on future outcomes of talks that have not even begun yet, but let me simply say that, clearly, nuclear weapons are in Europe to enhance our deterrent.

While they can enhance both our nuclear and conventional deterrent, their presence there is vital to maintaining the peace.

Now, what the future structure of those forces are vis-a-vis the conventional force structure, I think that remains to be seen. But we see no advantage in bringing these types of systems into a negotiation, in particularly in a negotiation on conventional force.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, there may not be an advantage if we can get an agreement without it, but if the only way to get an agreement is by including it, and if an agreement would facilitate a major asymmetrical reduction in conventional forces, thereby creating a much more stable military situation in Europe, it seems to me under those circumstances, it is worth at least talking about.

I mean, I am not in favor of a third zero myself, but the existing levels of our theater nuclear weapons are presumably in some measure related to the nature of the conventional threat we face.

If the conventional threat is substantially diminished by major asymmetrical reductions, then presumably on military grounds, there might be a case for a reduction in the level of our theater nuclear forces, leaving in place a residual force sufficient to maintain an adequate deterrent as well as a coupling of the American nuclear commitment to Europe, thereby facilitating the conventional arms control agreement.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Congressman Solarz, I think that it is my personal opinion that the Soviet Union does not have in mind reductions in nuclear and conventional forces that would be so advantageous to us, and I think that their interest in getting us started in talking about those things are to have us come out with outcomes which are even worse because of the fact that they have been brought together.

However, if they want to make an offer that is good for us across the board in conventional and nuclear, then they can make that offer.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, could I ask you to submit for the record two things? One, could you give us a compilation of those Soviet statements that you have indicating what the Soviet attitude is toward the nature and degree of the reductions that they are prepared to make?

For example, Mr. Hamilton's subcommittee had a hearing some time ago and Robert Legvold had some really, I thought, fascinating quotations from Mr. Gorbachev which seemed to suggest that he was ready to go to parity in virtually every category of weapon.

If, in fact, Gorbachev's statements meant what they seemed to mean, that would be an extraordinarily significant statement.

But, in any case, if you could provide a compilation of such statements as are in the public record by Soviet leaders on the questions of parity, asymmetrical reductions, that would be helpful.

Second, for the record, if you could submit what we believe to be an accurate assessment of the numbers of weapons NATO and the Warsaw Pact have in the area from the Atlantic to the Urals in every category of weaponry that is likely to be included in these negotiations?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Congressman Solarz, we would be pleased to do that, but let me say that as we prepare that answer, I mean, we are working with the alliance to discuss as an alliance, taking into account the interests of all of our allies, what actual systems would be discussed in these talks, and I would not want to imply by any answer on any bean count on the military balance that we have in mind any of these systems going into—

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, in order to avoid that unwanted and dangerous implication, why not simply include all categories of weaponry that have any military significance whatsoever? Then, we will leave to the imagination what would be included and what would not be included.

But I think it would be helpful for us to see it. It is all in the public record, but I assume—

Ambassador LEHMAN. It is. It is just—

Mr. SOLARZ [continuing]. Your people have the capacity to pull it together. I mean, you did make the point that it was your judgment that in every category, in fact, they had numerical superiority.

Ambassador LEHMAN. I could not think of one of the significant areas. I mean, there are certain categories of pistols and things where—

Mr. SOLARZ. Oh, you can leave out pistols. But if you can put in most of the other things, that would be helpful and appreciated.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Congressman.

Congressman Richardson, a member of the Commission.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

We often talk about allied unity and the future of NATO, and I am a little bit perplexed as I follow this issue with the cornerstones of the alliance: West Germany, the United States, and France.

Ambassador Ridgway, I would like to hear how you feel about whether, in effect, there is a common allied front in our talks with the Soviets.

I have been informed about a press conference held this morning by the West German Ambassador in which he talks about starting Conventional Stability Talks in October. Then, you have got Foreign Minister Genscher's statement embracing the 500,000-troop-reduction proposal by the Soviets.

I have also spoken to some French officials on CST, and the message I am getting is that the French are not interested in reducing troops.

So, my question is, are my statements correct? Are we each going our own way? Are we losing the unity that has been the cornerstone of NATO's negotiations with the Soviets?



I sense that happening, and if I am misinformed or incorrect, I would appreciate your view on that.

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Certainly on most any issue of the day, our allies, who represent themselves, fifteen democratic countries, come to questions often from a different perspective geographically, based on their size, based on their historical experience, based on their own visions of what Europe ought to look like and an improved East-West situation, and we do get public comments that are different, and then we have a lot of hard work within the alliance to find a common position.

Where we have common positions, I am not aware, and some of them represent the result of energetic and difficult negotiations to reach compromise, but where we have achieved allied positions, I am not aware of any instance in which allies have strayed from them.

There are a lot of active issues within the alliance at present on which people have different views, and we have to work that within the alliance. I do not take that as a sign of ill health. I take that as an inevitable consequence that we all remain free countries.

On Foreign Minister Genscher's so-called embrace of the Soviet conventional arms control plan, I think he has gotten a bad rap.

I think that those press reports were quite inaccurate. He did, at the Potsdam conference, express the hope, which we share, that Moscow sincerely desires to address the security problem that is posed by the superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe, and he welcomed apparent Soviet commitment to remove disparities.

I do not call that an embrace of the Gorbachev proposal, but simply a comment on pieces, of which we can share.

So, I find still—you asked me the general question that you started out, how does the alliance look today. It looks healthy. It has got a tough agenda in front of it on which the allies are going to have different views. Those differences will become known.

I do not take the fact of differences as an indicator of poor health.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, Ambassador, I think that is a very good message, but I participated with Mr. Hoyer and with Mr. Bereuter on a number of NATO parliamentary exchanges, and while the parliamentarians do not always reflect the diversity of views in Europe, I think there are more than just healthy misunderstandings and healthy differences.

I read the Genscher statement stating he thought it was a good idea that the Soviets were proposing to reduce conventional forces by 500,000 troops. Maybe he got a bad rap. Maybe so, but I sense that the core that we have had before the alliance is not as unified as it has been in the past. I am not saying it is disintegrating. I am not alarming anyone, but I do appreciate your sending that message.

What about the French, Ambassador Ridgway? Do they want troop reductions?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. I think that all of us would have to ask what the proposal is. We do not want troop reductions for the sake of troop reductions. We are looking for stability at lower levels of

forces, and I think if what emerges from the negotiations serves the interests of the West, then it is as likely that the French would support it as not, but we are all going to have to say, as Ambassador Lehman was saying in response to the questions from Mr. Solarz, we have really got to see what it is that gets out there on the table because there are formulations which simply do not serve alliance interests.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Ambassador Lehman, I think Congressman Solarz briefly touched on this, on the CSBMs, are we still resisting the eastern proposal for including air and naval activities? Is that still our position?

Ambassador LEHMAN. That is still our position. We think that there are areas where we could strengthen and enhance the CSBMs and that is what we see for the follow-on to the Stockholm talks.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I know we have a vote, and I believe the Chairman did ask this question, but I would like, for the record, to have it reinforced. By adopting a policy which differentiates the CSCE process from the CSCE conference, are we still in the same position of having leverage to pursue military security without the pressure of human rights concerns?

In other words, have we abandoned the policy of linking military security with human rights performance?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Let me say that that word "linking" always bothers me because it acts as if it treats matters of important principle, human rights, as if they can be quantified and put out there in the trade.

We have always had a policy of balanced progress which, admittedly, is a judgment call at the end of the day. Are you moving broadly forward?

It is true that if you—if the process turns out as we wish it to be, the follow-on to the Vienna conference will have two tracks. There will be within the framework of what emerges from Vienna follow-on activity across the board on the principles of all three Baskets to include human rights.

There will be the continued review of implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, and there will be a solid concluding document.

The mandate will have been approved in that context, and we will then go off to have conventional stability talks.

We want autonomy for those talks, and they would have their own—at that point, they would pick up their own pace and their own momentum. We obviously want to report back to countries that are not included, so that they can be informed, but I think at that point, what you are looking at is conventional stability talks which take place as arms control negotiations in their own setting.

That is our preferred outcome.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This is the view of just one member of Congress. You can call linkage whatever you want to, but if you want to use military security, trade, as leverage or weapons on behalf of human rights, just do it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have two quick questions. We have heard reports lately that the Soviet Union is planning a reduction or a total withdrawal of the 65,000 troops in Hungary.

What has been our position on that? I know we wish it to happen, but is this a realistic rumor or is it factual?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. It is a rumor, and it is a rumor that has had a life all spring, but I have no specific substance to offer to it, and as you know, our view has been that those troops went in in 1956 and it is a little late to be taking them out, but their departure would be welcomed.

As to its effect on the total balance within Europe, of course, one would have to see what their disposition was, where do they go and what happens to them.

Mr. LANTOS. Have we queried the Russians officially on this?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Not officially, no.

Mr. LANTOS. And there is no confirmation of any kind?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. No.

Mr. LANTOS. Do you intend to raise this issue with the Prime Minister of Hungary when he comes next week?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. Yes, yes. It will be a logical agenda item.

Mr. LANTOS. There is a tremendous discrepancy in the Rand study and Senator Levin's study of the actual balance of conventional forces in Europe.

What is the official State Department view of this incredible gap between the two sets of conclusions?

Ambassador RIDGWAY. We believe that there is an imbalance in the forces. Now, my problem, and you have given me an opening, Mr. Congressman, that I hope you do not mind if I abuse what I understand is your time—

Mr. LANTOS. You may take any opening you need.

Ambassador RIDGWAY [continuing]. But in the discussion of this, which was initiated perhaps most energetically in the consideration of the INF Treaty, there are a lot of words being thrown around that got mixed up and assigned the same values.

Imbalance, instability and things of that sort. We have stability in Europe today. There may be an imbalance, but we have found in the West ways to meet that conventional imbalance, and we do not have, as I say, the instability that is implied when many people discuss imbalance.

We have addressed the imbalance since 1945. I believe that the numbers show an imbalance in the essential areas of equipment, but there is also an imbalance in the geography. There is an imbalance in disposition, an imbalance in missions, and it gets lost very often when we confine ourselves to numbers.

The numbers, if you make the area broad enough, you may come out with numbers that are very close to each other, but where the forces meet along the line in the essential areas that affect our defense, we believe that there is an imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

Mr. LANTOS. I thank you.

We have a vote, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, Ambassador.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Ambassador, did you want to make a comment?

Ambassador LEHMAN. If I could just make a couple of brief comments, because I think this is an important issue.

Chairman HOYER. Sure.

Ambassador LEHMAN. One has to understand that reports such as the Rand study, such as Senator Levin's study, inevitably begin by saying that one should not focus on bean counts. That is to say, simple numerical counts.

Nevertheless, one has to remember that in the negotiating context, it is, in fact, numerical ceilings that you are negotiating about, but to ensure that equality does not reduce instability, one has to take into account where those troops are located and other factors that will probably have to be dealt with in the negotiation.

For example, the whole concept of Atlantic to the Urals as opposed to the original MBFR focus has that kind of a consideration in mind.

But, also, I think Ambassador Ridgway has raised a very important point, and that is, equalities and inequalities either grow or contract according to the geographical areas that you look at, but also in terms of the definitions.

Congressman Solarz had asked about our discussions with the Soviet Union. Secretary Carlucci, when he met with Defense Minister Yazov, was shown quickly a chart that had a number of Soviet advantages that were not unlike the advantages we had identified publicly, but they then also came out with some Western advantages that had nothing to do with our assessment of those categories.

Well, it became very clear, for example, in the question of tactical aircraft that they use a very different definition than we do of how various aircraft are categorized and, clearly, theirs was designed to show that there was an asymmetry in a certain type of aircraft for which they ought to get compensation.

In the Warsaw Pact, they mainly operate Soviet equipment. So, there is the ability to say, well, if you use that Soviet type as a category, then that side has so much.

You know, if you look up on the alliance side, we do not have identical forces, identical equipment, identical structures. We try to coordinate them and integrate them in a way that is useful for the alliance. But it is very difficult to provide a clear picture of, for example, the alliance numbers without first addressing the very important question of what exactly are the definitions of the categories, and when you are anticipating going into negotiations with the Warsaw Pact, what you call those categories and how you define them will have an important impact on the negotiations.

So, as we deal with these bean counts, we have to not only consider the qualitative dimensions, but we also have to consider the prospects for negotiations and we have to be very careful about putting forth numbers in one context with one kind of definition, when, in fact, in the context of a specific negotiation and in a narrow geographical area, that may not be the most appropriate category.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

I am sorry that time has not permitted me to delve a little more into the question of really how we are going to play this end game ultimately in terms of the relationship between CST and CSCE,

whether we are talking about structure or process, because I really think that is going to become a very, very difficult obstacle to ending Vienna and getting on with the conventional talks whenever that date is.

But we will talk about that a different day. We have a vote and also it is 12:30 p.m. I know you have to go and we have to go as well.

So, we will adjourn or recess, if I can, once again these hearings and thank both of you. You have now spent some four hours trying to educate us and we appreciate that.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee and the commission adjourned to reconvene at the calls of the Chairs.]

## APPENDIX

Responses to additional questions submitted by Hon. Rozanne  
L. Ridgway, Department of State

1. What is the current U.S. position on the degree of progress the Soviet Union has made in meeting its Helsinki Human Rights Obligations.

A: -- SINCE WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE COMMITMENTS BY ALL THE EASTERN STATES, LET ME COMMENT MORE BROADLY THAN JUST ON THE SOVIET RECORD.

-- DESPITE SOME NOTABLE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS, THE EASTERN HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IN GENERAL REMAINS SERIOUSLY DEFICIENT. WE HAVE SEEN SOME WELCOME CHANGES IN SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES SINCE THE VIENNA MEETING BEGAN IN 1986. IN EASTERN EUROPE, SOME COUNTRIES ARE FAR AHEAD OF THE U.S.S.R., SOME ARE FAR BEHIND.

-- SOME EXAMPLES OF PROGRESS SINCE THE VIENNA MEETING BEGAN IN NOVEMBER 1986 ARE:

- o IN THE SOVIET UNION, OVER 350 PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE HAVE BEEN RELEASED, INCLUDING THE RELEASE OF ANDREI SAKHAROV FROM INTERNAL EXILE; BUT A LARGE NUMBER REMAIN INCARCERATED, INCLUDING 9 HELSINKI MONITORS;
- o THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN EMIGRATION OF JEWS, ETHNIC GERMANS, AND ARMENIANS FROM THE SOVIET UNION;
- o THE SOVIETS HAVE STOPPED JAMMING VOA AND BBC BROADCASTS.

- o WHILE ABOUT 50 BILATERAL FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES REMAIN UNRESOLVED, THE SOVIETS HAVE REDUCED THE LIST BY OVER 50 PERCENT.
- o THE NUMBER OF EAST GERMANS PERMITTED TO TRAVEL ABROAD, ESPECIALLY TO THE FRG, HAS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY IN THE LAST TWO YEARS;
- o IN HUNGARY, A NEW PASSPORT LAW WHICH EFFECTIVELY ALLOWS HUNGARIAN CITIZENS PASSPORTS ON DEMAND TOOK EFFECT AT THE BEGINNING OF 1988.

-- WE ARE PRESSING FOR PERFORMANCE TO CONTINUE TO IMPROVE ACROSS THE BOARD. THE AREAS WE EMPHASIZE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR IN FUTURE CSCE, BILATERAL, AND OTHER MEETINGS, ARE:

- o RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PRISONERS, PARTICULARLY THE 9 REMAINING HELSINKI MONITORS.
- o RESOLUTION OF THE REMAINING BILATERAL FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES;
- o UNJAMMING OF ALL RADIO BROADCASTS;
- o SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED EMIGRATION;
- o RESPECT FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION;
- o INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS REFORMS.

2: What impact does this view have on efforts to bring the Vienna Review Meeting to a successful conclusion.

A: -- ONE OF OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES AT THE VIENNA MEETING HAS BEEN IMPROVED PERFORMANCE BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE NATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE IN IMPLEMENTING EXISTING CSCE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS. WE CONSIDER THIS TO BE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF A BALANCED OUTCOME. WHILE WE NOTE THAT CERTAIN IMPROVEMENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE EXPECT TO SEE FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS BEFORE THE MEETING ENDS.

3: Did we meet the declared objective of achieving "substantial Soviet compliance."

A: -- WE HAVE NOT SET OUT ANY SPECIFIC NUMERICAL OR ABSOLUTE CRITERIA FOR ENDING THE VIENNA MEETING. EACH COUNTRY IN THE WARSAW PAC<sup>1</sup> IS DIFFERENT AND SHOULD BE JUDGED ON ITS OWN MERITS. WHEN THE TIME COMES TO JUDGE WHETHER THE EAST HAS IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY ITS COMPLIANCE -- THE GOAL WE SET IN 1986 -- WE WILL CONSIDER THE RECORD OF THE SOVIET UNION AND EACH EASTERN EUROPEAN STATE. THE OVERALL SITUATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR MAINTAINING MOMENTUM WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.



4: With CST and CDE presumably beginning shortly after Vienna ends, what parallel human rights meetings do you expect to take place.

A: -- AS THE DRAFT VIENNA CONCLUDING DOCUMENT NOW STANDS, THERE WILL BE A SERIES OF THREE POST-VIENNA EXPERTS' MEETINGS ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION. THIS COULD WORK OUT TO ONE CSCE HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING PER YEAR BETWEEN THE END OF THE VIENNA MEETING AND THE NEXT GENERAL FOLLOW-UP MEETING (DEPENDING ON WHEN THE NEXT FOLLOW-UP MEETING IS HELD -- PROBABLY 1991 OR 1992).

-- THIS CONTRASTS WITH THE TWO HUMAN RIGHTS MEETINGS HELD AFTER MADRID -- THE OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERTS' MEETING AND THE BERN EXPERTS' MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS.

-- IN ADDITION, THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ALSO INCLUDES COMMITMENTS FROM EACH STATE TO RESPOND TO INQUIRIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS FROM OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. THIS MECHANISM WILL PERMIT CONTINUOUS PRESSURE ON SPECIFIC CASES AND WILL BE ESPECIALLY USEFUL TO STATES WHICH LACK OUR BILATERAL MECHANISMS FOR KEEPING PRESSURE ON EASTERN STATES.

5: Will we agree to the Soviet proposal to hold a human rights meeting in Moscow?

A: -- PARIS AND COPENHAGEN ARE CANDIDATES FOR TWO OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS MEETINGS; ON JULY 22, SWITZERLAND AND MALTA ANNOUNCED THEIR AVAILABILITY TO HOST THE THIRD MEETING.

-- MOSCOW ALSO REMAINS A POTENTIAL CANDIDATE FOR THE THIRD MEETING; HOWEVER, OUR POSITION REMAINS THAT THE SOVIETS MUST PROVIDE CREDIBLE GUARANTEES OF ACCESS AND OPENNESS FOR ANYONE WHO WISHES TO ATTEND. IN ADDITION, WE EXPECT TO SEE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE BEFORE THE U.S. WILL CONSIDER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO HOST A HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE. TO DATE, THEIR RESPONSE ON BOTH POINTS DOES NOT WARRANT SUCH CONSIDERATION.

6: Do you believe this alignment of security, human rights, and other meetings preserves structural balance within the CSCE process?

A: -- YES. IN ADDITION TO FOCUSING ON IMPLEMENTATION QUESTIONS, WE EXPECT TO OBTAIN FROM THIS MEETING NEW STEPS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH CSCE HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS, STEPS TO PROMOTE OPENNESS IN ECONOMIC EXCHANGES, AND FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITY WHICH INCLUDES MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS MEETINGS AND A NEW NEGOTIATION ON CSBMS. THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A BALANCED PACKAGE.

7: When meetings end -- and how they end -- is often as important as when they begin. What is the U.S. view how CST and CDE should end -- or recess -- when the next CSCE Review Meeting after Vienna begins?

A: -- ONCE A MANDATE HAS BEEN FINALIZED, A SEPARATE NEGOTIATION WILL BEGIN ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES. IT IS THE ALLIANCE POSITION THAT THE TIMETABLE OF THIS NEGOTIATION WILL NOT BE DEPENDENT ON CSCE TIMETABLES.

-- THE CONTINUATION OF THE WORK OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IN A NEW CSBMS NEGOTIATION SHOULD, OF COURSE, RESPECT THE TIMETABLE OF THE CSCE PROCESS SINCE IT WILL BE A FULL MEETING OF ALL 35 CSCE STATES.

8: If the CST is allowed to continue to run in parallel with the next CSCE Review Meeting, yet CST is supposed to be "within the the framework of CSCE," doesn't this have the effect of placing conventional arms reductions on an equal footing with all of the rest of CSCE -- human rights, human contacts, economic matters, cultural matters, etc.

A: -- THE FORMULATION "FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE PROCESS" REPRESENTS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THOSE ALLIES WHO WISHED A CLOSE LINK TO THE CSCE AND THOSE OF US WHO WOULD HAVE PREFERRED NO CONNECTION.

-- THE PHRASE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER HALF OF THE BARGAIN -- AUTONOMY FOR THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS.

-- IN OUR VIEW, THE "FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE PROCESS" IS A CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE THAT EXTENDS BEYOND THE CONFERENCE ITSELF TO INCLUDE, IN ITS BROADEST SENSE, THE BILATERAL RELATIONS AMONG THE 35 STATES ON TOPICS INCLUDED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IT IS NOT A PROCEDURAL LINK TO THE CONFERENCE ITSELF.

9: What does this do to the idea of balance?

A: -- BOTH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TALKS AND THE CSCE WILL HAVE FULL AND IMPORTANT AGENDAS IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS TO COME. WE HAVE INSISTED ON AUTONOMY FOR THE CONVENTIONAL TALKS, IN PART BECAUSE WE WANT TO INSULATE THE CSCE FROM PRESSURE TO LOWER OUR HUMAN RIGHTS SIGHTS. IN ANY CASE, THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL PROCEED ON THEIR OWN SCHEDULES AND ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN RULES. SINCE THERE IS NO DIRECT OPERATIONAL OR NEGOTIATING LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TWO FORA, BALANCE IS NOT IN PLAY.

10: Who within your bureau, will handle CST policy?

A: -- I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL MATTERS OF POLICY IN THE BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS. ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL POLICY, I AM ASSISTED BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY CHARLES H. THOMAS. THE OFFICE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS HAS SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL.

11: How will CST policy be coordinated with CSCE policy within your bureau?

A: -- I AND MY DEPUTY WILL ENSURE THAT COORDINATION. IN ADDITION, THE OFFICE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS IS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOTH CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND CSCE AFFAIRS.

12: Secretary Lehman stated that "the CST will not have its mandate, procedures, progress, or results 'blessed' or 'reviewed' by the CSCE as occurred, for instance, with the Stockholm Conference." Is this the agreed NATO position?

A: -- YES. THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES HAVE TAKEN A PRINCIPLED VIEW THAT THE CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS WILL REMAIN AUTONOMOUS FROM THE CSCE. AS REFLECTED IN A NATO-AGREED DRAFT MILITARY SECURITY SECTION OF THE VIENNA CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS WILL SHARE INFORMATION AND VIEWS WITH THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, BUT THEY ALONE WILL DETERMINE THE AGENDA, PROCEDURES, SCHEDULES AND OUTCOME OF THE CONVENTIONAL TALKS. WE EXPECT THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED NATIONS AND THE EAST TO ACCEPT THIS PRINCIPLE.

13: Will the U.S. have separate delegations for the CST and CDE II talks if they occur in the same city at the same time?

A: -- WE WILL HAVE SEPARATE DELEGATIONS TO THE CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CSBMS CONFERENCE.

14: Please describe for the Commission the interdepartmental process by which U.S. CSCE policy is made in the Executive Branch?

A: -- POLICY STATEMENTS, INCLUDING GUIDANCE TO DELEGATIONS, ARE CLEARED WITH EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES HAVING RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED TO THE CSCE PROCESS. DEPENDING ON THE ISSUE, THIS CAN INCLUDE THE STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS, THE INTELLIGENCE AND ARMS CONTROL AGENCIES, AND THE JCS.

15: Who are the participants in these interdepartmental meetings?

A: -- AS I HAVE SAID, ALL RELEVANT AGENCIES PARTICIPATE IN THE CLEARANCE PROCESS. WHEN NECESSARY TO THE CLEARANCE PROCESS, MEETINGS ARE HELD. ATTENDANCE IS DETERMINED BY THE NATURE OF THE ISSUE UNDER CONSIDERATION.

16: When the departments of State and Defense have differing views on policy questions that they cannot resolve between themselves, please describe how these disputes are resolved?

A: -- IN RECENT MEMORY THERE HAVE BEEN NO INSOLUBLE DISPUTES BETWEEN STATE AND DEFENSE, OR BETWEEN ANY TWO AGENCIES ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL OR CSCE ISSUES. WHEN DISAGREEMENTS ARISE AT THE WORKING LEVEL, THEY ARE NORMALLY RAISED TO HIGHER LEVELS FOR RESOLUTION. IN THE EVENT CABINET AGENCIES WERE IN THE FUTURE UNABLE TO RESOLVE A DISPUTE, IT WOULD BE RAISED THROUGH ESTABLISHED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CHANNELS TO THE PRESIDENT.

17: What role does the National Security Council staff play in resolving these disputes?

A: -- THIS QUESTION IS OUTSIDE THE PURVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

18: Is it not true that, on the National Security Council Staff, Soviet-related human rights policy, public diplomacy, and arms control matters are all handled by different senior NSC staff officers?

A: -- THIS QUESTION IS OUTSIDE THE PURVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

19: What opportunity have the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of the U.S. European Command had to review the U.S. approach to both CST and CDE II?

A: -- THE JCS ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN ALL MATTERS RELATING TO SECURITY, INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES.

-- RELATIONS WITH UNIFIED COMMANDS SUCH AS THE EUROPEAN COMMAND ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

20: To what degree would you say that our negotiating position is consonant with our military strategy and plans?

A: -- OUR POSITION IS COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH MILITARY STRATEGY AND PLANS. INDEED NATO'S SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL ARE DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE ALLIANCE'S POLICY OF CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, UPON WHICH OUR SECURITY RESTS.

-- THIS WAS CLEARLY STATED BY NATO IN THE SUMMIT STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL LAST MARCH.

21: Have the JCS and the European Command had the opportunity to fully express their views on these negotiations, the development of the U.S. position. and the direction and coordination of our efforts?

A: -- YES. THE JCS ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN ALL MATTERS RELATING TO SECURITY. RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMAND ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF JCS.

22: Are the JCS and the European Command fully satisfied with the U.S. position on CST and CDE II?

A: -- YES. THE JCS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN ALL ASPECTS OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT RELATED TO CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES.

