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**SECOND SEMIANNUAL REPORT  
BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE COMMISSION  
ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE**

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**REPORT**  
SUBMITTED TO THE  
**COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS**



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(II)

## FOREWORD

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
*Washington, D.C., June 26, 1977.*

This report was transmitted to the Committee on International Relations by Hon. Dante B. Fascell, Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It represents the second semi-annual report by the President to the Commission concerning the Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975. A statement by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance was transmitted with the report.

The report and statement are printed in the hope that they will be of use to the members of the Committee on International Relations and others.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, *Chairman.*

(iii)

## LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

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COMMISSION ON  
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,  
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*Washington, D.C., June 7, 1977.*

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,  
*Chairman, International Relations Committee, Rayburn House Office  
Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On June 3, 1977, the President transmitted the second semiannual report to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on implementation of the 1975 Helsinki accords. The report is a detailed and straightforward discussion of the record of implementation and nonimplementation during the period from December 1, 1976, through May 1977, and provides the Commission with valuable material for its own report to the Congress on the subject of Helsinki accord compliance. On June 6, 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance testified to the Commission about the President's report and U.S. policy on the Helsinki accords.

I am sure that the report, with Secretary Vance's statement as an introduction to it, will prove informative and useful to Members of Congress and other interested parties, and I take pleasure in transmitting both herewith to the House International Relations Committee.

Sincerely,

DANTE B. FASCELL, *Chairman.*

# CONTENTS

	Page
FOREWORD.....	III
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL.....	v
STATEMENT OF CYRUS R. VANCE, SECRETARY OF STATE, BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, JUNE 6, 1977..	1
<b>Second Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe</b>	
CHAPTER 1—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET ONE.....	3
A. Declaration of principles guiding relations between participating States.....	3
(1) Implementation.....	3
(i) Berlin and the principles.....	3
(ii) Human rights.....	4
(iii) Nonintervention in internal affairs.....	7
(2) Other uses of the declaration of principles.....	8
(i) U.N. human rights treaties.....	8
(ii) Italo-Yugoslav border agreement.....	9
(iii) Northern Ireland.....	9
(iv) Cyprus.....	9
B. Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.....	9
(1) Prior notification of major maneuvers.....	10
(i) NATO states.....	10
(ii) Warsaw Pact states.....	10
(iii) Neutral and nonaligned states.....	10
(2) Prior notification of smaller maneuvers.....	10
(i) NATO states.....	10
(ii) Warsaw Pact states.....	10
(iii) Neutral and nonaligned states.....	10
(3) Exchange of observers.....	10
(4) Prior notification of major military movements.....	10
(5) Exchange of military visits.....	11
(6) Questions relating to disarmament.....	11
CHAPTER 2—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET TWO.....	13
A. Introduction.....	13
B. Unilateral implementation activities.....	13
(1) Economic and commercial information.....	13
(i) Soviet Union.....	13
(ii) Bulgaria.....	14
(iii) Czechoslovakia.....	14
(iv) German Democratic Republic.....	14
(v) Hungary.....	14
(vi) Poland.....	14
(vii) Romania.....	14
(viii) Western and nonaligned states.....	14
(2) Other activities.....	15
C. Eastern complaints about Western implementation and vice versa.....	15

VIII

CHAPTER 2—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET TWO—Continued	Page.
D. Bilateral implementation.....	16
(1) Trade.....	16
(2) Science and technology.....	16
(3) Tourism.....	17
(4) Other activities.....	17
(i) Soviet Union.....	17
(ii) Bulgaria.....	17
(iii) German Democratic Republic.....	17
(iv) Hungary.....	17
(v) Poland.....	17
(vi) Romania.....	18
E. Multilateral implementation activities.....	18
CHAPTER 3—QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.....	21
CHAPTER 4—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET THREE.....	23
A. Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields.....	23
(1) Human contacts.....	24
(i) Family visits and reunification.....	24
(ii) Binational marriages.....	28
(iii) Travel for personal or professional reasons.....	29
(iv) Religious contacts and information.....	30
(v) Tourism; meetings among young people; sports.....	30
(vi) Expansion of contacts.....	31
B. Information.....	32
(1) Dissemination of information.....	32
(i) Broadcasting.....	32
(2) Cooperation in the field of information.....	33
(3) Working conditions for journalists.....	33
C. Cooperation in exchanges in the fields of culture and education.....	35
(1) General considerations.....	35
(2) Cooperation and exchanges in the field of culture.....	36
(i) Books and publishing.....	36
(ii) Films and broadcasting.....	37
(iii) Performing arts.....	38
(iv) Exhibits.....	39
(v) Exchange visits among specialists.....	40
(vi) Multilateral activities.....	40
(3) Cooperation in exchanges in the field of education.....	41
(i) Extension of relations: Access and exchanges.....	41
(ii) Other educational programs and visits.....	41
(iii) Science.....	43
(iv) Language.....	43
CHAPTER 5—LOOKING TOWARD BELGRADE.....	45

**STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS R. VANCE  
BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOP-  
ERATION IN EUROPE, JUNE 6, 1977**

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Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: You have all received the administration's report on the implementation of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.

Today I want to underline, as did the report, the continuing importance of the effort which began at Helsinki.

You are fully aware of this administration's interest in promoting more stable and mutually beneficial relations between the peoples of East and West. The Helsinki Final Act provides one framework for such cooperation.

You are also aware of our commitment to honor and promote the rights of individuals, the human rights of all peoples, no matter what their political or social origins and affiliations. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has provided a multilateral mechanism through which to pursue these aims.

Before discussing our plans for the forthcoming meeting in Belgrade, I want to convey my thanks for the close working collaboration achieved between the executive and legislative branches of our Government on the many political, economic, and humanitarian issues involved in the Helsinki accords.

I wrote you 3 months ago, Mr. Chairman, to say that "I am most anxious to bring about a relationship of full cooperation between the State Department and the Commission." I think that this relationship has been achieved. You and your colleagues in the Congress have played a helpful and constructive role. We are looking forward to your personal contribution in the work of the Belgrade Review Conference.

The spirit of collaboration has also marked our relations with our allies, at the Geneva and Helsinki phases of CSCE, as well as in our preparatory work for the forthcoming review process.

Let me now state the objectives which we seek at our Belgrade meeting:

We seek full implementation of all the commitments contained in the Helsinki Final Act. None can be called more binding, more vital, than others. All three of the so-called baskets are important.

We seek incremental improvements in relations between East and West on all the fronts surveyed at Helsinki: political, economic, scientific, cultural, security, and humanitarian.

We seek to move forward on all these fronts simultaneously; the freer flow of people and ideas is as important to long-term security and cooperation as, for example, advance notice of major military maneuvers; the humanitarian pledges at Helsinki are as important, as say, the promises of greater commercial cooperation.

There will be consideration of new proposals. But we must not be diverted from assessment of how fully the specific undertakings of Helsinki have been carried out by all the signatories.

This is an ambitious agenda. There may well be differences in understanding and priority; these can be discussed in good faith, in hopes of narrowing such differences.

But such discussions cannot serve as a diversion or a cloak for inaction. The CSCE Final Act was approved by 35 heads of state and government after 3 years of intense negotiations. Undertakings of such gravity cannot subsequently be relaxed or overlooked.

At Belgrade we will assess on the spot how best to be effective and persuasive in pursuing our objectives. Between public diplomacy and quiet diplomacy, we will strive for maximum practical impact.

We will avoid grandiose new proposals that have little chance of being acceptable. Propaganda ploys, debating points have no place in our strategy.

We will state our goals and our assessments clearly, without polemics.

It would serve no one's interests if such serious and far-reaching questions were dealt with in anything other than a serious and straightforward manner.

The report I have transmitted to the Commission on behalf of the President gives you a detailed assessment of what has been done and what has not been done.

Let me say from the start that no nation's record is perfect, and we will accept constructive criticism of our own record, just as we ask others to do.

When I outlined the administration's human rights policy at the University of Georgia last April, I said that "a decision whether and how to act in the cause of human rights is a matter for informed and careful judgment. No mechanistic formula produces an automatic answer."

So it will be in our decisions about working for implementation of the commitments contained in the Helsinki Final Act, those dealing with our political, economic, and military relations, as well as those affecting human rights.

Respect for the undertakings solemnly accepted at CSCE is an effort to which our Government is firmly committed, in the full knowledge that the pursuit of security and cooperation in Europe poses a test of our perseverance as much as of our ideals. I am confident that we will, together, persevere.



## SECOND ANNUAL REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

### CHAPTER 1—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET ONE

#### Questions Relating to Security in Europe

The first "Basket" of the Helsinki Final Act, titled "Questions Relating to Security in Europe," includes a Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States, with a subsection on giving effect to certain of the principles, and document on military confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

#### A. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES

Instances in which CSCE principles were cited in relation to political developments proliferated during the reporting period. While this may have been expected as the Belgrade Review Conference approaches, the majority of the references stemmed from an increase of human rights related activity in the Warsaw Pact countries and Eastern and Western reactions to it. This development served to focus public attention on the implementation records of the Soviet Union and its allies to a greater extent than at any time since the Helsinki Summit.

##### (1) IMPLEMENTATION

Increased attention to CSCE again brought out sharp differences between Western and Eastern interpretations of the Final Act. Despite the fact that the Final Act stipulates the equal importance of all its provisions, the U.S.S.R. and its allies continued to give disproportionate emphasis to the Declaration on Principles in general and those principles useful for their purposes in particular. They thus used the principle on nonintervention in internal affairs as a general defense against Western comment on their implementation performance. At the same time, they sought to deemphasize the principle on human rights and related Basket Three provisions by arguing that Western interest in these parts of the Final Act ignores the integrated nature of that document.

The following presents a review of the major incidents and issues related to the CSCE principles which arose during the reporting period.

##### (i) *Berlin and the principles*

During the reporting period, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) implemented a series of measures which appeared designed to

blur legal distinctions between its own territory and that of East Berlin. These measures included requiring visas for 1-day visits by non-Germans to East Berlin, removing control points on the East Berlin-GDR boundary and eliminating the procedure under which GDR laws must be separately adopted by Berlin authorities before they can apply in East Berlin. These measures were inconsistent with the status of Berlin as confirmed in the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971, to which the Final Act gives implicit recognition. Given the special nature of Western rights and responsibilities in Berlin, however, these issues were handled by the three Western powers directly with the Soviet Union as quadripartite matters rather than in the CSCE context. On May 9, the heads of government of Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States issued a joint communique stating that adherence to existing agreements on Berlin was essential to "the maintenance of security and the development of cooperation throughout Europe."

(ii) *Human rights*

*Soviet Union*

In early 1977, Soviet authorities arrested five prominent human rights advocates—Aleksandr Ginzburg, Yuri Orlov, Anatoli Shcharansky, Mykola Rudenko, and Aleksey Tykhy—and warned Nobel laureate Andrey Sakharov and Amnesty International official Valentin Turchin that continuation of statements to Western newsmen might lead to serious consequences. These measures culminated a period of increased activism among human rights advocates. Shortly before his arrest, Ginzburg defended himself against charges of currency violations by publicly acknowledging that he administered a fund established by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to assist political prisoners and their families.

The arrest of Orlov related directly to the Final Act of CSCE. As head of the "Public Group for the Assistance of the Fulfillment of the Helsinki Agreements in the U.S.S.R.," Orlov had been actively monitoring Soviet CSCE implementation. His group had published 19 reports by early 1977 on such matters as religious freedom, family reunification and the rights of national minorities. Similar groups were also established in the Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and Lithuania. Following Orlov's detention, other Soviet human rights activists sent a letter to Western governments calling the arrest a direct challenge to all signatories of the Helsinki Final Act.

There were other incidents during the reporting period. In December, for example, Moscow police dispersed people assembled in Pushkin Square to express "silent" protest against disparities between the theory and practice of Soviet constitutional law. An Amnesty International report published in January estimated that at least 90 dissidents known to the West have been convicted in the U.S.S.R. since the signing of the Final Act. An April Amnesty International report listed seven Soviet journalists currently under arrest or detention in the Soviet Union. A Belgian citizen arrested in the U.S.S.R. in March for distributing political pamphlets to Soviet students was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment.

The United States publicly and privately expressed its concern regarding the harassment of Sakharov and the arrest of Ginzburg.

Following Orlov's arrest, the United States requested an inquiry by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. After receipt of a letter from Andrei Sakharov asking President Carter to voice support for human rights advocates in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, the President replied with a letter assuring Sakharov that "our government will continue our firm commitment to promote respect for human rights not only in our own country but also abroad." The President and Vice President also met Vladimir Bukovsky, a Soviet dissident recently released from prison.

### *Czechoslovakia*

In early January, the Western press published a document called "Charter 77." It was signed initially by 257 Czechoslovak citizens and later by hundreds more, including prominent intellectuals and a former Foreign Minister. The document called upon the Czechoslovak Government to implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of which were signed by Czechoslovakia in 1968 and promulgated as law in 1976. Charter 77 specifically referred to confirmation of these rights by the Helsinki Final Act and discussed basic liberties such as freedom to voice one's opinions publicly. The document made clear that Charter 77 signers hoped to pursue these objectives in cooperation with the Government, not in opposition to it.

The Czechoslovak Government responded with a massive propaganda campaign denouncing Charter 77 and its supporters. Authorities arrested Charter 77 spokesmen Vaclav Havel, Jiri Lederer, and Frantisek Pavlicek (allegedly for unspecified activities not directly related to the charter) and detained and questioned others. Many signers were dismissed from jobs or otherwise harassed. One prominent signer who was extensively interrogated, the 69-year-old philosopher Jan Patočka, entered a hospital in exhaustion and died of a brain hemorrhage in March. Despite governmental pressure, however, several charter spokesmen continued through the spring to issue documents calling for implementation of human rights declarations formally endorsed by the state.

The Czechoslovak Government's repressive actions prompted numerous protests from abroad. A group of U.S. Congressmen sent a letter of concern to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Washington. Most Western European Communist parties criticized Prague's handling of Charter 77, and groups and individuals in Hungary, Romania, Poland, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia expressed support for the signers. An "International Committee for Support of Charter 77" was formed by a number of prominent Western personalities. Many Western governments expressed concern over the Czechoslovak Government's campaign either publicly or privately within the CSCE context.

In response to the Czechoslovak Government's actions, the U.S. State Department issued a statement referring to the final act and "strongly deploring" such violations of rights wherever they occur. In a protest to our Ambassador in Prague, the Czechoslovak Government asserted that our statement interfered in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. We rejected this claim.

Prior to issuance of the charter, the Czechoslovak Government had in December released four dissidents imprisoned since 1972.

### *German Democratic Republic*

A "Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Socialism," organized within the GDR to monitor violations of human rights, reported that at least 50 people who protested the forced expatriation of poet and singer Wolf Biermann in November had been detained by police and subjected to harassment. However, later reports indicated that the GDR chose to avoid a full-scale repressive campaign against writers and artists who protested the Biermann ouster. Most protesters were allowed to remain active in the Artists and Writers Union, and one of the most prominent protesters, author Rainer Kunze, traveled to Austria during February to receive a literary prize. He later emigrated legally to West Germany, citing difficulties in carrying on his work as the reason for his departure. Several other dissidents have also emigrated from the GDR in recent months.

### *Hungary*

In January, some 30 Hungarian intellectuals sent a letter of solidarity to the Czechoslovak Charter 77 group. Their declaration made no reference to conditions in Hungary. The Hungarian Government has to date taken no apparent measures against any of the signers.

### *Poland*

In January, 172 prominent Polish intellectuals sent the Polish Parliament a petition calling for an inquiry into charges of police brutality and torture following the June 1976 food price riots. First Secretary Edward Gierek stated in early February that he would grant amnesty to all workers still imprisoned as a result of their role in the riots if they "repented" their activities against the state. Reportedly, many workers have since been released. However, the Workers Defense Committee (WDC), an organization established to aid those who were arrested or lost their jobs following the riots, has continued to press for a full investigation of alleged police brutality against the rioters. Polish officials have in turn accused the WDC of having "links" to foreign organizations, including Radio Free Europe. The WDC denies this accusation.

In late March, 18 Polish human rights advocates announced the formation of the "Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights of Man." The group stated that its objective was to seek changes in Polish laws to conform with international human rights documents. The leading Warsaw newspaper quickly denounced the members for "blind servility to foreign anti-Communist centers."

In May, Polish authorities arrested six WDC members, including philosopher Jacek Kuron and writer Adam Michnik, who had attempted to join in a protest of the death earlier in the month of a student supporter of the WDC. Officials claimed the student's death had been accidental, while many dissidents believed he had died as a result of foul play.

### *Romania*

In early 1977, eight Romanian intellectuals, including novelist Paul Goma, sent an open appeal to the signatories of the Final Act, asking them to persuade the Romanian Government to respect fundamental human rights. Goma also sent Czechoslovak dissidents a letter which criticized domestic Romanian conditions. Romanian President

Ceausescu denounced such dissidents as "traitors" and charged that "some circles are attempting to use the Helsinki Final Act to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations." Goma was subsequently expelled from the Writers' Union and placed under arrest for several weeks, although he was released prior to an announced amnesty marking the 100th anniversary of Romanian independence. Certain other dissidents, including a prominent historian, were also released in May.

### *Yugoslavia*

During the reporting period even Yugoslavia, although not a member of the Warsaw Pact and generally considered to have more tolerant human rights policies, came under criticism from some of its citizens for certain practices. In early February, the prominent Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas appealed to Western Communist parties to try to persuade the Yugoslav Government to respect human rights. He estimated that there were at least 600 political prisoners in Yugoslavia and stated that political freedom had deteriorated since 1971.

In a separate incident, 60 Yugoslav intellectuals petitioned the Government to end the arbitrary denial of passports and travel permission to certain of its citizens. The petition pointed out the disparity between such denials and the provisions of the CSCE Final Act. Yugoslav officials stated, however, that 144 of the 161 persons who were initially denied passports in 1976 ultimately obtained passports on appeal.

### *Respect for religious freedom*

Although respect for religious freedom is specifically enumerated in the CSCE human rights principle, Eastern states have to varying degrees continued to discourage their citizens from participating in religious activities.

During the reporting period, sources in the West published a secret handbook allegedly distributed by the Soviet Government to instruct local officials on how to deal with religious groups. It outlines a number of curbs and restrictions on religious practice, including prohibition of religious or prayer meetings organized for children, young people or women.

In late March, a leader of the Pentecostal Christian sect in the U.S.S.R. appealed to President Carter to assist more than 1,000 members of the sect who had applied to emigrate from the Soviet Union because of religious harassment.

In early 1977 a group of Evangelical Baptists in Romania issued a letter charging the Romanian Government with religious discrimination. Several of the authors reportedly underwent daily interrogation by police for a week or longer, but none of them was arrested.

### *(iii) Nonintervention in Internal Affairs*

#### *Eastern accusations of interference*

The Soviet and Eastern European Governments reacted to expressions of Western concern for human rights in their countries with charges that this constituted "interference" in their internal affairs. In a nationally televised speech in March, for example, General Secretary Brezhnev referred to Soviet dissidents as "renegades" and warned: "We will not tolerate interference in our internal affairs by anyone under any pretext." When the United States expressed support

for Andrei Sakharov, the Soviet press charged that "the State Department pronouncement constitutes an unprecedented act of interference in the internal affairs of another country." Following President Carter's letter to Sakharov, the Soviet Government expressed displeasure at alleged attempts to interfere in the U.S.S.R.'s internal affairs. A number of Eastern European states made similar accusations on other occasions.

#### *The U.S. view*

The United States believes that the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act is a matter of obvious and legitimate concern to all signatories. We thus maintain that our interest in human rights does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of other states and has a firm basis in the Final Act and other international documents agreed to on the highest levels. As President Carter stated in his March address to the United Nations: "All the signatories of the U.N. Charter have pledged themselves to observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus, no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business."

We also pointed out to the press that the Soviet Union has a long record of interest in, and comment on, U.S. domestic affairs. Indeed, Communist ideologists have long maintained that, whatever improvement in relations détente may bring, the "ideological struggle" between East and West must persist.

#### *Other Western views*

Most other Western countries have also voiced their support for the human rights principle and rejected Eastern allegations of interference in internal affairs. Many Western European governments, for example, spoke out publicly or through private channels against the harassment of Czechoslovak human rights activists. The Foreign Minister of the Netherlands met with a prominent Czechoslovak human rights advocate in Prague. In his first major public address in March, the British Foreign Secretary expressed strong support for the human rights provisions of the Final Act and said the United Kingdom would speak out for human rights in the Communist as well as non-Communist world. A conference of Western European Socialist leaders in April concluded that pressing for respect of human rights was fully compatible with détente. Former Chancellor Willy Brandt, of West Germany, said in summing up the Conference that violations of human rights, wherever in the world they occur, should be met by adequate action.

#### (2) OTHER USES OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

The declaration, in whole or in part, has related to other developments in the reporting period:

##### (i) *U.N. human rights treaties*

President Carter, in his March address to the United Nations, stated that he would seek Senate ratification of the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Convention Against Genocide, and the Treaty for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The two covenants are cited specifically in the Final Act Principles Declaration.

*(ii) Italo-Yugoslav border agreement*

The agreement reached between Italy and Yugoslavia in November 1975 regarding a permanent border in the Trieste area entered into force in April 1977. Both governments have described the agreement as an example of implementation of the CSCE principles.

*(iii) Northern Ireland*

During the reporting period the Communist press, particularly in the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia, gave substantial coverage to a lawsuit before the European Court in which Ireland has charged Great Britain with violating human rights in Northern Ireland by torturing prisoners. Czechoslovakia used this example to argue that Western commentary on human rights in Eastern Europe is designed "to obscure the fact that it is in the capitalist states where human rights are trampled upon."

*(iv) Cyprus*

The Cyprus situation as it relates to CSCE has not changed during the reporting period. The formal positions which both Turkey and Cyprus took at the Helsinki Summit pertaining to the applicability of Final Act provisions to Cyprus remain in effect. In January, the British press published excerpts of a European Commission on Human Rights report charging Turkey with violation of human rights in Cyprus.

#### B. DOCUMENT ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

While no part of the Final Act is legally binding and military confidence-building measures (CBM's) are explicitly "voluntary," the commitment to prior notification of major military maneuvers (exceeding 25,000 troops) is clear and the implementation record, involving specific events and numbers, lends itself to objective assessment. The Final Act also encourages the notification of smaller military maneuvers (of 25,000 troops or less) and recommends invitations to observers to attend maneuvers. In addition, the Final Act recognizes that notification of major military movements can also contribute to confidence-building.

To date, there is no indication that any participating state or group of states has failed to provide notification of a major military maneuver. The West has a good record of notification of small military maneuvers, while the East has made no real prior notifications of such maneuvers. Hungary is the only Warsaw Pact state which has given notification of some smaller maneuvers, but it has provided only 1-day notice. Observation at most NATO and neutral maneuvers have been afforded greater access to exercise activity than observers at Warsaw Pact maneuvers, and the Warsaw Pact countries have invited observers only from countries located close to the maneuver area. In addition, Warsaw Pact countries have not accepted invitations to observe NATO maneuvers and continued during the reporting period to criticize such maneuvers as alleged military demonstrations contrary to the CSCE spirit.

## (1) PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS

*(i) NATO states*

Since the Alliance ground exercise season is mainly in the fall, NATO members conducted no maneuvers of more than 25,000 troops during the reporting period.

*(ii) Warsaw Pact states*

On March 9 the Soviet Government made notification to CSCE states of its third major national maneuver since the signing of the Final Act. This exercise took place March 31–April 5 in Soviet Moldavia and the Ukraine. Observers were not invited nor was a designation for the maneuver given. Three of the major Eastern maneuvers for which notification has been given since the signing of the Final Act have been national Soviet maneuvers in the U.S.S.R. and one was a joint Warsaw Pact maneuver in Poland, for which Poland gave notification.

*(iii) Neutral and nonaligned states*

No neutral/nonaligned states have held major maneuvers since the signing of the Final Act; except for Switzerland in October of 1975.

## (2) PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF SMALLER MANEUVERS

*(i) NATO states*

The United States on April 7, 1977, made notification of its exercise "Certain Fighter," a field-training exercise which took place from May 1–8 in Hesse in the Federal Republic of Germany—24,000 U.S. personnel were involved.

*(ii) Warsaw Pact states*

The Warsaw Pact states gave no notification of smaller exercises during the reporting period.

*(iii) Neutral and nonaligned states*

Sweden gave notification of a winter exercise captioned "Vonn 77" which took place in Lower Norland from March 5 to 9. The exercise involved 10,000 Swedish troops.

## (3) EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS

Sweden invited observers to its "Vonn 77" maneuver. U.S. observers participated.

## (4) PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS

No CSCE signatory state gave notification of a military movement during the reporting period. In fact, to date no signatory state has made a separate notification of a military movement. However, "Reforger," the annual return of continental U.S.-based forces to Europe for the fall exercise season, was mentioned in each of the notifications last fall of those Allied maneuvers which included "Reforger" troops.



## (5) EXCHANGE OF MILITARY VISITS

Under the category of "Other confidence-building measures," the Final Act encourages exchanges of military personnel, including visits by military delegations.

There have been frequent exchanges of high level military delegations between Eastern and Western countries since the Helsinki Summit. A visit by U.S. National War College (NWC) students to the U.S.S.R. was conducted on May 11 to 18. Similar visits by the NWC and the U.S. Industrial College of the Armed Forces were also made to Romania. In addition, the Romanian Air Force Chief of Staff has been invited to visit the United States. The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations visited Yugoslavia in mid-May as a guest of the head of the Yugoslav Navy.

There have been numerous exchanges of visits by naval ships between other Western countries and the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe since Helsinki. The U.S. ships *J. F. Kennedy*, *Farragut*, and *Sylvania* visited Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, from March 28 to April 2, 1977.

## (6) QUESTIONS RELATING TO DISARMAMENT

The Soviet Union has cited on a number of occasions the passages in the Final Act which call for the promotion of disarmament and describe the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security. The Soviets have increasingly referred to a relationship between implementation of the Final Act and further progress in the disarmament field.

The Warsaw Pact countries also advanced proposals for foreclosing any expansion in the membership of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and for a treaty on non-first-use of nuclear weapons by CSCE signatories. The NATO Allies rejected these proposals in the December 1976 NATO ministerial communique. They urged that all CSCE participants strictly respect the renunciation of the threat or use of force called for in both the Helsinki Final Act and the U.N. Charter and pointed out that this renunciation applies to all types of weapons. They also recommended pursuit of realistic efforts to achieve genuine measures of disarmament and arms control.

## CHAPTER 2—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET TWO

### Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment

#### A. INTRODUCTION

There was little development in unilateral Basket Two implementation during the period covered by this report. The Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries continued to use trade complaints against the West in efforts to divert attention from their implementation of Basket Two commitments. To the same end, they continued advocating acceptance of the sweeping Soviet proposals for pan-European conferences on energy, transportation, and the environment.

The provision of useful economic and commercial information by the East did not improve and, in some cases, even worsened. In the bilateral context, U.S. trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe continued to grow and some additional representative offices of U.S. firms were opened. Activity under bilateral agreements on science and technology continued at a high level and new agreements were signed or under negotiation.

The most visible implementation activity was on the multilateral front. The United States and other Western countries obtained a strengthened role for the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in specific CSCE projects and generally as the main multilateral arena for Basket Two implementation activities. The ECE also agreed to study the feasibility and utility of a high-level meeting within the ECE on the environment. There was also some activity on the Eastern proposal for a recognition agreement between the European Communities and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA).

#### B. UNILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

##### (1) ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION

In this reporting period, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states made little improvement in either the quantity or quality of useful published economic and commercial information. This situation varied in degree from country to country.

##### (i) *Soviet Union*

The Soviets took a step backward in the provision of economic information when the print run of the U.S.S.R. Statistical Annual for 1975 amounted to only 30,000 copies, as opposed to 45,000 copies for the years 1974 and 1973. This yearbook is the main source for the West of most statistical data on the Soviet economy.

Another negative development was an indication that the Soviets will not publish a detailed version of the current 5-year plan. The publication of such a document in 1972 had assisted Western economists and businessmen in evaluating and interpreting the basic plan document. Although a summary of the present plan was published, Soviet officials indicated that their planners will be too busy preparing the 15-year plan to publish a detailed version of the 5-year plan.

(ii) *Bulgaria*

Bulgaria's performance in the provision of economic and commercial information was mixed during this reporting period. On the one hand the Bulgarians published a somewhat improved foreign trade statistical yearbook. On the other hand, the press run for the yearbook was limited to 900 copies and quickly exhausted.

(iii) *Czechoslovakia*

Czechoslovak performance in providing economic and commercial information continued to be poor.

(iv) *German Democratic Republic*

The GDR's record of publishing economic and commercial information has remained poor. This situation may change once the privately sponsored joint United States-German Democratic Republic Trade and Economic Council now being formed begins its work. An initial plenary session is planned for mid-June in Washington.

(v) *Hungary*

The Hungarian record in providing economic and commercial information has generally been good. There were no apparent changes during this reporting period.

(vi) *Poland*

As noted in the previous report, Poland has generally done well in providing economic and commercial information. During this reporting period there were no significant changes.

(vii) *Romania*

Romanian performance with regard to provision of economic and commercial information remains inadequate, despite modest efforts at improvement. However, at a December 1976 meeting of United States and Romanian agricultural officials, the Romanians renewed their pledge to abide by the information exchange provisions of the 1975 United States-Romanian Protocol on Agriculture. In addition, the recently signed Long-Term Agreement on Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation, in language similar to that of the Final Act, reaffirmed Romania's commitment to make commercial data available.

(viii) *Western and nonaligned states*

The United States has taken steps to improve its already excellent record on dissemination of economic and commercial information by providing organization charts of Government bodies involved in East-West trade, together with comprehensive lists of directories of U.S. commercial firms, to the ECE in Geneva where they are available to

all CSCE countries. Likewise, the United States has taken measures to acquaint its business community with the provisions of Basket Two through publication of the brochure "The Helsinki Final Act: A Guide for the U.S. Business Community."

In general, the Western European states provided full economic and commercial information as envisaged in the Final Act. A number of states such as Portugal, Turkey and Greece, continued their previous efforts to improve deficiencies in statistical and information services. There were no significant changes in information provided by nonaligned states.

#### (2) OTHER ACTIVITIES

In the field of business facilitation, the Soviet Union permitted three more U.S. firms to open representative offices in Moscow. While this was a positive step, bringing the number of U.S. firms with offices in Moscow to 25, a number of other applications still await decision by the Soviets.

The United States agreed to let the Soviet Union establish a company, with headquarters in New York, to handle imports of Soviet tractors in the United States. It also agreed to let a Soviet citizen work for a newly established joint fishing company in Bellingham, Wash. In return, the U.S.S.R. agreed to let an American representative of the firm live and work in Nakhodka.

In negative developments, the Soviet Union in certain cases implemented a more restrictive visa procedure for some resident representatives of U.S. firms. It included a shortening of the time period during which the exit portion of a 30-day single entry/exit visa may be used, plus the requirement for stating the departure destination well in advance of travel. We expressed our concern regarding this procedure to Soviet officials. In addition, Soviet authorities continued to discourage Soviet tourism to the United States and offered little cooperation to the Visit U.S.A. Committee at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

#### C. EASTERN COMPLAINTS ABOUT WESTERN IMPLEMENTATION AND VICE VERSA

The Soviet Union and the Eastern European states have continued to complain of the West's performance in the Basket Two area. The absence of most-favored-nation tariff status in trading relations between the United States and most of the Eastern countries remained the most common grievance. In addition, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania complained that U.S. countervailing duties and anti-dumping regulations discriminate against nonmarket economies. The majority of Eastern complaints against the Western Europeans continued to focus on alleged tariff and nontariff barriers by the European Community.

Western complaints against Eastern countries included the poor provision of economic information, lack of access by Western businessmen to end-users of their products, arbitrary quotas on trade with Western countries, and insistence of Eastern countries on the primacy of intra-COMECON trade in their overall foreign trade balance.

## D. BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION

In bilateral relations between the United States and the Eastern countries, there was considerable activity toward new economic, commercial, scientific, and technological agreements. Despite little progress in the provision of economic and commercial information in the bilateral context, the United States received renewed pledges of improvement in this area. Trade between the United States and the Eastern countries continued to grow substantially. Toward the end of 1976 the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council as well as the United States-Romanian Joint Economic Commission met. The United States-Polish Economic Council met in Warsaw in May, and the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commercial Commission is scheduled to meet in early June. Arrangements for a United States-German Democratic Republic Trade and Economic Council are being completed. Fisheries agreements with the U.S.S.R., Romania, and Bulgaria have recently been concluded.

### (1) TRADE

U.S. trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union continued substantial growth in 1976, bolstered in part by massive exports of U.S. grain. U.S. exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—excluding Yugoslavia—totaled nearly \$3.5 billion in 1976—an increase of over 25 percent over the 1975 figure of less than \$2.8 billion. Especially large increases in U.S. exports to the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania occurred in 1976. U.S. exports to Czechoslovakia nearly tripled and to the GDR nearly quadrupled because of grain shipments. U.S. exports registered substantial increases in regard to all the Eastern countries except Hungary, whose purchases declined by 20 percent.

Overall U.S. imports from the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries increased from \$730 million in 1975 to \$864 million in 1976. While imports from all the Eastern European countries increased over 1975 levels, imports from the GDR and Czechoslovakia failed to reach 1974's prerecession levels. Imports from the Soviet Union continued to decline, reaching only \$221 million in 1976 as compared to \$254 million in 1975 and \$350 million in 1974.

### (2) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Scientific exchanges and joint work continued under the eleven specialized bilateral agreements on scientific and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union. Meetings included two joint committees in December—under the Agriculture and Atomic Energy Agreements—as well as a number of working groups under the Energy, Space, Oceans, and Science and Technology Agreements. In March, another U.S. firm signed a scientific and technological cooperation agreement with the Soviets.

In other activity, the United States and Hungary signed an agreement in April on Cooperation in Culture, Education, Science and Technology. Texts of similar agreements were negotiated with Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. The 1977-78 program plan under the 1974 agreement with Romania was completed in January and the last U.S.-owned zlotys in the joint United States-Polish account were obligated

at the end of 1976 for cooperative projects. When matched by Poland, the equivalent of \$60 million will have been made available for such projects.

### (3) TOURISM

The Visit U.S.A. Committee set up at our Embassy in Moscow continued to encourage tourism by Soviet citizens to the United States. Official Soviet organs, however, continued to show little cooperation. In February the United States notified the Hungarians that we have no objection to their proposal to station representatives of the Hungarian tourist industry in the Malev Airline office in New York.

### (4) OTHER ACTIVITIES

#### (i) *Soviet Union*

At the end of November 1976 the United States and the U.S.S.R. signed a Governing International Fisheries Agreement.

#### (ii) *Bulgaria*

In February, the Bulgarian Government approved the Governing International Fisheries Agreement negotiated with the United States. During the March meeting of the Bulgarian-United States Economic Council, the two sides adopted a nonbinding procedure for the pre-arbitral conciliation of commercial disputes.

#### (iii) *German Democratic Republic*

In May, the GDR presented to our Embassy several proposals for expanding trade and commercial ties between our countries. Most of the proposals, such as the GDR request for most-favored-nation tariff status, had been made on previous occasions. We will continue to discuss these and other matters with the GDR on a systematic basis.

#### (iv) *Hungary*

In December, the restrictions of the Johnson Act, which prohibits purchase or sale of bonds or other financial obligations of any foreign government which is in default to the U.S. Government, were officially lifted because Hungary had paid all arrears on its debts to the United States. In March we informed the Hungarian Government that there would be no legal obstacles to the opening of a branch of the Hungarian National Bank in New York. Present plans call for the opening of such an office in September 1977. A U.S. proposal for reciprocal reduction of fees for business visas and a draft convention on the avoidance of double taxation with Hungary are being considered. Finally, the Hungarians are working on plans for a series of Hungarian economic-technical days this fall. This major trade promotion activity, the first ever sponsored in the United States by the Hungarians, will consist of 1-day seminars in Washington, New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. These will be followed by visits of Hungarian technical experts to scientific meetings and conventions throughout the United States.

#### (v) *Poland*

In March, a Polish delegation came to the United States to review the U.S. antidumping measures against imports of golf carts. A Polish delegation visited Washington in February to discuss the Treasury Department's proposals for handling countervailing duty

complaints against nonmarket economies. The Treasury Department agreed to receive a second delegation sometime after May 23.

(vi) *Romania*

In November 1976 Romania signed a Governing International Fisheries Agreement with the United States.

#### E. MULTILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

During the reporting period, Eastern and Western countries were active in the multilateral aspects of Basket Two implementation. Eastern attention focused on the Soviet Union's proposals for all-European conferences on energy, transportation and the environment. The East also continued advocating its proposal for a mutual recognition agreement between the European Community and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). Western efforts succeeded in strengthening the role of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) as the main forum for multilateral implementation of Basket Two provisions and as a forum to pursue several specific projects.

The highlight of multilateral activities in the CSCE basket two area was the 32d plenary session of the ECE in April and, in particular, its handling of the Soviet proposals for conferences on energy, transportation, and the environment. When first proposed by the Soviets, these conferences generated little interest in the West. The United States and its allies continue to feel that the ECE should be the forum for multilateral implementation of basket two, and that the focus of ECE activities should remain on concrete implementation of specific commitments already undertaken in the final act. The ECE's 32d plenary session approved a resolution calling on the executive secretary to study possible topics for consideration at a high-level ECE meeting on the environment and to report to the ECE 33d plenary in 1978 on these topics and on the organization of such a conference. A decision on whether or not to hold such a meeting will be taken at that time.

In other ECE activities, the November-December 1976 meeting of the Committee on Development of Trade agreed on a 5-year work program largely corresponding to its CSCE trade-related mandate. The program contains a number of specific projects sought by the United States and other Western countries, particularly in the area of information dissemination. One project adopted by the committee was a U.S. proposal for strengthening basket two implementation through an annual listing by member governments of the basic information they feel is needed to improve development of trade. The ECE secretariat will assemble these lists, prepare studies as needed, and provide them to annual meetings of the committee. Another project calls on member countries to submit to the ECE lists of directories of firms and organizations concerned with foreign trade. Thus far, only the United States has submitted these lists.

At the February meeting of ECE senior advisers on environment, 14 ECE countries agreed to a Norwegian proposal for a joint program on monitoring the long range transport of air pollutants, beginning with sulfur dioxide. The Norwegians also formally tabled an expanded version of this initiative, proposing an ECE conference for the pur-

pose of reaching intergovernmental agreement on establishing harmonized control measures for the emission of air pollutants.

In other areas, activity continued on the eastern proposal for a recognition agreement between the European Community and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). In November 1976, the EC sent a letter containing a draft counterproposal to CEMA. This response suggested negotiations between the two bodies leading to an agreement covering sectors falling within their respective competence. These include economic forecasting, commercial and economic statistics, the environment, and standardization. In April 1977, CEMA responded to the EC letter, noting that both sides have made known their initial positions and proposing that negotiations between the presidencies of the two bodies toward an agreement begin as soon as possible.



The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry should be supported by a valid receipt or invoice. This ensures transparency and allows for easy verification of the data.

In the second section, the author outlines the various methods used to collect and analyze the data. These include direct observation, interviews with key personnel, and the use of specialized software tools. Each method is described in detail, highlighting its strengths and potential limitations.

The third section presents the results of the study. It shows that there is a significant correlation between the variables being measured. The data indicates that the current processes are largely effective, but there are still areas where improvements can be made to increase efficiency and reduce errors.

Finally, the document concludes with a series of recommendations based on the findings. These suggestions are aimed at addressing the identified weaknesses and implementing best practices to ensure the long-term success of the organization's operations.

SECRET

### CHAPTER 3—QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

In the Mediterranean section of the final act the participating states affirmed the importance of their relations with the nonparticipating Mediterranean states and declared their intention to improve relations with these states. This section was not intended to shift the basic East-West focus of CSCE discussions, but rather to acknowledge in a positive manner contributions made by the representatives of six nonparticipating Mediterranean littoral states<sup>1</sup> during the course of the CSCE.

Various activities can be related to the broad provisions of the Mediterranean section. For example, U.S. efforts to find a peaceful solution in the Middle East, including Secretary Vance's February 14-21 trip to several states in the Mediterranean basin and other U.S. meetings with leaders of these states, could be related to language in this section calling for an improvement in mutual confidence in order to promote security and stability in the Mediterranean area.

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<sup>1</sup> Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia.

## CHAPTER 4—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET THREE

### A. COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS

Basket three of the final act contains a variety of provisions all sharing a common objective—the freer flow of people, ideas and information among the signatory states. During the CSCE negotiations, the United States and most other Western countries took the position that genuine security and cooperation in Europe require a dismantling of the barriers which stifle contact and communication between the peoples of East and West. While accepting the third basket at the Helsinki Summit, the Soviet Union and its allies have since tried to diminish the full extent of its obligation upon them. They have advanced arguments and interpretations which seek to blunt the purpose of basket three through token and selective implementation of its provisions.

This pattern, with some modification, persisted during the reporting period. Wary of the scheduled review of implementation at Belgrade, a number of Warsaw Pact Governments have in recent months tried to counter Western criticism of their implementation records through a carrot and stick tactic. On the one hand, they have offered concessions in areas least incompatible with the closed nature of Eastern societies but known to be of interest to the West. Thus, for example, certain countries have recently made efforts to resolve some long-standing family reunification cases and increase the number of Western periodicals available at selected newsstands. On the other hand, these same governments have often reacted harshly toward public criticism of their implementation records while retaining their fundamentally restrictive policies intact. Working conditions for Western journalists in Eastern countries deteriorated during the reporting period, and basic policies which assure rigid state control over the movement of people and information remained generally unaltered. The overall basket three implementation by the Warsaw Pact countries, though varying among individual states, remained well below the objectives of the final act.

Eastern countries responded to western criticism of their implementation with charges that Western Governments, and particularly the United States, are “interfering” in their domestic affairs and seeking to mask their own implementation failures. While we categorically reject charges of interference and believe our implementation record to be generally excellent, we are reviewing aspects of our own implementation with a view toward a fuller compliance with CSCE provisions. For example, our visa-issuing practices are now under review to determine whether administrative and possibly legislative changes are required.

Similarly, the United States in March allowed expiration of restrictions on use of U.S. passports for travel to Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. In April we removed restrictions on the

travel of permanent resident aliens to all Communist and Communist-dominated countries. These actions demonstrate our desire to contribute to the CSCE objective of progressively reducing obstacles to the freer movement of all peoples.

### 1. HUMAN CONTACTS<sup>1</sup>

Despite some apparent efforts to improve their implementation records for the Belgrade review meeting, the Warsaw Pact countries have not fundamentally altered their policies on human contacts during the reporting period. Most Soviet and Eastern European officials continued to view travel or emigration to the West as a privilege to be granted or refused by the state rather than as a matter of personal choice.

Though the right of emigration is covered only indirectly in the Final Act (through endorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes the right of individuals to leave and return to their own countries), family reunification and marriage between nationals of different states are specific CSCE concerns. These tend to intermingle in the Soviet Union, where family reunification is considered by the state to be the sole legitimate reason for emigration. Though Soviet officials claim possession of state secrets or hardship of other family members to be the only grounds for refusal of emigration applications, these criteria are in practice often arbitrarily invoked. Procedures in Eastern Europe follow a similar though sometimes less restrictive pattern. Applying for either permanent or temporary reunification with relatives abroad thus remains an unpredictable endeavor in Eastern countries, particularly when such relatives are considered to have left Eastern countries "illegally."

#### (i) Family visits and reunification

During the reporting period, the United States continued to make representations to all of the Warsaw Pact countries to request fulfillment of CSCE obligations in resolving the longstanding divided family cases of which the U.S. Government is aware. The following numbers of such problem cases involving at least one previous refusal remained pending between the United States and Warsaw Pact countries as of May 1, 1977:

	Immediate families <sup>1</sup>		Nonimmediate families	
	Total cases	Individuals	Total cases	Individuals
Bulgaria.....	10	15	8	21
Czechoslovakia.....	30	74	13	19
German Democratic Republic.....	5	9	24	42
Hungary.....	7	12	0	0
Poland.....	136 <sup>2</sup>	247	810	2,467
Romania.....	218	327	578	1,560
U.S.S.R.....	124	359		

<sup>1</sup> An immediate family is comprised of spouses plus their minor children. A nonimmediate family includes brothers, sisters, adult children, parents of adult children, etc. It was not possible to make this distinction in the case of the Soviet Union, the figures for which include both immediate and nonimmediate families.

<sup>2</sup> Approximate.

<sup>1</sup> The material contained in this chapter, except where otherwise indicated, reflects the U.S. experience with the member states of the Warsaw Pact. Our consultations indicate that the experience of other Western states follows a generally similar pattern.

Despite U.S. efforts, resolution of divided family cases continued to be a slow and often frustrating endeavor. Individual successes were often accompanied by the appearance of new cases, leaving the final tally worsened or unchanged. We have, however, continued our representations on this issue and monitored emigration trends on a country-by-country basis.

*U.S.S.R.*

Our Embassy in Moscow processed a total of 2,574 Soviet emigrants to the United States in 1976, more than double the 1975 figure. The following table reflects the upward trend since 1972, with the sharpest rate of increase occurring last year:

1972.....	494	1975.....	1,162
1973.....	758	1976.....	2,574
1974.....	1,029		

While the high percentile increase for 1976 is a significant development, it should be noted that the absolute numbers are still relatively small. Also, much of the increase resulted from emigration of ethnic Armenians (69 percent of the total), many of whom immigrated to the Soviet Union after World War II, remained somewhat apart from the mainstream of Soviet society, and had, in the past, been immigrating to Lebanon rather than the United States. Soviet issuance of exit visas for the United States to Jews and other ethnic groups has increased only slightly since the CSCE.

In addition to tolerating Armenian emigration, Soviet authorities also increased the number of ethnic Germans allowed to resettle in the FRG. The 1976 total of 9,600 significantly reversed the slight downturn in 1975 and more than tripled the 1972 level, as seen in this table:

1972.....	3,100	1975.....	5,800
1973.....	4,400	1976.....	9,600
1974.....	6,300		

Nonetheless, a group of ethnic Germans refused exit visas protested their plight in an attempted demonstration in the West German Embassy in Moscow in May.

Issuance of exit visas to Soviet Jews destined for Israel increased in the last quarter of 1976 to produce a yearly total of over 14,000. Although this rise over 1975 halted the decline of the previous 2 years, Jewish emigration remained far below levels reached in 1972-73:

1972.....	31,500	1975.....	13,000
1973.....	35,000	1976.....	14,000
1974.....	20,000		

These figures indicate that the reforms in Soviet emigration policy announced in early 1976, such as the right to request reviews of refusals after 6 months instead of 1 year, apparently did not result in a greatly increased rate of Soviet Jewish emigration. At various times during 1976 there were also reports that some Soviet officials administered emigration laws more strictly by more narrowly defining family connections required to support an emigration application. Early 1977 figures have thus far shown approximately the same Jewish emigration rate as in 1976.

In a January 1977 press interview, the Director of the Visa and Registration Department of the Soviet Ministry of the Interior re-

stated the Soviet claim that 98.4 percent of those who wish to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. have their applications granted, and added that the number of Jews applying for emigration had declined by two-thirds since 1973. Though difficult to confirm or refute, the low refusal percentage may be technically accurate since the U.S.S.R. discourages emigration primarily by penalizing applicants with loss of employment and sometimes shelter, thereby creating an atmosphere which inhibits submission of applications. A refusal percentage thus cannot be a reliable measure of Soviet tolerance on emigration matters.

While the Soviet Union has allowed some increase in overall emigration rates, it has not shown itself more forthcoming in resolution of "difficult" divided family cases. Since January 20, we have emphasized the administration's commitment to family reunification and gave the Soviets lists of 10 divided family cases resulting in particular hardship as well as a list of Soviet citizens refused exit visas to join relatives in the United States. This second list, the 19th in a series which the United States has presented over a period of 20 years, contained the names of 366 individuals in 128 family units. In talks with high Soviet officials we have expressed U.S. interest in the resolution of a large number of cases of Soviet Jews refused exit visas for Israel.

#### *Bulgaria*

Following Bulgarian assurances in April 1976 that the divided families issue would soon be resolved, the Bulgarian Government made some effort to diminish the number of outstanding cases. In February Bulgarian officials informed our Embassy that they had reviewed all divided family cases with the United States of which they had knowledge. They stated that all the persons had been granted permission to travel to the United States except for two cases which had been refused and eight cases which were still pending. We have since noticed a tendency to resolve family reunification cases more quickly.

#### *Czechoslovakia*

Czechoslovak authorities appear to have adopted a more flexible attitude in recent months, at least in cases involving separation of minor children from parents. In early November, Prague officials gave our Embassy a list of 20 children belonging to 15 couples in the United States and said that there was a likelihood the children would soon receive exit visas. Thirteen children have since obtained emigration permits. Although there was little progress on many other long-standing cases of reunification, the reversal of Czechoslovakia's hard line on cases involving children was a welcome development, particularly since Prague released children to other Western countries as well. In April, we received indications that the Czechoslovak Government is considering a program which might help resolve other divided family cases on which progress thus far has been extremely slow.

In April, the Czechoslovak press published a Czechoslovak woman's appeal to President Carter for assistance in return of her two children to Czechoslovakia. The children, living in California with foster parents, had been brought to the United States in 1968 by the father who subsequently died. The California State Supreme Court reversed an earlier San Bernardino Court decision and turned down the mother's request for the children in 1972.

### *German Democratic Republic*

Emigration continued to be an especially vexing problem for the GDR, where an estimated 100,000 people are believed to have applied for permanent exit visas since the signing of the Final Act. Apparently dismayed by this trend, the GDR Government unexpectedly revived a 1963 regulation and for several hours on January 11 denied East Germans access to the FRG mission in East Berlin. Police officers informed prospective visitors that the mission could not be entered without prior written approval from the GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the exchanges which followed, the East Germans claimed that the FRG mission had been violating the Helsinki Final Act and interfering in internal GDR affairs, implicitly by assisting GDR citizens in emigration procedures. The FRG vigorously denied charges of wrongdoing and made clear its intent to continue advising individuals who visit the mission for assistance.

Most GDR divided family cases concern emigrations to West Germany, and the number of cases involving the United States is by comparison small. Nonetheless, we place high priority on resolution of these cases, and several times during the reporting period our Embassy in Berlin presented GDR officials with updated representation lists of both permanent and temporary reunifications still pending. In April, GDR officials indicated that they would resolve these cases shortly. This was repeated in an aide memoire presented to our Embassy on May 12.

### *Hungary*

While strict on paper, Hungarian emigration policy has tended in practice to be relatively tolerant. In January, we passed to the Hungarian Government a list of 7 unresolved family reunification cases involving 12 individuals in Hungary. We recognized the relatively positive efforts of the Hungarian Government in past reunifications of divided families, but emphasized that more could be done to resolve remaining cases. While the seven cases were still pending as of May 1, we remain hopeful of future progress.

### *Poland*

Polish policy toward emigration has been relatively strict in recent years, leading to a large accumulation of divided family cases. On January 5, we passed to Polish officials copies of all the lists of divided family cases handed to Polish authorities since January 1, 1974—few of which have been answered directly—and a chronology showing 58 U.S. representations on this issue in the same time frame. We emphasized that a continuing impediment to resolution of many cases appeared to be the narrow Polish definition of family, which excludes siblings and adult children, and expressed hope that the definition would be broadened. While there is still no evidence of a permanent change of policy, the Polish Government recently took favorable action on a few urgent, humanitarian cases.

### *Romania*

Romanian performance on family reunification has generally improved since the signing of the Final Act, though the motivation likely rests more with the receipt by Romania of most-favored-nation tariff status and access to Export-Import Bank credits from the United

States than with its CSCE obligations. In recent months, however, Romania's processing rate has not kept up with the increase of new cases, leading to a considerable backlog. In our exchanges with Romanian officials, we expressed the hope that efforts to improve the situation would be made.

Emigration from Romania to the United States totaled 1,021 in 1976, somewhat above the 890 figure for 1975. Early 1977 figures indicate a decline in Romanian emigration to the United States and Israel as compared to 1976 levels. Emigration of ethnic Germans to West Germany rose sharply during the first quarter of 1977 but declined in the spring.

#### *Family visits*

Soviet and Eastern European policy on family visits continued to be restrictive and far below the objectives set by the Helsinki Final Act. Temporary exit visas for family visits to the West were generally issued only on invitation from abroad and to those individuals whose family and professional circumstances or age gave some assurance of return to the home country. Even under these conditions, however, exit visas could by no means be guaranteed. In cases where relatives were considered to have gone abroad "illegally," the prospects of family visits generally grew poorer still. In February, for example, the ballet star Rudolf Nureyev stated publicly that he had been trying for 14 years without success to get a temporary exit visa for his 72-year-old mother in the U.S.S.R.

Of the Warsaw Pact countries Hungary was the most flexible in this area and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Soviet Union maintained the strictest policies. The U.S.S.R. permitted 1,654 private citizens to visit relatives in the United States in 1976. While this is a very low absolute figure, it does represent an increase of 40 percent over the 1975 figures.

The United States continued to raise family visit cases on an individual basis with Eastern governments. Following our intercession, some countries have on occasion reversed unfavorable decisions on granting entry visas for family visits.

The Romanian Government indicated early in 1977 that persons of "Romanian origin" visiting Romania would be exempted from the lodging and currency exchange requirements for tourists. The definition of "Romanian origin" remained unclear, however.

#### *(ii) Binational marriages*

As of May 1, the following numbers of problem binational marriage cases were pending involving American citizens and citizens of the Warsaw Pact countries:

Bulgaria .....	0
Czechoslovakia .....	9
German Democratic Republic.....	11
Hungary .....	0
Poland .....	0
Romania .....	71
U.S.S.R. ....	4

Policy toward East-West marriages continued to vary among Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviets remained uncooperative toward individual cases, while Czechoslovakia generally allowed exit after marriage but almost always prohibited departure of single persons for purposes of



marriage. Some marriages were effectively obstructed by refusal of the Eastern country to grant an entry visa to the U.S. fiance. In a January 20 demarche to Romanian officials, the United States emphasized that the large backlog in marriage cases was a very negative aspect of our bilateral relations. The Romanians expressed the desire to make resolution of marriage cases more flexible in the future, although the backlog has for the most part continued to grow.

*(iii) Travel for personal or professional reasons*

During the reporting period, the most serious contravention of CSCE provisions on personal and professional travel occurred on December 30 when the GDR announced that as of January 1 all non-German visitors to East Berlin from West Berlin would be required to have visas, even for 1-day visits. Previously such visas had not been required of visitors staying less than 24 hours. This move was contrary to CSCE commitments "to simplify and to administer flexibly the procedures for exit and entry."

The GDR also continued its practice of periodically obstructing travelers to East Berlin. Since early 1977, for example, a large number of former GDR residents who had left the country legally have been prevented from visiting East Berlin and the GDR despite possession of proper documents. Hundreds of formal complaints have been filed with the Travel and Visits Commission in Berlin. A new 10 mark fee on passenger cars entering East Berlin imposed by the GDR at the end of February has also served to complicate procedures for entry.

As noted in the section of this report on Basket Two implementation, Soviet authorities have recently imposed new visa procedures on some representatives of U.S. commercial firms stationed in the U.S.S.R. These procedures serve to abbreviate the validity of Soviet exit/reentry visas, make travel on short notice difficult, and require businessmen to declare their itinerary outside the U.S.S.R. The United States raised these procedures with Soviet officials and pointed out their discrepancy with CSCE commitments. We also reminded the Soviets of our longstanding proposal, which has not been responded to by the Soviet Government, to issue multiple-entry visas on a reciprocal basis to commercial personnel.

An article in the Soviet weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta* during the reporting period charged that the State Department had violated the Final Act by refusing a visa to the journal's editor (who is also a member of the Supreme Soviet) in retaliation for the Soviet denial of a visa to Chairman Dante Fascell of the joint Legislative-Executive CSCE Commission. The article claimed that there was no similarity between the two situations because the CSCE Commission had been created "unilaterally" and interfered in the internal affairs of the Socialist countries. In February, Senator Richard Stone, a member of the Commission, failed to obtain a visa to the U.S.S.R. in a repetition of the Soviets' refusal of a visa to Chairman Fascell.

The United States continued its efforts during the reporting period to reach bilateral agreements for facilitating travel in the CSCE context. Following the generally small implementation of our April 1976 agreement with Hungary to issue diplomatic and official visas within 7 working days, we proposed to Hungarian officials on January 19 the reciprocal issuance of 1-year multiple-entry visas to diplomats and officials coming on temporary visits for official business.

During the reporting period, the United States proposed to Eastern European governments the reciprocal issuance to diplomats and government officials of multiple-entry visas valid for the specific period of official assignment in the other country, up to a period of 48 months. Presently, such visas are issued for a maximum 12-month period, thus necessitating annual revalidations. We specifically characterized the proposal as a step forward in the context of CSCE implementation.

In January, we reminded the Romanian Government that no response has yet been received to our earlier proposal to facilitate issuance of tourist, business, and transit visas by lengthening validities and making the visas multiple-entry.

*(iv) Religious contacts and information*

Soviet policy on religious contacts not officially approved by the Government remained strict during the reporting period, particularly in cases of contact between Soviet and Western Jews.

In December, Soviet authorities refused visas to seven American scholars invited to a Jewish Cultural Symposium in Moscow. When we took the matter up with Soviet officials, they maintained that the symposium was only a "political demonstration" and told us that six of the Americans were temporarily barred from the U.S.S.R. and one permanently. Soviet authorities subsequently detained 13 of the symposium's organizers. Those remaining free condemned the action but were able to proceed only with the meeting.

A similar scientific symposium organized in Moscow by Soviet Jewish scientists 4 months later proceeded successfully with 10 American and Canadian participants. Some of the foreign participants, who arrived on tourist visas, were warned against participating, however, and two were turned back at Leningrad.

In December, we raised with Soviet officials two incidents in which a total of seven Americans were detained at Moscow airport and not allowed entry into the U.S.S.R., apparently in some cases for carrying religious artifacts. The incidents were also disturbing because one group had been denied the right to call the U.S. Embassy for consular assistance, a violation of the United States-Soviet Consular Convention.

In a show of tolerance for officially approved religious contacts, on the other hand, the Soviet Government announced in April that it was granting permission to a New York interfaith organization to print and ship 10,000 copies of the Pentateuch (the Five Books of Moses) to the U.S.S.R. as a gift to the Soviet Jewish community. The agreement came after 2 years of negotiation with Soviet officials.

The situation in Eastern Europe concerning religious contacts and availability of information continued to vary considerably. In Poland, Hungary, and Romania, for example, Westerners could generally have access to ecclesiastic organizations and individuals with relative ease, while in other countries obstacles were often raised. For the first time in 15 years, however, Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia recently permitted delegates to attend the annual meeting of the European Council of Jewish Communities.

*(v) Tourism; meetings among young people; and sports*

East-West contacts continued during the reporting period through tourist travel, youth meetings, and sport competitions with no major

changes. While the Warsaw Pact countries showed a preference for developing ties in these areas through state-organized and controlled exchanges, the United States hoped to see greater spontaneity through increased use of direct people-to-people initiatives.

In some recent examples of exchanges, delegations of young political leaders from the U.S.S.R. and Poland visited the United States in May at the invitation of the American Council of Young Political Leaders. The Soviet delegation of 12 also participated in a 5-day seminar with young political leaders.

The YMCA continued its exchange with the Soviets. It hosted a delegation of Soviet youth officials for 10 days in February to evaluate its exchanges with the Soviet Union in 1976 and to make plans for 1977. In October it sent a delegation of 13 American women to the U.S.S.R. to study the role of women in Soviet society, and in March it hosted 30 young Soviet professionals in the United States. Plans for a camp counselor and physical education exchange sponsored by the YMCA are proceeding.

Tourist exchanges between Eastern and Western countries do not appear to have increased substantially during the reporting period. Soviet authorities have in fact been discouraging tourism to the United States, as reported in the section of this report on Basket Two implementation.

*(vi) Expansion of contacts*

This section of Basket Three calls for further development of contacts between governmental institutions and nongovernmental organizations of the signatory states. Included in the Final Act by sponsorship of the Eastern side, this provision has been used by the Soviets to criticize exclusion of Communist labor representatives from visits to the United States.

In April, the United States refused visitors' visas to three Soviet labor representatives who had been invited to a longshoremen's union gathering in Seattle. In press articles and in a note to our Embassy, the Soviet Union again called this a violation of the human contacts provisions of the Final Act. We pointed out that it is a longstanding U.S. policy not to recommend waivers of ineligibility for Communist labor representatives because labor exchanges with Communist unions would equate our free and voluntary trade unions with the Communist labor organizations. There is no specific Final Act reference to travel and contacts among labor representatives, and, when signing the Final Act, all CSCE participants were aware of our longstanding policy on this matter.

## B. INFORMATION

The Warsaw Pact states continued during the reporting period to criticize Western implementation of CSCE information provisions. Such criticisms generally claimed that the Eastern countries publish more Western books and show more Western films than Western countries import from the East. The charges were facilitated by Communist access to statistics from state-controlled cultural outlets that do not exist in the West, thus making statistical comparisons difficult. There is, of course, nothing in the Final Act to suggest that there should be government-assured, statistical reciprocity in the numbers of books and films shown in East and West. Such a stipulation would imply a meas-

ure of state control over culture which Western countries, as well as the Final Act, reject. On the contrary, the Final Act supports the Western view that individuals should be free to choose what they read or see. In this respect, dissemination of information remains the Basket Three area in which the Soviet Union and its allies have made the latest progress in implementation since the Helsinki summit.

#### (1) DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

The number and range of Western books and films available in Eastern countries remain very limited. The choice of titles published and films screened is politically selective, and books which are published are often censored. The Soviet Union's own statistics show that over 50 percent of the books translated from American authors consist of scientific and technical literature while only 5.3 percent in 1973 and 11.8 percent in 1974 dealt with historical and socioeconomic topics.

Availability of Western newspapers and periodicals in Warsaw Pact countries remained poor during the reporting period. Only token numbers were imported and sold in select locations, if at all. At one point in early March, reports indicated that Czechoslovakia had curbed the importation of even Western European Communist newspapers, which had become increasingly critical of the Czechoslovak Government's policies toward human rights advocates. Subsequently, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, apparently with an eye to the Belgrade review meeting, initiated public sale of a few Western journals and newspapers. As in other Warsaw Pact countries, however, these were available in very small numbers and in select locations likely to be frequented by tourists and Western visitors. Also most issues were several days old, and expensive by Eastern European standards. There was little indication that Eastern governments allowed free access to Western newspapers through institutions such as major public and university libraries, which in Western countries often subscribe to Eastern periodicals and newspapers. Nor did most Eastern countries allow free and unhindered mail entry of newspapers paid for by Western relatives or friends.

In December, the Czechoslovak Government allowed an increase in the mail distribution of the USIS quarterly Czech-language publication "Spektrum" from 2,000 to 6,000 copies per issue.

#### (i) Broadcasting

In October, the Soviet State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting signed a cooperative agreement with CBS to exchange TV and radio programs as well as expertise and technology. NBC and ABC already have such agreements with the U.S.S.R. NBC has also contracted to televise the Moscow Olympics worldwide. In early January, Czechoslovak and Portuguese radios signed a cooperation and exchanges agreement. In February, France and the Soviet Union signed a cooperative agreement with reference to the CSCE. Despite such isolated ventures, however, the area of broadcasting remained contentious.

In January, for example, a Soviet press article denounced as "reactionary" the Russian-language broadcasting of Deutsche Welle, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Voice of America (VOA) because programing allegedly rests in the hands of political

emigres from the U.S.S.R. A particularly strident propaganda campaign against the VOA was initiated in the Soviet and Czechoslovak media in early 1977. One Czechoslovak attack characterized the VOA as an "espionage radio station," and the Soviets broadened their attacks to criticize not only the VOA but the U.S. Information Agency as a whole. While attacks on Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe have been common for years, such a concerted campaign of criticism had not been heard since well before Helsinki.

Most Eastern attacks against Western broadcasting continued to aim at Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL). A Czechoslovak press article in January defended the jamming of RFE as being fully in accord with the "letter and spirit" of the Helsinki Conference. The article claimed that RFE had been "secretly" instructed to work against the Belgrade review meeting and CSCE objectives. In a representation to our Embassy, the Soviet Government accused the stations of seeking to promote "national discord and enmity."

Other Warsaw Pact governments as well protested the radio stations as interference in their internal affairs. We continued to point out that the CSCE Final Act commits signatories "to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds." We thus maintained that jamming, rather than broadcasting, violates the letter and spirit of Helsinki.

In a report to Congress in late March, President Carter reaffirmed American support for the VOA, RFE, and RL and requested funding to expand their transmitting facilities. He pointed out that the stations have been for many years "a vital part of the lives of the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union."

In an Eastern example of positive implementation in the CSCE spirit, Hungarian television in late February showed the fourth in a series of East-West discussions on international affairs. As with the previous three broadcasts, Hungarian officials exercised no censorship and allowed Western panelists, who included prominent journalists, to speak openly on a broad range of East-West issues.

## (2) COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION

This topic will be discussed in section C of this chapter.

## (3) WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS

Working conditions for journalists in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe generally deteriorated during the reporting period, primarily because of the sensitivity of Communist governments to Western reporting of their human rights violations. The Soviet Union and several Eastern European countries mounted propaganda campaigns accusing the Western press of obstructing CSCE objectives by impeding East-West understanding. The Czechoslovak press, for example, accused Western newsmen of "slinking" around the apartments of dissidents and ignoring the true accomplishments of Czechoslovak workers. Also, American journalists continued to be attacked falsely in the Soviet press for alleged intelligence connections with the clear purpose of trying to restrict their contacts among Soviet citizens.

In early February, the Soviet Union expelled an Associated Press correspondent after charging him with illegal currency transactions. Earlier, the Soviet press had accused him of being an intelligence agent. This was the first expulsion of an American correspondent from the U.S.S.R. since 1970. The United States protested the action and expelled a Tass correspondent in Washington in retaliation. The U.S. Senate passed a resolution calling the Soviet action a contradiction of the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act.

In December, an American Washington Post correspondent was called to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and accused of distorting Soviet politics to worsen Soviet-American relations. He was warned that continuation of such behavior would have "consequences." Our Embassy in Moscow protested this incident to Soviet officials.

The Soviet Union subsequently called the arrest in Virginia of a Tass correspondent a violation of the Helsinki Final Act. In fact, the correspondent was arrested for repeatedly ignoring a traffic summons on the incorrect claim that he possessed diplomatic immunity.

In Eastern Europe, the GDR expelled a West German television correspondent in December after accusing him of defaming the GDR. This followed the expulsion of a Der Spiegel correspondent in December 1975.

In two separate incidents in February, Czechoslovak authorities detained American correspondents from NBC and the New York Times. Each was removed from a train while departing the country and searched. Each also had papers confiscated. The New York Times correspondent was not permitted to contact the U.S. Embassy. One of the incidents occurred on GDR, rather than Czechoslovak, territory, although it involved Czechoslovak officials. Our Embassies subsequently lodged vigorous protests with Czechoslovak and GDR authorities and termed such treatment of journalists unacceptable. A West German correspondent was similarly detained in Czechoslovakia at a later date. In early March, Czechoslovak police reportedly used tear gas on two Western journalists attempting to interview a dissident.

Although there is no permanently accredited U.S. correspondent in Prague, Czechoslovakia has on several occasions in 1976 turned down temporary visits of U.S. journalists. In late March, Czechoslovak officials informed our Embassy that American as well as other Western journalists would no longer receive visas to Czechoslovakia unless they agreed beforehand not to interview Czechoslovak dissidents. We were also told that correspondents whose work Prague considers "objectionable" would not be granted visas. We expressed our concern to the Czechoslovak Government regarding the application of such a policy and emphasized that the policy would work in exactly the opposite direction from the Helsinki CSCE commitment of promoting a freer flow of information and of improving working conditions for journalists.

In April, Romanian authorities denied a New York Times correspondent a visa but reversed themselves within 48 hours after representations by the U.S. Embassy.

In December, the GDR proposed to us the reciprocal issuance of 1-year multiple-entry visas to permanently accredited correspondents. We reaffirmed our willingness to issue such visas as soon as the GDR lifted its longstanding refusal to accredit U.S. correspondents resident in Bonn and West Berlin.

In other developments, a United Press International correspondent, the first from either East or West to reside in Leningrad, has opened an office in that city in reciprocity for the opening of a Tass office in San Francisco. Also, Yugoslav authorities sponsored a conference of some 100 journalists from the CSCE signatory states in Belgrade April 25-30 to discuss the role of the press in implementing the Final Act and the specific provisions on working conditions for journalists.

## C. COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN THE FIELDS OF CULTURE AND EDUCATION

### (1) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Though still falling short of fulfilling the resolve expressed in the Final Act to "increase substantially" cooperation and exchanges, implementation of provisions relating to culture and education continued to be characterized by notable progress. Interest on the part of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies in maintaining and expanding formal exchange arrangements remained evident and in many respects appeared to grow. At the same time, however, some Eastern countries indicated what they perceived to be certain limits to cooperation and voiced their concern about "unregulated activities."

Recent measures taken by CSCE participants reveal some nuances in both the pattern and pace of implementation. From the U.S. perspective, the most significant achievements center on the Basket Three provisions relating to "extension of relations." Formal negotiations on the first intergovernmental exchanges agreements with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary have been concluded and the agreement with Hungary was signed in April. Agreement has been reached with the Governments of Romania and the Soviet Union on programs for future activities under the existing bilateral exchanges agreements; discussions on implementing programs with Bulgaria and Hungary are in progress. We have proposed that a United States-German Democratic Republic cultural program of reciprocal exchanges be developed, outlining specific types of activities that might be undertaken in the near future. The initial GDR response to this proposal has been positive. If accepted, it would significantly enhance the presently limited exposure of American artists in East Germany. In mid-May, the GDR proposed to us for discussion several other areas of cultural cooperation. The United States has responded positively to this initiative and discussions on expanded cultural exchanges are underway.

New direct exchange agreements, primarily involving educational institutions, also contributed to the recent increase in formal, cooperative arrangements. At the same time, progress in extending relations on the level of direct contracts and communications among persons working in the fields of culture and education continued to be hindered in some Eastern countries by fear of ideological contamination.

Another factor affecting implementation was the continued importance of political considerations in the implementation activities of the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European States. It has become increasingly evident in recent months that as the date for the Belgrade follow-up meeting draws nearer, the Eastern governments are becoming more sensitive to the need for demonstrating a credible implementation record. The increased weight of this factor was illustrated during the

reporting period by the more frequent references in Eastern media to cultural and educational affairs in an explicit CSCE context, as well as by the somewhat more forthcoming Eastern attitude to new forms of cooperation. While the effort to document and defend their own records appears to have encouraged the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe to take further small but positive steps, it has also led to an increasing number of polemical attacks on Western performance.

Politicization of cultural and educational relations was also heightened by the reactions of Eastern governments to recent human rights activity in their countries. Linking dissident activity with exposure to Western "bourgeois" influences, Soviet and some Eastern Europe press articles presented increasingly strident warnings of the ideological limits to cooperation, particularly in cultural fields, and hints of a curtailment of further progress in East-West exchanges. This media campaign has shown that the Soviet Union and, to varying degrees, its allies, still adhere to the position advanced by Soviet Deputy Minister for Culture Popov, that cooperation and exchanges "without boundaries or barriers" are unacceptable.

The remainder of this section notes specific activities which relate to the Final Act's provisions on cooperation and exchanges in the fields of culture and education. The listing is by no means all inclusive but rather a representative sampling of recent activities.

## (2) COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN THE FIELD OF CULTURE

### (i) *Books and publishing*

There was considerable activity during the reporting period in the area of publishing and book and library exchanges. Representatives from the U.S. private and public sectors met on February 17, under the joint auspices of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Government Advisory Commission on International Book and Library programs. The group—which included officials from the Departments of State and Commerce, USIA and the CSCE Commission, as well as representatives from publishing, film, and library associations—discussed Basket Three implementation with particular regard to the role of the private sector in book and library programs. A prime topic of discussion was consideration of developing a currency convertibility program similar to the defunct information media guaranty program.

During the last weeks of November, a delegation sponsored by the American Library Association (ALA) visited the Soviet Union to develop a plan for library exchanges between the two countries. Although the Soviet Ministry of Culture appeared eager to exchange personnel, the ALA deferred consideration of a formal exchanges agreement until it could assess the results of two bilateral seminars on the subject which may be held in 1978. The U.S. National Archives and the U.S.S.R. Main Archival Administration also began discussions on an agreement which, inter alia, would provide for exchanges of archivists and joint publication of a collection of historical documents. Details of the program remained to be worked out.

In the area of publishing, one significant development was the February visit to the United States by a delegation from the U.S.S.R.'s



All-Union Copyright Agency. The group signed an agreement with the National Technical Information Service on the translation and publication in the United States of six Soviet journals, including the publications "Kommunist," "USA: Economy, Politics, Ideology," and "Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine." The agreement also provides for publication of seven collections of articles from Soviet journals on questions of politics, economics, philosophy, and agriculture. The Soviet delegation met with representatives from the Association of American Publishers, as well as with officials of major American publishing houses specializing in fictional works. In the course of these meetings, the representatives of Doubleday, Harper & Row, Simon & Schuster, Time-Life & Little, Brown indicated that they are considering publication of works by Soviet authors. McMillan noted that it will publish this year the first of 10 works of Soviet science fiction, and the Times Mirror publishing group signed an agreement to issue English language editions and coproductions of Soviet works on art and medicine.

The Soviet delegation also inquired about possible representation by American companies at an upcoming Moscow international book fair. Among others, the publishing houses McGraw Hill International, John Wiley & Sons, Times Mirror, Harper & Row, Ballantine Books, Plenum, Addison-Wesley, and Prentice-Hall International expressed a willingness to participate.

One major Soviet work currently being published in the United States is an English translation of the "Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia). The Franklin Book Programs, a nonprofit organization established 25 years ago under the auspices of the American Book Publishers Council and the ALA, has also begun translating European and Soviet scientific works under a contract with the National Science Foundation. New areas of activity relevant to the Final Act which this organization is considering include the translation of foreign books for publication in the United States and the promotion of international book exchanges by means of conferences, exhibits, and newsletters.

Citing the December visit to the United States by a Soviet delegation of translators and literary experts and the residency of a prominent Soviet writer at the Universities of Kansas and California during the fall semester of 1976, the official organ of the U.S.S.R. Union of Writers in January characterized recent exchanges with the United States as "very fruitful." The one Soviet complaint was that "anti-Soviet propaganda" allegedly hampered acceptance of Soviet literature in the United States.

Examples of recent activities with Eastern European countries include a visit to Romania by Prof. Richard Ellman, who lectured on James Joyce and American poetry at the Universities of Bucharest and Galati; a 1-month lecture tour of several U.S. universities by a Romanian professor of comparative literature, and the participation by prize-winning Hungarian poet Otto Urban in a 4-month international writers program at the University of Iowa.

#### (ii) *Films and broadcasting*

Specialists from Hungary, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. were among the broadcasters from 16 countries participating in a 2-month study

tour of U.S. radio and television facilities organized by Syracuse University and sponsored by the Department of State this spring. Following an orientation program in Washington, the radio specialists participated in an international broadcasting seminar at Syracuse University and attended the annual National Association of Broadcasters convention. While in the United States, project participants also had on-the-job assignments at American broadcasting stations. Eva Starodomsкая, a Soviet television journalist, visited the United States in April and attended the international program for foreign women journalists sponsored by the American Women in Radio and Television. Ms. Starodomsкая is the first Soviet participant in this annual program.

On November 23, CBS presented a 1-hour, primetime television program filmed in Romania and featuring Gymnast Nadia Comaneci. This program was subsequently broadcast on December 5 by Romanian television. Hungarian television presented on April 24 a report on United States-Hungarian relations. The program, the first Hungarian one specifically on this topic, included interviews with Senator Sparkman, Congressmen Bingham and Vanik, and Department of State Counselor Nimetz. Earlier in April, Hungarian television presented a program analyzing the status of the SALT talks. It included comments by New York Times correspondent David Binder on the U.S. media's reaction to Secretary Vance's trip to Moscow. In February, NBC signed an \$85 million contract with the Soviet Olympic Committee for coverage of the 1980 Olympics, and in mid-March Polish television began broadcasting the first of 16 half-hour programs produced in collaboration with the Kosciuszko Foundation, a private American organization.

Other contacts with Eastern Europeans in this area included a visit to Hungary by American film expert Henry Bietrose. While in Budapest, Professor Bietrose gave lectures on "Documentary Film-Making in the U.S." at the College of Dramatic and Cinematographic Arts and participated in a film workshop. The Polish film "Nights and Days" and the East German film "Jacob the Liar" were nominated for Best Foreign Film in this year's Oscar competition, a prize won in 1976 by the Soviet-Japanese coproduction "Dersu Uzala." The East German film archives presented a week-long retrospective of films by the American film pioneer D. W. Griffith in East Berlin in April.

### *(iii) Performing arts*

Highlighted by the Los Angeles Philharmonic Orchestra's tour of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia in November and December, live performances by American musicians continued to play a major part in our cultural programs in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. During the reporting period, the following U.S. performing art groups and individual performers traveled to Eastern European countries under State Department sponsorship: Nitty Gritty Dirt Band to the U.S.S.R. (April 28 to May 24); the Blackearth Percussion Ensemble to Romania (April 4 and 5); the Mississippi Delta Blues Band to Romania (May 2 to 11); and dancer Judith Jamison to Romania (February 24). In May a group of U.S. theater directors visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet copyright agency to view a selection of Soviet plays.

The Arena Theater of Washington produced "Catsplay," a play by the contemporary Hungarian playwright Istvan Orkeny.

A number of Soviet performing art groups visited the United States during the reporting period, including some which changed the previous emphasis upon classical performances. In December, for example, the folk group "Pesnyari" performed in 11 U.S. cities during a 2-week tour that included a recording session in Nashville. In the same month, an Armenian group performed before audiences during a 3-week tour of the west coast. In March, Soviet playwright Roshchin and theater director Yefremov spent 2 weeks in San Francisco assisting in the production of Roshchin's "Valentin and Valentina" by the American Conservatory Theater. They then spent a week visiting other U.S. theaters. Examples of the more traditional types of Soviet performances in the United States included the 2-month tour of the eastern United States by the Leningrad Symphony Orchestra and a series of performances by Daniel Shafran, a leading Soviet cellist. In addition, a number of Eastern European performers toured the United States.

*(iv) Exhibits*

As in the case of live performances by individuals or groups, exhibit exchanges continued to be a successful form of cultural cooperation. In the Soviet Union, the bicentennial exhibit "USA—200 Years" drew crowds which exceeded during the 1-month showing all records set during 17 years of USIA exhibits in the U.S.S.R. Other U.S. exhibits in the U.S.S.R. included the USIA exhibit "Photography USA," which was displayed during the reporting period for 1-month showings in Tbilisi, Ufa, and Novosibirsk.

Soviet exhibits in the United States included a display devoted to the history of Russian costumes at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, and an exhibition of Russian and Soviet paintings from Moscow and Leningrad at the same museum. The latter exhibit is the largest Soviet art show ever displayed in the United States. In December, the Soviet exhibit "Scientific Siberia" completed its tour of the United States with a final showing in New Orleans.

In Eastern Europe, the most activity pertaining to exhibits was in Poland. An exhibition entitled "200 Years of American Painting" ended its four-city tour in December. A USIA-sponsored "Shakers" exhibit was displayed for 1-month showings at Wroclaw's Architectural Museum and Krakow's Ethnographic Museum, and the Polish Government agreed to the showing of another USIA exhibit entitled "Reflections: Images of America" during the first half of 1977 in Katowice, Szczecin, Bydgoszcz, and Gdansk. The Hungarian Cultural Institute also agreed to accept this USIA exhibit, which will open in June. With the exception of a display of graphic arts from the New York Metropolitan Art Museum in 1973, this will be the first individual U.S. exhibit in Hungary outside the framework of the annual Budapest Trade Fair.

The "Reflections" exhibit also appeared in Sofia, Bulgaria, from December 10 to January 10 and was the first U.S. cultural exhibition in Bulgaria since World War II. In Romania, the exhibit was shown in Bucharest (October 1976) and Craiova (January 1977) and opened in Oradea in March of this year. Another USIA exhibit in Romania

focused on American agriculture. Romanian and Polish exhibits recently in the United States included displays of rugs and tapestries at the Chicago Museum of Science and Industry. The Bulgarian Government has agreed to provide a display of "Thracian Art" this summer at the Metropolitan Museum in New York. Arrangements are also proceeding for a major exhibit of works from East Germany's Dresden Museum. The exhibit is scheduled to open in Washington, D.C., in early 1978.

(v) *Exchange visits among specialists*

While not falling within a particular category, there were a number of visits and meetings of experts during the reporting period which served to implement the mutual understanding provisions of the Final Act. Included among these was a visit to the United States by a delegation of Soviet youth leaders under a project sponsored by the YMCA. Representatives from Hungary, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. were among economists from 20 countries participating in March in 4 weeks of State Department-sponsored meetings in the United States with their American counterparts.

On April 28, 94 Polish agricultural specialists completed a 13-month stay in the United States during which they lived and worked on American family farms under a new 4-H Council exchange. A smaller number of Americans from the 4-H Council went to Poland under the same program. A second group of Poles arrived in May for a 1-year stay, and the 4-H Council is discussing a similar program with Hungary.

Recent travel of this nature by Americans to the Soviet Union included a visit by political scientist Harold Isaacs to research and educational institutions in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, where he spoke on ethnicity and politics in American society; a trip by a delegation of U.S. mayors to Moscow, Sochi, Minsk, and Leningrad to strengthen links between American and Soviet cities; and the participation by a delegation sponsored by the American Council of Young Political Leaders (ACYPL) in a seminar with Soviet counterparts in Odessa. The latter trip was reciprocated in May with a visit to the United States by a delegation from the Soviet Committee of Youth Organizations.

Similar exchanges of visits occurred with Eastern European countries. For example, the second-ranking member of the Bulgarian Committee on Art and Culture visited the United States from January 24 to February 3, meeting with American poets and writers and touring American cultural institutions in Washington and New York. A similar event was the visit by a delegation of California mayors to Romania, where they were received by President Ceausescu. American futurologists Dennis and Donella Meadows also visited Bucharest and lectured at various Romanian institutions on energy and population questions.

(vi) *Multilateral activities*

As a result of actions taken at its 19th General Conference in November 1976, UNESCO during the 1977-78 biennium plans to continue programs to further European cooperation. It plans also to initiate a number of new activities recommended by the Helsinki Final Act.

As its contribution to the setting up of a cultural data bank recommended by the Final Act, UNESCO will make a systematic inventory of existing cultural documentation facilities to facilitate optimum use of existing resources. Studies of European cultures at the national and regional levels will be continued, and UNESCO will also publish a detailed annual calendar of cultural events in Europe, as recommended by the CSCE. In addition, the UNESCO European Centre for Higher Education, located in Bucharest, has begun to implement a full program of activities which promise to increase understanding and cooperation among educational institutions on the postsecondary level in Europe, Canada, and the United States. The problem of the education of migrant workers and their families will also be the subject of a number of UNESCO activities.

### (3) COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION

#### (i) *Extension of relations: Access and exchanges*

Probably the most encouraging aspect of cooperation in this area was the increased number of direct institutional exchanges. An indication of Soviet willingness to proceed toward the expansion of such arrangements was an article in the journal of the "Institute of United States and Canadian Studies." It praised the October 4, 1976, agreement between the State University of New York and Moscow State University—the first agreement for direct exchanges between American and Soviet universities—and spoke in glowing terms of the prospects for future direct exchange agreements. Several U.S. universities have made proposals for direct exchanges with Soviet universities, and in March a Soviet delegation of officials from Kiev State University visited various U.S. universities and discussed possibilities for such exchange agreements.

Direct exchanges agreements continued to increase in Eastern European countries. The University of Kansas recently established a new program with Warsaw University for undergraduate and graduate students as well as teaching assistants in various academic fields. Warsaw University also signed a direct exchanges agreement in March with Kent State University, bringing to over 20 the number of United States-Polish agreements of this type.

Together with the University of Nebraska, Iowa State University in December concluded a direct exchanges agreement with the Romanian Academy of Agriculture and Forestry Sciences. A recent encouraging development was the prompt implementation of a new agreement in urban planning between Johns Hopkins University and Bucharest University. Another new institution-to-institution arrangement discussed with Romania recently is a proposal for exchanges between the University of Kentucky Business School and the Romanian Academy of Economic Studies.

#### (ii) *Other educational programs and visits*

Interaction between professional organizations and visits by educational specialists and teachers also continued during the reporting period. In April, a Soviet delegation headed by the U.S.S.R. First Deputy Minister of Education participated in a U.S.-U.S.S.R. seminar on teacher education organized by the Council for International Ex-

change of Scholars. Following the seminars, the group visited teacher training institutes at three American universities. The following month a Soviet delegation on vocational and technical education traveled to the United States to return a Soviet visit by a U.S. group in January 1976.

Following discussions started over 2 years ago, the American Bar Association and the Soviet Lawyers' Association reached agreement on legal exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. The agreement called for a series of bilateral seminars on legal topics, individual placement of lawyers in legal or business firms of the two countries, and exchanges of lecturers in law. Because of difficulties on the Soviet side, implementation of the agreement was delayed and a planned seminar and other legal exchanges may not take place this year. In a related development, Moscow State University in January accepted the first American law professor under the Fulbright lecturer program. In April, the GDR doubled its academic exchange program through the International Research and Exchanges Board, which arranges exchanges between American and Eastern academic institutions.

History, a traditional field of academic cooperation, continues to evoke interest and interaction. In March, two prominent Bulgarian historians participated in a 2-day conference at the University of Vermont on the centennial of Bulgarian independence. Talks were also held on strengthening ties between the newly established international documentation center on Bulgarian history and interested institutions in the United States. These talks resulted in the signing of a cooperative agreement. In April, seven Romanian scholars attended a meeting at Ohio State University on the centennial of Romanian independence. The group subsequently visited other universities and academic centers in the United States and attended a symposium in Detroit on Romanian history. Americans also exchanged views with Eastern European colleagues from Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia during the second international colloquium of the Commission of the Balkan Countries Today, which was held in Bucharest in November.

Examples of related activities during the last months of 1976 included a lecture by Prof. Rudolf Tokes of the University of Connecticut on "East-West Relations" at the Institute for Historical Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and participation by Librarian of Congress Daniel Boorstin in a roundtable seminar at the same institute. Dr. Boorstin also visited Bulgaria and Romania. U.S. electoral specialist Richard Scammon traveled to the Soviet Union in April and lectured on U.S. national politics and elections and met with Soviet political leaders and journalists. That same month poet John Balaban and Prof. Christopher Given, American Fulbright lecturers in Romania, traveled to the University of Sofia to give lectures to students of literature; the trip marked the first time Fulbright lecturers have been invited to Bulgaria since the Bulgarian Government terminated the program in the 1960's. In May Alton Fry of the Council on Foreign Relations visited the U.S.S.R. and Poland to lecture on international affairs and disarmament. In May a three-person delegation from the Council for International Exchange of Scholars also traveled to the Soviet Union to

discuss an expansion of the Fulbright lecturer program with the Soviets. In February two professors from Moscow's Higher Trade Union College traveled to Chicago to lecture at Roosevelt University, and in March the director of the U.S.S.R. Institute for Scientific Information on the Social Sciences visited U.S. libraries, research institutes, and universities at the invitation of the Department of State.

*(iii) Science*

Provisions for cooperation in the field of science primarily fall under Basket Two of the Final Act. Scientific contacts in an educational, as opposed to a research, context, however, are also specifically encouraged in Basket Three. Many ongoing activities of this type are encompassed within the direct exchanges agreements noted above.

Other examples of activities in this field included talks by Dr. Rene Dubos with environmental and biological specialists at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, lectures by Prof. Kenneth Frey on plant genetics during a 6-day visit to the Romanian Academy of Agricultural and Forestry Sciences, and a roundtable discussion at the Romanian Space Council and National Council for Science and Technology, at which American specialist Karl Heize discussed aspects of the space shuttle and other U.S. space projects. A major U.S. program was a 35-day tour of American science and technology museums, organized by the Association of Science-Technology Centers and sponsored by the Department of State. Representatives from Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R. were among the 14 participants who, in addition to visiting science museums throughout the United States, also attended the first International Conference of Science and Technology Museums held in Philadelphia.

*(iv) Language*

Although statistics compiled by the Modern Language Association through 1974 indicate a downward trend in study of established foreign languages in American schools, the United States has continued to encourage the study of foreign languages and cultures through domestic and international programs. As in other fields, many of the international projects undertaken by the United States in the area of language study are encompassed and developed within programs of direct exchanges or other university-to-university arrangements. Agreements have been signed between Ohio State University and Middlebury College and the U.S.S.R.'s Pushkin Institute of the Russian Language which will enable American students to study Russian in Moscow. In addition to an exchange of Russian language students and teaching specialists, Ohio State and the Pushkin Institute will sponsor in 1978 a conference on teaching Russian. Together with existing exchanges between the State University of New York and the Thorez Institute of Moscow, and similar exchanges scheduled for summer 1977 between Bryn Mawr College and the Pushkin Institute, the new arrangement significantly expands the language-teaching ties between the two countries.

On the elementary and secondary school levels, the United States also expanded efforts in bilingual education. Wide-ranging programs offering part of the curriculum in a second language for the millions

of American students whose native language is not English are now an established aspect of U.S. educational policy, with State and Federal funding of over \$200 million annually. Today some form of bilingual teaching is mandatory in 11 States, whereas 6 years ago no State had such requirements. This year the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare will sponsor 627 bilingual projects in 68 languages. Moreover, it continues to encourage the development and maintenance of foreign language and area specialists with particular emphasis given to less widely studied languages and, through the promotion of ethnic studies, has attempted to underscore the contribution that various ethnic and cultural minorities have made to the life of the Nation. Of interesting potential for the future is the new section 603 of title VI of the National Defense Education Act which was passed by the Congress in 1976. It authorizes support for the stimulation of "locally designed educational programs to increase the understanding of students in the United States about the cultures and activities of other nations in order to better evaluate the international and domestic impact of major national policies."



## CHAPTER 5—LOOKING TOWARD BELGRADE

This month, delegates of the CSCE states will assemble in Belgrade to make technical preparations and establish an agenda for the main CSCE followup meeting in the fall.

A major part of U.S. preparations for the Belgrade meeting has been continuation of the close and detailed consultations on CSCE with our NATO Allies which began well before the Conference and continued up to the Helsinki Summit. The series of consultations held over the past year has been designed to shape a unified allied approach to the Belgrade meeting and has been largely successful in this respect. Indeed, alliance solidarity has served to encourage one of the healthiest products of the CSCE process—the West's heightened perception of the common values which our countries share.

The United States has also consulted on CSCE and the Belgrade meeting with the neutral and nonaligned states as well as with Eastern states. Although consultations are continuing on many levels, as might be expected the East, the West and the neutral and nonaligned states have adopted independent approaches and attitudes toward the follow-up meeting.

The United States and most Western states regard the Belgrade meeting primarily as an occasion for a serious review of implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. While we have no desire to see the Belgrade meeting devolve into an exchange of recriminations and polemics, we believe a full and frank review of implementation, as mandated by the Final Act, should remain the central task of the Belgrade meeting. The procedural method for accomplishing such a review effectively is still under active consideration. It is clear, however, that a positive and consistent implementation record is the key to a constructive Belgrade meeting, and we have stressed this point to both Eastern and Western states.

A thorough exchange of views on implementation will of course put our own performance under close public scrutiny. While we are proud of our record and believe the Final Act reflects the existing standards of most Western societies, we recognize that areas of our own implementation could be still further improved. We are currently examining our visa policies in this regard and will continue in coming months to review other aspects of our performance.

Developments during this reporting period suggest that the Belgrade meeting will attract considerable attention in both East and West. The Final Act has given high public visibility to issues of fundamental importance to the East-West relationship and to the many millions of people whose lives it affects. Ultimately, the success of the Belgrade meeting depends on whether or not it contributes to the basic goals of CSCE. These goals include a genuine relaxation of tensions between states, a greater respect for human rights, and practical improvements in the daily lives of people in both East and West. The test of the Belgrade meeting, as of the CSCE itself, remains whether it can bring about real progress toward these goals and demonstrates that the pledges made at Helsinki were taken in good faith.