BASKET III: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

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ON

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VOLUME III

INFORMATION FLOW, AND CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS: INFORMATION FLOW AND CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES

THURSDAY, MAY 19, 1977

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
Washington, D.C.

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 6202, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Dante Fascell, chairman, presiding.

In attendance: Commissioners: Fascell, Fenwick, Stone, Dole, and Pell.

Also present: Alfred Friendly, Jr., deputy staff director.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN FASCELL

Mr. FASCELL. The Commission will come to order.

Good morning. Our hearing today is the first of three mornings of testimony on the impact the Helsinki accords have had on easing and expanding the flow of information and ideas across international and ideological frontiers.

In past sessions, the Commission has heard a great deal about the movement of people—or the obstacles to movement—among the 35 signatory States. Now we turn to a field which is just as sensitive, just as important, but not as emotionally laden as questions of family reunification or unjust imprisonment.

The borders which are erected to keep people in, however, are also the obstacles that keep the views of others out. It is the aim of the Helsinki accords to diminish those obstacles—gradually and by mutual agreements—and it is the interest of this Commission to discover how that process is going.

From the perspective of the United States, in particular, the Commission seeks to discover what obligations our government assumed at Helsinki to promote and expand the flow of information and culture between societies like ours—where initiatives are private—and the Communist states—where all such activity is centrally controlled. The language of the Final Act provides many openings for better and wider contacts. What we are anxious to discover is who is pushing at those openings, what resistance they are meeting, and how the openings can be made wider.

This morning we are fortunate to have two Administration representatives who are responsible for organizations which carry important Helsinki responsibilities. John Reinhardt, a career officer, former

ambassador and recently Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, became the director of the U.S. Information Agency in January. Joseph Duffey, a distinguished educator and civic activist, is now the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs.

Mr. Duffey's office is responsible for planning and direction at the U.S. end of the cultural and educational programs which Mr. Reinhardt's agency handles overseas. Between them, they are responsible for what people see, hear, and know about America abroad and for exposing Americans as students, as performers, or as audiences to what goes on abroad. Both of them work extensively with private organizations whose activities fit into and should fill out the Helsinki framework for expanding the flow of information and ideas.

We welcome the chance to hear their views on American compliance in the fields of information, culture and education and to get their opinions on how America, as well as other signatories, can perform better in this important area.

Welcome, Mr. Reinhardt.

Mr. REINHARDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to introduce my colleague, Philip W. Arnold, Deputy Assistant Director of the USIA.

Mr. FASCELL. Welcome, Mr. Arnold.

Mr. Duffey, please introduce the gentleman with you.

Mr. DUFFEY. With me today is Mr. Yale Richmond, Director, Office of Eastern European Programs of the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs.

Mr. FASCELL. Please proceed, Mr. Reinhardt.

STATEMENT OF JOHN REINHARDT, DIRECTOR, USIA, ACCOMPANIED BY PHILIP W. ARNOLD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, USIA

Mr. REINHARDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a prepared statement with me today which I would like to read.

I am very pleased to be here this morning to assist as much as I can in your task of gathering information for the Commission's report on compliance and progress under the Helsinki Final Act. I plan to read a prepared statement, in accordance with your wishes, and then I will be happy to try to answer all questions concerning my area of competence, specifically in connection with certain sections of the Act's Declaration of Principles and the chapter on Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields, generally referred to as Basket III.

To cover those points, I am dividing this statement into three sections. First, Administration's information policy toward the Helsinki Final Act; second, what the U.S. Information Agency has been doing to support the implementation of the Act; third, USIA programing in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, what initiatives we have taken and what the results have been. In this section, I will also include a discussion of non-USIA, American activities under section 2 of Basket III, information.

From the moment of signing the Helsinki Final Act, the United States has stressed the importance of implementing all of its provisions. President Ford, in addressing the leaders of the other 34 signatory nations at the signing of the Final Act in July 1975, called attention to:

The deep devotion of the American people and their government to human rights and fundamental freedoms and thus to the pledges that this Conference has made regarding the freer movement of people, ideas and information.

President Carter, in his inaugural address, reaffirmed the strong U.S. commitment to human rights. The President, as we know, has continued in the past 4 months to reaffirm the great importance that he and the American people attach to the protection and extension of human rights at home and abroad.

Congress, too, has reaffirmed this commitment. And at last year's meeting in Kenya of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Conference, UNESCO, where I had the honor to be the Chairman of the American delegation, I emphasized our dedication to the free flow of information and ideas.

The United States does not regard its interest in implementing the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act as interference in the internal affairs of other states.

As President Carter put it last week during his European tour, "America's concern for human rights . . . is . . . an expression of the most deeply felt values of the American people." Moreover, the President stressed that in speaking out for respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms he has not intended it as an attack on any one country. Rather, because the detailed statement on human rights was incorporated in the Principles Declaration of the Final Act, it is a legitimate concern in relations between states and a proper subject for discussion among them.

Our information policy in the almost 2 years since the signing of the Final Act has been to emphasize the dedication we have to the implementation of all its provisions, including the commitments made by the signatory countries in the area of human rights and freedom of information.

The U.S. Information Agency has employed all its media, but particularly the Voice of America and the Press Service, to give comprehensive coverage throughout the world, especially to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, of the positive and the negative developments taking place in our country and abroad. Exclusive of news items, the Voice of America used 1,066 scripts relating to Helsinki in its world broadcasts in the period January 1976 through March 7 of this year. We have reported as encouraging, those modest steps taken by the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe to implement some of the Basket III provisions of the Act, for example, Soviet agreement to give multiple entry and exit visas to permanently accredited foreign journalists, as well as their activities relating to implementation of Basket I and II provisions. We have reported the steps being taken here in the United States and in the West in general to comply with the provisions.

Thus, President Carter's recent decision to lift the ban on American travel to Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam has been reported, as was the President's proposal in his United Nations speech that the United States ratify the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and his decision to review U.S. visa practices. Our media have noted that the U.S. implementation record is good; and they have pointed out that much of what is called for in the Final Act has long been commonly accepted in the United States and in the West.

We have also given prominent coverage to those developments which have been less than positive—to the authenticated reports of Soviet and East European denials of human rights to their citizens. Through newscasts, correspondents' reports, interviews, backgrounders, and United States and world press roundups, we have told this story and given the American reactions to them.

Close attention has been focused on this Commission as it monitors implementation of the Helsinki accords. Coverage of the activities and views of Commission members and of its hearings involving the testimony of dissidents such as Andrei Amalrik, Vladimir Bukovsky, and Andrei Grigorenko has been broadcast regularly and sent overseas on our wireless file. We have used interviews with Commission members. The VOA prominently played an interview with Chairman Fascell on "Press Conference USA," following the Commission's European study mission last November and a similar interview with Commission member, Representative Fenwick.

Last month our television service did a videotape of Chairman Fascell being interviewed on the work of the Commission by three newsmen, including one from Hungary. This videotape has been sent to all European posts, plus other posts from Chile to Iran, for use before select audiences.

The Charter 77 movement in Czechoslovakia has been fully covered. When the Charter 77 text was published in the West it was broadcast verbatim over the Voice of America to the peoples of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. Incidentally, the comments from listeners in Czechoslovakia following our broadcast of the Charter were informative and remarkably outspoken. Several writers told us that they had learned what the Charter contained only from hearing it on the Voice of America.

In addition to our making use of the media, USIA officers in the field—in Europe and elsewhere—have been given extensive background material on the Final Act, guidance on the specific problem points, and encouragement to engage in dialogue with their contacts on this subject. The background material has included the first semiannual report by the President to this Commission, issued last December. The report, as you know, contains an excellent analysis of the Helsinki document, a broad overview of implementation and some specific areas of compliance and cooperation by signatory nations. The next report, due several weeks from now, will also be forwarded to our European posts and utilized by our media here. The background material also includes a series of reports on Soviet and East European media themes produced by USIA's Office of Research and updated monthly. Our research personnel have also prepared some "fact sheets" countering Communist charges of alleged U.S. human rights violations.

Our officers are using all appropriate material in presenting the U.S. position to carefully selected groups of opinion molders, academics, government officials and media representatives. This activity, of course, is not limited to USIA officers; all members of each Embassy country team are engaged in similar efforts. The overall guiding themes in these discussions, as we prepare for the Belgrade meeting, go something like this: For the past 2 years the United States has stressed its interest in implementation of the Final Act provisions. A limited amount of progress has been made but a great deal re-

mains to be done. The American public and some Members of Congress remain skeptical of the worth of the CSCE commitments and will be following closely the implementation review scheduled to be made at the Belgrade meeting this fall. We hope to see further progress before this meeting.

In keeping with longstanding practice, the U.S. Government is carefully monitoring implementation, gathering and exchanging information with our NATO allies. This exchange has included distribution to our allies of the research reports on Soviet and East European media themes, mentioned earlier. The U.S. Government has consulted with the neutral countries which signed the Final Act and we have supported CSCE-related activities in multilateral organizations.

The pace of cultural, educational, and information activities between the United States and the Communist countries in the post-Helsinki period reflects no sharp change from the slow progress noted in the period of several years leading up to the meeting in Finland's capital. The Helsinki accords have lent a certain framework to the gradual expansion of cultural, information, and educational exchange programs between the United States and these nations, although much of the progress and in some cases lack of progress has been primarily a result of shifts in bilateral relationships between the United States and the several states of Eastern Europe, or of the ups and downs of détente or other international events. In recent months, many of the positive developments have come about because of the desire of these countries to present themselves in as bright a light as possible to the scrutiny of delegates to the upcoming Belgrade meeting. Thus, some, but by no means all, of these activities appear to be essentially cosmetic rather than substantive.

In the Soviet Union, in addition to 21 hours daily of VOA programing, USIA distributes two Russian language publications, presents traveling exhibits, and arranges programs for performing arts groups. While these programs are carried out by USIA officers in the field, backstopping arrangements here in Washington are divided between USIA and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State.

Our activities have expanded somewhat in recent years. In addition to America Illustrated, we began a second magazine, called Dialogue, shortly after the signing of the Helsinki accord, and the distribution continues. Similarly, we have been expanding our visiting American speakers program at Soviet institutions, which we began before CSCE. Last November and December, we mounted an impressive Bicentennial exhibit in Moscow within provisions for "national" exhibits in the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Cultural Agreement. In turn, the Soviets will mount an anniversary exhibit of their own in Los Angeles next November, to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Also on the positive side, we have added a second USIA officer to our consulate general in Leningrad and we will place a USIA officer at the new consulate in Kiev when it opens next year.

On the negative side of the ledger, we tried unsuccessfully to hold an American film festival late in 1976. The Soviets, after expressing initial interest, delayed action for months until the project finally died. Similar expressions of Soviet interest in a series of Bicentennial seminars we proposed between American scholars and their counter-

parts in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev on "The American Experience" were eventually followed by their rejection of the proposal. And last year during negotiations for the new cultural agreements, we proposed, as we have in the past, an increase in the circulation of America Illustrated magazine, but the Soviets turned it down again. They argued that since America Illustrated is so much more successful than the magazine they distribute in the United States, the element of reciprocity would be lost.

Regular Voice of America listeners in the U.S.S.R. are in the tens of millions and this element of our programing has come under sharp attack from time to time by the Soviets.

What has particularly irked the Soviet and Eastern European leaders is the VOA coverage of news developments regarding human rights and dissident activities in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. They have construed this coverage by the Voice of America and by Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, as an ideological attack on the Soviet system, interference in their internal affairs and a maneuver to embarrass them at the upcoming Belgrade meeting.

They have been similarly critical of broadcasts directed to the Soviet Union by the BBC and the Federal German Radio Deutsche Welle. While some of the Communist countries continue to jam reception of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, VOA broadcasts to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern European countries are not jammed. Incidentally, Radio Moscow broadcasts 72 hours per week in English to the United States but it has negligible listenership as far as we can determine.

Support for the broadcasts by these three American radios was publicly enunciated 2 months ago when, as you will recall, President Carter asked Congress to appropriate funds for expanding their transmitter capacity. At that time, the President said the stations have been for many years a vital part of the lives of the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The Administration position on these broadcasts is that, contrary to Communist claims, they are fully consistent with the spirit and with the letter of the Helsinki Final Act. In fact, the Final Act notes the expansion of information broadcast by radio and expresses the hope it will continue. Further, the Act states that the participating States "Make it their aim to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds."

The record of USIA initiatives taken or rebuffed in East Europe in the last few years is difficult to synthesize. In some places, for example Poland, USIA was able to mount a high level of programing before CSCE and this level continues, with little discernible impact by CSCE, either positively or negatively.

With other East European nations, for example Hungary, there has been encouraging overall progress in our informational initiatives since Helsinki, but with our latitude for programing affected by international events. In still other countries, for example Bulgaria, our information and cultural programing faces extreme restrictions by the authorities but is slowly moving forward. Bilateral cultural agreements, concluded or close to conclusion, will probably prove to be of more help in the expansion of our activities in Eastern Europe than the CSCE agreement.

However, it can be argued that the post-Helsinki climate has made possible an acceleration of negotiations for the agreements. In any case, the system of government is such throughout Communist Europe that the authorities have the centralized power to regulate closely the flow of our information-cultural activities and turn it up or down at their will.

Currently, in addition to the U.S.S.R. the United States has an arrangement with Romania; we have just signed a bilateral exchange agreement with Hungary and have completed negotiations for an agreement with Bulgaria; with Czechoslovakia a framework document was agreed to at the end of last year, and we are waiting for the Czechoslovak side to conclude its review of that document before we work out a detailed plan of activities under the cultural agreement.

The German Democratic Republic has stated that a binational agreement would expedite information and cultural programing. We do not feel that we should enter into a formal agreement at this early stage of our diplomatic relations. However, we have proposed a cultural plan which the GDR has accepted in principle.

Under these various agreements, we expect to mount regular exhibitions in each of these nations; the agreements should help us achieve a broader range of contacts, should encourage the organization of film festivals, seminars, and other meetings, and should permit a substantial increase in academic exchange between our respective universities and other institutions.

Here is a brief country-by-country rundown of USIA programing in Eastern Europe:

1. POLAND

For many years we have had substantial cooperation with the Polish Government in mutually expanding information and cultural programs. Our films are being lent to certain organizations; our Wireless Newsfile goes to editors and officials and there is some placement in newspapers; we have been arranging for American speakers to appear before Polish groups, especially in the economic sphere, and we have been distributing two periodicals ("Ameryka" and the Polish-language edition of "Dialogue") and mounting large-scale exhibits in major Polish cities. The USIA library within the Embassy in Warsaw and others in Krakow and Poznan are both well attended.

2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Recently our Public Affairs Officer called on the editors of major newspapers and officials of the Czechoslovak Television in an attempt to open a dialogue, improve nonpolitical coverage, and ameliorate the series of virulent attacks on the United States. He was told the press climate would not improve until bilateral relations improve. Other Czechoslovak institutions are similarly reluctant to cooperate with us. However, attendance at our library remains substantial, and last year we did arrange programs for the Los Angeles Symphony Orchestra, we did gain permission to raise the number of Spektrum magazines distributed through the mails from 1,500 to 6,000; and we did present former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Sidney Jones before leading Czechoslovak economists and government officials.

3. HUNGARY

During the past 2 years there has been a trend in the Hungarian media toward a more balanced portrayal of the United States and generally encouraging overall progress in the aftermath of Helsinki. At the same time there have been instances of Hungarian efforts to cut back on programs and to play down the visibility of U.S. visitors and projects. A planned TV program on the Bicentennial was canceled; a journalist who had planned a trip to the United States to write on bilateral trade, postponed it. On the positive side, we have successfully embarked on a cooperative project with Hungarian TV officials which has resulted in their producing and showing 15 programs, usually on prime time. Recently one of the segments was devoted exclusively to a positive report on United States-Hungarian relations. Hungarian TV also brought to Budapest U.S. journalist David Binder to discuss East-West relations. In addition our Public Affairs Officer has been making extensive use of videotape recordings (VTR's) on the new Administration and foreign policy. Recently he was able to provide key Hungarian media and government leaders with their first opportunity to see and hear Administration officials explain the U.S. position on disarmament and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, as well as on human rights and other international issues. Last year the Hungarian Government gave us permission to mail out the Hungarian language version of our worldwide magazine Horizons.

4. BULGARIA

The new United States-Bulgarian Cultural Agreement is expected to allow us to increase the small academic exchange program, bring to Bulgaria additional performing groups and stage a large-scale exhibit for up to a month in each of two or three Bulgarian cities. Despite these anticipated advances and despite the limited distribution of our Bulgarian magazine Spektur, which is now permitted, operating conditions for the press and cultural section in Sofia are probably the most restrictive of all the Eastern bloc countries. The restrictions are applied through a form of bureaucratic delay and inaction; all requests for contacts with Bulgarian officials to arrange any information or cultural programs must be channeled through the Protocol Office of the Foreign Ministry, and these requests more often than not are simply ignored. USIA maintains a library within the Embassy compound but there are few Bulgarian clients.

5. ROMANIA

This nation is on the liberal end of the East European spectrum in terms of the level and breadth of permitted American information and cultural activities. Most of our programing is carefully delineated in the bilateral cultural agreement. We have, however, successfully undertaken some activities outside the agreement (e.g., distribution of the Romanian language version of our magazine Horizons). Our USIA library—the only one in Eastern Europe outside a U.S. Embassy—is actively used and serves as a locale, as well, for film showings, presentations of speakers and small exhibits. Our wireless file

is sent to some newspaper editors, our large-scale exhibits, covered under the agreement, are seen annually by tens of thousands of Romanians.

6. GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Less than 2 years of programing experience in this country has confirmed the strictness of its controls. Thus, for example, the GDR press law forbids direct mailing of any information by our office to media in East Germany and GDR authorities continue to jam medium-wave broadcasts of RIAS (Radio in the American Sector of Berlin). And while there has been agreement in principle on a number of program initiatives, a great deal of effort is still necessary to insure that the programs actually take place. The degree of access allowed to our soon-to-be-opened USIA library in East Berlin will give us a meaningful indication of the current attitude of the Government. On the positive side, USIA was permitted to exhibit in the Information Section of the Leipzig Trade Fair for the first time last year and then again this year. Last year our theme was "Two Hundred Years of American Industry;" this year our exhibit featured a Viking Lander as an example of progress in control instrumentation development.

In the case of Yugoslavia, which of course is not a member of the Warsaw Pact, there is a national press law which provides detailed regulations for control of the foreign press, foreign films, and other mass communications media and foreign information institutions. Because this law is being interpreted liberally, USIA activity continues at the freest and highest level in East Europe. Our programing follows patterns traditional in non-Communist nations and includes regular placement of film clips on TV, press clips in Red Tanjug, a special bulletin on world affairs circulated to select Yugoslav officials, distribution to more than 10,000 Yugoslavs of our magazine Pregled, a cooperative TV project on our 1976 national election. We have regularly mounted major exhibits including the Bicentennial exhibit "Two Hundred Years of American Painting" last year. Each month our office in Belgrade arranges programs for from two to six American specialists who discuss all aspects of American society including the political process. Yugoslavia is the only East European nation to have a Fulbright Commission administering the large educational exchange program.

We are taking a realistic, step-by-step approach toward expansion of our activities in these countries and this approach appears to be positive. Rather than simply trying to compile a record of rebuffs for examination by a Helsinki follow-up meeting, we have been more interested in the realistic possibilities for expanding our activities. There has been some forward movement.

There has also been some slight forward movement in other than U.S. Government-sponsored oral, print, film, and broadcast information dissemination. But the picture in this area of Basket III is, at best, spotty. Let me, if I may, give you a brief summary of what has taken place.

The number of Western books available in the Warsaw Pact area remains very limited and the choice of titles published politically re-

strictive, with most of those translated from American authors being scientific and technical.

Similarly, films are often selected for screening on ideological grounds, the films most often shown are those thought to depict Western "decadence." In the field of books and films, some East European states have used the concept of reciprocity to counter the argument that not enough Western products are available to their people, claiming that more Western films and books are available in the East than vice versa. While this imbalance may possibly exist, we have pointed out that there is nothing about reciprocity of numbers contained in the Final Act, that we support the view that individuals should be free to choose whatever they want to read or see, and that under our system there is little that the Government can do to affect public interest in specific foreign products, that, in fact, in the case of films, East European productions simply are not as popular in the United States as our films are in the theaters of Communist Europe. The central point is that in the West there are by and large no government barriers; in the East the reverse is true.

In another area of information dissemination—Western newspapers and periodicals—the situation today remains poor, with only token numbers being available in East Europe and these only in places frequented by tourists.

Moreover, there is little indication these countries allow free access to such publications through institutions such as libraries, while institutions in the United States and other Western nations often subscribe to Eastern magazines and newspapers.

Correspondents for American, as well as other Western media, have generally had a difficult time working in the Communist countries of Europe and in recent months the situation has worsened, this despite the fact that the Final Act commits signatory countries to improve the working conditions of foreign journalists.

Among the major reasons for the deterioration in their working conditions have been Communist sensitivity to Western reporting of the activities of dissidents in the Eastern countries.

In fact, these countries have mounted a propaganda campaign against Western newsmen, accusing them of violating CSCE objectives by damaging the possibility of better East-West understanding. As part of the campaign, they have expelled correspondents, given them "warnings," detained them for searches, and turned down requests for temporary visas. Two months ago, we were informed by the Prague government that it would not issue visas to Western correspondents who report on Charter 77 developments or who attempt to contact dissidents.

In the area of radio and TV, we have already discussed the ongoing virulent campaign against Western international radio broadcasts. While this area thus remains sensitive, there have been some positive developments. The Columbia Broadcasting System has signed an agreement with the Soviet Government for the exchange of radio and TV programs, following similar agreements which the National Broadcasting Co., and the American Broadcasting Co., signed earlier. France and the Soviet Union last February signed a cooperative radio agreement and Czechoslovak and Portuguese radios signed a similar cooperation and exchange agreement.

In contrast to these negative developments, United Press International was permitted to open an office in Leningrad, but in return TASS opened another office in the United States; the German Democratic Republic has issued 1-year multiple entry visas to permanently accredited correspondents, but refuses to give accreditation to correspondents already accredited to West Berlin or the Federal Republic of Germany. And recently, Yugoslavia sponsored a journalists' conference which discussed inconclusively and sometimes acrimoniously the role of the press in implementing the Final Act.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I shall be glad to answer any of the Commission's questions that I can.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Reinhardt.

Before we go to Secretary Duffey and questions, let me just take this opportunity to commend you and congratulate you for your efforts at the UNESCO meeting. It was a most difficult matter and we still have problems there. If we had not turned things around at that last meeting, at least a little bit, I think we would be in a lot more difficulty than we are today.

Now, Secretary Duffey.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH DUFFEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY YALE RICHMOND, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EE PROGRAMS OF THE BUREAU OF EDUCATION AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

Mr. DUFFEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I prepared a statement which I would like to ask to have submitted for the record.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, it will be included in the record and you can proceed to speak extemporaneously or summarize or otherwise.

[The written statement of Mr. Duffey follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH D. DUFFEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

I welcome the opportunity to appear before this Commission and to report on the effect of the Helsinki Final Act on educational and cultural exchanges between the United States and the other signatory States, but with particular emphasis on the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.

The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State has been conducting reciprocal exchanges of persons with the Soviet Union and some countries of Eastern Europe for many years. With the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Poland and Romania we have had comprehensive programs since the late 1950s and early 1960s. These programs have been carried out pursuant to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Fulbright-Hays). They include not only the traditional exchanges of students, researchers, teachers, and professors, but also leaders and specialists in a variety of fields ranging from culture and information to government and politics. The programs also include the sending of performing artists and groups, both academic and professionals. They have been funded by Congress and fully supported by all Administrations since their inception. Their purpose has been to expand and deepen direct contacts and communications between individuals and institutions of the United States and other countries. These activities are administered by the Department of State as part of its worldwide educational and cultural programs. Overseas they are implemented for the Department by Cultural Officers of the United States Information Agency assigned to our diplomatic missions.

These exchanges have benefited from the improvement of our relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe over the past five or so years, and it ap-

pears that the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries have recognized them as being mutually useful and worthy of expansion. The Final Act of the Helsinki Conference has provided a further stimulus for expansion and improvement of these activities since all of the exchange programs conducted by the Department of State are encompassed in the provisions of Basket III of the Final Act.

There is, however, one major difference between the educational and cultural aspects of Basket III and the other aspects of the Final Act. While most of the Final Act breaks new ground and requires new action on the part of the signatories, the educational and cultural aspects describe, for the most part, on-going programs. The Final Act has confirmed, on a high political level, the legitimacy of these programs which we have conducted over the past 20 years. Since signature of the Final Act we have sought to expand activities, conducted for the most part under bilateral arrangements with these countries. We have also sought to encourage United States non-governmental organizations to enter into direct contact with organizations in these countries, and I believe it is in this area that the effects of Helsinki have been most notable.

We have taken several new initiatives since Helsinki to take advantage of the stated desire of the Governments of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe to expand these contacts and exchanges.

For the governmental programs conducted by this Bureau we negotiated a new three-year Program of Exchanges with the Soviet Union in October 1976. This provides for a modest expansion of exchanges, with particular emphasis on bilateral seminars and conferences and exchanges of individual specialists and researchers which are mentioned in Basket III of the Final Act. The bilateral seminar is a relatively new format in which the Soviets have recently shown considerable interest. In these seminars groups of American and Soviet specialists meet for several days to discuss issues of common concern. Following the seminar there is usually travel to visit institutions of professional interest. We have had four of these seminars in education over the past two years. The most recent was held in Washington in April when a high-level group of Soviet educators met with prominent American educators to discuss the training of teachers in the two countries. We have been discussing with the Soviets similar bilateral seminars in theater, library science and literature.

Also during the past two years we have invited participation by the Soviet Union in the Department's International Visitor Program. This brings to the United States leaders from around the world for visits of up to 30 days of professional consultation and observation. During the past two years we have had Soviet participation from the fields of journalism, education, government, culture and the arts, all of which are mentioned in Basket III. At the same time we have been sending Americans in these and other fields to the Soviet Union where they have lectured at universities and scholarly institutions and engaged in useful discussions wtih their Soviet counterparts.

Our bilateral academic exchanges with the Soviet Union are continuing at the highest level since their inception in 1958. The Soviets in October sought an increase in these programs under which equal numbers of graduate students, language teachers and faculty are exchanged for visits of up to one academic year. However, because of our desire to see qualitative improvements before discussing an increase in numbers, we were reluctant to agree to an expansion. We are maintaining our exchange of Fulbright lecturers wtih the Soviet Union, which is now in its fourth year. Under this exchange approximately ten Americans and ten Soviet university lecturers are exchanged each year for periods up to one semester. The Americans have lectured at Soviet universities in American history and literature as well as the sciences. In our overall Soviet programs we seek to maintain a balance between the humanities and social sciences on the one hand, and science and technology on the other.

The new three-year program also calls for at least ten performing arts groups to tour the Soviet Union. Currently the Nitty Gritty Dirt Band, a small country-rock group is having great success there and we are plannnig for a modern dance company to go later this year. In recent years, such groups as the New York Philharmonic, the New York Jazz Repertory Company, the American Conservatory Theatre, the Roger Wagner Chorale, and the North Texas State University Jazz Lab Band were very well received in a number of cities in the Soviet Union.

In Eastern Europe we have expanded programs since Helsinki, to the extent our budget has permitted, with Yugoslavia and Poland, and to a lesser extent with Romania. Also since Helsinki, the Department has negotiated wtih Bulgaria,

Czechoslovakia and Hungary our first bilateral general agreements on exchanges and cooperation in education, culture, science and technology. We are hopeful that under these new comprehensive agreements it will be possible to develop exchanges similar to those we now have with the other Eastern European countries.

With the German Democratic Republic we do not yet have a cultural agreement but have initiated a modest reciprocal exchange program for scholarly researchers. We have also begun a small cultural presentations program involving one or two exhibits, musical and cinema presentations and occasional lecturers. Until our political relationship progresses beyond its present state, larger programs are not envisaged.

It is in the private sector that the greatest expansion since Helsinki has taken place. We have been encouragng the Soviet Union and East European countries to develop direct exchanges with nongovernmental institutions and organizations in this country. We have assisted private American institutions in establishing such exchanges, working closely with them, providing advice when it has been sought, and in some cases, partial funding through grants-in-aid. For the most part, however, the major funding for these private programs has come from the American and foreign institutions directly involved.

The most promising development mentioned in Basket III has been the expansion since Helsinki of direct contacts between universities in the United States and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In October, 1976 the State University of New York (SUNY) and Moscow State University signed the first agreement for direct exchanges between an American and Soviet university. This agreement provides for exchanges of graduate students and faculty. In recent months the first Soviets have arrived in the US, and the first SUNY participants in Moscow. Other American universities have made similar proposals to Soviet universities and we are hopeful that additional agreements for direct exchanges will result. In Eastern Europe similar agreements have been negotiated with American universities, particularly in Poland, Yugoslavia and Romania. For example, Indiana University has an agreement to assist Warsaw University in establishing an American Studies Center. This Center, which has two Indiana professors on its staff, was opened in October. A Center for Polish Studies will be established at Indiana later this year. The Department has played a facilitative role in encouraging contacts between universities in the belief that such exchanges promote direct relationships between scholars. We do not see these direct university exchanges as replacing the Fulbright programs, for which participants are selected in national competition, but rather as a supplement to national programs and a step toward normalizing relations between universities of the countries which signed the Helsinki Final Act.

Since Helsinki we have also seen an expansion of direct contacts with nongovernmental organizations in other fields. For example, the National 4–H Council has established new programs of exchanges for young agricultural specialists with the Soviet Union and Poland, and 4–H is now negotiating with another Eastern European country. Our YMCA has established direct exchanges of youth leaders with the USSR State Committee on Youth Organizations. Our theaters are conducting exchanges with theaters in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The reciprocal exchange of young political leaders with the Soviet Union, which has been conducted so successfully for the past five years by the American Council of Young Political Leaders, has been extended to Eastern Europe. In addition to the young political leaders, we are also supporting exchanges of state governors and mayors, and are now discussing a new exchange of state legislators with the Soviet Union.

What has been the effect of these programs over the past 20 years? The cumulative results are encouraging. In both the United States, and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, there has emerged as a consequence of these programs a new generation of scholars and specialists who have lived and studied abroad and know the language, institutions and cultures of these countries. Alumni of these exchanges can be found at most major universities and colleges in this country and abroad. Many are now moving up to positions of leadership. For example, the Rector (President) of Moscow State University was a graduate student here in the early years of our Soviet program. It is noteworthy that under his tenure Moscow State University has signed its agreement with SUNY. A USSR Deputy Minister of Agriculture, under whose administration the agreement with the National 4–H Council was signed, was also a graduate student in the United States under this program. Similarly, alumni of these programs

can be found today in leading positions in our universities and institutions. These people are a national asset in both countries and are living proof that these programs can and do lead to improved communications and understanding.

A second effect of past programs has been the trend to a new emphasis on cooperative activities. We went through an earlier period of exchanging delegations with the Soviet Union in a wide variety of fields under the intergovernmental exchange agreement. These delegation exchanges were often described as touristic in nature, but they served a useful purpose in acquainting specialists of one country with their professional counterparts in the other. Building on these earlier exchanges we have now moved to a period where American, Soviet and East European specialists, are actively engaged in collaborative research in fields of mutual interest. With the Soviet Union these collaborative efforts are implemented under eleven cooperative agreements signed during the 1972–1974 period in various fields of science and technology. It is less widely known that similar collaborative research is being conducted in the humanities and social sciences under an agreement concluded in 1975 between the American Council of Learned Societies and the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Often in these activities, one exchange can lead to another and produce a ripple effect. For example, in 1976 we sent to the Soviet Union, under Department of State sponsorship, the American Conservatory Theater (ACT) of San Francisco. They had a very successful visit, giving 22 performances in three cities. As a result of that visit ACT decided to present a current Soviet play, and invited to San Francisco in February of this year, with Department of State assistance, the Soviet author and director of that play to help in its production here. This was the first such visit in the history of Soviet-American cultural exchanges. And as a result of that visit, eight American theater directors are scheduled to visit the Soviet Union this month to see current Soviet theater productions and to establish contacts with Soviet theater directors. We expect this to be followed by a visit of Soviet theater directors to the United States. In this manner, the initial visit has produced an ever-widening circle of exchanges, contacts and communication.

Several new ideas for exchanges are now under consideration which we may propose for implementation under Basket III in the next fiscal year. One would involve new reciprocal exchanges of graduate students and young scholars with the Soviet Union in agriculture and business, two fields in which the United States and the Soviet Union both have a high interest. We also hope to extend our Fulbright lecturer programs to other Soviet institutions of higher learning, in addition to the Soviet universities which are now participating. We plan to expand our exchange of leaders on both sides for short-term visits to enable them to become more familiar with the other countries. And we will continue to encourage and support private exchanges which can play a useful role in expanding direct contacts. All of these activities would serve to implement Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act.

While we believe the Soviet Union and East European countries are interested in expanding these programs, a number of obstacles and difficulties in implementation still remain. The bureaucracies of these countries are cumbersome to deal with. These activities involve movement of people, and they require advance planning, submission of nominations according to prearranged deadlines, prompt notification of acceptance and timely issuance of visas. In these administrative matters there are often frustrating delays as well as last minute cancellations. Clearly, the administration of these programs on the Soviet and, in some cases, East European side will have to improve if the numbers of people involved are to increase.

A second consideration is the reciprocal nature of these exchanges. These countries are accustomed to conducting exchanges on a two-way basis, with equal numbers on each side. As reciprocal programs, they also require the concurrence of the organizations and governments in the host countries abroad. Therefore, as bilateral programs, they must reflect the interests of both sides.

Another vexing problem, which is mentioned in the Final Act, has been the access of American scholars, particularly in the Soviet Union, to archives and other research sources necessary for their study programs there. While the situation has improved in recent years there is still room for further improvement. We take every available opportunity to make it clear to the Soviets that any increase in the number of participants in these exchanges must be accompanied by improved access afforded to American scholars in the Soviet Union.

Funding has also been a problem. These programs in the past have not involved large sums of money, because the opportunities for meaningful exchanges with the Soviet Union and some Eastern European countries were until recently not very great. For example, the cost to the Department of State this year for the reciprocal exchanges with the Soviet Union, exclusive of performing arts, is $1.5 million, a modest amount in consideration of their importance and long-range effect. Now that there is interest in both sides in an expansion there is a need for increased funding to keep pace with the new opportunities.

Finally, we need patience. These exchange began 20 years ago, but only in recent years has there been significant progress on qualitative improvements and numerical increase. A sustained effort over a period of time will be required to consolidate and continue these promising developments. These exchanges represent one area where we and the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe can cooperate and work toward improved understanding despite our differences.

In summary, I would say that these Basket III programs are very much in the United States interest. The return on our relatively small investment will be great, both in our time and in the future, in helping to normalize contacts and communications with a most important part of the world.

Mr. DUFFEY. Let me here summarize the written statement.

I welcome this opportunity to appear before this Commission and to report on some of the effects of the Helsinki Final Act.

The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the State Department has been conducting reciprocal exchanges of persons with the Soviet Union and some countries of Eastern Europe for many years. With the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Romania, we have had comprehensive programs since the late 1950's and early 1960's.

These exchanges have benefited from improved relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe over the past 5 years, but the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference has provided a further stimulus for expansion and improvement of these activities since all of the exchange programs which we conducted are included under the provisions of Basket III.

While most of the Final Act breaks new ground and requires new action on the part of the signatories, the educational and cultural aspects under Basket III describe, for the most part, ongoing programs. The Final Act has confirmed, on a high political level, the legitimacy of these programs which we have been conducting for the past 20 years. Since the signature of the Final Act, we have sought to expand these activities, conducted for the most part under bilateral arrangements with these countries.

We have also sought to encourage United States nongovernmental organizations to enter into direct contact with organizations in these countries, and I believe it is in this area that the effects of the Helsinki Final Act have been most notable.

We have pursued several new initiatives since Helsinki to take advantage of the stated desire of the governments of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe to expand these contacts and exchanges.

I have detailed in my statement, Mr. Chairman, some of these initiatives. We have signed a new agreement with the U.S.S.R. and with several countries in Eastern Europe. Our stress is on the quality of these exchanges rather than simply the improvement of quantity. I have cited particularly with the Soviet Union some new activities such as the bilateral seminars through which we recently engaged in discussions on education and the training of teachers. Other seminars

are currently being proposed in the areas of theater, library science, and literature.

During the past two years, we have also invited participation by the Soviet Union in our International Visitor Program, and we have had Soviet participation from the fields of journalism, education, government, culture, and the arts, all of which are mentioned in Basket III.

At the same time, we have been sending Americans in these and other fields to the Soviet Union where they have lectured at universities and scholarly institutions and engaged in useful discussions with their Soviet counterparts.

The new 3-year program of exchanges with the U.S.S.R. also calls for at least 10 performing arts groups to tour the Soviet Union. A small country-rock band currently is having great success there and we are planning for a modern dance company to go later this year.

In recent years, groups such as the New York Philharmonic, the New York Jazz Repertory Company, the American Conservatory Theatre, the Roger Wagner Chorale, and others have been well received in a number of cities in the Soviet Union.

We have expanded programs in Eastern Europe since the Helsinki Agreement, to the extent our budget has permitted, with Yugoslavia and Poland, and to a lesser extent with Romania.

Since Helsinki, the Department has negotiated with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary our first bilateral general agreements on exchanges and cooperation in education, culture, science, and technology. We are hopeful that under these new comprehensive agreements it will be possible to develop exchanges similar to those we now have with the other Eastern European countries.

It is in the private sector that the greatest expansion since Helsinki has taken place. We have been encouraging the Soviet Union and East European countries to develop direct exchanges with nongovernmental institutions and organizations in this country.

We have assisted private American institutions in establishing such exchanges, working closely with them, providing advice when it has been sought, and in some cases, partial funding through grants-in-aid. For the most part, however, the major funding for these private programs has come from the American and foreign institutions directly involved.

The most promising development mentioned in Basket Three has been the expansion since Helsinki of direct contacts between universities in the United States and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

In October of 1976, the State University of New York and Moscow State University signed the first agreement for direct exchanges between an American and Soviet university.

In recent months, the first Soviets have arrived in the United States as a part of these agreements, and the first State University of New York participants in Moscow.

Other American universities have made similar proposals to Soviet universities and we are hopeful that additional agreements for direct exchanges will result.

In Eastern Europe similar agreements have been negotiated with American universities, particularly in Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania.

Since Helsinki, we have also seen an expansion of direct contacts with nongovernmental organizations in other fields. For example, the National 4–H Council has established new programs of exchanges for young agricultural specialists with the Soviet Union and Poland, and the 4–H is now negotiating with another Eastern European country.

Our YMCA has established direct exchange of youth leaders with the U.S.S.R. State Committee on Youth Organizations. Our theaters are conducting exchanges with theaters in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

I mentioned also in my statement reciprocal exchange of young political leaders with the Soviet Union. We also support exchanges of State Governors and mayors, and we are now discussing a new exchange of State legislators with the Soviet Union.

The cumulative results of these programs over the past 20 years have been encouraging. In both the United States and the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, there has emerged as a consequence of these programs a new generation of scholars and specialists who have lived and studied abroad and who know the language, the institutions and the culture of these countries. Alumni of these exchanges can be found at most major universities and colleges in this country and abroad.

Many now are moving into positions of leadership. For example, the Rector or President of Moscow State University was a graduate student in the United States in the early years of this program. It is noteworthy that under his tenure Moscow State University has signed its agreement with the State University of New York.

A U.S.S.R. deputy minister of agriculture, under whose administration the agreement with the National 4–H Council was signed, was also a graduate student in the United States under this program.

Alumni of these programs can be found today in leading positions in our universities and institutions. These people are a national asset in both countries and are living proof that these programs can and do lead to improved communications and understanding.

A second effect of past programs has been the trend to a new emphasis on cooperative activities. We went through an earlier period of exchanging delegations with the Soviet Union in a wide variety of fields under the intergovernmental exchange agreements.

Those exchanges were often touristic in nature, but they served a useful purpose in acquainting specialists of one country with their professional counterparts in the other.

Building upon these earlier exchanges, we have now moved to a period where American and Soviet and East European specialists are actively engaged in collaborative research in fields of mutual interest. With the Soviet Union, these collaborative efforts are implemented under 11 cooperative agreements signed during the 1972–74 period in various fields of science and technology.

It is less widely known that similar collaborative research is being conducted in the humanities and social sciences under an agreement concluded in 1975 between the American Council of Learned Societies and the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Several new ideas for exchanges are now under consideration which we may propose for implementation under Basket III in the next fiscal year. These would have to do with reciprocal exchanges of

graduate students and young scholars in addition to the extension of the Fulbright lecturer programs.

While we believe the Soviet Union and East European countries are interested in expanding these programs, a number of obstacles and difficulties in implementation still remain. The bureaucracies of these countries are cumbersome to deal with. These activities involve movement of people, and they require advance planning, submission of nominations according to prearranged deadlines, prompt notification of acceptance and timely issuance of visas.

In these administrative matters, there are often frustrating delays as well as last-minute cancellations. Clearly, the administration of these programs on the Soviet and, in some cases, East European side, will have to improve if the numbers of people involved are to increase.

A second consideration is the reciprocal nature of these exchanges. These countries are accustomed to conducting exchanges on a two-way basis, with equal numbers on each side. As reciprocal programs, they also require the concurrence of the organizations and governments in the host countries abroad. Therefore, as bilateral programs, they must reflect the interests of both sides.

Funding is also a problem. These programs in the past have not involved large sums of money because the opportunities for meaningful exchanges with the Soviet Union and some Eastern European countries were until recently not very great. For example, the cost to the Department of State this year for the reciprocal exchanges with the Soviet Union, exclusive of performing arts, is $1.5 million, a modest amount in consideration of their importance and long-range effect. Now that there is interest in both sides in an expansion, there is a need for an increased funding to keep pace with the new opportunities.

Finally, we need patience. These exchanges were begun 20 years ago, but only in recent years has there been significant progress toward qualitative improvements and numerical increase. A sustained effort over a period of time will be required to consolidate and continue these promising developments.

These exchanges represent one area where the United States and the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe can cooperate and work toward improved understanding despite our differences.

I would say in summary that the Basket III programs are very much in the interest of the United States. Our relatively small investment will pay dividends, both in our time and in the future, in helping to normalize contacts and communications with a most important part of the world.

I have brought along, Mr. Chairman, a listing of some of the programs either underway now or within the past month, both with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which I felt might be of interest to the Commission and I would be glad to distribute it.

Mr. FASCELL. We would be very happy to have that for the record.

[Material submitted by Mr. Duffey follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTIVITIES UNDERWAY NOW OR DURING PAST MONTH

SOVIET UNION

Twelve Soviet young political leaders in United States for seminar with ACYPL (CU funded).

Soviet official here for graduate student placement talks for 1977/78 academic year (CU funded).

Nitty Gritty Dirt Band (rock groups) in U.S.S.R. on CU program.

Eight U.S. theater directors in U.S.S.R. (CU funded).
U.S. delegation representing seven midwest universities in Moscow to sign exchange agreement with Moscow State University (CU assisted).
Four Future Farmers of America in U.S.S.R. to discuss exchange program with Soviets (CU assisted).
U.S.–U.S.S.R. Commission on Humanities and Social Sciences to meet in June in U.S.S.R. to discuss joint research plans for next year. (CU will fund some projects).
Dick Scammon to Moscow to discuss U.S. elections and political scene (CU funded).
Alton Frye (Council of Foreign Relations) in Moscow to discuss U.S. foreign policy and disarmament (CU funded).

EASTERN EUROPE

Three Polish young political leaders in United States on ACYPL exchange (first Polish delegation to United States under this new program).
Mihai Simai, leading Hungarian economist in United States for 30 days (CU funded).
Mississippi Delta group (jazz-blues) performs in Romania (CU funded).
Robert Moran, American Composer in Yugoslavia and Hungary (CU funded).
A Yugoslav bank official in United States for 30 days (CU funded).
Two Yugoslav journalists in United States for 30 days (CU funded).
A Romanian editor in United States for 30 days (CU funded).
A Bulgarian biophysicist in United States for 30 days (CU funded).
A Polish history professor in United States for 30 days (CU funded) May 19, 1977.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We will now ask both of you gentlemen some questions. I get a general tenor in both of your statements. Mr. Reinhardt reports no sharp change, that any change is slow, some forward movement, and slight progress. Mr. Duffey's testimony tells of patience, 20 years of effort, and slow going.

In every one of the activities that you have listed, certainly there would have to be a positive side for the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries who have entered into agreements. Initiatives on our part would be matched by initiatives by them. There cannot be any argument on that.

So the question is what is the measuring stick? I am a firm believer in going positive and I do not think that we ought to sweep under the rug any of our failures or our inability to make more progress. But what is our main problem area here?

Mr. DUFFEY. I take it that the goal of these programs today is not so much the creation of favorable estimates of the other country—while that is obviously to be desired, but a more accurate perception of this society by those societies and principal individuals and likewise a more accurate perception here.

I take some heart from the fact that the current state of our relations is one in which I think there is tough and firm exchange in terms of our negotiations over SALT and other matters. But those negotiations continue.

I think that perhaps coming to a better understanding, one might look at what I have just described as some sign of that and I also think that progress is slow, but it is definite. We can point to definite qualitative increases. So my response would be, Mr. Chairman, that there are some tangible and I think perhaps some intuitive reasons for sensing that these programs are having an effect.

Mr. FASCELL. We are going to go vote and come right back. Senator Stone will preside.

Mr. STONE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. REINHARDT. I would say that in answer to the chairman's question, that certainly the cultural agreements represent a measuring stick, but it is a tricky measurement. These agreements call for specific activities often in terms of exact numbers of things that can or cannot be accomplished.

I do not think that there is any question that in the case of the U.S.S.R., the cultural agreement has enabled us to make some progress.

Mr. STONE. Is it fair to say that we have made good progress in cultural exchanges but not necessarily in the individual rights areas?

Mr. REINHARDT. That is a fair statement, but I was going to point out that under the agreement with the Soviet Union, we have the right and they have the reciprocal right to distribute a certain number of monthly magazines. In both cases, it is 62,000 copies. This means 62,000 and not 63,000. We have every reason to believe that we could double the number, but we need to work this out in the agreement before any doubling would be possible. Thus, progress has been made in this area, but the agreement also limits the progress that we think could be made.

Mr. DUFFEY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STONE. Mr. Secretary.

Mr. DUFFEY. If you look at forms that are conceived as one-way, it is always hard to measure effect. If we look at those parts which really stress communication, or a two-way process, you have some benchmarks by which to measure. Again, those are modest, but at least there are some of them there.

Mr. STONE. Senator Dole, would you like to make any inquiry?

Mr. DOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been trying to catch up. I apologize for being a bit late, but we have been down there arguing about public financing of campaigns.

Mr. STONE. I am on your side.

Mr. DOLE. I am opposed to it. [Laughter.]

Mr. STONE. I just changed my mind. [Laughter.]

Mr. DOLE. I wonder first of all—I think you are probably familiar with the amendment introduced by Senator Percy that would establish VOA as an independent agency. Perhaps you have been asked this question. The major argument has been that the VOA has to contend with interference from bureaucrats and others concerning their program. Just how independent is VOA?

Mr. REINHARDT. I am sure Mr. Duffey does not want that question. [Laughter.]

This is a long story and my answer could be long or short, Senator. We think that the present arrangement for VOA news broadcasts enables this worthy organization to broadcast with complete freedom.

Indeed, we have no mechanism whatsoever for interfering with the news broadcasts of the Voice of America. Another role of the Voice of America, of course, is to explain and defend American policies.

We make every effort to bring broadcasters together with policymakers so that they will understand the policies and so that their explanations and defense may be in accordance with the existing policies.

It is my contention that there is no interference with the Voice of America in carrying out its mandate and, indeed, its legislated charter to broadcast the news.

Mr. DOLE. Has there been any interference by the State Department officials?

Mr. REINHARDT. Certainly in my day—and my day has only been about 4 months—there has been no interference. There are allegations of interference in the past. Senator Percy and others have pointed to many examples. Some of them do trouble me. Most of them have perfectly logical explanations.

Mr. DOLE. Maybe interference might not be the correct word. Perhaps direction or suggestion is a more precise word?

Mr. REINHARDT. We solicit and we welcome comments by officials at home in the State Department and abroad in our embassies. We get them very frequently by cable and we treat each of them on its merits. Occasionally, we make mistakes and mistakes have been pointed out by ambassadors and other officials. We correct them. Occasionally, ambassadors and other officials point to broadcasts that simply seem to them to be embarrassing and we treat those on their merits. That is, they have no merit.

Mr. DOLE. Do you have any view on why the Soviets stopped jamming the Voice of America?

Mr. REINHARDT. The Soviets stopped jamming the Voice of America in the fall of 1973 and obviously we are not quite sure why.

However, it is our guess that this was in preparation for the negotiations governing the CSCE agreements and this was a move toward the official recognition of the radio of the United States, which put them in a position to negotiate these agreements from what they thought would be a better angle.

Mr. DOLE. With reference to the vigorous approach of spreading information of the USIA and the role it plays, the U.S. book publishing industry was invited to an exhibit at the Moscow Book Fair in September of 1977. We understand when they sought help from the USIA that they were turned down. Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. REINHARDT. Senator Dole, that is essentially correct, but from our point of view, there is a good reason for it. The U.S.S.R. in its inviting foreign book publishers to place their works in the Moscow Fair said that only books which meet the peace and progress criteria would be welcome.

They went on to say that only those books would be accepted whose content and format did not violate Soviet legislation and books that do not propagandize for war, that do not advocate racial or national exclusiveness, and that do not offend the national dignity of other participants. In other words, sir, this seemed to us to be an obvious means of trying to censor the types of books that would be admitted to the fair.

Mr. STONE. If the Senator would yield, I would just like to ask at that point—is the key area for potential censorship that category that you just mentioned—books or publications that offend the national dignity—is that not the kind of thing that is almost an umbrella that they could use?

Mr. REINHARDT. Yes; it certainly is, absolutely is. The phraseology that I have indicated here——

Mr. STONE. Does not the protest against the abuse of human rights offend the dignity of the abusing governments?

Mr. REINHARDT. Yes, sir, the Soviets could use this language to exclude any title that it pleased them to exclude. It is very broad and it is very general and it is an obvious invitation to censorship.

Mr. STONE. Senator Dole.

Mr. DOLE. I am just reminded—I think the question is that the Soviets do exclude such publications on that basis and should our Government not be there to protest if they do so?

Mr. REINHARDT. In the first place, there was no agreement to admit these books at all. Obviously, we would have been there to protest and we would protest, had there been an agreement and had the books been excluded by title under this general ban. But we did not think that the Government should be associated with a program that would inherently invite censorship.

Mr. DOLE. So you just turned down the whole program?

Mr. REINHARDT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. DUFFEY. My understanding, if I may speak, is that there will be a number of American publishers displaying books at the Moscow Fair and there will be a substantial representation, but there are independent ventures of the publishers.

Mr. REINHARDT. This is by the publishers and not by the Government. The publishers sought our assistance in this connection.

Mr. DOLE. Did you have any role in trying to push a certain book that might be excluded through protest or any other way?

Mr. REINHARDT. I know of no instance of our role in pushing a specific book.

Mr. DOLE. You just reacted to the Soviet invitation?

Mr. REINHARDT. The invitation was extended by the Soviet Government to book publishers and it was not a government-to-government invitation.

In our conversations with the publishers, we had pointed out to them what we would be up against with the kind of restrictive clause that the U.S.S.R. had inserted into the negotiations.

Obviously, technical and scientific books would be welcome. Books in other areas would be subjected to great scrutiny by the Soviet authorities.

Mr. DOLE. On another subject, Secretary Duffey mentioned in his statement reciprocal exchanges with persons of the Soviet Union and some countries of Eastern Europe that involve the various artistic groups such as dancers and other performers. Given the wealth of talent of many of our ethnic groups in this country, especially among those of Eastern European ancestry, has the State Department ever sponsored ethnic American choirs or dance groups?

Mr. DUFFEY. There have been a number of groups that have gone to Eastern Europe not really needing our sponsorship. The arrangements have been worked out privately and we were delighted to have these occur.

My impression is that particularly in Eastern Europe—and I spoke yesterday with the director of a choir in western New York that had been on two trips to Warsaw—these have been arranged completely in the private sector. The Government may have provided some facilitative help.

Mr. DOLE. But there would be a possibility of sponsorship.

Mr. DUFFEY. Certainly.

Mr. DOLE. The door is open for sponsorship as far as you are concerned?

Mr. DUFFEY. Certainly. What we do officially always has a tit-for-tat arrangement and when it can happen in a private sector, it is much better.

Mr. DOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STONE. The Final Act, Mr. Secretary, calls for encouragement to organizations to increase circulation of print publications and newspapers. But there are places where this is not likely to be profitable, and therefore, the U.S. distributors might not regard that as a priority.

Have you or your organizations done anything to encourage increased circulation of printed matter?

Mr. REINHARDT. The example that Senator Dole brought up is an excellent one. In general, publishers would doubt that the distribution of books in Eastern Europe could be a profitable venture and they have come to us for assistance. We have discussed with them the possibilities of assistance and are continuing to do so.

Mr. STONE. Have you actually given any assistance?

Mr. REINHARDT. Not recently. In the case of newspapers, we do subscribe to a limited number of newspapers which we use in our reading rooms and some for direct presentations to institutions and individuals in Eastern Europe. But this is a relative drop in the bucket and does not amount to a great deal.

Formerly, we had a book program that, of course, would have been of great assistance to the publishers. We think that books obviously should be distributed and should be sold to the extent possible in all of Eastern Europe, but there are real political difficulties in doing so. Our problem is more political than anything else.

Mr. STONE. Do you mean that you cannot make these assistances when you cannot get the books in in the first place?

Mr. REINHARDT. That is what it amounts to.

Mr. STONE. What you want to assist, they will not let in?

Mr. REINHARDT. Scientific and technological books really have no limit.

Mr. STONE. But social books do have a limit.

Mr. REINHARDT. They would have political connotations.

Mr. STONE. What have the USIA or the VOA done to publicize the barriers and abuses and restrictions in contravention of the Final Act of Helsinki that have been perpetrated by the Eastern Bloc countries?

Mr. REINHARDT. Innumerable broadcasts. I could furnish you a list for the record. But in numerous broadcasts dealing with the Final Act, they have gone on and continue.

We made a recent survey between January 1976 and March of this year, as I think I brought out in my statement, and there were well over 1,000 broadcasts on this specific subject of the Final Act.

Also, we have a wireless file that goes daily throughout the world to our Embassies. The European file points up for our officials and other Embassy officials the facts that enable them to discuss the Final Act and the manner in which it has been observed or not observed with media and governmental representatives.

Mr. STONE. What excuses—and I would ask this of both of you—do you hear most frequently from the Soviet Government and govern-

ments in Eastern Europe for their failure to live up to their treaty or their agreement? Why do they say they are not doing it?

Mr. REINHARDT. Of course, they do not admit that they are not doing it. Their argument is that the Helsinki Agreement is not simply Basket III. It is Baskets I, II, and III. They argue that we overemphasize the third basket and underemphasize the other two.

They say this must be an arrangement from their point of view which gives equal emphasis to all parts of the act.

Mr. STONE. Well, whether over- or under-emphasized, Basket III is part of it.

Mr. REINHARDT. Correct.

Mr. STONE. What do they say about Basket III aside from its underemphasis?

Mr. REINHARDT. I do not want to be caught defending their point of view.

Mr. STONE. I understand. I am just asking for a repetition of it so we can understand why it is that someone, a major power, a major government, one of the superpowers, would sign their name to something and then not live up to it.

Mr. DUFFEY. Senator Stone, one of the things that they said is that certain aspects of the act are inconsistent with their internal laws. This is the thing they put forth. I must say, from our side——

Mr. STONE. Is not the opposite the case?

Mr. DUFFEY. We also have that problem, Senator. For example, under Basket III, we have signed provisions for coproduction of films, but our Government does not produce films. We can only encourage the private sector to take incentives.

We have signed, under Basket III, provisions having to do with music from other countries being performed by our symphonies. But our Government does not go to symphonies and make suggestions about their repertoires or performances.

So I think there are some problems on both sides.

Mr. STONE. The most you can say about those two abuses is that we are not engaged in the area, but is not the opposite the case in the conduct of Soviet Union and their abuses? They are engaged in the area and not living up to these things.

Mr. DUFFEY. If I might refer back to your prior question which is related to this in terms of what we can do.

We have done some positive midway steps with regard to books. We do not know the outcome of them, but we recently have encouraged publishers here to work with their counterparts in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries to explore possibilities for joint ventures in seminars and exchanges of personnel.

We are sending three representatives of university presses to Eastern Europe in September to establish contact with their counterparts there and we have worked with the Association of American Publishers in conducting a seminar with Soviet publishers in New York this year.

So we are trying to take some positive steps at least to try to create the climate under which we might make a little progress in this area.

Mr. STONE. Are you hopeful that this climate creating is working?

Mr. DUFFEY. One always has to be hopeful.

Mr. STONE. But are you?

Mr. DUFFEY. It is——

Mr. STONE. I know you have to be, but are you?

Mr. DUFFEY. I would go back to my need for suggesting patience and we can look and see some progress. Yes; I am impatient from time to time, despite my counsel to patience, but I think this is constructive and not simply long term. We can actually see some results.

Mr. STONE. Mr. Friendly.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Mr. Duffey, I would like to follow up on the whole problem of the relationship between the Government in a free market economy and cultural informational exchanges.

Can you even keep tabs on what our movie producers or television producers or book publishers are trying to do?

Mr. DUFFEY. No; we try to do the best we can, but we have no reporting mechanism, as you are aware. I am sure that we do not have a complete inventory. We try to be as sensitive as we can. We have established ourselves as a place where advice and counsel—some of the kind that Mr. Reinhardt mentioned—would suggest what binding conditions private institutions may discover but also we try to proffer facilitative help. We have no way of measuring the broad range of activity when it is completely open, as it is in our society.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Facilitate is an important word. If it were bulldozers or drugs to be sold, then the American Embassy's commercial section in Moscow would have no hesitation about assisting in an exhibit with a guy coming to town with a suitcase of slides or samples.

Do you have any similar possibilities with film or publications or literature? Or do we get into the problem of what is the content? Is a bulldozer neutral, but a book somehow inflammatory?

Mr. DUFFEY. You are now really referring to questions which would fall in the nature of trade and the encouragement of trade.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Yes.

Mr. DUFFEY. To the best of my knowledge, there is nothing inhibiting in that area. I do not know that our publishers have found the kind of markets that perhaps would stir them up. The Association of American Publishers, however, cannot tell us how many Soviet books are published here and we do not have any record of that at all. Even in terms of Soviet books, we have no way of telling which ones are being published and translated.

In other words, there is no central inventory in this area.

Mr. FRIENDLY. The only one we have been able to find is the Library of Congress catalog.

Mr. DUFFEY. Yes.

Mr. FRIENDLY. But government facilitation—when we do not know what is going on, but we do know that there are obstacles—is most productive from our point of view, and best in the private sector.

Is there a way for the government to be there without being there?

Mr. DUFFEY. I think the private sector is still very sensitive to what appears as a heavy hand from the government in this area, and rightly so.

We have tried often with the private sector. For example, we have tried to make American businessmen understand that when they are overseas they carry, in a sense, the presence of the Government and we have a stake in their representation. We tried to do that by way of advice and we tried to encourage. Our principle at the moment is to

encourage in the private sector as much flow as possible with the judgment in general that that can only be positive.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Is there any thought that the formal exchange agreements, because they do involve these concepts of reciprocity, and therefore, are inherently limiting, get in the way of that expansion rather than encourage it? Has anybody ever kicked around the idea of trying to phase out the formal bilateral umbrella agreements in favor of more direct institutional and private contact?

Mr. DUFFEY. I think we would be in favor of doing that, and we resist signing that kind of agreement with societies that are open. In a closed society, everything is in a sense controlled by the government as opposed to our society which is urging openness. The conditions just do not seem to be there for the operation of anything aside from a treaty.

What we are trying to do is to make those agreements more and more open and more and more permissive. In Eastern Europe, for example, in the new round of agreements, we are putting in language that refers specifically to the private sector on this side in order to make these linkages possible.

But for the time being, the best we can do is to try to expand the scope of those agreements. I do not think that we see a way to get around them.

Mr. DOLE. I just wanted to follow up on something. This is a general question. We read a lot about the exchange programs and I am not sure that we read as much about Russians or others who may come here. Has there ever been any assessment made of the value of these exchanges? What do we learn from the Soviets? As far as I know, we excell in just about everything when it comes to business or agriculture. Are there records kept on the number of professors, students, researchers, teachers, and so forth who come from the Soviet Union?

Mr. DUFFEY. An organization which handles most of our scholarly exchange is IREX and they are currently publishing a survey of about 400 Americans who were engaged in activities in the Soviet Union. I would be happy to get a copy of that for you. The Soviet Union would not cooperate in that effort, and I think that——

Mr. DOLE. Are there an equal number who come here and go there or not?

Mr. DUFFEY. Yes; it is generally equal. There are some cases in Eastern Europe with smaller countries where it may fall a little bit out of balance, but we generally try to keep it equal. When you have a treaty, of course, it is more definite.

Mr. DOLE. I can understand the benefits that we might obtain, just by being in the country—or being in the area. Is there any hard evidence that there is any real benefit in technology or art or whatever? I am wondering in what area we might be inferior to the Russians—perhaps ballet. I do not know.

Mr. DUFFEY. Perhaps this forthcoming study which will be more up-to-date will give us the best way to answer that question. I cannot answer it now with any precision.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Secretary Duffey, may I just continue for a moment because the publishers are going to be testifying before us next week and presenting several gripes and suggestions.

One of the suggestions is for a revival of what is called the Informational Media Guaranty program. This drifted away 10 years ago, and it sounds as if they want the American Government to subsidize the sales of publications which the Eastern Europeans have resisted buying for being too expensive.

First of all, has that been a real element in resistance to expanding the volume of publications that go from West to East?

Mr. REINHARDT. Mr. Friendly, it is USIA that administered the old IMG program until about 1968, and we are certainly receptive, quite receptive, to any discussion of a revival of the program.

It has some real difficulties connected with it. The record will show that when the program ceased in the late 1960's, the U.S. Government had offered subsidies or in effect a subsidy for each title going into countries abroad.

As we see it, we still have yet to deal with this problem. There is also a problem of the selection of books. In the Eastern European countries, again, any scientific or technological title is easily admitted. Other titles cause more difficulty and when the IMG program was in existence, officials of the Government, in an effort to carry out the will of the Congress as stated in the legislation, were continually skirting close to the border of censorship.

A book that was deemed not to be appropriate—why—that was always the question.

The administering of this program was quite difficult. Nevertheless, it is a fair question as to whether or not IMG would assist us in getting more books, especially into Eastern Europe, but not only East European countries.

We are quite receptive to further discussions on the subject.

Mr. FASCELL. Mrs. Fenwick has a question.

Mrs. FENWICK. You sort of stopped at a point in 1967.

Mr. REINHARDT. The legislation stopped.

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes; the legislation stopped so it was no longer possible for you to pay these subventions or subsidies. Is that right?

Mr. REINHARDT. The legislation is still on the books and it was never cancelled actually, but the appropriations were stopped for carrying out the program.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see. What I have been puzzling about is this problem of censorship.

Mr. REINHARDT. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. I think it is extremely difficult for our country. In the People's Republic of China I was interested to see what books they had in the English-language American section at the Institute of Nationalities.

Of course, it was exactly what you would expect. Every single novel or writer who disapproves of the United States and its ways and portrays the most dismal and unhappy side of American life was represented.

I do not think that Congress would be enthusiastic about a program which was going to result in a flood of literature of that kind only.

Now, as I understand it, the way they handle it in England seems sensible. I wonder what you and Secretary Duffey would think of something like the English Council for the Arts, which is a body of people of high academic and cultural standing, separate from the

Government, which would have to approve all their cultural exchanges. Information and so on would be handled through that body.

I wonder how that would fit in to our system and whether or not you think it is a good idea?

That is the way the British handle the question of Government censorship.

Mr. REINHARDT. As far as books are concerned, if there were a revival of the IMG program or a similar program that called for a selection of titles or types of books, in my judgment, a private organization could handle this far better than the Government.

This is one way, subject, of course, to the terms of the legislation, for determining the types of books that would be eligible.

Mrs. FENWICK. Would you suggest, therefore, a body of publishers? Would that be your suggestion?

Mr. REINHARDT. Not necessarily. I think publishers certainly could be included in the body, but it should be a broader body.

Mrs. FENWICK. You mean academic and cultural experts and so on?

Mr. REINHARDT. Experts in the field.

Mrs. FENWICK. Exactly. Do you think that that would be an appropriate body?

Mr. REINHARDT. This is a suggestion that is worthy of much consideration.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see. In the matter of the subventions of newspapers and so on, if the appropriation were there, would that go forward?

Mr. REINHARDT. The appropriation existed for 20 years, as I recall, and it provided for no subventions. It was a program, however, to encourage publishers to convert their funds, soft currencies, into dollars and then the Treasury would authorize the use of the soft currency in the countries where they had been obtained. But the experience was that when the Treasury reconverted, the rates had changed tremendously.

This is true to the extent that the U.S. Information Agency now owes the Treasury approximately $22 million.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see.

Mr. REINHARDT. This works out to about 38 cents per title that went into these countries over a 20-year period.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see.

Mr. REINHARDT. This is a problem that would have to be dealt with.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Reinhardt, why could we not deal with that simply by putting a ceiling on the amount of money that is to be available for the program, period.

Mr. REINHARDT. That was finally done.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes; and it could be done again.

Mr. REINHARDT. It could be done again.

Mr. FASCELL. You just appropriate x number of dollars for the conversion of soft currency per year.

Mr. REINHARDT. Each year during the life of the program that was done. The $22 million that I referred to is the debt that accumulated over the period of the entire existence of IMG. This is not a 1-year figure.

Mr. FASCELL. I understand that. Is it still carried on the books that way? It was a paper transaction. What does it take to wipe it out?

Mr. REINHARDT. It is still carried on the books. The Treasury, however, does not dun us everyday.

Mr. FASCELL. I suppose it would take a $22 million increase in your appropriation to pay it off?

Mr. REINHARDT. Either that or——

Mr. FASCELL. No director heretofore has wanted to stick his neck out to ask for that appropriation as long as he does not have to pay it back.

Mr. DOLE. There could be a reduction, also.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Mr. REINHARDT. I am not asking for the appropriation this morning, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. I understand that. It seems crazy to carry it on the books. It is a liability of one government agency to another.

Mr. DUFFEY. Part of the dilemma here is that the American book publishers approached the Government as a private enterprise business operation and were asking, in this case, for a particular subsidy.

Mr. FASCELL. What is wrong with that, Mr. Duffey?

Mr. DUFFEY. Nothing at all.

Mr. FASCELL. We subsidize every other businessman in the United States.

Mr. DUFFEY. Nothing at all. Here we have that issue and beside it, we have the issue of particular national interest with regard to the freer flow of books. Somehow both of those become a part of the consideration of how to do it.

Mr. FASCELL. It is certainly not difficult for me to see the national interest in providing some money so that books are available.

That is a legitimate taxpayer's expense, it seems to me, and in our national interest to do that.

I recognize Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. I wonder if you negotiate with the governments before any of these arrangements, such as the one we are discussing, are possible? You have to, do you not?

Mr. REINHARDT. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. That is how you get your yes, or no, as to whether information can flow.

Mr. REINHARDT. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. I would think that our publishers might feel rather lonely and in a very difficult position unless they have some kind of recognition officially by our Government.

What kind of relationship have you worked out with them? How does that work?

I know that the businessmen to whom we talked in various countries, coming from the various Eastern European countries, seem to have worked out increasingly satisfactory arrangements. They now seem to be able to get a telephone in 2 years, for example, rather than 5.

But the publishers—it does not seem to be working for them because information is so much more dangerous than economic exchanges.

I wonder if you could give some kind of quasi-official recognition to publishers, as indeed we do to the Business Council which negotiates exchanges between the Soviet Union and the United States?

The businessmen are given a quasi-official position which seems to enable them to talk better, more freely, and with more power to the government in those countries.

Mr. DUFFEY. We have no specific proposals for such an arrangement, but of course, there is a difference between the publishers and the other organization that you mentioned, because one is a free enterprise business operation and the other is in the category of a foundation.

Mrs. FENWICK. The publishers?

Mr. DUFFEY. No; the Business Council is really a different category.

Mrs. FENWICK. Would it be wise for our publishers to form a sort of foundation?

Mr. DUFFEY. What you are suggesting is the possibility of more official discussions in which the publishers would be engaged.

Mrs. FENWICK. Included.

Mr. DUFFEY. Included. We are trying to nurture such discussions now by some of the activities I mentioned earlier and if we can come to that point, then I think obviously, individuals from the publishing world and others should be designated as those who would represent this Government, were we to come to that kind of thing.

In other words, I do not see on the horizon right now the possibility of those kinds of discussions.

Mrs. FENWICK. What is the difficulty?

Mr. DUFFEY. I have not followed this area for too long. One of the difficulties, I suppose, is the very difference in the structures. In the sense that in this country, we have large competitive industry which wants to and is used to operating privately, which we encourage, and we hope to work in cooperative relationships with. And on the other side, you have an officially controlled economy.

Mrs. FENWICK. But that is true of business, too. What I am trying to do is to put our newspaper and book people in the same position of being supported by the Government in appropriate ways—obviously, we would not want consorship involved—but in appropriate ways, the same way our business people are. That is what I am getting at.

Mr. DUFFEY. Part of the dilemma is the market available.

Mr. REINHARDT. Excuse me. Outside Eastern Europe, we assist in our embassies and we assist a publisher as we do any other businessman.

The publisher comes to a capital and he wants to make certain arrangements for the sale of his product.

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes.

Mr. REINHARDT. And in our commercial sections and in our USIA sections and in the embassies, we make arrangements for him and, to my knowledge, there is no problem in this procedure.

In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, there are all of the problems that we have been discussing this morning.

We are in continual discussions with the publishers about manners in which these problems can be either reduced or overcome and this is the reason for the IMG question and the reason for our attitude toward IMG.

Certainly, there are problems, but if we can solve some of them, this is one way to increase the free flow of information through books.

Mrs. FENWICK. I think that the U.S. Government might somehow be able to lend the kind of backing to the Publishers' Association that they do to the Chamber of Commerce. If so, it would be helpful.

I say this because we need to take the dissemination of information as seriously as we do the exchange of goods.

Mr. FASCELL. May I interrupt?

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. It has been so long since I got my head chopped off on the IMG program, trying to save it, that I have forgotten some details, so perhaps you can refresh my memory on the mechanics of that operation.

It was a direct exchange of dollars for nonconvertible currencies accumulated from sale of books. Is that right?

Mr. REINHARDT. Correct.

Mr. FASCELL. Also, as I recall it, there was no contribution made by the publisher toward any convertibility loss.

Mr. REINHARDT. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. The reason the program got into trouble not only with USIA, but particularly in Congress, was that it was difficult for some Congressmen to explain to people why it was that one of the largest or the largest publishing houses in the United States, which make excellent profits, was being subsidized for book sales abroad. The national purpose was never sufficiently identified so as to justify the taxes spent on it, especially when there was no contribution by the publisher.

However, we do have the parallel and Mrs. Fenwick has been indicating that parallel for some time. We do have all kinds of mutual insurance programs for which the U.S. Government is the final guarantor. I do not know why the program cannot be expanded, if it is already authorized to cover book publishers. We cover everyone else on riots and insurrections and loss of convertibility and everything else, including almost negligence. You can get comprehensive coverage, but you pay for it and you get a revolving fund and so far those funds have been doing fairly well. I do not know why some consideration might not be given to a proposition of that kind.

I do not know why the USIA and the publishers cannot get together and arrive at some legislative vehicle other than the present authorization, which I do not think will get any appropriation.

If it is not a mutual insurance program—maybe with a U.S. guarantee—then we might even get resistance. Of course, I do not know.

Mrs. FENWICK. In the Aviation Bill we passed yesterday, there was provision for such insurance.

Mr. FASCELL. We have OPIC now which covers businessmen going into countries where they are concerned about their capital investment and who might not otherwise make that capital investment unless there was an insurance program. But at any rate, that is just one suggestion.

Mr. REINHARDT. I think that should be considered, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Because that leads up to the next question, which is—and I gather that this is not critical—that what we are doing is more of the same in carrying out Helsinki. We have enough trouble doing that, so I am not knocking it.

But there is a question—what do we have going in something new or innovative or expansive? I understand the need for patience and you have to do one thing at a time, but is there any opportunity to move forward?

Mr. DUFFEY. Mr. Chairman, my submission indicates a number of programs. They are modest.

Mr. FASCELL. On that list which you made available for the record?

Mr. DUFFEY. Yes. On that list plus in the body of the testimony can be found new kinds of activities of qualitative value that are taking place and directly due to Helsinki.

I think you were away when I mentioned the fact that in the publishing area, where we are at a really primitive stage, we do have some specific things to point to which are positive in terms of moving in the direction of agreements. They are modest, but they are positive.

Mr. FASCELL. Let me ask this. Does Belgrade present to you an opportunity for pursuing the bilaterals?

Mr. REINHARDT. The bilateral agreements?

Mr. FASCELL. Whatever you have in the way of bilateral negotiations. Does Belgrade permit you an opportunity to pursue bilaterals and are you going to pursue those bilaterals outside of Belgrade? Does the meeting there of all the signatory countries for the next 6 months, present us with an opportunity to pursue our bilaterals in your respective areas?

Mr. REINHARDT. The bilateral agreements—we have two now—with Romania and the U.S.S.R. and we have three in various stages of negotiation with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, will be pursued regardless of Belgrade. They are outside the framework of that conference.

But from my point of view and from the point of view of the USIA, what Belgrade presents is an opportunity for a general review of where we stand and what has happened since Helsinki on both sides, and presents an opportunity at least to gain a greater quality of programs than we now have.

Some things have happened, I think, as a result of Helsinki, particularly in quality. For example, we operate what we call a voluntary speakers' program. That is the speakers are distinguished Americans in one field or another who happen to be traveling abroad on other business. In the Eastern European area, we have been able to arrange programs for about 75 of these persons, in the last year. We cannot be sure, but we think that there is a connection between Helsinki and our ability to arrange these programs. Probably without Helsinki, it would have been far more difficult. But as for examples of substantial changes and initiatives and innovations that have happened since Helsinki in our area, there is not much evidence of this.

Mr. FASCELL. I understand that very clearly. So I would be perfectly willing to say, for the record, that Helsinki gets credit for everything after Helsinki was signed and gets no credit for everything that happened before Helsinki was signed. But I am not talking about that. I am saying only this. Is there any daylight in terms of innovations in this program other than this very patient, slow, step-by-step process which has been going on with or without Helsinki?

Mr. DUFFEY. I think Helsinki was a legitimation and perhaps a small quantum jump in that process and I emphasize particularly Basket III.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Mr. DUFFEY. We will continue our bilaterals quite apart from Belgrade. The outcome of Belgrade, just as the Helsinki Final Act, will contribute to a climate of improved relations and of greater possibilities. Again, I have tried to document that. Without the Belgrade conference becoming simply an exchange of recriminations, I think there has to be a frank look at the implementation record.

I think that that puts our record under scrutiny and we have reason to be proud of our record in the area of education and cultural affairs.

Finally, if that meeting again raises the bit or legitimizes the efforts of governments in a mutual way to cooperate, it will serve our bilateral efforts quite well, as I think it has in the last year.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you. I recognize Mr. Pell.

Mr. PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one question that comes to mind which was triggered by what you just said, Mr. Duffey. Is our own action consistent with the Helsinki Accords? One of the questions that will be raised there, as we go down our list, and I am sure it will be quite a long one, is this.

One point that the Eastern European countries may be quite scrupulous about is in publishing the Helsinki Declaration in full in their government-owned and government-controlled press. This is something we have not been able to do. We described it in The New York Times and The Washington Post and the San Francisco Chronicle, but full publication has not happened. How do you propose countering that response?

Mr. DUFFEY. The State Department recently published and distributed that text.

Mr. Chairman, I have used every opportunity that I have had socially and otherwise with journalists both to tell them about the conference and to suggest the publication of the text. In a society such as ours, I do not know what more we can do. I think all of us need to continue to whet the interest of our journalist friends on the subject.

Mr. PELL. I know that I have talked about it to several in the field and they have absolutely no desire to publish it because it is no longer news.

I wonder if it would be worth it to buy some full-page advertisements in these newspapers and put it in?

Mr. DUFFEY. I do not know whether the State Department has ever done that, but perhaps it could be done. I do not know.

Mr. PELL. It is a way of obviating one piece of criticism and we have also underlined the point that we have a free press and we cannot prescribe in the same way that they do.

Mr. DUFFEY. I do think that there is increasing awareness. I think, for example, that the chairman and other members of the Commission have helped to promote greater awareness and while we may be faulted in terms of the specific text and the precise language—I think the spirit, particularly in recent days—there has been an effort to make our citizens more alert and we can point to some of those areas.

Mr. PELL. With regard to visas, what would be the State Department policy concerning Communist labor representatives? My last recollection is that we were going to continue letting Mr. Meany exercise the decisionmaking function in that regard. Will that continue or not?

That may be out of your bailiwick.

Mr. DUFFEY. Let me just say that our visa policy is under review by the Administration and the State Department. I do not think that your characterization that Mr. Meany is dictating policy is quite accurate.

There are obviously problems that have to be worked out and there is an awareness of the difficulties and potential embarrassments that we have in that area. There have been many helpful suggestions coming from the Hill and my guess is that the review will be completed sometime soon.

Mr. PELL. It seems that from Mr. Meany's viewpoint, there is a validity to his position because they are not free labor representatives.

But the question is whether that view should be the overriding consideration for the U.S. Government and be official policy.

Mr. DUFFEY. I do not personally believe it should be.

Mr. PELL. From his position, it is absolutely correct.

Mr. DUFFEY. I certainly understand that.

Mrs. FENWICK. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. In talks with the governments of Eastern European countries, is the McCarran Act brought up?

Mr. DUFFEY. I recently heard the figures and I would be a little hesitant because I am not sure my memory would serve me correctly, but there was something like a current sample of 1,700 applications for waivers of which 1,698 had been granted. Operationally, it has not been a great stumbling block.

Mrs. FENWICK. Do they mention the McCarran Act as a blot on our record, so to speak?

Mr. DUFFEY. I do not know that it has been mentioned in direct discussions or negotiations. It does, however, occur in the press.

Mrs. FENWICK. Does it occur often?

Mr. DUFFEY. Occasionally.

Mrs. FENWICK. What else do they talk about in the press as being examples of our "iniquity"?

Mr. DUFFEY. Perhaps John has surveyed the press as often as I. I think it is a fairly standard litany. I am trying to think whether there are any new things.

Mr. REINHARDT. They charge that we are not interested in publishing their books and we are not interested in assisting in the showing of their films, and they will cite statistics to indicate that x number of books have come into the Soviet Union and y number, or a lesser number, into the United States.

Again, this brings up the fact that scientific and technological books are imported in some great quantities. But as Mr. Duffey and others have alluded to this morning, because our system is what it is, and private enterprise must simply play its role, there are some roles which we may not play as a government which fundamentally and intellectually, they understand.

Nevertheless, the charge is made. For their own people, it sounds somewhat convincing and even perhaps to some others.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see. I have heard from some dance troupes that even in cities where there are good accommodations, the dancers have sometimes been put in hotels without hot water, and in one case, I believe, there was no water at all.

I was wondering whether you had any record of reciprocity or non-reciprocity on that score.

Mr. DUFFEY. The contracts that we negotiate normally call for first-class or equivalent accommodations. Sometimes there is a substantial difference between what is regarded as first class between one country and another. I think our general experience is that the comment to which you refer is an exception. The Soviets seem to have been providing satisfactory accommodations depending on what is available.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see. Perhaps this was one isolated example.

Mr. DUFFEY. I think there have been several, but we recently made an effort to see how characteristic they were and they are exceptions to our experience.

Mrs. FENWICK. How far can we go in absolutely straight reciprocity? Suppose we simply, in the case of books, for example, separate the scientific and technical books and magazines which they want from the categories of philosophy and literature which they fear.

How would we come out? What advantages are there in this interchange? Who wins?

Mr. DUFFEY. The interchange is two ways and it seems to me both sides gain. Both sides have a stake in what is happening and that is why they will be stable over a period of time and you can measure, to some extent at least. With one-way communication, you really cannot and you do not have a situation in which both sides have a stake.

As I have said earlier, I think they are useful and I see that we have to go back, as the chairman suggested, 20 years, and look at the current situation as well.

I think that those of us who are a little older perhaps may be a little more patient in that process. You are perhaps a little impatient.

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes.

Mr. DUFFEY. It might well be in our national interest to be able to handle the books in terms of balance. In our negotiations, we try to work on quality and not only quantity.

But the particular problem we have is more one of our system. I thought when the chairman mentioned earlier the question of subsidy, which I think might be a very good thing, that the tickler comes when you talk to the publishers about whether you are subsidizing everything they choose to publish and what they would desire as an open free forum. If you go that route, then you really cannot manage it quite as precisely as one might like to.

Mrs. FENWICK. What do you think of the council of the arts that we were talking about? As the chairman suggested, it could be involved.

Mr. DUFFEY. But that is also related to the publisher himself and that is what would have to be spelled out. A council of the arts might make it possible to do that, but again, there is a process of management of the market.

Mrs. FENWICK. But, Mr. Duffey, we do it in business. A businessman who is the head of one company may go abroad with an official of the U.S. Government and, therefore, he represents one company, but he is also representing many companies.

It seems to me that we ought to be able to do something for our publishers. The backing that our Government gives to the commercial side seems to be clearer and more supportive, and I do not know of anything similar in the world of ideas.

Mr. DUFFEY. It is more difficult in the world of ideas given our system and our approach. I think we are making some progress in terms of the determination of that central voice. I have not seen a proposal where they are quite ready yet to lay aside the certain real competitive needs. Perhaps we will come to that stage. We would value cooperation and an arrangement where the mutual interests of both the government and private enterprise are involved.

Mrs. FENWICK. What are we going to do about the journalists who are being harassed now? This is very irritating when we have Helsinki accords. What do we do—just wave our arms and say that it is bad? What ways have we of making sure that these agreements will be lived up to?

Mr. REINHARDT. We have certainly protested vigorously the mishandling of journalists in any number of those countries. The Department has made representations in all instances and in some instances has reciprocally expelled their journalists from this country. In some cases, this leads to amelioration and in others, it does not.

Mrs. FENWICK. Why do we not always reciprocate? Maybe there is a good reason that perhaps diplomatically or otherwise, it would not work out, but why do we not always immediately reciprocate. "If you will do this to our journalists, then this will happen to yours."

Mr. DUFFEY. I am advised that sometimes in the past when this has occurred, American news agencies have not been able to get together in terms of a recommendation. Again, we work in this situation with a free-floating pluralistic situation.

I have not felt that they always felt that they should engage in reciprocal activity. I sense an atmosphere of directness in this. In addition to protests, we are also discussing it.

We have had recently some conversations with one Eastern European country and high-level visitors were here. The negotiation of arrangements for the future included these kinds of items as they related to the particular field that we were considering then and were part of our discussion.

I think that there is an atmosphere of direct confrontation on this in the arena of negotiations. I think that is good and useful.

Mrs. FENWICK. I would like to pursue the first part of your remarks, Mr. Duffey.

You say that on account of our pluralistic society that we have all sorts of difficulties. I do not see how that enters at all. In other words, the Soviet Government in a case, let us say, might have treated a certain journalist in a certain way. I do not see why any American association would protest if we simply said, "If you do that to our journalists, then your Soviet journalist in this country is not going to be allowed to do that."

In other words, I do not see that our pluralistic society operates here. It seems that perhaps you have reasons why this might be an unwise course.

Mr. DUFFEY. We always feel that we have a tradition that it is unwise for the Government in some of these areas to act arbitrarily or unilaterally when there are major private interests involved.

In other words, there is a tremendous——

Mrs. FENWICK. We are talking about a Soviet journalist.

Mr. DUFFEY. Yes; but there has always been an effort to consult with professionals and specialists in the field about the current atmosphere and about the wisdom of acts. They are not taken without consultation.

I think that the Government is always in the situation, not simply in this area but in other areas, where it should be sensitive to people who are specialists in the field from the private sector.

Mrs. FENWICK. What specialists are you talking about and who are you talking about? Are you talking about Soviet people?

Mr. DUFFEY. No; American news people.

Mrs. FENWICK. Are you suggesting that American news organizations or individuals would be upset if a Soviet journalist here were treated in a certain way in reciprocity to the way an American journalist was treated in the Soviet Union?

Mr. DUFFEY. I am advised in the past that there has been no clear consensus of what reaction the Government should take in cases such as this.

So, there have been probably some very strong voices on both sides of a policy and there has been an inability to get an appropriate consensus.

Mrs. FENWICK. Do you think it would be effective or ill advised? What is your opinion?

Mr. DUFFEY. I am not sure that one could say that there is one role from time to time. I guess you are saying it would be a wise policy in an absolute reciprocal way to expel one for one.

Mrs. FENWICK. Why not?

Mr. DUFFEY. Perhaps.

Mrs. FENWICK. I am all for détente.

Mr. DUFFEY. Actually, we are moving in that direction at the moment, are we not?

Mrs. FENWICK. I do not think you can have détente or any kind of relationship unless you are frank. We should say, "You are pushing our people around and if you do it one more time, your boys are going to go." I think they would understand that.

Mr. DUFFEY. We seem to have arrived at that point.

Mrs. FENWICK. The American public would understand that, too. It seems that we are always in the position of being very understanding about their difficulties and rather reluctant to take similar measures ourselves.

Mr. FASCELL. The issue, if you will allow me, is whether or not you want to play the other man's ball game. An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth as a matter of national policy may not necessarily be a good policy.

Mrs. FENWICK. But in relation to journalists——

Mr. FASCELL. It is a philosophical question of whether it is in your national interest. If every time anybody else does something, you do exactly the same thing—that may not be a good policy. I do not think it is, myself, and operating on a case-by-case basis, you are probably better off.

There are times when you have to be just as tough as they are, but otherwise, if you let them set your policy every time, then I think it would be a tragic mistake.

Mrs. FENWICK. But look what we are doing. We are letting them set a policy that they can, according to——

Mr. FASCELL. They have set a policy in their own country and hopefully, they do not set it in ours.

Mrs. FENWICK. But they have set a policy of treating our journalists rather poorly according to testimony.

Mr. FASCELL. But some way, they have to live with that. I am not sure that we need to live with it, too.

Mrs. FENWICK. Apparently, we do have to live with it because it is our journalists who have to live with it.

Mr. FASCELL. But I do not see the point of punishment. To throw out a Russian from the United States is not necessarily the appropriate form of punishment. They do not have a free society anyway. He is not reporting anything except what they want him to report.

Mrs. FENWICK. How are we going to get accords lived up to and how are we going to protect our people unless we insist on the accords being lived up to?

Mr. FASCELL. Whether or not that is enforcement is another question.

Mrs. FENWICK. But we cannot get it done.

Mr. DUFFEY. Again, you are talking about the reasons for previous policy, but recent indications have said, "Let us take something like travel restrictions," and we have taken the same restrictions imposed on us and turned them back on the Soviets.

Mrs. FENWICK. That is good.

Mr. DUFFEY. I should not say that they are the same. Soviet exchange scholars have to give notice if they are traveling a certain distance as our scholars do in the Soviet Union. But that is essentially done in a spirit of reciprocity. There are some areas, however, where we do feel such reciprocity is appropriate.

Mrs. FENWICK. I am glad to hear that.

Mr. DUFFEY. Regardless of past policy.

Mrs. FENWICK. I am glad to hear that because I think there is a general feeling among the public and I have certainly found it reflected in comments to me, that we are very understanding and do not insist.

We have heard many heartbreaking things about the reunification of families. We would not want to treat people that way—and it would certainly be inappropriate if we resorted to reciprocity in that area.

But we must somehow find a way of forcing some kind of compliance. It is very frustrating.

Mr. DUFFEY There is obviously no way that we can enforce compliance. Clearly this Commission views activity in this area as a situation which calls for a posture of tough negotiating. We are simply not interested in increasing numbers. If we were, we might be able to come in to you today and simply point to the fact that our numbers had increased significantly since Helsinki. I did not do that. I did suggest some qualitative points. These were the gathering of educators from the U.S.S.R. and this country for the period of a week to discuss specifically the training of teachers. That is a new thing and had not occurred before—the private relationship of a university there to a university here.

Now the spirit in which we will pursue these negotiations will be one of an effort to break through in terms of quality and access and not one of a sentimental suggestion that simply more numbers and more exchange in itself is desirable.

Mrs. FENWICK. But numbers are important.

Mr. DUFFEY. We see specific purposes and without any apology, we take that posture and will continue to. That is one reason why our record is a modest one, and it continues to call for patience because we do not have that power to control the situation.

I think that exchange with this country, and the opportunity to study here and the opportunity to visit here is of value and we ought not to underrate it. It is a value in many parts of the world and it is desired by young professionals and young scholars.

We value that as we negotiate the terms of such arrangements.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PELL. Thank you very much, gentlemen. And our next and last witness this morning is Mr. Sig Mickelson, president of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

Before he took this job in July 1975, he had an outstanding career in broadcast journalism and in teaching. He was the first president of CBS News and its chief executive for news and public affairs. He also developed and directed the international broadcast operations of Time, Inc. and he has taught journalism at four universities.

This morning, he will discuss Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as communications links between East and West, both as journalism and as part of the Helsinki accord.

Welcome, sir.

STATEMENT OF SIG MICKELSON, PRESIDENT OF RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY, INC.

Mr. MICKELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission, I would prefer to insert into the record the prepared statement which I have available, and present here only a brief summary of that statement.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, the complete statement will be in the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mickelson follows:]

STATEMENT OF SIG MICKELSON, PRESIDENT, RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY, INC.

Mr. Chairman, members of the commission, my name is Sig Mickelson. I am President of RFE/RL, Inc. which broadcasts news, information and cultural programs to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union through its Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty divisions.

The existence and activity of our Radios has very much to do with the purposes and intents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as expressed in its Final Act—specifically, in its provision on information and on the respect for human rights and individual freedoms. By the same token, the fact that our Radios are the target of Eastern assertions of their illegality under the Helsinki Accords say a great deal about the Eastern interpretation and implementation of these accords.

For a quarter of a century RFE/RL has been engaged in the effort to open up channels of communication with the peoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe whose governments have sought to seal them off from access to censored information and ideas.

Over the years, there were changes in the status of these radio stations and indeed in the format and tone of their broadcasts. They have changed as the times have changed. But the essential situation to which they address themselves has not changed, even in spite of the Helsinki promise.

The governments in Moscow and the other East European capitals continue to regard information as a state monopoly, and view any flow of information not controlled by them as inherently subversive. In consequence, the hunger for information and ideas which are not available to the citizen in the Soviet Union or East Europe through his local media, or which are given him only in a distorted fashion, has not diminished. As a Western correspondent observed recently,

"The one constant in the situation was in the audience. Soviet bloc governments kept protesting, and Soviet bloc citizens kept listening."

Without this continuing hunger for information our Radios would not have been able to build up and retain the audiences they have. Without these audiences, we would not have been subjected to the barrage of attacks which the Eastern governments have markedly intensified after the signing of the Helsinki Accords.

It is not only from the unceasing, loud and often irrational criticisms by the Warsaw Pact governments that we have evidence of substantial audiences and our Radios' impact on them. We have, over the years, refined and carried on sophisticated, statistically sound audience research programs.

Since the early 1960's, increased travel by East European citizens (with the exception of Bulgarians) has made it possible to carry out extensive interviewing efforts. We are able to use methodologies based on an accumulated body of data, which, in the judgment of international experts in the field, provide us with a reliable index of our audiences.

Through reputable local opinion research institutions in Western Europe, field work is conducted with ever larger and more representative samples. The technique used is based on continual comparison of the various samples drawn by independent polls; a quota system is employed to assure that the various population segments are as adequately represented as possible. About 6,000 East Europeans (travelers returning to their countries, emigres are excluded from the samples) are interviewed each year. Generally, a survey is based on at least 1,000 interviews and is judged reliable only if it passes a battery of tests showing that it matches up with demographic data representative of the population of the country. Minor differences from established demographic patterns are corrected statistically. Validation studies conducted by our opinion researchers repeatedly confirm the high degree of similarity between our "external" surveys and those undertaken inside the broadcast countries by local institutions, as well as the closeness with which our samples approximate the existing, actual demographic structures.

The audience studies show that in East Europe RFE has larger listenership than any other Western broadcaster. The latest findings indicate that RFE audiences range from 37 percent of their adult potential in Czechoslovakia to 57 percent in Romania, with 38 percent listening regularly in Bulgaria, 47 percent in Hungary, and 51 percent in Poland. On the average day, the studies indicate, the following numbers tune in to RFE at one time or another.

Poland	4,890,000
Romania	4,725,000
Hungary	1,300,000
Czechoslovakia	1,250,000
Bulgaria	875,000

It is in the two last-named countries that RFE continues to be jammed heavily.

As for Soviet audiences, the available samples are unhappily much smaller, necessitating employment of a different methodology. A highly sophisticated system has been developed in consultation with experts at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This system is essentially based on computed simulation. Data obtained from several thousand interviews over a period of time as analyzed in 1975 indicated that during the period under study in an average day between 4 and 5 million Soviet citizens tuned in to Radio Liberty. Although jamming is concentrated in urban areas, the urban, better educated listeners form a substantial segment of the audience. The data indicate that in addition to covering the populous Russian Republic, the Ukraine and other western territories of the U.S.S.R., the Radio Liberty signal reaches well out into Central Asia.

Thus in their twenty five years of existence, RFE/RL have not only been able to retain a core audience but in fact managed to carry it over into the new, younger generation of Soviet and East European citizens. Their unsatisfied appetite for an open discussion of problems affecting them, and for better knowledge of what the rest of the world is saying and thinking, is of course the

primary reason why people in the USSR and East Europe keep listening even as their governments step up their protesting. By the same token, the existence of such listenership is a major concern to governments which have made control of information a key principle of their conduct, both in the domestic and international arena.

But it is not dry statistics which tell the whole story: it is told even more dramatically in the testimony of individuals. Vladimir Bukovsky described to this Commission how he listened to Radio Liberty on a makeshift radio built secretly by prisoners in a remote camp. Romanian dissident writer Paul Goma told a Western magazine correspondent that he and others who joined him in his appeal to the Government and to the Helsinki signatories "learned about each other via Free Europe: we learned each other's 'problems' and thus we found each other." RFE was also "the only source of information" from which his fellow citizens learned of his activities. A prominent member of the unofficial Soviet citizens' committee to monitor compliance with Helsinki, who was expelled from the USSR following the arrest of the group's leader, told reporters that "the civil rights fighters in the Soviet Union are by no means isolated from the general public: many people listen to foreign radio broadcasts. . ."

As for RFE's role in the aftermath of the tragic earthquake last March in Romania (for which role RFE was later viciously attacked by the Romanian authorities), let me quote two reports by American correspondents:

"RFE and RL have millions of listeners in this region, particularly in times of crisis. Visitors to Romania after the recent earthquake were particularly struck by the wide appeal of American stations. RFE was continuously informing Romanians about what had happened, what had been destroyed and where the heaviest casualties had occurred, many hours before Romanian radio returned to the air. For days thereafter, RFE devoted all its Romanian-language broadcasts to similar detailed information and personal messages from foreign relatives of Romanians anxious for their welfare. Meanwhile, Radio Bucharest concentrated its attention on the travels of President Nicolae Ceaucescu to the stricken areas." (Malcolm W. Browne, New York Times, Mar. 26, 1977.)

"When the quake struck, Romanian President Nicolae Ceaucescu was on a foreign visit, and all the Romanian radio did for the first few hours was broadcast serious music. Radio Free Europe abandoned its schedule and stayed on the air for 48 hours to cover the disaster. In effect, it turned its Romanian-language program into a public service broadcast. As many as 600 Romanians called the RFE newsroom in Munich, and RFE officials say about 30 percent of the calls came from Romania. . . . The amazing thing is that Romanian citizens did not hesitate to telephone RFE, which East bloc governments continually denounce as an espionage center that spreads subversive anti-socialist propaganda. Unlike the Hungarians and Poles, who have an automatic telephone system which makes tracing calls more difficult, Romanians had to go through the international operator, mentioning their names and addresses. Considering the vital role which Western broadcasts play in informing East Europeans on what's going on in the world and in their own countries, President Carter's request to Congress for an expansion of broadcasting facilities for the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty doubtless was good news for millions of regular listeners in the Soviet orbit." (Alice Siegert, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 16, 1977.)

It is hardly necessary here to suggest that the vehemence and vigor of the continuing Eastern attacks against Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty reflect the fact that they are heard by large audiences and that it is having an impact. The recklessness and exaggeration of the charges attest to the concern on the part of the Eastern leaders over this breach in their efforts to secure a monopoly of information.

It is difficult to select from the hundreds of attacks that are mounted against us by the whole orchestra of Eastern media day in and day out. But perhaps the commentary by the Soviet news agency TASS, distributed in English on March 24, 1977, may serve to give the general flavor:

"It is known that U.S. President Carter sent a report on international radio broadcasting to Congress. As evidenced by the report, the new American administration intends to mount the activity against the socialist countries of such subversive radio stations as 'Free Europe' and 'Liberty' on the pretext of a 'free exchange of information and ideas.' The two radio stations continue to be entirely in the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency and, as it is put in the report, are an inseparable part of the U.S. Government. As it was proved on

many occasions, the two radio centres, employ staff members of the CIA as well as former agents of the Gestapo and Hitler's intelligence services, all sorts of renegades and persons who betrayed their country and are on the payroll of the American intelligence service.

"This makes it clear that the report of Congress is most cynical in maintaining that the radio stations 'Free Europe', 'Liberty' and 'Voice of America' are intended to encourage a constructive dialogue with the peoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

"The report of the U.S. administration quotes the Final Act of the Helsinki conference, but the Final Act does not even contain a hint that would justify the new decision of the U.S. government to mount hostile radio propaganda against the socialist countries. Quite reversely, the act concluded in Helsinki contains clearly-put obligations to abstain from any interference, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in domestic or foreign affairs that are within the internal competence of another participating state."

It would seem wasteful of time and effort to deal with what one might charitably call the inaccuracies of this report (the likes of which, I wish to report, are being dished out daily to domestic audiences as well as those abroad, including Radio Moscow programs in English to America), or to register attacks of the kind such as recently appeared in the Soviet Government's newspaper Izvestiya where we are called "fascist cutthroats" and "dregs of humanity".

Long before Helsinki, our Radios were routinely accused of "hostile" and "slanderous" reporting, as well as interference in internal affairs of sovereign states. These general charges have been recently restated with direct reference to the language of the Final Act, in an effort to portray us as violators of both the letter and the spirit of the Helsinki Accords. The principal assertions are as follows:

1. According to the Warsaw Pact governments, RFE/RL broadcasts contravene Principle VI of the section describing the rules to be observed among signatory states. As in the foregoing TASS commentary, the East as a rule quotes or paraphrases only the introductory sentence which reads:

"The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations."

The Helsinki text, however, goes on to list examples of acts constituting such intervention which are of a wholly different nature than simple dissemination of information and ideas: armed intervention, military or economic coercion, assistance to terrorist or violent activities. Nevertheless, the East regularly uses the article to translate "intervention" as "interference" and avoids citing the examples. In addition, the Warsaw Pact governments argue that their information policy is within their domestic jurisdictions and therefore protected under Principle VI.

2. In the Eastern view, RFE/RL broadcasts fail to meet the test of contributing to friendly relations and mutual understanding among nations. To support this charge they cite the final paragraph under 2(iii) of the Third Basket providing that:

"The participating States note the expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio, and express the hope for the continuation of the process, so as to meet the interest of mutual understanding among peoples and the aims set forth by this Conference."

In interpreting this provision, the Communist authorities reflect some of their basic assumptions about the relationship between press and government, in the sense that they regard it as the duty of governments to "use" their mass media in ostensible fulfillment of international obligations. Talking to Western newsmen in March 1974, Leonid Brezhnev put it as follows: "In our epoch television, press and radio play an enormous role in the formation of public opinion, and by contributing to the consolidation of cooperation between countries." He then chided the Western press for carrying material "which does not correspond to Soviet reality". It is apparently the Soviet view that by signing the Helsinki document, the West has undertaken an obligation to "use" its media to conform to Soviet interpretation of what kind of reporting is friendly and fosters mutual understanding.

Here our Radios are in the dock along with virtually all Western media. For an example, let me cite a statement made by Sergei G. Lapin, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Broadcasting in an interview with Litera-

turnaya Gazeta (Moscow, Aug. 4, 1976). He criticized Western media such as the BCC–TV, CBS Television, West Germany's first and second television network, and the French television for "broadcasts which have nothing in common with the Helsinki Final Act". These programs, all of them domestic and none translated to the USSR, dealt with subjects such as the situation of Soviet women and the Soviet dissident scientist Sakharov. Lapin then outlined his understanding of what Helsinki should mean:

"Certain circles in the West which control the mass information media including television, are clearly afraid that the working people will learn the truth about the Soviet land and achievements of socialism. In an attempt to discredit socialism, bourgeois propaganda is inventing all sorts of fables about our country while concealing the true facts, avoiding honest cooperation in the field of TV information. This, of course, runs counter to the understandings reached in Helsinki. . . ."

As for their own media, the Warsaw Pact governments simply assert that they are using them, in Brezhnev's phrase, "to serve human aims, the cause of peace, the consolidation of trust and friendship between nations". Pravda, on August 17, 1976 expanded on the theme as follows:

"The substance of the activity of the Soviet press, radio and television, and our entire multinational culture in which a clear ideological direction, genuine humanism, national characteristics and internationalism are organically inherent, completely accords with the high ideals enshrined in Helsinki."

The claim that the Soviet international media are simply incapable of violations so persistently charged to others, deserves some examination. Soviet domestic media, permeated by a strong ideological bias, could hardly pass any test of objective reporting. Of particular significance in any discussion of Helsinki, however, is the fact that the same bias and the same distortion are reflected in the massive Communist external information output.

Radio Moscow and Radio Peace and Progress are the Soviet Union's two principal external broadcasters. Both disseminate their signals in a multitude of languages to the wide world. Both say they are dedicated to the high ideals of Helsinki.

A few recent samples, out of a great many, however suggest that Soviet broadcasters are not unduly hindered by considerations of whether their output is factually accurate, avoids critical comment on the recipient nation's internal affairs, or contributes to greater understanding among nations.

On President Carter's energy proposals:

"Many Americans . . . want to know whether a crisis is really looming or someone is bamboozling the public. . . . The present Administration has shown a penchant for moralizing but some Washington officials interpret moral loosely." (Radio Moscow in English to N. America, Apr. 23, 1977.)

"The imperialist course of monopolies (is) aimed at preserving oil reserves in the United States, and at plundering the countries of the Third World, the oil reserves of which are exhausting. To keep and increase its riches at the expense of the plunder of others, such is the policy of imperialist monopolies. This policy no doubt aggravates the contradiction between monopolist capitalism and the people of the countries of the Third World." (Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English to Asia, Apr. 26, 1977.)

On the U.S. Congress:

"Quite some time has passed since Church has tabled and then pushed through the Senate a resolution with help from anti-Soviet and Zionist circles. . . . All the so-called facts are dreamed up by Zionist propaganda. Another supposition is that somebody has forbidden Mr. Church to answer our questions. It is exceedingly strange that Mr. Church is allowed to spread deliberate lies with impunity and to do so at such a lofty and respected forum as the American Senate. Because of this we imagined that the U.S.A. has no laws envisaging punishment for defamation." (TASS International Service in English, Mar. 10, 1977.)

"American lawmakers are eager to meet the requirements of the Pentagon which is seeking to step up the arms race. (Radio Moscow in English to N. America, Apr. 4, 1977.)

On U.S. policies abroad:

"As is known, it is mainly the United States that, during the independent development of India, tried to enslave it economically . . ." (Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English to Asia, Jan. 31, 1977.)

"Here we have to expose the real essence and blatant designs of the American-Zionist policy . . . the American-Zionist imperial plan . . ." (Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic to the Arab World, Apr. 27, 1977.)

"It appears that American officials are setting various contingencies which could involve the dispatch of American troops to Rhodesia (which) could be used in Rhodesia only on the side of the unlawful Smith regime. All the more so since the United States has already done a lot to bolster the Rhodesian racists." (Radio Moscow in English to Africa, Mar. 10, 1977.)

On human rights in the United States:

"A systematic violation of civil rights has become a feature of the American way of life." (TASS International Service in English, Mar. 2, 1977)

"The hounding of 'dissidents' by the American authorities is assuming a mass character . . . The police . . . are directing their main effort not so much against the criminals who represent a real threat to society, as against those who disagree with the policies of the ruling circles." (TASS International Service in Russian, Feb. 24, 1977)

Of course Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have been subjected to the most exaggerated treatment in broadcasts from the Soviet Union and in the international press file of the TASS International News Service. This has been consistent particularly since Chairman Brezhnev made a personal attack on the two radios in June of 1976. To indicate some of the flavor of it however, the following is a quote from the Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in German to Germany on April 6, 1977.

"(RFE/RL) are remnants of the Cold War, which the Americans are too ashamed to have in their own country. They preferred to make such a disreputable privilege available to their best friend and ally, the Federal Republic of Germany . . . Information must serve the purpose of understanding between peoples, and the (German) Federal Government bears the responsibility here, at least for what goes on on its territory."

One could go on endlessly. The TASS correspondent here is free and unhindered to interview prisoners in a North Carolina jail, and to put a report on the agency's English service claiming that "political" prisoners in this country are "forcibly injected with mind-twisting drugs". The Moscow Radio broadcasts in English to North America come through unjammed. The Soviets apparently never thought of seeking "prior consent" for them as they would like for any broadcasts reaching their own territory. Nor, apparently do they regard their broadcasts as "intervention in the internal affairs of the United States". The radio claims that about 25,000 Americans write in, but Soviet newspapers warn against any local citizens writing to the Voice of America, much less to Radio Liberty. The same TASS agency some of whose product I quoted above can put out an indignant condemnation of our media on its English service (Feb. 25, 1977) claiming that:

"It is well known that many bourgeois propaganda media, which are the mouthpiece of the forces hostile to the Soviet Union, do not intend to spread objective, truthful information but on the contrary are making every effort to sow unfriendly feeling, suspicion and hatred for the Soviet land. Such are the manners and customs of the bourgeois press!"

And while asserting that any radio station carrying out external broadcasts must be state-owned and "everything else is illegal broadcasting, illegal propaganda and illegal information" as in the case of RFE/RL, the Soviet's own "Radio Peace and Progress" is described, whenever complaints are made against its blatant and inflammatory intervention in other countries' affairs, as being owned by Soviet "public organizations" (the trade unions and the Novosti press agency), rather than the Soviet Government. The station's philosophy of international broadcasting was expressed in one of its English-language programs to Asian audiences:

"When in the hands of genuine champions of the people's interests, radio broadcasting is a powerful leader that promotes better mutual understanding among peoples, that exposes the intrigues of the imperialists and neocolonialists, that offers the people Lenin's true words about ways for liberating the working people from all forms of national and social oppression."

Finally, the Communist double standard regarding international communications and interpretation of the Helsinki Accords in the area of information extends to the issue of jamming. No one—certainly in the West—is jamming Communist external broadcasts, no matter how viciously inaccurate or inflammatory. The Soviets and their allies argue that the Helsinki Accords give them the right and international sanction to jam RFE/RL broadcasts which, in their interpretation, are "contrary" to the Helsinki spirit. But let no one think that anyone else would be allowed to follow the same reasoning.

Soviet sensitivity in this regard was recently demonstrated in a Radio Moscow program in German to Germany (25 March 1977) responding to presumed listeners' complaints about poor reception. Promptly, Moscow saw "a case of deliberate interference by those who have an interest in hindering the spread of factual information on life in the Soviet Union and our policy (while) stubbornly working to convey and maintain false ideas about the Soviet Union and its policy." It also deplored "efforts to hinder the expansion of Moscow Radio's audience and the fear that FRG citizens might find the truth about the Soviet Union", as well as "the press campaign which is supposed to bring Moscow Radio into disrepute with its West German listeners".

Perhaps no more needs to be said about the Soviet media's "complete accordance with the high ideals enshrined in Helsinki", or the validity of Eastern charges that our media, and particularly RFE/RL, are in violation of these ideals.

Unlike our Eastern critics, we see a major purpose and intent of the Final Act to be encouragement and expansion of communications, and do our share by telling the people in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe of events and viewpoints which their own media suppress or distort. We believe that a constructive dialogue is best encouraged by conveying a broad spectrum of ideas and filling information gaps caused by censorship. Our Radios seek to provide information indispensable to the growth of sound, constructive public opinion.

We read the Helsinki Accords as recognizing the individual's right to such information as well as his right to the "effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development", "the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field" (Article VII, Final Act). But apparently in the eyes of the Communist regimes, anyone, inside or abroad, acting on these pledges to which the regimes have subscribed, is guilty of "subversion". It is a charge leveled against Czechoslovak citizens who, in the Charter 77 asked their Government to comply with the Final Act; against Soviet citizens who, like Professor Orlov, sought to monitor their Government's performance under the Act; against Western journalists and even political leaders such as the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands who want to hear what the dissidents have to say, and naturally against us who report all of this.

We are being singled out for a special attack because we contribute to breaching the Eastern states' domestic monopoly of information. We make it difficult for these governments to stifle the voices whose freer speech was urged at Helsinki and we may indeed have an instrumental role in helping assure that international agreements entered into by the Eastern regimes canot be reinterpreted or distorted for domestic audiences with impunity—in assuring that no "muffled zone", such as was described in Solzhenitsyn's Nobel lecture, can be maintained.

And we made an all-out effort to provide thorough, detailed, and comprehensive reporting on the protracted deliberations of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. We discussed at length the issues involved and Western positions on them—something that the Communist media persistently shied away from. Our audience studies indicate that the Radios had a substantial impact on the Soviet and East European listener's perception of what Helsinki is all about: those who listened to us were helped to form a more realistic yet positive view of the ensuing accord.

As the respected British weekly, The Economist, has put it:

"Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe are not relics of the cold war; they are more important than ever. Because they are seasoned watchers of East-West relations, their expertise is needed to beat off the present Soviet attempt to dodge consequences of the declaration that 35 countries signed at Helsinki. . . . The Russians want to avoid the opening up of contacts between eastern and western Europe promised by that document. A conference is due to be held in Belgrade next June to review what has happened—and not happened—since Helsinki. It is important that the record be known to the people of eastern Europe and Russia. One way of doing that is to ensure that Russia cannot exclude RFE and RL reporters from the proceedings in Belgrade as it excluded them, for example, from the Winter Olympics. . . . Another is then to make sure that the reporters get heard in the communist countries.

We might ask whether Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty deserve the kind of support that The Economist urges. Does their broadcasting output measure up to high standards of objectivity? Is it in fact designed to inform, not to inflame? To furnish the background for informed, rational viewpoints, rather than incite to action? To create a better climate for international understanding, rather than widen the gulfs between peoples?

The policy guidelines under which RFE/RL operate mandate precisely that we strive for and maintain the highest standards of an objective informational and cultural service. There is nothing in our rules and in the way we carry them out that could be construed as violating the principles of the Helsinki Final Act or any international covenant on human rights. We take very seriously the words of the legislative Act under which RFE/RL now operates: "to encourage a constructive dialogue with the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Eastern Europe."

Perhaps the relevant sections of our Program and Policy Guidelines will serve to describe more clearly the way we go about our business:

"The essence of RFE/RL's program policy continues to be the practice of independent, professionally competent, and responsible broadcast journalism. RFE and RL provide uncensored news and information on domestic and relevant world affairs and convey a broad spectrum of ideas to audiences whose governments attempt to exercise a monopoly of information.

"RFE and RL espouse no single specific political, economic or religious creed. They have no relationship to any political party or exile organization; nor do they identify themselves with any opposition group or groups, political party or organization, located inside or outside the broadcast area. RFE and RL are, however, committed to respect for human rights and to the principles of democracy, including freedom of opinion, the rule of law, and non-discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, class or nationality. They are non-sectarian, defending freedom of religious faith and observance for all creeds. They are committed to the free movement of people and ideas among nations; to cultural, scientific and economic exchange; and to the peaceful negotiations of international conflicts. They subscribe to the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples as expressed in the United Nations Charter and most recently affirmed by the Final Act of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation."

As always, rules are only as effective as the mechanism which insures adherence to them. That mechanism has been carefully constructed at RFE/RL, tempered by years of experience, enforced by dedicated personnel. I assure you that very little slips through this system. But our best guarantee, the main strength of the system we have developed, lies in our staff's participation in the writing of rules governing their professional conduct. We have found, by long experience, that the spirit and morale of an organization dedicated to freedom of speech and to the rights of the individual can be sustained only by practicing among ourselves what we broadcast.

If I may sum up our mission as we see it, our principal function is to deliver a news, information, and cultural service to five countries of Eastern Europe and in 16 languages to the U.S.S.R. We function as a "surrogate domestic radio" in the sense that our programs are designed to address the specific interests and informational needs of the populations within the range of our transmitters. Although the news and information coverage we furnish is worldwide, it is provided with careful consideration of the specific audiences. In short, the immediate objective is to furnish our listeners with information about their own societies and the world, and to fill in those information gaps which result from domestic censorship and government control over the local media.

The long term objective is to help ease international tensions which may result from misinformation or ignorance of other viewpoints. If we contribute, as I am sure we are contributing, to a better understanding on the part of the Soviet and East European populations of their own societies, to their better knowledge of what the rest of the world thinks and how it lives, and to a broader human perception of international relationships, I think we contribute in a substantial fashion to the realization of the Helsinki ideals. Our Mission Statement affirms that we also aid the broader goals of United States foreign policy: "The United States considers that the open communication of information and ideas can assist in an orderly process of evolution in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe toward domestic and international policies more conducive to international understanding."

Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned earlier the governments of many of the countries to which we broadcast, clearly concerned over the size of our audiences and or impact on them, have sought in various ways to inhibit our effectiveness and to block us out of the international information channels.

Considerable effort and resources have been expended by some of these governments, especially those of the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria—on jamming our signals. This jamming pre-dated the Helsinki Accords, and continues despite them.

Jamming is clearly contrary to the spirit of the Helsinki document, and to a whole host of internationally recognized principles concerning human rights—I don't think it necessary here to quote from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It certainly seems contrary to international law.

Specifically, jamming violates Article 35 of the Montreux International Telecommunications Convention which states:

"All stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other Members or Associate Members or of recognized private operating agencies, or of other duly authorized operating agencies which carry on radio service, and which operate in accordance with the provisions of the Radio Regulations.

"Further, the Members and Associate Members recognize the desirabiilty of taking all practicable steps to prevent the operation of electrical apparatus and installations of all kinds from causing harmful interference to the radio services or communications mentioned in paragraph one."

Not only is jamming of doubtful legality, it is also an enormously costly venture. It is very difficult to place a dollar value on the Communist effort. For every transmitter we have in operation, we believe the Soviets have at least four high power short wave (sky wave) transmitters operating against it. In addition, there is at least one local jammer operating against each of our transmitters in every city of 500,000 population or greater. There are 50 such cities, and simple arithmetic would indicate that for every one of our transmitters the Soviets employ upward of 50 jamming units. The East European effort appears to be less massive (Hungary and Romania abstained from jamming some years ago) but where it is mounted against us the RFE sginal is seriously impaired especially in the urban areas.

Some of the effects of jamming can be overcome by increasing our transmitting power, as the President has suggested in his recent message to Congress, which we hope Congress will view favorably. But the report on international broadcasting which was the basis of the President's message also notes:

On the other hand, the requirement for additional transmitters could be reduced if the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria halted their jamming of RFE/RL broadcasts. Such a halt would be in conformity with the final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which expressed hope for the continued "expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio." At the time of this writing, there is no indication that jamming will be halted.

Mr. Chairman, it is our hope at RFE/RL that the Belgrade Conference may bring the time nearer when jamming of international broadcasts will be recognized as a violation of the Helsinki Accords and ultimately ended.

Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to respond directly to the suggestion made in your letter inviting me here that I comment on any matters which I feel inhibit the effectiveness of our operations. I welcome this opportunity in part because of the significant role RFE/RL plays and should continue to play in supporting the ideals and objectives expressed in the original Helsinki Agreement.

I am sure it will not surprise you to hear that one of our problems is money. It is, however, in one specific context in which I am raising this issue. Our Radios have a pressing need for staff rejuvenation. In many respects our organization has grown or is growing old. A succession of reductions in the work force accompanied by stringent economy measures and criticism of the Radios both in the United States and Europe have tended to make the organization unduly sensitive and apprehensive about future reductions. Many of the younger staff members who were slated for eventual promotion to senior executive positions were forced out under a "last-in, first-out" policy when reductions in force had to be made. Consequently, we have a great need for new blood, for people who are more intimately attuned to the current attitudes and interests of our listeners in the Soviet Union and East Europe. But we have not appeared as

an attractive employer to those younger arrivals from our broadcast area who have to make the most basic and difficult of personal decisions: to establish a new career in the West. We have not been able to attract them because of the apparent uncertainties about our future and because of our inability to set adequate funds aside for a program which would work these people into our team and test them on the job. In fact, the morale of the whole organization would be enormously improved if funds became available to institute a serious staff reinvenation program.

Mr. Chairman, may I say in conclusion that our two radio networks, Liberty and Free Europe, have for a quarter of a century held out to a vast audience the belief that individuals have a right to know what is going on in this shrinking world of ours. In this way, we have sought to make a contribution to what the Helsinki document formulated as "the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development."

We have no power that could obtain these rights for those who lack them as a result of the policies of their governments. But we can symbolize to them our belief and conviction that we all are part of one humanity, and help them join with us in a world in which problems and issues concerning them as well as ourselves are openly faced and honestly debated. To the extent that we succeed in this endeavour, I believe we are contributing materially to the implementation of the Final Act of Helsinki.

Mr. MICKELSON. I am obviously grateful for the opportunity to discuss with you a number of observations of RFE/RL concerning the current status of the flow of information in the post-Helsinki era.

I am going to limit my comments, however, to specific areas in which you and members of the Commission staff have expressed an interest in the past.

Mr. Chairman, you requested of me in your letter of invitation to address myself to six specific questions and I will limit myself to those six.

First of all, the mission of RFE/RL. Second, its effectiveness. Third, reactions from Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. Fourth, possible objectives of the Eastern campaign against RFE/RL. Fifth, our policy guidelines and means of enforcement of them. Sixth, factors which inhibit our full effectiveness. And I would like to address these, with your permission, in order.

The first relates to the mission of RFE/RL. Our principal function is to deliver a news, information, and cultural service to five countries of Eastern Europe and in 16 languages to the U.S.S.R. We function as a surrogate domestic radio in the sense that our programs are designed to address the specific interests and informational needs of the populations within the range of our transmitters. Although the news and information coverage we furnish is worldwide, it is provided with careful consideration of the specific audiences. In short, the immediate objective is to furnish our listeners with information about their own societies and the world at large, and to fill in those information gaps which result from domestic consorship and the Government control over the local media.

The second question, Mr. Chairman, relates to the effectiveness of RFE/RL. There are four principal means by which we check response to our broadcasts. The first is by regular and continuing propagation analysis. Our engineers maintain constant contact with the Office of Telecommunications headquarters in Boulder, Colo. This gives them a reasonably accurate appraisal of the signal strength as our signals reach Earth at various points within the target areas. Second, by

using what devices are available to us to monitor signals. We do considerable monitoring on the fringes of the target areas. Over 1 million such reports are analyzed annually. We also receive informational reports with some degree of frequency from various travelers who have had occasion to use shortwave radios in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Third, by conducting carefully planned and methodologically tested audience research programs carried out by trained and experienced specialists in scientific sampling processes. The methodologies for RFE and RL are obviously different because of differences in sampling size resulting from limited accessibility to Soviet respondents by our interviewers. We therefore have more confidence in the results developed by RFE than by RL, but we are confident that data concerning response in the Soviet Union is accurate within reasonable parameters. The conclusions show that on a daily basis we are reaching about 13 million people in Eastern Europe and the latest available analysis shows between 4 and 5 million in the U.S.S.R. The fourth system is interviews with emigrants from the East who furnish a constant flow of specific reactions. This includes comments from such persons as Solzhenitsyn, Bukovsky, Amalrik, Sinyavsky, and a host of others, some important, some not very well known.

We also believe that certain long-range trends in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. effectively reflect the impact of RFE/RL.

There has been, for example, a limited relaxation of rigid regulations concerning media. We cannot take full credit, but we are confident that our broadcasts—supplemented by those of other Western stations including VOA—have penetrated censorship walls to the extent that local media have been freer to take positions and report events than in previous periods of heavier handed censorship.

There is also evidence that Eastern leadership has been forced to pay greater respect to public attitudes by the competitive threat of our broadcasts. RFE/RL's special concern with matters of direct domestic audience interest has often served, in our view, to lessen tension in our audience areas by, in effect, restricting possible arbitrary action on the part of authorities.

The Polish events of last June 25 provide a case in point. The Polish Government, you remember, issued orders on that date that suddenly increased food prices. Mass public protests ensued.

Radio Free Europe covered the confusing events in a comprehensive, but low-key factual manner. The government soon rescinded the order and a relative degree of calm was restored.

We have been informed by a number of sources that the most reliable and comprehensive source of information to Polish citizens during that crisis was broadcasts from the Polish Service of RFE/RL. We have also been informed that the events of June 25 might have gone largely unreported except for RFE's detailed coverage.

Another interesting case in point is the Romanian earthquake of last March. News stories coming out of Romania filed by American and British correspondents reported that Bucharest citizens after the earthquake were referring to RFE's Romanian Service as Bucharest IV. There are three government-operated official stations. These correspondents called attention to the extent to which Romanian citizens were relying on RFE for information concerning the earthquake

and the manner in which their friends or relatives survived the disaster.

At one time, we were handling 150 phone calls daily, both out of and into Romania. A Chicago Tribune story reports that up to 600 Romanians called RFE in Munich during the crisis and about 30 percent of these calls came from Romania.

It is perfectly apparent that local listeners in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. are better informed because gaps in the information available to them have been filled by RFE and RL. From the point of view of the United States, RFE and RL are not only giving specific evidence, but demonstrating through their free information policies the freer atmosphere and greater respect for individual liberties in the United States. In the long run, this may be the most important service to the cause of free institutions rendered by RFE/RL.

Anyone who has followed American media in the past years is aware of reaction of RFE/RL from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. I do not need to go into detail except to say that there has been a constant campaign of vilification which has been building in a growing crescendo apparently designed to lead up to the Belgrade Conference. Chairman Brezhnev himself keynoted the campaign in a speech in East Berlin in June 1976. I do not intend to offer rebuttals here because the charges are utterly without foundation.

The objectives of the Eastern campaign are transparent. The major objective is undoubtedly to take us off the air. Any action which would lead to this result is apparently regarded as a useful objective. The campaign is designed to weaken support in the United States in order to reduce or eliminate our appropriations, and we judge, although we have no specific evidence, that pressures have been imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain and Portugal to see that we are ousted from those countries. If there was such a campaign in Portugal, and we assume there was, it met with a resounding failure.

We now have a new 15-year contract with them which guarantees us at least 11½ years firm for our operations there.

A Spanish lease renewal is yet to be signed, but we hope that it can be accomplished before the end of the year. Our position in the Federal Republic of Germany seems secure.

The key to our acceptance lies in our rigid adherence to a set of unassailable guidelines and rigid enforcement of policy. The guidelines under which RFE/RL operate mandate that we strive for and maintain the highest standards of an objective informational and cultural service. There is nothing in our rules and in the way we carry them out that could be construed as violating the principles of the Helsinki Final Act or any international covenant on human rights.

We take very seriously the words of the legislative act under which RFL/RL now operates: ". . . to encourage a constructive dialog with the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Eastern Europe," and I stress the word "constructive."

As always, rules are only as effective as the mechanism which insures adherence to them. That mechanism has been carefully constructed at RFE/RL, tempered by years of experience, enforced by dedicated personnel. I assure you that very little slips through this system.

But our best guarantee, the main strength of the system we have developed, lies in the participation of our staff in the writing of rules governing their professional conduct.

We have found, by long experience, that the spirit and morale of an organization dedicated to freedom of speech and to the rights of the individual can be sustained only by practicing among ourselves what we broadcast.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, you asked me to comment on factors inhibiting our full effectiveness. There are two main problems which I think fall in this category.

The first is the vigorous jamming to which we are subjected. Considerable effort and resources have been expended, especially by the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, and a lesser amount apparently by Poland, on jamming our signals. This jamming predated the Helsinki Accord, and continues despite them.

Jamming is clearly contrary to the spirit of Helsinki, and to a whole host of internationally recognized principles. I do not think it is necessary here to quote from article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which makes the case clearly and forcefully.

Specifically, jamming violates article 35 of the Montreux International Telecommunications Convention which states:

> All stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other members or associate members.
>
> Further, the members and associate members recognize the desirability of taking all practicable steps to prevent the operation of electrical apparatus and installations of all kinds from causing harmful interference to the radio services or communications mentioned in paragraph 1.

Not only is jamming of doubtful legality, it is also an enormously costly venture to the jammers. It is very difficult to place a dollar value on the Communist effort. For every transmitter we have in operation, we believe the Soviets have at least four high-power shortwave—that is skywave—transmitters operating against it. In addition, there is at least one local jammer operating against each of our transmitters in every city of 500,000 population or greater.

There are 50 such cities, and simple arithmetic would indicate that for every one of our transmitters, the Soviets employ upward of 50 jamming units or about 2,500 units in all and that is the Soviet Union alone.

The Eastern European effort appears to be less massive—Hungary and Romania ceased jamming some years ago, and have not resumed—but where it is mounted against us the RFE signal is often seriously impaired, especially in the urban areas.

Some of the effects of jamming can be overcome by increasing our transmitting power, as the President has suggested in his recent message to Congress, which we hope Congress will view favorably. But the report on this international broadcasting which was the basis of the President's message also notes—and here I quote—

> On the other hand, the requirement for additional transmitters could be reduced if the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria halted their jamming of RFE/RL broadcasts. Such a halt would be in conformity with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which expressed hope for continued "expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio." At the time of this writing, there is no indication that jamming will be halted.

That is the end of the quote from the President's message.

Mr. Chairman, it is our hope that the Belgrade Conference may bring the time nearer when jamming of international broadcasts will be recognized as a violation of the Helsinki accords and ultimately ended.

A second inhibiting factor is the continued aging of the RFE/RL staff with an attendant morale problem—and that is a much more internal one from our point of view. Our radios have a pressing need for staff rejuvenation. In many respects our organization has grown or is growing old. A succession of reductions in the work force accompanied by stringent economy measures and criticism of the radios both in the United States and Europe have tended to make the organization unduly sensitive and apprehensive about future reductions.

Many of the younger staff members who were slated for eventual promotion to senior executive positions were forced out under a "last-in, first-out" policy when reductions in force had to be made.

Consequently, we have a great need for new blood, for people who are more intimately attuned to the current attitudes and interests of our listeners in the Soviet Union and East Europe. But we have not appeared as an attractive employer to those younger arrivals from our broadcast area who have to make the most basic and difficult of personal decisions: To establish a new career in the West.

In too many instances we have not been able to attract them because of the apparent uncertainties about our future and because of our inability to set adequate funds aside for a program which would work these people into our team and test them on the job.

In fact, the morale of the whole organization would be enormously improved if funds became available to institute a serious staff rejuvenation program.

Mr. Chairman, with that I hope I have answered the questions which you raised in your letter of invitation.

Mr. FASCELL. You certainly did, Mr. Mickelson, very precisely. There are obviously going to be points at issue and I do not know how we are going to deal with that, but I gather that the whole communications aspect of Helsinki would be a major part of the deliberations. Is that the way it appears to you right now? I have not been able to find anything very helpful in what I have read and heard.

Mr. MICKELSON. For a year and a half we have followed very closely what appears to be the buildup toward the Belgrade Conference. As I suggested earlier, there does appear to be a growing crescendo of attack and it appears to be getting a little more definitive and a little more precise as time goes on.

As you may have noticed, within the past week or two, the latest news is that the Soviet Union is now promising retaliatory measures. We have no idea what those retaliatory measures will be.

Mr. FASCELL. They will broadcast more hours to the United States.

Mr. MICKELSON. Well, they are just about saturating hours into the United States right now and, of course, it should be noted that we are not jamming those hours they are broadcasting here.

Mr. FASCELL. I know that and you would not jam in even if they doubled it.

Mr. MICKELSON. Not at all.

Mr. FASCELL. Maybe they want to broadcast more to the people of the Republic of China in retaliation.

Mr. MICKELSON. My guess is that the campaign is probably part of a longer range campaign which is really designed for the purpose of causing complete cessation of all RFE/RL activities. I think they have been seriously embarrassed by the fact that they have not been able to maintain the type of censorship which they wish to maintain in their home countries. I think they have been embarrassed by having information coming in from this country and from areas in Western Europe.

Mr. FASCELL. So you think their campaign is directed at the U.S. Congress?

Mr. MICKELSON. Yes, to a certain extent, but also I think it is directed at the Bundesrat in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. FASCELL. To put pressure on our friends?

Mr. MICKELSON. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Wherever they are located?

Mr. MICKELSON. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Technically, is jamming an unintelligible signal or is it interfering with transmission?

Mr. MICKELSON. It varies concerning the manner in which the jamming is conducted and the power of the jamming. There essentially are two types of jamming that are undertaken. One is called skywave jamming. Skywave jamming uses very high-powered transmitters situated roughly as far away to the rear of the target as our transmitters are in front of the target. That means that, if we are 1,500–2,000 miles from the target area, they would be 1,500–2,000 miles in the other direction. The signals then meet over the target area. That is generally effective during nontwilight immunity hours. Twilight immunity is that period of time when it is dark at the jamming transmitter area and light at the area from which the original signal comes. During that period, apparently, the original broadcast signal is going faithfully into the area into which it is beamed, but the jamming signal penetrates the ionosphere and goes up into space. So the jamming is somewhat less effective during the twilight immunity period.

The other jamming system is groundwave jamming which is done by two processes. One is by small trucks which are constantly cruising around, broadcasting signals to a relatively narrow area.

The other is by using tall buildings, church steeples, and the like to broadcast into the line of sight from those areas.

Between the two, it is possible to create quite an effective jamming situation in major cities. We find this to be much less effective outside the major cities.

The other part of your question related to how this jamming sounds or what it actually does——

Mr. FASCELL. What do they transmit?

Mr. MICKELSON. There are two things they transmit. One is just plain noise—all the screeches and howls that you hear over your receiver. The other is to transmit programs, either on the same or an immediately adjacent signal which has all of the same effect as noise—it makes the signal almost unintelligible.

Mr. FASCELL. What other Western countries' broadcasting is being jammed now, if any?

Mr. MICKELSON. There is no jamming being done of Western broadcasters except, as you have noted, some jamming in East Germany.

My understanding is that Deutsche Rundfunk, Sweden, BBC Ex-

ternal Services, Radio Canada, are all getting through without jamming.

I believe Kol Israel is jammed and I believe that Mainland China's service is being jammed, but BBC External Services, no.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you think the retaliatory measures that the Soviets have in mind is the jamming of VOA?

Mr. MICKELSON. It could very well be. This is a matter of guesswork and it could very well be that that is one of the retaliatory measures.

Mr. FASCELL. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask what the content of the Soviet broadcasting here is. Is it straight propaganda?

Mr. MICKELSON. You mean Soviet content broadcast to us?

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes.

Mr. MICKELSON. Well, it varies—there are two systems. One is the Radio Moscow System which is—propaganda is a hard word to define—but it is news, information, culture. I suppose it is not too unlike the Voice of America.

On the other hand, there is another service which broadcasts largely in the Africa-Asia area, called Radio Peace and Progress, which is, we think, described as being somewhat comparable to our RFE/RL only in the sense that the Government of the Soviet Union does not take any direct responsibility for it. That service can be much more outrageous in its distortion of events and in its rather heavyhanded appraisal of events, particularly as they affect the United States.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see. So when they broadcast to Asia and Africa, it has a heavy content against the United States?

Mr. MICKELSON. Very definitely.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see. I have another question, Mr. Chairman, if I may.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. It is about the Board of International Broadcasting. How does that Board differ in the role that it plays with the Board of Directors? The Board of Directors are private people, are they not?

Mr. MICKELSON. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. Can they elect each other, so to speak? I understand that they nominate to the Board. But the Board for International Broadcasting is appointed by the President?

Mr. MICKELSON. Yes; the Board for International Broadcasting is appointed by the President and seeks funding from the U.S. Congress and passes the funding on to the private corporation, RFE/RL, Inc.

Mrs. FENWICK. The Board of Directors?

Mr. MICKELSON. Yes; I suppose to the Board of Directors, would be an accurate appraisal.

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes.

Mr. MICKELSON. And it maintains oversight over the expenditure of those funds and also sees to it that the programming output of RFE/RL is not inconsistent with broad U.S. foreign policy.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see. There is a proposal in the Senate, as I understand it, to merge these two bodies. What effect would that have, do you think?

Mr. MICKELSON. I can answer that best by calling attention again, I think, to the report of the Eisenhower Commission, which was a very thoughtful and sensitive report, developed by five distinguished,

knowledgeable citizens over a period of approximately a year. This report very strongly made the point that this country would profit from the maintenance of two separate types of program services in the international informational area.

One which could, in effect, represent the foreign policy of the United States and the informational policies of the United States. Another service, while operating as a factual informational cultural service, could become what was described as "surrogate domestic radio" in the areas into which it broadcasts.

The Eisenhower Commission had a feeling that blurring the distinction between the two would destroy or at least diminish the capability of RFE/RL to furnish the type of service which was envisioned for it.

I believe the public law which created the Board for International Broadcasting also strongly supports this theory. We strongly believe in it. We believe that federalization of the institution which we represent would cause a blurring of the distinctions and over a period of time, might make it much more difficult to maintain the independence and freedom and the type of service which we now believe we are successfully delivering.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see. You see your two branches as a surrogate. In other words, if they had free radio, that is more or less what they would hear.

Mr. MICKELSON. Yes, Mrs. Fenwick, precisely. As a matter of fact, the best thing that could possibly happen to us would be for those countries into which we broadcast to develop their own free domestic radios to the point where we would gradually or perhaps quickly be suffocated by the fact that we get no listeners.

Mrs. FENWICK. Right.

Mr. MICKELSON. Local radio in those countries would attract those listeners. But in the meantime, we are positive, on the basis of all the evidence available, that there is a distinct need for this type of service and the listener reaction which we get indicates the extent of that need.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see. Is Voice of America directly under the International Board for Broadcasting?

Mr. MICKELSON. No; the Voice of America is a department of the U.S. Information Agency, so we are completely separate and we have very little relationship.

Mrs. FENWICK. Even the supervisory board talks to your board of directors—and they have no connection with the VOA?

Mr. MICKELSON. None whatsoever.

Mrs. FENWICK. And they are governmental only in the fact that they are appointed by the President, is that it?

Mr. MICKELSON. I suppose that is a fair appraisal, yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see.

Mr. FASCELL. There is another factor. You get money from U.S. Congress.

Mr. MICKELSON. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. You are governmental in that sense, but the distinction is that RFE/RL, Inc. is a private, nonprofit corporation, incorporated under the laws of——

Mr. MICKELSON. The State of Delaware.

Mr. FASCELL. The State of Delaware. And it receives a grant from the Board for International Broadcasting to operate.

Mrs. FENWICK. And Congress grants funds to the Board?

Mr. FASCELL. Yes; and an appropriation goes to the Board on which Mr. Mickelson serves and then, it in turn, makes a grant to the nonprofit corporation which operates the RFE.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Friendly.

Mr. FRIENDLY. What is your reading of the effect on the U.S. Congress and countries of Western Europe of the steady buildup of the Soviet campaign against the radios? At Belgrade what will be that campaign's effect on the flow of information and the principle that that flow is a good thing regardless of the content?

How much backing is the principle going to get?

Mr. MICKELSON. Well, I have not had any opportunity, obviously, nor access to public opinion surveys, so I cannot give you precise statistical answers to your question. I can say that I am literally amazed at the amount of backing and the strength and enthusiasm of support that we are receiving from many leaders in Western Europe.

I have had occasion to talk to some—we have our own Western European Advisory Commission—we have fairly regular contact with a number of people in publishing and in parliaments and the like.

I must say that the support is very, very strong, indeed, and if anything, it is growing as a result of the opposition from the East.

Mr. FRIENDLY. We have talked about trying to avoid confrontation in Belgrade before, and being polite and constructive. There is no way to duck a confrontation on this point, is there, or to soften it?

Mr. MICKELSON. I think it is quite conceivable if it is the intention of the U.S. delegation, for example, to go in rather softly, it cannot remain soft very long because if the Soviet Union, for example, attacks as vigorously as they gave every indication of doing, then it seems to me it is going to be necessary to stand up and call attention to the fact that the charges are outrageous and unreasonable.

Furthermore, that is the perfect opportunity to introduce the jamming question which is obviously an outright violation of not only the Helsinki accords, but also of a number of other international agreements.

Mr. FRIENDLY. What about the freedom of movement of your correspondents in the countries that they cover? Do any RFE/RL personnel get into any of the Warsaw Pact countries and what is their experience with visas?

Mr. MICKELSON. There have been scattered examples. For example, when President Ford made a trip to Bucharest, Warsaw, and Helsinki a couple of years ago, we obtained credentials for one of our correspondents to go along on that trip, but of course, those were White House credentials that he obtained.

We have submitted credentials for the Belgrade Conference, but of course, we do not broadcast into Yugoslavia. We anticipate having at least three correspondents accredited.

The main test, of course, is going to come in 1980 at the time of the international Olympic games which are to be held in Moscow—that is going to be a very interesting test, concerning the freedom of our correspondents to move.

Mr. FRIENDLY. But you have not made the test of just sending a correspondent to cover the jazz band that Mr. Duffey was talking about that is traveling in the Soviet Union?

Mr. MICKELSON. No; but we did try to accredit a correspondent during the earthquake in Romania, but we failed.

Mr. FRIENDLY. An American citizen?

Mr. MICKELSON. I am not sure whether he was or not. He was one of our Romanian language staff in Munich and I am not sure whether he has American citizenship.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Any other attempts or events or news stories that you have tried to cover but have not been able to?

Mr. MICKELSON. I have not been able to think of any. We have been very cautious about doing it. The policy is to be extremely cautious about encouraging any of our correspondents to go into Eastern Europe because there is the danger that there might be some entrapment system which would be set up and as a consequence, unless there is a major event, we have tried to restrict the movement across those lines.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Could you find out and let the Commission know whether the Romanian staff member had an American passport or not?

Mr. MICKELSON. We will certainly do that. [*The correspondent was a U.S. citizen.*]

Mr. FASCELL. Any other questions?

Mrs. FENWICK. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. You spoke about budget and the difficulties that it is imposing. Please give us a brief picture of what your budget life has been.

Mr. MICKELSON. Well, there have been—of course, in dollar terms, it is hard to say—severe cuts over the years, but in terms of dollars against inflation, there have been some severe cuts.

For example, the personnel over a 6-year period has declined from in excess of 2,500 to something under 1,800.

Mrs. FENWICK. How many in this country?

Mr. MICKELSON. In this country, the total is a little more than 100. Between two-thirds and three-fourths of them are involved directly in programing and they are responsible directly to the headquarters in Munich.

From the budgetary point of view, I do not think I am exaggerating when I say that we are operating right on a thin line, and as a consequence, every expenditure has to be most carefully analyzed in advance so there is no opportunity to undertake any activities which are not planned for in advance.

One more thing—I mentioned the staff rejuvenation. We have established a 3-year program for staff rejuvenation which would cost approximately $300,000, and the plan would be to employ younger persons to double-slot with older ones while the older ones moved toward retirement.

Simultaneously, we are also, after 2 years of preparation, proposing a new pension plan which would ease the opportunity for some of the older members of the staff to retire and make it possible for newer members to take over those positions.

Mrs. FENWICK. I understand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Mickelson, for being here and presenting your testimony and answering our questions.

Mr. MICKELSON. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. The Commission stands adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearings were concluded.]

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS: CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE

TUESDAY, MAY 24, 1977

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
Washington, D.C.

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock, in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante Fascell, chairman, presiding.

In attendance: Commissioners Fascell, Simon, and Fenwick.

Also present: Alfred Friendly, Jr., deputy staff director.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN FASCELL

Mr. FASCELL. The Commission will come to order.

The thrust of the Final Act, whether in commerce or culture, science or education, tourism or family reunification is toward easing and expanding contacts. Our task at the hearing this morning is to examine the progress scholars and scientists have made in this area, the obstacles they still encounter, and the utility of the Helsinki Accords in smoothing their path.

Our focus is on educational, scientific, and cultural exchanges between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, and our witnesses are experts—participants themselves—in the exchange process.

Many of the formal exchanges covered in the Final Act were underway before Helsinki, some for as long as 17 years. The Final Act, however, is meant to expand the personal institutional contacts by scholars and scientists with foreign colleagues and with the institutions they represent—both within and outside the framework of existing exchange agreements.

It was also meant to ease the access of scholars and scientists in one country to pertinent information and materials in other nations.

The question we must ask is how well have these provisions worked and if they are not yet working well enough, how can we give them added effect.

This morning we are fortunate to have as our first witness a man with considerable experience in the fields of cultural and educational exchange. Leonard Marks, former Director of the U.S. Information Agency, is presently the Chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. In his capacity as Chairman of this Commission, Mr. Marks visited four Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union in August 1975, in an effort to

evaluate the impact which Basket III's sections on culture and education might have on the Helsinki Final Act's Eastern signatories.

In addition to that, I know he has talked to just about everybody in and out of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the United States about all of these matters and so we have a real expert here with us today. We are delighted to welcome you to the Commission once again, Mr. Marks, and to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF LEONARD H. MARKS, CHAIRMAN, U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

Mr. MARKS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is always a delight to appear before you and your colleague, Congressman Paul Simon, for whom I have the greatest respect.

Mr. FASCELL. And Mrs. Fenwick, who has just joined us.

Mr. MARKS. I am honored to see Mrs. Fenwick here.

As the chairman indicated, I have had an interest in the Basket III provisions of the Helsinki declaration, even before the declaration was concluded. When the negotiations were going on, our Commission held hearings to determine what progress was being made and to focus attention on some of these vital subjects.

As you pointed out, 15 days after the Helsinki agreement was entered into, I did visit the Soviet Union and four Eastern European countries with a fellow member of the Commission. We talked with ministers of education, ministers of culture, those who were engaged in informational activities, we met everywhere with directors of universities, with newsmen, and with writers.

We found that there was a tremendous interest in what Basket III could provide even at that early stage. There was great hope that this would be the opening of new doors and exchange agreements between Western and European countries.

Now, you may know, at the time the Helsinki agreement was negotiated, very little attention was paid to Basket III. The Soviet Union had reluctantly agreed to include it in the final agreement as a quid pro quo for provisions that they desired, particularly in Baskets I and II.

Very few people thought that the provisions of Basket III would amount to anything. After all, some of those covenants are very similar to those in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, entered into in 1948, to which the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries paid lip service. There was little optimism that these would be meaningful provisions.

Now, of course, worldwide attention has been focused on what has happened since that time. I think we in the United States can be very proud of what we have done to create this interest. I am particularly pleased that now throughout the world, the United States stands for something. We are the apostle of human rights. Democracy is a theme that has not gained as much attention or support as one would expect. It is probably not very well known that only 22 countries of the 156 in the United Nations practice the democratic way of life. And the leaders of those countries will tell you that democracy is not for them.

But no one can argue against the fundamental provision of human

rights—there is a deep craving on the part of people to travel, to express themselves, to be able to understand what is going on in neighboring nations.

Since you have heard all of this from others, and I thought today that I might focus on what might be done in terms of the information, the educational and the cultural exchange relationships.

When I visited the Soviet Union, I talked to the Minister of Culture, Mr. Demichev, about the restrictions on journalists and the fact that multiple entry visas had not been approved. Allowing these visas would be a small step, it was something that could be done in the spirit of Helsinki. And I am pleased that perhaps my visit and that of others may have prompted the Soviet Union to remove some of these restrictions. Eastern European countries have followed suit.

We may not think this is a large or significant concession, but it is a step in the right direction.

I attended a meeting not too long ago with Harrison Salisbury, who covered the Soviet Union for The New York Times 25 or 30 years ago. He said the problem is a matter of perspective. If you look at what has happened in the last 25 years, the U.S.S.R. has come a long way. If you look at what has happened in the last 2 years, the progress has not been as great.

But I am encouraged that there have been a few small steps.

It would be foolish to assume that because of Basket III, the Soviet Union or the Eastern European bloc countries will suddenly change their way of life. They will not.

Mr. Arbatov, a couple of months after the Helsinki agreement was signed, was quoted in The New York Times—it is a very significant statement—and repeated it to me when I met with him in December at a meeting in Germany. In his quotation, he said:

> In reference to the item in the "Final Act" on freedom of information, the Soviet Union intends to earnestly fulfill all provisions recorded. However, if some people regard them as an invitation to fling open the door to subversive anti-Soviet, proviolence propaganda, or to fan national and racial strife, then they are laboring in vain. Neither the document signed in Helsinki nor detente will permit such occurrences.

When I discussed this with him, I said we are not trying to fan the flames to incite violence; I pointed out that the Declaration states that freedom of communication would be helpful in creating an atmosphere leading to better understanding and peace. He answered:

"Yes; that is true, but you must not challenge the fundamental principles of our way of life." That is the Soviet position, and I think it would be foolhardy to assume that they are suddenly going to adopt the same kind of freedoms that we enjoy in the United States, or that our Western European allies enjoy.

But there can be progress.

I have enumerated a number of subjects which I feel we should attempt to embark upon. First of all, I think we should expand cultural and educational exchange. It is not just a hope on my part that the Eastern European countries will be receptive. When I talked with the ministers of education and culture, I found a great receptivity. Let me give you one illustration. The rector of Moscow University, Mr. Khoklov, expressed an interest in having more American professors coming over to participate in classes, more exchange arrangements, so that his professors could come to the United States for short

visits. He was aware that we did not have the central control of education and that he would have to make arrangements with individual universities.

He and some of his colleagues came to the United States and visited our major colleges and universities from the east coast to the west. At the conclusion of his visit, I met with him and I asked him what his reaction was and what arrangements had been concluded. He shook his head in dismay. He said, "I am prepared to increase the number of exchanges, perhaps as much as tenfold, but your colleges do not have the money. The private colleges do not have the resources and your Government is not doing anything about it." Whether he is right or wrong about the American private college system, I believe that it is incumbent upon us as a Nation, to make additional funds available for greater academic exchanges, either by providing funds to organizations—private organizations—or by sponsoring exchanges on the official governmental level.

I witnessed a graduation ceremony at Moscow University for American teachers who were teaching Russian in their own schools and had come to the Soviet Union for a 6-week visit. In that 6 weeks, they got to know their Russian colleagues on a personal basis, they exchanged ideas, they began to realize that although their ways of life were different, their forms of government were different, there was a unity of human desires. Friendships were formed. I am sure that there is correspondence between some of those teachers and their Russian colleagues.

The warmth that existed at that graduation ceremony had to be seen to be appreciated. We ought to do more of that. The Russian teachers that come to the United States to learn English, to improve their knowledge of our country, are valuable allies in trying to create a better understanding. We should be teaching more foreign languages. Russian should be taught in more schools, as should Czech, and Polish and Hungarian. I am a great believer that providing a certain limited amount of dollars will bring us greater dividends than their face value would suggest.

Second, I think there is an opportunity for a greater flow of informational materials into Eastern Europe. Let me outline the problems that we found.

In many countries, when we talked to those who were in charge of importing books or films or educational material, they would say we want to import more—we just do not have the dollars. Our economy is such that the Central Bank will not give a high priority to having American textbooks or American films or American educational material imported.

This is nothing new. We faced this situation many years ago, and Congress authorized a program whereby American organizations could sell their products to an Eastern European or other country, for local currencies. The Americans would then take the currency to the Treasury Department and exchange it for American dollars. Then the U.S. Government could spend those funds for certain identified purposes.

The importation of American educational materials into Eastern Europe has declined to a point where it is really infinitesimal. The need is great. The opportunities are many.

I would hope that Congress would reexamine this idea and come up with some sort of a currency convertibility program. It need not be open-ended. You would fund this just as you do any other activity. You put a limit on how much money you want to spend.

We will lose a certain amount in the sense that the dollars will be converted at one rate and the soft currency will be spent at another. But that is the cost of disseminating information, and in my opinion it is well justified.

Third, one of my favorite projects for many years has been opening a book store in the capitals of Eastern Europe—an American book store, where those who desire can come in, examine books in English, buy them, listen to our tape recordings, see educational or other films. I suggested this to Mr. Demichev in Moscow. He has a pretty good sense of humor. He said, "All right, but we will tell you what books to put in there." Naturally, we cannot tolerate that.

But in our negotiations at Belgrade, this is one of the specific items that I believe we should advocate. The Soviets have the right to open up a bookstore in downtown Washington, or in New York or in San Francisco. We should have the same right in Moscow and Leningrad and Kiev.

Mrs. FENWICK. Do they have outlets?

Mr. MARKS. Yes; they do have outlets to disseminate their literature in the United States. We place no restrictions. We are a free country. We are delighted to have books circulated. I think there should be reciprocity.

Now, American magazines, the fourth item. "America" magazine has been published in the Soviet Union for many years under our formal cultural exchange arrangements. Under the agreement, we have the right to publish 60,000 copies and in return, the Soviets publish their magazine called "Soviet Life," in the United States. Again, 60,000.

When our magazine goes on sale in the Soviet Union, long lines appear at the newsstand, and inside of an hour, copies are all gone. Then there is a black market. These magazines sell for three and four times their original cost. Al Friendly probably knows more about how quickly these magazines disappear and how popular they are.

However, at the end of the month, the Soviet authorities return to us a certain number of copies because they could not be sold. That happened while I was Director of USIA, and I said it cannot be, 20,000, 30,000 copies would be returned. When we inquired, we found out that they equated the returns with the number of copies of "Soviet Life" that were not sold in the United States.

I was not going to be in the position of trying to sell "Soviet Life," but I do not think that this reciprocity is in the spirit of Helsinki. I think the 60,000 limit should be removed. If Basket III means what it says, then there should be an opportunity for us to sell American magazines in such quantities as we can, through our bookstore and through other channels of distribution.

I would hope that our negotiators would raise that point at Belgrade.

I believe that private organizations should play a major role in this expanded exchange. A people-to-people relationship produces more concrete results than a government-to-government relationship.

Let me point out to you that Basket III is the only provision in the Helsinki declaration that deals with people. Economic relationships are government; military relationships are government. Basket III—travel, emigration, communication—are people-to-people projects.

I have been a great admirer of the Sister City program through which ordinary Americans will relate to other ordinary people in a foreign country. We have such relationships all over the world.

I met a former U.S. Ambassador, retired, who told me he was devoting his time now to creating Sister City relationships with Africa. In 1 year, he had set up 20 between American cities and African cities.

How many cities in the United States do you think have such relationships with all of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? Eleven. Let me name them to you. Baltimore has relationship with Odessa; Seattle with Tashkent; Jacksonville, Fla., with Murmansk; Oakland, Calif., with Nahhodka; Houston with Baku. In Poland, Rochester has a relationship with Krakow; Cleveland with Gdansk; Buffalo with Rzeszow. In Romania, Cleveland with Brasov. In Yugoslavia, Tempe, Ariz., has a relationship with Skopje; Long Beach, Calif., with Zagreb.

There are no relationships in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria or East Germany, and only one in Romania.

President Carter, early in his administration, pointed out that while he was Governor, he was tremendously impressed with the efficacy of Sister City relationships, and he has recently created the Friendship Force Task Group, which is developing such a program.

I think Congress should take a hand and encourage this by appropriating funds for the State Department so that they can go to communities throughout the United States and say, "Here is some seed money, get started."

The people who travel do it on their own. The rewards are infinite because plumbers talk to plumbers and scholars talk to scholars and there is an interchange of professional and vocational information. But there is also an interchange of human relationships. They get to know each other and know that their language may differ, their appearances may be different, but essentially human beings are the same everywhere. I cannot praise enough the value of these relationships.

Let us take the other side of the coin. I have been talking about things that we can do and which we should be doing. We have not done enough. I am going to be critical for a moment of the previous administration. In 1975–76, the appropriation for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs was $60 million. When the Ford administration decided on an austerity program, they withheld from that $60 million, $5 million.

Now, there is a certain amount of fixed expenses. You have people on the payroll, and the margin for programs is very slight. Thus, when you cut $5 million, you have practically destroyed the program. That is what happened. We cut back seriously on educational and cultural exchange throughout the world.

In that appropriation, only $1 million was assigned for performing arts—for the whole world. It costs a quarter of a million dollars to send a symphony abroad. I am not saying we should send symphonies to every world capital, but $1 million is hardly adequate for

our performing arts groups to travel throughout the world and exchange relationships.

Whenever an attraction from Eastern Europe has come to Washington, whether it is the Bolshoi or the Kirov or symphony orchestras or soloists, it has been sold out. The same thing is true when the U.S. attractions go abroad. Our rock bands and our popular singers are sellouts everywhere they go. Many of these people travel without compensation. If you pay their expenses, they get very little salary or professional fee. They are anxious to do this for patriotic reasons. Let us encourage them. The amount of dollars is insignificant. So I urge greater attention for the appropriations for cultural and educational exchange.

When we go to Belgrade, we should not just advocate programs of this nature. We must be prepared to point out the shortcomings of the other side. I am not in favor of pounding the table, of engaging in invective. I am not in favor of putting any country "in the dock," but at the same time, we must not be remiss in pointing out the failures.

Many will say 2 years is a relatively short time in the history of international relations, but 2 years has been long enough for us to assess what has happened. There are deficiencies, and we should stress them in the hope that changes will come about.

Let me give you a few. Visa requirements are needless interferences with the free movement of people. A certain amount of control and regulation is required for national security. But getting a visa to the Soviet Union becomes a major problem, instead of just a procedural step.

Many of our scholars and those who are engaging in these programs become frustrated because until the day of their departure, they do not know whether they are getting a visa. This must stop. If there is to be a fulfillment of the Helsinki promises, this must stop.

Newspapers, magazines—these should be freely distributed. I am not saying they should be displaying the Washington Post, the New York Times, or Los Angeles Times on every newsstand throughout Eastern Europe, but they should be available. The ordinary Russian, Czech, or Pole should have access to them, and we should insist upon this.

The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, article 19, says "Every person shall have the right to receive and impart information, regardless of frontiers." That means people should be able to listen to radio broadcasts. They should be able to hear what others think, yet Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are regularly jammed.

Now legal scholars may say to you that this is permitted by international agreements. I disagree. The Montreux Convention on international broadcasting specifically restricts or prevents interference, but the spirit of Helsinki goes beyond that. If we are to know each other, then there has to be information exchanged.

Let me give you one personal aside on that point. When I was director of the USIA, I visited the cities of Bulgaria along with Senator Magnuson, who is now chairman of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. We met with the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, Mr. Zhivkov. He wanted to sell us tobacco, and he wanted more tourists to visit Bulgaria.

Senator Magnuson and I had agreed that when he raised that question, I was to be given the chance of saying "But you are jamming the Voice of America. How can you expect Americans to feel comfortable in coming to your beaches or your important cities if the people of Bulgaria do not have a chance to know something about us?" So I made that speech, and Mr. Zhivkov looked at us and he said, "All right." He reached for the phone and said, "I'll stop the jamming. How much tobacco are you going to buy?" [Laughter.]

Mr. MARKS. Well, maybe that is the realism of life, but jamming can and should be stopped, so that if there is to be a relationship between people, it is based upon accurate and free flow of information.

Mr. FASCELL. Does he still want the tobacco—I think I can get him some. [Laughter.]

Mr. SIMON. He wants to sell it.

Mr. MARKS. Mr. Chairman, those are the principal remarks that I had. Let me say in conclusion that a year after Helsinki, I wrote an article for the Washington Post in which I said I was disappointed. I have been disappointed that more was not achieved, but I am not discouraged. And I hope the American people are not. I believe profoundly in the importance to international relations of people-to-people democracy and diplomacy. This is the essence of Basket III and Basket III is one of the most vital sections—I am not going to say it is the only section that requires our consideration—but it is certainly a vital section. And therefore, I urge that our delegation to Belgrade point out the deficiency, without rancor, without invective, but firmly so that the world will know that we believe in the principles of the free flow of information—that it is not just an empty phrase. Reciprocally, I think we should show by our actions that we believe in what we say and that we practice it. I know that this Commission can play a vital role in obtaining the necessary Congressional authorizations for some of the steps I have outlined and in providing funds and encouraging the Executive to move a little faster.

Thank you very much.

[The written statement of Mr. Marks follows:]

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me to testify before this Commission. I am pleased to do so, for you are dealing today with a subject which has been of great concern to me for over a year and a half.

In August 1975, just two weeks after the signing in Helsinki of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I undertook, in my capacity as Chairman of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, a trip to four Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, accompanied by Mr. William French Smith a member of the Commission who was at that time Chairman of the Board of Regents of the University of California. The purpose of our trip was to evaluate, through talks with Russian and Eastern European officials, just how seriously countries of the Soviet Bloc were taking the provisions of the agreement which dealt with "Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields"; that is, Basket III.

As you know, relatively little attention was paid to Basket III in the period immediately following the signing of the Helsinki agreement on August 1, 1975. The Soviet Union and its allies had reluctantly agreed to its inclusion in the Final Act of the agreement as a quid pro quo for Western acceptance of political and economic measures outlined in Baskets I and II; and no one really believed that the Eastern European countries would attach much importance to the obligations they had assumed under the provisions of Basket III. After all, the issue of human rights had long been on center stage in international relations. The 1948 Declaration of Human Rights was not substantially different from the human rights provisions of the Helsinki document. The Soviet Union had not distinguished itself in observance of the former, so there was little reason to expect that it would do so in observance of the latter.

Nevertheless, I was initially hopeful. I came away from my discussions with Soviet officials with the conviction that, for all their inadequacies, the Basket III provisions of the Helsinki agreement represented a step forward. The Communist officials I talked with were uniformly aware of the fact that their country had signed an international agreement which committed them, at least in principle, to reciprocal actions to increase human contacts and to improve the free flow of information. Consequently, in the report on our trip, Mr. Smith and I wrote—though without illusions about the political realities involved—"We believe that the United States has important opportunities for strengthening the mutual exchange of people and ideas with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries in the coming years. These contacts can play a significant role in moving our relations with the Communist world to a more stable, constructive relationship."

A year later, on the first anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki agreement, I had to acknowledge that our hopes had not been realized. The title of an article I wrote for the Washington Post on August 1, 1976, summarized my feelings: "The Unfulfilled Promise of Helsinki." I have had no reason to alter the sentiments expressed in the first paragraph of that article: "It is revealing to see what has happened to the Basket III provisions for human contact and informational and cultural exchanges in the 'Final Act' of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The results are, in a word, disappointing."

What had happened? Clearly, the Soviet government had followed a very selective policy of compliance with Basket III proposals. Travel restrictions on foreign journalists were somewhat relaxed; a few copies of Western newspapers were put on sale in Moscow hotels and newsstands; Russian universities arranged careful exchanges with U.S. institutions, and so on. Such relatively minor concessions to "the spirit of Helsinki" were trumpeted abroad. But at the same time the Soviets were using the phrase of the Final Act pledging signatories to refrain from "intervention in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating state," to give an extremely restrictive interpretation to Basket III. It was, in fact, using the Helsinki agreement to control and limit, rather than to further and expand, contacts and exchanges of information. Georgi A. Arbatov, Director of the Institute of United States and Canadian Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, admitted as much in the following passage of an article he wrote for the New York Times barely two months after the signing of the agreement (Oct. 8, 1975):

"In reference to the item in the 'Final Act' on freedom of information, the Soviet Union intends to earnestly fulfill all provisions recorded. However, if some people regard them as an invitation to fling open the door to subversive anti-Soviet, pro-violence propaganda, or to fan national and racial strife, then they are laboring in vain. Neither the document signed in Helsinki nor détente will permit such occurrences."

Your Commission, which has itself been derided by Pravda, is better prepared than I to document the Soviet Union's unique interpretation of the provisions of Basket III. I shall therefore confine myself here to noting, by way of illustrating my main point, a few of its more blatantly contradictory actions.

Requirements for exit visas were changed; a Soviet citizen must now give up his apartment before applying to emigrate; so, as 15 Soviet Jews wrote U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, "If a visa is denied, which is the usual procedure of the Soviet government, the applying family is left without shelter from the elements."

The infamous Berlin Wall, instead of being lowered, has been heightened and strengthened.

A prominent feature of the Soviet effort to control the flow of "subversive" information into the USSR is a determined and coordinated Bloc-wide campaign against Western broadcasts, particularly those of Radio Liberty.

Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union for the first six months of 1976 was at about the same level as 1975, about 1,000 a month, but far below that of 1973.

Proceeding apparently, on the well known principle that the best defense is a good offense, the Soviet Union has mounted a heavy propaganda campaign accusing the United States of violating the Basket III agreements. The campaign has included charges that we restrict circulation of Soviet films and books; and Soviet commentators have said with straight faces that U.S. short-wave news broadcasts beamed towards the USSR are in violation of the Helsinki Accord.

Most of these accusations are, of course, nonsense, and fortunately our system of government is designed specifically to prevent abuses of human rights of

the kind I have just mentioned in the USSR. Nevertheless, I must admit that, according to Soviet lights, we have given them some grounds for criticism. For example, our refusal to grant entry visas to Soviet trade unionists hardly seems designed to broaden East-West exchanges. And it is, I believe, quite true that the private sector has made no unusual effort to encourage the importation of books, films, television programs and the like from Eastern European countries. These are minor matters, and reasonable explanations can be made for what the Soviets consider American errors of omission or commission. What concerns me more is that we have been slow to develop strong initiatives to capitalize on the possibilities of Basket III.

Congress's reaction to this situation, the establishment of this Commission was praiseworthy; but I believe the basic initiative in this field must come from the executive branch. Here are some specific things which I think should be done.

First, we should make clear that the United States gives the subject the very highest priority.

Second, we should put forward, and publicize widely at home and in Eastern Europe, specific proposals for implementing Basket III. Our proposals should be pragmatic, realizable, designed to attract the support of influential young professionals in Communist lands who want more "windows on the West." They should include the following:

1. *Expanded cultural and educational exchange.*—The Soviets have demonstrated a willingness to step up academic and professional contacts. The State Department should respond by an enlarged official program and by stimulating more private exchanges.

2. *Insisting on a free flow of informational materials into Eastern Europe,* where there is a great demand for Western publications, films, recordings, etc. The establishment of a currency convertibility program similar to the former Informational Media Guaranty Program administered by the U.S. Information Agency would promote this end and demonstrate U.S. adherence to the "spirit of Helsinki."

3. *Increased circulation of "America" magazine.*—This USIA publication has for over 30 years been an effective interpreter of American ideas and events, and demand for copies far exceeds the number (60,000 per month) we are allowed to distribute. It would seem logical to press the Soviets to allow, "in the spirit of Helsinki," an increase in circulation.

4. *An American bookstore in Moscow.*—The Soviets have always discouraged this project by insisting on controlling the selection of books for it. Perhaps the time is ripe to remind them that no censorship is imposed on Soviet books imported into the United States, and that the Helsinki signatories specifically agreed "to promote wider dissemination of books."

5. *Mobilizing private organizations* to propose and carry out contacts with their Soviet counterparts. Soviet universities have already shown a disposition to respond to such initiatives. Representatives of American universities, labor unions, industry, public service groups and other institutions should be mobilized to initiate proposals for exchanges.

Your Chairman has told me that you would welcome recommendations on U.S. participation in the Belgrade Conference in June. What I have just said implies my thoughts on this point. I do not think we have anything to gain by engaging in a shouting match of mutual recriminations. The Soviets can, of course, be expected to present a well-documented case to demonstrate their "achievements" in complying with Basket III, and an equally shrill one on our violations of it. We must be prepared to respond. But our emphasis should be on the presentation of a positive policy backed up by concrete actions and proposals which will challenge the Soviets to be more responsive to the real issue: the opening of all borders to more human and informational contacts which are central to the development of peaceful relations.

Let me give you one illustration of the kind of imagination that I hope we can exercise "in the spirit of Helsinki":

Citizen groups from various parts of the United States have entered into their own exchange arrangements with cities throughout the World. Their interests are linked in a "Sister City" relationship so that visits or groups from an American community established relationships with their counterparts abroad. Travel between the two points gives the people in each community a better chance to know more about each other and their respective community problems.

In examining the relationship between our American cities and those in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, I was surprised to find there are only eleven Sister City relationships. They are:

USSR: Baltimore—Odessa; Seattle—Tashkent; Jacksonville (Fla)—Murmansk; Oakland (Calif.)—Nahhodka; and Houston—Baku.

POLAND: Rochester—Krakow; Cleveland—Gdansk; and Buffalo—Rzeszow.

ROMANIA: Cleveland—Brasov.

YUGOSLAVIA: Tempe (Ariz.)—Skopje; and Long Beach (Calif.)—Zagreb.

There are none in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, or East Germany, and only one in Romania. Yet in these countries, wherever I ventured, I found that these people had a great curiosity about the United States.

I would hope that the Executive Branch, stimulated by Congressional action, would encourage an expansion of these exchanges in the many American communities that have ties with Eastern Europe—to name a few, my own home town of Pittsburgh, Akron, Milwaukee, Detroit, and New York. In many cases people in these communities cling to their cultural traditions and speak the language of their native country. And even those cities which do not have such ethnic ties are proper candidates for exchanges. Cities should be stimulated to work out Sister City arrangements "in the spirit of Helsinki."

I am confident that if this is done the cause of world peace will be advanced and the exchange of ideas will be conducive to removing the erroneous impressions which so frequently lead to conflict.

Now let me turn to the other side of the Belgrade meeting—obtaining an accounting of what has been done by all nations to comply.

Although I do not believe that our objective should be to rack up a good score in the Basket III league, I want to stress the importance of reminding the Soviets and the Eastern European countries—and our Western allies as well—of failures to comply with either the letter or the spirit of the Helsinki declaration. We should remind the other participants of the frustrations that accompany a genuine effort to achieve cultural exchange. For example:

1. Getting a visa to the Soviet Union becomes a major event rather than a procedural requirement for an exchange visit. Time and again bureaucratic details have occurred to frustrate a visit. Perhaps some of the delays are of innocent origin, but I am inclined to think that most of them are designed deliberately to prevent the visit.

2. Newspapers, magazines, and other informational materials cannot be obtained in the Eastern European countries except under controlled situations.

3. RFE/RL broadcasts are regularly jammed.

4. Newsmen are not free to travel throughout the countries or to interview sources.

These are merely illustrative of the type of incident which we can document and which we should place on the record.

Let me emphasize my hope that the Belgrade meeting will not degenerate into a "shouting match" on either side: we should not attempt to place any country "in the dock" and subject them to ridicule and embarrassment. But, there can be no true-assessment of what has happened in the two years since the signing of the Belgrade declaration if we shirk our responsibility to criticize where there has been a failure of performance on our part or that of any other participants.

Those who negotiate on behalf of the thirty-five nations involved have a heavy burden to avoid being a prosecutor but to perform in a responsible manner so that the facts will be ventilated without bitterness or rancor. This is a challenging assignment, but I am confident that those who serve on the United States delegation can and will meet it "in the spirit of Helsinki."

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me say that though I have been disappointed in the results stemming from the Basket III proposals—as this statement has indicated—I am not discouraged. And I hope the American people are not. I believe profoundly in the importance to international relations of people-to-people diplomacy. This is the essence of the proposals in Basket III; and Basket III is the only section of the Helsinki agreement which predicates the participation of people, as opposed to governments, in the improvement of international relations. I am therefore convinced that the United States and its allies were right to insist that "Cooperation in Humanitarian and other Fields" be made an integral part of the "Final Act." We should not now allow our early disappointment with the Soviets' performance to deter us from keeping the subject at the top of our agenda for discussions with them. So long as there is hope that Basket III's potential for the development of mutual understanding may eventually be real-

ized, we should continue to remind the Soviet Union of its obligations under it. I sense that this is the feeling of your Commission and am pleased to have had this opportunity to participate in your deliberations.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Marks. We appreciate your statement in giving us guidelines for your consideration of what the U.S. posture ought to be in Belgrade. Those are very important recommendations, and as usual, you have been very responsive and persuasive.

Let me just say that because of your persuasiveness, the Subcommittee on International Operations added $5 million, specifically at your suggestion, to help carry out some of the programs that you have recommended. I hope it stays in the bill and I hope we get the additional appropriations. The Senate has taken similar actions and perhaps we can hold it.

But I do want to thank you for taking the time to make the specific suggestions which you have been making all along about this matter.

Mr. Simon.

Mr. SIMON. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to welcome an old friend. I do not know who is representing the State Department here, but I would hope that Leonard Marks' talents can be used in the Belgrade meeting somehow.

A few brief areas—first in the area of foreign languages that you mentioned. Part of the Helsinki accords is that we promote the teaching of foreign languages and, yet just the opposite is happening. Within our country, at the same time, in the last decade, we have doubled the percent of our gross national product that is dependent upon exports. So it does not make sense anyway we look at it.

I would hope that your advisory commission might take a good, hard look at where we are going in this whole area and any suggestions you might have for our Commission would be welcome.

Second, your sister city idea. I wonder if also we cannot have sister states. I remember when Jose Figueres was President of Costa Rica and when I visited there—I was not in Congress at that point—but I suggested that he come and speak in Illinois sometime and he said, "Well, I am supposed to go to Oregon. We have a special attachment for Oregon. Oregon has adopted us, so to speak." I do not remember the exact language that he used. But there was that kinship. While I was there, a group of students from Oregon came down and sang and did some gymnastic things. It was just a very, very healthy thing.

I thought I knew Leonard Marks fairly well, but I found out something about you that I did not know, as I was reading through your biography. You are a trustee of Hampshire College. I do not have any idea where Hampshire College is——

Mr. MARKS. Amherst, Mass.

Mr. SIMON. I am sorry. I did not know that. Why could Hampshire College not also have a sister college or university somewhere in Bulgaria or Thailand or wherever? Somehow, we ought to be building those kinds of links.

Mr. MARKS. There are such relationships, but they are mostly with the larger colleges, and I do agree with you, Congressman Simon, that we ought to encourage some of the smaller groups to have these links. They could teach special courses related to the country that they are having the special relationship with.

Mr. SIMON. If somehow funding were available to Hampshire College—I do not know what the enrollment is there—my guess is that if you had a dozen Bulgarian students or Thai students or whatever it would be, it would have more of an impact than the same number of students at the University of Illinois or Rutgers or the University of Florida.

I really like your book store idea. I think that is something that people can understand. It is a very practical, positive thing and maybe it could come out of Belgrade.

And now one question. You have read the morning newspapers, I am sure, about the East German situation. What is that going to mean?

Mr. MARKS. Well, I was just talking to Mr. Kassof before the hearings began, and he will in his testimony, probably give you more current information. He tells me that through his organization there has been an increase in the cultural relationships, in educational exchanges, within the past month.

I think it is a very healthy sign. I think we can feel very pleased with the results in East Germany, which has taken a very hard line, at this point, before the Belgrade Conference opens, opening the door to further exchanges.

I do not know the exact extent, but——

Mr. FASCELL. They are putting on their coat and tie.

Mr. MARKS. And they are getting ready to come to the party. There are other places like that, which I think might benefit from similar exchanges, and they will be encouraged by the fact that East Germany is doing it. I am delighted that that has occurred. I do not know what it means exactly, but it certainly is a step in the right direction.

Mr. SIMON. I thank you again for your statement. We are fortunate to have the contribution that you have made.

Mr. FASCELL. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I feel the same way. It is so good to hear constructive testimony.

Mr. FASCELL. Nice affirmative voice.

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes; and the book store, I am heartily in favor of no censorship. Do they have a book store now, or a couple of them?

Mr. MARKS. The Soviets?

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes.

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. So we ought to think of increasing reciprocity and magazine exchange.

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. Mr. Duffey from the State Department testified that he had been in the university world and he had organized a movement with his university—was it not Mr. Duffey?

Mr. SIMON. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. He had organized with his university some relationships. I wonder why money is necessary? Mrs. Carter spoke about the fact that Georgia had a number of sister cities in Latin America. I think many of them were in Brazil.

What is the funding arrangement—why do you need money?

Mr. MARKS. It is such a small amount of money. Let me explain to you what happened when I was at USIA. We had a division—we had

maybe two or three people and they went out to the various cities in the United States and talked to the mayors and chambers of commerce and the professional organizations to encourage them and to explain how it was done.

Mrs. FENWICK. But is there not some employee of the State Department who is already on the payroll who could do that?

Mr. MARKS. There are some, but I do not know whether or not they have enough time, or whether there are sufficient numbers, to undertake the expansion of this program. There are some who are currently doing this. It is just that it is not being done sufficiently.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see.

Mr. MARKS. And then you may have to give them a little seed money so that they can go over with a small delegation to try to make the arrangements and come back and say, "Now we have this proposal."

Mrs. FENWICK. I see.

Mr. MARKS. They could raise their own money, but if you gave them the seed money and a little encouragement, the process would be accelerated.

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes. It is a good idea. I wanted to ask you about something that Senator Dole was interested in and it interested me too. Do you know anything about these newspapers from the Ukraine—they come to this country, one printed in English by the Soviet Government and this one in Ukrainian, this in Byelorussian, and finally this one in Russian. They are, as you can see, called "News from Ukraine, Noble Aim: Building Young Builders of Communism." Do you know anything about that?

Mr. MARKS. No, I do not. But I do know that most countries do that and I am so proud that we allow that material to come into our country. Anybody can read anything; we have the free flow of ideas.

Mrs. FENWICK. Apparently, there are many people in this country who have not asked for it—they just get it. I suppose because they have Ukrainian names. Do you know how they get their names?

Mr. MARKS. No, but I imagine that the Soviet Embassy has a pretty good intelligence system of knowing whose origin is where and who has relatives, and I imagine that is the basis for their circulation.

Mrs. FENWICK. Maybe if they write and ask to let their relatives come over, then maybe they get the Ukrainian newsletter. [Laughter.]

I am all in favor of opening doors and minds, of fresh air and circulation. I think that there is no help otherwise, but there is always something that worries me about the book business. As I understand it, the Russians are very anxious to get our technological books, and any educational materials we give them are fine, as long as they are not about ideas. As long as it concerns mechanical or chemical or electrical subjects or physics or any technology it is welcome, but the minute you begin to move into the realm of ideas, those books are not welcome.

Mr. MARKS. That is why Mr. Demichev said he wanted to determine which books were sold. We must not stand for that.

Mrs. FENWICK. I know, but this is the problem. It is to their advantage to get our technical material and I really think that we ought to insist that certainly we are delighted that this should be as far as there is nothing secret, but we should insist on the right to export our ideas, too.

Mr. FASCELL. We could use the old whiskey system. When it was short, you get so much scotch if you buy so much white lightning. [Laughter.]

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes, that is it. Something like that maybe if we could approach it in a cheerful and practical but very determined spirit.

I think that is more constructive.

Mr. MARKS. We will have the chance at Belgrade. There will be a chance to do a little swapping and I would hope these ideas might serve—might surface at the time. The Soviets will want some things and we should have a list ready, too.

Mrs. FENWICK. It is wonderful to hear you say that.

Mr. FASCELL. Are you a good Yankee trader?

Mr. MARKS. There are many of us who can trade.

Mr. FASCELL. I want to thank you, Leonard Marks, very much.

Mrs. FENWICK. Does the State Department run the Bureau of Cultural and Educational Exchange?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Just one question. Do you think that the Eastern bloc and the Soviets are united in their programs—cultural programs?

Mr. MARKS. Absolutely not.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you think there are all kinds of differences that are visible and desirable?

Mr. MARKS. Yes; I have observed that there may be an exchange of information between the various countries, but there are marked differences between the attitudes between some of the East European countries and the others in the Warsaw Pact.

Mr. FASCELL. So the exchange programs are different?

Mr. MARKS. Absolutely. We have great latitude in some countries; we have tremendous restrictions in others. There is considerable enthusiasm—I do not want to name countries because it would put them in an invidious comparison with their allies—but, no; I do not think there is a coherence. There is an attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to keep them informed, but I do not believe there is any control.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you see any possibility in the future of getting away from formal government-to-government programs?

Mr. MARKS. In some cases a government-to-government program may be desirable because it gives you more exchange than you would get on an informal basis. I generally feel that there should not be a governmental exchange arrangement, but I have been confronted with the fact that without it, in some cases, you would not get as much.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, you might not get any at all, it seems to me.

Mr. MARKS. You might not get any at all.

Mr. FASCELL. With the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union, they do not really understand anything outside of government, do they?

Mr. MARKS. They do not in some countries. Now those who are on the more liberal side in terms of their relationship with Western Europe are engaging in substantial exchanges without a formal agreement. I think you have to look at it on an individual basis rather than to generalize.

Mr. FASCELL. Maybe if we just use the government-to-government agreement as the nucleus and then expand on it, but use it as a base constantly.

Mr. MARKS. Right.

Mr. FASCELL. It is the minimum.

Mr. MARKS. And then what you can add on, you can.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Friendly.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Mr. Marks, when we talk about cultural exchanges, presumably the virtue of the exchange is in the exchange itself, but sometimes questions of politics enter in. Take for instance, Isaac Stern who will not perform in the Soviet Union anymore until problems of Jewish emigration in his view are resolved. What is the real option for individuals or the government in situations like that? Is refusal to participate a lever or does it close doors that you want to have open?

Mr. MARKS. I personally feel that we should not boycott each other because we have differences on an individual subject. The change can be brought about by meetings and discussions and relationships. If you close the door, then there is no such relationship—there is very little opportunity for improvement.

My personal view would be that even though Isaac Stern might disagree with a policy, if he can be instrumental in creating a better atmosphere, it is in his interest, and our interest, and in the world's interest that that effort be made.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Does it help if the participant says "I am participating, but I am concerned about the imprisonment of so and so or the inability to circulate such and such a book?"

Mr. MARKS. Yes; I think it is important that we air our differences and not suppress them; and I think that a protest like that does have its effect because Isaac Stern is an important person and he attracts a great crowd when he comes. His talents are well recognized, and to the extent that he airs his views, it causes some people to think about them.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Marks.

Mr. MARKS. Thank you again and goodbye.

Mr. FASCELL. Our next witnesses are Mr. Allen Kassof and Mr. Loren Graham. They are intimately familiar with two specific exchange programs. Dr. Allen Kassof has been the Executive Director of IREX, the International Research and Exchanges Board, since its founding in 1968. Through IREX, graduate students and faculty representing 102 participating American universities are able to conduct research in the educational institutions of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Dr. Loren Graham is presently a research fellow at Harvard University's program on science and international affairs. A specialist in Soviet science, Dr. Graham has participated in the research and writing of a soon to be released report which will evaluate the science exchange between our National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

I would like to thank you, Dr. Graham, for being a pinch-hitter in coming in for Carl Kaysen, who was originally scheduled to testify.

We will be delighted to hear from both of you, of course. Dr. Kassof, if you will start off and then Dr. Graham, and then we will ask some questions.

STATEMENT OF DR. ALLEN H. KASSOF, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IREX

Dr. KASSOF. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen of the Commission, I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before you to testify about the exchanges of scholars and researchers between the United States and Eastern Europe.

Your Commission faces a challenge which is both noble and demanding in its preparations for the review talks in Belgrade. Those of us who are daily concerned with the complex problems of East-West communications are indebted to you and to your staff for the high level attention to these important matters which the creation of the Commission has brought about.

If I may add a personal note, it is a special pleasure for me to recognize the leadership of Senator Clifford Case and Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick—who represent, respectively, my state and my congressional district—in establishing the Commission.

Mrs. FENWICK. A constituent. [Laughter.]

Dr. KASSOF. We are heartened by their initiative and that of their colleagues, and by the determination of this Commission to assure an active and constructive role for the United States in living up to the intent of the Helsinki Agreement and in encouraging other nations to do so as well.

The International Research and Exchanges Board, of which I am Executive Director, was established in 1968 by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council to administer academic exchange programs between scholars in the United States and the countries of East-Central and Southeast Europe and the Soviet Union.

Today, IREX administers formal scholar exchanges for purposes of advanced research with all the socialist countries of Eastern Europe with the exception of Albania. Three of our exchanges with the Soviet Union taken place under the auspices of the intergovernmental agreement on educational and cultural exchanges. We have a graduate student and young faculty exchange, an exchange of senior research scholars, and a summer exchange of language teachers, all with the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the USSR.

We also administer the exchange between the American Council of Learned Societies and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. During the last complete program year in 1975–76, 164 Americans and 168 Soviet and East European scholars and scientists participated in these exchange programs.

With the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the IREX programs constitute the major channel for long-term advanced research in all academic disciplines; when one considers advanced research in the social sciences and humanities only, IREX provides virtually the sole channel open for such individual research for a semester or more. And here, I might add that included in our East European exchanges is the exchange with the German Democratic Republic, East Germany, to which Mr. Marks alluded before.

In addition to these formal exchanges, which operate under reciprocal agreements with the countries concerned, IREX provides short-term travel grants to scholars planning new exchanges or taking part in collaborative projects, and awards fellowships for Soviet and East European area studies in North America preparatory to participation in the exchanges.

During 1975–76, these programs provided support directly or indirectly for some 1,000 scholars involved in various forms of East-West cooperation. The Helsinki document—and compliance with its provisions—is, therefore, of fundamental concern to us.

The Final Act both codifies and further stimulates the gradual but significant opening of East-West communication which has now been taking place for a number of years. Very difficult and complex problems characterize the exchange of scholars, researchers, and scientists with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union—and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Yet it is also fair to say that the predominant current theme in these East-West relationships has been the new readiness of our partners in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to engage in an ever-widening circle of mutually beneficial forms of cooperation.

If your Commission can further encourage this healthy trend and help to solve some of the outstanding problems, the beneficiaries will be not only the scholars, researchers, and scientists directly involved, but the diplomats and statesmen who depend on the opening of communications pioneered by scholars, and ultimately, the broad public which will enjoy the fruits of shared knowledge and understanding as well as the advantages of international harmony.

Only a few days ago, in a conversation with a leading representative of the Soviet Academy of Sciences who is at the same time a member of the Soviet Government, he expressed to me his conviction that scholars and researchers can address themselves now to problems and issues that diplomats and governments will not be able to handle directly for some years, and that scholarly specialists from both sides can, therefore, lay the groundwork for new forms of international cooperation.

We at the International Research and Exchanges Board know this to be true from our past experience, and it is an observation with which we gladly associate ourselves.

Let me summarize the achievements of the scholar exchange programs, underline the most difficult obstacles and problems with which they are faced, and suggest some ways in which this Commission can play a constructive role for the future.

We are now engaged in patterns of research cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe which only 4 or 5 years ago were considered to be impossible. For almost 20 years, since the beginning of official cultural and educational exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1958, the United States and, in particular, the American academic community, has tried to persuade our Soviet and East European counterparts to participate in the kind of normal and open cooperation and joint work which is typical, for example, of our relations with Western Europe and Japan. Yet the fears of our partners about the internal consequences of such open cooperation greatly inhibited their willingness to work with us, so that more often than not there was a one-sided courtship.

Against this historical background, the most significant development of recent times has been the willingness, indeed, the eagerness, of the socialist countries to engage in exchanges—so much so, that it is now the United States that may lag behind in taking advantage of the new opportunities, a serious matter to which I shall return.

Why this change has occurred is in itself a fascinating reflection of the shifting international scene. Fundamentally, it stems from a recognition on the part of the socialist countries that they really have no choice but to participate, as we all must, in the international division of scientific and scholarly labor. Even the most powerful and largest among them, the U.S.S.R., cannot cope by itself with the universal knowledge explosion—whether it be in chemistry or biology or sociology or economics. No country, including the United States, can afford to isolate itself from the sharing of knowledge and technique—the heart of scholarship and research—that is made possible by cooperating in exchange programs.

A compelling example of this new attitude in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union can be seen in the new Soviet-American Commission on the Social Sciences and Humanities, which my organization, the Internal Research and Exchanges Board, founded and administers on the American side in cooperation with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Indeed, Secretary Duffey, in his testimony the other day, mentioned this as an outstanding example.

Our Commission sponsors a broad range of collaborative research undertakings, ranging from comparative anthropological studies of long-living populations in the Soviet Caucasus and selected United States counties—we will tell you what their secret is when they find it out, by the way—to problems of East-West economic relations, to comparisons of local governmental patterns.

Mr. FASCELL. I thought it was skinny yogurt.

Dr. KASSOF. Well, it may be. We hope it is that simple.

The Commission also considers such things as comparisons of local governmental patterns. Soviet and American specialists confer together, participate in reciprocal field work, and they will publish their research findings.

It has been a tremendous learning experience for both sides. All of this would have been out of the question only a few years ago.

Moreover, similar undertakings are conducted with all of our East European partners; with Poland, we cooperate on studies of enterprise management in private and socialist economies; with Romania, on historical research; with Bulgaria, on Balkan studies; with Hungary, on the question of how economists are educated, and so forth.

These examples are only a small fraction of our current project-oriented activities which, in addition to the continuing exchanges of individual scholars, not only produce mutually beneficial works, but add powerfully to our expert knowledge of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and which at the same time expose small but significant numbers of Soviet and East European researchers and opinion leaders to the experience of living and working in the United States.

The list of accomplishments to date, then, is already impressive, and we are still only at the beginning. At the same time, there are a number of fundamental problems which cannot be ignored, and toward the

solution of which this Commission has an important contribution to make.

The first set of problems can be summarized generally under the heading of "access." While it is true that the range of exchange activities has grown significantly by contrast with earlier experience, it is no less true that American (and other foreign) participants in these undertakings continue to face serious obstacles.

I have in mind the limitations sometimes imposed by our exchange partners on our researchers' access to such essential facilities as archives, current social and economic data, and restrictions on movement within the country, visits to institutions, the possibility to conduct interviews, and the like. I also have in mind more subtle obstacles, such as the frequent refusals of the socalist governments to allow their scholars and specialists to accept invitations to travel abroad professionally, or to attend international scientific and scholarly meetings.

While all of this has significantly eased in recent times, it would be misleading to suggest that these problems have been solved in any fundamental way, and perhaps unrealistic to hope that they will be in the very near future.

It must be emphasized that these obstacles pertain in widely varying degrees to the several countries involved, and it would be both incorrect and unfair to generalize about the socialist countries as a group.

Thus, as we know from our own very careful followup research, the most severe problems tend to be in the Soviet Union, while such countries as Poland and Hungary follow much more open practices in dealing with visiting researchers.

We can also take comfort from the finding that, while most American scholars do experience access problems in one degree or another throughout the area, most of them also manage to overcome them and to conduct valuable research—almost all of them, in fact, report a strong desire to return another time in view of the great value of the initial experience and the benefits to their research.

Nevertheless, the amount of time and effort that must be expended not only by our scholars, but by the administrators here and by the cultural staffs of our overseas embassies in struggling with these problems, is a serious loss, and our efforts are not always successful. Here is an area of conduct which cries out for improvement, and is surely one of the subjects which the Commission has both the right and the obligation to pursue at Belgrade. The International Research and Exchanges Board has already placed at the disposal of this Commission's staff a number of surveys and documents which we hope will be useful to you in assessing both the successes and the failures of our efforts to assure reasonable access for our researchers in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. I hope that the Belgrade meeting will provide a suitable opportunity to make some additional progress on this very important matter.

It is essential for the Commission to understand this set of problems in proper perspective. At the heart of the matter is the fact that, while the socialist countries are now committed to the concept of exchanges, they do remain concerned about their consequences and about how to contain them. Thus, while Americans increasingly are accepted by our exchange partners to work on topics and themes which a few years ago would have been considered too sensitive—for example, research bear-

ing on contemporary political or economic questions—some of them still have problems when it comes to collecting data or meeting with appropriate specialists or officials once they are in the country.

Again, it is necessary to stress that there is not only a wide variation from one country to the next, but among individual American participants. Still, it is a problem that ought to engage the Commission, for there is vast room for improvement, the more so in view of the intention of the Final Act to facilitate scholarly communication.

It is also worth emphasizing that in many or most cases, these obstacles have not been deliberately created to hamper the visiting researchers, but are essentially byproducts of the same traditions of secrecy and control that affect local scholars no less than visitors. Nor is it the case that the problem is specific to East-West relations, for the evidence shows that American researchers often are afforded better opportunities and working conditions than specialists from one socialist country visiting another, in part because we have been quite vigorous in representing the needs of our scholars and because we have not hesitated to use the leverage inherent in reciprocal exchange arrangements when necessary.

All of this makes the work of your Commission more subtle and difficult than if the matter concerned visiting Americans (or other Westerners) only. But it also provides an additional opportunity. Since the solution to the access problem would involve changes in deeply rooted practices that are essentially domestic in nature, the impact of insisting that international standards be observed is likely to benefit not only the visitors, but ultimately the scholars and scientists of the host countries. Such a gradual process is already at work, and may be said to be one of the most important long-range consequences of our exchange programs.

The Commission can hasten this valuable progress by emphasizing its concern that such international standards be consistently observed by all the signatories to the Helsinki document, and by bringing to public attention the most serious departures from those norms.

The problem of access, as you will readily appreciate, is too complex to be summarized here, but I would welcome an opportunity to return to this subject if the members of the Commission wish, after the conclusion of my statement.

The second problem is no less serious. And Leonard Marks has already referred to it. The problem is "funding." Fortunately, however, its solution lies entirely in our hands, or more accurately, within these halls. After 20 years of trying to persuade our Soviet and East European colleagues of the need to expand these exchanges, we have finally succeeded in doing so—only to find that the modest, but essential financial resources to mount such an expansion are not at our disposal.

In the earlier years of the exchanges, support from the private sector—the universities and the foundations—was more than adequate to the limited possibilities. Alas, they no longer are so, and there are grave difficulties just to maintain the exchanges at their current modest levels.

The unfortunate fact is that the Federal Government has failed to come to grips with the problem of financing the East-West exchanges, encouraging them through such actions as its adherence to the Hel-

sinki Final Act, but neglecting to provide sufficient wherewithal for American participation. Urgent action is required, and quickly, if we are to live up to our obligations as a nation. Within recent weeks and months, all of our exchange partners in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have asked us for—indeed, challenged us to—expansion of the exchange programs in the spirit of Helsinki.

I am sorry to say that we have not only been unable to respond to their urgings, but even have had to reduce programs in Eastern Europe from their earlier levels; the prospect is for still further reductions next year or the abandonment of entire programs with some countries. The Department of State and the National Endowment for the Humanities have tried bravely to fill the gap, but their own resources are limited. Continuing donations from the private foundations and from the universities, as well as from public-spirited corporations, have also helped, but the fulfillment of our Helsinki obligations is a national responsibility and ultimately will rest upon the Congress.

To illustrate the urgency of the situation, I can report that a year ago the United States came very close, for want of funds, to failing to fulfill its obligations under the research exchanges portion of its formal agreement with the U.S.S.R. which is administered for the United States by my organization. It was only a last-minute plea to the White House and an additional emergency grant from the Ford Foundation that saved us the embarrassment of turning to the Soviet Union to say that we could not operate the exchange agreement at the level stipulated in the intergovernmental agreement. In the meantime, our exchange agreements with Eastern Europe, which were coming up for renewal, had to be signed at reduced levels.

Our first priority, then, must be to assure on a long-term basis our abilities to support existing exchanges, as well as to respond to the new challenge which is now being addressed to us by the East Europeans and the Soviets.

If after urging them for years to engage with us in expanded relations the United States is unable to follow through on its own initiatives, we shall be in a very awkward situation indeed.

Moreover, it is important to recognize that the problem of access which I have already described is directly related to the question of material support for expanded exchange activities. We shall be in a very weak position, indeed, if we insist on improvements in the conduct of the exchanges when we are allowing them to shrink or disappear, for our Soviet and East European counterparts would argue—and rightly—that the United States is not taking its Helsinki obligations very seriously. (Indeed, the Soviet Union has already published, in preparation for the Belgrade meetings, a compendium of their own exchange activities.)

A vigorous American response to the challenge, on the other hand, will not only allow us to make more forcefully the case for overall compliance with the final act, but will provide a splendid opportunity to insist that such questions as that of access be resolved as part of a growing relationship. I do not doubt that, in any such friendly contest, the strength of American institutions will make itself felt. But we must first take the trouble to organize our effort and to mobilize the essential support.

Finally, let me emphasize that, although my statement today is addressed to the international political implications of the exchanges in the context of the Helsinki agreement, the ultimate utility of the exchange programs themselves is, in fact, much broader in scope than these brief remarks can even begin to suggest.

In the final analysis, the issue before us is not simply one of numbers or quotas or budgets, but the need to devise ways to work cooperatively and on a transnational basis on common human questions ranging from an understanding of our histories to the most urgent social and scientific questions of the day. Here, the contribution of the exchanges, the mutual benefits that they provide, and American leadership in encouraging them, should be a matter of pride and satisfaction to us all. I know that this Commission will play a positive role in maintaining that leadership.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Dr. Kassof. Dr. Graham.

STATEMENT OF PROF. LOREN R. GRAHAM

Dr. GRAHAM. Thank you. It is a pleasure to be here and to try to help in this important endeavor. I am not an administrator of any exchange program and never have been. I am a member of the faculty of Columbia University and a specialist in the history and politics of Soviet science; I have been working for the last several years for several panels and commissions studying scientific and technology exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union.

I will draw on that experience, but the interpretation I give is my own. Those reports are not out yet.

Instead of reading my statement, I think I will just emphasize a few of the main points.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, we will put the entire statement in the record and you may summarize as you see fit.

[The written statement of Prof. Loren R. Graham follows:]

TESTIMONY OF LOREN R. GRAHAM, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, PROGRAM ON SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, AND PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The testimony which I am giving here is that of a private citizen and not that of an official administering exchange programs with the Soviet Union (I have never served in such capacity). I am a specialist in the history and politics of Soviet science on the faculty of Columbia University, and I have been for several years *rapporteur* for a panel of the National Academy of Sciences evaluating the interacademy scientific exchange program with the Soviet Union. The report of that committee (known as the "Kaysen Panel") is still not completed, although it soon will be. In giving my opinions here I will draw upon my personal knowledge of Soviet science and I will attempt to present the majority opinion of my colleagues studying exchanges with the Soviet Union, but my interpretation is entirely my own and not that of the Kaysen Panel nor the National Academy of Sciences.

OVERVIEW AND PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-U.S.S.R. SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES

The formal channels of U.S.-U.S.S.R. scientific and technological exchange can be summarized in a list of agreements that now number 13. Two antedate the period known as détente, and have now been in existence for eighteen years. These two are administered on the United States side by non-governmental organizations: the National Academy of Sciences and the International Research and Exchanges Board.

The other eleven agreements are known as the "bilaterals", and they grew out of the summit meeting of 1972, with additions in 1973 and 1974. Most of these

agreements are administered on the United States side by governmental organizations, the "lead agencies." The list of these latter agreements is readily available and is, I think, already known to you. Most of the bilaterals are goal-oriented, as distinguished from the fundamental science predominating the interacademy exchange.

One of the first questions often asked of the exchange administrators and the American scientists who participate in the exchanges is, "How valuable are these exchanges to the United States?" Another similar question is, "Are we getting as much out of them as we are giving?" I will try to answer those questions on the basis of my knowledge of the interacademy exchange, which is the oldest predominantly scientific exchange program with the Soviet Union.

First of all, we should notice that this exchange program is not primarily about technology, but about basic science. In other words, we exchange knowledge about nature, not manufactured products or information directed toward such manufacture. Such an exchange is not best compared with an economic exchange in which the parties give up the goods they offer in trade and retain those they receive in return. In the interchange of scientific ideas neither side parts with any of its initial stock, and adds to what it receives. Indeed, the initial stock of "knowledge" each side brings to the interchange—a complex mixture of well-articulated concepts, and factual information, and much less explicit, speculations, understandings and hunches—is itself changed by the transaction: new perspectives and new points of comparison make new and different the initial "knowledge" each side brings to it.

In the process of intellectual interchange, two plus two often equals six. Thus an attempt to evaluate an exchange of ideas in terms of a calculus suitable to an exchange of goods, which compares what was offered by one side with what it received in exchange from the other, usually goes awry.

Intellectual interchange is one of the indispensable processes by which science grows. For a working scientist, trying out his nascent ideas by talking them out with colleagues, or explaining them to students—and thus seeing them anew in the light of others' reactions—forms an essential part of the conduct of his scientific work.

The present interacademy exchange program between the United States and the Soviet Union definitely helps serve the world community of scientists in the manner just described. It is, for example, the only existing formal channel under which Soviet and American mathematicians can spend long periods of time working together. And Soviet mathematics happens to be one of the very strongest fields in Soviet science. Soviet mathematicians have, in fact, been world leaders in some fields for many years.

I should emphasize that the description of the exchange program I have given so far concerns fundamental science. If we turn to technology, the situation is rather different. It is obvious that a nation has an interest in preserving those aspects of its technology that give it advantages in military and commercial applications. When one evaluates the exchange programs between two competing powers like the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. it is useful to make the distinction between fundamental science and strategic or proprietary technology wherever this distinction is feasible (Middle areas certainly exist where the distinction is unclear.)

In the first area, both countries usually benefit; in the latter fields, the benefits are often differential. Even in clearly technological areas, however, there are many areas where strategic considerations do not usually enter in and where interchange is beneficial to both parties if the commercial arrangements are equitable.

Returning now to the question of scientific merit in the interacademy exchange program, I would summarize the majority opinion of knowledgeable American scientists as follows: They consider the interacademy exchange program as definitely worthwhile, indeed quite valuable in certain areas, and they urge its continuance. If certain changes can be made in its administration, they would recommend expansion in some areas. They agree that in many, probably most, scientific fields the United States is ahead of the Soviet Union, yet the level of Soviet work is sufficiently high to make the exchange a valuable experience for the majority of participating American scientists.

The direct, purely scientific achievements of the exchanges, whether measured by publications resulting from them or some other objective measure or by the opinions of the participants are widely believed to be of lesser significance than cultural and political gains. The American scientists who have participated

in the interacademy program believe that it has helped build and maintain the world scientific community, that it has served as an indispensable information channel for keeping abreast of Soviet science, and that it has contributed to the improvement of relations between two societies often seen as antagonistic.

Even though American scientists often emphasize the importance of the exchange programs for cultural and political rather than scientific goals, it would be wrong to interpret these views as implying that the purely scientific content of the exchanges was unimportant. Those political results that are seen as more important than the direct and immediate contributions of the exchanges to scientific knowledge could not be received if the direct scientific value of the program were not substantial. Neither contributions to building and maintaining the world scientific community nor to improving the tone and substance of the political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union could result from an exchange lacking in substantive scientific content. Indeed, were that to be the case, the result would be regress from rather than progress toward both these goals, since the scientists involved would soon prove unwilling to continue the exchanges, except to the extent that they did so under the pressure from their governments.

In summary, then, the exchanges are a worthwhile endeavor, both for scientific and non-scientific reasons. Yet the exchanges need to be improved, and I will refer to some specific suggestions for their improvement in following sections.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE EXCHANGE PROGRAMS TO CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES AND THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

Soviet repression of non-conformers and dissidents is a serious obstacle to scientific exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. Discrimination against Jewish scientists is a particularly sensitive issue, one which has caused some American scientists to cut off relations with their Soviet counterparts. On balance, however, the majority of American scientists favor continuing exchanges despite their disapproval of Soviet discrimination and repression. The majority opinion is that isolation from Western contacts would be the worst fate for Soviet dissidents.

American scientists who have lived in the Soviet Union for more than a few weeks have usually learned at first hand that political restrictions interfere with scientific work. In fields where the potentiality for fruitful high-quality exchange is the greatest, such as some areas of mathematics and physics, the controls seem to be the most restrictive.

Over the eighteen years of the interacademy exchange American impatience with Soviet political restrictions on science has definitely grown. This heightening impatience is the result of two factors: the Soviet controls have increased in the last five or ten years, and the American knowledge of these restrictions—both the old and the new—has grown as American scientists have learned more and more about Soviet science through the exchange programs.

Soviet authorities attempt to use the exchange programs as a reward system for orthodox Soviet scientists. Those Soviet scientists who cause trouble are not permitted to participate in the exchanges. In response to this challenge to the principle of freer communication for which the exchanges were originally designed, American participants have increasingly urged future American exchangees to visit Soviet scientists who have lost their academic positions because of their attempts to emigrate, or their support of dissidents, in order to help them to keep abreast of developments in science, as well as to render moral support. And other American scientists have said that they will neither go to the Soviet Union nor receive Soviet scientists in their laboratories while the present political conditions continue. Several knowledgeable American scientists estimate that the number of American scientists who feel this strongly about the situation as "about ten per cent." If this number grows appreciably it could, within another five or so years, be a major influence on the exchanges.

At the same time, it should be noticed that it is entirely possible for an individual American exchangee to go to the Soviet Union and never to encounter a serious political limitation or problem so far as his or her own work is concerned. Even at the present moment of growing political awareness in the exchange community, a strong body of opinion exists among American scientists that it would be a mistake for the American administrators of the exchange program to become deeply involved in human rights or other political problems. Other officials or private individuals seem better qualified for this work. Some

scientists emphasize that it is possible for good science to exist in repressive political conditions. Other American scientists stress that it might be particularly important to continue the exchanges, at least on a minimal level, if the political situation grows worse, since the exchanges are one of our most important channels of information about the repression of Soviet scientists.

Against this complex background of differing opinions, the most sensible position for the administrators of the program seems to be a third position between the pure alternatives of a scientific exchange program which disregards human rights entirely and one which is so absorbed in them that all other considerations are forgotten. The political factors which enter into this third position are of two types: (1) The knowledge that some types of political restrictions *do* decrease the value of the exchange in scientific terms, and, therefore, are perfectly legitimate topics for discussion among the administrators of the exchange; (2) The knowledge that on the American side the existence of the interacademy exchange is dependent upon the support of the individual members of the American scientific community. If the time ever comes when these scientists become so offended by political conditions in the Soviet Union that they no longer support the exchanges, it would be very difficult for them to continue, whatever official policies might be at that time. A series of arrests of Soviet scientists known to the American community could bring about that situation rather quickly.

Although scientists quite understandably do not normally consider questions of politics or ethics to be central to their professional concerns there is one area where the link between science and ethics is inevitable and proper. That area is the issue of the ethics of scientific research itself. The one set of ethical rules which a scientist must defend *qua* scientist is that set of principles necessary to gain knowledge, such as free access to information, the right to communicate with other scientists freely, and the right to question the assumptions reigning in his area of investigation. When a scientist defends *these* principles, he is not taking a position in international politics, he is defending science itself. If a scientist is asked to participate in scientific exchanges he has every right to require that these principles be observed if he is to be involved, for he knows that his scholarly work will be encumbered if they are not. If a government is asked to sign exchange agreements, it has the right to ask if these principles will be observed as it tries to assess the value of the proposed agreements.

A Western scientist who travels in the Soviet Union on one of the exchanges and defends the right of his Soviet colleagues to go to foreign scholarly congresses or to accept an invitation to lecture in a Western university—rights he knows have frequently been denied— is not being politically provocative in the way he would be if he attacked Soviet foreign policy or the structure of the Soviet government. He is commenting on matters which fall within his expertise as a specialist, for he knows that fruitful scientific research requires such forms of communication; he further knows that the particular Soviet scholars he names would be able to make genuine contributions if they were permitted to exercise these rights. Western scientists are acting as representatives of their professions when they point out that an advancement of science is dependent on the removal of barriers to communication and travel.

As long as the Soviet Union places such heavy restrictions as it currently does on scientific interchange with foreign nations each new proposed new agreement should be measured against the standard of better communication. Soviet science administrators should be advised that while experienced American scientists are in favor of maintaining the existing interacademy exchange even under the present rather restrictive conditions, their interest in expanding the level of these interactions is small unless guarantees of new measures of access to institutions, personnel and information are given. Such assurances should be viewed as requirements for the success of joint scientific work, not as political demands.

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One of the intentions of the Helsinki accords was to promote better communications among the citizens of the participating states. Among scientists a form of communication which is essential to their profession is voluntarily-arranged meetings and discussions in the form of research visits, symposia and conferences. The present exchange programs have helped widen opportunties for contacts significantly, but despite these gains, the Soviet government has not fulfilled the spirit of the accords in scientific exchanges. The Soviet authorities continue to exercise tight political controls over the selection of Soviet participants, and they often prevent Soviet scientists from accepting invitations to come to the

United States for joint research or lectures. The voluntary principle is at work on the United States side, but not on the Soviet side.

Efforts to bring the scientific exchanges closer to the spirit of the Hensinki accords should be made on two levels, the unofficial and the official.

On the unofficial level, American scientists need to discuss among themselves more than they have so far done the full implications of their participation in exchange programs which are often used on the Soviet side as reward systems for orthodox scientists, and, in addition, reflect discriminatory patterns of selection. My own opinion is that the appropriate response by individual scholars to these restrictions is not refusal to participate in the exchange (although that is certainly an option), but for the American scientist in the Soviet Union to make contacts with a wide variety of Soviet scientists, including those who cannot themselves participate in the exchanges. In that way we can help build a stronger worldwide scientific community and at the same time render moral support to Soviet scientists who are under political restrictions.

On the official level, it is my opinion that the United States should not significantly expand scientific contacts beyond the present level unless evidence of better communication and freer exchange can be given. Emphasis on traveling delegations should be diminished, while greater emphasis should be put on working symposia and joint research in which the identities of the scientists on both sides will be known in advance and in which something approaching the invitational principle will be at work. We now know Soviet science and Soviet scientists well enough to know the names of many Soviet scientists who should participate in a given conference or symposium on a specialized subject. If a significant proportion of the appropriate Soviet specialists do not participate, and if we have good reason to believe that they would have participated if permitted, then that particular series of symposia and workshops should not, in my opinion, be continued. Each proposal to expand exchanges should be measured against the degree of success in obtaining freer exchanges in the previous round.

There is obviously a delicate line between, on the one hand, moving toward a confrontational posture in which the present gains in scientific communication would be lost, and Soviet non-conformers would be isolated; and, on the other hand, acquiescence to Soviet utilization of these exchange programs to meet their own political purposes. We must learn to handle these questions in a sophisticated way that promotes both scientific knowledge and the principles of human rights. That means defending the present exchanges against those who would try to eliminate them while requiring that any proposed expansions meet improved standards of behavior.

Dr. GRAHAM. I would like to talk about two different points. The first point is the question of how valuable these science and technology exchanges are to the United States. The second point is what the relationship of these science and technology exchanges is to the Helsinki accords.

Now, in all of my comments, I will be restricting myself to science and technology exchange, the natural sciences and engineering exchanges on which I have special knowledge, and not to all the other kinds of contacts that exists.

I think you probably know what these exchanges are. I would like to summarize them by saying that in science and technology, at the moment, there are 13 exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two of them predate détente—one of them is the International Research and Exchanges Board—the one that Dr. Kassof just talked about which includes components of science and technology; and the other of those older ones is the National Academy of Sciences Exchange with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Those two old exchanges were supplemented in 1972 at the summit meeting by additional bilaterals of which there are now 11. So if you add those 11 to the 2, you come up with 13. I think you have that list, but I have it with me if you need it, but I see no need to go through that list.

Mr. FASCELL. We have it and it will be part of your record, Dr. Graham.

[List of 11 Soviet-American bilateral exchanges in science and technology follows:]

LIST OF ELEVEN SOVIET-AMERICAN BILATERAL EXCHANGES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Agriculture
Atomic Energy
Development of an Artificial Heart
Energy
Environmental Protection
Housing and Other Construction
Medical Science and Public Health
Oceanography
Outer Space
Science and Technology
Transportation

Dr. GRAHAM. Fine. Now one of the first questions often asked is, How valuable are these science and technology exchanges to the United States—are we getting as much out of them as we are giving? I would urge you to make a distinction when you address that kind of question between science and technology to the degree that it can be done.

If we are talking about fundamental science, which is what the interacademy exchange is primarily about, then——

Mr. FASCELL. Fundamental, translate—please translate. Do you mean basic research?

Dr. GRAHAM. Yes; if we are talking about basic research, we are talking about studies of nature, ideas. If we are talking about technology, we are talking about machines or information for making them.

Now if we could make that distinction, it would be very helpful. Questions about how much we are getting out of basic science exchanges which are based upon a kind of economic tradeoff model are not very helpful. When you are trading ideas, you do not lose what you are giving and you add to what you get. In other words, you retain what you give away and you have added something by what you received. So a question of what we are getting out of this exchange, whether it is as much as we are giving, well, such questions usually go awry when we are talking about basic science.

The technology issue is a very different question and there are many people in the Government looking at this aspect.

The interacademy exchange program is primarily about fundamental science—about basic science, about ideas, about nature. We now have a lot of information on whether or not this is an experience which American scientists consider worthwhile. The majority opinion of knowledgeable scientists who have participated in the exchanges in the basic sciences is that this is a worthwhile experience. It is also true that the majority of these scientists believe that the United States is ahead of the Soviet Union in most areas of science.

Nonetheless, they believe that the level of activity in the Soviet Union in many of these areas of fundamental science is sufficiently high that going there is a worthwhile experience in the way in which I have already described. This exchange in fundamental science is the kind of experience where two plus two is not four, but two plus two can be six, because you are adding to each other's viewpoint and you are testing our ideas on each other.

So the majority of knowledgeable scientists do urge the continuance of the exchanges in the fundamental sciences and the majority of knowledgeable scientists and engineers urge the continuance of the ex-

changes in technology. But I would not be frank if I did not say that in the areas of technology heavily represented in the 11 bilateral agreements the situation is quite checkered; some pruning is definitely in order in my opinion. There are areas of success and there are areas of failure. Furthermore, in the specific area of technology, there are considerations of security and of commercial proprietary rights which are obviously very complicated and which I cannot go into in any detail here. So again, I urge people to look at the technology side a little differently from the way they look at the basic science side, even though I personally favor the exchanges in both areas. They just need to be looked at with somewhat different eyes.

In summary then, I would say that these exchanges in science and technology are worthwhile endeavors, both for scientific and for nonscientific reasons. The American scientists are quite strong in their support of the exchanges for nonscientific reasons (increasing cultural and political understanding). In fact, they often says the exchanges are more important for nonscientific reasons than for scientific ones. That is often taken to mean that the exchanges, are not really worth much in science, but that interpretation would be a mistake. If the science in these exchanges did not have substance and quality, then the nonscientific goals could not be served.

For one thing, good American scientists would not participate in the exchanges if they were not scientifically worthwhile. They just simply would not go. Participation on the American side is voluntary, and if the American scientists ever decide that participation is just not worth the effort, they will not participate.

I would like now to shift to the question of the relationship of the exchange program to civil rights issues and the Helsinki accords.

Soviet repression of nonconformers and dissidents is a serious obstacle to scientific exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. Discrimination against Jewish scientists is a particularly sensitive issue, one which has caused some American scientists to cut off relations with their Soviet counterparts. On the balance, however, the majority of American scientists favor continuing exchanges despite their disapproval of Soviet discrimination and repression. The majority opinion is that isolation from Western contacts would be the worst fate for Soviet dissidents.

It also should be noticed, I think, that the impatience in the American scientific community with Soviet controls over science is growing. This growth is the result of two factors. First of all there has been an increase in the political controls in the Soviet Union in the last 5 or 10 years in certain fields. And, second, American scientists are simply much more familiar with the political restrictions that exist—the old ones as well as the new ones—than they used to be. The greater awareness is, in part, a product of these exchanges. We know more about these restrictions than earlier because we simply know a lot more about Soviet science in general.

You get a strange effect here: The knowledge we gain from exchanges (e.g., greater familiarity with political restrictions) is sometimes used as an argument against such exchanges. It is a complicated phenomenon.

But there are serious moral issues here and I do not think they can be dodged. In particular, Soviet authorities attempt to use the exchange program as a rewards system for orthodox Soviet scientists.

Those Soviet scientists who cause trouble are not permitted to participate in the exchanges.

In response to this challenge to the principle of freer communication for which the exchanges were originally designed, American participants have increasingly urged future American exchangees to visit Soviet scientists who have lost their academic positions because of their attempts to emigrate, or because of their support of dissidents. The American scientists have done this in order to help these Soviet scientists keep abreast of developments in science, as well as to render moral support.

Among the American scientific community, there is a growing moral awareness of these issues and it is both, I think, a healthy development and a somewhat interesting and perhaps even troublesome development if it leads to the cutting back of the exchanges, which I would oppose. But the moral question cannot be dodged.

I would estimate that among American scientists participating in the interacademy exchange, the number who have been so turned off by certain political restrictions in the Soviet Union that they will no longer participate is probably on the order of about 10 percent, which may not sound like too much, but this percentage could increase, and it could become an important factor if certain things happen. For example, if there were a series of arrests of Soviet scientists known to the American community, that percentage could grow quite rapidly.

It should be added that it is quite possible for an American scientist to go to the Soviet Union and live there for months and never encounter a political restriction on his or her own work—it happens. It definitely happens. So one should not exaggerate the extent of the political controls, but they are definitely there.

It seems to me that there is really no alternative here but a third position between the pure positions of being on the one hand, so absorbed in civil rights issues that no other considerations count, or, on the other hand, not paying any attention to them at all. In science and technology, at least, I think the third position is absolutely essential. Sketching out that third position is not, I think, so difficult to do. After all, some kinds of political restrictions definitely cut down on the value of scientific exchange. If you do not have free exchange of information, you cannot get together with the scientists you want to get together with in order to work on a certain problem, whether it is in Berkeley or in Moscow, because of political restrictions. That is not just a political question—it becomes a scientific question. You want to do good research and it is hard to do good research when you have got some of those problems in your way.

The other factor is that on the American side, these exchanges will not prosper without the support of the American scientific community. The level of impatience is high enough for us to remember that it is there and to realize that the exchanges could definitely be endangered by that rising indignation. Who of us can object to such complaints against the exchanges? I think consideration of those complaints is a part of the way we run our system.

One of the intentions of the Helsinki accords was to promote better communications among the citizens of the participating states. Among scientists, a form of communication which is essential to their profession is voluntarily arranged meetings and discussions in the form of

research visits, symposia and conferences. The present exchange programs have helped to widen opportunities for contact significantly, but despite these gains, the Soviet Government has not fulfilled the spirit of the accords in scientific exchanges. They continue to exercise tight political controls over the selection of Soviet participants. Soviet scientists are often prevented from accepting invitations to come to the United States for joint research and lectures. The voluntary principle is at work on the United States side, but not on the Soviet side.

I might add that some years ago, I criticized the American side for some of the controls they exercised on the exchanges, so I am not just putting my criticism on one side, but at the moment, the voluntary principle is at work on the United States side and it is not at work on the Soviet's side.

It seems to me that the way in which we can try to bring the scientific exchanges closer to the spirit of the Helsinki accords calls for action on two levels—the unofficial and the official.

Unofficially, I think American scientists need to discuss among themselves more than they have so far done the full implication of their participating in exchange programs which are often used on the Soviet side as a reward system for orthodox scientists and in addition reflect discriminatory patterns of selection. It is moral issue and I think they need to reflect on it.

My own opinion is that the proper response to that issue is not refusal to participate in the exchange program. I think that would be a great mistake. It is, however, an option—a live option in the American scientific community—but in my opinion, it is an incorrect path to choose.

I think that the correct answer to that dilemma is for American scientists in the Soviet Union to make contact with a wide variety of Soviet scientists, including those who cannot themselves participate in the exchange. I think that the American scientists should realize that only in that way can they avoid being accused of abetting a system (and working with it without objection) which is really based upon political principles. I think there is a serious reason for objecting on ethical grounds.

On the official level, in science and technology, it is my own opinion that it would not be worthwhile to expand significantly the current level of science and technology exchanges with the Soviet Union unless assurances of better communication and freer choice would be gained than presently exist. The total number of applications for the interacademy exchange from American scientists is not very high. There has been a certain decline in quality and I think one reason for that decline is because these restrictions do exist. I do not think that the reason for that decline in quality is because scientists think good work cannot be done in the Soviet Union. In some areas—mathematics, for example—the Soviet Union is at absolutely top world levels. There are other areas and we could name them, where the Soviet Union is far behind. But in principle, good work can be done there. If the level of application is not very high, it is not for lack of talent in the Soviet Union, but because of certain organizational and political difficulties.

Therefore, I think that when the Soviet Union proposes the expansion of exchange programs in science and technology as it currently is doing, we should ask for those guarantees necessary for seeing that

normal standards of behavior will be observed in order that the scientific work which comes out of these exchanges will be of sufficiently high quality.

So then we have a delicate line, it seems to me, between, on the one hand, moving toward a confrontational posture in which the present gains will be lost and the Soviet dissidents will be isolated—which would be the worst possible outcome, and on the other hand, acquiescence to Soviet utilization of these exchange programs to meet their own political purposes.

I think the exit from that dilemma, if there is an exit, is defending the present exchange programs against those people who would like to eliminate them while insisting that any expansion of those programs contain these new guarantees of access, communication, and free flow of ideas and people.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much, Dr. Graham. Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your concise reports on exchange activities and the perspective which you urge upon us as well as the suggestions that you have made.

I have some questions, but I want to defer to my distinguished colleague at the end of this table since her constituent is in the chair. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think that some of my questions have been answered by your further testimony, Dr. Kassof, and I was interested in the outstanding problems as they seem to consist mostly of access and the question of where you get the money.

There are really two questions that I wanted to ask. One, you speak of an international standard of access. Is there such a thing—has it been agreed upon?

Dr. KASSOF. There is a kind of informal international standard of access which I think accurately describes relations between the United States and Western Europe and Japan. Dr. Graham has already referred to the kind of inherent needs of scientists for access and that is applicable to no less a degree to scholars working on nonscientific materials.

Obviously, there are restrictions. We do not let Soviets into our defense laboratories; we do not let them into university laboratories to do classified work; and they have similar restrictions. The problem in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is the scope of those restrictions.

Let me give you a current example which occupies us at the office in New York these very days. We have had urgent communication from our Embassy in Moscow about the fate of one of our scholars who is in Uzbekistan in Tashkent doing research on transformation and changes in the Uzbek language. It is an important social topic and it is instructive to us because it informs us about how the Soviets manage to handle this complex problem of a multilinguistic society.

It took him about 7 months just to get into the Archive of the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan. He was allowed in for 1 day. He was assured that he could come back the next day and when he came back, they would not let him in and he had left his notes there and they would not give them back to him on the grounds that his notes pertained to topics that were not officially included in his research plan.

Now that is nonsense. You do not look at scholars' notes and you do not confiscate them. That is a very concrete and immediate example of the kind of thing I had in mind. Clearly, whatever sense you have of international standards, that is a violation. And that is the kind of thing I have in mind.

Mrs. FENWICK. What do you say—I was very much interested in applying Dr. Graham's point about insisting on better conditions and access and guarantees to the embassy people—guarantees that there would be more freedom for scholars who want to come out rather than the ones who are picked and approved as reliable. We know about Russia—it is a great plum to be allowed to go abroad. You are important and blessed if you are allowed to go to a foreign conference. But you pressed for expansion of the program?

Dr. KASSOF. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. Dr. Graham suggests that it ought to be under certain conditions. If you imposed those conditions, what do you think would happen—what is your view of that?

Dr. KASSOF. I would like to associate myself in part with Dr. Graham's remarks. He is referring to the interest of American scientists to go to the Soviet Union to do cooperative work in science.

Our situation is a little bit different. There is a sense in which scientists can do their work almost anywhere. They have a movable situs where they can do their research. The people that we send to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have to do their research there. They are social scientists and humanists who are using archives, looking at local resources and so forth.

We do, in fact, need an expansion and at the very least, we need to restore the cuts that we have already made in Eastern Europe.

I said in my formal testimony that I think that the expansion should, indeed, be accompanied by discussions of improved access. And I think that these two things go hand in hand. The Soviets and East Europeans are anxious for an expansion and I think that this is now our best opportunity to bring them to the table, both at Belgrade and in our work—our own work with them—to talk about the conditions under which that expansion will take place.

I also think it is necessary to add, in giving a proper perspective to this, that things, in fact, have improved. We are not satisfied with the rate of progress, but it would be wrong not to recognize the great progress that has been made. This is especially true in most of Eastern Europe. It is also true also in lesser degrees in the Soviet Union.

I think it is going to be important for your Commission in Belgrade not to paint the picture of no progress because that is not true and I think that would get us all into trouble. I think we have to recognize, acknowledge, and reward and encourage the progress that has been made without pretending that there are no further problems.

Mrs. FENWICK. Right. That is it. You know, it would be very helpful if you had a little one-page memorandum, Mr. Churchill used to say, on what have been the improvements so that we would have good, strong facts. Also, referring to something you said—what evidence have scientists come upon concerning anti-Jewish bias. Do they find, for example, that a brilliant scientist who happens to be Jewish is not advanced? Or what were you referring to exactly there?

Dr. KASSOF. Let me defer to Dr. Graham on that because he has been following this more closely in science exchanges than I have.

Mrs. FENWICK. Oh yes, that was in Dr. Graham's paper.

Dr. GRAHAM. The typical pattern is the following. There would be a symposium on some specialized subject in the United States. It would be on relativistic physics, let us say. If it is a highly specialized symposium, as they frequently are now, we know pretty much who should attend and we also know pretty much whether they want to attend. We have had contact with them in Moscow the previous year and we asked, "Would you come to the United States to this conference?" Then the symposium is held. At the last minute, there are some cancellations, and, surprise of surprises, the cancellations often are the Jewish scientists.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see.

Dr. GRAHAM. It has just happened too many times to be an accident.

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes. I was interested also when you spoke of the U.S. controls on participation. What were they and who imposed them?

Dr. GRAHAM. The ones I criticized years ago?

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes.

Dr. GRAHAM. Well, I think that there was a time a number of years ago when the U.S. administrators of some aspect of the exchanges were so concerned about what would happen to Americans who went to the Soviet Union that they rode herd. They wanted to look into their private lives and make sure that they did not do anything that might allow them to be compromised or blackmailed; and they became sort of puritanical overseers of Americans in a way that I consider quite inexcusable and reprehensible. I would like to say I think that situation has changed dramatically.

Mrs. FENWICK. Was that our State Department?

Dr. GRAHAM. I——

Mrs. FENWICK. Well, it is over, so maybe we had better not go into it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that is all of my questions.

Mr. FASCELL. Gentlemen, let me see. Doctor Kassof, in talking about expansion, which means money, is your agency the agent for the U.S. Government and the expenditure of some funds?

Dr. KASSOF. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. So the part which is public, how much is that—how much are we talking about?

Dr. KASSOF. Well, our budget is now about 60 percent provided by the Government from the State Department and from the National Endowment for the Humanities for those aspects which concern humanistic research. We operate on an overall budget of about $2.5 million a year to deal with all of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Mr. FASCELL. Which is nothing.

Dr. KASSOF. Which is nothing.

Mr. FASCELL. So, now, what are you talking about in terms of needing—in terms of meeting our commitment for expansion?

Dr. KASSOF. My organization——

Mr. FASCELL. What are you talking about in dollars?

Dr. KASSOF. My organization alone could easily absorb to good effect about twice the budget that we currently have to do the things that we urgently need to do with Eastern Europe and the Soviet

Union. Then, of course, there are other organizations and there are the direct Government programs. I might add, by the way, that many of our programs with the Soviet Union are, at the same time, Government programs. There is an overlap.

In Eastern Europe, they are nongovernmental, but supported to some extent with Government funds.

Mr. FASCELL. So U.S. funding of $1.2 million on your present budget could go to $2.4 million or $2.5 million.

Dr. KASSOF. Easily. And we would absorb that, might I say, with really no waste.

Mr. FASCELL. Does that have to come from the national academy?

Dr. KASSOF. No; our funds are from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the State Department. The National Academy of Sciences derives its funds principally and, indeed, I believe exclusively from the National Science Foundation. So we are in two very different funding channels.

Mr. FASCELL. You are. Your organization.

Dr. KASSOF. My organization receives money in governmental form from the State Department and from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

Mr. FASCELL. OK. So you are the administering agent for both of those organizations?

Dr. KASSOF. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. The national academy—that is something else?

Dr. KASSOF. That is completely different and given their overwhelming and, indeed, exclusive concerns in science, they derive their funds from the National Science Foundation. But our critical connection——

Mr. FASCELL. They have their own exchange program?

Dr. KASSOF. That is right, with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. We also have an exchange with the Soviet Academy.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you happen to know what the dollar amount of that program is?

Dr. GRAHAM. In no year has the budget exceeded $400,000. I think that is the upper limit for the interacademy exchange. There are people in the audience who could correct me, if that is wrong.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am Lawrence Mitchell from the National Academy of Sciences. The overall budget level for the Academy's programs with the Soviet and East European Academy of Science is currently around $1.5 million.

Dr. GRAHAM. What portion is the Soviet Union?

Mr. MITCHELL. I think about 40 percent of that.

Dr. GRAHAM. Then the sum is somewhat more than I said.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you for furnishing that information. OK. That does not seem like an insurmountable problem if we get the increase in the appropriation which is going through on the present bill.

Now, just as a matter of curiosity—it seems to me—and this is a question on perspective—maybe you gentlemen can add something to this. I have the feeling that there is a great deal of preoccupation with the Soviet desire and need in basic sciences and technology and yet I have a funny feeling that they place a tremendous effort on behavioral sciences and perhaps need some perspective in our thinking in those fields also. Is that true?

Dr. KASSOF. Mr. Chairman, let me comment. The Soviets in recent years have become increasingly aware, as indeed, have the East Europeans earlier on, that the vast and complex range of current problems of how you manage a society and how you improve the standard of living—how you manage the complex relations among linguistic groups and nationalities—that these questions demand the attention of social scientists and humanists.

Our activtiies in and with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in recent years have shown an increasing participation of their economists, of their sociologists, of their psychologists and that is a trend that is going to continue. Incidentally, it is also one of the best channels for East-West communication because these contacts address themselves to matters of fundamental values.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, it seems to me that there is a great opportunity for us.

Dr. KASSOF. There is, and that is precisely where we need more funding. I mentioned before the new condition with the Soviet Union in the social sciences and humanities. We are just beginning to tackle these questions. The questions of how cities are managed, the questions of urban transportation——

Mr. FASCELL. Of course, we cannot tell them a lot about that—we have not been too good. [Laughter.]

Dr. KASSOF. Well, we can tell them——

Mr. FASCELL. We can exchange our failures.

Dr. KASSOF. We can exchange our failures, and that, of course, is the story of life. [Laughter.]

But not without some very critical values in that respect.

Mr. FASCELL. It seems to me—I do not know how—with respect to the use of their research—in the behavioral sciences——

Dr. KASSOF. We are well ahead of them. On the other hand, we have something to learn from them because they have a very special laboratory. People who are involved in comparative studies understand the value of their experience in developing our own views on these things.

Mr. FASCELL. Are they conducting studies on a community-wide basis in the Soviet Union?

Dr. KASSOF. They are, and of various kinds. The sociologists in particular. There, incidentally, is a problem of access. We do have——

Mr. FASCELL. They will not let us into those studies at all, will they?

Dr. KASSOF. No; but they are beginning to and that is where I want to stress the positive side. We now have a projected program with them in the study of social indicators, the use of social science techniques to measure changes in social relations—changes in the relations among members of the community and so forth, health, education, and welfare. We are going to sit down with them, in fact, beginning in 2 weeks and—in Moscow, to discuss how to proceed on that question and on others.

We are ahead of them on methodology—they are going to learn something from us, but we are also going to learn something from them in the process. It is a slow, painful, extraordinarily difficult task, but we are going to do it if we can find the money for it.

We are going to have groups of American economists and sociologists and psychologists sit down with their Soviet counterparts, and we

are going to find out whether there is some way in which we can tackle these problems in common.

We will get some of their data. I am convinced. I am convinced of that because we have told them that we are not going to go very far without their data.

We will not get all of it, but we are going to get an awful lot more of it than we would have 3 or 4 years ago.

Mr. FASCELL. It seems to me we have a great opportunity there and also additional leverage.

Dr. KASSOF. Absolutely.

Mr. FASCELL. It seems that there is more mutual hunger in terms of need in the social sciences than there is in the hard sciences.

Dr. KASSOF. It is an area of growing interest and Mr. Chairman, could I add that it is natural that while much of the discussion in this kind of session revolves about the Soviet Union, one must not forget Eastern Europe. The East Europeans are ahead of the Soviets and, in fact, one of the things that worried us desperately about having to cut the Eastern European exchanges is that the Soviets learn from us through the East Europeans. Several years after we do something with the East Europeans, then the Soviets come around. It is easier to deal with the countries of Eastern Europe—those are smaller countries, the sense of confrontation is much diminished. If we neglect Eastern Europe, which is what we are doing now, we are going to have troubles in our relations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. FASCELL. Just take the factors of longevity, for example, which may or may not be a health matter, but may be a social matter as well. Just understanding that, for example, may lead to other things.

The thing that intrigues me and the reason that I got into this discussion is that there is a factor of fear that enters into most mankind and it seems to me—it may be a matter of prejudice—particularly in the Soviet Union. I have never understood a society that is so fearful of everything it does. That may be why they have a closed society. Goodness knows, we have enough fear here.

Look what happened when Sputnik went into the air. We were suddenly energized.

Dr. KASSOF. You referred earlier, Mr. Chairman and Mrs. Fenwick, to how one creates international standards. I think one of the most dramatic results of these exchanges has been to spread in the Soviet scientific and scholarly community in a subtle but absolutely effective way, the experience of seeing how Americans and other Westerners operate. It has had a tremendous impact. It is not talked about very widely, but we know from private discussions with Soviets that these things have had an immense effect.

Mrs. FENWICK. Even in the business world. What the Soviets seem the most to want from us is how to put it all together. They have a compartmentalized society. But I would like to get something that you said about technologies and how wise or unwise it might be to increase the technological exchanges and what are the dangers that you foresee. What are your thoughts on those exchanges as compared to basic science?

Dr. GRAHAM. I am in favor of technology exchanges as well as scientific exchanges, but there are particular problems with technology exchanges. There is a problem of perception, for example. The Soviet

Union has, in most of the commercial agreements, assumed, I think incorrectly, that American firms are willing to sell their technology for a buck. That is, they think we should be happy if we receive money and they receive the technology, whereas, most American companies are really not interested in selling their sophisticated technology on such a simple basis.

What the American companies want is a continuing business relationship. They want to be involved in the development of markets; they want to have licensing arrangements; that is, they want not just to meet over a conference table and sell machines and receive money. They want to have a continuing market, with long-term buying and selling.

Now, to the Soviets, that sounds like creeping capitalism and so there is a real problem.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see.

Dr. GRAHAM. The above comment is completely aside from the problems of strategic technology, which are quite separate.

I wanted to add just one more thing on the social sciences, if I may. Very important work could be done in the Soviet Union in the social sciences, yet restrictions are still bothersome. Dr. Kassof may want to add something to this. Areas like archeology, anthropology, sociology, linguistics—there are significant opportunities in these areas for Americans in the Soviet Union. There are populations to study, sites to study, archeological and historical sites and so forth, anthropological research to be done that would be fascinating. However, the restrictions on field work have been very heavy. That is, it is quite difficult for an American to go to a dig in Siberia.

Mrs. FENWICK. And think of the poor man in Uzbekistan with his notes.

Dr. KASSOF. Yet at the same time, we are making some progress. Last year, we had one of our young scholars participate in a Soviet archeological expedition on the Ob River. One of our anthropologists just left last week for the Soviet Union to discuss precisely this question of field work. So the difficulties do persist; they are, however, somewhat diminished and we are making some progress.

Mrs. FENWICK. Give us a little one-page memorandum on that.

Dr. KASSOF. I would be delighted to.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Friendly has a question.

Mr. FRIENDLY. I do not think you can do it in one page. Has anyone attempted to define what you call the moral standards, Doctor Graham, and what Doctor Kassof calls an international standard? Is there any indication of what those standards ought to be?

My idea perhaps is that we could at least put them on the table at Belgrade. This might not be something that all signatories would agree to, but at least it is an attempt to get the subject out.

Dr. KASSOF. I think it is important to sort these two questions out. International research standards have largely to do with questions of access which do not necessarily involve moral questions as such. They overlap with them, to be sure.

If you cannot get access to a given scientist or scholar because he is out of favor, that is a moral question as well as an access question.

It is easier to tackle the access question, obviously, because it does not go quite as directly to the heart of the political system. But yes,

we can, we have, and we will provide this Commission with concrete suggestions as to how it ought to be taken to Belgrade.

Mrs. FENWICK. That would be very helpful.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Just one followup to that. In either of the—either of the reports—the NAS report or the most recent IREX report—has anyone attempted to list the recent occasions on which either East European or Soviet scientists invited to the United States have been interferred with in coming here, in accepting the invitation, or on their return to their own country?

Dr. KASSOF. Let me use this occasion to enter into the record a concern which is a very grave one and a very current one. We learned only a few weeks ago that a distinguished Romanian historian, Vlad Georgescu, who is, in part, an alumnus of our program—we assisted him in coming to occupy a Romanian funded chair at Columbia University some years ago, is now under detention.

Mrs. FENWICK. What is his name?

Dr. KASSOF. Vlad Georgescu. I will provide the spelling of it for you later. We have tried in quiet ways to make our concern known to the Romanian authorities about this question. We hope and believe that they have simply made a mistake, in placing him under detention—no charges have been filed yet.

But I indicated in my communications with our Romanian colleagues that I would be appearing before this Commission and that it seemed to me that if the matter had not been resolved, then it would be not only legitimate, but necessary to register my concern about that kind of behavior before this body.

The fact that he has had an American experience and has many American friends and contacts and colleagues purely of a scientific and scholarly kind——

Mrs. FENWICK. What is his field?

Dr. KASSOF. He is a historian. We are very, very concerned that this occasion which, to be sure, is a rare one, I would say almost an exclusive one—not be repeated. Because someone has had an experience of a positive kind in working with American colleagues, he should not suffer upon his return home.

Mrs. FENWICK. When did he leave here?

Dr. KASSOF. He was here a couple of years ago and he has been under detention, as we understand it, since the end of March. We have been in communication with Ambassador Barnes in Romania who shares our concern, and I hope that by bringing this question to the attention of this Commission, it will underline the seriousness with which we, on our side, regard such matters.

Dr. GRAHAM. I might just add that—I will put it this way. The Soviet scientists whom we know to be in trouble politically are only very rarely people we can name as being a part of the exchange program. They are excluded from the beginning, so it is rather difficult for us to give you names of Soviet scientists who have gotten in trouble and yet this trouble can somehow be linked to their participation in the formal exchange program.

The political difficulties among scientists in the Soviet Union can usually be linked to the exchanges only in the broad Helsinki sense of desiring better communication in general—not usually individual times and individual events.

Mr. FRIENDLY. I was thinking more not of the people who are distinguished or renown dissidents, but the people you spoke of before who are active in a field or specialist in a field, invited to a symposium here or in Britain and then at the last minute, or before the last minute, denied permission to come. Are there many of those? Do we know who they are?

Dr. GRAHAM. Proving that the reason that a Jewish scientist did not come to a symposium was discrimination is an almost impossible task.

Mrs. FENWICK. We would not have to do that. We would just say that we hope that those who are invited would be able to come and we would like to have a list of those who were invited and not able to come without saying why.

Dr. GRAHAM. I think such lists have been drawn up and can be provided. I might just add that insisting too much on the invitational principle, as much as I would like to be able to do it, can backfire.

Let me portray the following scenario. Let us say that the Soviet Union invites the 15 most distinguished physicists in the United States to come to a symposium in Alma Ata. Now, not many of them are going to come. They have got other things to do. They will not come, and therefore, if we say, "Those we invite must come," we are setting up a no win game; I think it really does not accomplish the purpose we are after.

We have to look at the exchanges in a somewhat broader framework looking for patterns over long periods of time.

Mr. FASCELL. Gentlemen, thank you very much. I want to assure you of our concern also in the Georgescu case, Dr. Kassof. We have no knowledge, of course, until you brought it to us. You say you have no understanding of why he was detained at the time that he was detained and I guess those friends of his in the United States are concerned only because he had some contact with them here 2 years ago.

Dr. KASSOF. They are very concerned that the detention not signal, on the part of the Romanians, a crackdown on scholars who were doing perfectly legitimate work. That is their main concern.

Mr. FASCELL. Maybe he was more fortunate than the rest and simply got a traffic ticket.

Dr. KASSOF. We hope that that is all that it involves.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We appreciate it.

Our next witness is Dr. Robert Adelstein who is a cochairman of the Committee of Concerned Scientists and the head of the molecular cardiology section of the National Institutes of Health. Dr. Adelstein has been to the Soviet Union several times, where he had the opportunity to meet with his Soviet colleagues, most notably those who participate in the Moscow Scientific Seminar. He is also a representative on one aspect of the official Soviet-American medical science exchange.

Dr. Adelstein, we are delighted to have you here and I noticed that you have been here all morning busily making notes, probably for rebuttal. [Laughter.]

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT ADELSTEIN, COCHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

Mr. ADELSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually, I would like to say that I have a written statement that will be submitted, but my oral statement will emphasize the major points.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, your full prepared statement will be included in the record, and you may emphasize and summarize and add.

[The written statement of Dr. Robert Adelstein follows:]

TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, MAY 24, 1977, BY DR. ROBERT ADELSTEIN, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, INC.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Robert Adelstein and I am testifying today as Co-Chairman of the Committee of Concerned Scientists, an organization of four thousand American scientists dedicated to the protection and advancement of scientific and human rights for our colleagues.

This Commission has, quite properly, devoted most of its time to discussions of the general Principles contained in Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act and the provisions of Basket III. The Warsaw Pact countries have stated that no one section of the Final Act is more important than any other and have decried the concentration of the Western countries on these two sections. It is our purpose today to review Soviet implementation of the provisions contained in Basket II concerning scientific and technological cooperation.

In some sense Soviet implementation of these provisions is a litmus test of compliance with the free flow of people and ideas sections of the Final Act. If the Soviets reject the free flow of scientists and scientific information, an area in which benefits certainly accrue to them, it is highly unlikely that they would permit the free flow of people and ideas in areas from which they derive no direct benefits.

Discussion of science issues in the Final Act is based on the premise "that scientific and technological cooperation constitutes an important contribution to the strengthening of security and cooperation among" the participating States. The signatories recognized that scientific advancement brings with it "the effective solution of problems of common interest and the improvement of the conditions of human life."

Scientific progress is, however, dependent on the free international exchange of scientists and scientific information. Science is, after all, a cumulative effort. Every researcher builds on the foundations provided by the investigations of other scientists. Thus, if any scientist is prevented from conducting his research or sharing it with his colleagues, scientific progress as a whole suffers. Recognition of this fact appears to be the underlying premise for the interest of the Helsinki signatories in scientific exchange.

Unfortunately, the international scientific community is suffering the loss of the talents of several hundred Soviet scientists. Because these people have applied to rejoin members of their families abroad, they are dismissed from their academic and research posts and subjected to cruel harassments. An intensive effort is made by the Soviet authorities to ostracize and isolate these scientists. Without access to libraries, conferences and colleagues they cannot keep abreast of current development. Such circumstances inevitably lead to the scientific death of these refuseniks.

In order to combat their scientific isolation the refusenik-scientists set up the Moscow Seminar on Collective Phenomena in 1972 as a forum for the exchange of ideas. They have invited Western scientists to attend the seminar to present the results of their research and to bring the Soviet participants up to date with current Western research. In recent years similar seminars have been organized in other cities as well. These exciting fora for scholarly exchange have been under intermittent attack by the Soviet authorities. In Kiev the seminar has been forcibly disbanded. The members of the Vilnius seminar have been threatened

with prosecution for their participation. The Moscow seminar too is under constant pressure from the authorities. In my view the attacks on these scientific seminars do not square with the implementation of the Final Act.

The Final Act leaves the development of scientific exchanges to "the potential partners, i.e., competent organizations, institutions, enterprises, scientists and technologists. . ."

Scientific cooperation in the signatories view can be "at the governmental or non-governmental level." A number of specific "forms and methods of cooperation" are also outlined in the document. I propose to examine the implementation of science and technology provisions of the Act in the modalities of cooperation which are suggested.

The first form of cooperation envisaged is "exchange and circulation of books, periodicals and other scientific and technological publications and papers. . ." Examples of the failure of the USSR to implement this section of the Final Act are legion. For several years the American Institute of Physics has sent copies of their journals, which deal exclusively with the technical aspects of physics, to the Moscow Seminar on Collective Phenomena in care of Prof. Mark Azbel, its leader. These journals have been returned marked undeliverable. A number of refusenik scientists maintain subscriptions to other journals which are also not delivered. We have attempted, on several occasions, to mail a copy of a paper written by Professor Benjamin Fain that appeared in the *U.S. Journal of Chemical Physics* to the author. Professor Fain has yet to receive it.

The exchange of scientific papers is equally difficult. Papers sent by American scientists to refusenik colleagues through the mail are rarely, if ever, delivered. As refusenik scientists are prevented from publishing their articles in Soviet Journals, they frequently attempt to have them printed in American publications. Because mail to and from these scientists is usually interdicted, the process of exchange becomes extremely difficult. American scientists who have sought answers to questions on research done by refusenik scientists have met with failure because their letters have not been delivered.

Another component of this problem is the doctoring and censoring of Western scientific publications. According to emigre scientists it is common practice in the Soviet Union to remove from various journals, in particular *Nature*, a British publication, and *Science*, an American magazine, articles which the Soviet authorities find offensive. The names of refusenik scientists have even been deleted from Soviet reprints of articles in which these scientists have been cited.

The second major form of cooperation suggested by the Final Act is "exchanges and visits" among scientists. For refusenik scientists, these visits are impossible. Professor Benjamin Levich, a Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Science, has been invited to take up visiting professorships at seventeen American universities including such institutions as the California Institute of Technology, University of Maryland and Case Western University. Thus far the Soviet authorities have refused to permit him to take up any of these posts. The University of Pennsylvania has invited Professor Mark Azbel to take up a visiting professorship there, with the same results. Professor Aleksandr Lerner has similarly been prevented from taking up a visiting appointment at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The various exchange programs under government or Academy of Sciences sponsorship are completely closed to refusenik scientists. The Soviets have never permitted a refusenik scientist to take part in such an exchange. Each side has complete control over who participates from that country. The wishes of American scientists to have a Professor Azbel or a Professor Lerner participate in these programs are never taken into account by the Soviet authorities.

Another method of cooperation called for in the Final Act is the "holding of international and national conferences, symposia, seminars courses and other meetings of a scientific and technological character, which would include the participation of foreign scientists and technologists." Two categories of problems have been encountered in this context. The first type includes a number of situations in which Soviet scientists have been prevented from attending scientific meetings in the U.S.S.R. or abroad, because they have applied to emigrate or have been involved in civil rights activities. The second category covers Western scientists who have been denied permission to attend scientific meetings held in the U.S.S.R. chiefly because of their activity on behalf of colleagues in the U.S.S.R.

Before examining the failures of implementation in this area we should look briefly at what we regard as a positive development. From April 17–20 the Mos-

cow Seminar on Collective Phenomena held a special Fifth Anniversary Session with the participation of ten American scientists. The response of the Soviet authorities to this seminar differed significantly from their reaction to an attempt in 1974 to hold a similar international scientific seminar. At that time all the Western scientists who had intended to participate were denied visas and the Soviet organizers were arrested. We hope that the Soviet authorities have set a precedent for themselves in permitting this seminar to take place and will allow future conferences of this type to take place.

However, even though this anniversary session was allowed to occur the Soviets placed severe impediments in the way of a free scientific exchange at the three day seminar. Two of the American scientists who were to give papers at the session, Nobel Laureate George Wald of Harvard University and Dr. Robert Goldberger, Chief of the Laboratory of Biochemistry of the National Cancer Institute, were prevented from attending. Both men were granted visas to enter the U.S.S.R. and to visit Leningrad and then Moscow. Hotel space was also confirmed in advance of their departure. Shortly after their arrival in Leningrad they were told that they would not be permitted to go to Moscow because, according to an Intourist official, there "were no hotel rooms available." Eleven distinguished French scientists were denied visas to the U.S.S.R. Upon arriving in Moscow for the event, Professors Bertrand Halperin of Harvard University and James Langer of Carnegie-Mellon University were detained for five hours by Soviet police and told that if they attended the seminar they would be expelled from the country. Professor William Glaberson of Rutgers University was given a similar warning. Equally distressing was the fact that refusenik scientists from outside of Moscow were prevented from traveling to the capital to attend the sessions.

The almost invariable refusal of Soviet authorities to permit refusenik scientists to attend other scientific conferences in the U.S.S.R. and abroad similarly reflects a failure on the part of the U.S.S.R. to fully implement the Final Act. Less than a month after the signing of the Helsinki document Dr. Viktor Brailovsky, a refusenik computer specialist, was prevented from attending the Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Tbilisi, Georgia, U.S.S.R. On the positive side it should be noted that Professor Aleksandr Lerner, another eminent refusenik scientist, was permitted to deliver a paper to the conference, but only after strong representations from Western scientists and the threat of an on-site protest. Soviet authorities prevented Academician Benjamin Levich from participating in the 27th Annual meeting of the International Society of Electrochemistry, September 5–11, 1976 in Zurich. Prof. Levich, the Society's Vice President, would normally have been nominated as President-elect but declined because the authorities would not have permitted him to participate in the Society's activities.

Professor Naum Salansky of Vilnius was forbidden to attend an international conference on thin film physics on whose organizing committee he sat. Dr. Benor Gurfel was refused permission to take part in the European Meeting of the Econometric Society last summer which was held, paradoxically, in Helsinki.

We will be looking to a number of scientific meetings this summer for signs that the USSR has decided to fully implement the undertakings made in the Final Act. Dr. Brailovsky has been invited to chair a scientific session at a conference on Pattern Recognition and Image Processing to be held June 6–8 at the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York. Dr. Brailovsky has applied to the exit visas office for permission to attend this conference and has thus far received no answer. Academician Levich has been invited to deliver a paper at the 51st National Celluloid Symposium June 19–22 in New York. In this case too Prof. Levich has not yet been given permission to attend.

The second category of problems related to attendance at scientific meetings concerns the participation of Western scientists in meetings organized in the USSR. Some scientists who have played an active role in adding oppressed colleagues in the Soviet Union have been denied visas to enter the USSR to participate in international scientific meetings. Professor D. Brian Spalding of Imperial College, London, a leading compaigner on behalf of Prof. Levich, was prevented from attending an international conference on Heat and Mass Transfer held in Minsk. This situation is particularly ironic because Prof. Spalding had been one of the founders of the sponsoring organization for this conference and had been instrumental in obtaining Soviet and Eastern European support and participation in its research efforts. In November 1975 Professor Edward Stern of the University of Washington was denied a visa to attend a conference on

Amorphous and Liquid Semi-Conductors in Leningrad sponsored by the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics. It should be noted that the refusal on the part of the Soviets to grant Prof. Stern a visa reflects not only a failure to implement the Final Act but is also a direct violation of IUPAP rules.

The final area of implementation which we would like to examine is the "joint preparation and implementation of programs and projects of mutual interest . . ." In this area as well, political considerations intrude on scientific matters such that failures in implementing the Fnal Act occur. For example, Dr. Vladimir Raiz was involved in such a joint program on x-ray crystallography of proteins for several years. When he applied to emigrate from the USSR he was dismissed from his research post and therefore from the joint program. Professor Jacob Alpert was a member of an international committee on satellite beacons which conducted a joint program in this field under the sponsorship of the International Council of Scientific Unions. Following his application for permission to emigrate Prof. Alpert was prevented from carrying out his fuctions under the program. These dismissals have a deleterious effect on the conduct of ongoing joint programs.

We believe that the evidence we have presented today warrants a thoroughly frank and specific review of Soviet implementation of the provisions of the Final Act related to cooperation in science and technology. It is clear that there does not exist today a free flow of scientists and scientific information as envisioned in the Final Act. Were such a free flow to exist, mankind as a whole would be the beneficiary. We hope that the leadership of the USSR will, in the coming years, implement the Final Act in its entirety so that security and cooperation in Europe become a concrete reality rather than a lofty ideal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ADELSTEIN. Good. I would also like to say that my report will be a little less optimistic than some I have heard today, although I will not be asking for any money. [Laughter.]

I do, however, agree with a lot of the things that Doctor Graham said and although there may be some differences with some of my experiences, perhaps we can get to those in the question period.

I am testifying today as cochairman of the Committee of Concerned Scientists, an organization of 4,000 American scientists concerned with the protection and advancement of scientific and human rights for our colleagues.

I have visited the Soviet Union three times: in 1972 to participate in the International Meeting of the Biophysical Society; in 1975 as part of the American delegation of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. cardiovascular program; and in 1976 to take part in a special meeting of the Moscow Seminar on Collective Phenomena.

I attended this last meeting in order to gain firsthand knowledge of the difficult circumstances in which refusenik Soviet scientists find themselves. The refuseniks are Soviet scientists who have applied to be reunited with their families abroad, but have been refused visas. It is their plight which is the central theme of my testimony today and it is their treatment which I wish to analyze in relation to the Helsinki accords.

Specifically, I will describe the intolerable situation which the refusenik scientists find themselves in. I will show how treatment of these scientists clearly violates the Helsinki accords, particularly Basket II which pertains to cooperation in the fields of science and technology. And finally, I shall suggest how the Helsinki accords can be utilized to expand and encourage the exchanges.

Scientific progress is dependent upon the free international exchange of scientists and scientific information. Science is a cumulative effort—every researcher builds on the foundations provided by the investiga-

tions of other scientists. Thus, if any scientist is prevented from conducting his research or sharing it with his colleagues, scientific progress as a whole suffers.

Unfortunately, the international scientific community is suffering the loss of the talents of several hundred refusenik Soviet scientists. The following penalties have been imposed on these scientists for simply having applied to rejoin members of their families abroad:

They have been dismissed from their academic research positions; they have been excluded from their laboratories and libraries; they have been denied permission to publish scientific papers inside the U.S.S.R. and have been prevented from sending papers to the West for publication; they have been barred from attending scientific meetings, both inside and outside the U.S.S.R.

In 1972, in order to combat their scientific isolation the refusenik scientists set up the Moscow Seminar on Collective Phenomena as a forum for the exchange of ideas. There are, at present, five different scientific seminars in Moscow alone and similar seminars have been organized in other cities.

These forums for scholarly exchange have been under intermittent attack by the Soviet authorities. In Kiev, the seminar has been forcibly disbanded. The members of the Vilnius seminar have been threatened with prosecution for their participation. The Moscow seminar, too, is under constant pressure from the authorities.

I shall now document how treatment of these scientists violates the provisions of the Final Act. Under Basket II, the signatories "express their view that scientific and technological cooperation should in particular employ the following forms and methods . . ." and they go on to name the forms and methods.

This first form and method is "exchange and circulation of books, periodicals and other scientific and technological publications and papers. . . ." For several years, the American Institute of Physics has sent copies of their journals, which deal exclusively with the technical aspects of physics, to the Moscow Seminar on Collective Phenomena in care of Professor Mark Azbel, its leader. These journals have been returned marked "undeliverable."

The exchange of scientific papers and reprints is also difficult. We have mailed refusenik Professor Benjamin Fain reprints of his paper that appeared in the *Journal of Chemical Physics*. They have never been received. Papers sent to refuseniks by American scientists describing their own work are rarely, if ever, delivered.

Censorship is another component of this problem, interfering with the free exchange of information. The Soviet authorities have deleted the names of refusenik scientist Azbel and Levich from articles which cite their own work and moreover, have censored articles in the well-known Western publication *Nature*, which is published in Great Britain, and *Science*, published here, on delivery to the U.S.S.R.

A second form of cooperation envisioned under Basket II is "exchanges and visits as well as other direct contacts and communications among scientists and technologists. . . ." For refusenik scientists, these visits outside the U.S.S.R. are impossible. Prof. Benjamin Levich, a corresponding member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, has been invited to take up visiting professorships at 17 American universities.

Thus far, the Soviet authorities have refused to permit him to take any of these posts.

The University of Pennsylvania has invited Professor Azbel to be a visiting professor with the same results. Prof. Aleksandr Lerner has similarly been prevented from assuming a visiting appointment at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

A third method of cooperation called for in the Final Act is the "holding of international and national conferences, symposiums, seminars, courses, and other meetings of a scientific and technological character, which would include the participation of foreign scientists and technologists." Two categories of problems have been encountered in this context.

(A) The prevention of Soviet scientists from attending scientific meetings in the U.S.S.R. or abroad, because they have applied to emigrate; and (B) the denial of visas to Western scientists to attend scientific meetings held in the U.S.S.R.

Examples of the former, that is, preventing refuseniks from attending international scientific meetings, are many. Less than a month after signing the Helsinki document, Dr. Viktor Brailovsky, a computer specialist, was prevented from attending an international conference in Tbilisi, U.S.S.R. Prof. Aleksandr Lerner, another eminent refusenik scientist, was permitted to deliver a paper to the conference, but only after strong representations from Western scientists and the threat of an on-site protest. Soviet authorities prevented Academician Benjamin Levich from participating in a meeting of the International Society of Electrochemistry in Zurich in 1976—a meeting at which he would have been nominated as president-elect.

While examining the denial of visas to Western scientists, let us also look at what we regard as a positive development. From April 17 to 20 of this year, the Moscow seminar on collective phenomena had a special fifth anniversary session with the active participation of 10 American scientists. Response of the Soviet authorities to this seminar differed significantly from their reaction to an attempt in 1974 to hold a similar international scientific seminar. At that time, all the Western scientists who had intended to participate were denied visas and the Soviet organizers were arrested.

However, even though this anniversary session was allowed to occur, two of the American scientists who were to give papers at that session, Nobel Laureate George Wald, of Harvard University, and Dr. Robert Goldberger, of the National Cancer Institute, were prevented from attending. Moreover, on arriving in Moscow, Prof. Bertrand Halperin, of Harvard University, and James Langer, of Carnegie Mellon University, were detained for 5 hours by the Soviet authorities and told that if they attended the seminar, they would be expelled from the country. Prof. William Glaberson, of Rutgers University, was given a similar warning. However, they did not heed the warning. They attended the seminar and gave their papers.

Mrs. FENWICK. They were not expelled?

Mr. ADELSTEIN. And they were not expelled.

We will be looking to a number of scientific meetings this summer for signs that the U.S.S.R. has decided to fully implement the undertakings made in the final act. Dr. Brailovsky, a refusenik, has been invited to chair a scientific session at a conference to be held June 6

to 8 at the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, N.Y. Academician Levich has been invited to deliver a paper at the 51st National Celluloid Symposium to be held at Oxford University in honor of his 60th birthday in July. Both men have applied for, but have yet to receive visas.

I should like to close with four suggestions concerning how the Helsinki accords can be utilized to expand and encourage the exchanges.

One: The serious violations of the final act documented here in the cases of the refusenik scientists should be brought to the attention of the Soviet delegation at Belgrade. An immediate end to practices which are in violation of the accords should be sought.

Two: Since it appears that Soviet science is benefiting from the exchange programs that already exist, the possibility of increasing these programs and expanding the areas of exchange should be made dependent upon strict observance of the spirit of the final act by the Soviet authorities.

Three: Moreover, it should be made clear that all Soviet scientists, including the refuseniks, should be eligible to participate in the exchange programs.

Finally, American scientists who go to the Soviet Union to participate in scientific conferences and official U.S.S.R. exchange programs should be encouraged to visit and exchange scientific ideas with the refusenik scientists.

On the night prior to my departure from Moscow, after attending the Moscow seminar, Professor Azbel summarized the situation in which the refuseniks find themselves. "The West is serving as a witness to our scientific death. This is the whole point of Soviet policy, to doom us forever as scientists."

Professor Levich pointed out that the scientific isolation forced on the refuseniks is particularly devastating for the younger scientists whose careers and development require constant work and access to recent publications.

It is clear that there does not exist today a free flow of scientists and scientific information as envisioned in the final act. Were such a free flow to exist, mankind as a whole would be the beneficiary.

We hope that the leadership of the U.S.S.R. will in the near future implement the final act in its entirety so that scientific cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union become a concrete reality rather than just a lofty ideal.

Thank you very much.

Mr. FASCELL. Dr. Adelstein, thank you very much for bringing us the case histories. They are now part of the public record and the official record. So to that extent, you will have certainly accomplished your purpose and we on the Commission are delighted to have provided the forum by which that is possible.

I also want to thank you for the suggestions that you have made with respect to our activities at Belgrade. I am sure that all of them will be undertaken one way or another.

Mrs. Fenwick, do you have any questions?

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes; I can see that we might have difficulty if we try to do what we would like to do, which was to insist that these younger scientists be given more freedom. It is terrible what you tell

us—I can imagine what it must be to have a passion for science and to be cut off like that. But that is an internal matter which would be difficult for us to protest under the terms of the Helsinki accords; but where we have some leverage and the right to speak, as well as the duty, is in the matter of these exchanges.

I know that. Gurfel—Bernard Gurfel—was invited to go to a seminar in Helsinki. I made earnest representations to the Soviet Embassy and spoke to Dr. Gurfel on the telephone. The net result of all those efforts were that his telephone was cut off.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you mean in Moscow?

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes. I did not really feel that I had advanced his cause much, but at least they know that we know he is alive and was invited and was not allowed to go. Maybe that is something. It is terrible that that is about all we can say.

I think it would be most——

[Whereupon, Mr. Friendly made a remark to Mrs. Fenwick.]

Mr. ADELSTEIN. What was that?

Mr. FRIENDLY. He was allowed to emigrate and I think he has left.

Mrs. FENWICK. The Helsinki Conference was last fall. When was that?

Mr. ADELSTEIN. I referred to that in my written testimony.

Mrs. FENWICK. I think this is great. I did not know that.

Mr. ADELSTEIN. It was last summer.

Mrs. FENWICK. I knew it was some time ago.

We will have, of course, your testimony and the list of specific people. I saw Dr. Mark Azbel and Aleksandr Lerner when I was in Russia and it is awful to hear that it is still the same.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Adelstein, you heard earlier that the Soviets use the exchange program as a kind of reward system for the more orthodox thinking and also the suggestion that one way to answer that problem would be for scientists to undertake on their own when visiting there to meet with a broad spectrum or as broad a spectrum of scientists as they can. If one of those broad spectrum scientists happens to be a refusenik or a dissident, do our scientists have the freedom to contact him—or is the scientist under any pressure from exchange program administrators or from the Soviet Government? Or both?

Mr. ADELSTEIN. That is an excellent question and I have some knowledge in this area. It comes from a number of points.

The question really is, are American scientists in the U.S.S.R. on official programs, particularly on their own free time when there is no program going on, free to contact other Soviet scientists for the purpose of exchanging scientific information?

I have spoken to three or four American scientists who are under the distinct impression that while they are participating in exchange agreements they are not supposed to visit dissident scientists. They are under the impression that our own Government would disapprove of visits to dissident scientists, even on their free time.

I have my own experience. While I was a member of an official American delegation in the Soviet Union in 1975, I went to visit and exchange some scientific ideas with a number of refusenik scientists on my own free time. Approximately 1 year after I returned to this country, I received a letter congratulating me on my completion of tour as the NIH liaison on my particular program area and thanking me

for my participation. This came as somewhat of a surprise to me because I was not aware that my term was actually up. In fact, I thought my term was indefinite.

After calling the relevant people involved, I found that my term had been terminated because of my visits. It was felt that this was not the proper behavior for a person who is part of an official delegation.

Mr. FASCELL. Who wrote you the letter?

Mr. ADELSTEIN. The letter came from the head of the Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute.

I think there is a misunderstanding among some officials as to what constitutes proper behavior for Americans on official exchange visits. I should say that I have asked to be reinstated to the program.

Recently I had the opportuntiy to talk to Assistant Secretary of State, Ms. Patsy Mink. I discussed not only my own case, but the general question as to the State Department's position concerning American scientists who are participating in official U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchange programs. In particular I asked about visits to the dissident and refusenik scientists, during one's free time. Ms. Mink said that she thought such visits were entirely proper and, indeed, were in keeping with the Helsinki accords.

Finally, I would like to point out that some scientists have gone directly to the Soviet authorities and said that they wished to attend the Moscow seminar and present papers. They did this while they were part of a National Academy of Sciences exchange program. The Soviets were not too pleased about it, but they were permitted and, indeed, they did attend.

Mr. FASCELL. Doctor Adelstein, let me ask you this. As a Government scientist, are you not different from a nongovernment scientist? Are you not in a different boat?

Mr. ADELSTEIN. In what sense?

Mr. FASCELL. If your Government instructs you not to go see a dissident or not to stray outside of the boundaries of the conference to which you have been sent, do you not do so at your own peril?

Mr. ADELSTEIN. Well, I——

Mr. FASCELL. I am not arguing about the policy. Obviously, you did do it at your own peril because they terminated whatever you were terminated from. They did this after the fact. If they are going to instruct you, they ought to eyeball you and tell you ahead of time.

Mr. ADELSTEIN. What I am trying to stress is I think there is confusion as to what our Government's policy is.

Mrs. FENWICK. In other words, it may not be the policy—it may be an understanding among some of the scientists.

Mr. ADELSTEIN. I do not think it is the policy of this Government at all. I think there is a misunderstanding by some of the administrators and scientists that are participating in the programs as to what our Government policy really is.

Mr. FRIENDLY. You said you were trying to get reinstated. Have you gotten reinstated?

Mr. ADELSTEIN. I have not heard officially. Just before coming here I did call some of the responsible people from the program. I wanted to ascertain one very important thing—when the Soviets came here, had they reason to feel that I should not be a member of the program,

and I was—and this is what bothers me a little bit—that the Soviets are perfectly happy with me. I certainly had never made any complaints about this. So I do not really know the answer as to whether I will be reinstated.

Mr. FASCELL. I do not see why there would be concern on either point. I can see maybe if politicians were running around in the Soviet Union with a lighted torch, that that might create a problem, but I take it that your meetings, even though they might have been with scientists who are not part of the program—was a thoroughly appropriate and normal kind of meeting, for just an exchange of ideas and a meeting of people and had nothing to do with politics or tearing down a jail or revolution in Russia and so on.

Mr. ADELSTEIN. No; as I said, there were no protests made by the Soviet authorities.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Friendly has a question.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Do you know if we have a clean bill of health on our end as far as our treatment of visiting Soviets?

Mr. ADELSTEIN. As far as I know from my own program, we have a very clean bill of health. We certainly do not ask them what they do in their free time. In a recent visit of the Soviet scientists, we went out of our way to help them when they said they wanted to speak to somebody who was not on the program. We flew some of them to New York City so they could see some people who they wanted to see.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. Doctor Adelstein, thank you very much. We appreciate your help in making this record. We appreciate your very important contribution in making this record more specific.

The Commission stands adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow in room 6202 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

APPENDIX I

CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE, MAY 24, 1977

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN FASCELL: Attached is an open letter from 24 dissidents, including Sakharov, to the highest Soviet science officials describing certain rights of scientists which are being infringed.

This letter was received on Monday, September 27, 1976, by F.A.S. and translated by Dr. B. J. Stone. The media is authorized and encouraged to quote from it.

JEREMY J. STONE, *Director.*

OPEN LETTER

To the President of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Academician A. P. Alexandrov.

To the Chairman of the Government Committee for Scientific and Technical Affairs, Academician A. A. Kirillin.

Science has become one of the determining factors of contemporary life. It is impossible to separate science from the people who create science. For this reason, systematic infringements of fundamental civil and professional rights of scientists do damage far removed from the bounds of the narrow professional interests of the scientists themselves. In the past, in their most extreme and ugliest manifestations, infringements on the rights of scientists have repeatedly developed into a direct struggle with science. For a long period in the Soviet Union, the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics was regarded with suspicion; cybernetics was opposed; and genetics and contemporary biology were violently persecuted.

At the present time, the infringement of the rights of scientists continues, although not in such an extreme form. This circle of questions has a direct relationship to you, and through your authority you could in large measure contribute to the normalization of the situation. We consider it our duty to draw your attention to the most important infringements, in our opinion, of professional and civil rights of scientists.

Professional rights of scientists

(1) *The right to publication of one's work.*—Not one scientific work can be published without the approval of the so-called "expert committee" attesting to the absence of any so-called secret information in the work. These committees will consider only the results of researchers at the institutions in which they function. As a result, there is a wide category of individuals not in institutions with such committees, who are thus, for all practical purposes, deprived of any possibility to publish their scientific results. These extremely inconvenient and humiliating rules were introduced in that special period in the history of the Soviet Union in the early fifties. Unfortunately, in contrast with many other statutes of that period, these rules remain in force even now.

(2) *Scientific Meetings and Lectures.*—Scientists located outside the borders of selected institutions and not receiving special permissions are deprived of the opportunity to deliver scientific lectures and reports in public, or to lead public scientific discussions. Scientists not working in specialzed scientific establishments are denied the opportunity to participate in scienific conferences in as much as presentation of a lecture demands official registration, and related publications, although attendance itself at such conferences, as a rule, does receive official permission.

(3) *Migration of Scientists and Scientific Contacts.*—Participation in international scientific conferences and trips of scientists abroad are not regulated by published rules. A necessary precondition for departure is the endorsement of a

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specialized scientific institute. As a result, a significant fraction of scientists have no possibility to cultivate the personal contacts so necessary for the development of contemporary science. Scientists receiving invitations from foreign scientific institutions cannot accept them at their own discretion. Nor can they, by their own decision, contract to perform temporary work in foreign scientific establishments.

Civil rights of scientists

(1) *Concernng the Right of Scientists to Possess and Express their Convictions.*—Creative scientific work is incompatible with automatic adherence to official doctrine. Scientists must be permitted freedom of convictions and conscience as proclaimed in many declarations ratified by the Soviet Union. No purely secular government has the right to dismiss scientists from professional activity and teaching for their religious and ideological views and convictions. The modern world places on scientists a responsibility extending far beyond the defense of their professional and personal rights. Those scientists who, in response to conscience, engage in social activism on their own time, often find themselves, under the conditions in our country, in an especially difficult, and sometimes tragic situation. We call attention to the fate of scientists, who have suffered for their humanitarian and enlightened social activity. There are the biologist Sergei Kovalev; the psychiatrist Semyon Glusman; the astrophysicist Kronid Lyubarsky; the mathematician Alexander Bolonkin; the physicist Andrei Tverdokhlebov; the philosopher Vasily Lisovoy; the historian Gabriel Superfin; and others.

(2) *The Right of Choice of one's country of residence.*—The Universal Declaration of Rights of Man establishes the equal right "of every man freely to abandon any country, including his own . . ." However, any scientist announcing such a desire is severely discriminated against. Under the pretext of possession of secret information, he is refused for years the right of exit. Meanwhile: a) in order to attract scientists to work in classified matters, no effort is made to obtain the consent of scientists to such a restriction of thier civil rights; b) in general there do not exist established and publicly known limits to the period of restriction; c) unknown individuals, in the absence of interested parties, determine whether secret information is possessed. The decision is announced verbally without any kind of concrete substantiation. As a result, there is no real possibility to question or appeal groundless assertions with regard to possession of secrets. All of this fully precludes any control by competent interested scientific institutions and opens up broad possibilities for arbitrariness.

(3) *About Repressions in the Treatment of Scientists.*—All scientists dismissed by instructions of the authorities are ostracized, are deprived of the possibility to receive work in their specialty elsewhere, and are forced to seek unskilled labor. The latter is rendered most difficult by the fact that individuals with a higher education are not accepted for unskilled work. In addition, unskilled, badly paid work becomes compulsory under threats of persecution "for parasitism." Some actually are victims of such persecution and related threats on the part of the police. All of the above clearly contradicts the many international obligations of the Soviet Union. It is unprecedented in the history of science to deprive scientists of their scientific degrees and ranks for political assertions inseparable from their essence and thought.

The solution of the problems posed cannot be delayed, and we await your answer as soon as possible. SIGNED: A. Sakharov, V. Levich, N. Meyman, A. Lerner, D. Azbel, V. Brailovsky, E. Trifonov, S. Alter, Yu. Orlov, A. Korchak, N. Salansky, G. Rosenstein, I. Goldstein, Yu. Gaslev, V. Turchin, Ye. Finkelstein, I. Brailovskaya, Yu. Gelfond, G. Goldstein, V. Kislik, B. Gurfel, M. Shepelev, T. Khodorovich, Ye. Kosterina.

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICS,
Cambridge, Mass., May 27, 1977.

DEAR CHAIRMAN FASCELL: I am writing to report several specific violations of the Helsinki accord which I learned about during my visit to the USSR last July, as well as some general relevant problems. I was in the USSR at that time to attend the annual meeting in Tbilisi of the Commission on Particles and Fields of the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics, which was held there at the time of the Eighteenth International Conference on High Energy Physics,

which is sponsored by the Union. I am one of the U.S. representatives on that Commission.

After the Conference, I spent four days in Moscow meeting with dissidents and would be emigrés. I talked at length with many of the latter, all of whom were fired immediately on applying for an exit visa, and have been waiting for periods ranging from two to six years without success. For your information, I am enclosing a small informal factual report I wrote for circulation to interested organizations, after my return.

The Helsinki Agreement, I believe, does not include specifically the right to emigrate. However, let me cite three of the cases as in specific violation of the Accord.

1. Benor Gurfel—refused permission to attend an econometric meeting in Helsinki, in violation of section (d), article 1, basket III (Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons).

2. Alexander Lerner—refused permission to emigrate to Israel to join his daughter who is there, in violation of section (b) of the same article.

3. Irina McClellan—refused permission to emigrate to join her American husband, in violation of section (c) of the same article.

Finally, you should know that in general terms the problems of scientific collaboration with the USSR are acute, and the American scientific community is very concerned to improve this. It is common knowledge in the USSR (see for example H. Smith's excellent book, The Russians) that travel permission is given as a special reward. In particular, first rate Soviet scientists who have been invited to visit U.S. and European laboratories on several occasions, as well as to serve as rapporteurs at International Conferences, have had to refuse, even though they have expressed great interest in coming. The two examples I know best are L. Okun from Moscow and V. Gribov from Leningrad, altho there are many others.

I hope these comments are helpful to you, and that the Commission can find some mechanism for improving the situation with respect to the USSR. I have some optimism in this respect, since I consider the Soviet policy so self-destructive that I feel it must be possible to influence them to change it.

Yours sincerely,

FRANCIS E. LOW,
Karl Taylor Compton Professor of Physics.

SEPTEMBER 1976.

On Saturday afternoon (July 24) refuseniks and other sympathizers meet from 2:00 to 3:30 in front of the Moscow synagogue. Rimma Yakir and her son Sasha called for us at the hotel to take us there, a short walk. Peter and Lisa Schlein (UCLA) and Mike Chanowitz (LBL) came along. Some of the following summaries were taken by Mike, the rest by me.

Rimma introduced me to Viktor Brailovsky. He is obviously a leader, and suggested that I sit down across the street and he would send me people who could each give me information on his or her situation.

Viktor Brailovsky has permission to leave, but his wife *Irina* has not, and he will not go without her. She is an applied mathematician, has worked in fluid dynamics at Moscow State University. Dismissed September, 1972. Reason for denial: cannot prove lack of contact with secret work. The requests letters to the Rector of Moscow State University, Academician Rem Khokhlov.

Azbel was not in Moscow, and his seminar was cancelled for the summer. I had brought along a large number of reprints in particle, nuclear and solid state theory, intending to leave them at the Azbel seminar. I left them instead with Yuri Mnyukh, a solid state refusenik physicist and asked him to distribute them. Brailovsky reported that Azbel had sent a letter to the Physics Secretary of the Academy, Prokhoroff (Nobel Laureate), asking for an explanation of refusal of viza, and help. Prokhoroff, in a telephone conversation, said he would try to find out. Azbel asks telegrams from prominent scientists to Prokhoroff, asking him to decide the case. Every Refusenik and dissident to whom I talked believed that pressure from abroad on individual administrators and top level scientists could help, that these people had considerable latitude and would in many cases be able to resist KGB pressure without serious risk.

Benor Gurfel (44). Tallin Sipruse Street, 211, Kv 28. Kv = Kvartira (apartment). Tel: 590507. Field is nonferrous metallurgy—zinc, copper, lead. Wife Dorothy is Md, roentgenologist. Son, Eliezer, just finished middle school.

Applied for permission in 1973, refused same year. Reason was given as secret work in 1971, on production statistics of metals. [Gurfel told me that his refusal, and the reason, were given to him in writing. I had previously been told by A. Lerner that this was never done, that the reason was always given orally, so I questioned Gurfel closely on this point, and he insisted that it was a formal, written statement. When I saw Lerner again, he stuck to his previous statement, and assured me that there must have been a misunderstanding.] He says a) he has forgotten the numbers by now, and b) furthermore they are way out of date. He was told in 1973 that he would get permission in 1976. However, this year he was told he would have to wait another three years.

He has just been invited to attend a European meeting (Aug. 23–27, Helsinki) of the World Econometric Society. Invitation was received from the president, Zvi Griliches, of Harvard. Applied for ten day visa, Aug. 20–30, to attend Conference. Application turned down. Plans hunger strike in protest, Aug. 20–30.

Josef Andryuchin (52). Moscow. Lobacheskovo Street, 78, Kv 104. Tel: 1316632. Education: Dr. of Technical Science 64, mechanical engineer. Dozent (just under professor). Worked in All Union Polytechnic Institute, a correspondence school, prepared material at University level. Applied, May 1975; refused Jan. 1976. Fired immediately on application. Reason for refusal: Mother did not give permission. He no longer sees mother. Wife and son wish to stay in USSR. They will divorce.

Yuri Kalenov (32). Moscow. Krasnoyarskaya 10, korpus 7, Kv 51. Candidate degree, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology '67. Post Graduate Course, '70. Theoretical Chemical Physics; molecular binding and reactions. Worked in Institute of Chemical Physics of the Academy until Feb. '72, then as lecturer in physics department of Institute of Economics and Statistics. He applied in July '74, was refused, and told that the reason was that the Institute of Chemical Physics was opposed to his leaving for security reasons, although he has a letter from the vice-director, Academician Kondratyev, who was teacher and with whom he worked, saying that he had no access to secret material from '67 to '72. After '72 he was a teacher—"Newton's second law is not secret."

Mikhail Shepelev (41). Moscow. Pervomajskaya 117–19/2/47. Chemist. Was head of laboratory in Scientific Research Institute of Rubber and Latex Goods, Moscow. 140 publications. Applied '73. Reason given for refusal was secret work—KGB says that the Institute said so, but Shepelev told me that the Institute head, Chornaya, had personally told him that she knew he had not done secret work. She will be in San Francisco in Aug. or Sept. at International Rubber Conference. Just married: Olga Karnilova, chemist, worked together; she has not yet applied.

Felix Lerner (28). Moscow. Leningradsky Chaussée, 7/2 (2nd number is cross-street address), korpus 1, Kv 95. Electron Microscopy of Proteins. Graduated from Steel and Alloys Institute. Dissertation finished, but no defense, which is needed in candidate degree. Worked in Institute of Crystallography of the Academy. Applied Oct. 1975. Dismissed immediately. Refused March, 1976. Reason: no association of families, although wife's uncle is in Israel and parents have given permission.

Bronislav and Irene Lainer (only Irene present), Moscow, Profsoyusnaya 87/4//26.

Irene (38). Two young children. Education: Institute of Non-ferrous Metals (now called Institute of Steel and Alloys). Degree: diploma of metallurgy (1960). Institute of Treatment of Non-ferrous Metals: doctorate (65). Specialty: physics of metals, experimental solid state physics, oxidation of metals and alloys, particularly for possible application to thermocouples. Worked until 1973 in same institute as senior researcher, and then decided to apply for permission to emigrate. She was strongly advised to leave employment and take very low level job because she was not a loyal citizen and could not get a good recommendation necessary for continuation. She refused low level job, but resigned to look for comparable position—with no success. Applied Oct. 1973, refused Feb. 1974. Reason: security. She denies access to secrets.

Bronislav (38). Graduated together—specialized in semi-conductors and crystal growth of same. Worked in Institute of Rare Metals, and forced to leave after application. The two institutes (his and hers) are closely connected, across the street from each other. He was given a very hard time; they started to fire him even before he applied. Reason was perhaps the previous large concentration of Jews in his institute. One visa application (by Libov) in 1971 provoked large scale firing, and continued sensitivity. Reason for refusal again security, although Bronislav had no access to secrets.

Evgenyi Yakir (44). Moscow. Prosfoyusnaya 100/5//35. Father executed 1938, mother prison and exile for 20 years. Brought up by mother's mother in Karhov—narrowly escaped deportation, unlike older cousin Pyotr. Graduated Karhov Polytechnic Institute '55—vibrations, elasticity, automatic control of machines. Parents not yet rehabilitated, so secret work (hence many jobs) was excluded. Worked as designer of machine tools, and then as researcher in same plant. In two more years, became chief of hydraulics lab, where he could finally apply his education. Between 1958 and 1964 he was part time teacher of applied mechanics in some institute. In 1964 invited to Moscow in Central Research Institute of Machine Tools (ENIMS)—was aspirant, became candidate in 1969, and on same day appointed major scientific researcher in ENIMS. 12 publications, about 12 patents. Oct. 1973 applied. Not dismissed, but resigned at request of Jewish colleagues one day before application. Particular sensitivity because this field (mechanical engineering? civil?) is over populated with Jews, since one of the few fields which was completely open to them. He would have prefered physics, as would his son Sasha (20), now studying engineering. Refused as Rimma's husband following family application. Sasha is now re-applying alone. Message to Frisch: help enormously important for moral support, dignity and survival. Yakirs live by translating technical German-Russian; however, if discovered who he was, he would be fired.

Rimma Yakir. Same specialty: gears, technical calculations, stress and elasticity. No aspriant degree, but passed exams for candidat; no thesis. Courses in applied math and computers. Work was at Mechanical Engineering Research Institute, Moscow. Several open publications. Fired in 1973. Reason for refusal: secret work (which she denies).

Irina McClellan. Married to Professor of Russian Studies, U. of Virginia, 1974, who has been coming to U.S.S.R. for ten years. Denied permission to leave, and husband no longer allowed in. Held press conference with Western press, is now dissident. Request—is there a CCS for historians?

Alexander Lerner. Already very well known—no need for C.V. etc. Invitation from Wiesner to visit MIT. Suggested option 1: MIT will not receive Soviet scientists (like Columbia) until Visa. Option 2: MIT will not receive Academician Trapesnikoff or members of his Institute for Control Problems. Option 3: Statement of concern by Wiesner and some members.

Son: *Vladimir*, 5 years refused, lives by tutoring in English. Now applying with wife's family. *Iva and Yuli Kosharovsky* (address not obtained)

Yuli: Electrical Engineer. Graduate Polytechnic Institute, Sverdlovsk. 1964, 1965–1968; automation research institute, with 2nd from security clearance; 1968–1971; medical research center senior engineer in telemetrical research lab and postgrad study on application of electronics in science and industry. Post 1971—intermittent manual labor. March 1971 applied, arersted for houliganism, 15-day sentence. In prison, sentence extended to 27 days for agitating and inciting against Soviet authority. After releave, dismissed from job as unreliable and from post-graduate study. Reason for denial: security clearance, now eight years out of date.

Iva Kosharovsky: mathematician (statistics) in Kolmogorov group at Moscow State U. for 15 years. Forced from job after marriage and visa application in 1975. No reason for denial.

Simion Priven, Moscow, Kastanaevskaya 6. Kv. 103. Applied in and jobless since 1971. Radio engineer (color TV) since 1951. Has relatives in Israel—Professor Michael Zant, in Jerusalem. Reason for denial: secrets from period in research Institute.

Yuri Mnyukh, Moscow. Ulitsa Novatorov 38–1. Kv. 6. Candidat 59, but unable to defend doctoral dissertation, as was fired in 1973 for "insufficient enthusiasm." Field is solid state physics, polymorphic transitions in crystals. Formerly with Institute of Biophysics. Main concern: to get published; has had difficulty with referees.

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON,
DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICS,
Eugene, Oreg., June 2, 1977.

DEAR CHAIRMAN FASCELL: This letter is intended as testimony on the implementation of the Helsinki Agreement dealing with cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology, and the environment. The specific area is the obligation of countries to assist in the travel and participation of foreign and of their own scientists in international meetings. I will describe two experiences relevant to this subject.

As program chairman of the International Conference on Electron Lifetimes in Metals, held in July 1974, I and an international program committee (members from the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, and Germany) selected a program of speakers which included five Russian papers. A copy of the program is attached, with the Russian contributions marked with an X. It is significant that although all other authors were able to travel to the meeting, coming from as far away as Europe and Japan, not one of the five Russian papers was presented. In fact, among 100 scientists from eight countries, not one Russian was in attendance at the conference, in spite of the fact that in several cases the organizers of the conference were willing to supply the funds for travel from the Soviet Union. In my file of letters from authors submitting papers, a typical comment from a Russian is that "I would like very much to attend, but I'm afraid I will be unable to". The difficulty was not in securing the funds, but in securing the permission to travel.

A second example in quite the opposite character occurred at the 14th International Conference on Low Temperature Physics held in Helsinki Finland in August 1975. Of the more than 800 participants from more than 30 countries, 39 scientists from the U.S.S.R. attended, or approximately 5 percent. This was the largest number or percentage of Russians I have ever seen at an international conference. The opportunity to exchange information and ideas with colleagues whose work one has only dealt with in print before was extremely valuable, and the Russians contributed substantially to the flow of information.

Comparing these two examples, the first one, with no Russians able to attend, is typical of international conferences. This one occurred prior to the signing of the Helsinki Agreement. The second conference, although it occurred in Helsinki, occurred right after the Helsinki Agreement was signed, and there is no reason to think that the agreement directly resulted in the large attendance of Russians. Rather, in this case the status of Finland as a neutral country contributed greatly to the free exchange of Soviet scientists. It is however typical of the best one could expect were the Helsinki Agreement to be implemented fully. The numbers quoted for the second conference may serve as a standard against which the actual performance of the Soviet Union in living up to the Helsinki Agreement may be measured.

Sincerely yours,

R. J. HIGGINS,
Professor of Physics.

Geographical distribution of participants

Australia	4	Kenya	1
Austria	1	Norway	7
Belgium	3	Pakistan	1
Brazil	2	Poland	3
Canada	30	Saudi Arabia	1
Czechoslovakia	5	South Africa	2
DDR	2	Sweden	20
Denmark	19	Switzerland	22
Finland	71	Syria	1
France	80	The Netherlands	57
Ghana	1	Turkey	1
Hungary	3	UK	82
India	3	USA	175
Iraq	1	USSR	39
Israel	7	Venezuela	2
Italy	23	West Germany	107
Japan	33	Yugoslavia	3

DEAR CHAIRMAN FASCELL: The U.S.S.R. is well known in the scientific community for repeated and flagrant violations of the Helsinki Accords. Moreover the Soviet authorities harass citizens who assert their rights under the Accords and persecute those who attempt to monitor compliance. These attacks have recently become so serious that U.S. scientists fear for the safety of several innocent colleagues. The most famous case of persecution is Anatoly Sharansky who, because of his membership in the "Soviet Helsinki Monitoring Committee", is now in jail charged with treason. His association with other scientists (Azbel, Brailovsky and Fain) in a purely scientific seminar run by refuseniks in Moscow has recently

led to yet more threats against them and their prolonged harassment by interrogation.

The purpose of this letter is to give a few examples known personally to me, falling under the headings of "Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields" and "Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment". Much of the information was confirmed during a recent visit to the Soviet Union in order to attend the fifth anniversary meeting of the Moscow Seminar on Collective Phenomena (a weekly gathering of refusenik scientists for the purpose of keeping themselves alive professionally) and to obtain information about a similar Seminar on Applied Mathematics held weekly in Leningrad. The items below were told to be personally by the individuals concerned.

HUMAN CONTACTS: (B) REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES

Benjamin Levich has been waiting at least five years for an exist visa to go to Israel. The reason for refusal is his alleged involvement in secret work, an allegation which has been declared false by the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. Now the excuse is a doctoral thesis rejected many years ago by Levich: since the student did not publish, the work is "secret".

Arkady Tsinober has been waiting two years and was just told officially that it would be another three (an unreliable statement made in an attempt to break a refusenik's spirit). Again the excuse is "secret" work, and again that is nonsense.

Joseph Begun was in Lefortovo jail during my visit to Moscow so that information had to be given to me by his wife. He had been in jail some six weeks and is still there some six weeks later. His trial on a charge of parasitism was to have taken place on May 6, but was postponed till May 27 because of his physical weakness from a hunger strike in protest of the charge. There has been no pretense of "secret" work, in fact no reason for refusal to grant a visa during the past six years.

Begun's case in viewed very seriously because it represents a new level of harassment of refusenik scientists. Having nothing else to charge him with, the authorities have used parasitism for the first time against a respected scientist. (Such a charge has been threatened before, but never used.) The fact is that, having been dismissed from his academic post when he filed for permission to emigrate (a common occurence), he was then dismissed from jobs of laborer and watchman on a variety of pretexts (one of which was "truancy" when he was jailed with other refuseniks for no apparent reason). For the past four years he has worked as a private tutor in mathematics, but has been refused registration as such.

HUMAN CONTACTS: (D) TRAVEL FOR PERSONAL OR PROFESSIONAL REASONS

My example also falls under "4. Science and Technology. Forms and methods of co-operation" and under "4. Co-operation and Exchanges in the Field of Education. (b) Access and Exchanges and (c) Science." It is one of the most famous in a long list of similar cases.

Benjamin Levich (mentioned above) has had invitations to international scientific meetings for many years, but he has not been allowed to go to them. He has also had many other invitations, as befits a scientist of his stature. This July an International Conference on Physical Chemistry and Hydrodynamics is being held in Cambridge (England) as celebration of his 60th birthday, in recognition of his distinguished contributions to the field. The organizers are top-rank scientists including Nobel Laureates. So far Levich has been unable to get permission to attend, even though the conference is in his honor.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVING CO-OPERATION AND FORMS AND METHODS OF CO-OPERATION

Finally, let me mention something which does not appear explicitly in the Accords, possibly because nobody thought that a civilized country would allow such a basic scientific right to be violated. Nevertheless, it is implied in the two subsections referenced. As soon as they became refuseniks, several members of the Leningrad Seminar had had their names removed (and other names substituted) from scientific papers of which they were authors. Moreover, as refuseniks they are unable to publish in any Soviet journal and it is dangerous for them to publish elsewhere.

Should you wish more details, please let me know.

Yours sincerely,

G. S. S. LUDFORD,
Professor of Applied Mathematics, Cornell University.

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON,
DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICS,
Seattle, Wash., June 1, 1977.

DEAR CHAIRMAN FASCELL: Enclosed please find testimonies which we are submitting for the hearings of the Helsinki Commission in preparation for the meeting in Belgrade on June 15.

Sincerely yours,

E. A. STERN,
Professor of Physics.

TESTIMONY TO THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

The advancement of science depends critically on the free circulation of scientific information and scientists for scholarly purposes. This principle has been reaffirmed by the final act of the Helsinki Agreement in Section 4 on Cooperation in Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology and the Environment. In addition scientists should also have right of human contacts afforded to all other members of society, including the right to reunification of families, and travel for personal or professional reasons as affirmed in the final act of the Helsinki Agreement in the Section of "Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields." The following are testimony from several members of the faculty of the University of Washington.

PRESENTATION OF PROFESSOR EDWARD S. STERN

The Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. denied me a visa in November 1975 to attend the International Conference on Amorphous and Liquid Semiconductors in Leningrad even though my scientific presentation had been accepted on the Conference Program, my registration approved by the Organizing Committee, Intourist had approved all of my documents, and my Travel Agent had assured me that the Embassy approval was perfunctory. This denial of my visa was also in direct violation of the assurances given by Soviet Officials when they requested permission to sponsor this International Conference.

Although the Soviet authorities gave no explanation for the denial of my visa, I presume it was because of my active participation in the struggle to permit the emigration of some of the Soviet refusnik scientists.

My ability to communicate with Prof. Mark Azbel and Drs. Victor and Irina Brailovsky of Moscow has greatly deteriorated since the signing of the Helsinki Agreement. The Soviet authorities have disconnected telephones used by the Brailovskys and Azbel and do not deliver any mail that I send to them.

I have sent many letters by registered mail, return receipt requested, to the Soviet Union to correspond with scientists and almost all of these letters have not been delivered. I have followed through on some of these undelivered letters by having the post office put a tracer on them and then finally collecting the penalty from non delivery.

Prof. Azbel and Drs. Victor and Irina Brailovsky among several hundred scientists, have been denied the right to emigrate to Israel, lost their scientific positions in the Soviet Union, and have been continually harassed by the KGB. The purported reason for their denials is their past access to classified information. This reason is false since their scientific research has been published in the open scientific literature and they have always been employed in Institutes open to foreign visitors.

PRESENTATION OF PROFESSOR ALISTAIR HOLDEN

Experiences at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 3–8 September, 1975, in Tbilisi, Georgia, U.S.S.R. Just before the IJCAI in Tbilisi, there was quite a bit of correspondence in the Newsletter of the Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence (SIGART) of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) regarding the issues:

(1) Would Alexander Learner, well known Soviet scientist who had applied for an exit visa to Israel, be allowed to speak on a panel of invited scientists at the conference?; and

(2) Would the brothers, Dr. Gregory Goldstein and Dr. Isai Goldstein who resided in Tbilisi, and who had registered for the conference, be allowed to attend? The Goldstein brothers had also applied for an exit visa to Israel.

I was not involved in the controversy prior to the conference, but as a member of the executive committee of the conference, I was involved in the negotiations which led to success, in the sense that Alexander Lerner was allowed to present his views as a member of the invited panel, and the Goldstein brothers were allowed to attend the conference.

A copy of the letters on this issue, which appeared from August 1974, before the conference, until December 1975, after the conference, in the SIGART Newsletter, are attached. These letters speak for themselves and give the background to the controversy.

At the beginning of the conference, it appeared that neither Lerner nor the Goldstein brothers would be allowed to attend. After lengthy negotiations with the local Soviet organizing committee, the committee finally agreed to allow Lerner to speak at the panel discussion, but they made it clear that he was there, not as a member of the Soviet delegation, but as an individual speaker invited by the conference committee. It took longer to get them to agree to allow the Goldstein brothers to attend the conference, but when it became clear that the conference would not go on as scheduled, they finally agreed to let them attend.

I was a member of the policy making committee at the Stanford IJCAI conference on 20–23 August 1973, at which it was decided to convene the 1975 conference in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet delegation there, who apparently had full power to commit the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences in funding and arranging the local aspects of the conference, agreed that anyone, regardless of national origin, whose paper was accepted by the IJCAI Programs Committee, would be allowed to present their papers. Specifically, they gave assurances that there would be no difficulty in obtaining visas by any scientist whose paper was accepted. The above incidents occurred in spite of this assurance, and it is fortunate that they were finally resolved.

Only a small fraction of the total flagrant violations of human rights and scientific principles by the Soviet Authorities is outlined above. These violations endanger the freedom of all scientists because they undermine the basic principles that have permitted the flourishing of science in the past. There is great concern in the American scientific community concerning this situation and I hope that the Helsinki Commission can forcefully and effectively express this concern.

E. A. STERN,
Professor of Physics,
J. G. DASH,
Professor of Physics,
A. HOLDEN,
Professor of Electrical Engineering.

IJCAI4

As mentioned in the Editor's Entry of the June Newsletter (page 2), there has been a considerable expression of concern about the announced plans for the Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.[1] We are publishing here the letters we have received on this matter, and can report to you the current status of the situation as we know it.

The letter included below from Eric Sandewall, conference chairman, indicates that as of June 26th, the plans to hold the conference in the Soviet Union were continuing unchanged. Eric has indicated to us in a later correspondence, however, that the dates for the conference have been changed from August 25–29, 1975, to September 3–8, 1975. His letter states that the change was decided on by the Soviet INTOURIST conference service, and was apparently caused by internal Soviet considerations. This change in dates has the pleasant side effect of removing the conflict between IJCAI4 and the USA–Japan computer conference, which seemed to be the primary cause for dissatisfaction regarding the conference dates. Eric also mentions that he is trying to convince the Russians to advance the deadline for submission of papers from October 1, 1974, to January or February, 1975. This change also would be welcomed by most potential conference participants. (Ed.)

[1] The conference announcement was published in SIGART Newsletter, No. 46, June 1974, page 14.

WHY LENINGRAD?—a Letter to the Editor

From: Professor Jack Minker
Vice-Chairman for Computer Sciences
Committee of Concerned Scientists, Inc.
505 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022

sent to SIGART May 29, 1974

The October 1973 issue of the SIGART newsletter informed the membership that the Fourth International Joint Conference On Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI4) will be held in Leningrad, USSR [2] in 1975. I question this choice, and request that the organizing committee change the conference site from the Soviet Union.

There are several reasons why the Soviet Union is a poor choice for the conference. First, past IJCAI meetings have had very few attendees from the Soviet Union. Second, with decreased travel budgets, a large majority of those who have attended past conferences will not be able to attend this conference. Third, there have been few publications in AI from the Soviet Union. Fourth, and most important, is the deprivation of freedom and the persecution of scientists within the Soviet Union.

The problems evidenced by Soviet scientists is best illustrated by the plight of the noted Soviet physicist, Andrei Sakharov. Because of veiled threats made to Sakharov by members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Dr. Philip Handler, President of the U.S. National Academy of Science was impelled to write to the head of the Soviet Academy of Sciences expressing the deep concern of U.S. scientists for Sakharov's welfare. Dr. Anthony Ralston, President of the ACM, in the February 1974 issue of the Communications of the ACM, eloquently wrote,

"It would be wrong, . . . , to view the Sakharov matter merely as one of scientific freedom. . . The issue is instead the larger one of the right of any scientist, any professional to live a public existence outside of his professional life, particularly when his professional completence may enable him to shed light on social and political matters."

Although Sakharov's problems are the best known, he is not the only Soviet scientist having problems. Professor Earl Callen of American University, in an article entitled, "Notes on a Scientific Conference" published in the May 1974 issue of the Atlantic Monthly describes the barring of soviet scientists Azbel, Brailovsky, Lunts and Voronel from delivering papers at, or attending the International Conference on Magnetism in Moscow, in August 1973. Their treatment was in violation of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) to which the Soviet Union is a signatory.

Professor Callen further states that the harassment was not restricted to Soviet scientists. He notes that although applicants everywhere received their visas months in advance, those from Israel were issued by the Soviet government only two days before the conference, and in one instance two hours before flight time.

Scientists whose work is in computer science, or closely related areas have also been persecuted because of their political views. In particular, the noted Soviet cyberneticists A. Lerner and O. Gelman have been fired from their jobs because of their desire to emigrate from the Soviet Union. They have been denied the right to emigrate, which right is granted to all individuals under the United Nations charter.

There is no assurance that scientists attending IJCAI will be subjected to the same problems as those who attended the conference on magnetism. In view of this, I ask, 'Why Leningrad for IJCAI4?' Our presence in the Soviet Union will serve only to condone the above practices, and thereby worsen the plight of Soviet scientists. How will the field of artificial intelligence be furthered if the freedom of fellow scientists is sacrificed, and our colleagues from countries with whom the Soviet Union is unfriendly are insulted and inconvenienced?

I ask that the members of SIGART join with me in requesting that IJCAI4 not be held in the Soviet Union.

JACK MINKER.

Supporters of The Minker Letter

Jack Minker sent copies of his "Why Leningrad?" letter to various individuals in the AI community with a cover letter requesting those who supported his position to sign a statement to that effect and send it to the SIGART Newsletter editor. We have received such statements of support for Minker's request that

[2] Ed's note: This letter was written before the announcement was made that the site had been moved to Tbilisi.

IJCAI4 be moved from the Soviet Union from the following people: Louis Hodes, National Institutes of Health; J. D. Sable, Auerbach Associates, Inc.; Benjamin Mittman, Computer Center Director, Northwestern University; Stuart C. Shapiro, Indiana University; Judea Pearl, Associate Professor, University of California at Los Angeles; Yoram Yakomovsky, Senior Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory; Zohar Manna, The Weizmann Institute of Science; Walter Jacob, The American University; Jonathan D. Wexler, Assistant Professor, State University of New York at Buffalo; Ira Pohl, Associate Professor, University of California at Santa Cruz; Saul Amarel, Professor and Department Chairman, Rutgers University; Jack Sklansky, University of California at Irvine; Martin D. Levine, McGill University; J. B. Rosen, Professor and Department Chairman, Marvin Stein, Professor, University of Minnesota; Ray Reiter, Richard S. Rosenberg, University of British Columbia; Peter E. Hart, Acting Director, AI Center, Nils J. Nilsson, Staff Scientist, Stanford Research Institute; Michael A. Arbid, Daniel H. Fishman, William Kilman, Edward M. Riseman, University of Massachusetts; Eileen Cailton, Larry Davis, Kenneth C. Hayes Jr., James R. McSkimin, David Lee Milgram, Gerald A. Milson, Royer N. Nayel, Azriel Rosenfeld, Professor, Jordan J. Vanderburg, Joan Weszla, University of Maryland.

JUNE 4, 1974.

Letter to the Editor
From: Professor Robert W. Floyd, Chairman, Computer Science Department, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.

DEAR RICH: I think I agree with Minker's position on holding the next IJCAI in the Soviet Union. I believe that we should try to maintain contact with Russian scientists, but this is probably only effective on a one to one basis. The heavy abuse of both science and scientists in recent years, as exemplified by the Medvedev affair, should not be ignored. Unless you can think of compelling reasons for meeting in Leningrad, I think we should not at this time. I myself boycotted meetings in Chicago for five years after 1968; I hardly like the authorities' views on intellectual freedom in Russia any better. I have in fact avoided scientific meetings in Russia on similar occasions before. As Minker observes, there are also practical reasons for a change of venue.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT W. FLOYD.

JUNE 9, 1974.

An Open Letter To Professor Jack Minker
From: Bert Raphael, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, Calif.

DEAR JACK: As a member of the IJCAI committee who voted in favor of holding the next conference in the Soviet Union, I was quite disturbed to read your recent letter. Although I appreciate and agree with some of your concerns, I hope I can dissuade you from further attempts to change the already advanced plans for holding the fourth IJCAI in Tbilisi, Russia, in August of 1975.

First, in reply to your question as to why the Soviet Union was chosen: In spite of the fact that IJCAI is nominally sponsored by more than 20 organizations in more than a dozen countries, the Soviet Union representatives came to IJCAI3 with the only firm invitation for the next conference. They promised to supply suitable conference facilities; arrange reasonable-cost housing for visitors; and provide translation services to minimize language barriers. The issues of possible problems for Western scientists were discussed, and a few members expressed serious doubts, but eventually the organizing committee voted overwhelmingly to accept the Soviet invitation.

Your request that the conference site be changed from the Soviet Union seems to be based upon three issues:

(1) Russian participation in the previous IJCAI's and in western AI publications has been small.

(2) The government of the Soviet Union persecutes various Soviet citizens, including certain scientists, in violation of basic human rights and of international agreements.

(3) This persecution sometimes extends to foreign visitors, who may be insulted or inconvenienced in various ways.

We have several indications, including the IJCAI invitation itself, that the Russians are highly interested in AI, and are presently increasing their own level of AI research activity. We do not see many papers from them at least partly because they, like the Japanese, face a big language barrier. They do not

attend IJCAI's or other western conferences in larger numbers because their travel budgets and other travel restrictions are much more constraining then our own. These seem to me to be strong arguments for holding IJCAI4 in the Soviet Union. The Russian local arrangements committee expects about 200 young Soviet scientists to participate—most of whom would certainly not be able to travel to the conference in an alternative site such as, say, Japan. The conference in Russia will thus give us a unique opportunity to really find out about the achievements and attitudes of Soviet "cyberneticists." I don't think the travel burden upon us to go to Russia is significantly worse than to go to almost any other nonAmerican location; and, after all, every second IJCAI is held in North America. It is unfortunate that the Russian committee could not obtain suitable accommodations in Leningrad or Moscow, as originally proposed, and instead settled upon the more remote Tbilisi. Hopefully, inexpensive charter plane service will be arranged.

Your second issue is more serious: What can we do, as scientists and as human beings, to oppose the loss of individual freedom in the Sakharov case and in thousands of perhaps hundreds of thousands of similar less celebrated cases throughout the world? Although I certainly share your concern about these problems, I disagree with your proposed course of action. How much effect would a decision by a few hundred computer scientists to move an international conference, have upon the Supreme Soviet? Moreover, consider the unlikely possibility that we convince all western scientists to boycott all meetings in the Soviet Union; what will we accomplish? Such a move might have some propaganda value, but it could very well backfire. There would almost certainly be retaliatory restrictions imposed upon attendance by Soviet Scientists at western meetings. We would have succeeded in increasing international tension, and closing an extremely worthwhile avenue to personal contact with individuals in Russia. Moving IJCAI4 at this time would certainly embarrass our Russian scientific colleagues, but would not be an appropirate or effective means of influencing high level Soviet policy. How would you feel, for example, if some IFIP committee refused to hold meetings in the U.S.A., to protect government policies toward American Indians?

Finally, you express concern over the possible harassment or discriminatory treatment some of us, and in particular our Israeli colleagues, might be subjected to in connection with our visit to Russia. I agree wholeheartedly that difficulties of this kind must be prevented. I know that unpleasant situations do occasionally arise: I had to cancel my own plans for visiting Russia with my family four years ago when our visa applications were ignored, and a friend of mine leading a youth group there was harshly treated by the KGB and expelled for refusing to participate in anti-American propaganda. On the other hand, after speaking with several people who should know, I have been unable to discover any such incidents.

AI FORUM

Statement Concerning the Reviewing Procedure for IJCAI4

Erik Sandewall, Uppsala, Sweden

After having read Professor Minker's open letter of July 11 to Dr. Raphael I would like to correct the misunderstanding concerning the reviewing procedure. All papers for IJCAI–75 are to be reviewed by an international review board under the direction of the program chairman, Professor Patrick Winston of MIT. Acceptance of papers is of course only directed by the professional quality of the paper. The conference committee does not expect to receive any "recommendations" on political or other grounds, and if received, such recommendations would certainly not be allowed to affect the reviewing process.

To guarantee uniformity of evaluation, all reviewing will be done on English-language versions of submitted papers. On the other hand, because of the conference location, both Russian and English are official languages of the conference. The Soviet Academy of Sciences has kindly offered to provide free Russian-to-English translation of papers to the extent that their resources suffice. It is understood that if they receive more papers than they can handle, they will give priority to translating papers that they consider to have higher quality.

As has been made clear in all information about the conference, this optional service is related to the language of the paper, not the nationality of its authors. As at previous conferences, authors who so desire can arrange themselves to have their paper translated into English (from whatever language) and mailed to the program chairman.

IJCAI4
From: Anthony Ralston, Past President, ACM, Dept. of Computer Science, SUNY at Buffalo, Amherst, N.Y. . . .

SEPTEMBER 17, 1974

DEAR MR. BUCHANAN: One of the residual perquisites of the ACM presidency is that I remain on the mailing list of Newsletters of SIG's to which I do not belong even after the end of my term. The debate in the August, 1974, SIGART Newsletter on the subject IJCAI4 interested me considerably. The subject of scientific meetings in the Soviet Union is of great interest to me and is, of course, closely related to the issues I raised in my President's Letter, "Sakharov" in the February 1974 issue of CACM. I would, therefore, appreciate the opportunity to express my views on, the IJCAI4 controversy to the SIGART membership.

As a long time liberal I spent much of the 1950's and 1960's believing that there was real hope of evolution of the Soviet system toward one which, however it was organized internally, would deal with its own citizens in an even-handed and relatively enlightened way and would conduct its external affairs in a responsible and cooperative way. Events of recent years have convinced me that such hopes were naive; it pains me considerably, therefore, to see so much naivete on the subject of the Soviet Union in the reaction of some of the leaders of the A1 community to the suggestion that IJCAI4 be moved out of the Soviet Union.

Erik Sandewall suggests that "unequal treatment [for attendees to IJCAI4] for an irrelevant reason such as national origin would be contrary to Soviet law" and thus "it would not be reasonable to ask their authorities for a written promise not to break their own laws". He is right but for the wrong reason. Such a written promise would not be worth the paper it was written on because higher Soviet authorities can and have violated such promises whenever it is convenient. Indeed I am shocked that any sophisticated Westerner believes that "Soviet law" is anything more than a sham to be quoted and used when it is convenient and violated when it is not. To carry on the debate on IJCAI4 with the underlying assumption that Soviet authorities can be trusted to keep any agreement which they make when it is convenient for them not to do so is straight out of Alice in Wonderland.

To decide what to do on this matter I suggest you ask the following series of questions to which I give my own answers.

1. Can the Soviet Union be trusted to treat Israeli attendees equally with all others or to allow "controversial" Soviet scientists to attend IJACI4?

Answer: Unequivocally, no; there may, of course, be no problems but the evidence of recent history is that they will do just what they want once the meeting can no longer be moved.

2. Can a decision to move IJCAI4 out of the Soviet Union be expected to have any effect on the Soviet Government?

Answer: Yes and no. No in the sense that some hundreds of A1 researchers can hardly be expected to cause a change in Soviet policy. But yes in the sense that is becoming increasingly clear that the needs of the Soviet Union for Western technology (yes, Virginia, even computers) and wheat, etc., are such that the Soviet Government—which recognize only power as a moral imperative—will either provide quid pro quos (e.g., guaranteed (and measurable) Jewish emigration in return for trade agreements) or respond to world public opinion in order to create the right climate for détente and future agreements (e.g., Solyhenitsyn, the Panovs). Thus, as part of a hopefully larger movement against scientific meetings in the Soviet Union, you can be effective.

3. Would such an act increase international tension and be counterproductive to the movement toward détente and peace?

Answer: More tension perhaps but the relaxation of tension is not to be bought by being wooly-headed. (At one time it was called appeasement). More important, the future of détente and peace between the U.S. and the U.S.S R. depends unfortunately not to friendly relations between U.S. and Soviet scientists but on hard realities and correct appraisals of each nation by the other. It will not help if the Soviet Union equates Western liberalism with softness.

4. What about the loss of international scientific contact if IJCAI4 is not held in the Soviet Union?

Answer: A real loss, to be sure. I believe as much as anyone that personal contacts between sicentists can only increase international understanding and respect. But such relationships can develop from IJCAI4 only if the Soviet government allows them. The history of such relationships is that they are allowed only for a select number of "safe" scientists, and that, because of this,

there has been, with, of course, some notable exceptions, little of lasting value from Soviet-American scientific relationships in recent years. If we are to have reasonable relationships of this kind, they must be free and open; to believe that is possible today is, I think, naive.

My strongly felt hope is that the American AI community will either succeed in moving IJCAI4 out of the Soviet Union or that it will stay away from the meeting if held there. Unless and until the Soviet Union treats its own scientists and those of nations with whom it is not on friendly terms with a reasonable degree of human decency, international scientific meetings should not be held in Russia.

Sincerely,

ANTHONY RALSTON.

SEPTEMBER 19, 1974.

More IJCAI4.

From: George W. Baylor, Department of Psychology, University of Montreal.

I am immensely pleased by the nature of the debate taking place in the SIGART Newsletter (August, 1974) re the site of IJCAI4. While appreciating the importance of establishing personal contacts with Soviet scientists and citizens, on balance, it seems to me that the refusal of the international AI community to hold its conference in the Soviet Union while overt abuse of scientific and artistic freedom of expression and inquiry continues unabated.* is likely to be considerably more effective in influencing Soviet policy. In casting my vote against the choice of a Soviet site, I fully agree with Professor Minker's opinion that such an act "could have a major positive impact. The Soviet government is extremely interested in western technology, and especially computer technology. . . . they have a great deal to gain from us. Hence, it is in their interest to cooperate with western nations on this matter."

CONFERENCES

Revised Call for Papers for IJCAI4

The final call for papers for the Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence [1] has now been issued. Please note the following changes relative to the conference announcement of last May:

The date of the conference has been adjusted and is now September 3–8, 1975.

The deadline for papers has been been advanced to January 15, 1975.

International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic Correction of Previous Announcement [2]

The 1975 International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic has been rescheduled to May 13–16, 1975, to avoid conflict with the National Computer Conference on May 21–23. There is no change in the deadline for contributed papers, December 1, 1974.

International Symposium on Proving and Improving Programs Call for Papers

The International Symposium on Proving and Improving Programs is to be held on July 1–3, 1975, at Salines de Chaux, Arc et Senans, Doubs, France. It is jointly organized by the Institute de Recherche d'Informatique et d'Automatique (IRIA) and the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science. It is sponsored by Societe Mathematique de France. Chairman of the program committee is D. M. R. Park, of the University of Warwick, U. K., and the organizers, G. Huet and G. Kahn, of IRIA, France.

The program will cover theoretical and practical advances in program understanding, proving and improving. More specifically, topics of interest include: formal semantics of programming languages; logical systems for program proofs; mechanical proof checking and theorem proving; program synthesis; formalization of special programming features (control and synchronization, data structures and storage sharing, non-determinism and backtracking); interactive systems to help write and debug programs; program optimization; computer aided program design; programming methodology; error recovery in compilers.

*The recent (September, 1974) hooliganism and arrests associated with the closing of an "unacceptable" art exhibition in Moscow (as reported in the Montreal newspapers) continues to reflect the current political climate there.

[1] See SIGART Newsletter No. 46, June 1974, p. 14.

[2] SIGART Newsletter, No. 47, Aug. 1974, p. 16.

AI FORUM

JANUARY 15, 1975.

More on IJCA14
David J. Mostow,
Computer Science Dept. Carnegie-Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, Pa.

When I first heard that IJCA14 had been changed to September 3–8, 1975, which conflicts with the Jewish High Holidays, I was frankly suspicious. My suspicions were increased when I read in the August, 1974, SIGART Newsletter that according to conference chairman Erik Sandewall, "the change was decided on by the Soviet Intourist conference service, and was apparently caused by internal Soviet considerations". (although it did have the "side effect of removing the conflict between IJCA14 and the USA–Japan computer conference").

The picture I get is that the Soviet authorities are trying to keep the conference far away from Moscow and other centers of internal dissidence, holding it at a pleasant resort "beautifully located in the Caucasian mountains," where (they hope) it will be easy to forget about the scientists who have not been allowed to attend, and holding it at a time when many who might remember anyway will necessarily not be present. The dates have been changed already; assuming that the conference is to be held at all, it can and should be rescheduled. After all, would intourist schedule a conference for Christmas?

AI FORUM

NOVEMBER 11, 1975.

IJCA14—A Retrospective,
Jack Minker,
Chairman and Professor, Computer Science Department,
University of Maryland College Park, Md.

The Fourth International Joint Conference On Artificial Intelligence (IJCA14) has been the subject of much controversy concerning the choice of the Soviet Union as the site for the conference. Now that the conference is a matter of record, it is well to review whether or not the concerns evidenced were justified. Indeed, as shall be shown, the Soviets violated not only international standards as represented by the International Conference of Scientific Unions (ICSU), but agreements made to the Organizing Committee of the IJCA14. Were it not for the key members of the Organizing Committee, Dr. Erik Sandewall of the University of Upsala, Stockholm, Conference Chairman, Dr. Patrick Winston of MIT, Program Chairman; and Dr. John McCarthy of Stanford University, member of the Organizing Committee, the Soviets would have violated all international standards to the detriment of IJCAI and science in general.

The nub of the controversy centered on whether or not it was possible to have an Open International Conference in the Soviet Union. As noted in my letters that appeared in the August 1974 *SIGART Newsletter* No. 47, at such a conference, the following basic principles should apply:

(1) Every scientist who wants to attend the international meeting should be able to do so regardless of his political viewpoint or whether or not his country has diplomatic relations with the host country.

(2) Scientists from the host country who wish to attend the conference should be able to do so.

(3) Visas should be available at least one month in advance of the conference if the individual applies at least two months in advance of the conference.

(4) Every technical paper should be reviewed by an impartial international review board. Technical excellence, not political orientation should be our standard."

The Program Committee headed by Dr. Winston assured that every technical paper received an impartial review. Furthermore, he had the courage to accept a panel session that I proposed on which Dr. Alexander Lerner, a noted international Soviet scientist would appear with me, Dr. McCarthy and others. He agreed because he recognized the technical merits of a discussion on cybernetics vis a vis artificial intelligence and ignored the fact that Dr. Lerner was a Soviet dissident. What mattered to both Dr. Winston and Dr. McCarthy was the relevancy of the topics and the technical competence of the panelists. Dr. Winston upheld the fourth basic principle. However, the Soviets did not abide by this principle. The Soviet members of the Organizing Committee agreed, reluctantly, to have Dr. Lerner on the panel. However, because of my stand against the Soviet

Union as the site of the conference, they requested that I not be on the panel. Policies, not technical competence, was the issue, for the Soviets. I withdrew from the panel in order not to give the Soviets an excuse to turn down the panel session.

As for the second principle, the fact that the Soviets agreed to Dr. Lerner's participation did not assure that he would be permitted to attend the conference. No sooner had he received his invitation to participate in the conference, than the KGB informed Dr. Lerner that he would not be permitted to attend. Upon learning of this from the *New York Times* of June 8, 1975, I informed the Organizing Committee and, through a special mailing, the members of SIGART of this violation of an agreement and of international standards. I asked the SIGART members to request that the conference be withdrawn from the Soviet Union and if it were not withdrawn to not attend the conference as it would not be held according to international standards. In a period when many members were on vacation, there was a tremendous response by the membership of SIGART. Over 450 of approximately 2700 members indicated that they would like the conference removed from the Soviet Union or would not attend if it were held in the Soviet Union. The responses came from a variety of countries: Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, West Germany, Japan, South Africa, Israel, Puerto Rico, and the United States. Armed with this support, the Organizing Committee informed the Soviets that if Dr. Lerner would not be permitted to attend, there would be a formal protest on site. It was only with intense pressure from Dr. McCarthy, and on the day the conference was to start, that the Soviets relented and permitted Dr. Lerner to participate in the panel discussion and in the conference.

The Soviets also violated the above first and third basic principles. Two years before the IJCAI4, the Organizing Committee informed the Soviets that Israeli scientists must be permitted to attend the conference if the conference was to be held in the Soviet Union. The Soviets agreed to this condition. However, they did not abide by this agreement as they denied, in writing, a visa to a citizen of Israel, Dr. Yoram Yakimovsky, who works at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California. Not only had Dr. Yakimovsky applied to attend the conference, but he was scheduled to deliver a technical paper accepted by the Program Committee of IJCAI. Upon learning of this, Dr. McCarthy phoned Dr. Sandewall in Stockholm to appraise him of this deplorable violation of agreements. Dr. Sandewall phoned the Soviet Organizing Committee and informed them that if Dr. Yakimovsky could not attend, the conference, even at that late date, would be withdrawn. The Soviet Organizing Committee informed him that there was a "mistake", and that a telegram was being sent to the Soviet consulate in San Francisco authorizing them to issue a visa to Dr. Yakimovsky. According to Dr. McCarthy who was in contact with the Soviet consulate up to the time that he left for the conference, no such authorization was received. It was not until the Organizing Committee arrived in Tbilisi and informed the Soviets that there would be no conference, that a member of Soviet Organizing Committee phoned Dr. Yakimovsky in Israel, where he had gone from California after being denied entry to the Soviet Union, and informed him that he could now attend the conference, and that if he came to Moscow he would be issued a visa at the airport. However, at this point, Dr. Yakimovsky could not attend the conference. Since the Soviets "in principle" had not denied entry to Dr. Yakimovsky, the conference was not withdrawn from the Soviet Union.

I am told that the local Soviet Organizing Committee in Tbilisi apparently played a constructive role in permitting Dr. Lerner's entry to the conference, as well as two dissidents, Dr. I. Goldstein, and Dr. G. Goldstein, Physicists and Cyberneticists, brothers who live in Tbilisi. However, as documented by the Goldstein brothers in their letter that appears in this Newsletter, they were harassed by the KGB throughout the conference.

It should be clear from the above that Dr. Sandewall, Dr. Winston, and Dr. McCarthy were deeply concerned with making IJCAI4 a truly scientific event. They worked hard and effectively towards this end. In addition to being outstanding scientists themselves, they showed that scientific standards and humanitarian considerations cannot be compromised. Scientists in the Soviet Union and in all countries where there is repression should now know that their colleagues will not abandon them.

It further seems clear that every scientific organization should be warned as to what they might expect at a conference to be held in the Soviet Union. The Soviet scientists who were members of the Organizing Committee for the

Soviet Union apparently were in no position to make agreements that were binding. Such agreements can only be made by official members of their government.

In the final analysis all that was desired and all that was only partly achieved was to persuade the Soviets to behave the way international agreements specify that countries should behave. The Soviets were alerted two years in advance of the conference that the Israeli scientists must be permitted to attend. They were alerted at least one year in advance of the conference that scientists from the Soviet Union who had appropriate qualifications and desired to attend must be permitted to attend on the same basis as all scientists. Yet, Dr. Lerner, an invited panelist, was permitted to come to the conference only after threats of on-site protest were made by the Organizing Committee. With so much advance notice there is no excuse for "mistakes".

At the summit conference in Helsinki in the summer of 1975, broad human rights pledges were given by 35 nations including the Soviet Union. Whether or not the Soviet Union will relax international tensions based upon the human rights pledges can be measured more by their actions than by the documents they sign. Based on the Soviet handling of IJCAI4, barely two months after Helsinki, one wonders what is the real meaning of the Helsinki Conference.

I asked in my August 1974 letter to the membership of SIGART "Why the Soviet Union for IJCAI4?" Indeed, one still wonders why . . .

NOVEMBER 3, 1975.

Message from the Goldstein's re IJCAI4

From: Lilli S. Chertoff, Executive Director, Committee of Concerned Scientists, Inc., New York, NY

. . . We have received the enclosed letter from the Goldstein brothers of Tbilisi, who were . . . involved in the conference and whose attendance was the subject of KGB threats against them.

. . . I am sending you a Xerox of their original, and a retyped version.

For your information, our latest word is that Dr. Isai Goldstein was ordered to present himself for a medical examination preparatory to military conscription. He is some ten years past the normal age of military service. This is an increasingly employed device to harass and prevent emigration. If he is conscripted, then an additional ten years beyond his term of duty could be imposed to prevent his emigration "for security reasons."

SEPTEMBER 6, 1975.

To: The International Joint Council on Artificial Intelligence

From: Dr. Gregory Goldstein and Dr. Isai Goldstein, Ul. Oktyabrskaya, Microrahyon 2, Korpus 2, Apartment 63, Thilisi 80, USSR

This is a report describing our participation in the Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, which took place in Tbilisi, USSR on 3-8 September 1975.

We were invited by the Conference Committee to participate in the Conference. We arrived at the main entrance hall on 3 September, the first day of the Conference. The guard at door stopped us. We asked the guard to call Dr. Sandewall to confirm our permission to enter. Instead of Dr. Sandewall, an officer of KGB arrived and ordered us to stay away from the Conference and the area adjacent to the Conference. We complied.

This action of the KGB was followed by strong protests from several members of the Conference Committee and other Conference participants, particularly Professor McCarthy. As a result of these protests, Professor V. V. Chavchanidze gave us his permission to attend the Conference, with the apparent approval of the KGB. We participated in the Conference on 4 September without interference from the KGB, and made no demonstrations or political statements.

At about 10:30 a.m. on 5 September, the same officer of the KGB came to our home and ordered us to accompany him to the headquarters of the Georgian branch of the KGB in Tbilisi, and we complied. At the headquarters, the colonel in charge ordered us to stay away from the Conference. He also stated that the Americans have no right to invite their own guests to a Conference in Georgia. "Let the Americans be the hosts in America—here we are hosts," he said. We promised not to attend the Conference in compliance to his order.

Following this action by the KGB, several non-USSR Conference participants asked Dr. Chavchanidze on 6 September to obtain renewed permission for our participation. That afternoon, Dr. Raphael came to our apartment to inform us that renewed permission for our participation was obtained under the condition that we make no "further provocations." The only interpretation we could make for this so-called "provocation" was one of us identifying himself as an Israeli citizen before presenting a question to Professor McCarthy about his chess theory during a discussion session on 5 September. Other participants in the discussion did identify their citizenship, so we did not consider this statement of provable fact—a "provocation." In any event, we agreed not to identify our citizenship in this manner during the remainder of the Conference.

As a result of this history we wish to state the following:

1. We express our deep gratitude to those of our colleagues in this Conference who helped make possible our scientific intercourse related to this Conference.

2. We did not intend any "provocation." On the contrary, the KGB have frequently used provocations against us during the four years of our forced detention in the USSR.

3. We assume that Dr. Chavchanidze's renewed permission was granted with the approval of the KGB. That is why we will continue to attend the remainder of the Conference.

4. We wish to make our scientific colleagues aware that additional repressions against us may take place after the Conference is ended.

Postscript to the statement by brothers Goldstein to the Joint Council on Artificial Intelligence of 6 September 1975:

On September 8 we attended the morning session of the Conference accompanied by Dr. Raphael and Dr. Sklansky. During the break we parted with Dr. Raphael and Dr. Sklansky having made an appointment with them for 1:30 P.M. Just after we parted we were met by two KGB officers. They told us: "We had forbidden your presence at the Conference but you violated our order." When we mentioned renewed permission for your participation given by Prof. Chavchanidze to Dr. Raphael, KGB officers said that didn't matter. They told us not to come any more and if asked why we missed the appointment to answer that we ourselves decided not to go. They also added that Americans would go while the Goldsteins must stay here.

September 8, 1975.

Dr. GREGORY GOLDSTEIN.
Dr. I. GOLDSTEIN.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS: INFORMATION FLOW

WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 1977

COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
Washington, D.C.

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 6202, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Dante Fascell (chairman) presiding.

In attendance: Commissioners Fascell, Case, Simon, and Clark.

Also present: Alfred Friendly, Jr., deputy staff director.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN FASCELL

Mr. FASCELL. Our hearing today begins with bad, but not surprising news. A preliminary staff report to the Commission on the flow of information finds that progress in that area of the Helsinki accords has been, at best, minimal. Although it includes some statistics that describe the flow in part, the report emphasizes the key problem of expanding access, a problem that cannot be quantified. And it finds, in that area, that longstanding restrictions on the circulation of ideas from abroad remain basically unchanged inside the Warsaw pact countries.

The report, which will be included in the record of today's hearing,* suggests that this area of the Helsinki accords is one where change is most needed and hardest to obtain.

So the questions to be put at our hearing today are derived from that assessment. Why is freer flow of information so feared by the Communist signatories? What impact does information from the West have on the lives of individuals in the East? What is the proper role of a Western government in promoting expanded circulation of information and ideas? How can this issue be most effectively handled when the 35 signatories meet this year in Belgrade to review implementation?

Fortunately, we have three distinguished witnesses this morning to help us consider those questions and to develop some evidence that they are the right ones to ask and are possible to answer.

Our first two witnesses are two men who have long been active in trying to promote expanded circulation of their products—books—and the ideas books contain.

Leo Albert is chairman of the board of Prentice-Hall International and has been working energetically for at least the last 18 years to expand international distribution of American literature. As head of

*See appendix.

the Washington Liaison Committee of the American Association of Publishers, he has worked with both the United States and Soviet bureaucracies on widening the opportunities for publishers and the reading public. He knows the problems of moving both sides toward action and agreement, and he has a specific proposal to offer the Commission to get some Helsinki action underway.

Robert Bernstein, president and chairman of the board of Random House, Inc., is a successful publisher and an ardent human rights activist. He has negotiated and is negotiating with the Soviets both for better commercial relations and better treatment for Soviet writers. Active in the International League for Human Rights and Amnesty International, he has just finished a two-year term as head of the Association of Publishers' International Freedom to Publish Committee.

We are fortunate, indeed, to have their testimony and through it, an opportunity to see how the interests of expanding trade and the flow of information have come together.

Mr. Albert, you may start the proceedings.

Mr. ALBERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF LEO ALBERT

Mr. ALBERT. In the interest of time, I will merely extract from the statement that I brought.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, your full statement will be included in the record. You may proceed in any manner you see fit.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Albert follows:]

IN RESPONSE TO HELSINKI—"A CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY PROGRAM" BY LEO N. ALBERT, PRENTICE-HALL INTERNATIONAL, ON BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTRODUCTION: STUDY MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

> ". . . The Commission should urge the State Department and appropriate Congressional Committees to establish a program to encourage wider availability of U.S. publications in Eastern Europe and elsewhere by guaranteeing to convert to dollars any soft currencies accepted in payment for U.S. publications." [1]

This proposal by the Association of American Publishers is designed to assist the Commission in implementing the above recommendation by outlining a currency convertibility plan which could be used as a reference by Congress in drafting legislation. The need for active American response to the provision of the Helsinki accords was highlighted in the Study Mission's report: "Many European leaders reminded the Study Mission how hard the West Europeans had worked to insure that the United States and Canada were given a role in CSCE. A retreat from that role in the aftermath of Helsinki, they maintained, would diminish prospects for the accords' success and undercut the important Soviet acknowledgement that the United States did have 'political business' being in Europe." [2]

In order for the United States to implement a number of the provisions of Basket III of the Accords, the foreign currency barrier must be overcome. Many soft currency countries wish and need our cultural and educational materials. And the U.S. producers of such materials are anxious to make the investments required to effect such sales. However, both sides are frustrated and powerless because of the currency barrier. Hence, this proposal sets forth a plan which will enable such nations to purchase U.S. products in local currency which the American exporter will then exchange for dollars through the U.S. Treasury. The soft currencies thus generated will, in turn, be used to provide programs designed to implement other provisions of the Accords.

Footnotes at end of Article.

It should be emphasized at the outset that this proposal is not a subsidy or giveaway program. U.S. exporters will be required to carry out their business in a normal fashion (e.g., generate sales by calling on prospective customers) and will be subject to the general hazards of doing business. The convertibility program will come into play only after local currency payments have been made to the exporter and it will guarantee the proceeds (up to an authorized amount) into dollars.

Serious problems created by the lack of hard currency can best be demonstrated statistically: In 1966, the last full year of a previous convertibility program "the Informational Media Guaranty Program" (IMG), U.S. sales to certain Helsinki countries were much higher than in 1976, despite abnormal U.S. inflation during this period and a general easing of political and ideological tensions between Eastern European countries and the U.S. in the middle Seventies.

Country	1966	1976
Poland	$169,000	$111,000
Czechoslovakia	13,000	6,000
Hungary	3,000	[1] 1,000

[1] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

The IMG program was operational in a total of 21 countries during the years 1948 thru 1968. During this 20-year period contracts totalling $108,492,652 were issued. It is interesting to note that as regards Poland, the program began in 1953 and ended in 1968. During this time the contracts issued totalled $10,892,078 (or an average of $726,138 per year). This compares with $110,000 during 1976.

The IMG program was not without flaws and weaknesses. However, its positive impact on developing nations is a matter of record. American intellectual products were made available to 21 nations who otherwise could not afford them. Furthermore, as the countries of Western Europe which participated in the program improved economically and financially, the sale of American materials continued even after the IMG program was terminated. The Commerce Department testified to the importance of IMG to its trade promotion objectives and it recognized that the sale of cultural and educational materials resulted in a desire for and the sale of a wide variety of American equipment and technology.

Apparently the British subscribed to the Department of Commerce's theory that "the trade follows the book" since it established a similar program which *even today* continues to promote the intellectual and cultural products of the country to many nations of the world.

A new convertibility program is absolutely essential if the U.S. is to implement the cultural and educational exchanges called for in the Helsinki Accord.

Our propsal attempts to capture the strong and valuable features of the old IMG while, at the same time, correcting the weaknesses which led to its demise.

THE PROPOSAL

The following three sections are the components of the actual proposal. These include: the types of materials to be included in the program, the method of operation, and a suggested list of programs designed to utilize the counterpart currencies.

I. Materials To Be Included

In order to establish criteria for exporters wishing to participate in the convertibility program, priority should be given to those materials which fall within the scope of the Accords. These include, but need not be limited to, the following.

A. *Newspapers and magazines.*—"To facilitate the improvement of the dissemination . . . of newspapers and printed publications, periodical and non-periodical, from the other participating States." [1]

B. *Nonthcatrical Films.*—"To encourage the competent bodies and enterprises to make a wider choice and effect wider distribution of full-length and documentary films from the other participating States . . ." [2]

Footnotes at end of Article.

C. *Audio-visual materials.*—". . . Facilitate the import by competent organizations and firms of recorded audio-visual materials from other participating States." [3]

D. *Books (General).*—"Encouraging meetings among representatives of competent organizations and relevant firms to examine measures within their field of activities—such as the simplification of orders, time limits for sending supplies and *modalities of payment* (emphasis added) which might facilitate international commercial exchanges of books." [4]

E. *Textbooks.*—"Encouraging exchanges of teaching materials—including school textbooks, having in mind the possibility of promoting mutual knowledge and facilitating the presentation of each country in such books . . ." [5]

This might be expanded to include other media which were included in the eligibility criteria which was used for the IMG: "Informational media are deemed to include books, pamphlets, magazines, newspapers, photographs, prints, play scripts, motion pictures, film strips, projection slides, musical scores, musical and other acoustical recordings, news services, radio broadcasting and television services, the rights to make, use or perform any of the foregoing, and other generally used instrument or means for conveying information, insofar as the content of such media is in fact intended to convey knowledge or is expressive of the life or culture of the United States . . ." [6]

II. Method of Operation

A. FINANCING

The IMG was created under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, which enabled it to bypass normal appropriations procedures (with the exception of funds appropriated to cover administrative costs). This was the program's basic weakness and the ultimate, but not sole, cause of its demise. In order to avoid such problems and to enable the Congress to keep close watch and control over its operation, the new currency convertibility program should be subject to normal authorization and appropriations procedures. Eligibility for participation would be limited to those Helsinki countries with nonconvertible currencies. The legislation establishing such a program could set an overall authorization figure or it could set categorical limits for each participating nation. The difficulty with the latter approach is that it would not allow for the flexibility necessary in dealing with changing political and economic events.

The foreign currencies which would be received would be converted at a rate of exchange determined by the U.S. and the participating country. It is suggested that these exchange rates be reviewed as often as necessary to provide for the cloest possible supervision in an area of rapid currency fluctuations.

3. *Implementation.*—The operation in any country would begin with a bilateral agreement between the governments of the United States and the participating country. This agreement would be in the form of an exchange of diplomatic notes and would not only become the legal basis for conducting the program but would also describe the terms and conditions of operation, the implementing details of which would be determined annually at the working level in the two governments. (See sample Exhibit A)

Within the limits of the bilateral agreement and the implementing arrangements, the U.S. agency responsible for the program would then make guaranties to U.S. exporters whose proposals to make sales in the participating country had the approval of that country's government. The guaranties would be evidenced by contracts between the agency and the exporters. (See Exhibit B) Each contract would establish the level of U.S. Government's potential liability to the exporter; set the time limits of the guaranty; identify the types of materials whose sales were covered by the guaranties; and describe the terms and conditions which the exporter must meet. After these formalities have been concluded the U.S. exporter would pursue his or her business with importers in the participating country in a normal fashion, protected only against the hazard of accepting blocked currency in payment for sales. All other business risks attendant upon such sales transactions would be beyond the scope of the guaranty and would be borne by the exporter.

Upon receipt of payment in noncovertible currency, the exporter would apply to the U.S. agency administering the program for conversion and present a draft for the foreign currency. When all conditions of the guaranty contract were com-

Footnotes at end of Article.

plied with, the agency would direct the U.S. Treasury to remit a dollar check equivalent in value to the nonconvertible currency proceeds of the transaction covered by the guaranty. Obviously, the agency could only approve contracts up to the amount appropriated for the program and within the limits set by the bilateral agreements.

The governments of the importing country and the U.S. would mutually set the criteria for the types of materials which would come within the scope of the program and the U.S. agency involved would also monitor the shipments to make sure they were within the statutory (or other) guidelines.

All transactions would be subject to audit by the responsible agency before conversion payments would be made under the contracts. In addition, the accounts and records of the exporter would be subject to post-audit by the agency or the General Accounting Office within time limits set by the statute.

III. Counterpart Currency Programs

In order to retain the focus of the Helsinki Agreement in all facets of the currency convertibility program, the foreign currencies which accumulate as exchange for dollar equivalents issued to U.S. exporters will be used for programs and projects designed to implement other provisions of the Accords. These soft currencies will not be used for any ongoing U.S. programs in the host country such as running the Embassy, or for projects sponsored by USIA or any other agency.

Some of the new projects which might be included are:

A. Programs to train translators and to develop translations of U.S. and host country materials

"Promoting, on a wider scale, the translation of works in the sphere of literature and other fields of cultural activitiy, produced in the languages of the other participating States, especially from the less widely-spoken languages, and the publication and dissemination of the translated works by such measures as:

(1) developing their efforts in the basic and advanced training of translators;

(2) encouraging, by appropriate means, the publishing houses of their countries to publish translations;

(3) facilitating the exchange between publishers and interested institutions of lists of books which might be translated; and

(4) promoting between their countries the professional activity and co-operating of translators;" [1]

A shortage of competent translators is a universal problem. The first step would be to establish centers in the host country where translators could be trained in the basics of their craft, with an emphasis on translations into English. These centers could be staffed by U.S. or host country personnel who would be paid in U.S. owned local currency.

The second step would be to hold regular seminars in the host country where more advanced translators could discuss techniques and strategies.

The third step would be to identify competent host country translators to staff a project designed to bring local books to the attenion of U.S. publishers. One of the most frequently-voiced complaints of the East European nations is that their books receive very little attention in the West and that the flow of intellectural properties seems to be a one-way street. While there has been some success in the exchange of scientific materials, their complaint is certainly justified as far as *belles lettres* are concerned. This third-step project would have translators evaluate and prepare digests of their country's literature which would be made available to Western publishers on a regular basis.

B. Copyright information centers

"Endeavouring to ensure the full and effective application of the international agreements and conventions on copyrights and on circulation of cultural property to which they are party or to which they may decide in the future to become party." [2]

"Facilitating, while taking full account of the international copyright conventions to which they are party, international contacts and communications between authors and publishing houses as well as other cultural institutions, with a view to a more complete mutual access to cultural achievements;" [3]

Footnotes at end of Article.

All of the Eastern Bloc nations which are signatories to the Helsinki Agreement belong to either the Berne Union or to the Universal Copyright Convention. (See Appendix C) Programs could be developed to establish international copyright information centers in those countries where they do not now exist, or to expand the programs in countries where such clearinghouses are already in operation. One of the difficulties in international publishing is determining who owns the rights to copyrighted works and whether or not reprint or translation rights have already been sold for a particular country or geographic area. The clearinghouse would seek to overcome this difficulty by communicating with the copyright information center located in the country where the book was originally published. If necessary, the publisher or author could be contacted directly. The copyright information center would not take part in the financial negotiations for rights, but merely assist in identifying the copyright owners and facilitating the paperwork necessary for such clearances.

In addition, such copyright centers could serve as the payments and licensing center for the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted works. This has become an increasingly important function in many countries since libraries and educational institutions require a central agency for the payment of reproduction fees which go beyond the "Fair Use" limits of copyright laws.

C. PROGRAMS TO DEVELOP BIBLIOGRAPHIES OF CERTAIN ARCHIVES OF HOST COUNTRIES

"To envisage other appropriate measures which would permit, where necessary by mutual agreement among interested parties, the facilitation of access to their respective cultural achievements, in particular in the field of books;" [4]

"Establishing, developing or encouraging programmes providing for the broadest exchange . . . of educational and scholarly information such as university publications and materials from libraries;" [5]

There is a wealth of materials of an intellectual and cultural nature in the Helsinki signatory countries. Those of the Eastern European nations have not generally been available to scholars in other parts of the world. One reason for this is that complete catalogues or bibliographies of certain collections or archives do not exist. A project could be established using local currencies generated by the convertibility program which would allow U.S. and host country specialists to prepare bibliographies of these collections or archives to be made available to scholars throughout the world in traditional card index, microform or computer-based format. This would not be an annual program in any country, but rather one-time projects of several years duration, where the need exists.

In addition, a project could be established which would set up an archive of out-of-print scholarly works such as dissertations and monographs which could be made available to scholars and researchers upon request. This project could be modeled along the lines of the service provided by University Microfilms in the United States.

D. PROGRAMS TO TRAIN EDUCATORS IN THE USE AND DEVELOPMENT OF AUDIO-VISUAL SOFTWARE AND OTHER NEW TECHNOLOGIES

"To promote the exchange of experience, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, in teaching methods at all levels of education, including those used in permanent and adult education, as well as the exchange of teaching materials . . ." [6]

The latest techniques and technological developments could be shared in a program designed for educators and producers of educational materials. The program could deal with the use and development of films, tapes and audio and video cassettes as well as computer-based information retrieval.

This program need not be limited to regular educational activities. It could also be used to expand the use of audio-visual software in on-the-job training activities, which are also called for in the Accords:

"Facilitating exchanges of experience concerning . . . the means of adapting education, including vocational and technical training, to the needs of economic and social development in their countries." [7]

Eastern European nations, like a great many other countries including the United States, have a tremendous interest and need in "lifetime learning"—adult education and retraining programs designed to help persons outside of the traditional educational environment cope with a rapidly-changing world. Under this proposal, projects could be developed designed not only to provide for an exchange of views and experiences in this area between experts from the U.S. and the host country, but also to establish centers for such activities in the host country.

Footnotes at end of Article.

E. DEVELOPMENT OF LOW-COST TEXTBOOK PROGRAMS, INCLUDING THE TRAINING OF PUBLISHING PERSONNEL

"Encourage such forms of cultural co-operation and the development of such joint projects as: . . . the preparation, translation and publication of articles, studies and monographs, as well as of low-cost books and of artistic and literary collections, suited to making better known respective cultural achievements envisaging for the purpose meetings among experts and representatives of publishing houses." [8]

Still another use for the local currencies which would accumulate under the new convertibility program would be one designed to produce low-cost textbooks. These joint U.S.-host country projects would also be charged with training editorial and production personnel in advanced publishing methods. These low-cost books could be published in the host-country language, either from original materials or from translations from other languages. The goal of this program would be to increase the marketing and translation capabilities of such industries in the host country.

F. SEMINARS HELD IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTERNATIONAL BOOKFAIRS

"Encouraging meetings among representatives of competent organizations and relevant firms to examine measures within their field of activity—such as the simplification of orders, time limits for sending supplies and modalities of payment—which might facilitate international commercial exchanges of books." [9]

Seminars held in conjunction with the five international book fairs held annually in the countries with nonconvertible currencies would provide an opportunity for authors, publishers and librarians to meet and discuss professional matters of mutual interest, with an emphasis on working towards implementing some of the provisions of the Accords. These events would be held in host countries and would be financed by the local currencies.

G. TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR TEACHERS AND LIBRARIANS

"Intensifying exchanges of information on teaching methods used in various educational systems and on results of research into the processes by which pupils and students acquire knowledge, taking account of relevant experience in different types of specialized education." [10]

"Improving and expanding exchanges of books, bibliographies and catalogue cards between libraries." [11]

Training programs could be established in host countries where U.S. educators and librarians would spend weeks or months studying the methodology of the host country while at the same time sharing information about American methods and philosophies.

The preceding seven points are some suggested projects which would be made possible through the use of the accumulating local currencies in the proposed convertibility program. They are not in any way meant to be limiting or exclusive. Any compatible program suggested by a host country should also be considered, so long as it fits into the overall objective of this program which is to demonstrate U.S. support for and implementation of the Helsinki accords.

General Discussion

A. SHORT HISTORY OF IMG

Since comparisons are bound to be made between this proposed currency convertibility program and the Informational Media Guaranty (IMG), it seems only fair to point out the strengths and weaknesses of that program which ran almost 20 years.

The IMG was created under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 as one of the many programs designed to encourage private sector enterprise to play a major role in the rehabilitation of Europe. "The Mutual Security Act of 1951 made it possible for IMG to operate outside of Europe. Over the years, other provisions were added under subsequent Mutual Security Acts. For example, in 1953 IMG was transferred from the International Information Administration to the newly-created USIA. Technical budgeting changes were made but through them

Footnotes at end of Article.

all the Congress reaffirmed its opinion that IMG is one of the most important aspects of the overseas information programs' until 1964 when the Senate Appropriations Committee 'expressed its disapproval of this program.' In 1967 that Committee instructed that no part of the USIA appropriations be used for IMG and 'that the cost of liquidating this IMG program would be absorbed within the funds appropriated.' "[1]

The IMG was officially ended in June 1967, although there was a later effort to revive it by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in October 1967, but the measure was defeated in the full House. The end of the program was accomplished by cutting off the funds authorized to administer it. The statutory authority for the original IMG legislation, (Section 1011 of PL 402, 80th Congress), as amended, remains in effect. IMG operated in seven Western European countries immediately after World War II. Other countries which were added later included Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, Israel, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Guinea, Chile, Korea and Pakistan.

The basic flaw in the IMG program (and one which this new proposal corrects) was the method of financing. Once the legislation was established, the IMG did not fall under the normal appropriations procedures of the Congress, with the exception of an appropriation for administrative costs. Another difficulty (which again, this new proposal eliminates) was the lack of a detailed plan for the use of the local currencies which accumulated. The selection of materials which were included in the IMG presented a few problems at the outset, but for the most part, these difficulties were worked out.

It should be pointed out that the IMG was not a subsidy program. With the exception of protection against accepting blocked currency, the exporter had all of the normal problems and risks associated with doing business. In fact, one publisher stated, "The massive paperwork required under the IMG program required the addition of four people to our regular accounting staff. The administration cost resulted in a non-profit, in fact to a less than break-even situation, which we tolerated only for the reasons of keeping foreign markets open and to cooperate with the government in the attainment of its objectives."

The accomplishments of IMG were many. Perhaps one of the best discussions of the benefits of the IMG came in a letter from the Secretary of Commerce to the Director of the USIA, dated February 28, 1961, in which he pointed to the importance of U.S. publications in foreign trade and emphasized IMG's role in facilitating their distribution.

He saw a ". . . significant relationship between the international distribution of American magazines and books and the export of other products. This relationship is particularly direct with respect to American technical and scientific periodicals and books, including textbooks. The foreign engineer who has used American textbooks in his professional training and subsequently has subscribed to American engineering periodicals is very likely to recommend the purchase of American equipment when a choice has to be made between equipment from several possible foreign sources. This is an obvious and most important relationship between publication exports and other exports. It is by no means the only one, however. The extensive use of our periodicals and books abroad helps to spread and strengthen the use of the English language; to stimulate education and economic development; and to promote closer ties with and a better understanding of the United States. These results are all significant both to U.S. foreign policy goals in general and to the more specific problem of expansion of U.S. exports." [2]

The important and positive points to remember about the IMG are:

It was not a subsidy program.

The cultural and educational materials got to the persons who wanted and needed them.

It directly benefited educational development in the countries of operation.

". . . in keeping with the program's basic purpose, it is clear that many people in many countries read American books, studied from American texts, etc., and, one can only assume, gained some understanding of the U.S.—its policies, culture, and values." [3]

In summary, despite some weaknesses in its organization (which have been corrected under the new proposal), the concept of the Informational Media Guaranty Program is as valid today as it was in 1948, not only for the Helsinki countries with nonconvertible currency but also in developing nations around the world.

Footnotes at end of Article.

D. CONCLUSION

The United States became a signatory to the Helsinki Accords over 21 months ago. A follow-up conference is scheduled to be held in Belgrade this year. It seems timely for the United States to take positive legislative action towards implementing an important part of the Accords. Basket III is the least controversial, most acceptable part of the Accords to the American people. It seems to be potentially the most productive place to start. This new proposal is one which plants seeds of mutual understanding and cooperation—which was the intent of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe from whence the Accords emerged. Books and other cultural and intellectual media can play an important part in achieving the goals of Helsinki, but many of the objectives of Basket III simply cannot be effected without a currency convertibility program of the kind contained in this proposal.

"'Since wars begin in the minds of men,' the UNESCO Constitution states, 'it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed.' Books constitute one of the major defenses of peace because of their enormous influence in creating an intellectual climate of friendship and mutual understanding. All those concerned have an obligation to ensure that the content of books promotes individual fulfillment, social and economic progress, international understanding and peace."[4]

APPENDIX A

SAMPLE DIPLOMATIC NOTES ESTABLISHING CONVERTIBILITY PROGRAM IN HOST COUNTRY

From: American Ambassador to Minister of Foreign Affairs in Host Country.

Excellency: I have the honor to refer to conversations which have taken place recently between representatives of our two governments relating to the establishment of a program intended to facilitate the export of intellectual and cultural products from the United States of America and the concurrent establishment of various projects of an educational and cultural nature in your country. I also have the honor to confirm the understandings reached as a result of these conversations, as follows:

The Government of (Host Country) shall authorize the import of such educational and cultural media, without obligation on its part to provide foreign exchange cover, under the following circumstances:

1. The Government of the United States of America shall guarantee to nationals of the USA, exporting educational and cultural material to (Host Country), the value in currency of the United States of America of such materials in accordance with our national laws. (Citation.)

2. The importers in (Host Country) of such materials shall pay the value in local currency of these imports to banks in your country designated by the respective exporters in the United States of America holding guaranty contracts, following which these exporters will transfer these currencies to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States in accordance with the terms and conditions of their guaranty contracts. The (Host Country) currency thus acquired by the Government of the United States of America will be expended for the educational and cultural programs which have been agreed upon by our respective representatives.

3. The Government of the United States of America will refer all applications for guaranty contracts approved by the Government of the United States of America to the Government of (Host Country) for approval before such guaranty contracts are issued.

Upon receipt of a note from Your Excellency indicating that the foregoing provisions are acceptable to the Government of (Host Country), the Government of the United States of America will consider that this note and your reply thereto constitute an agreement between the two governments on this subject, and that the provisions of this agreement are in effect as of the date of your note in reply, in the manner and to the degree permitted by the prevailing legislation in the two countries.

/s/ U.S. Ambassador.

Footnotes at end of Article.

To: American Ambassador from Minister of Foreign Affairs in Host Country.

Mr. Ambassador: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note No. —— dated today, which reads as follows: [repeats provisions of Paragraphs numbered 1, 2, and 3:]

In reply, I am happy to inform Your Excellency that my Government concurs in the terms of the note transcribed.

/s/ Host Country Minister
of Foreign Affairs.

APPENDIX B

COMPONENTS OF CONVERTIBILITY CONTRACTS BETWEEN U.S. AGENCY AND EXPORTER

1. Dollar limit of the guaranty.
2. Term of the guaranty.
3. Country in which guaranty will operate.
4. Materials to be included.
5. A brief history of the applicant, including date of establishment of business.
6. Warranties of Contractor.
7. Requirements and Limitations on Contractor.
8. Procedures for requests for conversion.
9. Applicable rates of exchange in currency conversion.
10. Limitations on payments.
11. Accountant's statements.
12. Adjustments and repayments.
13. Termination for cause.
14. Maintenance and examination of records.

Once a contract has been signed, then the U.S. exporter proceeds with his or her normal business practices in the host country. When sales have been made (up to the dollar amount authorized in the contract) the exporter files a request for conversion with the U.S. agency, including copies of invoices and a copy of each notice of deposit received by the exporter from his host country bank for the local currency covered by the contract.

After a review of the application and supporting documents, the Agency will then authorize the U.S. Treasury to exchange the local currencies for dollars at the rate of exchange established by the contract.

APPENDIX C.—INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF HELSINKI COUNTRIES WITH NONCONVERTIBLE CURRENCIES

Country	Berne [1]	UCC [2]	Bilateral with United States
Bulgaria	X	X	
Czechoslovakia	X	X	X
German Democratic Republic	X	X	
Hungary	X	X	X
Poland	X	X	X
Romania	X		X
Soviet Union		X	
Yugoslavia		X	

[1] International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Union).
[2] Universal Copyright Convention.

NOTES

Introduction

[1] Report of the Study Mission to Europe to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe—February 11, 1977, p. 9.
[2] Ibid., pp. 4–5.

I. Materials To Be Included

[1] Final Act, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, p. 117.
[2] Ibid., p. 124.
[3] Ibid., p. 118.
[4] Ibid., p. 122.
[5] Ibid., p. 131.
[6] *A History of the Informational Media Guaranty Program*, p. 16.

III. Counterpart Currency Programs

[1] Final Act, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Page 123–124.
[2] Ibid., p. 128.
[3] Ibid., p. 123.
[4] Ibid., p. 124.
[5] Ibid., p. 128.
[6] Ibid., p. 131.
[7] Ibid., p. 131.
[8] Ibid., p. 126.
[9] Ibid., p. 122.
[10] Ibid., p. 131.
[11] Ibid., p. 114.

General Discussion

[1] *A History of the Informational Media Guaranty Program,* pp. 6, 7, 8.
[2] Ibid., appendix L. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges to Director of USIA, Edward R. Murrow, dated February 28, 1961.
[3] Summary History of the IMG prepared as an abstract from *A History of the Informational Media Guaranty Program,* p. 9.
[4] Ronald Barker and Robert Escarpit, "The Book Hunger." (Unesco, Paris, 1973), p. 155.

Mr. ALBERT. On page 9 of the Study Mission Recommendations to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, it reads, and I quote:

The Commission should urge the State Department and appropriate Congressional committees to establish a program to encourage wider availability of U.S. publications in Eastern Europe and elsewhere by guaranteeing to convert to dollars any soft currencies accepted in payment for U.S. publications.

The proposal being presented by the Association of American Publishers is designed to assist the Commission in implementing the above recommendation by outlining a currency convertibility plan which could be used as a reference by Congress in drafting legislation.

The need for active American response to the provisions of the Helsinki accords was highlighted in the Study Mission's Report, and again I quote:

Many European leaders reminded the Study Mission how hard the West Europeans had worked to insure that the United States and Canada were given a role in CSCE. A retreat from that role in the aftermath of Helsinki, they maintained, would diminish prospects for the accords' success and undercut the important Soviet acknowledgment that the United States did have 'political business' being in Europe.

In order for the United States to implement a number of the provisions of Basket III of the accords, the foreign currency barrier must be overcome. Many soft currency countries wish and need our cultural and educational materials. And the U.S. producers of such materials are anxious to make the investments required to effect such sales. However, both sides are frustrated and powerless because of the currency barrier. Hence, this proposal sets forth a plan which will enable such nations to purchase U.S. products in local currency which the American exporter will then exchange for dollars through the U.S. Treasury. The soft currencies thus generated will, in turn, be used to provide programs designed to implement other provisions of the accords.

It should be emphasized at the outset that this proposal is not a subsidy or giveaway program. U.S. exporters will be required to carry on their business in a normal fashion—that is, they will have to generate sales by calling on prospective customers and they will be subject to the general hazards of doing business. The convertibility program will come into play only after local currency payments have been made to the exporter and it will guarantee the proceeds up to a certain authorized amount be converted into dollars.

Serious problems created by the lack of hard currency can best be demonstrated statistically. In 1966, the last full year of a previous

convertibility program which was known as IMG, U.S. sales to certain Helsinki countries were much higher than in 1976, despite abnormal U.S. inflation during this period and a general easing of political and ideological tensions between Eastern European countries and the United States in the middle seventies.

In Poland, for example, our export sales in 1966 were $169,000; in 1976, $111,000.

The IMG program was operational in a total of 21 countries during a 20-year period. During that time, contracts totaling $108,492,652 were issued. It is interesting to note that as regards Poland, the program began in 1953 and ended in 1968. During this time, the contracts issued totaled $10,892,078 or an average of $726,000 per year. This compares with $111,000 during 1976.

The IMG program was not without flaws and weaknesses. However, its positive impact on developing nations is a matter of record.

A new convertibility program is absolutely essential if the United States is to implement the cultural and educational exchanges called for in the Helsinki accords.

Our proposal attempts to capture the strong and valuable features of the old IMG while, at the same time, correcting the weaknesses which led to its demise.

Now, in order to establish criteria for exporters wishing to participate in the convertibility program, priority should be given to those materials which fall within the scope of the accords. These include, but need not be limited to, the following: Newspapers and magazines, nontheatrical films, audiovisual materials, general books, and textbooks. This list might be expanded to include other media which were included in the criteria used under the old IMG.

As regards financing, the old IMG was created under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, which enabled it to bypass normal appropriations procedures. Public debt financing, as it was called, enabled the Administrator of Economic Cooperation to issue notes for purchase by the Treasury. Public debt financing was the program's basic weakness and the ultimate, but not the sole, cause of its demise.

In order to avoid such problems and to enable the Congress to keep close watch and control over its operation, the new currency convertibility program should be subject to normal authorization and appropriations procedures, providing there is some commitment to continuity.

Eligibility for participation would be limited to those Helsinki countries with nonconvertible currencies. The legislation establishing such a program could set an overall authorization figure or it could set categorical limits for each participating nation. The difficulty with the latter approach is that it would not allow for the flexibility necessary in dealing with changing political and economic events.

The foreign currencies which would be received would be converted at a rate of exchange determined by the United States and the participating countries. It is suggested that these exchange rates be reviewed as often as necessary to provide for the closest possible supervision in an era of rapid currency fluctuations.

Regarding implementation, the operation in any country would begin with a bilateral agreement between the governments of the United States and the participating country.

Within the limits of the bilateral agreement and the implementing arrangements, the U.S. agency responsible for the program would then make guarantees to the U.S. exporters whose proposals to make sales in the participating country had the approval of that country's government. The guarantees would be evidenced by contracts between the agency and the exporters.

Each contract would establish the level of the U.S. Government's potential liability to the exporter; set the time limits of the guarantee, identify the types of materials whose sales were covered by the guarantees, and describe the terms and conditions which the exporter must meet.

After these formalities have been concluded, the U.S. exporter would pursue his or her business with importers in the participating country in a normal fashion, protected only against the hazard of accepting blocked currency in payment for sales. All other business risks attendant upon such sales transactions would be beyond the scope of the guarantee and would be borne by the exporter.

Upon receipt of payment in nonconvertible currency, the exporter would apply to the U.S. agency administering the program for conversion and present a draft for the foreign currency. When all conditions of the guarantee contract were complied with, the agency would direct the U.S. Treasury to remit a dollar check equivalent in value to the nonconvertible currency proceeds of the transaction covered by the agreement. Obviously, the agency could only approve contracts up to the amount appropriated for the programs and within the limits set by the bilateral agreements.

The governments of the importing country and the United States would mutually set criteria for the types of materials which would come within the scope of the program, and the U.S. agency involved would also monitor the shipments to make sure they were within the statutory—or other—guidelines.

All transactions would be subject to audit by the responsible agency before conversion payments would be made under these contracts.

In order to retain the focus of the Helsinki agreements in all facets of the currency convertibility program, the foreign currencies which accumulate as exchange for dollar equivalents issued to U.S. exporters will be used for programs and projects designed to implement other provisions of the accords. These soft currencies will not be used for any ongoing U.S. programs in the host country, such as running the embassy or for projects presently sponsored by USIA or any other agency.

Some of the new projects which might be included are programs to train translators and to develop translations of U.S. and host country materials; a series of seminars in host countries where more advanced translators could discuss techniques and strategies and could identify competent host country translators to staff a project designed to bring local books to the attention of the U.S. publishers; the establishment of international copyright centers in countries where they do not now exist and the expansion of programs in countries where clearinghouses are already in operation; the establishment of a program which would allow the U.S. and host countries' specialists to prepare bibliographies of host country intellectual and cultural materials not heretofore made available to other nations; the establishment of archives of out-of-print

scholarly works such as dissertations and monographs which could be made available to scholars around the world; a program to train educators in the use and development of audiovisual software and other new technologies; the development and publication of low-cost textbooks; the training of personnel in all facets of publishing; the holding of seminars in conjunction with book fairs now held annually in some of the Helsinki countries with nonconvertible currencies. This would provide an opportunity for authors, publishers and librarians to meet and discuss professional matters of mutual interest, and finally, the establishment of a training program for teachers and librarians.

These are some suggested projects which would be made possible through the use of the accumulating local currencies in the proposed convertibility program. They are not in any way meant to be limiting or exclusive. Any compatible program suggested by a host country should also be considered, as long as it fits into the overall objective of this program, which is to demonstrate U.S. support for, and the implementation of, the Helsinki accords.

Since comparisons are bound to be made between this proposed currency program and the old IMG, it seems only fair to point out the strength and weaknesses of that program, which ran for almost 20 years.

As I mentioned before, the basic flaw in the old IMG program was the method of financing. Once the legislation was established, the IMG did not fall under the normal appropriations procedures of the Congress, with the exception of an appropriation for administrative costs.

Another difficulty, which again this new proposal eliminates, was the lack of a detailed plan for the use of the local currencies which accumulated. The selection of materials which were included in the IMG presented a few problems at the outset, but for the most part, these difficulties were worked out.

The important and positive points to remember about the old IMG program was that it was not a subsidy program, the cultural and educational materials were made available to the persons who wanted and needed them, and it directly benefited educational development in the countries of operation.

In summary, despite some weaknesses in its organization, which have been corrected under the new proposal, the concept of the informational media guarantee program is as valid today as it was in 1948, not only for the Helsinki countries with nonconvertible currency, but also in developing nations around the world.

The United States became a signatory to the Helsinki accords over 21 months ago. A followup conference is scheduled to be held in Belgrade this year. It seems timely for the United States to take positive legislative action toward implementing an important part of the accords. Basket III is the least controversial and the most acceptable part of the accords to the American people.

It seems to be potentially the most productive place to start. This new proposal is one which plants seeds of mutual understanding and cooperation—which was the intent of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe from whence the accords emerged. Books and other cultural and intellectual media can play an important part in achieving the goals of Helsinki, but many of the objectives of Basket

III simply cannot be effected without a currency convertibility program of the kind contained in this proposal.

"Since wars begin in the minds of men," the UNESCO Constitution states, "it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed." Books constitute one of the major defenses of peace because of their enormous influence in creating an intellectual climate of friendship and mutual understanding. All those concerned have an obligation to insure that the content of books promotes individual fulfillment, social and economic progress, international understanding, and peace.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. I want to thank you very much for that concise and yet very thorough statement, Mr. Albert. I appreciate also the very specific recommendations. Somebody has been very thorough in the proposal.

I certainly concur with your concepts and as one who struggled to keep the old IMG alive and lost, I find your analysis of the problems and flaws and obstacles certainly accurate. It is one story which we do not need to repeat.

A couple of things that occur to me—and to see if I understand this correctly—on the guarantee for nonconvertibility—we are talking about 100 percent; is that correct? Is that what this proposal envisions, within the limits laid down by the authorization or the particular contract with the agency?

Mr. ALBERT. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. This is not an open market concept, as I understand it, because it would require an agreement with the host country on the selection of material. I am not so sure what that means or what kind of problem we would run into. If it amounts to direct selection and censorship by the host country in order to make sales, I think we would have one whale of a time trying to get anybody to agree with that, in the Congress.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, at the present time when we try to sell to soft-currency countries, we can only sell them what they wish to purchase anyway and that might be called censorship.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes; but that is a little different. If they censor a private outfit and you sell them what they want, that is one thing. But if the U.S. Government has agreed to it and then pays for it, then that is something else. To me, that seems like a real obstacle and maybe there is an easy answer to it that I do not envision or maybe I have created an obstacle that does not exist. At least that is my understanding of what the fundamental problem would be. I can hear the Appropriations Committee now, and authorization committees, saying, "why in the world should the United States, in undertaking the fulfillment of a concept under Helsinki accords, finance selected publications for the purchase by the host countries simply because those publications are printed in the United States?"

I think we would have a hard time with that one. Anyway, it does not mean that the idea should be scrapped; I think we just have to be realistic in taking a look at it.

I like the idea, frankly, and I think it will sell, of changing the uses for the buildup of local currencies. I think that has been a problem in the past. I also like the concept of making those funds available for the

purposes of Helsinki accords, particularly the suggestions that you have outlined in your statement.

So with just that brief comment, which comes right off the top of my head, I would say that the program merits very serious consideration in the Congress by the authorizing committees. And I do not know what posture the Commission can take with respect to this, except maybe perhaps some broad recommendation, since we have, as you know, no legislative authority. We would have to take it to the authorizing committees. If an effort is made to take it to an authorizing committee or committees, perhaps we could support it in some informal way. That might be more meaningful.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, it seems to us in the private sector that the United States did enter into an accord and it made some serious commitments. We think those commitments ought to be fulfilled and we are convinced that where Basket III is concerned, it is impossible to go further without a convertibility program.

I would like to go back for a second to the matter that I expressed before, having to do with censorship. It is a problem, but I do not think it is an unsurmountable problem. During the later years of the old program the selection problem had been pretty much eliminated. From the U.S. side, contractors were allowed to sell books that were for the benefit of the United States, and on the host country's side, there was no serious attempt at censoring. In other words, they merely ordered the kinds of books that they needed—scientific, technology, management, computers, et cetera. So if they did not order certain types of books, it was not because of censorship, but because there was no demand for them. So I think that the selection process, as I say, is not necessarily an insurmountable problem.

Mr. FASCELL. Well at least, it might be worth a try to see where we are going and what it looks like. One thing about it, you cannot sell the books without the program and you cannot make a selection without possibility of sales. You cannot broaden selection without talking, so that has some merit.

I do not know whether Senator Case was involved in the old media guarantee program——

Mr. CASE. I have been involved in many of those types of things for years, but not closely, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Albert has made a proposal with respect to the reinstitution of a media guaranty program. We had this in the old Foreign Assistance Act some years ago and then it was killed for a variety of reasons, one of which was the fact that it bypassed the appropriations process, if you recall.

Mr. CASE. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Anyway, it is an interesting concept. One way to get around the selection process problem might be to have an industry kind of guarantee program for convertibility backed by the Federal Government as we do in OPIC on export/import. We would have an industry mutual fund on a premium basis, if that is feasible, and then have it backed and underwritten by the Federal Government within certain limits.

Mr. CASE. How do you do this—once you start guaranteeing profits or sales? Is that not likely to somewhat reduce the zeal of people to push their own books?

Mr. ALBERT. Under the old program, my company lost money because we were still under the pressures of commercial business—the buyers in the soft-currency countries demanded the highest discounts possible; the paperwork that was connected with the administration of IMG required four people on our staff to do nothing but fill out forms; our contracts were subject to slow payments on the part of purchasers which sometimes resulted in the expiration of our contracts with the U.S. agency; and we ended up with soft currencies that we did not exchange and, therefore, we had to write them off. So the entire program was a loss. We participated in it because we thought it was opening markets for us and that it might benefit us in the future, and we also felt that we were helping the U.S. Government attain one of its objectives.

Also, another point to be made is this—what is wrong with a publisher making a profit on a sale where convertibilty is guaranteed? If we decide to sell planes to Israel, we do not say we cannot do so because the manufacturer is going to make a profit on that plane—we do it because it is in the national interest.

So I do not apologize for making a profit on a sale if a profit can be made.

Mr. FASCELL. Any other questions?

Mr. CASE. No questions.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Friendly.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Are you simply saying that there would not be any substantial book trade without it?

Mr. ALBERT. No; no substantial trade.

Mr. FRIENDLY. There is nothing that the publishers can do with nonconvertible currencies that they might get from such sales?

Mr. ALBERT. No. If there were something that could be done with soft currency, obviously, we would be doing it.

Mr. FRIENDLY. But there are existing purchases, very small—and heavily technical.

Mr. ALBERT. Yes; science and technology and management and computer sciences, but if you look at the figures in Poland, as I said, they are $111,000 compared to $600,000 or $700,000 during the program. So we know that there is a demand. And we know even today because we have men covering the soft-currency countries. They would like to have books from U.S. publishers, but they simply cannot purchase them because of the currency problem.

Mr. FRIENDLY. If such a program were authorized, the first step would be negotiations between the American Government and the Helsinki signatories with nonconvertible currencies. Is it feasible, given your experience of trying to sell books in those countries, for the American Government to say that there must be a mix of content of purchases?

I am afraid that the host purchasing government might say "We are not going to commit ourselves as to what we will buy or the mix in it. Instead of using our hard currency to buy technical books, we will now take advantage of this and buy those—not necessarily Bibles or books of history."

Mr. ALBERT. I would like to know what sort of mix you have in mind before I can answer that question.

Mr. FRIENDLY. I am really asking you how we could write into an accord implementing Helsinki that kind of thing. Can it be done?

Mr. ALBERT. I don't think so. Obviously, we are not going to be able to sell books that are detrimental to the ideologies of the host country, and we would not want that to happen here.

But aside from that, I do not see that the restrictions would be that severe. In dealing with the Soviets, for example, since they have joined the copyright convention, we have evidence already that they are being much more liberal in what they will allow to come into the Soviet Union. We have a long way to go, but I think we are making very slow, but steady progress.

Mr. FASCELL. I think that the practical political problem in the Congress is this. If the program is characterized simply as an arrangement to make it easier for the Soviets and Eastern bloc countries to buy technical materials—or if it is characterized as a subsidy or market-opening process for American publishing companies—we just will not get any dollars appropriated for the program and that is the problem.

There is a national obligation here and there is a national interest, which would justify the expenditure of tax revenues for this purpose.

But to the extent that it is a 100-percent guarantee on sales and to the extent that it sanctions host countries' selection and to the extent that it is a direct subsidy in a new market, problems would arise. Those questions would be asked every time, so we might as well face them at the start if we can.

This does not mean, of course, that we should not consider the program because I agree with you that we have a very serious obligation.

Mr. FRIENDLY. May I ask another question?

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Mr. FRIENDLY. The chairman mentioned the idea of a revolving fund. Is there, in the publishing industry, enough interest in that market for the publishers themselves to put together at least a partial fund to which the American Government could contribute on a revolving basis and try it for a couple of years and see how it goes? I do not even know what the dollar figure would be, but would you have any guess?

Mr. ALBERT. I cannot answer that, but my offhand impression would be that frankly American publishers can obviously live without those markets because they are doing so now.

Mr. FASCELL. You will just stay out of the market?

Mr. ALBERT. Yes; stay out of the market.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Albert.

Mr. ALBERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CASE. One question.

Mr. FASCELL. Senator Case.

Mr. CASE. Are there problems of censorship that operate against this being a really successful venture?

Mr. ALBERT. It would depend upon the attitude on the American side, I believe.

Mr. CASE. The American side?

Mr. ALBERT. Yes. If a free market were allowed to take place—that we would sell what is requested, and what is in demand in the host country, then I do not see censorship as being a problem.

But if the Congress were to say that unless the host country agrees to buy every type of book published in the United States no matter how controversial, then I would say that the program will never get off the ground.

Mr. CASE. What would they want?

Mr. ALBERT. As I said before, science, technology, management.

Mr. CASE. All of this stuff that they are getting.

Mr. ALBERT. Noncontroversial.

Mr. CASE. If they want that, are they not willing to pay hard currency for it? I do not know. I am just asking.

Mr. ALBERT. Unfortunately, books are pretty low on the list of priorities for some of them. That is to say, we are not selling very much in soft-currency countries now.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Would any of the censorship problems be solved if, instead of the IMG, there were a guarantee for participation in Helsinki bookstores—where all sorts of imported books, not just American books, were on sale, where the American sales were in some way guaranteed—would that be easier to negotiate perhaps under the terms of the accords and with the host governments than an open-ended, somewhat fuzzy program of unspecified titles? What if the titles were the ones that American publishers choose to send over, and then we found out how many of them were sold and discussed soft-currency reimbursement? Does that make it a tighter package, in your view?

Mr. ALBERT. Yes; but I think the results would be the same. As a businessman, I would not want to send books to foreign countries that I know will not sell. So I would only send over what I think they want.

I personally feel that the censorship problem is not that critical. I understand the chairman's position as far as the Congress is concerned, but I think that if a program could be effected, the censorship problem would not be one of the major problems.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Albert.

By the way, has this proposal been submitted to the State Department yet?

Mr. ALBERT. No.

Mr. FASCELL. I see. Is there any plan to move forward on this?

Mr. ALBERT. We will be happy to do so. We did not know whether it should be presented directly by us or through your Commission.

Mr. FASCELL. As I explained, we cannot do that in this Commission since we have no legislative authority. We would not have any process by which we could pursue it legislatively. The best way to do it would be either through the Department or through Representatives or Members of the Senate who are interested.

Mr. ALBERT. When we do present it to the State Department, would it be possible to accompany it with the recommendation from this Commission?

Mr. FASCELL. That is assuming that the Commission could meet in time to make a recommendation. We will be making some suggestions when we get through with all of our hearings.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Last week, this question came up in testimony with Mr. Reinhardt. He indicated that he would be receptive to discussing some sort of proposal. My own view is that you can go directly to

USIA, but keep the Commission informed and give the Commission a chance, when it makes its recommendations, having studied your proposal, to endorse them or make some suggestions. This could be a cooperative informal relationship.

Mr. ALBERT. We will not present it to USIA because I think that is the wrong agency.

Mr. FASCELL. To CU?

Mr. ALBERT. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you. Now we go to Mr. Robert Bernstein. We will be delighted to hear from you and if you would like to move in front of the microphone, that will help us all.

Thank you, Mr. Albert.

Mr. ALBERT. Thank you.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. BERNSTEIN

Mr. BERNSTEIN. I have submitted my statement and I will try to cut it as I go along.

Mr. FASCELL. We will put your whole statement in the record, Mr. Bernstein, so you can extract and summarize as you see fit.

[Mr. Bernstein's prepared statement follows:]

My name is Robert Bernstein, and I am Chairman of the Board and President of Random House.

I first became interested in the Soviet Union when I visited that country in 1971 with four other publishers [1], on behalf of the Association of American Publishers. Our purpose was to encourage Soviet accession to the Universal Copyright Convention. Before my trip, I tried to learn as much as I could about the country and even took several Russian-language lessons, but I left for Moscow believing that the Soviet Union, despite its well-advertised Communist political and economic system, was not that different from other European countries.

My two-week visit in 1971, and another one-week visit last year, convinced me that simple things which are essential for the successful conduct of international publishing, and which we tend to take for granted, present serious if not insurmountable difficulties in our relations with the Soviet Union. I have in mind such basic things as meeting with individual authors and contacting them by phone or mail.

After my return in 1971, I continued to follow events in the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union announced its accession to the Universal Copyright Convention in February 1973, I became Chairman of the Association of American Publishers' Committee on Soviet-American Publishing Relations. Later, in 1975, as our scope broadened, that Committee became the International Freedom to Publish Committee, which I have chaired for the past two years.

In the fall of 1973, the Soviet Union announced the formation of the All-Union Copyright Agency (VAAP for short) which was granted the exclusive right to license Soviet works for publication abroad and to negotiate contracts for Soviet publication of foreign works. At the time of its formation, VAAP informed foreign publishers and Soviet authors that only contracts made through VAAP would be recognized under Soviet law, and they intimated that Soviet authors negotiating contracts directly with foreign publishers might be subject to criminal sanctions in the USSR. A number of Soviet statements referred to "further regulations governing publication abroad of works by Soviet authors," but to this time, despite repeated requests, these regulations have never been disclosed to foreign publishers.

This illustrates another problem of doing business with the Soviet Union: the existence of secret, unpublished regulations in many crucial areas, ranging from the granting of exit visas to licensing foreign publication. The censorship laws of the Soviet Union have never been published; this is one of the factors which has curtailed American participation in the Moscow Book Fair scheduled for Sep-

[1] W. Bradford Wiley, Chairman, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; Edward McCabe, President, Grolier, Inc.; Mark Carroll, Director, Harvard University Press; Robert Frase, Vice President, Association of American Publishers.

tember. We have been told that our exhibits would be subject to Soviet laws, but we have been unable to discover what those laws are.

These laws can also affect American authors directly. In May 1976, we signed Suzanne Massie, wife of Robert Massie who is the author of "Nicholas and Alexandra", to do an art book about a great Soviet collection which would serve as a celebration of the Russian heritage. We consulted with VAAP and told them that we were signing Mrs. Massie to do this book and that she would have to do research in Leningrad and Moscow. VAAP was very cooperative and helped us to arrange appointments. Two days before her scheduled departure, Mrs. Massie's visa was canceled. To this day, after repeated inquiries, neither VAAP nor the Russian Embassy has given us any explanation. We have speculated that perhaps this happened because she wrote a book on Soviet poets, or because she was friendly with the Panovs when they came to the West. We do not know. But an enormous amount of time was wasted setting up the trip, writing the contract, trying to do everything in the right way.

Many of us feared that the Soviet Union would use their accession to the Copyright Convention and the newly-formed VAAP to prevent Western publication of such unofficial Soviet writers as Andrei Sakharov and Vladimir Voinovich. Since 1973, so far as I know, the Soviet Union has not prosecuted any authors simply for publishing their works abroad, and officials have even stated in interviews that they do not object to direct author-publisher negotiations. But the situation remains ambiguous, and a number of authors—Lev Kopelev, Vladimir Kornilov, Vladimir Voinovich—who have published abroad have been expelled from the Writers' Union since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. It is also ominous to note that many members of the various Helsinki Watch Committees in the USSR have been jailed, prosecuted, or otherwise harassed.

Therefore, my first recommendation to the Commission is that the agenda for the Belgrade Conference should include a request that the Soviet Union state publicly, officially and unambiguously that Soviet authors do enjoy the right to enter into direct contracts with foreign publishers for publication of their works abroad, and that Soviet authors will not suffer expulsion from the Writers' Union or other sanctions on account of foreign publication of their work. This request is based on the Final Act's reference to "facilitating . . . international contacts and communications between authors and publishing houses."

In 1974, Alfred A. Knopf, a subsidiary of Random House, wished to publish a collection of Andrei Sakharov's essays. Letters sent through the mails did not reach him but, at that time, it was still possible to reach him by phone, and arrangements for the publication of his book were concluded directly. When in July 1975, Dr. Sakharov sent his next book, "My Country and the World", abroad for publication, it was no longer possible to reach him directly by phone—all overseas calls to his number were not put through. In fact, when I had dinner with Dr. Sakharov in his Moscow apartment last September, he told me he had not received an international phone call or letter from abroad for two years. However, some of his friends could be reached by phone, and messages could be exchanged in this cumbersome way. Now, after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and Dr. Sakharov's receipt of the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize, not only does his phone remain cut off for international phone calls, but the phones of many of his friends have been disconnected (Valentin Turchin, Vladimir Voinovich and Lev Kopelev), or his friends are in jail (Yuri Orlov, Sergei Kovalev, Alexander Ginzburg and Anatoly Shcharansky), or in internal exile (Andrei Tverdokhlebov). So that in the case of Dr. Sakharov—and in the case of other unofficial authors as well—the possibility for direct contacts between authors and publishers has deteriorated since Helsinki from an unsatisfactory state to an impossible state.

I have cited my experience with Dr. Sakharov as an illustration of the vital importance of unimpeded postal and telephone communications for the conduct of publishing business, and for commercial, cultural and scientific exchanges of all kinds. In this country, we tend to take the functioning of the post office and telephone service for granted until a strike or other interruption occurs. But a few moments of reflection will convince you that our civilization depends on the existence of inexpensive, rapid and dependable means of communication. My second recommendation, therefore, is that securing effective guarantees for the normal delivery of international mail and unimpeded international telephone service should be a high priority for American delegates to the Belgrade Conference. Although there is no explicit mention of telephone and postal communications in the Final Act, such guarantees are obviously essential if we are to realize the human contacts and cultural exchanges called for in that agreement.

After publishing Andrei Sakharov's books, I had the privilege of meeting Mrs. Sakharov at the 1975 Peace Prize ceremonies in Oslo—Dr. Sakharov was denied permission to attend—and, in 1976 as I have mentioned, I met Dr. Sakharov himself. I learned from the Sakharovs that a number of their friends were in prison: Vladimir Bukovsky, for sending to the West detailed reports on compulsory confinement of dissenters in psychiatric hospitals; the literary specialist Gabriel Superfin, for sending to the West Edward Kuznetsov's "Prison Diaries"; Sergei Kovalev, for contributing to the samizdat journal A Chronicle of Current Events. The Sakharovs told me that their son-in-law, Efrem Yankelevich, had been forced to leave Moscow University, but the authorities had refused him permission to complete his studies at MIT. When I, and other American publishers, have raised such issues with our Soviet counterparts, we have been told by the Soviets—and sometimes by US State Department officials as well—that questions on such subjects represent unwarranted interference in the USSR's internal affairs and could damage Soviet-American relations. In fact, in 1976, just before I visited Moscow with nine other publishers [2] to conduct a seminar on the American publishing industry, Boris Stukalin, Chairman of the State Committee of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers on Publishing, Printers, and Book Trade, had an urgent message delivered verbally by messenger to Townsend Hoopes, President of the Association of American Publishers, threatening to cancel the seminar if the Bukovsky case or similar cases involving freedom of expression and human rights were going to be raised. An unsatisfactory compromise was worked out: the American delegation agreed not to mention such issues in their public remarks, but they reserved the right to raise such questions in individual meetings.

Since the adoption of the United Nations Charter, it has been a recognized principle of international law that a State's respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is a matter of international concern. So my third recommendation is that we make clear at Belgrade that by signing the Helsinki Final Act and other international agreements containing human rights provisions, the US and the USSR have explicitly recognized that "respect for human rights is an essential factor for the peace, well-being and justice necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations among . . . States" and that discussion of human rights issues cannot be evaded by references to "non-intervention in internal affairs." It is not only our right but, in important respects, our duty to strive to secure Soviet compliance with the humanitarian provisions of the international agreements that we have jointly signed.

I am well aware that America's record on human rights is not without flaws. I am prepared, and I trust most Americans are prepared, to listen to Soviet criticism of our record and to take appropriate action when we are at fault. The American delegation to Belgrade must make clear that we consider it our right to speak out publicly and privately on Soviet violations of their international human rights obligations.

Freedom of expression is, of course, intimately connected with the fate of the publishing industry. When freedom of expression is curtailed (and this means the freedom to express unpopular, inconvenient, even outrageous thoughts—for what government or society has ever censored the expression of views echoing the official line?), then publishing becomes merely propaganda. John Steinbeck once gave John O'Hara a silver cigarette case with this inscription: "The lonely mind of one man is the only creative organ in the world, and any force that interferes with its free function is treason." Treason, I believe Steinbeck meant, against our inalienable human rights. Freedom of expression is not a luxury reserved for prosperous states or selected individuals; it is not a privilege to be granted or withheld by governments or parties. Freedom of expression is the inalienable right of every man and every woman, and, as a citizen and publisher, I urge that the United States government make plain that it does not condone the denial of this right anywhere, or at any time.

I want now to mention a fundamental issue that has particular significance for the publishing industry.

[2] W. Bradford Wiley, chairman, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; Mead Stone, president, McGraw-Hill International Book Division; Theodore vandenBeemt, president, W. B. Saunders Co.; Leo Albert, chairman of the board, Prentice-Hall International, Inc.; Lawrence Hughes, president, William Morrow & Co., Inc.; Peter H. Neumann, Sr., vice president, International Publishing Group, Addison-Wesley Publishing, Inc.; Chester Kerr, director, Yale University Press; Donald W. Jones, president and chairman, Management Committee, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc.; and Townsend Hoopes, president, Association of American Publishers, Inc.

The Helsinki agreements were negotiated and signed on a government-to-government basis with slight or no consultation with publishers or other nongovernmental groups. In the Soviet Union, implementation of commercial, scientific and cultural agreements is the responsibility of—and strictly controlled by—government agencies; in the case of publisher, it is controlled by the State Committee on Publishing, Printers and Book Trade. In the United States, implementation of such agreements depends on many autonomous firms and institutions; the government is only one factor in our pluralistic society. But by signing the Final Act, the U.S. government in effect committed Random House and other independent American publishers to increase their participation in book exhibitions, to improve the quality of translation and to increase the number of translated books published, to exchange on a systematic basis advance publication lists with foreign publishers, and so on. Since signing the Helsinki Final Act, the State Department has furnished little guidance or support to U.S. publishers to help us fulfill these commitments; in fact, we had a difficult time arranging the services of an interpreter for our negotiations of a protocol to cover Soviet-American publishing relations.

I certainly do not want unnecessary government intervention and interference in the publishing industry, but I believe that it is the govenrment's responsibility to provide counsel and support, including financial support in appropriate areas such as book exhibitions, to U.S. publishers who are trying in good faith to honor the commitments assumed on their behalf—if without their consent—by the U.S. government at Helsinki. The State Department may object to my remarks on the grounds that the Final Act is not a legally binding treaty, and that the language of the provisions I have cited is indefinite and subject to interpretation. But I remember when the leaders at Helsinki stated that the success or failure of Helsinki should be judged by the promises that would be kept and not simply by the promises that were made. Unless the U.S. government takes practical steps to implement the promises we made, what is the point of the Helsinki Final Act? My fourth recommendation is that the U.S. government take practical steps to implement the promises we made; otherwise, how can we hold the Soviet Union accountable for the promises they made?

I for one feel that honoring commitments is a serious subject, and I believe that the State Department, together with the Congress, must make a more serious effort than it has to date to help publishers, and other affected nongovernmental institutions, in their efforts to fulfill the commitments made by the U.S. government at Helsinki.

I would now like to focus on one very specific provision of the Helsinki Final Act which is, in my opinion, the crucial test for Soviet-American publishing relations and expanded exchange of information. In the Final Act, the participating States committed themselves to "promote, where deemed appropriate, an increase in the number of sales outlets where books by authors from the other participating States, imported in the original on the basis of agreements and contracts, and in translation, are for sale" and to a "gradual increase in the number and diversity of works by authors from the other participating States available in the original and in translation in their libraries and bookshops."

Books published in the Soviet Union are readily available in the United States. The Kamkin bookstore in Washington is almost exclusively devoted to books imported from the Soviet Union, and the similar Four Continents Bookstore in New York has just moved to expanded quarters on Fifth Avenue. What many persons fail to realize is that the Soviet Union publishes an extensive list of English-language books designed for distribution in the American market. In 1969, for instance, they published 952 new titles in English. Selections range from the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and literature by Gorky, Soloukhin and Bondarev, to frankly propagandistic works such as Georgi Arbatov's "The War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations" and Yuri Ivanov's "Caution: Zionism!" All these works, as well as a full range of Russian-language books and periodicals, can be conveniently purchased at low, subsidized prices in New York, Washington and other American cities. In addition, by offering various inducements, the Soviet Union has persuaded major American publishers to have published a volume of Nikita Khrushchev's speeches and more recently, a volume of Brezhnev's speeches; even an English translation of the multi-volume Soviet encyclopedia is scheduled.

Direct arrangements by the Soviet government with publishers, by the way, give some publishers an inside track on approved Soviet publications and serve to limit American competition favoring those who are friendly to Soviet govern-

ment officials. You may be interested to know that, for this reason, Random House has been trying to arrange to have an editorial scout in Moscow. We have explained to Boris Stukalin that this scout would keep us informed only about books officially published in the Soviet Union, so that we could better decide which of them we might want to publish. After receiving discouraging signs about two interested persons, I finally found an ideal individual, Raya Orlova. Author of a study of Abraham Lincoln called "The Story of John Brown" and an expert on American literature, Mrs. Orlova is well equipped to help determine what would interest American readers. She is the wife of Lev Kopelev, a Soviet author who is not being published in the Soviet Union but has been in Germany and will soon be in the United States by Lippincott. And her stepdaughter lives in the United States with her husband, Pavel Litvinov. I wrote to Mr. Stukalin describing Mrs. Orlova's duties and asking for his help; he responded that it was not under his jurisdiction and he could not advise me. I wrote to Raya Orlova through the mails; the letter was never received. I have written to a friend of mine in the Soviet Union, an American who has spoken with her; I have asked him to clear Mrs. Orlova's taking a job with us, because I do not want inadvertently to place her in a compromising position. It has taken months, and the matter still has not satisfactorily been arranged; we are not writing each other through the mails directly, and we cannot speak on the phone (her husband's phone was removed some time ago). This shows you clearly, I think, how difficult it is to do legitimate business in an open and honest way with the Soviets.

Now, what is the situation in the Soviet Union with respect to Western publications? In 1970, in Moscow Bookstore Number 3, a very limited selection of books published in France, mostly children's books, was on sale to the Soviet public. These were the only books published in the West on sale there. Now, after Helsinki, even this inadequate outpost of Western culture has disappeared with the expiration of the Franco-Soviet cultural agreement. Nowhere in the Soviet Union can books published in any Western country be purchased by the Soviet public. They cannot order Western books by mail, allegedly because of foreign exchange problems. And personal copies of controversial Western books are often confiscated from tourists entering the USSR.

The Soviet Union's response to criticism of this total exclusion of Western books—and the situation with respect to newspapers and periodicals is almost as bad—is that they translate an impressive number of Western works into Russian. They are correct. But that response illustrates the Soviet Union's incapacity or unwillingness to understand what cultural exchange means. Every foreign book translated and published in the Soviet Union (just as every book or printed text published in the Soviet Union) is selected and edited by publishers under the direct control of the Soviet government and the Communist Party; is censored by Glavlit under the direct control of the Soviet government and the Communist Party; is printed on presses under the direct control of the Soviet government and the Communist Party; and is sold through bookstores under the direct control of the Soviet government and the Communist Party.

It is true that they publish translations of Mark Twain, Jack London and even J. D. Salinger, but the Communist Party's taste in contemporary nonfiction works is best illustrated by their first purchase from Random House: several chapters of the book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. And it is interesting to note that the Soviet Union is now negotiating with Random House to publish "The American Police State" by David Wise. This concerns us. We do not wish to discourage the Soviets from publishing books critical of the United States, but we do wonder how Soviet citizens can have a fair picture of what life is like in America if such books are the only ones they are allowed to read. This is not right, not honorable. If the Soviets choose to publish only vigorous criticism of the United States, then their sincerity is surely suspect and should be exposed for what it is. If they publish "The American Police State," then they should also publish Alistair Cooke's "America."

This absolute and arbitrary control by the Soviet government and Communist Party of all literature published in the West scarcely satisfies the goals set forth in the Final Act: to promote access by all to respective cultural achievements. I admire Jack London as a writer, but Soviet publication of his work in Russian translation is not the exchange of information and cultural values necessary to promote peace and mutual understanding; it is the false illusion of detente substituting for real progress.

If the Final Act's provisions on cultural exchange are to have any meaning, the ordinary Soviet citizen must have access to books published in the West; this is my fifth recommendation. If is naive and utopian to believe that we can persuade the Soviet Union to immediately end all censorship, and I would acknowledge their right to ban from sale or circulation in the U.S.S.R. any books that violate provisions of published Soviet laws. But I believe our delegates at Belgrade must make clear that unless ordinary Soviet citizens can have access in some fashion to current Western books beyond those works selected and edited by Communist Party officials for publication inside the U.S.S.R. then cultural exchange and cooperation is a sham and a deception.

There are at least two ways to achieve access by ordinary Soviet citizens to an increased diversity of American publications. First, a special bookstore in Moscow could be devoted to books imported from the countries participating in the European Conference. Soviet citizens could be allowed to order foreign books by mail, with payment in rubles to a central account; the U.S. government could then purchase these rubles from the bookseller and use them to pay the costs of U.S. exhibitions and cultural exchanges in the U.S.S.R. (By the way, when I consider the years when the USIA had an exhibit at the Frankfurt Book Fair, where it was hardly necessary as so many publishers were represented there anyway, it seems to me even more important to aid the proper display of American titles in Moscow next September.) Second, a group of American authors and publishers could pick ten outstanding American books each year to be translated into Russian and printed in the United States for sale in Soviet bookstores (the Soviet censors would have the right to veto any selection that violated Soviet laws).

The practical problems of book exchanges can easily be overcome if the Soviet Union is willing to allow ordinary Soviet citizens access to Western books. Unless the Soviet Union is willing to take some steps in this direction, we can have only propaganda exchanges, not cultural exchanges, with them.

A closely related problem is the right of American publishers and universities to invite Soviet authors to visit the West. Perhaps the most celebrated cases of Soviet restrictions on foreign travel were the actions which prevented Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov from going to Stockholm to accept their Nobel Prizes. But many lesser known Soviet authors are refused permission to accept invitations from abroad. Perhaps the remarks of the judge who tried Joseph Brodsky for "parasitism" best illustrate the Soviet attitude toward authors: "You are not a poet, because you are not a member of the Writers' Union." And even members of the Writers' Union have been denied permission to travel abroad. My sixth recommendation is that we make clear to the Soviet Union that the cultural exchanges and expanded tourism promised by the Final Act were not meant only for Party officials; that a fair proportion of Soviet writers and scholars respected in the West must be included in such exchanges if we are to keep the promises made at Helsinki; and that we should be advised well in advance—as we so often have not been—of who is coming, and when and how they are coming, so they may be properly received and their visit publicized.

Some of my remarks may seem overly critical of the present state of affairs. But that is because I take seriously the Helsinki Final Act and the possibility for real cooperation in the future between Soviet and American publishers, as well as Soviets and American in other professions. I endorse President Carter's call for cooperation and not confrontation at Belgrade. That is why I would like to conclude my remarks by underlining the importance I attach to an early agreement that further Conferences will be held at regular intervals to review the status of the Helsinki Final Act. If the forthcoming Belgrade Conference is the last formal opportunity to review the fulfillment of the Helsinki accords, the pressure to cover every point and to attain maximum results will inevitably push the parties into confrontation. The problems which plague U.S.–U.S.S.R. relations cannot be solved in a single meeting; they require an extended process, gradual accommodation. If the parties—and the public—know that future Conferences will occur, there is a greater chance that they will be satisfied by those definite but small steps toward accommodation that can be taken now.

Thank you very much.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. It is a good experience for me. I know the pain that our authors sometimes feel when we ask them to cut out a few lines.

Mr. CASE. You usually end up with a longer statement.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. That might be the case here.

I first became interested in the Soviet Union when I visited that country in 1971 with four other publishers on behalf of the Association of American Publishers. Our purpose then was to encourage Soviet accession to the Universal Copyright Convention.

My 2-week visit in 1971, and another 1-week visit last year, convinced me that simple things which are essential for the successful conduct of international publishing, and which we tend to take for granted, present serious, if not insurmountable, difficulties in our relations with the Soviet Union. I have in mind such basic things as meeting with individual authors and contacting them by phone or mail.

When I returned home in 1971, I continued to follow events in the Soviet Union and when the Soviet Union announced its accession to the Universal Copyright Convention in February 1973, I became chairman of the Association of American Publishers' Committee on Soviet-American Publishing Relations, which was set up to try to make that agreement work. Later, in 1975, as our scope broadened, that committee became the International Freedom to Publish Committee, which I have chaired for the past 2 years.

In the fall of 1973, the Soviet Union announced the formation of the All-Union Copyright Agency—VAAP for short—which was granted the exclusive right to license Soviet works for publication abroad and to negotiate contracts for Soviet publication of foreign works.

At the time of its formation, VAAP informed foreign publishers and Soviet authors that only contracts made through VAAP would be recognized under Soviet law, and they intimated that Soviet authors negotiating contracts directly with foreign publishers might be subject to criminal sanctions in the U.S.S.R.

A number of Soviet statements referred to "further regulations governing publication abroad of works by Soviet authors," but to this time, despite repeated requests, these regulations have never been disclosed to foreign publishers.

This illustrates another problem of doing business with the Soviet Union: the existence of secret, unpublished regulations in many crucial areas, ranging from the granting of exit visas to licensing foreign publication. The censorship laws of the Soviet Union have never been published; this is one of the factors which has curtailed American participation in the Moscow book fair scheduled for September. We have been told that our exhibits would be subject to Soviet laws, but we have been unable to discover what those laws are.

These laws can also affect American authors directly. In May 1976, we signed Suzanne Massie, wife of Robert Massie, who is the author of "Nicholas and Alexandra," to do an art book about a great Soviet collection which would serve as a celebration of the Russian heritage. We consulated with VAAP and told them that we were signing Mrs. Massie to do this book and that she would have to do research in Leningrad and Moscow. VAAP was very cooperative and helped us to arrange appointments. Two days before her scheduled departure, Mrs. Massie was told she would not get a visa. To this day, after repeated inquiries, neither VAAP nor the Russian Embassy has given us any explanation. We have speculated that perhaps this happened because she wrote a book on Soviet poets, or because she was friendly with the Panovs when they came to the West. We do not know. But an enor-

mous amount of time was wasted setting up the trip, writing the contract, trying to do everything in the right way.

Many of us feared that the Soviet Union would use their accession to the Copywright Convention and the newly formed VAAP to prevent Western publication of such unofficial Soviet writers as Andrei Sakharov and Vladimir Voinovich.

Since 1973, so far as I know, the Soviet Union has not prosecuted any authors simply for publishing their works abroad, and officials have even stated in interviews that they do not object to the direct author-publisher negotiations. But the situation remains ambiguous, and a number of authors—Lev Kopelev, Vladimir Kornilov, Vladimir Voinovich—who have published abroad, have been expelled from the Writers' Union since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.

It is also ominous to note that many members of the various Helsinki Watch Committees in the U.S.S.R. have been jailed, prosecuted, or otherwise harassed.

Therefore, my first recommendation to the Commission is that the agenda for the Belgrade Conference should include a request that the Soviet Union state publicly, officially, and unambiguously that Soviet authors do enjoy the right to enter into direct contracts with foreign publishers for publication of their works abroad, and that Soviet authors will not suffer expulsion from the Writers' Union or other sanctions on account of foreign publication of their works. This request is based on the Final Act's reference to "facilitating * * * international contacts and communications between authors and publishing houses.

In 1974, Alfred A. Knopf, a subsidiary of Random House, wished to publish a collection of Andrei Sakharov's essays. Letters sent through the mails did not reach him, but at that time, it was still possible to reach him by phone, and arrangements for the publication of his book were concluded directly.

When in July 1975, Sakharov sent his book, "My Country and the World," abroad for publication, it was no longer possible to reach him directly by phone—all overseas calls to his number were not put through. In fact, when I had dinner with Dr. Sakharov in Moscow in September, he told me he had not received an international phone call or letter from abroad for 2 years.

Some of his friends could be reached by phone and messages could be exchanged in this cumbersome way. After the signing of the Helsinki pact and Dr. Sakharov's receipt of the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize, not only does his phone remain cut off, but the phones of many of his friends have now been disconnected—Valentin Turchin, Vladimir Voinovich, and Lev Kopelev, to mention three. Or his friends are in jail—Yuri Orlov, Sergei Kovalev, Alexander Ginzburg and Anatoly Shcharansky, or in exile—Andrei Tverdokhlebov. So that in the case of Dr. Sakharov—and in the case of other unofficial authors as well—the possibility of direct contacts between authors and publishers has deteriorated since Helsinki from an unsatisfactory state to an impossible one.

I recommend, second, that securing guarantees for the normal delivery of international mail and unimpeded international telephone service should be a high priority for American delegates to the Belgrade Conference. Although there is no explicit mention of telephone

and postal communications in the Final Act, such guarantees are obviously essential if we are to realize the human contacts and cultural exchanges called for in that agreement.

After publishing Andrei Sakharov's books, I had the privilege of meeting Mrs. Sakharov at the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize ceremonies in Oslo—Dr. Sakharov was denied permission to attend—and, in 1976, as I have mentioned, I met Dr. Sakharov himself. I learned from the Sakharovs that a number of their friends were in prison: Vladimir Bukovsky, who is now out, for sending reports to the West on compulsory confinement of dissenters in psychiatric hospitals; Gabriel Superfin, for sending to the West Edward Kuznetsov's "Prison Diaries"; Sergei Kovalev, for contributing to the samizdat journal "A Chronicle of Current Events."

The Sakharovs told me that their son-in-law, Efrem Yankelevich, had been forced to leave Moscow University, but the authorities had refused him permission to complete his studies at MIT. When I, and other American publishers, have questioned such situations, we have been told by the Soviets—and sometimes by U.S. State Department officials as well—that we were interfering in the U.S.S.R.'s internal affairs and could damage Soviet-American publishing relations.

In fact, in 1976, just before nine American publishers, including myself, went to Moscow, Boris Stukalin, chairman of the State Committee of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers on Publishing, Printers, and the Book Trade, had an urgent message delivered verbally by messenger to Townsend Hoopes, president of the Association of American Publishers, threatening to cancel the seminar if the Bukovsky case or similar cases involving freedom of expression and human rights were going to be raised. An unsatisfactory compromise was worked out: the American delegation agreed not to mention such issues in their public remarks, but they reserved the right to raise such questions in individual meetings.

Since the adoption of the United Nations Charter, it has been a recognized principle of international law that a state's respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is a matter of international concern. My third recommendation, therefore, is that we make clear at Belgrade that by signing the Helsinki Final Act and other international agreements containing human rights provisions, the United States and the U.S.S.R. have explicitly recognized that "respect for human rights is an essential factor for the peace, well-being and justice necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations among * * * states" and that discussion of human rights cannot be evaded by references to "non-intervention in internal affairs."

I am well aware that America's record on human rights is not without flaws. I am prepared, and I trust most Americans are prepared, to listen to Soviet criticism of our record and to take appropriate action when we are at fault. The American delegation to Belgrade must make clear that we consider it our right to speak out publicly and privately on Soviet violations of their international human rights obligations.

I now want to mention a fundamental issue that has particular significance for the publishing industry. The Helsinki agreements were negotiated and signed on a government-to-government basis with slight or no consultation with publishers or other nongovern-

mental groups. In the Soviet Union, implementation of commercial, scientific and cultural agreements is the responsibility of—and strictly controlled by—government agencies; in the case of publishing, it is controlled by the State Committee on Publishing, Printers, and the Book Trade. In the United States, implementation of such agreements depends on many autonomous firms and institutions.

But by signing the Final Act, the U.S. Government, in effect, committed Random House and other independent American publishers to increase their participation in book exhibits, to improve the quality of translation, to increase the number of translated books published, to exchange on a systematic basis advance publication lists with foreign publishers, and so on.

Since signing the Helsinki Final Act, the State Department has furnished little guidance or support to U.S. publishers to help us fulfill these commitments. In fact, we had a difficult time arranging the services of an interpreter for our negotiations of a protocol to cover Soviet-American publishing relations.

I certainly do not want unnecessary Government intervention and interferences in the publishing industry, but I believe it is the Government's responsibility to provide counsel and support, including financial support in appropriate areas such as book exhibits, to U.S. publishers who are trying in good faith to honor the commitments assumed on their behalf—if without their consent—by the U.S. Government at Helsinki.

Unless the United States takes practical steps to implement the promises we made, there is no point in the Helsinki Final Act. Therefore, my fourth recommendation is that we take practical steps to implement the promises we made so that we can hold the Soviet Union accountable for the promises they have made.

I would like to focus now on one very specific provision of the Helsinki Final Act which is, in my opinion, the crucial test for Soviet-American publishing relations and expanded exchange of information. In the Final Act, the participating states committed themselves to:

> Promote, where deemed appropriate, an increase in the number of sales outlets where books by authors from the other participating states, imported in the original on the basis of agreements and contracts, and in translation, are for sale and to a gradual increase in the number and diversity of works by authors from the other participating states available in the original and in translation in their libraries and bookshops.

Books published in the Soviet Union are readily available in the United States. The Kamkin bookstore in Washington is almost exclusively devoted to books imported from the Soviet Union, and the similar Four Continents Bookstore in New York has just moved to expanded quarters on Fifth Avenue.

What many persons fail to realize is that the Soviet Union publishes an extensive list of English-language books designed for distribution in the American market. In 1969, for example, they published 952 new titles in English. Selections range from the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and literature by Gorky, Soloukhin, and Bondarev, to frankly propagandistic works such as Georgi Arbatov's "The War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations" and Yuri Ivanov's "Caution: Zionism!" All these works, as well as a full range of Rus-

sian-language books and periodicals, can be conveniently purchased at low, subsidized prices in New York, Washington, and other American cities.

Some American publishers who are especially friendly to Soviet officials and who publish only approved Soviet publications have an inside track on new titles, thereby limiting American competition for them. You may be interested to know that for this reason Random House has been trying to arrange to have an editorial scout in Moscow. We have explained to Boris Stukalin that this scout would keep us informed only about books officially published in the Soviet Union, so that we could better decide which of them we might want to publish.

After receiving discouraging signs about two interested persons, I finally found an ideal individual, Raya Orlova. Author of a study of Abraham Lincoln called "The Story of John Brown" and an expert on American literatutre, Mrs. Orlova is well equipped to help determine what would interest American readers. She is the wife of Lev Kopelev, a Soviet author who is not being published in the Soviet Union, but has been in Germany and will soon be in the United States by Lippincott. Her stepdaughter lives here in exile with her husband, Pavel Litvinov.

I wrote to Mr. Stukalin describing Mrs. Orlova's duties and asking for his help. He responded that it was not under his jurisdiction and he could not advise me. I wrote to Raya Orlova through the mails; the letter was never received.

I have written to a friend of mine in the Soviet Union, an American who has spoken to her and I have asked him to clear Mrs. Orlova's taking a job with us because I do not want inadvertently to place her in a compromising position.

This matter has taken months, and it still has not satisfactorily been arranged. We are not writing each other through the mails and we cannot speak on the phone—her husband's phone was removed some time ago. This shows you clearly I think how difficult it is to do legitimate business in an open and honest way with the Soviet Union.

What is the situation in the Soviet Union with respect to Western publications? In 1970, in Moscow Bookstore No. 3, a very limited selection of books published in France, mostly children's books, was on sale to the Soviet Union. These were the only books published in the West on sale there.

Now, after Helsinki, even this inadequate outpost of Western cultuure has disappeared with the expiration of the Franco-Soviet cultural agreement. Nowhere in the Soviet Union can books published in any Western country be purchased by the Soviet public. They cannot order Western books by mail, allegedly because of foreign exchange problems. Personal copies of controversial Western books are often confiscated from tourists entering the USSR.

The Soviet Union's response to criticism of this total exclusion of Western books—and the situation with respect to newspapers and periodicals is almost as bad—is that they translate an impressive number of Western works into Russian. They are correct. But that response illustrates the Soviet Union's incapacity or unwillingness to understand what cultural exchange means. Every foreign book translated and published in the Soviet Union is, of course, censored.

It is true that they published translations of Mark Twain, Jack London, and even J. D. Salinger, but the Communist Party's taste in contemporary non fiction works is best illustrated by their first purchase from Random House: several chapters of the book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. And it is interesting to note in the last week, that the Soviet Union is now negotiating with Random House to publish "The American Police State" by David Wise. This concerns us. We do not wish to discourage the Soviets from publishing books critical of the United States, but we do wonder how Soviet citizens can have a fair picture of what life is like in America if such books are the only ones they are allowed to read.

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The absolute and arbitrary control by the Soviet Government and Communist Party of all literature published in the West scarcely satisfies the goals set forth in the Final Act: to promote access by all to respective cultural achievements.

If the Final Act's provisions on cultural exchange are to have any meaning, my fifth recommendation is that the ordinary Soviet citizen must have access to books published in the West. I know it is too much to hope that all censorship will stop, but there is still much more than can be done.

There are at least two ways to achieve access by ordinary Soviet citizens to an increased diversity of American publications. First, a special bookstore in Moscow could be devoted to books imported from the countries participating in the European Conference. Secondly, it is possible that a group of American authors and publishers could pick 10 outstanding books that they wished published in the Soviet Union and those could be paid for in some way and even allowed to go through Soviet censorship.

A closely related problem is the right of American publishers and universities to invite Soviet authors to visit the West. Perhaps the most celebrated cases of Soviet restrictions on foreign travel were the actions which prevented Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn, and Sakharov from going to Stockholm to accept their Nobel Prizes. But many lesser known Soviet authors are refused permission to accept invitations from abroad.

Perhaps the remarks of the judge who tried Joseph Brodsky for parasitism best illustrate the Soviet attitude toward authors: "You are not a poet, because you are not a member of the Writers' Union." And even members of the Writers' Union have been denied permission to travel abroad, some by invitation.

My sixth recommendation is that we make clear to the Soviet Union that the cultural exchanges and expanded tourism promised by the Final Act were not meant only for party officials; that a fair proportion of Soviet writers and scholars respected in the West must be included in such exchanges if we are to keep the promises made at Helsinki; and that we should be advised well in advance—as we so

often have not been—of who is coming and when and how they are coming, so they may be properly received and their visits publicized.

I endorse President Carter's call for cooperation and not confrontation at Belgrade. That is why I would like to conclude my remarks by underlining the importance I attach to an early agreement that further conferences will be held at regular intervals to review the status of the Helsinki Final Act.

If the forthcoming Belgrade Conference is the last formal opportunity to review the fulfillment of the Helsinki accords, the pressure to cover every point and to attain maximum results will inevitably push the parties into confrontation. The problems which plague U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations cannot be solved in a single meeting; they require an extended process, gradual accommodation. If the parties and the public know that future conferences will occur, there is a greater chance that they will be satisfied by those definite but small steps toward accommodation that can be taken now.

Thank you. My apologies for reading so fast, but I wanted to get as much of it in as I could.

Mr. FASCELL. That is quite OK, Mr. Bernstein. I want to thank you very much for a very thorough and detailed record, which will be a very substantial contribution to the public record which is being compiled by this Commission. We obviously need that and we welcome all suggestions which you have made.

My own reaction immediately is that I concur with your general thrust on the objectives that we have to achieve at Belgrade, and we are very anxious to do all of those things.

Senator Case.

Mr. CASE. I do not know that I have any specific questions. I do know that this very clearly brings out this phase of observance or nonobservance of the Helsinki accords. I think that is my chief point.

First of all, you point out that the Russians will not let decent books in.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. No; they do let decent books in.

Mr. CASE. I mean free——

Mr. BERNSTIEN. They even let in a lot of books that we would approve of and are perfectly fine. Many, many of them are critical of the United States.

Mr. CASE. I was talking very loosely and you are quite right. They let in what they want to let in and they keep out anything that they want to keep out. That is not a free exchange of books.

I am not sure—although I do not condone it if it is true—but you suggested that our Government is not helping your industry to sell books—I do not mean sell only on the commercial side, but to get books into Russia. You do say that in substance.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Yes.

Mr. CASE. I am not quite sure that I understand how help on the part of our Government to your industry, in that regard, will help get books in and to get them to take them.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Picking one thing is always easier. The opening of a bookstore in Moscow, in view of the fact that there are two Soviet bookstores here, could certainly be highlighted and discussed; there could be meetings with American publishers to try to implement that in some way. That is one example.

Other examples include our negotiating a protocol with the Soviet Union now. It is a very unusual position for American book publishers to be negotiating directly with Soviet Government officials on a protocol. I used the example that we could not even get an interpreter or had difficulty getting an interpreter.

I would suggest that we need much more than an interpreter. We should have someone there from our Government working with us and talking with us. This protocol is important to the Soviets; it is not particularly important to us. We do not even understand the real meaning of it because everything in that protocol is also in the Helsinki Agreement. I think there should be much closer communication between the Government and the publishing industry on things like this.

Normally publishers, in their international dealings, do not have any contact with governments. They deal with other publishers and authors. But in the case of Communist states, we are always dealing with governments. For publishers, this is exceedingly complicated. We must learn how the state works and what all the rules are and where all the committees are and these are governments of people who are not making a profit and have limitless time to devote to these negotiations. Our Government could smooth some of his out a lot, I think.

They could help make arrangements when you go there and tell you how the organization works and who to see. Would you agree with that?

Mr. ALBERT. Yes.

Mr. CASE. I am asking Mr. Albert whether this is his view, as well.

Mr. ALBERT. Yes; it is, Senator Case, and I do share Mr. Bernstein's recommendation that where we are confronted with a monolithic government that we need to support—we need support and assistance from our own Government if we are to deal effectively.

I would like to make another comment. There might be some inconsistency between what I recommend in my proposal and what Mr. Bernstein has said, but I do not think there really is because, as Mr. Bernstein points out, I think total confrontation would be counterproductive. I think that we must maintain the pressure on the Soviets to adhere to Helsinki and to recognize the commitments that they have made.

On the other hand, we must realize that they signed a copyright convention and it puts us under the obligation to try to work with them in trying to work these things out. So I think we must go forward on parallel tracks.

Mr. FASCELL. Congressman Simon.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bernstein, in reply to Senator Case, you pointed out the failure even to provide an interpreter.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Not failure. Finally we had an interpreter. It is just not easy, in my judgment—easy enough in areas that are very difficult for publishers—dealing with government structures, in Communist countries.

I think that there must be ways to help that along. I am not nearly as experienced as Leo Albert is, however.

Mr. CASE. If my colleague will permit this interjection——

Mr. SIMON. Certainly.

Mr. CASE. In the Government, we have learned how to handle arms sales with great facility. Our Pentagon and State Department are great salesmen for American industry. But you would not like to have that kind of messing around with your business, would you?

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Specifically in negotiation of a protocol, it would be very good to be able to talk with the Government and get an idea of what we are doing and where we are going and how to do it. And even have them work on some of the things that we want to get done.

The problem, as I see it, is that American publishers are busy doing other things. From a strict business point of view, we would forget dealing with these countries at all. It just would not be practical. The main reasons for doing it are philosophical—interest in knowing the people and exchanging ideas, and an uncynical belief that talking things out helps. By the way, one problem in cultural exchange is that people arrive without warning—it is hard to find out who is coming here and it is hard to find out who is going there and why the cultural exchange has been made. There are many ways that that could be improved. For instance, there is the industry journal, Publishers' Weekly which could have articles on who is coming in cultural exchange and every publisher would read it.

Mr. SIMON. What you are really suggesting—to use the analogy that Senator Case is mentioning—is that we spend a great deal of time in the arms area, but very little time encouraging the freer flow of ideas, which could perhaps defuse the arms situation.

I am also concerned not only with the indifference you suggest, but also what you say on page 7 of your statement—that "When I and other American publishers, have raised such issues with our Soviet counterparts, we have been told by the Soviets—and sometimes by U.S. State Department officials as well—that questions on such subjects represent unwarranted interference in the U.S.S.R.'s internal affairs and could damage Soviet-American publishing relations." I wonder if you would expand on that a little bit?

Mr. BERNSTEIN. In all fairness—that should not be stated since the change of administration. In the past administration, I got the very definite impression that there was a great feeling that things should be done not through these open discussions, but in some way behind the scenes. In my judgment, that was never spelled out enough so that I really, first of all, knew that it was going to be done or how it was going to be done or when it was going to be done or if it was going to be done.

Therefore, I do not want to comment on the current attitude of the State Department, because I have not dealt with them sufficiently. I had only one meeting with them and it was extremely satisfactory.

Mr. SIMON. And then on page 3, you refer to some difficulty that you have had in connection with Suzanne Massie. Do you get any assistance from the State Department in these kinds of problems?

Mr. BERNSTEIN. She herself tried—I am trying now to remember—she went to the State Department and then she went to the Soviet Embassy, and we did and we wrote to them. We got some help, but we did not get an answer. There did not seem to be pressure to get an answer.

What really happens is that you get weary.

Mr. SIMON. And just give up.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. These things start to take too much time and too much effort. In this particular case, and in the case of getting an editorial scout in Moscow, we have done everything directly with the Soviets. We have told them what we want to do, in effect, and given them a chance to say that there is something wrong with what we are doing. That has not happened. In the case of Suzanne Massie, it was just the opposite. They made the actual appointments. I think that VAAP was embarrassed when she did not get a visa, and even they do not know why.

Mr. SIMON. Your statement refers to books within the Soviet Union. What about the other Warsaw Pact countries? What has been your experience there?

Mr. BERNSTEIN. I personally have had none. Our publishing house has had very little. I think that we are at fault there completely. But what happened actually was that with the copyright agreement, a much closer relationship with the Soviet Union grew up from the initial talks and we knew people there and we were talking back and forth.

Mr. SIMON. I should know this, but I do not. Does that agreement apply in Poland and Romania and other countries?

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Yes.

Mr. SIMON. Are they signatories to that?

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Yes.

Mr. ALBERT. If I may, I would like to go back for a second to the relationship between the private sector and the State Department, and outline some problems that we face.

The Helsinki accords call for an exchange—increased exchange of exhibits and books. The Soviets are holding their first international book fair in September of this year in Moscow. It is not commercially viable for us to exhibit because we cannot sell books in the Soviet Union. The United States will be the only government that will not have a national exhibit. We will be conspicuous by our absence. We went to the State Department, specifically to USIA, and said, "Cannot you give us help in putting up an exhibit and transporting the books and paying for this because we cannot do it?" We further said that we think you have an obligation because of the Helsinki accords and they said no, they could not do it because we have not been invited, and second, the censorship would establish a precedent which would be difficult to deal with in years to come.

But the fact remains that there will be perhaps 10 U.S. publishers' exhibits in Moscow and we will be the only country without a major national exhibit and I think this is not in keeping with the Helsinki accord.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. May I add to that? Until recently, the USIA did mount an exhibit at Frankfurt which was silly because practically every major publisher in the United States is at Frankfurt and there was really no need at all for an exhibit there.

Mr. SIMON. Is it too late to reverse that decision at this point?

Mr. ALBERT. It would not be too late. It would be a difficult problem, but it would not be too late.

Mr. SIMON. I think this is something the staff ought to explore.

Mr. FASCELL. Absolutely.

Mr. FRIENDLY. We raised the question with Mr. Reinhardt when he testified and we got nowhere.

Mr. FASCELL. Censorship is the block.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. What was the answer?

Mr. FASCELL. Censorship is the block, as far as the U.S. Government is concerned. They do not want to establish the precedent period. That is the present policy as far as I know it.

In other words, if they go in there to participate in a book fair with a national exhibition, the U.S. Government wants the right to decide what books are going to be there and not let the Soviets do it.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Well, what would happen if the United States submitted a list of books that it wanted to have at the fair, based on publishers' recommendations, and then it sent the ones that the Soviets would let in and published the titles of the books the Soviets did not let in—it seems to me that that would be extremely effective, rather than doing nothing.

Mr. FASCELL. There is a possibility of going affirmative rather than negative.

Mr. SIMON. I think your suggestion is a good one and, indeed, for the books that were banned, it would be like being banned in Boston for some of these movies.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. The United States would not be submitting to censorship. That argument is not true. It would be submitting all the books it wished and it would make it known that it would like those books to be in if it had its own way, but it does not have its own way.

Mr. CASE. Is there a feeling among American publishers that they should not be encouraged to manufacture books that are going to be satisfactory to the regime in Russia—I say this because that is not a good idea.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. This should not be encouraged?

Mr. CASE. Yes.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. The act of going into the fair would encourage them to publish those books.

Mr. CASE. Yes; you will just think about books that will please the Russians and not present a fair picture of philosophy and educational matters, history and politics and so forth.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. You mean that you will not publish or present those books to go in?

Mr. CASE. Well, I am not saying that this is the case, but I am just wondering whether there might not be some feeling that it might be a good idea to encourage manufacturers—and when I say manufacturers, I am not downgrading your industry. It is all a part of the business—but I mean to think about satisfying a market of that kind.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. First of all——

Mr. CASE. It is like encouraging, let us say—it is related in some way to the boycott question.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. First of all, the publisher is merely the author's arm. The books are created by authors and that is such a diverse process; an author can even publish his own work.

Mr. CASE. Authors cannot do anything unless their books are bought by publishers.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. That is not even true. They can publish them themselves.

Mr. CASE. Some people have to do that, I know. I am sorry. I am not really serious about this, but I am just trying to grope with you toward some reasonable position.

Mr. FASCELL. It seems to me reasonable to assume that the dynamics of the marketplace will set the selection and I do not think you can ignore that.

Mr. CASE. Right.

Mr. SIMON. If I may ask one more question.

Mr. FASCELL. Certainly.

Mr. SIMON. This is a question I asked Mr. Bernstein earlier, but Mr. Albert, what about the other Warsaw Pact countries—do we have any sales and what is our experience in these other countries?

Mr. ALBERT. I would say that our sales are greater than they are in proportion to the Soviet Union. Censorship varies from country to country. There is practically no censorship in Yugoslavia. There is some censorship in Poland, but it is not as severe as it is in the Soviet Union.

Mr. SIMON. What about Czechoslovakia?

Mr. ALBERT. Yes; we do. Our sales are very small because of the currency problem. There is always the lack of hard currency.

Mr. SIMON. How about Hungary?

Mr. ALBERT. Same thing.

Mr. SIMON. Romania?

Mr. ALBERT. Same thing. We sell to those countries, but in very small amounts. We are not promoting very much in those countries because they do not have hard currency to buy with and we are not really at fault for not promoting our books.

Mr. SIMON. What about East Germany?

Mr. ALBERT. Our sales in East Germany could be higher than any other country with regard to soft currency.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you.

Mr. ALBERT. In connection with the Moscow Book Fair, it may not—it need not be branded as a USIA exhibit. What we are asking for is technical and financial assistance. It could be an exhibit mounted by the Association of American Publishers so that it is not branded as the Government. Those publishers that will be exhibiting at the fair have been asked by the Soviet Union to submit a list 6 months in advance of the books that they plan to exhibit, under the pretext that they would like their publishers to become acquainted with our books so that sales may result at the fair.

Mr. FASCELL. The thought that you have about the Association of American Publishers putting on the book fair with some U.S. support somewhere—financially is what I gather you are talking about—that certainly seems like something that ought to be considered.

May I ask one or both of you to give us the letter on the Shcharansky case on which the association has made an appeal to the Soviet Union.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Yesterday, the Association of American Publishers held a press conference to ask that Shcharansky be freed; we said that if he is not, we would like to have a representative at the trial, which is the first time that the association has ever done that.

We did it in the Shcharansky case because there is increasing belief that, first of all, anybody who touches Andrei Sakharov is in trouble and, second, there was concern because Shcharansky was the translator

of Sakharov's letter to President Carter and also a member of the Helsinki Watch Committee. We have learned that a lot of people like him—like Vladimir Bukovsky, as an example—become authors, and the whole relationship of human rights to authors and free expression is so intertwined now that we just wanted to choose one case. We could have chosen others, frankly. We can give you our statement, and we can give you the information behind it.[1]

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you. We would like very much to have it. Also, could we get a copy of the protocol that is in the process of being negotiated?

Mr. ALBERT. Yes.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Certainly. There is no problem with that either. We will show you the one that we have received from the Soviet Union and the one that we have sent back.

Mr. FASCELL. That will be very helpful.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. However, we have not yet heard back from them.

Mr. FASCELL. Gentlemen, thank you very much.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Thank you.

Mr. ALBERT. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. Our final witness today is Lothar Loewe, a distinguished West German television correspondent who has served in Washington and Moscow and, until last Christmas, in East Berlin. There, although he was reporting for West German television, his broadcasts made him a prime source of information for East Germans on what was going on in their own country. Because his reporting was accurate and timely, it was increasingly offensive to his hosts, and last December, they expelled him on 48 hours' notice.

He is here today to tell us about the impact of information from a free society, West Germany, on a closed one, East Germany, and to give us a professional journalist's perspective on the problems the West faces in trying to expand the flow of information and the opportunities Helsinki offers for overcoming those problems.

We are very happy to welcome you here and delighted that we have the opportunity to hear you.

Mr. LOEWE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF LOTHAR LOEWE

Mr. LOEWE. Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, it is a great honor for me as a German journalist, to testify before this Commission. As you know, I come from Berlin, the former German capital, a European city which, as a result of the Cold War, is still divided by the Wall.

In Berlin, as in the rest of East Germany, the Government of the German Democratic Republic still does not allow hundreds of thousands of East Berliners to cross the Wall to see friends and relatives in the western part of the city. The German Democratic Republic stubbornly clings to a general ban on travel from East to West, although Communist Party Secretary-General Erich Honecker, by his signature on the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, including Basket III, has committed himself to facilitate travel. The GDR Government restricts travel from East

[1] The statement and the protocols are printed in the Appendix.

to West with the exception of aged people and some others, primarily because it is afraid that many of the potential travelers might use the opportunity to stay in the West. It is the dilemma of the East German leadership that it does not trust its own citizens.

Still, the Government of the GDR, on account of the Basic Treaty concluded between Bonn and East Berlin in 1972, has at least considerably improved travel of Germans from west to east. This is, no doubt about it—this is progress. The basic treaty between the two German states and the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, in the conclusion of which the United States played an essential role, have contributed remarkably to improving the situation within divided Berlin and divided Germany.

Mr. Chairman, you will know that last year some 8 million Germans from the Federal Republic and West Berlin went to see friends and relatives in the GDR. They did not enter East Germany as Communists, nor did they return as Communists. In all, 1.6 million aged people—people over 65 and pension age—and about 40,000 younger than 65 were allowed in 1976 to travel from east to west on special occasions.

Eight million visits which West Germans paid to East Germany mean at least 8 million discussions of personal matters, but also of politics and economics and the differences between the two systems. Eight million discussions of this kind are designed to waken curiosity and desires among the East Germans; desires for a better life, desires for more freedom and free movement. I know from my 2-year experience as a correspondent in the GDR that people there long to visit Western Germany or other foreign countries in all parts of the world. This goes for people critical of the Communist system as well as for party members, young and old. I remember a talk with a young East German jazz musician 2 years ago, who said: "What kind of life is it when I have to wait until retirement age of 65 before I can attend a jazz festival in West Berlin and hear Miles Davis play. Miles Davis will be dead by then." And a party member told me: "I had always hoped to see the Swiss Alps one day," and he added: "Do you think I ever will get there?"

In view of the division of Germany into two separate German states, it is not surprising that according to reliable estimates, more than 100,000 residents of the German Democratic Republic wish legally to leave their homeland and live in the Federal Republic.

During my activity as a correspondent in East Berlin, many East German citizens came to see me in my East Berlin office. They told me about their irresistible desire to leave. They handed me copies of their petitions and, full of despair, explained to me why they no longer wished to live in the GDR. Many of them did not agree to their children being trained in the Communist ideology in school. Others suffered vocational disadvantages because they were active members of Protestant or Catholic congregations. Then there were people who had been rejected for college or university studies because they declined to join the Communist Party and whose professional careers were affected. Others wished nothing but to live with their parents, brothers, sisters in Western Germany. The despair of all of these people was great. My colleagues and myself had to dissuade some of those seekers of help from committing suicide or other desperate acts. Ow-

ing to the endeavors of the West German Government, at least 4,914 East Germans were allowed to leave and join their relatives in Western Germany in the framework of family reunification in 1976. Only eight such cases were reported back in 1964.

It is my impression that a combination of events in the recent past has considerably strengthened the self-confidence of people not only in the GDR, but also in other countries—Communist countries of the Warsaw Pact. The Final Act of Helsinki, which all Communist countries published unabridged, is a document to which many people in Communist countries refer when they negotiate with government and party functionaries. They also refer to the U.N. Charter of Human Rights and to the freedom of movement sections of their own countries' constitutions. Yes, even the Communist summit meeting in East Berlin last year caused intellectual party members to think more intensely about tolerance and humanity within the Communist social system.

In my judgment, there are three groups of people today in the GDR. The largest group comprises millions of Germans who after the division of Germany had no alternative but to adjust themselves to the Communist system. Nevertheless, they are not enthusiastic followers of communism—they just have to go along.

The second group, referring to provisions in the Final Act of Helsinki, consists of a growing number of people who are firmly resolved to leave the GDR and live in the West.

Third, there is a remarkable group of people who intend to stay in the GDR, with the intention of changing the rule of bureaucratic and merciless functionaries and trying to make the regime more human and tolerant for the benefit of all citizens in East Germany. Let me give you an example.

A doctor living near East Berlin, director of a clinic and member of the Communist Party, for many years had been asking the health ministry in East Berlin for special equipment for better and more effective treatment of his patients. He asked for it because he believed sincerely in the party slogan of "all for the benefit of man." His requests were persistently refused. One day, he hired a lawyer and sued the East German Minister of Health on charges of homicide through negligence, arguing that he, the doctor, could have saved the lives of many patients if he had had the requested equipment which, by the way, is available for prominent functionaries in a government hospital in East Berlin. His suit was stifled through administrative channels. Following disciplinary proceedings, the doctor was excluded from the party. As he was a good physician and good physicians are scarce in East Germany, he remained head of the clinic. And here now is the interesting result of his action: I have learned that this brave man finally received the desired medical equipment 2 months ago.

This example indicates that the resolutions of Helsinki and the provisions of the Human Rights Charter have had an effect on the people in Communist countries. This can be noticed in the Soviet Union, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, and also in the GDR. We must all hope that the leading functionaries of those countries will finally make their methods of government more human, more tolerant, and thus more democratic. This also includes the universal release of political prisoners. The West German Government is currently trying to buy freedom for 1,309 inmates of East German prisons—political inmates, that is

Allow me now to make a brief remark on the situation in East Germany. I think if the style of government in East Germany were more human and more tolerant and if there were more opportunities for travel from East to West, many people would not wish to seek a new home in the Federal Republic, but would stay in East Germany. Such an evolutionary development would not only be progress benefiting the 17 million people in the GDR, but would also contribute to the relaxation of tension in Europe. We Germans, as a result of the war, now live in two German States—in the Federal Republic with Bonn as its capital, and in the German Democratic Republic with its capital of East Berlin. Although we live in two States, we feel—and this goes for the overwhelming majority of all Germans—like members of one nation. The relations between the two German States are still very difficult and sometimes tense, but they are much better today than they were 10 years ago. In the interest of the unity of the German nation and in the interest of a positive development of the relations between the two German States, a mass exodus from East to West would not be desirable. It must remain our goal to make Germans continue to live in East Germany as Germans who are happy and content, for, Communists or not, they are Germans and compatriots with whom we feel very closely connected.

In my entire journalistic career, one of the most fascinating assignments was to report for the German ARD Television from the GDR on the GDR to the Federal Republic and also to people living in the GDR. On account of agreement between the two German States on the activities of media correspondents, the working opportunities for correspondents in the GDR are better than in most other East Bloc states. Sixteen West German correspondents are currently accredited in East Berlin—they include three for television, two for radio and the rest for newspapers and news magazines and the German Press Agency.

My activity in the GDR was privileged in that I had two three-man camera teams from my home station at my disposal. My coworkers and I enjoyed full freedom of movement in the GDR and were allowed to carry films, tapes, manuscripts and information material of every kind across the border uncensored. We had the opportunity to talk with every willing GDR citizen before the camera or without it, and the people's courage to speak frankly was remarkable. Restrictions, as in all Communist countries, were related to reporting on industrial installations and authorities—government and party authorities. Even shots taken in a department store, for instance, required prior authorization. With the help of a so-called journalists ordinance, the GDR Government tried to restrict us to official sources of information. The decision as to what was factually correct and objective reporting was made by the East German foreign ministry.

Nevertheless, it was possible for me to report extensively and successfully from the GDR for more than 2 years, obviously, too successfully, for otherwise the GDR would not have declared me to be persona not grata.

For better understanding of the situation, let me add that the 17 million habitants of the GDR are among the best-informed people in the Communist camp.

It is true that they have no access to Western newspapers, but they have ample opportunity to receive, clearly and intelligibly, broadcasts of radio stations in West Berlin, which is located in the middle of the GDR, and from the Federal Republic. Television broadcasts of my network—the ARD—reach 80 percent of GDR territory, and those of our competitor, the ZDF Second German Television, Channel 2, can be received in about 60 percent of the GDR. Western television, and in particular, its information broadcasts, are very popular with millions of GDR residents. They are a primary source of free, unimpeded, and unfiltered information. There are about 3 million television receivers—television sets, that is—in the GDR compared to 18 million in the Federal Republic.

One of these Western sources of information is RIAS, the Radio in the American Sector, a station operated by the U.S. Information Agency, with programs made by—written and produced by German journalists, colleagues of mine. RIAS broadcasts enjoy great popularity among the GDR population. When last year, for instance, RIAS beamed an 8-hour night program about the history of rock 'n roll music, sound tapes were sold out in many GDR music shops. Hundreds of thousands of East German youngsters recorded the broadcast. And yet, contrary to the spirit and letter of the Final Act of Helsinki, RIAS medium-wave AM broadcasts have been jammed for years. Before the Helsinki Conference in the summer of 1975, I asked Deputy East German Foreign Minister Ewald Moldt at a press conference whether GDR authorities would cease jamming the RIAS after the Helsinki meeting. The deputy foreign minister called my question hostile to détente, provocative and slanderous. He failed to give me an answer, and the jamming of RIAS has not ceased.

Because of passive resistance, earlier attempts to stop the population of the GDR from receiving Western television remained abortive. Electronic jamming of television broadcasts is technically not possible today and, therefore, broadcasts of Western television can be received in the GDR as clearly as transmissions of Eastern television are received in West Berlin and in the eastern parts of the Federal Republic. Here we have competition of information media, competition which the GDR obviously fears, although its top functionaries, including members of the Politburo, attentively watch our Western telenewscasts every night.

There are two factors which many politicians and journalists have not judged correctly after the conference of Helsinki. Many of us had been optimistically looking forward to the Warsaw Pact countries taking seriously their Helsinki commitment to facilitate a freer flow of information. We had also hoped that the Communist governments would be prepared to endure critical reporting by Western correspondents more easily than before. We have ultimately hoped that the government of the Communist states would finally under the impact of the Act of Helsinki, cease to expel Western journalists because of their journalistic activity, as these governments had been doing for years. These hopes have turned out to be fallacious.

It should not be forgotten that the Government of the German Democratic Republic in East Berlin was the first government of all the East bloc countries to start expelling journalists as early as Christmas 1975. My colleague, Spiegel magazine correspondent, Jorg

Mettke, was expelled within 48 hours because of a critical article in the magazine which actually he himself had not written, about the compulsory adoption of children left behind by refugees. I was also expelled by the East Berlin authorities within 48 hours a year later, at Christmas Eve, at 4 p.m., 1976.

The vigorous diplomatic protests of the Federal Republic remained without effect.

The GDR Government acused me of gross defamation of the people and Government of the GDR, gross interference in the internal affairs of the GDR, as well as deliberate and malicious breach of GDR laws. I need not tell you that these charges were unjustified and false. In a television report on December 21, 1976, I had referred to the critical political situation in East Germany and I had discussed the growing number of arrests for political reasons; I had criticized the refusal, expressed in threatening terms, of petitions for permission to leave the GDR; and I had finally, with a view to the inhuman and cruel situation along the border across German and in the middle of Berlin, observed that every child knew that the GDR border guards had orders to shoot at people as though they were rabbits. This, I think, is an accurate and frank statement and an accurate description of the situation of the border in Germany today, which does not give the GDR leadership the right to violate flagrantly the agreement on the exchange of correspondents between the two German states and the spirit and letter of the Final Act of Helsinki, and expel me.

He who has had the chance to see the border in Germany with his own eyes knows how inhuman it is with its minefields, automatic weapon devices, barbed wire, watchtowers, bloodhounds, and guards. There is evidence that three persons were killed or injured last year. Unfortunately, there are also cases of GDR border guards being killed by escapees and criminals. I would like to make it very clear that I condemn such acts—I condemn all acts of violence. It had been the goal of my reporting from the GDR to inform audiences in East and West as quickly and truthfully as possible. One of the main objectives of my reporting was to contribute to a general halt of the use of force against people at the border between the two German states and in Berlin.

Communist Party Secretary-General Erich Honecker and a few top functionaries know from interviews and talks with me how much the renunciation of force along this border was a matter near to my heart. The more unjustified was my expulsion.

There is no doubt that the situation at the border between the Federal Republic and Czechoslovakia or along the border between Austria and Hungary is more human than at the border between the two German states. There is less frequent shooting there.

The two reasons—the true reason for my expulsion from the GDR, in my view, was that the West German television and radio correspondents, by quick and extensive reporting on the situation in the GDR, supplied not only audiences in the Federal Republic, but also in East Berlin and the GDR with firsthand information which was neither broadcast nor printed by Communist media. This includes for instance, flu epidemics, food shortages, if they occurred, as well as political developments. This interesting original information made

us well known and obviously popular with listeners and viewers in the GDR.

There is hardly a major development in the GDR today, which escapes the notice of Western correspondents. Its fairly small territorial size, the nonexistence of language barriers, and the readiness of people to give correspondents information have helped to keep my colleagues and me rather well informed about the situation. The Government of the GDR obviously does not like the idea that Western correspondents are so well informed about developments in its country. The leaders in East Berlin have yet to learn to live with well-informed Western journalists. This, too, I think is part of the process of détente.

As long as the Communist media in the GDR and other East bloc states lack the courage to break with their taboos and persist in informing their leaders, listeners, and viewers in a slanted and one-sided manner, instead of as extensively, objectively, and truthfully as possible, the Western media will remain the only popular source of reliable information.

In view of the Helsinki follow-up conference in Belgrade, opening on June 15, it must remain the goal of the Western governments strongly to urge the Eastern signatories of the Final Act of Helsinki not to curb free, unimpeded, reporting by correspondents. The governments of the Warsaw Pact organization should be admonished to commit themselves to renounce the practice of punitive expulsions once and for all, for the expulsion of correspondents will not promote détente; it is an act clearly directed against the relaxation of tension and the peaceful life of nations side by side.

You will certainly understand that in this short time, I am not in a position to discuss the entire—to discuss all aspects of correspondents' activities in all the countries of the Warsaw pact, but I will be glad to try to answer your questions, and I thank you very much for your attention.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much for a very interesting and authoritative report on the situation as it exists. I must say that I regret the necessity that the East German Republic found for expelling you just simply because you were telling the truth, but I guess that is the way it is for a while.

I certainly concur with the recommendations and the objectives which you feel must be carried out at Belgrade. I do not think there is any question about that.

What about the rest of Eastern Europe—is it more or less the same or are there major differences?

Mr. LOEWE. There are, I think, differences according to my experience and according to my exchange with colleagues of various nations. I think the situation is still fairly difficult, although there has been an improvement, as you probably know, in the Soviet Union—but, you know, it is a large country and the chances of moving around are very limited. You still have to apply to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and to cover that country with many closed areas is very difficult.

We had one improvement which, I think, the American media have not made, so far as German television is concerned: for years we had to use Soviet cameramen and Soviet sound crews. We achieved last year the privilege of having West German cameramen and a West Ger-

man assistant—sound assistant, stationed in Moscow, which I think is very important because the choice of the pictures you are taking—as long as you have a Soviet cameraman, he is subject to certain pressures from his superiors—so there has been progress, but a limited progress.

The situation in Poland is similar, although there is one difference. In Poland, correspondents are able to move around all over Poland very freely and I would say the situation is much better than in the Soviet Union so far as television is concerned. Correspondents have to rely on Polish camera crews, but the whole atmosphere and climate seems to be, despite certain set-backs occasionally, more relaxed.

In Czechoslovakia, the situation is fairly critical. Although again the West Germans have, our network has, a correspondent in Prague with a West German camera crew which is important, and they are able to move around and produce films, but they are under the normal restrictions other colleagues have, too.

In Hungary I think if you are getting in—if the Hungarians grant visas—the chances of reporting out of Hungary are fairly good, fairly liberal.

In Romania, it is different. It is a little bit more complicated; although we have correspondents there on a temporary basis, internally, the system is fairly tight; surveillance is fairly tight, and I think you cannot move around within Romania without having an escort—and that goes for most other bloc countries, too.

Mr. FASCELL. Senator Case, do you have any questions?

Mr. CASE. Your statement is most interesting, Mr. Loewe. You are a German?

Mr. LOEWE. Yes.

Mr. CASE. And you want to stay a German and you want to see the German nation exist and continue?

Mr. LOEWE. There is no doubt about that.

Mr. CASE. Do you think that the East and West should unite and that this philosophical approach is something that you feel most Germans still have?

Mr. LOEWE. Yes; I would say the question of unification—not reunification, but rather unification because the two German States developed historically after World War II in a different way—but there is no doubt in my mind that if all of the Germans in the Federal Republic and in the GDR would be asked today—would they like to live in one country or in one state—I am convinced that the overwhelming majority would prefer to live in one country. That means certainly not under the Communist regime existing in the GDR, but under a united Germany in a western style of democracy.

I think, however, that the chance of unification is tremendously slim. But I think it would be great progress if the two German States were able to develop relations which are similar today to those between the Federal Republic and Austria. We have free exchange between the Federal Republic and Austria going back and forth. For an Austrian being in West Germany and for a West German being in Austria, there is really no difference. There is only a different currency, but otherwise, no difference.

If the East German Government and East Germany itself would change in an evolutionary way and change toward more tolerance and

more humanity and more freedom and more freedom of movement from East to West, then I think that would ease the division of Germany tremendously and would help to keep this nation together.

Mr. CASE. I see. It is a fascinating idea to look into someone else's mind in this way. We get our ideas from all kinds of sources and very seldom from a source as authentic as yours.

What does that mean as far as the future goes? Should Germany still be feared as it is feared by Russia?

Mr. LOEWE. Well, Mr. Senator——

Mr. CASE. I suppose these are things that you know.

Mr. LOEWE. Well, to give you my personal view on that, it is certainly a question today—if you are thinking of Europe today with 65 million West Germans and 17 million East Germans, the industrial potential of both countries—there is a question apart from the political differences of the two systems whether a united Germany would be bearable for the other European neighbors in the West and the East. That goes for both sides, and the question is whether or not this is desirable. I personally think there are only three nations—three countries, who could bear it because they are extremely powerful—the United States, Soviet Union, and China.

But in Europe, I think Dutch people—the Danish people, Poles, Czechs, because of the German history, would be probably very uneasy. But I would not say that Germany is a threat. The Federal Republic is no threat and East Germany is no threat because it is controlled by the Russians.

These are the problems and I am not thinking in terms of the immediate future—as a realistic policy for the next 20 or 30 years. I am not looking at a unified Germany soon, but rather at a changing climate in Europe, and we hope for a changing situation—evolutionary changes in East Germany which make it easier for the two German States to live together.

Mr. CASE. Which, according to you, the great mass of people want?

Mr. LOEWE. Yes.

Mr. CASE. Did you know Senator Cooper?

Mr. LOEWE. Yes; I was there when the American Embassy opened. When the first embassy premises were opened, it happened that we were neighbors in the same building. German television was on the first floor and Senator Cooper was residing on the fifth floor. I met with him frequently and I know members of the staff of the American Embassy. My impression is that the Embassy is doing a very good job over there.

Mr. CASE. We are very prejudiced. We think he is about the tops and he is an extraordinarily good man in that position.

Mr. LOEWE. I agree.

Mr. CASE. I do not think I have any questions that I want to ask you further. Will you be around for a while?

Mr. LOEWE. I will be here for a couple of days and then I will go back to Germany.

Mr. CASE. You will be available anyway?

Mr. LOEWE. Yes.

Mr. CASE. Here or in Germany?

Mr. LOEWE. I will be available here or in Germany.

Mr. CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. I want to ask you a question about retaliation on expulsion. In your case I have been advised that Bonn did not respond in kind. We had the case of the expulsion of the Associated Press man in Moscow and we retaliated, but from a correspondent's viewpoint, how do you see it?

Mr. LOEWE. Let me put it this way. I think the Western Governments, the Government of the United States, the West German Government—all governments, have to think of methods to deter the East European or the bloc countries from expelling journalists.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, we need to be more forceful about it?

Mr. LOEWE. Yes; exactly. I think in the past, the Germans have practiced the retaliation by expelling other correspondents so far as the Soviet Union is concerned, and it worked, so I would say that although I am in favor of the freedom of reporting of my Communist colleagues, whether they are East Germans, Russians, Chinese or whatever, they can and should report whatever they feel and whatever they think is right. Therefore, they should not be subject to oppression.

If, for instance, the Soviet Union or East Germany continues to expel Western correspondents, I do think it is a good thing, to retaliate and throw somebody out, although I realize how problematic it is.

On the German side, we cannot do that because under the West German Constitution, Germans, even East Germans, when they are in the Federal Republic are regarded as Germans under the Constitution and——

Mr. FASCELL. So East Germans get the protection of the West German Constitution?

Mr. LOEWE. Yes, and I am not in favor of expelling Germans from Germany. That is what happened to me and I am not in favor of expelling East Germans—correspondents from Bonn to East Berlin. This is contrary to our belief and the Nazis and Hitler—we have a tradition of expatriation, of expulsion and Hitler did it and I only hoped that after 1945 in German history, that this practice would end and, therefore, I think it is very regrettable that Mr. Honecker and his colleagues are still using the practice of expelling journalists.

Mr. FASCELL. That is very persuasive with me and I hope it would be equally persuasive with others.

Let me ask you another question. I detected on the mission that we undertook in Europe that there is a difference of opinion with regard to the pursuit of the issue of human rights—as to style and emphasis and whether or not, for example, it ought to be done publicly or whether we should always resort to quiet diplomacy.

Of course, with President Carter taking such a strong and open position, my own feeling is that you have to discuss these matters openly.

I wonder if there is a real undercurrent, however, in Europe about this issue. Some of our friends think perhaps we are moving too far, too fast and too hard and too public.

Mr. LOEWE. Mr. Chairman, I think the recent foreign policy speech of the President of the United States and the President's stand on human rights—I think many people in Europe will agree on that. It is an old American tradition to come out for human rights and I think the President made it clear that no matter whether you are in the East or the West, most countries have certain human rights problems.

I think we have them in Germany, certainly there is unemployment and the basic right of people to work is something of a human right and if they are out of work, then their human rights are impeded, although that is not done by a policy of the government.

I think it is very good and I am supporting it personally to speak out on human rights—but speaking out on human rights means also that you have to retain your capability of operating foreign policy in an effective way.

To find the right mixture of both is important. It does not help anybody just to speak up on human rights without doing anything. I think this was the reason for some concern among some Europeans.

The fear was not that we did not agree on the human rights stand. I think we all agree on that. But the fear was that if you are emphasizing it too much, you might imbalance the internal situation of certain Communist countries to an extent that it gets very explosive. That was one concern, particularly in respect to Poland.

Secondly, insofar as the Germans are concerned, the German Government—and also the prior German Governments, have been fairly effective on one human rights issue which is family reunification or permission to get German nationals out of Communist countries. There is hardly any Communist country where we do not want to get Germans out. We want to have family reunification from East Germany to West Germany. There has been an agreement between the Federal Republic and Poland on 125,000 Germans coming from Poland and the flow is up.

We have the same problem with the Soviet Union and it is still not satisfying, but the number of people with permission to leave is larger than it used to be. The other problem, such as in Czechoslovakia, is particularly with children who want to join their parents. We have that problem in Romania, and it is very difficult and very sensitive. So the feeling in Germany is to make a stand on human rights where it helps and then be very outspoken about it, but to exercise quiet diplomacy in those areas where speaking out would not help.

Mr. FASCELL. That is a question of style and selectivity of diplomacy.

Mr. LOEWE. Yes; it is more a question of style than substance.

Mr. FASCELL. I am quite confident that in the U.S. Government we are fully cognizant of this fact that we cannot pursue human rights to the exclusion of all other international matters. But we also feel that it ought to be public and we ought not to be afraid or concerned to speak out where necessary and to speak out and to do whatever we can. I certainly agree with you on that.

Are there any other questions?

Mr. FRIENDLY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Friendly.

Mr. FRIENDLY. Just one. In the 2 years that you were in East Germany, what effect did you see of the Helsinki accords themselves on what we now read about in regard to the flareup of civil dissent?

Mr. LOEWE. The interesting thing is really—as I said in my statement—the Communist countries have been printing the Final Act in whole, which most Western countries did not do in their main

publication because we in the West have the freedom of movement, freedom of speech, and we observe the aspects of the Final Act, but by having published the final document, the Final Act, in their party organs, this document really became the hottest item on the market in the East and this was a rare occasion that the Communist Party organs like Pravda and Neues Deutschland have been sold out in those days when the Final Act was printed.

I know a lot of East German citizens, who are running around with the Final Act in their pocket all the time and whenever they approach a Communist functionary and get a rebuff or feel not treated fairly, they pull out the Final Act and reply: "Mr. Honecker signed it and here it is and it says such and such and do you keep your word on it or don't you?"

Mr. CASE. Do you think this applies in Russia as well as East Germany?

Mr. LOEWE. From what I read and hear from my colleagues, it also applies to Russia. You have the Helsinki chapter as you have human rights and Helsinki groups in the Baltic States and you have it in the Soviet Union and throughout the bloc.

Mr. CASE. But what about Mother Russia and Central Russia?

Mr. LOEWE. I do not know. Senator, I have to say I do not know all the details in Central Russia.

Mr. CASE. Because Russia—because the Soviet Union has an awful lot of ethnic minorities scattered around.

Mr. LOEWE. Yes.

Mr. CASE. May I ask another question?

Mr. FASCELL. Yes, sir, please.

Mr. CASE. What is your opinion of the Radios—are they useful and are they listened to?

Mr. LOEWE. Which do you mean?

Mr. CASE. Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe.

Mr. LOWE. I have not been following in Germany—in East Germany. the programs of Radio Liberty—I mean the non-German broadcasting radios of the United States. RIAS, the USIA station, I did mention. That is Radio in the American Sector of Berlin. It is tremendously effective. I think radio is a major source of information. It is very important and it is listened to and the Voice of America also.

I think the programs are important and millions of people are listening in all parts of the bloc. East Germany is a special case and we are reaching with television into 80 percent of the territory, but in Poland and Czechoslovakia and Romania and in the Soviet Union up to Siberia and wherever people live—even including Uzbekistan—it is very important. We once were on a trip to Tashkent and I think that that was the time when Solzhenitsyn got the Nobel Prize. People had picked it up from the Voice and Russians were talking about it to me within 24 hours and I think it is an essential means of information.

Senator, may I also direct your attention to the problem which is coming up in this century and in the next 10 years. It is the question of satellite television. I think satellite television will be a very important item and I think the Western countries should make every effort that satellite television is not barred. We should have the chance

of using satellite television as a free means of information. It is very essential.

Mr. CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Let me just ask you something. Yesterday the press reported on actions taken by the East German Government that seemed to be very forthcoming with respect to Helsinki. What is your reaction to that?

Mr. LOEWE. I saw the story in the Washington Post and from my experience in East Germany, I would welcome it if the East German Government shows more tolerance and permits East German citizens to marry Americans and have family reunions. I consider that progress.

From my own experience, I knew of a young American who was living in West Berlin and got engaged to a very attractive and pretty young East German woman and it took them 3 years to get out. The American Embassy in East Berlin helped and I tried to give them advice and finally they managed to get out. I think that that is a step in the right direction and we can only hope that Mr. Honecker and the East German leadership continue in that direction. I think it is certainly a good example, but they have in view the upcoming conference in Belgrade. I hope that other nationals have—not only Americans, but also West Germans and British and Swiss and Austrians and Canadians—the same benefits, and that the East Germans move in that direction. We can only hope that the other bloc countries do the same. It is encouraging that the East Germans are ready to act in that way toward the United States.

Mr. FASCELL. It certainly seems that they are taking whatever steps they can to get ready for Belgrade and I think that is a reasonable assumption.

Mr. LOEWE. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Let me certainly thank you very much, Mr. Loewe, for your testimony here. We are delighted to have you and you have made a very, very important contribution to the record of this committee and, I assure you, to the overall effect of the Helsinki Conference and the accords.

Mr. LOEWE. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. If I were in West Germany or East Germany, I would certainly be anxious to see how you come out on television.

Mr. LOEWE. Thank you very much. Come and see us.

Mr. FASCELL. The hearing is now concluded.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was concluded.]

APPENDIX II—INFORMATION FLOW, MAY 25, 1977

PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT ON THE FLOW OF INFORMATION BETWEEN HELSINKI SIGNATORIES TO THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

INTRODUCTION

Under the headings of cooperation in Information and in the Field of Culture, the 35 Helsinki signatories declared their intent to exchange information more freely and widely and to expand their cultural cooperation by making books, other publications and films more easily available to each others' publics.

Judging from extensive but still incomplete research into the implementation of these declarations, progress has been, at best, minimal. Statistics on sales of periodical publications and newspapers, on film purchases and on book translations show little or no growth in the volume of East-West exchanges. Statistics, however, do nothing to describe the most pervasive obstacles to freer flow of information: the restrictions on the circulation of ideas from abroad. In that area, too, the pattern of conduct by the Communist signatories remains basically unchanged. Whether by requiring visitors to public libraries to have special clearances to see imported literature or by impeding journalists' access to their sources, the Warsaw Pact states—with some exceptions—have failed to fulfill the promise of eased and expanded contacts across ideological frontiers.

The brief paragraphs below on different categories of information summarize the preliminary findings the Commission staff has been able to draw from data that is now—and may always be—incomplete.

NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Despite announcements by the Soviet Union (in 1976) and Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia (in 1977) that more imported newspapers would go on public sale than in the past, sales of one U.S. daily and four weeklies in 1975 and 1976 showed little circulation growth within the Warsaw Pact. Newsstand and subscription sales of the International Herald Tribune in the seven countries actually declined from 1757 copies to 1645 from one year to the next. While Newsweek increased its circulation by five copies (to 2681) and Business Week by seven (to 238), Time boosted sales by 98 copies (to 1280) and U.S. News and World Report rose by 150 copies (to 631). But the pattern was inconsistent throughout the bloc: Poland dropped 100 copies of the Herald Tribune while adding 100 of Newsweek. Czechoslovakia took 68 more copies of the four weeklies, but Romania decreased its imports of the four by 36 copies.

In Poland, where imported publications can easily be read in official reading rooms and where citizens with foreign currency can subscribe with considerable freedom to foreign literature, the hard currency costs of imported literature seemed to pose the greatest limit on circulation. To a lesser extent, the same observation can be made about Hungary. But in other Warsaw Pact states, subscriptions are nearly impossible to arrange—except for official institutions—and Western papers are often hidden under newsstand counters, even in the hotels for foreign tourists where most such imports are sold and where few local citizens go. In those same countries imported literature is available in libraries only to readers with special clearances; and in some Soviet libraries even those who are cleared are forbidden to take notes on what they read.

Commission staff inquiries on exports of Warsaw Pact papers and periodicals to the U.S., unfortunately, have produced no helpful responses from the exporters to date. Bulgaria did inform us that it sent only seven copies of its two major papers to America, but that information is incorrect. The U.S. Embassy in Sofia sends 12 copies of those papers to U.S. readers. Moreover, one university in America reports spending $500 annually on purchases of Bulgarian publications.

BOOKS AND AUTHORS

If access to periodical literature is difficult, in several Warsaw Pact states it is almost impossible to purchase a book printed in the West. Soviet stores, for instance, sell Western literature only in translation. Soviet statistics on translations, however, reflect a very high volume of such activity—inflated in some cases by translations of short pamphlets and, in general, by multiple translations of Western classics into several of the Soviet Union's major, non-Russian languages. Still according to Soviet data, there were some 258 works by American authors translated in the USSR in 1973 and 230 more in 1974. The Library of Congress, by contrast, catalogued only 261 titles translated from Russia for U.S. publication in 1975 and 1976, a little more than ten percent of the 2012 translations from Helsinki-signatory languages catalogued by the Library in those years. Translations from Russian stood third after French (601) and German (583) and, like the Soviet translations from American authors, were about evenly divided between fiction and history or sociology on one hand and scientific-technical works on the other.

Numbers, however, tell nothing of progress or its absence in implementing Helsinki provisions on easing contact between authors and publishers or between publishers and readers. U.S. publishers, despite Helsinki, must still take round-about routes just to communicate with some authors in the East. Letters and telephone calls from abroad are not permitted to Andrei Sakharov and Vladimir Voinonich in Moscow. Czech playwrights Vaclav Havel and Pavel Kohout are still denied permission to see their works performed in the West. Lev Kopelev in Moscow is expelled from the Writers' Union for publishing his memoirs abroad, and Konstantin Simes, also a Muscovite, is fired from his job and threatened with criminal prosecution just for writing a manuscript he had kept at home. Even U.S. efforts to obtain permission to translate non-dissident Soviet authors are often frustrating and sometimes frustrated. The U.S. Air Force, for instance, spent 19 months negotiating translation rights to one book by the late Marshall Grechko only to be denied permission later to translate two other works on military subjects.

FILMS AND TELEVISION

As with printed matter, the statistics the Commission staff has been able to compile show little quantitative change in East European and Soviet purchases of filmed material from America. In both 1975 and 1976, for example, the Soviet Union bought only three feature films made by independent American producers and increased by only $1,000 (from $5,000 to $6,000) its expenditures on television films purchased from major U.S. studios. The Eastern European countries, similarly, purchased 20 feature films from independent producers in both 1975 and 1976, but did increase their purchases of television films from major studios from $541,000 in 1975 to $660,000 in 1976. Independent American film distributors bought four Soviet films for U.S. showing in both years, as well as 19 East European movies in 1975 and 22 in 1976.

The Commission staff has not yet obtained statistics on the total annual U.S. imports of films from the Warsaw Pact countries or on the audiences such films reach. It has discovered, however, that despite Communist criticism of Western "indifference" to Soviet and East European films, U.S. distributors stock a large number of features and short subjects for both private rental and commercial showings. U.S. distributors contacted by the Commission have available for rental 42 Soviet short subjects in 16 millimeter, 156 Soviet feature films in 16 millimeter and approximately 35 Soviet features in the 35-millimeter size that is standard for commercial motion picture theaters. Comparable figures for East European films available to U.S. audiences are 222 shorts and 77 features in 16 millimeter, as well as 95 features in 35 millimeter.

REPORTING AND BROADCASTING

From testimony it has heard, the Commission already knows that interference with Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe and RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) persists despite the Final Act's endorsement of continued expansion of radio broadcasting. Although Romania and Hungary do not jam Radio Free Europe, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria do. East Germany jams AM transmissions of RIAS from West Berlin. And the Soviet Union not only jams Radio Liberty but was criticized by many less controversial broadcasters last year for emitting

a powerful signal that interfered with a great many radio transmissions. An increasingly vitriolic Soviet press campaign against Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe has compounded its interference with the broadcasting aspect of the Helsinki pledge to "facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds."

A mixture of interference and positive gesture has marked Soviet and East European compliance with the pledge to ease the working conditions of journalists. In the Soviet Union, multiple exit-and-entry visas have made life easier for accredited resident correspondents, but the new facilities have not led to any broader easing of journalists' access to their sources or, in one case, to the country. United Press International this year, like Reuters, has been denied the right to send the correspondent of its choice to its Moscow bureau. Associated Press correspondent George Krimsky was expelled from Moscow in January, 1977, and yet is still vilified—along with the resident Washington Post correspondent and a former Newsweek bureau chief—as a CIA agent. East Germany has also expelled two correspondents, both West Germans, since the signing of the Helsinki accords, and Czechoslovakia, after harassing resident and visiting reporters from France, Spain, Sweden, West Germany and the United States, has adopted a policy of refusing visas to newsmen who do not bind themselves in advance to stay away from local dissenters.

A survey by the Commission staff of journalists working in the USSR and East Europe elicited a disappointing total of only 28 responses. Nevertheless, a comparison of the comments of the eight surveyed in Moscow with those of the seven polled in Warsaw shows a considerable difference between official treatment of the foreign press in the USSR and in Poland. Although Soviet officials made the most ostentatious changes in announced press policy after Helsinki, half of the eight resident in Moscow said they were never notified of officially sponsored trips, agreed that journalists were excluded from such travel deliberately to punish them for unfavorable articles and asserted that they were having greater difficulty after Helsinki than before in gaining access to official news sources. Six of the seven correspondents in Poland, by contrast, said they suffered from no travel restrictions and were always notified of official trips. Four of the seven, moreover, reported that the post-Helsinki atmosphere has eased their access to official news sources. Even non-resident journalists rated Poland as the easiest country to visit and work in—though some said they had been followed and harassed there—with the possible exception of Hungary. Czechoslovakia was named as the most difficult in granting visas and one of the least helpful in granting access to sources. Romania was also sharply criticized, especially for expelling a visiting New York Times correspondent on arrival and supposedly because of unfavorable articles he had written in the past. In fact, it seems more likely that he was prevented from entering the country in order to keep him from making contact with local dissidents being severely harassed there.

STATEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM TO PUBLISH COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS ON THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF ANATOLY SHCHARANSKY

In a letter to Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman of the Central Committee of The Communist Party of the USSR, and Roman Rudenko, Procurator General of the USSR, the International Freedom to Publish Committee of the Association of American Publishers expressed grave concern today over the arrest and detention of Anatoly Shcharansky, a close associate of Andrei Sakharov and the translator of the correspondence between Sakharov and President Carter.

According to the letter, Mr. Shcharansky has been imprisoned for "his contacts with Western journalists and writers and his membership in the Group for Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR." The letter states that "as publishers we have a significant interest in the implementation of these accords, particularly as they relate to the right to publish. Members of the American publishing community have had personal contact with Mr. Shcharansky and know him to be a responsible and law-abiding person of the highest character."

The letter urges that the charges against Mr. Shcharansky be dropped and that he be freed. "If charges are brought and a trial is scheduled, we respectfully request the opportunity to send an observer representing our Committee to attend the trial in order to report back to our membership. An open trial is specifically

mandated by Article 111 of the Constitution of the USSR." This is the first time the American publishing community has made such a request.

In conclusion, the letter states, "The conviction and sentencing of Mr. Shcharansky at a closed trial in the absence of an observer would, in our view, seriously interfere with the continuing good relationship between your country and our publishing industry."

The letter is signed by Winthrop Knowlton, Chairman of the AAP's International Freedom to Publish Committee, on behalf of the following members of the committee:

Mr. Winthrop Knowlton, Harper & Row, Publishers; Mr. Leo Albert, Prentice Hall International, Inc.; Mr. Larry Ashmead, Simon & Schuster; Mr. Robert Baensch, Harper & Row, Publishers; Mr. Robert Bernstein, Random-House, Inc.; Mr. Simon Michael Bessie, Harper & Row, Publishers; Mr. Ed Burlingame, J. B. Lippincott Company; Ms. Lisa Drew, Doubleday Publishing Co.; Mrs. Heather Florence, Lankenau, Kovner & Bickford; Mr. Paul Gottlieb, Paul Gottlieb Associates; Mr. Lawrence Hughes, William Morrow & Co.; Mr. Marc Jaffe, Bantam Books; Mr. Kenneth McCormick, Doubleday Publishing Co.; Ms. Nancy Meiselas, Farrar, Straus & Giroux; Mr. Andrew H. Neilly, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; Patrick O'Connor, Popular Library; Mr. Andre Schiffrin, Pantheon Books.

Mr. Alan Schwartz (Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst), Counsel.

A copy of the full text of the letter is attached.

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS, INC.,
May 23,1977.

Chairman LEONID BREZHNEV,
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, U.S.S.R.

DEAR CHAIRMAN BREZHNEV: It has come to the attention of the American publishing community that on March 15, 1977 Anatoly Shcharansky was arrested and that he has been held incommunicado since that time. Although Shcharansky has not yet been formally charged with any crime, several articles in Izvestia have suggested that he may be accused of serious offenses including espionage, treason, and anti-Soviet activities. The International Freedom to Publish Committee of the Association of American Publishers is gravely concerned about the Shcharansky situation. Mr. Shcharansky has been a close associate of Andrei Sakharov, whose works have been published in this country and numerous others. Mr. Shcharansky has been a critical link between Sakharov and the people of our country, having most recently translated the correspondence between our President and Mr. Sakharov. Among the accusations directed against Mr. Shcharansky have been his contacts with Western journalists and writers and his membership in the Group for Implementation of Helsinki Agreements in the U.S.S.R. As publishers we have a significant interest in the implementation of these accords, particularly as they relate to the right to publish. Members of the American publishing community have had personal contact with Mr. Shcharansky and know him to be a responsible and law-abiding person of the highest character.

We urge, therefore, that no charges be brought against Mr. Shcharansky and that he be freed. We fear that if charges are brought, this will serve to discourage communication between our two nations and particularly between writers and publishers. If charges are brought and a trial is scheduled, we respectfully request the opportunity to send an observer representing our Committee to attend the trial in order to report back to our membership. An open trial is specifically mandated by Article 111 of the Constitution of the USSR. We have no reason to doubt that the protective provisions of the Soviet code of criminal procedure will be applied to Mr. Shcharansky in the event of a trial. The best—and indeed the only—proof that the Soviet courts do indeed comply with the letter and spirit of these protective provisions would be for the authors to allow our representative to observe the trial in person.

The conviction and sentencing of Mr. Shcharansky at a closed trial in the absence of an observer would, in our view, seriously interfere with the continuing good relationship between your country and our publishing industry. As one who would very much like to see closer ties between your country and mine and between your publishing industry and ours, I urgently hope that you will take favorable action on this request either by releasing Mr. Shcharansky or, in the event there is a trial, by granting our request to send an observer.

Sincerely,

WINTHROP KNOWLTON, *Chairman.*

DRAFT PROTOCOL (APRIL 1976)

On co-operation between the State Committee for Printing & Publishing and Book Trade under the USSR Council of Ministers and the Association of American Publishers, Inc. for the period 1976–1978.

In accordance with the General Agreement between the USSR and the USA on contacts, exchanges and co-operation of June 19, 1973 and guided by the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the State Committee for Printing & Publishing and Book Trade under the USSR Council of Ministers and the Association of American Publishers have agreed as follows:

1. The contracting parties shall facilitate various forms of co-operation in the book-publishing field between the State Committee for Printing & Publishing and Book Trade under the USSR Council of Ministers and the Association of American Publishers, between Soviet and American publishers; shall take measures within their jurisdiction to increase the publication of books by Soviet authors in the USA and books by American authors in the USSR, as well as the publication of books and manuals for learners of Russian and English in their respective countries.

2. The parties have agreed to delegate Soviet and American publishing experts on a non-currency exchange basis for 10 man-weeks annually to handle specific co-operation problems. In particular:

(a) the delegating side shall bear the expenses involved in the experts' two-way travel;

(b) the host party shall bear the expenses involved in the experts' stay in the host country, including travel, and shall appoint an interpreter if necessary.

Specific measures in the exchange of Soviet and American publishing experts shall be implemented by mutual consent in each particular case.

3. The parties have agreed to hold in the USSR in 1976, a seminar on publishing work (methods of manuscript selection and procesing, forms of promotion and advertizing of books, etc.). In particular, The American side shall meet the costs of the two-way travel of its experts attending the seminar, and the Soviet side shall meet the costs of the stay of these experts in the USSR. The specific arrangements for the seminar shall be decided upon in routine procedure.

4. The parties have agreed to implement in the period 1976–1978 an annual noncurrency exchange of up to three translator and editor trainees for a term of three months to one year depending on the necessity in each particular case for advancing their skills and language practice.

5. The parties have agreed:

(a) to exchange in 1976 bibliographical lists of the American authors published in the USSR between 1965 and 1975 and lists of the books by Soviet authors published in the USA during the same period.

(b) to exchange annually before May 1 lists of the books by authors of the other side published in the previous year.

6. The parties have agreed to exchange children's book exhibitions in the period 1976–1977. The exhibition of Soviet children's books in the USA shall be organized by the State Committee for Printing & Publishing and Book Trade under the USSR Council of Ministers; the exhibition of American children's books in the USSR, by the Association of American Publishers.

Each of the exhibitions shall have on display up to 1,000 books. The parties shall exhibit publications promoting peace, mutual understanding and cultural exchanges between the peoples of the USSR and the USA, and containing no material discrediting the host country. The parties shall forward to each other in advance lists of the books to be exhibited.

The Soviet children's book exhibition shall be held in New York, Washington and San Francisco, for 14 days in each city.

The American children's book exhibition shall be held in Moscow, Leningrad and Yerevan, for 14 days in each city.

The exhibitions shall be held on the following terms:

(1) the exhibiting party shall bear the expenses involved in the delivery to the first host city of exhibits and other materials, the travel of its staff to the host country and back; produce advertising material, labels in the corresponding language, the design of the exhibition poster and organize the shipment of its exhibition to the home country, if necessary.

(2) the host country shall bear the expenses involved in the renting of buildings and stands (stands may be brought from the home country); the assembly

and disassembly of equipment; the maintenance of the experts in charge of the exhibition, including their travel in the host country, the charges for the transportation of exhibits and other exhibition materials between the aforementioned cities of the host country, shall provide exhibition stands free of charge if necessary, shall guarantee at its own expense the safety and insurance of the exhibits, advertizing of the exhibition in the press, broadcasts and TV programmes, shall print posters to designs of the exhibiting party; shall appoint at its own expense one interpreter to assist during the assembly and disassembly of the exhibition on each site of display.

The parties shall forward to each other in advance the blueprints of their pavilions and stands.

The costs of maintenance of the accompanying exhibition personnel shall be borne by the host party.

The parties have agreed to delegate:

One official representative for the opening of the exhibition in each city for a period of 5 days;

One representative for handling the problems involved in preparations for the exhibition for a period of 14 days;

Two accompanying exhibition experts each for a period of 75 days.

7. The parties have agreed to discuss the question of holding in 1978 of exhibitions of art books on the principles laid down in Article 6 of the present Protocol.

8. The parties have agreed to organize annually (in the USSR and the USA alternately) one working meeting between leading publishing executives of the two countries for a discussion of co-operation problems, a review of the progress made under the present protocol, and for drawing up programmes for the coming periods.

9. The present Protocol shall come into force as of the time of signing and be valid until December 31, 1978.

For the State Committee for Printing & Publishing and Book Trade under the USSR Council of Ministers.

For the Association of American Publishers.

_____, _____,

_____ _____

(date) (date)

DRAFT U.S.A./U.S.S.R. PROTOCOL (APRIL, 1977)

On cooperation between the State Committee for Printing and Publishing and Book Trade of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers and the Association of American Publishers, Inc. for the period 1977–80.

In accordance with the General Agreement between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on contracts, exchanges and cooperation of June 19, 1973, guided by the provisions of the Universal Copyright Convention, and in order to effectively support the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki), the State Committee for Printing and Publishing and Book Trade and the Association of American Publishers have agreed as follows:

1. In support of their undertaking at Helsinki to facilitate "international contracts and communications between authors and publishing houses . . ." the contracting parties shall endeavor to facilitate various forms of cooperation and direct contacts in the book publishing field between the State Committee and the Association of American Publishers, between Soviet and American publishers, between Soviet publishers and authors living in the United States, and between American publishers and authors living in the U.S.S.R., without hindrance from governmental bodies.

2. In support of their undertaking at Helsinki to promote "an increase in the number of sales outlets where books by authors from the other participating States . . . are for sale," the parties shall examine jointly and take measures (a) to increase the number of sales outlets in the U.S.A. where Soviet books are on sale to the public and to establish sales outlets in the U.S.S.R. where American books are on sale to the public; (b) to encourage the uncensored publication and translation of an increased number and diversity of books by Soviet authors in

the U.S.A. and of books by American authors in the U.S.S.R.; (c) to increase the publication and translation of books and manuals for learners of the Russian and English languages in their respective countries; and (d) to expand the export of Soviet books to the U.S.A. and of American books to the U.S.S.R.—all such measures being designed to increase the number and diversity of works by authors of each State available to the public in the libraries and bookshops of the other, and to increase the number of bookshops where such works are available. The parties shall examine jointly various modalities of payment and simplification of customs clearance that might facilitate commercial exchanges of books.

3. For the purpose of handling specific matters of cooperation, the parties shall facilitate mutual business trips by publishing executives and experts of the two countries, with the understanding that the dispatching country shall be responsible for the travel costs of its own executives and experts, as well as for their expenses while in the host country.

4. The parties shall make a best effort to implement, in the period 1977–80, an exchange of up to three translator and/or editor trainees for a term of 3–6 months for the purpose of advancing their skills and improving their knowledge of the language.

5. In support of their undertaking at Helsinki "to facilitate . . . exchange of opinions at round table meetings, seminars, symposia, summer schools, congresses, and other bilateral and multilateral meetings," the parties, having held in the USSR in 1976 a seminar on American publishing practices and procedures, agree to hold in the USA in 1977 a seminar on Soviet publishing practices and procedures, based on scheduling and cost arrangements similar to those used in the 1976 seminar. Specific arrangements will be decided and implemented by mutual consent.

6. The parties agree to exchange annually, before May 1 of each year, lists of books by authors of the other side that they have published in the previous year.

7. In support of their undertaking at Helsinki "to encourage more frequent book exhibitions and to examine the possibility of organizing periodically in Europe a large-scale exhibition of books from the participating States," the parties agree to discuss the question of exchanging exhibitions of children's books and of art books on a noncurrency basis.

8. The parties agree to organize annually one working meeting between leading publishing executives of the two countries to discuss mutual concerns and measures of cooperation, to review progress made under this Protocol, and to develop programs for the future. Such a meeting will normally be scheduled in Frankfurt at the time of the Frankfurt Book Fair, but may be scheduled alternately in the USSR and the USA.

9. In support of their undertaking at Helsinki, that the principles of the Final Act "will be published in each participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possible," each party agrees to publish and widely disseminate the text of this Protocol in its respective country.

10. This Protocol will come into force on the date of signing and be valid until December 31, 1980.

For the State Committee for Printing and Publishing and Book Trade of the USSR Council of Ministers.

_____ _____,

_____
(date)

For the Association of American Publishers, Inc.

_____ _____,

_____
(date)

A Freedom House Advisory: An Analysis of Compliance With the Information Section of Basket Three of the Helsinki Accords of 1975*

For thirty-six years, Freedom House has been deeply concerned over the totalitarian controls that separate Eastern and Western Europe, thereby posing still larger threats to world stability and peace. Our organization was among the few in the United States which declared immediately after the Final Act was approved that it had created a significant new mechanism for implementing universal standards of human rights and expanding information exchanges of all kinds. The Basket Three provisions of the Accords (pressed by the West) were ultimately approved with the same unanimity as the inviolability-of-fron-

*Submitted by Freedom House, 20 West 40th Street, New York, N.Y. 10018, for the record of the Commission hearing of May 25, 1977.

tiers clauses of Basket One (sought by the East bloc). All baskets were to be implemented by all the signatories. The Soviet Union reluctantly accepted the human rights and "freer information" provisions in order to achieve reassurance on boundaries.

We therefore believe that the forthcoming follow-up conference on the Helsinki Accords is the proper time and place to press energetically but tactfully for the fulfillment of the pledges of CSCE.

We recognize the dilemmas in pursuing an activist policy at the Belgrade meetings: We have other, critically important business to conduct with the Soviet Union and the East bloc (above all, SALT). Frontal attacks on all the denials of freer information in the bloc could influence the satellite leadership, after a period of increasing divisions, to close ranks again with the USSR. Our Western European allies (particularly West Germany) may fear a breakdown of arduously constructed East-West trade and travel, especially between the two Germanys. The neutrals of Europe would not welcome being drawn into the vortex of a superpower debate.

Yet we believe that there are strong offsetting advantages. All three baskets, as the Final Act is written, should stand or fall together: Retrogressive actions tending to devalue Basket Three could readily suggest similar reconsideration of Basket One's territorial clauses. It must also be assumed that the USSR seriously wants SALT agreements and will ultimately act pragmatically to pursue them despite its displeasure with public diplomacy. The Soviet Union, moreover, will not want to be seen by the communist parties of Western Europe as stymieing or defeating implementation of human rights and freer-information policies.

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ACCORDS

Considerable attention is properly focused in the United States on the Third Basket of the Helsinki Accords (the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). Comparatively little notice, however, is paid the Second or Information Section of Basket Three. This Advisory, therefore, examines the importance of the Information Section. Improved information exchanges among the 35 participating states would reinforce the human rights and cultural-exchange sections of the Third Basket, and the security and economic-cooperation sections of Baskets One and Two. Information, in our view, is the keystone to all the commitments made in the Final Act. This keystone is described in the Accords as the aim to facilitate:

> the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage cooperation in the field of information and the exchange of information with other countries, and to improve the conditions under which journalists from one participating State exercise their profession in another participating State.

It is likely that the "freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds" could serve to dissipate ungrounded fears which nations, East or West, hold regarding their potential military or political adversaries, or economic or social competition. Information may indeed alert nations, East or West, to real dangers; information presumably serving in such an event, too, as a deterrent to precipitate actions. For lack of information, misinformation, or misperception may generate a grave threat to the peace of the world.

This Advisory will also examine what should have happened as a consequence of the completion of the Final Act in 1975, what has happened and what has not happened. We shall conclude with some recommendations for the United States in approaching the Helsinki Review meetings at Belgrade.

We initiate this analysis by stating our fundamental premise: The Soviet Union and the Marxist-Leninist bloc of Eastern Europe regard the State as supreme and the individual a component of society subject in every important respect to the will of the State; the Western European and the North American nations, while acknowledging the sovereignty of states, recognize the right of the individual citizen to exercise significant control over his or her life, and the right to meaningful participation in decisions affecting the life of the nation. The Helsinki Accords could not and did not alter these fundamental distinctions between the fully controlled and the open societies, and the respective role of the individual in those societies.

The "freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds" may, however, enable the citizens of those societies to seek the liberalization of policies of their own regimes, and lead ultimately to the relaxation of tensions across national borders.

By the same token, "freer and wider dissemination of information" originating within Eastern Europe may enable Western Europe and North America to formulate security and economic policies on a sounder and more realistic basis.

The first question, then, is what should have happened after 35 nations accepted the Information Section of Basket Three as an expression of mutual will, if not an obligation solemnized by treaty?

II. WHAT SHOULD HAVE HAPPENED?

In every nation, East and West, the signing of the Accords should have set in motion machinery to examine the national commitments to each paragraph of Section Two, Basket Three. For every word in every paragraph in the Information Section, as indeed in every part of every Basket, was mutually accepted and is to be equally implemented.

Such an examination would have disclosed, in every nation, the areas requiring movement toward the goals of Section Two. It is understood by all the signatories that no action would be expected that, in itself, requires a fundamental breaching of the respective state's social or political philosophy of governance. It is assumed, however, that since all 35 states signed the Accords each was able to rationalize within its own system, the specific commitments to a "freer and wider dissemination of information."

The ongoing implementation of Section Two, as of all the Accords, should have presumed the informal oversight by each nation of one another's progress toward the mutually defined goals. In the field of information such multinational oversight is essential. The commitments to widen "knowledge and understanding" clearly imply interaction between states, as well as within them. It was, for example, the "intention" of the signatories to provide

(a) Improvement of the circulation of, access to, and exchange of information.

[This includes the encouragement of more lectures, seminars, congresses of a bilateral and multilateral nature; greater distribution internally of newspapers and periodicals from other participating states; wider public access to publications from other countries; expanded broadcasts by radio; and greater dissemination of films from other states.]

(b) Cooperation in the field of information.

[Favoring increased cooperation among mass media agencies, including news services and publishing houses; public or private, national or international radio and TV organizations; journalists' organizations from participating states; and expanded exchanges of articles among newspapers and periodicals of different states.]

(c) Improvement of working conditions for journalists.

[Among the most important Sections of all the Accords, this endeavors to improve the conditions under which a journalist from one country practices his profession in another: facilitating visa requests from journalists, granting them multiple entry and exit visas for specified periods, easing travel procedures for foreign journalists moving about within one country, increasing access by journalists to the sources of information (whether official or private), easing the transmitting of information to the journalist's home office, and assuring safety from expulsion for a journalist in normal pursuit of his or her profession.]

After August 1, 1975, each participating nation should have examined its own and other signatories' compliance or lack of compliance with each goal-commitment; and, in areas of non-compliance, set in motion discernible acts to approach eventual compliance.

There are, consequently, two major areas of improvement to be sought in examining what has happened since the Accords were signed:

(1) Improvement in securing access to, and distributing printed and broadcast information.

(2) Improvement in the working conditions of journalists.

III. WHAT HAS HAPPENED?

This survey examines compliance by the participating states with particular reference to the effective distribution of news materials—in both print and broadcast form—and the improvement, since Helsinki, of working conditions for journalists. The latter category would include: (a) restrictions on the mobility of journalists, both within and among participating states, (b) restraints

on their access to legitimate sources of information, and (c) pre-publication, or pre-broadcast censorship and related restrictions.

A study such as this cannot be all-inclusive—some violations are bound to be left out, and for some nations there simply is not enough data available. We have included the more conspicuous examples of compliance, or lack thereof. These have been drawn from reports by American news media, the International Press Institute, Amnesty International, and the files of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Freedom House.

We have not noted for each country the great or limited distance still to be travelled if that nation were to follow the procedures, in a particular category of information-exchange, employed by nations which disseminate information most freely and widely.

SUMMARY

I. In Eastern Europe, where there is not a continuing tradition of the free exchange of information within or between countries:

Czechoslovakia and Romania have tightened restrictions on the information media since the Accords were signed.

The USSR has made minor improvements in the working conditions of foreign journalists but the newsman or woman is still severely restricted in pursuing the profession. The general public has no greater access to foreign publications or broadcasts than in 1975.

Poland showed no change.

The closed information systems of Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic improved slightly.

II. In Western Europe and North America, in countries in which there is a significant continuing tradition of freedom in the exchange of information:

Austria, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States recorded occasional restrictions on journalists. These restrictions were usually reversed or limited through court action. In each country, some relatively minor barriers to the free exchange of information within and between countries persist.

III. In Western Europe, in those countries where the free exchange of information has recently begun:

Portugal and Spain have made significant progress, since 1975, in opening the channels of information to diverse domestic viewpoints and some foreign publications.

The study follows the alphabetical sequence of the 35 signatories to the Helsinki Final Act. Nations not listed are those for which insufficient data was available. Citations are for the year 1976 and through April 1977.

Austria

Members of the state police and military intelligence services searched the two homes of Georg Possaner, military editor of Die Presse. Possaner had written an article in which he said he knew details of Austria's defense plan. Possaner was subsequently questioned and accused of having published a state secret. It was alleged that he had received the information from an army officer who had been arrested. Possaner refused to reveal the source of his information.

The foreign and domestic press is normally free to travel and report without hindrance, and publications and broadcasts from foreign sources are readily accessible to the public.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria continues to jam the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe.

Until very recently, access to Western publications was limited to individuals bearing passes valid for special libraries. This was eased somewhat earlier this year.

The foreign and domestic press are generally restricted.

Canada

Police searched the offices of the *Toronto Sun* following publication of a letter by a senior Canadian security official alleging that Prime Minister Trudeau had ordered a relaxation of security checks on Quebec separatists. Police seized a copy of the letter from the office of Peter Worthington, the executive editor. Trudeau told the Canadian parliament that the leak of the letter was "obviously designed to destroy my reputation and credibility." Opposition leaders called

the police raid on the paper an attack on press freedom and accused the government of engaging in a conspiracy of silence on the matter.

The foreign and domestic journalists are generally unrestricted.

Czechoslovakia

Three Western journalists were refused visas to attend the party congress in Prague. Authorities also required guarantees from journalists applying for Czech visas that they would in no way seek contacts with dissidents. Violators of such a guarantee were threatened with immediate expulsion. The Prague spokesman acknowledged that they maintain a list of correspondents whose work they have found to be objectionable and who will not be issued visas in the future.

On separate occasions, an American and West German reporter were taken off the Prague-Vienna express train by Czech authorities, searched, detained for questioning, and then forced to walk—with their luggage—two miles to the Austrian border. Both incidents were related to contacts with dissidents.

No Western periodicals are freely on sale in Czechoslovakia, and even newspapers published by some Western communist parties have recently been blocked by censorship. A Czechoslovak citizen cannot subscribe to any Western publication, for it is officially classified as an arm of the CIA. A subscriber may be placed on a list of enemies of the State, endangering his security, his job, his children's hopes to get a better education. Western newspapers or magazines, even the most apolitical, disappear in the process of postal delivery. Practically no printed matter is allowed to cross the border. The Ministry of Interior publicly acknowledges, from time to time, the number of tons of books and magazines confiscated from foreign visitors. It does not publicize the quantities of mail secretly copied or simply excluded from delivery.

Foreign mail, both incoming and outgoing, is processed in a specialized facility in Prague, operated by the federal Ministry of Interior and equipped with imported, Western computerized devices. Letters are singled out, copied, numbered and stored.

Jamming of foreign radios has significantly interfered with reception of the British Broadcasting Corporation's Czech and Slovak shortwave broadcasts; Deutschland Sender, the former Deutsche Welle radio; Radio Liberty programs in Russian and other languages of the Soviet Union, which could possibly impair the ideological purity of the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia; and Radio Free Europe. The number of authors, domestic and foreign, whose works are blacklisted and expelled from public libraries has reached 351, eliminating almost 2,000 titles.

The Czechoslovak government's stiff policy with respect to foreign newsmen was somewhat relaxed in 1976. A few multiple-entry and exist visas were granted in that period, though heavy surveillance of Western reporters continued, There was a significant improvement in foreign coverage of Czechoslovak affairs. This policy was apparently reversed, however, when Czech citizens appeared to be reassured by liberalized rules for the foreign press.

Paul Hofmann of the New York Times; Leslie Collit, an American freelance writer; and Walter Kratzer of Stern were harshly treated. A Swedish journalist was refused an entry visa. Two French writers were arrested and forcibly deported. A Spanish trade union writer was detained for ten hours by the secret police for attempting to enter a house occupied by a dissident Czech. And the secret police used irritant gas against a Reuters correspondent, Pierre Requette, and the AFP's Pierre Debeuschen.

A Czech journalist, Jiri Lederer, was arrested in mid-January and was still under detention in April.

The exchange of information in Czechoslovakia—for foreign and Czech citizens—has been notably reduced since the Helsinki accords were signed.

German Democratic Republic

Journalist Rolf Mains was arrested in Leipzig, October 5, 1976, and was still being held in April 1977. GDR officials refused to accredit three West German radio correspondents who had applied to report on the Leipzig trade fair. They were barred on the grounds that their stations "interfered with the internal affairs of socialist states." A camera team from "German Television News" was refused entry into East Berlin to film a news conference in the Palace of the Republic. Working conditions for journalists accredited in the German Democratic Republic were officially eased with regard to obtaining information and travelling to West Berlin.

Federal Republic of Germany

Working conditions for foreign journalists resident in West Germany were formally improved. Journalists have easier access to ministries and other institutions to obtain information, and travel for their spouses between West and East Berlin was made easier. Foreign and domestic journalists are generally free to report, and widely diverse foreign and German publications and broadcasts are available to the public.

Greece

Although the Greek press is free again, the government still has full control of broadcasting and there are laws permitting the arrest of journalists and editors for minor "insults" to the authorities. Manos Haris, editor of a newspaper in Crete, was sentenced to eleven months' imprisonment for criticizing the island's police over the demolition of some houses. An editorial writer and director of the right-wing Eleftheros Kosmos were sentenced to prison terms of fourteen and four months respectively and ordered to pay fines. The two were charged under articles 181 and 191 of the Greek penal code, covering insult of authority and "spreading of false rumours designed to cause fear and unrest."

The editors of five newspapers were sentenced to four months' imprisonment for defying a ban on news reports about the assassination in December 1975 of Richard Welch, chief of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) bureau in Athens. All five were released pending appeal and finally acquitted.

Ireland

The Irish government announced that "Radio Telefis Eireann," the national radio and television service, was henceforth prohibited from carrying interviews with members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) or of its political wing, Provisional Sinn Fein. The move followed a declaration of a state of emergency to counteract the terrorist activities of the IRA and other illegal organizations in Eire and Northern Ireland.

Minister for Posts and Telegraphs Conor Cruise O'Brien defended the government decision. He said it was incompatible with the state of emergency that the IRA and Sinn Fein should be able to make use of a national broadcasting service for propaganda purposes.

Although newspapers in Ireland are prohibited by law from mentioning the IRA under Offenses Against the State Act, they have never been prosecuted for doing so.

Italy

Italian authorities seized an issue of the weekly magazine Oggi because it printed a report about a dissident Catholic sect in New York which was considered insulting to the Roman Catholic Church. Authorities in La Spezia seized the local sports weekly Antreprima Sport because it published a photograph deemed insulting to the Pope.

Because of the growing influence of the Communist Party in Italian political life, critical assessments of communist are less apparent in the Italian press. The Italian and foreign press generally are free to seek and communicate news, and the Italian public has access to diverse foreign and domestic publications and broadcasts.

Poland

Poland continues to jam the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe.

Lio Pin-chiang, correspondent of the New China News Agency, was expelled from Warsaw allegedly for distorting reports about workers' demonstrations following government announcements of planned food price rises. The government also recalled the correspondent of the Polish news agency PAP from Peking.

Poland refused to readmit Inger Wahloo, correspondent of the Swedish daily Expressen, who had been based in Warsaw for many years. She was barred because of articles critical of the Polish regime.

Portugal

The weekly O Diabo was banned because of an article by the publisher, Vera Lagoa, which was alleged to be insulting to President Francisco de Costa Gomes. Vera Lagoa was later acquitted by a Lisbon court. The same court also adjourned indefinitely proceedings against Isabel do Carma, publisher of the newspaper Revolucao, charged with insulting the para-military National Guard. A fine imposed on the weekly Expresso was also lifted.

The government announced plans for further reorganization of the state-owned press, including the return of some papers to private hands. Information Minister Manuel Alegre declared that the Socialists were "against a state-controlled press and believe in freedom of expression."

Romania

Information about other nations has decreased since 1975. The Romanian Television has reduced its subscriptions to Western newspapers, magazines and other publications. Individual subscriptions to such publications were refused in 1976 by the authorities. Western newspapers or magazines are not readily available, and in the research departments or the few libraries where they are filed, one needs a special authorization to consult them.

Printed information coming from Western states is subject to severe censorship. Only "The Voice of America" and "Radio Free Europe" are not officially censored.

Western movies must satisfy Marxist ideology. Officials accept only films which show human tragedies in Western countries: drug victims, the world of crime, etc. If necessary, they cut scenes of films and translate the dialogue to serve Marxist goals.

Spain

The government is more permissive in its attitude toward the press with the result that journalists have been taking a more courageous stand on questions of democratic freedoms, and new publications have begun in several cities.

The news media have acquired greater prestige and respect from the public because there is now more confidence in truth and accuracy. But although newspapers have become more outspoken, particularly the weekly Cambio 16, and new liberal publications have made their appearance, the press is still subject to regulation by the government.

A reporter of the Madrid daily Nuevo Diario was indicted by a political court on a charge of refusing to reveal his sources. The government censored a political article for the first time since Franco's death. The police stopped a press conference called by socialist, communist and other opposition groups to explain the terms of their new alliance. Some 300 journalists held a demonstration to protest death threats made to an editor who had been beaten by right-wingers. The protesters also called for freedom of the press.

Switzerland

A Swiss news agency report of the assembling in Switzerland of helicopters destined for the Chilean police force was heavily censored by the agency's directors. They said it was disloyal to pass on such information to the press. The author of the report and editor of the news service were suspended from the agency. The Swiss press and foreign journalists generally operate with broad freedoms, and the public access to a wide variety of foreign and domestic publications and broadcasts.

Turkey

West German journalist Jurgen Roth and two colleagues were put under house arrest and later expelled from Turkey. The three journalists had been making a documentary report of the Kurdish people in Turkey. Their film material was confiscated.

Five journalists were under detention in Turkey, as of mid-April 1977. Two had been arrested in 1974, one in 1975, one in 1976 and the date of arrest of one was not known.

U.S.S.R.

Soviet officials refused a visa to the reporter of the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten to attend the Communist Party Congress in Moscow. Correspondents of the Austrian newspaper Die Presse and Kurier were also barred from the country. The reasons given were "shortage of accommodation" and alleged anti-Soviet attitudes of the newspapers.

Soviet authorities refused to allow a visit to the Soviet Union by Sir Charles Curran, director general of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), because of a BBC television interview with the exiled Soviet writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, about his new book on Lenin, founder of the Soviet state.

In three separate articles, the Soviet official weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta accused three United States correspondents of belonging to the CIA. The correspondents consistently denied the accusations, and one, Alfred Friendly, Jr.,

filed suit against the Soviet weekly and demanded that the official organ of the Soviet Writer's Union print a retraction of the article and an apology to him.

A Washington Post correspondent in Moscow was summoned to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and accused of writing flagrantly anti-Soviet articles. He was warned that a continuation of such activities "cannot but bring certain consequences." The Soviet news agency Tass announced that eighteen more newspapers from capitalist countries would be on sale in the Soviet Union. According to Tass several Western newspapers, including the Times of London, the French paper Le Monde and the International Herald Tribune, had been on sale since 1968. But foreign visitors to the Soviet Union continue to claim that it is almost impossible to buy a non-communist foreign newspaper in Moscow.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry has relaxed certain travel restrictions on foreign journalists. Henceforth, journalists were able to travel more freely within the Soviet Union.

Multiple-entry visas were also granted to foreign journalists and direct access to government sources was facilitated, though most newly accessible officials generally remained uncooperative.

Under a reciprocal agreement, the United States news agency United Press International opened a new bureau in Leningrad, and the Soviet agency Tass did the same in San Francisco.

Some radio stations such as Radio Liberty which broadcast into the Soviet Union are still jammed by the Soviets. Denmark, Sweden and the British Broadcasting Corporation complained about another kind of interference emanating from the Soviet Union. European radio transmissions were being disrupted by powerful shortwave radio signals. Soviet authorities explained that the shortwave signal might have been caused by experiments during installation of radio equipment. The Soviet telecommunications ministry said it would take steps to reduce the disruption. In addition to its jamming of Radio Liberty, the Soviet Union has waged an intense, aggressive campaign against both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. This campaign was carried to the highest political level of the USSR by Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev who told the East Berlin conference of European Communist parties that "The very existence of such stations poisons the international atmosphere and is a direct challenge to the spirit and letter of the Helsinki Accords. The Soviet Union resolutely comes out for the termination of the operation of these instruments of psychological 'warfare'."

The Soviet campaign was responsible for the exclusion of RFE sports reporters from the 1976 Winter Olympic Games at Innsbruck. The committee decisions was subsequently reversed at Montreal, but there is no assurance that this precedent will apply at the 1980 Olympics in Moscow.

The following journalists were known to be under detention in the USSR in mid-April 1977:

Vyacheslav Chornovil—imprisoned since 1972; Boris D. Yevdokimov—arrested in Leningrad in 1971; detained in psychiatric hospital; Svyatoslav Osipovich—date of detention unknown; Boris Kovgar—arrested in March 1972; Valery Marchenko—arrested in Kiev in June 1973; Mykhaylo Hryhorovych Osadchy—arrested in 1972; and Ivan Svitlychny—arrested in 1972.

United Kingdom

Britain attempted to expel Philip Agee and Mark Hosenball, two American journalists based in London, apparently for their activities in exposing Western intelligence organizations and personnel. The case is still under appeal.

The government announced in November that it planned to liberalize the Official Secrets Act. Section 2 of the act, passed in 1911, bans all unauthorized disclosure of government information. The press had long called for reform of the act because it allowed British governments to suppress embarrassing information which had nothing to do with national security. Under the proposed reforms, there would no longer be criminal prosecutions for merely disclosing official information without authority. The information would have to fall into special categories such as defense, internal security and foreign affairs, and would have to be officially classified as secret. Foreign and domestic journalists generally have wide freedom in seeking and transmitting information, and the public has access to diverse foreign and British publications and broadcasts.

United States

Judicial "gag" orders—rulings by judges barring the news media from reporting aspects of criminal cases—and the traditional right of journalists to protect

their sources, remain the key press-freedom issues. These are cases in which there is a clash of two or more constitutionally-guaranteed rights, and the courts are asked to adjudicate. "Gag" orders have been overturned or modified by higher courts.

CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr was the subject of an investigation by Congress for his having obtained access to a secret committee report. Schorr was subsequently subpoenaed to appear before the committee, which he did while again refusing to reveal his source for the report. Congress eventually dropped the inquiry.

The U.S. still exercises visa control on all journalists from the Soviet Union, as well as reporters from other nations who have been members of a communist party. In the cast of the USSR, reciprocal travel restrictions are also in effect. These are based on similar restrictions applied against American journalists in Moscow. A State Department spokesman says that they are under constant review, and that—in most cases—waivers have been granted to communist journalists seeking to visit the United States. The request of the Italian Communist Party newspaper l'Unita to base a correspondent in Washington is being considered by the State Department.

The United States Information Agency maintains Foreign Press Centers in New York and Washington to facilitate foreign newsmen seeking information about the United States. This includes assisting journalists from all nations. The Washington Center Director says that Soviet and Eastern European newsmen are among his most frequent visitors.

Foreign journalists generally have the same wide freedoms as American newsmen and women in practicing their profession in this country.

Yugoslavia

Although Yugoslavia is generally considered to be one of the more liberal communist states in eastern Europe, it has recently hardened its attitude towards dissidents, including journalists. The current period of repression has included arrests, prison sentences, threats, harassment and closure or seizure of publications.

A major political trial of four "Cominformists" charged with "crimes against the state" took place in Belgrade. The four defendants, who included the former editor of the national news agency Tanjug, Milovan Stevanovic, were accused of plotting against the state and of having contacts with "Stalinist" Yugoslav exiles in other parts of eastern Europe. Stevanovic was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

Yugoslav authorities denied allegations that five journalists were in prison for political reasons. A spokesman said that, "in Yugoslavia, there are no journalists imprisoned for their political activities." The five journalists, who have all been in prison for several years, are Sime Djodan, Jozo Ivicevic Bakulic, Momcilo Jokic, Mihajlo Mihajlov and Marko Veselica. The various charges against them included "counter-revolutionary attacks against the state," "conspiracy," "anti-state activities" and "hostile propaganda."

IV. WHAT HAS NOT HAPPENED?

There appears to be no evidence that any nation, East or West, began in August 1975 to examine systematically its own policies, or those of other signatories to the Helsinki accords, for evidence of movement toward "freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds." Indeed, until Fall 1976, when the Soviet Union mounted a campaign to vilify the American Freedom Radios, in anticipation of the forthcoming review conference at Belgrade, there was little organized effort to assess the implemenetation of the accords. The USSR has increasingly published and broadcast statistical accounts of Western films, books, newspapers and magazines admitted to the Soviet Union, and has contrasted this with the smaller number of Soviet information materials circulated in the Western countries. Western and Eastern nations rarely discuss publicly the fundamental distinction that governs the actual circulation of information materials in the respective countries. In the East bloc, the governments control the selection of publications and films which will enter and leave their countries, and determine which few members of the elite will be permitted to see Western information materials. In Western countries, the individual citizen generally has the right to choose the materials he will read or reject. That free-market choice based upon personal taste and interest may seldom result in the selection of materials from the Soviet Union or the East bloc, even though there is no restriction on receiving

such materials in the West. Whereas circulation of Western materials imported into the USSR are severely restricted, they may outnumber the East bloc materials voluntarily selected by Western citizens. This situation should be better understood in the West and the East.

If it is to insist on reciprocal movement toward compliance in this as in other matters, the United States should consider making earnest explanations to its own citizens, not only of reasons for American technical noncompliance, but as well the paucity of compliance in the East bloc, reflected in the stringently restricted circulation of a few Western newspapers and magazines.

The USSR has relaxed somewhat restrictions on the foreign press but they must still live in a diplomatic ghetto, inaccessible to ordinary as well as dissident Soviet citizens. Every movement the journalist makes must still be filtered through some government service agency which has excellent ties to the security organs of the state.

Travel restrictions have also been eased somewhat but a journalist still must fear accusations of committing acts of hooliganism or making anti-Soviet propaganda if he strays off the prescribed travel route.

In Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania, similarly, there have been sudden tightening and occasional loosening of journalists' rights to travel, secure access to sources, and facilities to transmit news reports. This uncertainty itself serves to harass journalists, dry up news sources and generally restrict the flow of information.

The American Freedom Radios are coming under increasing attack and, in some countries, stepped-up jamming. The USSR regards the Radios as an interference in the internal affairs of the East bloc. The Radios are, in fact, widely listened to in the Soviet Union and other Eastern countries. These Radios, along with the British Broadcasting Company and the West German radio stations, obviously provide a "wider dissemination of information" than would otherwise be available within the East bloc. Yet the bloc has not yet accepted as the fundamental premise that "information broadcast by radio" should be expanded and this "process"—implicitly free of jamming—continued (Basket Three, Section 2, Subsection iii).

The full text of the Final Act has not been published in the American mass media though it did appear immediately after the signing in the two major Soviet dailies with combined circulation of twenty million. The text is available in the Congressional Record and in many U.S. libraries.

Fundamentally, of course, distribution of the text—in the East or the West—is no guarantee that the Accords' goals will be advanced. On the contrary, the Western societies continue to provide their citizens with broad choices of printed, filmed and broadcast information; and journalists—domestic and foreign—have wide access to news sources, including officials, and freedom to travel, transmit, and circulate information with little or no restrictions. The Eastern bloc, even when providing some relaxation of restrictions, causes uncertainty by sudden restoration of bans and regulations. For, fundamentally, the distinctions between the open and closed societies remain.

V. HOW BELGRADE SHOULD BE APPROACHED

The meetings should be employed to reaffirm the broad U.S. commitment to the expansion of information exchanges. Our national interest lies not primarily in winning debate points but in pressing continuously for the expansion of individual freedom where it is denied. Human rights, as generally interpreted are an aspect of the broader human freedoms we seek for everyone. A stable, peaceful world order is ultimately best achieved by a community of free peoples. The restoration of the democratic system in India is an inspiring demonstration of the power of freedom, even in a poorly developed society, once the promise of freedom is understood.

The development of such understanding, through the relaxing of information restrictions, was the intent of the Helsinki Accords. Active steps should be taken to record the degree to which the accords have or have not been implemented, and construct a mechanism for the continuing evaluation and implementation of the accords in the years ahead.

FREEDOM HOUSE RECOMMENDATIONS

We share the view that public diplomacy, promised and conducted by this Administration, is essential to the implementation of the CSCE's agreements. We

believe an energetic, though not aggressive, stance must be taken at Belgrade, and machinery left in place at the conclusion of the talks so that human freedom, as reflected in the issues of expanded human rights and information exchange, remains high on the conscience and the agenda of the world.

We therefore recommend:

I. In preparation

1. The U.S. delegation should be selected after consultation with the major voluntary organizations which have followed events and monitored the implementation of the Helsinki Accords.

2. The U.S. delegation should be composed of both governmental officials and leaders of nongovernmental agencies, men and women of broad experience in the field of human rights and freer information exchanges.

II. The approach

1. The American approach should employ the Belgrade meetings constructively to join the debate over the divergent systems of value regarding human freedom.

2. No new general areas of commitment should be placed on the agenda. Instead, wherever possible, the West should add substantive details to describe approaches and mechanisms for implementing commitments already in the accords. The watchword should be: specificity.

3. The United States should not underemphasize the importance of the freer-information clauses in the accords. Progress in fulfilling human rights, economic, or security commitments, is limited whenever the national and international systems of information exchange are restricted.

III. The continuation

1. The United States and its allies should propose "confidence-building measures" for Basket Three as there are in Basket One. This would provide some assurance to all parties that the objectives of expanding human rights and freer information exchanges are being pursued. Basket One calls upon the powers to notify one another before engaging in military maneuvers involving more than a prescribed level of forces. Similarly, regularized reporting should be required of steps being taken to implement each of the sections in Basket Three.

2. Toward this end, a small multi-national secretariat might be created to accept and record these regular reports under every section of the accords. The secretariat would not evaluate the national reports. It would serve as a clearinghouse for all reports. The records would be available for public inspection. This would place continuing emphasis on compliance with the accords.

3. At the conclusion of the Belgrade meetings this winter, a date should be set for another review conference a year or two later. Plans should also be made for continuing a series of such conferences until the broad objectives of Helsinki have been achieved.

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