

The Road to Vilnius – the OSCE after Astana

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July 28, 2011

Introduction

I want to thank Chairman Smith and Co-Chairman Cardin for having me back to testify about the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and our goals in the run-up to the Vilnius Ministerial in December. I am particularly proud that you have made me a Commissioner, along with my esteemed colleagues here today. I am honored to associate myself with this Commission and its myriad achievements over the decades.

The OSCE

The OSCE has three attributes that make it unique. First, it has a vast geographic scope, stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, from Vancouver to Vladivostok. This scope allows it to address a diverse set of security challenges with a variety of approaches, drawing on its extraordinary 56-nation membership.

Second, the OSCE has a three-basket approach to security – comprised of the human dimension, the economic and environmental dimension, and of course the political-military dimension. This comprehensive approach, enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, was revolutionary at the time – by including dialogue on human rights, democracy, and economic development along with military transparency – and is still relevant today.

Third, the OSCE has an extraordinary and storied history. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe – the predecessor to the OSCE – played a critical role in providing support and hope to persecuted groups behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, and helped to bring order during Europe's tumultuous political transitions of the early 1990s.

Throughout its history, the OSCE has adapted to new challenges and changes in the security environment. In keeping with this tradition, we must continue to adapt the OSCE's political-military security toolbox to face the challenges of the 21st century.

Astana Summit

In December of last year, the OSCE held its first Summit since 1999 in Astana, Kazakhstan. At the Summit, we learned that the achievements of the OSCE cannot be taken for granted. The effort to produce an action plan for 2011 foundered over fundamental disagreements on the security challenges facing the OSCE – especially on conventional arms control and the unresolved conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The United States insisted on an action plan that reflected our longstanding principles on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and host nation consent as it relates to the unresolved conflicts. Russia was unwilling to support

this, and the resulting impasse threatened the Summit outcome.

Without hope of consensus on an action plan, the U.S. delegation, led by my good friend Assistant Secretary of State Phil Gordon, worked assiduously to produce the Astana Commemorative Declaration instead. The Declaration recommits all 56 participating States of the OSCE “to the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals.”

Importantly, the Astana Declaration reaffirmed the right of countries to choose their own security arrangements and reasserted that no country can create a sphere of influence or seek to strengthen its security at the expense of others. The Declaration reiterated the importance of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures, highlighting their role in ensuring military stability, predictability and transparency. It also committed all of us to revitalize, modernize, and update the three most important parts of the conventional arms control regime – the Vienna Document 1999, the Open Skies Treaty, and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.

I will leave it to my colleagues from State to address the human and economic-environmental dimension, and focus instead on what the Administration would like to accomplish before the OSCE Ministerial in December in the political-military dimension of security.

Conventional Arms Control

I will address each part of the conventional arms control regime in turn, and note that the United States is fully engaged in the process of modernizing them, in both Vienna and Washington. Last month, Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, assisted by Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel Russell and my Deputy Assistant Secretary, Celeste Wallander, attended OSCE’s Annual Security Review Conference. DASD Wallander represented me in discussions on the Vienna Document 1999, and it is to that instrument that I turn now.

Vienna Document 1999

The OSCE can trace its role in arms control to four pages in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which established a confidence-building mechanism to reduce the chance of conflicts arising from large military maneuvers in Europe. The subsequent talks on military transparency, which eventually resulted in the Vienna Document 1999, formed one of three pillars of the effort to secure peace in Europe during the Cold War. The second pillar was the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks, focusing on balancing NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional armaments, which evolved into the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, or CFE. The third pillar was the ongoing bilateral U.S.-Russian strategic arms limitation talks, which eventually led to the START Treaty.

The Vienna Document has grown to 60 pages, and comprises a series of confidence- and security-building measures designed to increase the transparency of military affairs on the territory of all participating European and Central Asian States. It includes a conflict-prevention mechanism, visits to military air bases, annual exchanges of military information, on-site

inspections and visits to evaluate the information exchanges, and a series of military-to-military contacts. The Vienna Document 1999 applies to all military forces in the OSCE zone of application.

The OSCE is engaged in an intensive effort to update the Vienna Document for the first time since 1999. With the direction provided by our Heads of State in Astana, we are approaching the milestone of issuing a new Vienna Document in December in Vilnius. Delegations have been working in the OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation for the past year to review the Vienna Document comprehensively and update it to meet today's demands. Several proposals already have been adopted, and dozens more are under consideration. However, the proposals adopted to date have been administrative in nature, and more needs to be done if this effort is to be judged a success. One proposal to increase military transparency that I would like to highlight would lower the thresholds for notification of military manoeuvres – a subject central to the intent of the original document. Adopting this proposal made by the French delegation would send a clear signal that the OSCE is serious about modernizing its approach to military transparency and security.

The dedication all delegations are demonstrating in this effort is encouraging; however, much more needs to be done. I believe the United States needs to have a deeper discussion with other delegations on the future of military transparency and what measures are needed to improve the security of all participating States. Our military budgets are all under pressure, and many participating States are undergoing rapid and radical military transformations. The Vienna Document must continue to evolve to keep pace – and the quality of military advice in Vienna must be equal to the challenge.

Open Skies

The Treaty on Open Skies started with an idea by President Eisenhower – to reduce the need for destabilizing espionage and transform the security environment. The idea was revived in the 1980s, and then, in 2002, the Treaty entered into force. To date, the 34 States Parties have flown more than 700 aerial observation flights, providing unprecedented levels of military transparency. The ability of any party to overfly every part of the territory of every other party from Honolulu to Vladivostok is extraordinary. Indeed, the United States and Russia both use the Open Skies Treaty as part of the verification of the New START, highlighting the linkages and reinforcing effects among these agreements.

In June 2010, the parties met for their second Review Conference in Vienna. There, they recommitted themselves to addressing the challenges and guiding the way toward improved transparency. These challenges include implementation problems, such as increasing instances of interference with the full exercise of Treaty rights; economic issues, such as determining the future of aging airframes; and technological issues, including adapting to digital technology and fully implementing Treaty-allowed sensors. Addressing these challenges will require political will and could put strains on increasingly scarce defense budgets.

We are seeking to recommit the United States to the Treaty, both by increasing the number of flights we fly and participate in each year, and by taking advantage of the ability to upgrade our sensors from film to digital capability. According to recent media reports, Russia has begun flight-testing a new TU-214 airframe with a full suite of digital sensors for use under the Treaty - the same airframe as the forthcoming replacement for their equivalent to Air Force One. No other participating State has been able to commit to updating its aircraft. In fact, some, notably the United Kingdom, have eliminated their aircraft due to budgetary pressures.

CFE

The news on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty is less encouraging. However, it is worth noting the Treaty's achievements – including the elimination of more than 72,000 battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters; the successful completion of thousands of on-site inspection, and the orderly, verifiable, and peaceful withdrawal of the massed armored forces that typified the Cold War standoff for decades. The CFE Treaty succeeded in eliminating the possibility of large-scale, surprise attack in Central Europe, it has been at an impasse with Russia's "suspension" of implementation of CFE in December 2007, which was further complicated by Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia.

The State Department named Ambassador Victoria Nuland as Special Envoy to engage in modernizing CFE in February 2010. She consulted closely with our NATO Allies to launch an effort to reach agreement among the 30 CFE Parties, joined by the six NATO members that are not signatories of the CFE Treaty (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Albania, Croatia, and Slovenia), on a framework agreement based on three of President Obama's five principles of European security: 1) reciprocal transparency of conventional armed forces; 2) reciprocal restraints on concentrations of heavy forces and permanent basing in sensitive regions; and 3) a renewed insistence on host-nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces on sovereign territory.

Since June 2010, the United States and our Allies have been engaged in an intensive effort to reach agreement on a framework for negotiations to strengthen and modernize conventional arms control in Europe. However, after ten rounds of consultations in Vienna, Russia remains inflexible on two key issues: host-nation consent for the stationing of foreign troops on sovereign territory, and providing appropriate transparency among all parties regarding their current military posture for the period of any negotiation. Currently, the United States is consulting with Allies to decide the way forward, while continuing to encourage Moscow to reconsider its position. If Russia will not reconsider, we must look carefully at our options regarding the current unequal situation, whereby 29 Parties implement the Treaty and one does not. As the NATO communiqué issued at the Lisbon Summit warned, this situation cannot continue indefinitely.

While the future of CFE remains uncertain and the Treaty cannot be replaced by the Vienna Document, we remain committed to conventional arms control and military transparency in Europe. We will continue to work through the OSCE to advance these objectives through modernizing the Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty.

Outside of the OSCE, we are working both bilaterally with Russia and through the NATO-

Russia Council to address concerns about missile defense and strategic stability. At the same time, through the Forum for Security Cooperation, we are seeking to address modern threats, such as transnational crime, nuclear proliferation, Central Asian instability, and unsecured, unsafe stocks of small arms and light weapons. Finally, we are using every opportunity possible, including the OSCE, to address the unresolved conflicts that have contributed to the stalemate on modernizing of the CFE.

The Unresolved Conflicts

The OSCE continues to play a critical role as a central forum for addressing the unresolved conflicts which emerged at the end of the Cold War in Georgia, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh. As the 2008 war in Georgia showed, these conflicts hold the devastating potential to destabilize security in the OSCE region, and their resolution must remain a high priority for the OSCE and all its member states. The United States seeks to use the leverage of the OSCE's diverse membership to address these unresolved conflicts, and, through cooperative efforts, resolve them. While each of the conflict resolution processes has faced myriad difficulties this year, I still hold out hope that with the help of our Lithuanian Chairman-in-Office, we can show progress by Vilnius.

Georgia

We have seen few signs toward progress on resolving the conflict between Georgia and Russia. First and foremost, the OSCE has not been able to resume its presence on both sides of the administrative boundaries in Georgia. Talks continue in Vienna and Geneva on the possibility that an OSCE team, based in Vienna, will be given access to all of the territory of Georgia within its internationally-recognized borders. This would be a significant step forward, but Russia and Georgia have yet to agree on the conditions for bringing such a team into existence.

As the Co-Chairs of this Committee noted after the 2008 hostilities, Russia's invasion of Georgia represented "a clear violation of Georgia's territorial integrity and Principle Four of the Helsinki Final Act." The expiration of the OSCE mandate in Georgia at the end of 2009 was regrettable. Our position remains unchanged: the U.S. continues to advocate for allowing humanitarian assistance, as well as a return to pre-conflict positions, as Russia committed to doing as part of the August 8, 2008 ceasefire agreement. The U.S. continues to support Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders, and we will maintain our support for international efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the dispute over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia needs to abide by its ceasefire arrangements and take steps that promote stability in the region. We reaffirm this message regularly to our Russian counterparts.

Moldova

The OSCE (then the CSCE) became involved in peacekeeping in Moldova in 1993, and continues to play an important role in supporting a peaceful resolution of the dispute over Transnistria through the 5+2 talks. These talks comprise Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, plus the U.S. and the EU as observers. The United States continues to press for a resumption of formal 5+2 negotiations to make progress toward a settlement that will end this

conflict based on Moldova's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Informal 5+2 talks in February discussed freedom of movement between the sides, the negotiating process, and a work plan for 2011 – but showed limited results. President Medvedev hosted another informal 5+2 meeting in June in Moscow, but was unable to reach agreement on holding a formal meeting in September. Even without formal 5+2 negotiations, we encourage the parties to continue to pursue confidence-building measures, such as those to facilitate commerce within the existing customs process and to otherwise work to improve the daily lives of citizens on both sides of the Dniester River.

In addition, the OSCE stands ready to support the completion of the removal of the estimated 20,000 tons of ex-Soviet arms and ammunition left on Moldovan territory, in Cobnasa, as well as any remaining equipment. The OSCE began assisting Russia and Moldova in removal and destruction of equipment, arms, and ammunition in 1999, but Russia stopped this effort in March 2004. The OSCE has allocated both money and manpower ready to facilitate the completion of Russia's obligation to complete this effort.

Nagorno-Karabakh

The United States remains closely engaged with our OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs – Russia and France – in supporting efforts to bring a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Presidents Obama, Medvedev, and Sarkozy in a joint statement at the G-8 Summit in Deauville in May noted “the time has arrived” to move beyond the “unacceptable status quo” and called for a “decisive step toward a peaceful settlement.” Specifically, the three presidents urged the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to finalize the Basic Principles, which will provide the formula for a future comprehensive settlement. If we reach agreement on the Basic Principles, the United States will work diligently with its partners, including the EU and the OSCE, to take the next steps toward implementing an eventual peaceful settlement to this terrible conflict.

Unfortunately, there has been a step backward in this effort. I am sad to report that the attempt to reach a breakthrough in Kazan, Russia on June 24 failed, while tensions along the Line of Contact are increasing. Armenia and Azerbaijan remain unable to finalize the Basic Principles, and we remain at an unhelpful and dangerous stalemate. President Medvedev has put forward another proposal to break the stalemate, but the prospects for progress are uncertain.

New and Emerging Threats

Part of the rich history of the OSCE, and a source of its strength, has been the adaptability of the institution to face new and emerging threats. No one in 1975 could have imagined that cyber-security would be a topic of discussion among states. In addition, the specter of nuclear proliferation to non-state actors, the control of small arms and light weapons, and border security in Central Asia all have become issues that concern all participating States. Fortunately, the OSCE provides ample flexibility to address new threats as they arise.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was adopted in April 2004 to facilitate an effective global response to WMD proliferation threats by committing states to improve their domestic controls and prevent non-state actors from acquiring or developing WMD and their means of delivery. As the world's largest regional security organization, the OSCE plays an important role in the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 through effective norm-setting and providing leadership that other regional groupings with less developed structures are looking to follow.

The United Nations Committee overseeing implementation has welcomed the OSCE's efforts to implement UNSCR 1540, praising its ability to leverage and empower regional approaches and understandings. In January 2011, the OSCE hosted a workshop specifically to define the Organization's role in facilitating UN Security Council Resolution 1540. It brought together policymakers and experts from around the world, reviewing progress in the implementation of UNSCR 1540, the facilitation role appropriate for regional organizations and the UN, best practices, lessons learned, and the utility of border controls and end-use monitoring.

The OSCE 1540 workshop demonstrated the Organization's critical role in bringing together national, international, and non-governmental organizations to stop the spread of WMD, and the results are leading to further cooperation. The United States, with support from other delegations, is pressing for the development of such OSCE tools as a best-practices guide for UNSCR 1540 implementation for OSCE participating States, integration of the 1540 Adviser who started working in 2010 at the Secretariat level, national action plans, and making use of OSCE institutions such as the Dushanbe Border Management College.

Small Arms and Light Weapons

The OSCE continues to provide a vital forum for Euro-Atlantic cooperation on the reduction of threats posed by the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons and their possession by sub-national groups. Beginning with the adoption of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons in 1999, the OSCE has fostered cooperation among participating States in reducing trafficking, securing existing stocks, and eliminating excess small arms and light weapons and related materials.

In March 2011, DoD participated in an OSCE-led assessment of ammunition storage, destruction, and related infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan. During this visit, DoD discovered poorly secured man-portable air defense systems MANPADS and large stockpiles of obsolete and hazardous conventional ammunition. As a result the United States has offered funding for physical security upgrades and MANPADS destruction there. DoD will participate in an OSCE follow-up visit in July to assess the possibility of an OSCE-funded storage and security improvement program at seven ammunition and small arms and light weapons depots.

Cyber Security

Next, I would like to address the role of the OSCE in cyber security. Information technologies are vital not only to the global economy but to our national security. There is no exaggerating

DoD's dependence on information networks and systems for the command and control of our forces, intelligence and logistics, and weapons technologies. As malicious cyber activities increase in their scope and sophistication, international concern has increased.

In May, the OSCE hosted a conference on cyber security to explore potential roles for the organization. The conference was broadly attended, with participants from the participating States, partners, and international organizations, including Japan, the European Commission, and NATO. At the conference, the United States suggested that the OSCE promote confidence-building mechanisms within the political-military dimension of security to address cyber threats. In the run-up to the Vilnius Ministerial, DoD will continue to support State Department-led discussions on such mechanisms to protect our vital interests.

Border Security in Central Asia

The United States has been working to promote a stable, secure, and prosperous Central Asia since the break-up of the Soviet Union. At the OSCE Summit in Astana, all participants renewed their commitments across all three dimensions, as well as to continue their efforts to promote a stable, independent, prosperous, and democratic Afghanistan. We can achieve this by improving border security and working to combat drug trafficking and other forms of proliferation across Central Asia.

One area where the United States certainly hopes the OSCE will do more is with Afghanistan. The Government of Afghanistan, an OSCE Partner Country made an urgent request for support in 2007. Responding to this request, the OSCE Secretariat proposed sixteen separate projects to enhance Afghan border security, including an emphasis on building Afghan capacity. These projects are designed to support the Afghanistan National Development Strategy in close coordination with the government of Afghanistan. We would like to see more progress in these projects.

Conclusion

In 1970, if you addressed a group of NATO or Warsaw Pact military planners and told them that they would, within their lifetimes, hand each other their order of battle, publish advance warning of large military exercises, invite the other side to observe the largest of these exercises, conduct thousands of intrusive inspections, and fly hundreds of uncontested reconnaissance sorties over each others' territory, they would have responded with disbelief. Now, we take these measures for granted.

The Helsinki process, initiated in 1973, and aided by this Commission, remains an important tool to remind people that this effort is still underway, and still necessary to prevent future conflicts, resolve the remaining conflicts in Eurasia, and address new threats as they emerge.

I had hoped that by 2011 we would be looking forward to projecting the peace and security of the OSCE area to other areas of instability that the OSCE area would be serving as a beacon and a guide to the rest of the world. Instead, we have much work to do to fulfill our original promise of a Europe whole, free and secure. As well as engaging in the hard work of creating the

conditions necessary for advancement and growth in Central Asia.

I hope that, in the future, the OSCE's Astana Summit will be seen a turning point, where the participating States truly and fully recommitted themselves to reinvigorate the OSCE and move boldly into the 21st century. I think we see some positive signs as we advance toward our next milestone, the Vilnius Ministerial. Time will tell, and with your help, we will succeed.