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FIRST SEMIANNUAL REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

REPORT

SUBMITTED TO THE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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

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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., December 14, 1976.

This report has been submitted to the Committee on International Relations by Hon. Dante B. Fascell, Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It represents the first semiannual report by the President to the Commission concerning the Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975.

The report is printed in the hope that it will be of use to the members of the Committee on International Relations and others.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, *Chairman.*

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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D.C., December 14, 1976.

THOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, House International Relations Committee, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have today received from the President the First Semiannual Report to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe outlining the status of the implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975. The report contains a broad overview of the progress to date as well as an analysis of the Helsinki document. It also details some specific areas of compliance and cooperation by signatory nations.

I am forwarding herewith a copy of this report to the House International Relations Committee. I am sure that members of the House International Relations Committee and others will find this report informative and useful.

Sincerely,

DANTE B. FASCELL,
Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, December 3, 1976.

Hon. DANTE B. FASCELL,
Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am transmitting today the first semiannual report to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe established by Public Law 94–304.

When I signed the Final Act at Helsinki on August 1, 1975, I stated that:

"Our peoples will be watching and measuring our progress. They will ask how these noble sentiments are being translated into actions that bring about a more secure and just order in the daily lives of each of our nations and its citizens."

Since that time our policy toward the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has continued to be that the test of the Conference will be the extent to which its provisions are actually implemented. This concept, advanced by all the Western leaders present at Helsinki, has made of the CSCE a key yardstick for measuring the significance of the development of East-West relations.

The creation of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and its work, is part of this measuring process. It reflects how seriously the United States takes the Final Act and how conscientiously we expect all the signatory states to approach the task of implementing its provisions. It is not our purpose to interfere in the domestic affairs of others. We do expect, however, that all those with whom we pledged our word at Helsinki will work with us closely to give life and meaning not only to the noble goals but to the specific practical undertakings in the Final Act.

The CSCE has a long history of diplomatic preparation and hard negotiation against the background of wider diplomatic efforts. It is part of a broader diplomatic process, both bilateral and multilateral. The West, for instance, stipulated that progress in this larger area was necessary before the Conference could even be convened. As a result of these diplomatic efforts the Soviet Union and its Allies acknowledged, after a quarter-century, that the United States and Canada do play an indispensable role in security and cooperation in Europe. The four powers with responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole concluded the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, and the East agreed to begin negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe (MBFR).

During the CSCE negotiations we worked closely, cooperatively and harmoniously with our Allies. We attached the greatest importance to insuring that the interests of our friends in Western Europe were supported and reflected in the results of this Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We worked throughout the Conference in the

closest consultation with members of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. Maintenance of this Allied unity has been a major element of our policy since Helsinki and will continue to be a key part of our approach to the Belgrade followup meeting. Largely as a result of this unity, the West succeeded during the negotiations in obtaining significant commitments from the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe on human rights and related matters, including especially the freer flow of people and ideas. Through the CSCE the West succeeded in establishing human rights and fundamental freedoms as a basic subject for legitimate East-West discourse. With these commitments in hand, Western leaders signed the Final Act at the Summit 16 months ago, almost 3 years after the initiation of preparatory talks and more than two decades after the idea of a conference was first broached.

Since Helsinki our policy has been based on the need for implementation of the provisions of the Final Act: we have stressed this approach in all our contacts on CSCE. We have made a series of demarches to the Soviet Union to convey to the Soviet Government the importance which the United States Government and the American people attach to implementation of the commitments contained in the Final Act, and have sought to encourage positive implementation. We have also raised specific CSCE commitments with each of the Eastern European governments and have urged that those states fulfill their Helsinki undertakings. Our Allies and many neutral European states have also urged Soviet and Eastern European implementation of specific Final Act provisions, using high-level visits and contacts to press for progress on CSCE-related bilateral problems.

Since Helsinki, the United States has also carefully monitored implementation activity by all CSCE participant states, and has developed a continuing process of exchange and collation of information with our Allies. We have maintained contact and compared notes with other Western countries in order to have the broadest possible picture of how the provisions of the Final Act are being carried out.

We and our Allies are now preparing for the 1977 Belgrade followup meeting that is called for in the Final Act. The Belgrade meeting is, of course, closely related to the broader effort to improve East-West relations, of which CSCE is a part. The course of the Belgrade meeting and the future of the CSCE concept, however, will be determined primarily by the degree to which the participating states carry out the provisions of the Final Act.

The Final Act is not a legal document but rather an expression of political will. Nonetheless, we do not accept the argument of some Eastern states that implementation can only occur if there are supplementary legal undertakings. Nor can we accept that behavior contrary to the act's undertakings is acceptable, even in the absence of such legal undertakings.

The Final Act has not transformed the behavior of signatory nations overnight, but it has committed the national leaders who signed it to standards of behavior which are compatible with Western thoughts about the relationship of people to their governments. With its profoundly Western orientation, the Final Act reflects the great importance that the West attaches to human rights and the self determination of peoples. As stated in greater detail in the accompanying report, the United States rejected in the negotiations and rejects in principle the concept of hegemony. Rather than freezing the political face of Europe the Final Act expresses the determination that Europe

should again become a continent of nations free to choose their own course, both domestically and internationally.

The Helsinki document provides an agenda and a detailed framework—accepted at the highest political level by both East and West as well as by the neutral states of Europe—for addressing the problems which led to the division of Europe. In other words, we and our Allies have, with CSCE, added a dynamic new dimension to our efforts to reduce the barriers between East and West, a dimension which is based on peaceful contacts between both governments and peoples in Europe and North America.

We are generally satisfied with the initial steps taken to implement the military security or confidence-building measures contained in the Final Act. The East has provided advance notification of several maneuvers and has invited observers, although on a somewhat more limited basis than the Western and neutral states.

There has been some limited improvement in cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment in the last 16 months, a development which builds upon a process begun before the conclusion of CSCE. Nonetheless, this section of the Final Act affords scope for greater progress.

In the vitally important humanitarian and related fields, progress has been both limited and uneven. Predictably the most difficult areas have involved human contacts and the freer flow of information, concepts in the practical implementation of which the Soviet Union and its Eastern European Allies continue to have ideas very different from the West. There have been some positive developments in the fields of culture and education, which again build upon experiences which predate the Helsinki Summit. It is evident, however, that so far the Soviet and East European record on human rights issues remains inadequate when measured against the important undertakings of the Helsinki Final Act. The success of the Belgrade meeting will depend primarily on constructive Eastern efforts in the period ahead.

As I pointed out in Helsinki, the signing of the Final Act began a process directed toward more normal relations between states and people in Europe. The start has been slow, but a start nevertheless has been made and we are determined to continue our efforts. The Final Act remains a valid set of standards which, if pursued steadily, will contribute toward lowering the barriers between states and people in Europe.

Thus far there has been some limited progress overall, but we are not yet content with what has been accomplished. There is much yet to be done to bring the commitments of Helsinki to life.

The United States intends to continue to work with all the signatories of the Final Act for its full implementation. We will consult widely in preparation for Belgrade and move in concert with like-minded states.

We do not wish to engage in recrimination, but we shall continue to press for real and steady progress both within the context of CSCE and in our broader relationships with the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe. We hope and believe that CSCE will prove a practical and positive step in an historic process. However, as I stated in Helsinki and wish now to reemphasize, the proof remains in the doing.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD

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CHAPTER 1—ON OVERSIGHT OF CSCE

A. Preconference History

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, with its familiar acronym CSCE, has a long history. It was proposed initially by the Soviet Union in 1954 as a grand Conference on Security in Europe (though General Secretary Brezhnev once suggested that the concept had its origins in the diplomacy of the 1920's). Its post-World War II gestation phase, however, coincided with the fading of hope that a peace treaty providing for the reunification of Germany could be concluded within a foreseeable time. The proposed Conference was viewed by the Soviets as an effort to forestall the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany in the NATO Alliance and to isolate the states of Western Europe from the United States and Canada which were to be accorded no place at the conference table or in the pan-European "security" system. Proposals were also made during this period by various Western statesmen for some form of all-European conference, but with full North American participation.

The idea of a security conference, loosely if at all defined, remained a part of the Soviet diplomatic arsenal throughout the 1960's, but as late as 1966 the Warsaw Pact, in a declaration issued at Bucharest, implied that a major purpose of an agreement would be to detach the United States from Europe; the Bucharest Declaration stated that "there can be no doubt that the aims of the U.S. policy in Europe have nothing in common with the vital interests of the European peoples and the tasks of European security." Such movement toward a conference as was initiated by informal contacts between smaller members of the two alliances was halted temporarily by the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the espousal of a doctrine asserting a special right of the Soviet Union to intervene in the internal affairs of the states of Eastern Europe to preserve their Communist regimes.

The Soviet Union sought to focus renewed attention on a conference in 1969. In the early stages of a sounding out process, the Soviets proposed three central agenda items:

—Inviolability of the existing frontiers in Europe, in particular the Oder-Neisse border between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Poland, and the border between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

—Recognition of the GDR, which at the time had established diplomatic relations only with the states of the Communist world.

—Renunciation by the FRG of the possession of nuclear weapons.

The Warsaw Pact suggested that when these central points had been satisfactorily resolved it would be possible for the nations of Europe to cooperate on projects in the economic and environmental spheres, but the core of the Soviet proposal was what many observers considered to be a series of political undertakings designed to resolve the unfinished business of World War II in a manner favorable to Soviet interests by providing Western acceptance of both the territorial and the political status quo in Germany and Eastern Europe.

The response of the United States and its Allies to these Soviet overtures was cool. In the absence of specific agreements which could reduce tensions in Europe, we considered a conference premature, particularly one that dealt with issues of security in only the most general of terms or that threatened interests of key allies such as the FRG. We did, however, seize the opportunity to use the Soviet desire for a European security conference to encourage the Soviets toward specific discussions of concrete issues.

Among the central points stressed by the United States and its Allies were:

—The need for substantial prior progress in other diplomatic endeavors underway at the time, notably the quadripartite negotiations on Berlin.

—Full participation of the United States and Canada at the conference, countering the Warsaw Pact concept that the purpose of a conference would be to develop a Soviet influenced security system for a Western Europe stripped of its North American partners.

—The development of an agenda that would include a series of concrete issues susceptible to practical resolution.

Through exchange of ministerial declarations and other contacts, the NATO Alliance also made it explicit that conclusion of a satisfactory Berlin agreement was a necessary precondition to the convening of the CSCE. The Alliance also indicated that concrete issues related to military security, specifically the desirability of achieving mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe, would have to be discussed in a more restricted forum of NATO and Warsaw Pact States. German questions, which had figured so prominently in the original Soviet proposals, were dealt with instead in separate West German treaties on renunciation of force with the U.S.S.R. and Poland. The Soviet Union insisted, however, that the Berlin agreement could only be completed after the FRG had ratified the bilateral treaties with it and with Poland.

This interlocking series of preconditions was met in 1972. The FRG ratified nonuse of force agreements with Poland and the Soviet Union in May 1972, which precluded change of present-day territorial frontiers by force but held open the possibility of ultimate peaceful resolution of the German national question. The United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union signed the Final Quadripartite Protocol bringing the Berlin Agreement, with its guarantees of access and its concomitant inner-German arrangements between the FRG and the GDR and between the city government of the Western Sectors of Berlin and the GDR, into force in June 1972. The FRG and the GDR signed an agreement on traffic in May 1972 and concluded a "Basic Treaty" on bilateral relations in December 1972, which was

followed with the granting of diplomatic recognition to the GDR by the United States and virtually all other members of the NATO Alliance within the next 2 years. The Soviet Union announced its readiness to begin preparatory MBFR discussions, and these talks began in January 1973. Additionally, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded a wide-ranging series of agreements affecting the quality of their bilateral relations, one of which, on strategic arms limitation (SALT), made a major contribution to larger security interests. On the multilateral level, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement was ratified by a large number of governments, including those of the two German States.

Preparatory talks for a CSCE accordingly began at the expert level in November 1972. Following a difficult 7-month negotiation leading to agreement on a detailed agenda, the Conference proper was opened by the foreign ministers of the 35 participating states in Helsinki in July 1973. Full participation of the United States and Canada had long since been assured. At the insistence of the Western participants the agenda had been greatly expanded to include concrete questions of cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and environment, and the key human contacts, information, and cultural issues, as well as the formulation of general principles guiding interstate relations and certain limited "confidence-building measures" in the military domain. More than symbolically, the Conference's putative title had been modified to focus on cooperation, that is specific projects or undertakings directed toward the lowering of barriers between states and between their peoples. The Conference retained a more limited security element, with military issues to be discussed primarily at the Vienna talks on MBFR. The U.S. approach to the negotiation was outlined by the Secretary of State to the gathering of Foreign Ministers at Helsinki in July 1973. In approving the final recommendations which constituted the agenda for the Conference itself, the Secretary said:

> For a quarter century division has been the dominant feature of Europe. We all recognize that this Conference must not confirm the barriers that still divide Europe. Rather, by our support of the Final Recommendations prepared by the meeting of experts in Helsinki between November, 1972 and July, 1973. We have expressly undertaken to lower these barriers. We have said coexistence is not enough. Indeed, the document to which we have agreed requires constructive change on a broad front in order that, with the passage of time, we can engage in many truly cooperative, and mutually beneficial and peaceful relationships.

Many of the smaller states regarded the Conference as a single opportunity to contribute to that process of relaxing tensions and developing a new pattern of relationships which had already been begun by France, the FRG and other Western European countries as well as by the United States and the Soviet Union in their bilateral negotiations. The nine members of the European Community welcomed the occasion afforded by the Conference to formulate and carry out, virtually for the first time, a coordinated diplomatic policy. The European neutrals wished to take advantage of an opportunity, uncommon in postwar Europe, to express their views on outstanding East-West issues in a forum including the major powers. Yugoslavia was among the most interested participants, and assumed a role in line with its long-standing policy of non-alignment. Romania was also

deeply interested in the Conference as a means to preserve and enhance its independent foreign policy.

The United States attached prime importance throughout the negotiations to the close consultation and harmonization of views with our Allies—in NATO and at the Conference site. This constant process insured effective Western cooperation in dealing with the complexities of a 35-nation conference covering a wide array of East-West issues. We and our Allies also worked closely with the European neutrals. Negotiations with Soviet and Eastern European representatives were businesslike and rarely polemical, and a constructive negotiating atmosphere prevailed despite the fundamental differences between East and West.

In a very real sense, the nature of the CSCE had changed significantly from the original Soviet aim to consolidate the U.S.S.R.'s own position in Eastern Europe and to inhibit Western cohesion. CSCE as it actually happened was quite different. Many of the most important political questions, notably those involving the two German States, had been addressed previously in a constructive fashion designed to bring practical improvements while leaving to the future still unresolved matters such as the unification of Germany and the nature of a final legal settlement of World War II. Fundamental military security questions in Central Europe were being negotiated in the more appropriate smaller MBFR forum, among the states directly concerned. Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union already had produced significant agreements such as SALT, and the two superpowers were attempting to build on that progress.

The CSCE in fact became a negotiation about the manner and pace of breaking down the division of Europe and alleviating the human hardships engendered by it. The addition of Western Basket Three initiatives gave concrete meaning to commitments on human rights. CSCE thus must be seen against both this larger diplomatic background and in terms of the real opportunities to bridge the postwar divisions between East and West in Europe.

B. The Final Act

Diplomatic language is rarely colorful, but the CSCE negotiators displayed a certain ingenuity in using the descriptive term "Baskets" for the various elements of the Conference agenda. Basket One, to which was ascribed the general title Questions Relating to Security in Europe, included the following documents: (a) A Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States; (b) matters related to giving effect to certain of the above principles, including an elaboration of the principle on refraining from the threat or use of force and consideration of a proposal designed to facilitate implementation of the principle on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes; (c) confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament. Basket Two covered Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment. Basket Three dealt with "Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields." Special Conference committees also dealt with "Questions Relating to Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean," and "Follow-up to the Conference."

(1) THE NONLEGAL NATURE OF THE FINAL ACT

One of the basic questions addressed by the negotiators was whether they were to produce a legally binding document. The Western position was that this would be inappropriate given the broad scope of the agenda and the desire to make clear that CSCE was to develop a framework for progress rather than to conclude World War II or ratify territorial dispositions. The Soviet Union and its Allies wished to stress the political significance of the occasion since they considered that the idea of a conference had originated with their proposal, and to emphasize those portions of the declaration on principles which, even in attenuated form, they sought to have regarded as the main work of the Conference. They saw advantage, however, in restricting the legal nature of their obligations, particularly with respect to Basket Three. As a result consensus was reached on a form and procedure which leaves no doubt that the various documents reflect expressions of political will but not legal obligation. This is demonstrated in three basic ways:

(*a*) The conference documents are presented in a Final Act, an instrument which customarily is not legally binding in international practice;

(*b*) The language used in the various documents is expressive of political rather than legal commitment. Thus, the Final Act concludes with the following statement:

> Wherefore the undersigned High Representatives of the Participating States, mindful of the high political significance which they attach to the results of the Conference, and declaring their determination to act in accordance with the provisions contained in the above texts, have subscribed their signatures below: . . .

(*c*) An additional paragraph is included requesting the Government of Finland to transmit to the Secretary General of the United Nations "the text of this Final Act, which is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. . . ." The meaning of this statement was explained by the Government of Finland in its letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, itself a document negotiated by the CSCE participants, as follows:

> I have been asked . . . to draw your attention to the fact that this Final Act is not eligible, in whole or in part, for registration with the Secretariat under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, as would be the case were it a matter of a treaty or international agreement, under the aforesaid Article.

(2) BASKET ONE

(*i*) *Declaration on principles*

This Declaration includes the following 10 principles:

—Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
—Refraining from the threat or use of force;
—Inviolability of frontiers;
—Territorial integrity of states;
—Peaceful settlement of disputes;
—Nonintervention in internal affairs;
—Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief;
—Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

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—Cooperation among states; and
—Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

By far the greater part of the subject matter of this declaration has long since been familiar ground in international life. The essential core is to be found in the U.N. Charter. A more detailed and precise elaboration was negotiated over a period of years in the United Nations by international legal specialists and adopted by the General Assembly in 1970 as The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations. The mandate laid down by the Foreign Ministers at Helsinki in July 1973 required the CSCE negotiators to "take into account in particular" the Friendly Relations document. The United States and its Allies sought to insure that the CSCE Declaration, a political document, was consistent with existing international law and did not conflict with vital interests of the Allies. The final product, as a result, breaks little new ground. As a document reaffirming familiar principles of state conduct already subscribed to by all participating states, it was, as a consequence, of less intrinsic interest to the Western participants than other portions of the Final Act in which an effort was made to give a new impulse to specific practical projects.

The main area of dispute centered around the effort by the Soviet Union, on the one hand, to insert language that would gain for it acceptance of the territorial and political status quo in Eastern Europe, and by the West, on the other hand, to avoid this and to advance the concept that respect for human rights and self-determination is an essential element of the more secure interestate relationship the Conference was designed to further.

The Soviet effort was concentrated on the principle of inviolability of frontiers, in an effort to foreclose definitively any possible revision of German or other borders in Europe. The language of that principle makes clear, however, that it is based on and limited to a long-accepted concept of international law: that frontiers of states must not be assaulted or modified by force. The United States and the other NATO Allies strongly supported the FRG in obtaining the following sentence, included within the principle of sovereign equality, that preserves the possibility that German or other borders in Europe can be modified through good faith negotiation: "They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement." This clause clearly establishes that frontiers in Europe can be changed.

The declaration likewise reflects, in both the principle of sovereign equality and the principle of equal rights and self-determination, the concept that all states in Europe should be able to choose and carry out their own political life free of domination by any other state. The Western and other negotiators considered this a de facto rejection of the doctrinal underpinnings of the Soviet Union's 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Within the principle of territorial integrity, the negotiators inserted a sentence expressing the impermissibility of acquisition of territory in Europe in contravention of international law. This clause, which states that no such acquisition will be recognized as legal, reflects the long-standing official position of the United States not to recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the U.S.S.R.

The opening clauses of the Final Act indicate that the results of the Conference apply "throughout Europe," thus eliminating any doubt as to their applicability to Berlin. The conclusion of the declaration contains language which, as the negotiating record makes clear, serves as a reservation of quadripartite rights and responsibilities for Berlin and Germany: "The participating states . . . note that the present Declaration does not affect their rights and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and other agreements and arrangements." The language of the declaration, therefore, leaves unaffected the still open questions which can be resolved only by a peace treaty, and it provides for an evolutionary process which may help to improve the situation of the peoples and states of Eastern Europe and gradually wear down some of the barriers which separate them from the rest of the Continent.

The West was likewise successful in incorporating a detailed statement on human rights in the principles, a step which goes beyond the U.N.'s Friendly Relations Declaration and recognizes that respect for human rights is a legitimate element in relations between states. Any effort to assert that this principle or any other is secondary to those of a purportedly higher political order is inconsistent with the clear statement in the final paragraphs of the declaration that "All the principles set forth above are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others."

(ii) Supplementary matters related to the principles

The NATO Alliance gave constructive assistance to a Romanian effort to elaborate on the principle of the nonuse or threat of force. This document was considered a further reaffirmation of the right of Eastern European States to pursue their own policies free from special claims upon them by others. The text adds nothing to the existing body of international law but it represents a reiteration by the Conference that any doctrine purporting to justify use of force or other forms of coercion in Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union would be inconsistent with the Final Act.

The United States and its Allies also viewed sympathetically an effort by Switzerland to evolve a recommendation for dispute settlement. We sought to reach agreement on machinery or procedures that might complement existing mechanisms, for example, the International Court of Justice. We wished to avoid creation of any body that might occupy itself with disputes of a purely political nature and which might as a consequence provide the Soviet Union with a pretext to intrude itself into peaceful settlement efforts being conducted within the framework of the NATO Alliance or the U.N. system. The Soviet Union and its Allies maintained their traditional reluctance to accept an expansion of the concept of binding dispute settlement. The agreed compromise provides merely that the Government of Switzerland may convene a meeting of experts to work on a Swiss draft convention or related projects subsequent to the CSCE followup meeting which will be held in 1977.

(iii) Confidence-building measures

Major military issues, notably MBFR and SALT, are under negotiation in more narrowly constituted forums between the states most immediately concerned. CSCE's contributions in this area are, never-

theless, of some significance. They include prior notification of major military maneuvers "exceeding a total of 25,000 troops . . . which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating state as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space;" discretionary notification of smaller military maneuvers; and exchange of observers to attend military maneuvers. The participating states also expressed an intention to review at a later time "the question of prior notification of major military movements," and agreed on the desirability of promoting "exchanges by invitation among their military personnel, including visits by military delegations."

We and our NATO Allies considered that agreement on these helpful measures was preferable to mere restatement of disarmament and arms control objectives. While there are such restatements in the document as well as general language expressing the importance of movement in these areas and, indirectly, the interest of the smaller states in the ongoing MBFR and SALT talks, the focus is on practical steps the importance of which depends largely upon their implementation. The care with which these measures were negotiated is testimony both to the substantial interest which a number of states have in these measures and to the difficulty of proceeding to far-reaching security measures in the CSCE context.

(3) BASKET TWO

The Conference produced six main documents in this basket, each of which dealt, albeit in a general and nonbinding way, with specific steps designed to improve economic cooperation. These are:

—Commercial exchanges, including business contacts and facilities, economic and commercial information, and marketing;

—Industrial cooperation and projects of common interest, including inter alia, such diverse matters as cooperation concerning energy and the development of road networks in Europe;

—Trade and industrial cooperation, including harmonization of standards, arbitration and the conclusion of appropriate specific bilateral arrangements;

—Science and technology, including cooperation in agriculture, energy, new technologies for rational use of resources, transport, physics, chemistry, meteorology and hydrology, seismology, glaciology, computers, space, and medicine and public health;

—Environment, including cooperation in control of air and water pollution, protection of the marine environment, land utilization, nature conservation, improvement of environmental conditions in settled areas, fundamental research and legal and administrative measures; and

—Other areas, including development of transport, promotion of tourism, economic and social aspects of migrant labor in Europe, and training of personnel.

The impressive scope of these topics should not, however, obscure the fact that, as with all else in the Final Act, the specific undertakings of the participating states remain political rather than legal. They are matters on which the participants express an intention or a determination to make progress, but for the most part the details and shape of implementation are left to the states to determine subsequently, unilaterally, bilaterally or in appropriate multilateral forums such as the Economic Commission for Europe.

The following examples are typical. The participating states pledged to "make use of every suitable opportunity to cooperate in the field of environment" and listed a series of specific areas where the opportunities might be "suitable". The Final Act does not, however, commit them to specific environmental steps. While identifying more than a dozen areas for cooperation in science and technology, the relevant document notes that "it is for potential partners in the participating countries to identify and develop projects and arrangements of mutual interest and benefit."

Given the widespread interest among all the participating States in developing cooperation in these relatively nonpolitical areas, these texts were somewhat less contentious than those in the first and third Baskets. The Soviet Union initially expressed the desire to emphasize in these documents the concept that cooperation should primarily be between states or at least between state-controlled entities. The Western delegations succeeded, however, in obtaining balanced recognition of the important role played by private firms and individuals. While agreeing to "recognize the beneficial effects which can result for the development of trade from the application of most-favored-nation treatment," the Conference did not accept the Soviet and East European proposal that most-favored-nation treatment should be granted automatically to all participating states.

In general the Basket Two texts build on a process of economic cooperation for mutual benefit across ideological lines already well underway prior to the convening of CSCE. They create a coherent framework and provide impetus to invigorate this process further. They also provide a substantial body of relatively uncontroversial undertakings which may be of use in East-West dealings. For example, the section on economic and commercial information commits the participating states to provide a wide variety of information of use to businessmen and economists, and the section on business contacts and facilities calls for specific improvements in the facilities available to foreign businessmen. The effectiveness of these provisions must continue to be evaluated in the light of specific bilateral and multilateral experience.

(4) BASKET THREE

Under the general heading "Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields," the four individual documents in this Basket cover the following wide range of topics:

—Human contacts, including contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties, reunification of families, marriage between citizens of different states, travel for personal or professional reasons, improvement of conditions for tourism on an individual or collective basis, meetings among young people, and sports;

—Information, including improvement of the circulation and access to and exchange of oral, printed, filmed and broadcast information and improvement of working conditions for journalists;

—Cooperation and exchanges in the field of culture; and

—Cooperation and exchanges in educational fields including science, foreign languages, and teaching methods.

Discussion of these texts paralleled to a considerable extent negotiation of the Declaration on Principles. Western delegations worked

closely together to obtain texts that reflected the view that improved opportunities for individuals in the participating states were essential to give life and meaning to the general principles of state behavior to which the Soviet Union sought to ascribe preeminent political importance. Many provisions were championed by individual delegations. France, for example, took the lead in developing the text on access to culture. The Vatican did the same with texts relating to religious freedom. The NATO caucus and the European Community carried out active negotiations on a range of issues and worked with the European neutrals to attain detailed texts on humanitarian matters. The Western delegations successfully resisted efforts to insert language that would suggest that progress in these fields was less important than the political statements in Basket One. While the Soviet Union obtained preambular language in this Basket to the effect that cooperation in humanitarian and related fields "should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating states," the Western delegations noted that the Declaration on Principles contained a detailed elaboration of the human rights which should be enjoyed by all individuals, a specific commitment to implement the provisions of the Final Act, and the statement, cited above, that each principle was of primary significance.

The texts contained in this Basket, like those in other parts of the Final Act, express political rather than legal commitment. They also commonly employ relatively subjective terminology such as "appropriate measures." It is evident, however, that the linkage established by these texts between improvement in the daily situation of individual Europeans and improvement in broader political relationships between states represents the most innovative aspect of CSCE. It is this Basket which clearly establishes human rights, including the freer flow of people, ideas and information, as a legitimate subject of interstate relations, and serves notice that improvement in these areas will be necessary if East-West relations are to continue to evolve in a positive direction. The United States attaches great importance to the full implementation of the Basket Three undertakings by all participating states.

(5) QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

This document reflects the initiative and special interest of a number of Mediterranean States. During the course of the Conference, statements were presented by representatives of six nonparticipating, non-European Mediterranean littoral states: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. The Conference agreed to express appreciation for these contributions and a general interest in finding ways for states participating in the CSCE to deepen and improve the quality of their relations with other states in the Mediterranean area. The document contains no specific propositions to which participating states are committed, however, and was generally considered less central to the work of the Conference than the other subject headings.

(6) FOLLOWUP TO THE CONFERENCE

This document addresses circumspectly the question of followup to the Conference. Soviet interest in the years preceding the convening

of the Conference had focused on the possibility of establishing a more or less institutionalized pan-European "security" system from which the United States and Canada would have been excluded. In the Soviet conception, this arrangement would have legitimized a substantial Soviet involvement with the affairs of Western Europe and would have rendered theoretically superfluous the continued existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, while bilateral Soviet-East European arrangements would have continued. The United States and its Allies considered that any form of permanent political organ would serve a disruptive purpose and could become the nucleus of the pan-European system conceived by the U.S.S.R. We considered, however, that there might be some value in finding a means to review relatively formally the progress made in implementing the specific undertakings to which the participating states were subscribing in the Final Act. A number of smaller states were interested in developing additional means by which they could increase their individual national contributions to the evolution of European affairs. Several of these states saw particular benefits that might accrue to their independent policies from an institutionalized conference. The Soviets, on the other hand, became progressively less interested in a meaningful followup arrangement as it became clear that a major purpose of such an arrangement would be to review their implementation record.

The agreed document, while a compromise, fully reflects the major Western interests. In order to provide for a review of implementation, as well as the possibility of deepening their mutual relations, improving security and cooperation and furthering "the process of détente in the future," the participating states agreed to organize:

> . . . Meetings among their representatives, beginning with a meeting at the level of representatives appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This meeting will define the appropriate modalities for the holding of other meetings which could include further similar meetings and the possibility of a new Conference;
>
> 3. The first of the meetings indicated above will be held at Belgrade in 1977. A preparatory meeting to organize this meeting will be held at Belgrade on 15 June 1977.

It is clear from this that the 2 years after signature of the Final Act are to be regarded primarily as a period of implementation of the Final Act. No permanent machinery has been established. The host country for the 1977 meeting, Yugoslavia, will provide an ad hoc technical secretariat.

C. The Helsinki Summit

The decision to have the Final Act signed at the Summit was reached, like all others during the Conference, by consensus, that is unanimously. The Soviet Union expressed throughout the negotiating phase a particular wish for this denouement, which it considered would emphasize the political significance and successful conclusion of what it still regarded as its own major initiative. Many other states, including our NATO Allies, sympathized with this desire because they believed that the texts as ultimately drafted, particularly the Basket Three documents, reflected a substantial success for Western positions which in many cases they had championed in difficult and lengthy negotiations. In addition they considered it important to commit the U.S.S.R. and its Allies as prominently as pos-

sible to carrying out their undertakings. The United States concurred in this evolving consensus because we considered that, on balance, the Final Act represented a successful negotiation which offered reasonable possibilities for further progress, because we considered that it was important to demonstrate an interest equal to that of our closest Allies in bringing about a positive evolution in East-West relations in Europe, and because we believed it was important for the President and other Western leaders to have a public forum for the proclamation of our values to all the peoples of Europe.

The statements made by the signatories at Helsinki in the summer of 1975 tended to reflect the particular viewpoints of the participants as well as the evolution of the CSCE concept that had been produced by 2 years of negotiation. General Secretary Brezhnev, for example, returned to the theme that, in the Soviet view, the conclusion of the Conference itself represented a major political fact that marked the close of an era. He emphasized that the Soviet Union saw in the Final Act "a necessary summing up of the political outcome of the Second World War," and said that "the hour has struck for the inevitable collective conclusions to be drawn from the experience of history." The General Secretary was more cautious in his assessment of the future value of the Conference. In a reference viewed by many observers as directed at the substantial provisions for humanitarian improvements gained by the Western negotiators, he stated that the compromises contained in the Final Act:

> . . . are an expression of the common political will of the participating States in a form that is feasible today in the conditions of the existence of States with different social systems.
>
> The experience of the work of the Conference provides important conclusions for the future, too. The major one which is reflected in the final document is this: no one should try to dictate to other peoples on the basis of foreign policy considerations of one kind or another the manner in which they ought to manage their internal affairs. It is only the people of each given State and no one else, who have the sovereign right to resolve their internal affairs and establish their internal laws. A different approach would be perilous as a ground for international cooperation.

Western leaders did not accept the interpretation that the Conference's results should be read as a political summation of the postwar divisions of Europe. They emphasized, for example, that the principles of state behavior subscribed to by the Conference recognized the possibility of change of borders by peaceful means and that the ultimate success or failure of CSCE could only be determined at a much later time when its relationship to the broader patterns of diplomacy and human contacts across the frontiers of the Cold War could be judged in perspective. In this spirit, President Ford pointed to the significant developments, including the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, which had made the convening of the Conference possible. He stressed that the application of the results of the conference to Berlin, subject to continuing quadripartite rights and responsibilities, remained a test of the nature of future relations, and he noted other vital political, military and economic matters still on the diplomatic agenda. Rather than regarding CSCE as a surrogate peace conference, he explained the United States' view that:

> We have learned from the experiences of the last 30 years that peace is a process requiring mutual restraint and practical arrangements. This Conference is part of that process—a challenge, not a conclusion.

He assured the other leaders that the United States took the Final Act seriously but advised the Soviet and Eastern European leaders that "it is important that you recognize the deep devotion of the American people and their Government to human rights and fundamental freedoms and thus to the pledges that this Conference has made regarding the freer movement of people, ideas and information." He cautioned against premature efforts to summarize the Conference and said that:

> The goals we are stating today are the yardstick by which our performance will be measured.
>
> The people of all Europe and, I assure you, the people of North America are thoroughly tired of having their hopes raised and then shattered by empty words and unfulfilled pledges. We had better say what we mean and mean what we say, or we will have the anger of our citizens to answer.

This dynamic concept, that the significance of the CSCE will be judged on the extent to which its specific, concrete provisions are actually implemented, has guided U.S. policy toward the Conference since Helsinki.

D. U.S. Policy Since Helsinki

Since Helsinki we have based our policy on the President's Helsinki statement that the significance of the CSCE will depend on how it is implemented. We have sought to encourage implementation of CSCE provisions in which we have an intrinsic interest, such as family reunification, binational marriages, improved working conditions for businessmen and journalists, and liberalization of travel restrictions. We have also tried to move ahead in areas where East-West cooperation could be mutually advantageous, such as cultural, scientific, and educational exchanges. In all our efforts we have had in mind the CSCE followup meeting to be held in Belgrade in 1977, and the need to prepare thoroughly for that meeting.

To carry out this policy and move toward our objectives we have established a mechanism for coordination and monitoring of CSCE-related activities in the departments and agencies of the administration. We have undertaken a variety of bilateral approaches to the Soviet Union and Eastern European governments to encourage implementation of specific Final Act provisions. Without detracting attention from the commitments in the Final Act, many of which call for unilateral implementation, we have taken a significant number of initiatives to carry forward the concepts reflected in the Final Act itself.

We and the Allies have developed in NATO a system for continuing exchange of information and experience, and for harmonization of activities by individual Allies. This process, which has included a major contribution by the European Economic Community, has made it possible to monitor implementation on a broad basis and to maintain Western unity. We have also continued the fruitful contacts which we had with many neutral European States during the CSCE itself, and have compared experience and views with them on a periodic basis.

We plan to continue these activities, which will form the foundation for our position at the 1977 followup meetings in Belgrade.

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CHAPTER 2—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET ONE

The first "Basket" of the Helsinki Final Act, titled Questions Relating to Security in Europe, includes a Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States, with a subsection on giving effect to certain of the principles, and a document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

A. Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States

The 10 principles in the declaration are general restatements of expected international behavior, consistent with international law and such earlier general statements as the U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations. The fundamental ideological and political differences between East and West present the main difficulty in their implementation. Since Helsinki, the Soviet Union and the East European States have interpreted and emphasized various principles in a manner which differs from that of the West. In so doing they have at times sought to win through reinterpretation points lost in the negotiation. Thus, the Soviets have sought to have the declaration regarded as "first among equals" in the Final Act—and so more important than the Basket Three undertakings on human contacts and freer flow of people and information. They have stressed the importance of the third and sixth principles—inviolability of frontiers and nonintervention in internal affairs—and their own interpretation of these two principles, while deemphasizing others, such as the principles on self-determination, nonuse of force and human rights. The United States insists upon the primary significance of all the principles and will continue to resist any effort to cloak the declaration with a special political significance divorced from the Basket Three commitments.

(1) IMPLEMENTATION

Since the declaration sets out general principles for the behavior of states rather than commitments to specific actions, it is difficult to measure affirmative implementation action. What follows, therefore, is an illustrative review of Soviet and East European efforts since Helsinki to interpret key principles in the declaration.

(i) Inviolability of frontiers

There has been, as expected, a consistent tendency on the part of the Soviet Union and the other member states of the Warsaw Pact to interpret the declaration to suit their foreign and domestic policy interests. In an echo of the original Soviet goal of having the CSCE serve as a surrogate peace conference that would ratify the political and territorial status quo in Eastern Europe, public statements and

authoritative commentaries in their official press have sought to portray inviolability of frontiers as the most important of the 10 principles of interstate behavior. These statements and commentaries discount the language of the Final Act which provides for the possibility of peaceful modification of borders through negotiation and states that all the principles are of "primary significance" and are to be "equally and unreservedly applied." In accordance with this pattern, the Soviet-GDR treaty of October 7, 1975, described the GDR's borders as immutable and the inviolability of frontiers as the "most important precondition for safeguarding European security." The Final Act does not suggest that frontiers in Europe are "immutable" and specifically states that all the CSCE principles are of equal value. A lengthy analytical article in Pravda, the journal of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, advanced the view, unsupported by the Final Act, that the peaceful changes language in the declaration applies only to minor adjustments and rectifications of frontiers, and not to more basic border questions which might be addressed in a World War II peace conference or in other bilateral or multilateral negotiations.

(*ii*) *Human rights*

In their references to the declaration, the Soviets and the East European governments have tended either to subordinate the human rights principle or to stress societal rights and responsibilities over individuals rights. The final document of the European Communist Party Conference (ECPC) held in East Berlin in June 1976 touched on human rights in the CSCE context, but it focused on ratification of the U.N. Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights as the appropriate step by which to give life to the principle. These two treaties, which contain a number of escape clauses based on state security interests, were given a clearly secondary significance in the CSCE Declaration, which concentrated instead on the central place of the United Nation's more encompassing and definitive Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The ECPC document reflected neither the Universal Declaration nor the concrete measures written into the CSCE Basket Three.

At the meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva in February–March 1976, the Soviet Union submitted a resolution on détente and human rights which qualified the human rights undertakings of the Final Act. The United States opposed this move by submitting, together with other Western participants, a resolution which correctly reflected the CSCE's human rights commitments. A non-aligned "compromise" version of these two draft resolutions, which was only marginally better than the Soviet draft, was passed by the majority of Communist and non-aligned nations present at the meeting. However, the United States and other Allied countries on the Commission voted against this so-called "compromise" resolution.

There is, in fact, no evidence yet that the Soviet Union or the East European States have significantly altered their approach to human rights questions since the signing of the Final Act. They continue to act on the philosophy that individual rights must be subordinated to the collective good as defined by the Communist Party. This results in a situation, with some degree of gradation in each of the Warsaw Pact States, that falls far short of compliance with the human rights principle as expressed in the declaration and as understood in the West.

A group of Soviet dissidents who have formed a committee entitled Public Group for the Assistance of the Fulfillment of the Helsinki Agreements in the U.S.S.R. to monitor their country's implementation of the human rights aspects of the Final Act, stated at a press conference on the first anniversary of the signing of that document that it did not appear that the Soviet Government intended to implement these provisions.

It concluded, however, that the existence of the CSCE document was nonetheless a useful tool that could be used to induce better Soviet performance in human rights fields. Indeed, the very existence of a statement by the dissident group is an illustration of this. The United States and its allies intend to continue to use that tool. A more detailed discussion of the implementation record on the specific human rights-related measures of Basket Three will be found in chapter 4 of this report.

(*iii*) *Nonintervention*

In the most general sense, the Soviets have repeatedly cited the nonintervention principle when complaining about the alleged Western preoccupation with Basket Three implementation. Excessive Western concern with the steps taken by the U.S.S.R. to implement the human rights principle and the human contacts and information provisions of the Final Act, Soviet commentators argue, amounts to overt interference in Soviet domestic affairs.

More specifically, the Soviets have utilized the nonintervention principle to protest certain Western—and especially United States—activities and attitudes.

—Beginning in the winter of 1975–76, Moscow launched a concerted media campaign against Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), charging that the content of their broadcasts was out of step with the general tenor of the Final Act, and that the activity of the Radios constituted interference in internal Soviet affairs. This subject will be treated in detail in chapter 4.

—In a demarche in June 1976, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington objected to the creation of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe established by Public Law 94–304 to monitor CSCE implementation. The Soviet statement asserted, inter alia, that the Commission's work would interfere in internal U.S.S.R. affairs. Similar reasoning was used when the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries refused to issue visas to Commission members for a Commission trip to Europe on November 5–23. We have made it clear that we reject this position.

—Almost immediately after the signing of the Final Act on August 1, 1975, the Soviet media began characterizing Western concern over political developments in Portugal and particularly the European Community's program of assistance, as interference in Portuguese internal affairs. In a similar vein, before and after the June 1976 parliamentary election in Italy the Soviets accused the United States, the FRG and other members of NATO of interference in Italian domestic affairs because of their expressed concern about possible participation by the Communist Party in the Italian Government. The United States

and its Allies have noted that nothing in the CSCE documents restricts their ability to cooperate with and to provide assistance to a state as they desire or to offer their views on matters of common interest.

(2) OTHER USES OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

The declaration, in whole or in part, has been cited in a wide range of other matters of interest to signatories:

Italo-Yugoslav Border Agreement.—Italy and Yugoslavia reached an agreement in November 1975 on a permanent border in the Trieste area. Both governments described the agreement as an example of implementation of the CSCE principles.

Balkan cooperation.—Representatives of Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania held the First Inter-Balkan Conference on Economic and Technical Cooperation in Athens, January 16–February 5, 1976. The participants, who discussed cooperation in the sectors of agriculture, commerce, energy, transport, communications, and environment, related the conference to "the spirit of Helsinki" and in particular to the principle of cooperation among states.

Cyprus.—The Cyprus problem remains an outstanding contentious issue among three signatories of the Final Act. The Government of Cyprus circulated a formal reservation during the last stage of the CSCE in Helsinki setting forth its position on the dispute. The Turkish Government circulated a formal reply. In an interview marking the first anniversary of the signing of the Final Act, the Greek Foreign Minister regretted that no solution had yet been found to a situation which, he said, includes "violations of almost all the principles of Helsinki."

The Baltic States question.—President Ford stated on the eve of the Helsinki Summit that the United States has never recognized the legality of the 1940 incorporation into the Soviet Union of the independent states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and was not doing so by signature of the Final Act. He pointed out that the U.S. policy of nonrecognition was not affected by the results of CSCE. The Soviet Union has suggested that it considers U.S. policy in this respect to be contrary to the Declaration of Principles. The administration, however, welcomed separate resolutions passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives in December 1975 which took note of statements by the President and by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and expressed the sense of the Congress that there has been no change in the U.S. policy of nonrecognition. President Ford reiterated this position in a message to Estonian-Americans on February 19, 1976.

Berlin.—In an interview on the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the Final Act and with reference to that document's provisions that the benefits of the Conference should apply "throughout Europe", including Berlin subject to Four Power rights and responsibilities, the governing mayor of Berlin expressed the belief that CSCE had as yet made no difference to his city. He noted, however, that Berlin continued to benefit substantially from the Quadripartite Agreement and the concomitant inner-German arrangements the conclusion of which had been a Western precondition for the opening of the CSCE negotiations. The United States continues to regard

the Berlin situation, in the words of President Ford at Helsinki, as a test not only of the general East-West relationship but "of the principles of this Conference."

Shooting deaths on the East German border.—Both the FRG and the GDR invoked the Declaration of Principles in the summer of 1976 in connection with a series of fatal and near-fatal shootings by East German border guards. The FRG accused the GDR of violating the human rights principle by indiscriminately shooting individuals who were either attempting to cross the border or who had wandered inadvertently into the border area. The GDR charged the FRG with violation of the principle of inviolability of frontiers for failure to take measures to prevent persons from entering the GDR from the FRG and with violation of the principle of sovereign equality for continuing to speak of "inter-German relations." The FRG Foreign Minister indicated that it might be necessary to raise the GDR's shooting practices at the Belgrade followup meeting.

B. Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament

The most specifically drawn confidence-building measure (CBM) provides for prior notification of major military maneuvers in the European territory of participating states, or, in the case of the Soviet Union and Turkey, the two participating states whose territory extends beyond Europe, in a 250-kilometer deep zone along the frontiers facing or shared with another participating European State. It specifies a troop threshold of 25,000 and a prior notification period of at least 21 days.

While no part of the Final Act is legally binding and CBM's are explicitly "voluntary," the political commitment is clear and the implementation record, involving as it does specific events and numbers, lends itself to objective assessment. Western delegations at the Conference strongly registered the position that notification of major military maneuvers requires specific compliance.

The record thus far is moderately encouraging. There is no indication that any participating state or group of states has failed to provide notification of a major maneuver.

The Soviet Union has criticized the NATO maneuvers, however, as military demonstrations inconsistent with the CSCE spirit. Eastern policy on exchange of observers has been more cautious but within the letter of the Final Act.

(1) NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS

(i) NATO States

The NATO Allies have worked closely together to insure that the Alliance follows common modalities for CBM's. Notification has been given of the following major maneuvers:

—August 22, 1975, by the FRG and the United States, "Grosse Rochade," a 68,000-man exercise with the participation of Canadian and French forces which took place in Bavaria September 15–19, 1975.

—September 10, 1975, by the FRG and the United States, "Certain Trek," a 57,000-man exercise with the participation of French and Canadian elements which took place in Bavaria October 14–23, 1975.

—August 16, 1976, by the FRG, "Grosser Baer," a 50,000-man exercise with the participation of United States, British and Dutch forces which took place in the FRG September 6–10, 1976, at the opening of NATO's "Autumn Forge" exercise series.

—August 16, 1976, by the United States, "Gordian Shield," a 30,000-man exercise with the participation of West German and Belgian forces which took place in the FRG September 7–11, 1976.

—August 23, 1976, by the United States, "Lares Teams," a 44,000-man exercise with the participation of West German and Canadian forces which took place in FRG territory September 13–17, 1976.

(*ii*) *Warsaw Pact States*

—January 4, 1976, by the Soviet Union, "Kavkaz" (Caucasus), an exercise described as involving "about 25,000 men, which was held near the Soviet-Turkish border January 26–February 6, 1976.

—May 24, 1976, by the Soviet Union, "Sever" (North), an exercise also described as involving "about 25,000" men which took place in the Leningrad Military District June 14–18, 1976.

—August 19, 1976, by Poland, "Tarcza-76" (Shield-76), a 35,000-man exercise with the participation of Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak troops which took place in Poland September 9–15, 1976.

(*iii*) *Neutral and non-aligned states*

—October 16, 1975, by Switzerland, a 40,000-man exercise which took place near the West German border November 10–18, 1975.

(2) SMALLER MANEUVERS

Notification of maneuvers involving fewer than 25,000 troops is optional but encouraged. Notification has been given of the following maneuvers in this category:

(*i*) *NATO States*

—August 1975, by Turkey and the United Kingdom "Deep Express," an 18,000-man exercise with the participation of United States, FRG, and Italian forces which took place in the Aegean Sea and Turkish Thrace September 12–28, 1975.

—September 12, 1975, by Norway, "Batten Bolt 75" an 8,000-man ground, sea and air exercise with the participation of United Kingdom, Dutch, and Danish forces which took place October 3–7, 1975.

—October 14, 1975, by the Netherlands, "Pantersprong," a 10,000-man exercise which took place in the FRG October 28–November 6, 1975.

—February 1976, by Norway, "Atlas Express," a 17,000-man exercise with the participation of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force which took place February 26–March 22, 1976.

In the Fall 1976 series of smaller-scale exercises, NATO members gave notification of the following maneuvers:

—September 1976, by Norway, "Teamwork-76" a 15,000-man exercise with the participation of United States, United Kingdom, and Dutch forces which took place September 22–24, 1976.

—September, 1976, by Turkey, "Tayfun-76," a 15,000-man exercise which took place October 4–5, 1976.

—September 20, 1976, by Denmark, "Bonded Item," a 10,000-man exercise with the participation of FRG and United States forces which took place in the FRG and Denmark October 11–21, 1976.

—October 1976, by the United Kingdom, "Spearpoint," an 18,000-man exercise with the participation of United States, and Dutch troops which took place November 8–12, 1976.

(*ii*) *Warsaw Pact States*

—April 5, 1976, by Hungary, a 10,000-man exercise which began on the following day. (It should be noted that while at least 21 days notification is specified for major maneuvers, there is no similar requirement laid down for smaller maneuvers.)

—October 18, 1976, by Hungary, an 18,000-man exercise with the participation of Soviet forces which began the same day.

(*iii*) *Neutral and non-aligned states*

—September 26, 1976, by Yugoslavia, an 18,000-man exercise which took place in southwestern Macedonia October 21–25, 1975.

—August 17, 1976, by Yugoslavia, "Golija-76," a 24,000-man exercise which took place in the southern part of the country on September 20–23, 1976.

—September 3, 1976, by Sweden, "Poseidon," a 12,000-man exercise which took place October 2–6, 1976.

(3) EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS

The Final Act does not require that observers be invited to every maneuver for which notification is given, and there is no requirement that all CSCE signatories be included when invitations are extended. In general NATO and other Western States have thus far been inclined to invite observers somewhat more frequently and to extend their invitations to a larger number of countries. Warsaw Pact invitations have tended to go to a politically balanced smaller group of states in close geographic proximity to the area of the maneuver in question. Observers have been invited in the following instances:

(*i*) *NATO States*

—The FRG extended invitations to all CSCE signatories to observe "Certain Trek" in September 1975. Observers attended from eight Allied and seven neutral countries. None of the Warsaw Pact States sent observers.

—The FRG invited the CSCE States to observe "Grosser Baer" and "Lares Team" in August 1976. The invitations were not accepted by the Warsaw Pact States.
—Norway invited selected regional NATO, Warsaw Pact and neutral states to attend "Teamwork–76" in September 1976. Warsaw Pact recipients, including the Soviet Union, did not attend the exercise.
—The United Kingdom selected CSCE participant states to attend "Spearpoint" in October 1976. Warsaw Pact States did not attend.

(*ii*) *Warsaw Pact States*

—The Soviet Union invited observers from Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia to attend "Kavkaz" in January 1976. All recipients accepted the invitations.
—The Soviet Union invited Finland, the GDR, Norway, Poland, and Sweden to send observers to "Sever" in June 1976. All recipients accepted the invitations.
—Poland extended invitations, which were accepted, to Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden for "Tarcza–76" in September 1976. This exercise was also attended by the Ministers of Defense of the Warsaw Pact States and by observers from several non-CSCE states.

(*iii*) *Neutral and non-aligned states*

—Switzerland invited military attaches resident in Bern from both CSCE and non-CSCE countries to observe its November 1975 major maneuver. Only Romania of the Warsaw Pact invitees sent an observer.
—Yugoslavia invited all of the principal military attaches accredited to Belgrade to observe the "Golija–76" maneuver. Observers from 22 CSCE states, including neutrals and members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, attended.

(4) PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS

The Final Act notes that CSCE participants "may, at their own discretion" give notification of their major military movements. The Final Act does not lay down any commitments except to provide that the participating states will give "further consideration to this question at a later time." No CSCE signatory has yet given notification of a military movement.

(5) EXCHANGE OF MILITARY VISITS

Under the category of "other confidence-building measures," the Final Act encourages exchanges of military personnel, including visits by military delegations. There are many ongoing programs of this type between the Armed Forces of the United States and its Allies in Western Europe which predate the CSCE but can nevertheless be considered activities implementing the CBM provisions of the Final Act.

There have been frequent exchanges of high level military delegations between Eastern and Western countries since the Helsinki Summit. U.S. activities in their field have included a visit to Romania in

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September 1975, by General Weyand, the Army Chief of Staff, returning a visit to the United States by General Coman, Romanian Chief of Staff, in March of the same year. In October 1975, General Tutoveanu, Commandant of the Romanian Military Academy, visited the United States. The U.S. National War College visited Romania April 28–May 2, 1976, and Brigadier General J. L. Collins, Jr., U.S. Army, visited the U.S.S.R. in May 1976, to improve relations between United States and Soviet military historians. There have been numerous such visits by military officers and delegations between Western European and neutral countries and the U.S.S.R. and the states of Eastern Europe.

Exchanges of ship visits have also taken place between East and West during the period since Helsinki. Naval training vessels from the U.S.S.R., Poland, and Romania visited the United States during the bicentennial celebration in July 1976, and the U.S.S. *Yarnel* visited Constanta, Romania, in September 1976. Here again, there have been numerous exchanges of visits by naval ships between other Western countries and the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe since Helsinki.

(6) QUESTIONS RELATING TO DISARMAMENT

The Soviet Union has cited on a number of occasions the passages in the Final Act which call for the promotion of disarmament and describe the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security. It has increasingly referred to a relationship between implementation of the Final Act and further progress in the disarmament field. At the European Communist Party Conference (ECPC) in June 1976, both General Secretary Brezhnev's speech and the final communique presented a detailed exposition of recent Soviet disarmament proposals as examples of the Soviet effort fully to implement the Final Act. As a result of a Warsaw Pact Summit meeting in Bucharest on November 25–26, the Warsaw Pact countries have advanced proposals for foreclosing any expansion in the membership of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and for a treaty on nonfirst use of nuclear weapons to be agreed among all CSCE signatories. These proposals are not entirely new and go well beyond what is contemplated in the Helsinki Final Act.

The United States and its Allies have emphasized the need to make further practical progress on disarmament and arms control in the appropriate bilateral and multilateral fora outside CSCE such as SALT and MBFR.

CHAPTER 3—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET TWO

Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment

A. Introduction

Unilateral Basket Two implementation activities in the year since Helsinki have been modest, possibly reflecting CSCE countries' preoccupation with multilateral issues. The Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries have sought to distract attention from implementation of Basket Two commitments with numerous trade complaints against the West in general and the European Community in particular. To the same ends, they also have advanced grandiose proposals for major "pan-European" conferences which are not foreseen by the Final Act.

The provision of economic and commercial information, particularly that useful to Western business firms and banks, has not improved greatly in the 16 months since Helsinki; nonetheless, there have been exceptions to this general statement. In the strictly bilateral context the period since Helsinki has seen a significant increase in U.S. trade with the Soviet Union and individual East European States as well as some efforts by the Eastern countries to facilitate U.S. business interests. Bilateral agreements covering exchanges in science and technology have continued to be implemented during this period, and new agreements are currently under negotiation with several East European States.

The most visible implementation activity in the Basket Two area since Helsinki has been on the multilateral front. Here, for example, the United States and other Western countries have urged the strengthening of the role of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in undertaking specific Basket Two implementation projects and generally serving as the main multilateral arena for Basket Two implementation activities. For their part, the Soviet Union and its Allies have made two proposals which did not flow directly out of the Final Act but which the Soviets presented with explicit references to the Final Act. The first was the presentation of a draft recognition agreement to the European Community by the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) in February 1976.

This draft agreement was intended to establish relations between the two economic organizations. The other major multilateral initiative by the Eastern States during the post-Helsinki period was the proposal by the Soviet Government for the convening of all-European conferences to discuss problems in the fields of energy, transport and the environment. Neither proposal has generated much enthusiasm in the West.

B. Unilateral Implementation Activities

(1) Economic and commercial information

Of particular interest to the United States in Basket Two was the commitment by CSCE participating states to improve unilaterally the provision of economic and commercial information, with a view to facilitating East-West business contacts. The Soviet Union and the East European States have made little apparent improvement, however, in either the quality or quantity of useful published economic and commercial information. This situation varies, however, from state to state.

(i) Soviet Union

There have been no significant changes since Helsinki in the quantity, quality and timeliness of statistics and other economic-commercial information published within the Soviet Union. There have, however, been some small improvements, for example, the publication of quarterly trade statistics by country and the provision to the United States bilaterally, under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agricultural Agreement, of slightly better agricultural data.

Provision of statistics concerning production, national income, budget, consumption and productivity continue to be largely unsatisfactory, and no change has been detected in the Soviet manner of reporting these statistics since Helsinki. Balance-of-payments statistics are especially meager. No data on debt, debt service or reserves are published. The Soviets still do not include output figures for some industrial products, including nonferrous metals, ships, aircraft, many chemicals, some machines, as well as military weapons. Statistics on the labor force in particular industries are not given in any detail, nor is there any detailed information on average pay in different industries. Since many statistics, especially those regarding growth, are given as indices, problems are created by changes in bases as well as by lack of definitions and other explanatory details. Budgetary information appears only as generalized figures, lacking details.

With regard to timeliness of publication, the one comprehensive source of Soviet economic information, the "Statistical Handbook of the U.S.S.R. National Economy," is normally published 9 to 10 months following the close of the calendar year which it is reporting. There has been no change in the publication of generally available public information on food and agricultural matters since Helsinki. On the other hand, as noted above, there is continuing minor improvement in the provision of such economic information on a bilateral basis to the United States under the terms of the 1973 U.S.-U.S.S.R. agricultural agreement. For example, in the fall of 1975 it was agreed that additional food and agricultural products data would be furnished to the United States, and the current list of U.S.-requested data under the agreement has now reached 18 separate items. The major problem with Soviet data in the food and agricultural area, taking into consideration both public information and that which is furnished the United States under the bilateral agreement, is qualitative and not quantitative. Further, the qualitative difficulty pertains mainly to timeliness of data rather than to its reliability. Most

authorities accept the basic accuracy of the majority of published Soviet statistics.

However, Western governments and markets require current crop and livestock production data, which the Soviets have not yet made available with sufficient timeliness. For example, planted grain acreage is not provided to the United States until August, and no official crop production estimates are released during the growing season. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. has not always submitted required data on schedule. The major data deficiency is the lack of current crop reports. It is possible that although the Soviet Government has more information available than is released publicly or bilaterally, it lacks a crop reporting system as reliable as that in the United States.

The annually published statistical handbook on foreign trade is the only Soviet publication that provides a commodity and country breakdown of the U.S.S.R.'s foreign trade. Until May 1976, it was the only meaningful, regularly published statistical accounting of Soviet foreign trade, since quarterly economic plan fulfillment reports that appear regularly in the economic press report only the percentage increase of total trade turnover, that is, exports plus imports, over the comparable period of the previous year. Beginning in May 1976, however, the Soviet Union began the publication of quarterly statistics on exports, imports and trade turnover with individual countries and groups of countries. This is new information and appears as a statistical supplement to the monthly journal, Foreign Trade. The new quarterly supplement, however, does not provide any information on composition of trade by commodity.

The commodity classification system employed by the U.S.S.R. allows for a very detailed accounting of foreign trade and is the standard commodity classification system employed by the CEMA countries. The conversion of data from the Soviet format to SITC or BTN nomenclature can be readily accomplished, but comparable categories do not exist in all cases. In practice, it is often impossible to make the data meaningful and useful because of: (*a*) the Soviet penchant for aggregating their reporting in broad, generic categories, for example, crude oil and oil products; (*b*) the Soviet practice of not fully reporting commodity trade by country of origin or destination; and (*c*) the frequent complete omission of reporting on specific commodities either in total trade or in trade with individual countries, resulting in unspecified residuals which on occasion amount to 50 percent or more of the value of trade with a given country.

The U.S.S.R. periodically publishes compendia of foreign trade laws and regulations. This publication, however, is not comprehensive.

The Soviet Union's record has been mixed in publishing information that would facilitate forecasts of economic development relevant to trade promotion. On the one hand the Soviet Union has already published an English translation of Council of Ministers Chairman Kosygin's speech to the 25th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee's draft, Guideline for the Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. for 1976–80. These publications contain useful indications of directions the Soviet economy will take and are expected to be followed by further published data on the national plan. As sources of information for market research, however, the

value of these publications is limited, since they do not indicate the areas where the Soviets will turn to foreign firms for help in fulfilling planned objectives. The reason for this, probably, is the fact that foreign trade in the U.S.S.R. is not easily subject to long term planning because, among other things, export earnings and Western credit availability are significantly affected by factors beyond the control of the Soviets themselves.

Other modest information is available in the U.S.S.R. to assist foreign businessmen in commercial contacts. The Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry publishes an English language handbook detailing the responsibilities of the foreign trading organizations but lacking any information on their key personnel. With some assistance from the Soviet side of the organization, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council published a directory entitled, "Who's Who in Soviet Trade," in late 1974 and updated it in July 1975. This publication contains useful but short lists of Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Trade Organization executives and indications of their areas of responsibility. On the other hand, in its monthly journal "Foreign Trade" the Ministry of Foreign Trade has been publishing regularly for several years useful biographic notes and photos of Soviet Foreign Trade officials, Counselors for Economic Affairs at Soviet Embassies abroad, and heads of Soviet-owned or jointly owned companies abroad. The journal's Announcements section at the end of the publication includes information on personnel changes, as well as changes in authorizations for signing foreign trade transactions. These data would provide the basis for a periodic listing in a form more useful to businessmen which, unfortunately, the Soviets do not yet produce.

In sum, then, the Soviet Union's record since Helsinki in the provision of useful economic and commercial information has improved, but only very modestly.

(ii) Poland

The Polish record of providing economic and commercial information, both before and since Helsinki, has been generally good. The statistical yearbook of Poland provides data on gross and net national income, the national budget, consumption, prices, investment, industrial and agricultural production, and productivity. As in the case of the Soviet Union, this yearbook is published some 9 to 10 months following the conclusion of the calendar year for which it is providing statistical data. Figures on national income are broken down by major economic sector. Rather detailed breakdowns are provided for government receipts and expenditures in major categories, such as industry, agriculture, education, health, and administration. A total figure is given for budget expenditures on national defense. Statistics on consumption are provided in the yearbook. Consumption figures are not clearly broken down into durable and nondurable goods, however. Breakdown of figures on consumption of public goods or goods and services provided as nonsalary benefits is also deficient. Two tables in the yearbook are devoted to productivity per employee in Polish industry. A separate table provides information on production per 100 zlotys of investment, but data are given for the years 1970 and 1975 only.

Poland also publishes a foreign trade yearbook. The edition containing 1975 trade statistics appeared in September 1976, 4 months

later than usual. Export and import statistics are provided in considerable detail by country and product. Trade statistics are usually given in terms of "exchange zlotys", and volume figures are provided for major commodities. The Government of Poland announced the implementation of a tariff effective January 1, 1976, which will use the tariff categories of Brussels Tariff Nomenclature.

Statistics in the annual yearbooks described above are supplemented by a monthly statistical bulletin. With usually a 2- or 3-month lag, the monthly bulletin lists statistics on investment by economic sector, retail trade (a proxy for consumption), credit and savings, and foreign trade. Foreign trade figures are given in terms of value of total imports and exports by country and in volume terms for major products.

Statistics on agricultural production, acreage, productivity, and prices are provided in the statistical yearbook. Figures on state purchases of crops and livestock and state and Free Market prices are published in the monthly bulletin. In keeping with agreements reached in the Agricultural Working Group of the United States-Polish Joint Trade Commission, the Government of Poland provides the U.S. Government with information on total plantings, estimated yield, and production of major crops several times during the year. The Government of Poland similarly provides the United States with information on livestock population.

With regard to commercial information, the Polish Chamber of Foreign Commerce periodically updates a booklet entitled, "Information for Businessmen Trading with Poland." This booklet is available in English and several other foreign languages. It describes the activities of each of Poland's foreign trade organizations, with addresses and telex numbers, but without names of officers. Of greater utility, the Government of Poland provides lists of key industrial projects of interest to U.S. firms during the annual meetings of the Joint Trade Commission, and has supplied supplementary information at other times. The 5-year plan for 1976–80 has not yet been published due to the uncertainty concerning price, wage, and incomes policies. When published, the plan will be indicative of Government economic priorities and will therefore be important to company assessments of market potential in Poland. In the absence of a formal plan, the Government of Poland has provided substantial information through the press concerning planned investment and growth in agriculture and other sectors. The State Bank receives generally good marks from Western bankers for financial information provided with regard to project loans.

Laws and publications on foreign trade are published regularly. Regulations on new treatment for foreign investment in Poland were published in May and June. There are significant areas, such as Government policy on the range of products which a foreign firm might be allowed to consider under counter purchase agreements, which are not published.

In sum, it appears that the major shortcoming in Poland's record on providing economic-commercial information would be in the lack of published data on the Polish balance of payments, particularly the services account, remittances from abroad, and foreign borrowings. Even in these areas, however, fairly detailed balance-of-payments

information is given to foreign banks which are considering industrial and financial credits to Poland.

(*iii*) *Romania*

Romania has made a modest effort to publish more economic and commercial information in basic documents. Despite progress, the quantity of useful data in the public domain remains inadequate. However, Romania does provide data to the IMF/IBRD on a reasonably current basis.

Romania's two primary publications of economic data are entitled, "Statistical Annual" and "Foreign Trade of the Socialist Republic of Romania." Additionally, in the post-CSCE period the Romanian Government has issued four principal documents pertaining to the domestic economic and foreign trade of the country. These are: (1) "Communique Regarding Fulfillment of the Unitary Plan of Socio-Economic Development for the Period 1971–75;" (2) "Law for the Adoption of the Unitary National Plan of Socio-Economic Development of the Socialist Republic of Romania for the Year 1976;" (3) "Law for the Adoption of the State Budget for the Year 1976;" and (4) "Law for the Adoption of the Unitary National Plan for Socio-Economic Development of the Socialist Republic of Romania for the Period 1976–80." In addition, President Ceausescu on February 4, 1976, made a speech to the Congress of Peoples Councils which contained data not generally available on basic aggregates minus consumption. Most notable in the President's speech was the fact that it contained for the first time absolute figures rather than indices for national income and industrial and agricultural production, projecting these both forward (to 1980) and backward (for 5-year intervals between 1950 and 1975). It appears that this speech was in direct response to the CSCE provisions.

The level of information currently provided by the Romanian Government on foreign trade is unsatisfactory. Data is provided on a country-by-product and product-by-country basis, but detail is slight. The classification scheme is virtually incomprehensible, and individual country import/export figures are recorded in either value or volume terms, but not both.

The basic foreign trade law has been translated and is republished from time to time. The law is too general to be of much help to foreign firms, however. Innovation this year has included providing a summary of arbitration and industrial property provisions in the text of a primer for foreign businessmen entitled, "Your Commercial Partners in Romania."

Both the annual and 5-year economic development plans in Romania contain authoritative forecasts of development pinpointing sectoral emphasis but in insufficient detail to serve as a basis for market research or to guide trade promotion activities. The pamphlet, "Your Commercial Partners in Romania," has been revised on almost an annual basis in recent years. While this publication lacks organization charts, it does list all the foreign trade organizations and provides a fairly comprehensive cataloging of products, technologies, et cetera, which each foreign trade organization imports and exports. Moreover, pursuant to our repeated requests, this has been supplemented with a list of individuals in ministries, foreign trade organizations,

and even some industrial entities responsible for trade contacts with the United States.

Romania has not yet published adequate agricultural market and crop assessments and forecasts. Articles I and II of the September 11, 1975, United States-Romania Bilateral "Protocol on Development of Agricultural Trade" which calls for the exchange of "agricultural economic information including stocks and forward estimates on supply and demand and trade in major agricultural commodities" as well as submission by November of each year of Romania's planned import needs, have not been fully implemented. Nevertheless, during frequent visits by U.S. agricultural officials, the Romanians have been reasonably forthcoming with current crop information.

(*iv*) *Hungary*

Hungary's record for providing economic and commercial information approximates that of Poland. It makes available relatively comprehensive and meaningful statistical data, although there may be some difficulties for Western businessmen who require particularly specialized data or who require readily available material in English. Most economic and commercial information, including directories, lists of foreign trade officials, foreign trade laws and regulations are available in Hungarian. While a great deal of this material is available in German, only a lesser amount is produced in English. Publication of the 5-year plan provides selected economic and trade projections, but these tend to be less than fully adequate for business firms that require comprehensive detailed information on particular fields. A weakness in Hungarian performance which has not been alleviated since the signing of the Final Act is the failure to publish organizational charts for foreign trade-related entities.

(*v*) *Bulgaria*

There is no indication that the quality or quantity of information provided by Bulgaria has improved since the signature of the Final Act. A certain amount of information responsive to the commitments of the Final Act is published. Little of this information, however, can be considered timely, and much of it is in a form not readily subject to comparative analysis.

Basic data about the Bulgarian economy is provided in the annual "Statistical Yearbook" which contains fairly extensive information including indices of living standards, consumption, income, breakdown of budget expenditures, savings, services and some productivity data. The "Statistical Yearbook" also includes some data on gross national product, national income and economic growth, fairly extensive information on industrial and agricultural production, and figures for foreign trade, credit and insurance, as well as some regional economic information. The yearbook, however, has two major drawbacks. It appears between March and June of a year with figures for the next to last year. Thus the 1976 edition contains figures for 1974. The published data also often lacks a firm base being calculated as percentage increases since 1944 rather than on a known index. This makes determination of actual levels of production, consumption or other activity difficult to divine. More current, though significantly less detailed and

extensive, basic economic data is published in a journal, entitled "Statistical News," which is hard to obtain at times and appears despite a promised monthly publication schedule, at irregular intervals.

The most comprehensive source of foreign trade data is the "Statistical Yearbook on Foreign Trade," which lists products and value of trade for several years previous. The level of detail is sometimes low. Many items are listed only as part of large commodity groupings. Agricultural food crops are broken down, for example, only into "Fresh Vegetables" and "Fruit," and all machine tools are included under "Lathes." It is also often quite difficult to obtain a copy of this publication.

Laws and regulations on foreign trade are published in the biweekly "Government Journal." They are also readily available through the Government-run Chamber of Commerce. Relevant ministries issue normative documents on new laws and regulations on an ad hoc basis.

The 5-year plans and public discussion of them by government and party officials in the press and other publications provide the general lines of economic development of assistance in trade promotion, but the information tends to be somewhat vague.

There is a dearth of periodic directories, lists and organizational charts of foreign trade organizations which would be of interest to Western businessmen. The Chamber of Commerce does publish lists of ministries, foreign trade organizations and State economic associations involved in foreign trade every 18–24 months. These lists are usually out of date when they appear, however, and contain no names or organizational charts.

The Bulgarian-United States Economic Council has met once since its establishment in September 1974. A second meeting is tentatively planned for spring 1977. It cannot yet be considered an effective vehicle for the exchange of economic and commercial information.

In summary, much of the economic and commercial information provided by Bulgaria is tardy, irregular, sparse, acquired only with considerable difficulty and not easily subject to analysis.

(*vi*) *Czechoslovakia*

In Czechoslovakia, as in the other Eastern countries, there is one basis statistical source of economic information, entitled "Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia," which provides data on all sectors of the society and the economy. Included in the yearbook are figures on production, national income, budget, consumption, and productivity. Statistics on GNP are expressed in Marxist terms—that is, social product—and much space is devoted to various indices which are of little use. However, the yearbook also provides raw data in usable units such as monetary and quantitative measures.

Agricultural information is included in the yearbook and is available through no other published source. Information provided is detailed and useful for historical purposes. Statistics found in the yearbook are not adequate, however, for market and crop assessments and forecasts.

Good foreign trade statistics also appear in the annual yearbook. Exports and imports are shown by country and the standard international trade classification (SITC) is utilized to the three-digit level. As in the case of the Soviet Union and the other Eastern States, the "Statistical Yearbook" appears some 10 months after the period it covers. It also suffers from the fact that sectoral statistics are too highly aggregated for most purposes, such as market research.

General trends to be expected in development of the Czechoslovak economy are readily available under the aegis of widely publicized 5-year plan information. More specific aspects of the plan, particularly as reflected in the yearly plan, are much less widely disseminated. For that reason, although broad lines of domestic economic development are well known, specific items such as financing and availability of internal credit for projects are closely held secrets.

The Chamber of Commerce of Czechoslovakia is helpful to American businessmen in providing published materials on commercial organizations. The chamber publishes in English documents which list and describe all foreign trade organizations and representative agencies. The chamber also publishes foreign trade statistics in English which are more timely and detailed in commodity by country breakdown than are yearbook statistics. Organization charts of foreign trade organizations or enterprises are not made available, although considerably detailed directories are published by other Czechoslovak agencies on an irregular basis.

In sum, statistics published in Czechoslovakia on domestic production and economic development, including agriculture, are severely tarnished by lateness, aggregation, and deliberate secretiveness. Statistics published on foreign trade are good, though late. There is no indication that the scope of published statistical material in Czechoslovakia has changed since the signing of the Final Act.

(*vii*) *German Democratic Republic*

The German Democratic Republic publishes statistics on production, national income, consumption and productivity annually in a publication entitled, "Statistical Yearbook of the GDR." As in the case of Poland and the U.S.S.R. this publication appears about 10 months following the calendar year covered. An abbreviated version of the "Statistical Yearbook," the "Statistical Handbook of the GDR," appears 8 to 9 months following the year covered. Global figures on the state burget are published in connection with the annual budget session of the Volkskammer in December. Budget materials released at that time consist of a sketch of the budget for the year to come and about two pages of detail on actual versus planned budget figures for the year which ended the previous December.

Foreign trade statistics in the GDR appear only in the Statistical Yearbook. They contain no product classification system and do not purport to account for the whole of the GDR's foreign trade, that is, figures are provided for "selected" imports and exports and for "selected" countries. The GDR's foreign trade figures are thus sketchy, and apparently getting worse. For example, in contrast to previous years, the "Statistical Handbook" providing data for 1975 contained only figures for trade "turnover," that is, exports plus imports, with various countries. The only export and import figures given were for total GDR exports and total GDR imports. The GDR publishes no balance-of-payments data.

Laws and regulations on foreign trade are published. As in the case of the Soviet Union and other East European States, however, it should be noted that most decisions on foreign trade are made in an internal administrative process to which foreigners have no access. This means that laws and regulations are of secondary importance.

Information on the general orientation of national economic plans is published, and it is possible to discern the main lines of GDR economic development from published material.

Lists and directories of foreign trade contacts published by the GDR are very general in nature, providing names and addresses and a general listing of product lines handled by the organizations in question. While the GDR apparently does not object to outside efforts to compile more detailed lists and charts of Government organizations and foreign trade officials, it has made no effort to perform this job itself.

In sum, the GDR's record of publication of basic statistical reports is not impressive. The annual "Statistical Yearbook" lacks detailed data required by professional analysts in most fields. Foreign trade data are not comprehensive, have no classification system, and are particularly unsatisfactory. With the exception of scattered and cryptic references in public statements and press reports, statistical data on agriculture is published ex post facto, and could not serve as the basis for serious market and crop assessments. GDR authorities appear to place a high value on concealment of detailed and timely statistical information about the country and the economy, making the task of obtaining better information most difficult. To conclude, there is no reason to believe that either the quantity or quality of economic information made available by the GDR since Helsinki has increased or improved.

(viii) Western and non-aligned stats

Western European States are generally providing full information of the type envisaged in the Final Act. Certain states are presently making efforts to improve areas where their statistical and informational services have had relative deficiencies. Portugal, for example, is working, with the assistance of a Norwegian technical team, to upgrade its statistical methods in order to provide a statistical service more adequate for economic forecasting and planning. Turkey has taken internal steps to upgrade the accuracy of its statistics and their conformity with international standards. Turkish economic and commercial statistics are considered generally adequate and in conformity with international classifications but not as timely as they might be. Greece is also attempting to eliminate minor problems in its generally satisfactory statistical output. There are occasional weak spots in the availability and accuracy of its statistical information in certain areas. Italy has been prompter in publishing statistical information since the Helsinki Summit, but there is still some tardiness in reporting production and import-export figures in the agricultural sector. Virtually all statistical information of an economic and commercial nature provided by Malta is timely and of high quality, but figures on foreign trade quantities tend to be too general for optimum utilization. Yugoslavia's published statistical material is reasonably good and sufficiently detailed for most purposes, but it is often less timely than desirable, and information on laws and regulations relating to foreign trade is limited.

(2) OTHER ACTIVITIES

There have been several other unilateral implementation steps by the Eastern European States since Helsinki. For example, both Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia have promulgated new internal regulations which permit the opening of representative officers in Sofia and Prague respectively by foreign business concerns. As of November 1, 1976, four Western companies had established offices in Bulgaria. In October 1976, Czechoslovakia approved 19 of 37 applications by Western firms to establish offices.

Regarding specific business facilitation, the Soviet Union has accredited a few American business firms since Helsinki, bringing the total of U.S. firms with offices in Moscow to 23. In the GDR, the one U.S. firm to apply for accreditation so far has been permitted to open an office; in addition, the GDR has moved rather promptly to provide housing for that company's representative in Berlin, office space, telex facilities, and other requirements.

C. Eastern Complaints About Western Implementation and Vice Versa

The Soviet Union and the Eastern European States have directed a number of complaints at the West's performance in the Basket Two area. One of the more prominent of these has concerned the absence of MFN in trading relations between the United States and most of the Eastern countries. Complaints regarding MFN in the CSCE context are clearly without foundation, however, since the Final Act in the preambular, nonoperative portion of Basket Two makes only passing reference to the "beneficial effects which can result . . . from the application of most favored nation treatment." None of the signatories are in any way committed to applying, or even considering the application of, MFN in their trading relations with other CSCE countries. Most of the other trade-related complaints of the Eastern countries have to do with alleged tariff and nontariff barriers which they claim are being applied by the European Community.

For its part the West has numerous legitimate complaints relating to continuing practices in the state trading countries which hinder the satisfactory development of East-West economic relations. Problems here are led by the traditional Eastern secretiveness and resultant reluctance to release the meaningful domestic economic information necessary for Western firms to assess adequately business prospects in those countries. Another problem which has not improved since Helsinki is the Eastern practice of channeling commercial contacts through the so-called "foreign trade organizations," which in many instances are staffed by unhelpful bureaucrats. This in turn results in the inaccessibility to foreign business representatives of potential end-users of their machinery, equipment and technology. Arbitrary quotas for trade with individual Western countries, set as much for political as economic reasons, together with the insistence of each Eastern country on the primacy of intra-COMECON trade in its overall

foreign trade balance, are other effective artificial barriers to more normal development of East-West trade.

D. Bilateral Implementation

In the bilateral context—for example, U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and the individual states of Eastern Europe—there was a wide range of governmental and private economic, commercial, scientific and technological agreements in place prior to the conclusion of the CSCE. On the economic and commercial side, the United States is using bilateral fora to pursue its position that there must be a much broader provision by the East of meaningful economic and trade data if bilateral commercial relations are to realize their full potential. For example, as noted above, the United States has worked vigorously within its bilateral agricultural agreements with both the Soviet Union and Romania, as well as with Poland, to obtain more current and useful crop assessments and other agricultural data. In the case of Romania, thus far neither the United States-Romanian Economic Commission nor the Romanian-United States Economic Council has proven an ideal instrument for promoting the exchange of basic economic data. They have, however, served to clarify a number of questions related to doing business in Romania. For example, the trade contact list mentioned above, as well as a Romanian commitment to prepare the contact guide in response to questions raised by the Department of Commerce, are illustrative of how bilateral commercial fora can be and have been used to obtain better commercial information from Eastern States.

Since Helsinki, the Czechoslovak and U.S. Chambers of Commerce have established a joint economic council. The first plenary meeting of this council was held in Prague in June, and the results were generally satisfactory. Also, the United States and Romania have negotiated a long-term economic agreement which covers several CSCE-related areas.

(1) TRADE

Figures for U.S. trade with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for the first 8 months of 1976 in comparison with the first 8 months of 1975 would tend to bear out the contention that trade has increased substantially in the period since Helsinki. For example, U.S. exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—excluding Yugoslavia—totaled more than $2.5 billion in January–August 1976, as compared with $1.4 billion for January–August, 1975. Even if one excludes the sizable purchases of grain in the United States made by the Soviet Union during 1976, the trade increases for the period were significant. Especially large increases in U.S. exports to Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Bulgaria took place in 1976. U.S. exports to Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria in the first 8 months of 1976, exceeded the total U.S. exports to those countries for all of 1975, and it is clear that U.S. exports to Poland and the U.S.S.R. in 1976 will also exceed comparable figures for 1975.

U.S. imports from the Eastern European and Soviet area during 1975 showed a marked decline over the previous year. This is basically attributable to the recession in the United States which resulted in a decrease in demand for goods from the Eastern States in 1975. U.S.

imports from the region for the first 8 months of 1976, however, totaled nearly $580 million as compared to an import total of roughly $730 million for all of 1975. It is clear, therefore, that U.S. imports from the Eastern European States and the Soviet Union in the current year will substantially exceed the figure for 1975.

(2) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

There were 11 bilateral science and technology cooperative agreements in place between the United States and the Soviet Union prior to the signing of the Final Act. These covered such diverse areas as S. & T. cooperation, environment, medical science and public health, space, transportation, energy, and housing and other construction. Notwithstanding the fact that the provision of scientific and technical data, as well as its quality and quantity, from the Soviet side has been uneven, there has been meaningful cooperation between the two countries in the period since Helsinki. The technical benefits derived by the United States from this cooperation with the Soviet Union have included: contributions to the solution of common problems; in some instances access to Soviet technology highly complimentary to U.S. interests; useful data and other information; and monetary savings from sharing work.

A specific example of the type of technical benefits derived by the United States from these cooperative arrangements has been the provision of substantial amounts of information on the technology of magneto-hydrodynamics (MHD) a process designed to utilize more fully the energy in coal. The Soviet Union is a world leader in this technology, and we are now tapping that source.

In October 1975, during a meeting with the President's Science Adviser in connection with a Moscow session of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Science and Technology, Soviet Chairman of the Council of Ministers Kosygin expressed interest in United States and U.S.S.R. joint projects and the benefits of bilateral cooperation. This Soviet initiative may lead to the identification of additional useful cooperative projects.

As far as Eastern Europe is concerned, U.S. relations in science and technology are most developed with Poland where we have long supported scientific research with U.S.-owned local currency generated through the sale of surplus agricultural commodities under Public Law 480. Projects underway cover a wide range of fields, including agriculture, health, energy, basic science, technology, ecology, and transportation.

A 5-year United States-Romanian umbrella agreement on cooperation and exchanges in the fields of culture, education, science and technology, was signed December 13, 1974, in Bucharest. The science and technology section of the program document accompanying the agreement incorporates existing arrangements that had previously been concluded between the Romanians and such U.S. organizations as the National Science Foundation, ERDA, Department of Transportation, and HEW. In February 1976, American and Romanian representatives met in Washington to discuss experience under this agreement. Some specific problems were identified, but both sides agreed that the cooperation was of mutual benefit. The Romanians appear eager to intensify and expand cooperation in the science and technology area.

U.S. governmental relations with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia in the science and technology area are not very extensive at this time. However, the Department of State is at an advanced stage of negotiations on cultural/scientific exchange agreements with all three governments. (In the case of Hungary a general exchange agreement was initialed on October 14, 1976, and a work program is now under negotiation.) To date, there has been virtually no governmental scientific exchange with the GDR. Representatives of the GDR Embassy in Washington have been in contact with U.S. technical agencies, however, and the GDR has proposed the conclusion of an S. & T. agreement.

(3) TOURISM

In the bilateral context, the U.S. organized a "Visit USA Committee" at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. That group is working with the Soviet tourist organization, Intourist, to encourage tourism by Soviet citizens to the United States. Practical cooperation from the Soviet side, however, has thus far been minimal.

E. Multilateral Implementation Activities

During the 16 months since Helsinki, both East and West have undertaken major multilateral initiatives in the CSCE Basket Two context. The Eastern initiatives have revolved around the proposal by the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) to conclude an agreement calling for mutual recognition with the European Community (EC) and the Soviet Union's proposal to convene all-European conferences on energy, transport and the environment. The chief Western initiative has been to upgrade the practical importance of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), to identify it as the main multilateral organization for implementing Basket Two provisions, and to identify for the ECE a number of specific limited-objective projects which it should implement within its CSCE mandate.

East German Deputy Premier Gerhard Weiss, in his capacity as CEMA Executive Committee Chairman, tendered the draft CEMA proposal on February 16, 1976, to Luxembourg Prime Minister Gaston Thorn (in his then role as President of the European Council of Ministers). Despite the fact that discussion of such a step predated the CSCE, the Soviets have cloaked their presentation of the CEMA draft agreement in the mantle of Basket Two. The EC has studied the many economic and political issues posed by the CEMA proposal, and has given CEMA a limited reply indicating that, while a framework agreement on such matters as exchange of technical information may be possible, the EC plans to continue to deal bilaterally with CEMA members on trade matters.

The Soviet proposal for convening all-European conferences on energy, transport and the environment first surfaced in a speech by General Secretary Brezhnev on December 9, 1975, at the Polish United Workers Party Congress in Warsaw. In that speech, the General Secretary indicated his interest in broadening Soviet participation in multilateral economic discussions. The Soviets presented a concrete proposal to the 31st annual meeting of the ECE in March–April 1976.

Their original objective was to obtain a resolution expressing agreement by the ECE countries to the Soviet initiative.

The Soviets described the agenda of the putative conferences in the following terms:

Transportation.—The main objective would be to define the basic directions of international cooperation in developing the means and systems of transportation in Europe, the development of specific proposals in the framework of general European cooperation, the formulation of recommendations in the field of regulating mixed methods of transportation, as well as other questions relating to the development of transportation.

Environment.—A conference might discuss possible directions and large scale cooperative undertakings in such areas as, inter alia:

—The long-distance transnational movement of polluting substances by air and water and their effect on soils and internal water resources;

—A program of joint actions for the protection of the oceans;

—Possible ways of cooperating in the task of creating and unifying equipment and instrumentation for the protection and monitoring of environmental quality, as well as developing pollution-free or less polluting technological processes in heavily polluting branches of industry; and

—Special environmental problems in agricultural production.

Energy.—The proposed all-European conference might discuss the full range of energy problems in Europe including the activities of certain organizations or bodies already dealing with energy problems. It might also seek to identify large-scale projects for cooperation including interlinking European electrical power and gas supply systems, establishment of an all-European fuel-energy transportation system, and joint construction of large-scale fuel-energy enterprises based on coal, brown coal, lignite and natural gas deposits.

Western countries took the position at the ECE 31st session that it would be impossible to agree on such a grandiose proposal with the small amount of advance notification they had received from the Soviet Union. Moreover, there was considerable skepticism that such conferences if held would result in the type of specific concrete implementation activities which were envisaged in the Final Act. On the contrary, there was widespread feeling that the Soviet initiative was designed primarily to allow the Soviet Union to claim implementation of the provisions of Basket Two while at the same time diverting attention from its minimal implementation in other areas of CSCE. As a result, Western countries urged that a decision on the Soviet proposal be deferred and that the ECE concentrate on a limited number of "special attention" projects for immediate application.

The ECE ultimately adopted two parallel "decisions." The decision on the Soviet proposal "noted the interest" which had been expressed in it, "drew the attention" of the relevant subsidiary bodies to the topics suggested for discussion at the proposed conferences, "suggested" that ECE governments study the proposals, and asked the Secretariat to circulate such views on the proposals "as member governments may wish to communicate." The projects decision called on the organization to pay "special attention" to all areas mandated to it

in the Final Act; to all other multilateral Basket Two proposals, and specifically to four limited projects in the trade, environment, and transport areas in which early progress appears most feasible. It called on the competent subsidiary bodies to present progress reports on ECE activities in these areas to the 32d ECE session in April 1977. The United States supported these ECE decisions and continues to believe that major attention should be focused on specific areas of potential practical progress in the ECE forum as envisaged in the Final Act.

The specific implementation projects cited by the ECE on which the United States believes practical progress would be possible include promotion of the publication and dissemination of economic and commercial information; promotion of international agreements and other appropriate arrangements on acceptance of certificates of conformity with standards and technical regulations; development of an extensive program for the monitoring and evaluation of the long-range transport of air pollutants; and harmonization of administrative technical provisions concerning safety in road, rail and river transport.

Western States have continued to press for progress on concrete implementation projects at subsequent ECE meetings. Eastern delegations, however, with the exception of Romania, resisted Western efforts at a June 1976 ECE meeting of senior science and technology advisers to reach agreement on a proposal to convene meetings of younger scientists under the organization's aegis. Market research was opposed by the Soviets and the East Europeans as a topic for the upcoming ECE Fourth Seminar on East-West Trade Promotion, Marketing and Business Contacts despite the agreement at the 31st session to designate the subject of publication of economic and commercial information as a project deserving special attention. This subject has, however, now been inscribed on the agenda.

CHAPTER 4—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET THREE

A. Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Differences in the approaches of the West and East with respect to implementation of the Final Act are most pronounced in the human contacts and information areas of Basket Three. The Soviet Union has advanced both procedural and substantive arguments tending toward a selective implementation that would concentrate on those areas least incompatible with the closed Eastern societies or that would offer maximum public relations benefits—for example, exchange of educational, performing arts, and sports groups, Western tourism and working conditions for Western journalists.

The Soviets have implied that many of the Basket Three undertakings, and especially those of human contacts and information, require additional bilateral arrangements between CSCE signatories before they can be implemented. They have not, however, pressed this view very hard in their dealings with the West. The United States and other Western nations consider that, except where indicated by the specific language of the Final Act—for example, multiple entry-exit visas for journalists—the Basket Three arrangements stand by themselves and do not require further bilateral implementing arrangements.

One of the principal objectives of the CSCE was to lower communication barriers so as, in the words of the preamble of the information section of the Final Act, "to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds." The Soviet Union has nonetheless made clear its concern for the "ideological subversion" which it considers might result from an unimpeded flow of Western information and cultural materials. It has argued that Western information which presents news and views contrary to those officially sanctioned in the East is not in keeping with the broader goal of developing "mutual understanding between the participating States." The Soviets have also cited the Basket One principle of nonintervention in internal affairs in support of their continuing restrictions on the movement of people and the free flow of Western books, newspapers, and radio broadcasts.

(1) HUMAN CONTACTS [1]

The United States has frequently raised the issue of human contacts and the movement of peoples within the CSCE framework in all Eastern capitals since the Helsinki Summit. Soviet and Eastern European attitudes and policies in these areas have differed markedly from those in the West. Thus while there are no barriers to emigration in the West, Soviet practice, with some exceptions, suggests that the only reason recognized—and then only selectively—for a citizen to depart

[1] The material contained in this chapter, except where otherwise indicated, reflects the U.S. experience with the member states of the Warsaw Pact. Our consultations indicate that the experience of other Western States follows a generally similar pattern.

permanently from the U.S.S.R. is family reunification. Emigration is viewed as a privilege granted by the state rather than as a basic human right. A Soviet national who applies to emigrate often suffers social and economic deprivation—loss of job, property, et cetera—during the period he waits for permission, which can be long. The situation varies, but is generally similar, in the Eastern European countries.

East-West marriages are also discouraged in some Communist countries, and tourism is viewed largely as a one-way street—that is, a West-to-East movement which brings in much-needed hard currency. On the other hand, there is a favorable disposition toward East-West meetings between youth representatives and toward sports competitions which can be controlled through official, government-sanctioned programs.

After an initial period of defensiveness in the months following Helsinki, lasting until the beginning of 1976, the Soviet Union enacted a series of limited Basket Three related measures. These moves were widely regarded in the West as calculated to create a defensible record of Soviet CSCE implementation for the 1977 Belgrade followup meeting. However, Soviet implementation in this area has slowed markedly in recent months. This slower progress has been accompanied by a measurable increase of polemics, charges of Western nonimplementation and proposals designed to distract attention from the Soviet record of implementation. The Eastern European countries did not in all cases announce similar measures early in 1976, but their policies in these areas were generally less restrictive to begin with than those of the Soviets.

(*i*) *Family visits and reunification*

The measures put into force by the Soviet Union at the beginning of the year had relevance specifically for the family reunification provisions of Basket Three. They included the following:

—Effective January 1, 1976, the fee for a Soviet exit visa dropped from 400 rubles ($540) to 300 rubles ($406). (Emigrants to Israel, however, must still pay an additional 500 ruble ($676) fee for renunciation of Soviet citizenship.)

—The 40 ruble ($54) application fee for travel documents now need only be paid if the application is approved—not, as in the past, each time an application is made.

—The number of "character references" that prospective emigrants are required to obtain from their employment supervisors and the local trade union and party leaders was somewhat reduced.

—The review period for rejected applications was reduced from 1 year to 6 months.

—Children below 16 are now entered without additional charge in family passports.

On the negative side, there are reports that in some areas of the U.S.S.R., Soviet officials are interpreting more strictly the definition of "family" for emigration purposes. If this reported practice continues and is adopted throughout the U.S.S.R., it could have serious implications for reunification of families under the CSCE provisions. Also, the Soviets tightened their rules on gift cash remittances from abroad effective in January 1976. This has a detrimental effect on prospective emigrants who rely on such funds to augment their incomes while

awaiting departure from the Soviet Union. In like manner, new regulations went into effect on June 15, 1976, which increased duties on gift merchandise from abroad and imposed stricter limits on the number of items which may be sent in a single package. These regulations also have an adverse effect on some prospective emigrants since Western supporters now must pay more to send the same merchandise. It should be noted, however, that this type of action, while inconsistent with the spirit of the Final Act, is not specifically addressed in that document.

Among the Eastern European countries, Hungary has reduced the fee for an emigration passport from 1,500 forints ($72) to 1,000 forints ($48).

The question of emigration for the purpose of family reunification has become a factor in United States-Polish relations, owing to Poland's rather strict laws on the subject. On the other hand, Romanian emigration to the United States has proceeded at a relatively active pace—a fact due primarily to Romania's satisfaction at recently receiving most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment under the terms of the U.S. Trade Act. There was, however, a drop in the number of emigrants from Romania to the United States and to Israel following the congressional hearings in early September 1976 on Romanian emigration and MFN tariff status. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Hungary have relatively few divided family/emigration cases open with the United States. We have, however, made presentations on this subject to each of these states during the course of 1976.

Emigration Statistics.—The number of Soviet citizens receiving exit visas to join their families in the United States increased significantly in the first half of 1976. The following table reflects a general upward trend since 1970, with the sharpest rate of increase occurring this year:

1970	230	1974	1,029
1971	287	1975	1,162
1972	494	1976 (through June)	1,303
1973	758		

It should be noted that this increase is largely due to Armenian emigration. The number of Jews receiving Soviet exit visas for the United States is only slightly higher than it was before CSCE, and overall Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R., while up slightly from 1975, is still significantly lower than the peak years of 1972–73. Some prominent Jewish dissidents have, however, been allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. since the Helsinki Summit.

Among the other Western countries, the FRG has reported a large increase in ethnic German emigration for both the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Thus, the monthly figure for ethnic German resettlers from the Soviet Union to the FRG rose from 364 in August 1975 to 1,129 in August 1976. In the case of Poland, where the opportunity for emigration is linked to a series of special bilateral financial arrangements ratified in early 1976, the number increased from 358 in August 1975 to 2,528 in May 1976, and some 125,000 ethnic Germans from Poland are expected to resettle in the FRG in the next several years.

The GDR is also a special case because of its relationship to the FRG. The GDR issued more than 10,000 permits for emigration to the FRG in 1975, including a number of cases where it defined reuni-

fication of families liberally. There are indications that at least an equal number of such permits are being issued this year, though the percentage of successful applicants remains only a small fraction of the total. The GDR, whose Berlin Wall and border death strips are egregious barriers to freer movement of people, was severely criticized in the Western press when it became known early in 1976 that in at last several instances the children of parents who had escaped to the FRG were put up for forcible adoption. The GDR has denied that such a practice exists, and several of the publicized cases have been satisfactorily resolved. While at least some East German applicants for exit visas have cited the GDR's CSCE undertakings, and West German newspapers have specifically cited the Final Act in criticizing the adoption cases, the GDR's practice in this area appears to be determined primarily by the broader considerations of its relationship with the FRG. There have been recent reports of sharp increases in applications to emigrate from the GDR since Helsinki, and of the East German Government's reactions to this development.

As of November 1, 1976, the following number of family reunification-emigration cases were pending between the United States and the Warsaw Pact countries:

	Immediate families [1]		Nonimmediate families	
	Total cases	Individuals	Total cases	Individuals
Bulgaria	33	50	24	33
Czechoslovakia	34	70	12	15
Germany, Democratic Republic of	4	8	29	54
Hungary	7	13	0	0
Poland	188	328	749	2, 332
Romania	176	[2] 300	574	[2] 1, 855
U.S.S.R.	112	315	.....	.....

[1] An immediate family is comprised of spouses plus their minor children. A nonimmediate family includes brothers, sisters, adult children, parents of adult children, etc. It was not possible to make this distinction in the case of the Soviet Union, the figures for which include both immediate and nonimmediate families.
[2] Approximate.

U.S. action on family reunification.—U.S. interest and activity in the field of family reunification has remained high since Helsinki. The U.S. Ambassador in Moscow presented the 17th in a series of representation lists of family reunification cases to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on August 18, 1975, and raised the issue in demarches on October 14, 1975, and March 3, 1976. On this last occasion he noted that some recent favorable decisions on family reunification were gratifying, but that more could be done in this area of high U.S. interest. A new representation list was presented to the Soviets in August 1976. Similar approaches have been made in the Eastern European capitals. In an apparent change of policy a Czechoslovak official indicated on November 9, 1976, that his government was prepared to resolve 15 United States-Czechoslovak family reunification cases involving 19 individuals, and linked this move to the CSCE provisions. We understand Czechoslovakia is taking similar action in regard to other Western countries.

The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) has, with our encouragement, expressed an interest in contributing to the work of the CSCE participant states in the field of family reunification. The role which can be played by this organization may be limited by the fact that its membership is quite different from the list of participants in the CSCE.

Family visits.—On the matter of East-West family visits—as opposed to reunification through emigration—the United States continues to encounter problems with the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European states. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, for example, generally refuse to issue visas for visits to or from former citizens who left the country "illegally"—that is, without official permission—although there are recent indications that Czechoslovakia is allowing some pensioners to visit their children abroad "illegally". Similarly, in the case of the GDR, men over 65 and women over 60 can obtain permission to visit relatives abroad; this is not the case, however, for younger individuals. The United States has expressed its dissatisfaction with the state of affairs on family visits to the various Eastern countries, making representations in Prague, for example, on several such cases in the CSCE context. In a few instances visas were subsequently issued.

(ii) Binational marriages

Policy toward East-West marriages varies considerably among the Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviet response is inconsistent. Marriages between Soviet citizens and Westerners are sometimes prevented. On other occasions no obstacles are raised.

In general, the policy on binational marriages is less restrictive in the Eastern European countries. Romania, however, seems to have taken a somewhat harder line recently, citing as its justification the return of a number of disillusioned spouses from the West.

As of November 1, 1976, the following number of binational marriage cases were pending involving U.S. citizens and citizens of the Warsaw Pact countries:

Bulgaria	0
Czechoslovakia	9
GDR	13
Hungary	0
Poland	0
Romania	51
U.S.S.R.	5

(iii) Travel for personal or professional reasons

The governments of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe cite impressive figures to support the contention that their citizens have the right to travel abroad freely. The great majority of these travelers, however, go to other Warsaw Pact countries. Only a small number travel to the West in view of numerous official and unofficial constraints, including the difficulty in obtaining hard currency.

U.S. action to facilitate travel and tourism.—The human contacts section of the Final Act calls on CSCE participants "gradually to simplify and to administer flexibly the procedures for exit and entry." After the Helsinki Summit, the United States began an overall review of its visa procedures to determine if they could be further streamlined, taking into account both the Final Act and the requirements of U.S. law.

U.S. government and travel industry officials met in Washington in late January 1976 and formulated a plan to set up a "Visit USA" program to encourage Soviet tourist travel to the United States. The American Ambassador notified the Soviets in March of the establishment of a "Visit USA Committee" in Moscow to foster this goal. The committee is comprised of U.S. Embassy officials and resident U.S.

businessmen. It held its first meeting with Intourist officials in Moscow on May 10, 1976, for the purpose of soliciting their views and gaining assistance in the promotion of tourist visits to the United States. The Soviet attitude has seemed generally receptive to the program, but little in a practical sense has been accomplished.

Soviet tourism to the United States could well benefit from such a program since the volume of private travel by Soviet citizens to the United States has remained at a low, virtually unchanging level for years. Since 1970, the number of tourist and private visitor visas—encompassing both individual travel, largely for family visits, and group tourist travel—issued to Soviet citizens has been as follows:

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Tourists	219	225	429	370	596	566
Private visitors	1, 087	1, 015	969	1, 059	1, 135	1, 184
Total	1, 306	1, 240	1, 398	1, 429	1, 731	1, 750

The Final Act calls on CSCE signatories to reduce nonimmigrant visa (NIV) fees, as one means of promoting travel. In cases where foreign states charge NIV fees to American citizens, the United States by law reciprocates by charging comparable fees to their citizens. Among CSCE participants, only Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, and Poland continue to charge such fees. In April 1976 the U.S. Embassies in these countries proposed a mutual elimination of NIV fees but definitive responses have not yet been received.

The Soviets had indicated in late 1975 that they were considering the possibility of reducing the number of zones in the U.S.S.R. closed to travel by U.S. citizens. The United States had been considering a similar measure, and in his demarche of March 3, 1976, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow announced that a number of geographic areas in the United States temporarily closed to travel by Soviets—in retaliation for the imposition of restricted areas by the Soviets—would shortly be reopened. There has not yet been a substantive Soviet response to this measure.

On November 3, the United States and Czechoslovakia agreed to terminate reciprocal travel restrictions on each other's diplomats which had been imposed in the early 1960's. In addition, the United States agreed to terminate unilateral restrictions on ports of entry that Czechoslovak officials can use to enter the United States. In the diplomatic notes which were exchanged on the subject, both Governments stated that the elimination of travel restrictions was "another step in the implementation of the Final Act of the CSCE and in the further development of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations." Bulgaria also has under consideration a U.S. proposal to eliminate closed zones and designated points of entry on a reciprocal basis. There are no longer such closed zones in other Eastern European countries.

The Soviet Union and Eastern European States refused to issue visas to members of the joint Legislative-Executive Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe who wished to travel in their official capacity to Eastern countries during the Commission's trip to Europe on November 5–23. The Soviets and Eastern Europeans took the position that such visits constitute interference in their in-

ternal affairs, in contradiction to the provisions of the Final Act. We do not accept this position. In demarches in Moscow and Eastern European capitals we strongly regretted the decision to refuse visas to the Commission.

The reciprocal United States-Soviet agreement on multiple entry-exit visas for journalists went into effect on October 1, 1975. Later that month and again in March 1976, the United States renewed an earlier proposal that multiple entry-exit visas be available not only to journalists but also to students and businessmen residing for an extended period in the U.S.S.R. The response to this proposal was cool; the Soviets suggested that students have few reasons to make frequent trips outside the country. They have, however, recently indicated a more positive approach to this question.

On October 26, 1976, our Embassy in Bucharest informed the Romanian Foreign Ministry that, subject to reciprocity of treatment by the Romanian Government for corresponding categories of American travelers, we were prepared to liberalize our visa practices for certain categories of Romanian visitors to the United States. The effect of this step will be to permit issuance of multiple-entry visas of longer periods of validity than was previously the case.

(*iv*) *Religious contacts*

The Human Contacts section of the Final Act also contains a confirmation by the participants that religious groups can "have contacts and meetings among themselves."

Governmental attitudes in the East on religion range widely from reluctant tolerance to general hostility. There has been little change in their respective basic attitudes toward religion since Helsinki. We have learned, however, of some small improvements in this area, especially in Eastern Europe. It appears that a somewhat larger number of pilgrims are being allowed to travel abroad and more Eastern European priests living in the West are being permitted to go home to visit their families. Hungary and Poland sent high-level clerical delegations to the Eucharistic Congress in Philadelphia in August 1976.

A number of bishops and priests from Latvia and Lithuania attended the Eucharistic Congress, and Soviet authorities now seem more willing to allow the importation of a limited amount of religious materials into the Baltic area. An American rabbi on a factfinding mission to the U.S.S.R. in the first part of 1976 reported that he was received more hospitably by Soviet officials than in the past. In March–April 1976 a 10-man Soviet religious delegation visited the United States at the invitation of the Appeal of Consciousness Foundation; it had discussions with coreligionists in New York and Washington, and with several Members of Congress and State Department officials.

(*v*) *Meetings among young people*

Youth exchange programs between the United States and both the Soviet Union and the Eastern European States continue to be carried out within the framework of existing agreements which predate the CSCE. For example, a group of young American journalists visited the Soviet Union in November 1975, and groups of young American political leaders visited Romania in late 1975 and again in the

summer of 1976 under the auspices of the American Council of Young Political Leaders (ACYPL).

On the negative side, despite American interest in attending, U.S. representatives were not invited to the preparatory stage of the Soviet and Eastern European sponsored "European Youth Security Conference" held in Warsaw in June 1976. The relevant U.S. organizations, the U.S. Youth Council and the ACYPL, received invitations at the last moment, and then only to send a single observer each to the conference. Both groups rejected the invitation as being out of keeping with the CSCE.

(*vi*) *Sport*

As in the case of youth exchanges, East-West sports competitions have been underway since before the CSCE, under a variety of programs. Since the Helsinki Summit, competitions between United States and Soviet or Eastern European athletes have taken place in such sports as ice hockey, figure skating, boxing, horsemanship, basketball, swimming, track and field, and volleyball.

(*vii*) *Expansion of contacts*

The last paragraph of the Human Contacts section of Basket Three calls for the further development of contacts among governmental institutions and nongovernmental organizations of the participating states. This provision, which was included in the Final Act on the initiative of the Eastern side, has been invoked by the Soviets to protest the fact that Soviet labor representatives have not received visas to visit the United States. The Soviet labor representatives were refused visas under the terms of the Immigration and Naturalization Act regarding Communist Party membership. Waivers of ineligibility were not recommended, in keeping with long-standing policy in such cases. The views of the American labor movement were taken into consideration in this decision. Moreover, specific reference to travel and contacts among labor representatives does not appear in the Final Act because of the U.S. position on the subject. All participants were aware of our long-standing policy, and, in signing the Final Act, had accepted our position against a reference to such exchanges. The Secretary of State has indicated, however, that the administration is ready to consider any changes which the Congress may wish to make in the law, keeping in mind the terms of the CSCE.

B. Information

The Information Section of Basket III results from a major Western initiative which produced one of the key features of the Final Act: the commitment of the 35 participating states to "make it their aim to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds." This aim is unqualified and—coming as it does in the preambular paragraphs of the information section—represents a commitment which applies to all of the subareas included in the information section—improvement in the circulation of, access to, and exchange of oral, printed, filmed and broadcast information; cooperation in the field of information; and working conditions for journalists.

The intent of this section of the Final Act is clearly to lower the barriers to the free and unimpeded flow of information, in both di-

rections, between East and West. We accepted this commitment without reservation, since it represents a continuation of traditional American practice. The United States, of course, does not jam radio broadcasts from the U.S.S.R. and East Europe, place restrictions on circulation of or subscription to Eastern newspapers and periodicals, restrict the showing of Soviet or Eastern European films, or inhibit the work of journalists.

By signing the Final Act, the Soviet Union and its East European Allies also accepted the commitment to work toward the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds. Beginning at the Helsinki Summit itself, however, they have sought to interpret this commitment in keeping with their traditional view of information as an instrument of state policy. Despite the fact that the Final Act places no restrictions on the type or content of information to be disseminated, they have taken the position that information which is not to their liking does not contribute to that "development of mutual understanding between the participating States" referred to in the Preamble of the Information Section. These governments have also argued that information which is critical of Communist society is not in keeping with the spirit of the CSCE, or even that it constitutes interference in their internal affairs.

Indeed, information is the area in which the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe have made the least headway in implementing the provisions of Basket Three. While a few positive steps have been taken with regard to working conditions for journalists and token action on the availability of newspapers and news magazines, the general availability of these materials has remained virtually unchanged and the Eastern States have done nothing since Helsinki to facilitate the freer flow of broadcast news from the West. The U.S.S.R. and several of the Eastern European States continue, for example, in contradiction to the provisions of the Final Act, to jam, respectively, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, two autonomous U.S.-funded stations which broadcast news and commentary to Eastern audiences in their native languages.

(1) DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

Availability of Western publications.—At the beginning of 1976, the Soviets announced that 18 non-Communist Western newspapers, including the New York Times and the Washington Post, would shortly go on sale in the U.S.S.R. (We subsequently learned that these two newspapers are not being publicly distributed, allegedly because of high cost and lateness of delivery from abroad.) Whereas previously a few Western non-Communist newspapers were intermittently available in Moscow on an under-the-counter basis, now a somewhat larger number of papers are openly displayed in tourist hotels in Moscow and a few other cities. The numbers of newspapers imported into the U.S.S.R. remains, however, extremely small. For example, an RFE report of February 1976 indicated that the French newspaper Le Monde and The Times of London each send only 40 copies for daily public sale to the Soviet Union. The Paris International Herald Tribune is reportedly distributed publicly in only 60 copies. The average Soviet citizen does not have practical means of access to such papers,

and there has been little real change in the availability of newspapers and news magazines in the U.S.S.R.

One small positive sign is the willingness of the Soviet authorities to permit USIA to distribute 300 copies of its new Russian-language intellectual journal "Dialogue" through the mail, matching the 300 copies of the U.S. Embassy news bulletin which are circulated in Moscow. Some 60,000 copies of the USIA monthly publication America Illustrated are distributed on the basis of a pre-CSCE bilateral agreement with the U.S.S.R.

A situation similar to that in the U.S.S.R. prevails in Eastern Europe, where Western newspapers and news magazines are ordinarily available only in places frequented by Western visitors. It is worth noting that Poland, and to a lesser extent Hungary, are less restrictive than the other Eastern European countries. Thus, 1,105 copies of Newsweek are reportedly distributed weekly in Poland, compared to 545 in Hungary, 261 in the U.S.S.R., 161 in Czechoslovakia, and 96 in Romania. The RFE study cited above indicates that Le Monde is able to send 1,000 copies daily to Poland and 250 to Czechoslovakia for public sale while the figures for The Times of London are 207 and 110 respectively in those two countries. As with the Soviet Union, however, these Western publications are available largely for foreign tourists.

Attacks on RFE and RL.—As noted above, we consider that any jamming is inconsistent with the Final Act. The Soviet Union has continued to jam Radio Liberty. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia continue to jam Radio Free Europe as does Poland sporadically. The GDR continues to jam the American-run Berlin station RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) on the medium wave frequencies though it does not jam RIAS on FM or short wave and does not jam West German broadcasts. Hungary and Romania do not jam any foreign broadcasts. The Voice of America has not been jammed by the Soviet Union since August 1973 and is not jammed in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union and its Allies have also conducted a campaign of criticism and invective against RFE and RL. Eastern criticism of the two stations was muted during the CSCE negotiations in Geneva, but picked up again after the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki. A Soviet Foreign Ministry official complained in November 1975 that U.S. broadcasts to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe failed to promote the CSCE goal of mutual understanding between peoples. This charge became the principal theme of a Soviet and Eastern European media campaign against RFE and RL which became more intense at the beginning of 1976. (Criticism of the Voice of America, as an official U.S. Government station, has been more circumspect.)

Soviet media attacks on RFE and RL reached a peak in February 1976, when leading publications denounced the stations as "criminal activities contrary to Helsinki principles," which hurl "absurdities and fierce rage" against the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. During this same period, Soviet and Eastern European Olympic representatives succeeded in having RFE barred on a technicality from covering the 1976 Winter Olympics in Innsbruck, Austria. The United States strongly protested this decision of the International Olympic Committee. The Senate with the support of the Department of State passed a resolution (S.R. 413) calling for freedom of the press at the

Olympics. RFE and RL were subsequently accredited to cover the Summer Olympics.

The Soviets have continued to criticize RFE and RL as contrary to the terms of the Final Act, though somewhat less polemically than in early 1976. At the European Communist Party Conference in late June, however, General Secretary Brezhnev personally charged that the existence of the two U.S. stations "is a direct challenge to the spirit and letter of the Helsinki accords."

U.S. spokesmen continue to stress that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty serve the CSCE goal of achieving a freer flow of information between East and West. Secretary of State Kissinger made this point clear in his August 28, 1976, letter to David Abshire, Chairman of the Board for International Broadcasting, on the occasion of the BIB's first annual review conference in Munich. The Secretary noted that the U.S. Government categorically rejects allegations that RFE and RL contravene the aims of the CSCE Final Act; on the contrary, the two Radios "can admirably serve the stated aim of the participating states 'to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds.'" The Secretary also noted that cessation of jamming of overseas broadcasts would accord with the Helsinki provisions.

(2) COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION

This topic will be discussed in section C of this chapter.

(3) WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS

The two East European capitals in which American journalists have the most practical need for multiple entry-exit visas are Moscow and East Berlin. A few days after the Helsinki Summit, the United States approached the U.S.S.R. on this matter. In our opinion, this was one of the few Basket Three provisions for which conclusion of a bilateral implementation arrangement after signature of the Final Act was appropriate. An exchange of notes was effected which provided for the reciprocal issuance, effective October 1975, of multiple entry-exit visas for American journalists resident in the U.S.S.R. and multiple entry visas for Soviet journalists resident in the United States (we have no exit visa requirement). This became one of the first CSCE implementation steps taken by the Soviets after the signing of the Final Act. Since that time, the U.S.S.R. has concluded similar bilateral agreements with a number of other Western countries.

U.S. representatives have also approached the GDR authorities to secure a reciprocal agreement on such visas. Agreement has been held up by the GDR's refusal to accredit U.S. correspondents stationed in Bonn and West Berlin. However, one American journalist, resident in Copenhagen, was recently accorded a multiple entry visa by the GDR.

Among the other Eastern European countries, Czechoslovakia has displayed the most restrictive attitude toward U.S. journalists. The Czechoslovak Government has since Helsinki refused visas to correspondents from the Los Angeles Times and the Voice of America. The United States, in response, suspended action for several weeks on the

visa application of the Rude Pravo correspondent assigned to Washington.

At the end of December 1975 the Soviets announced their intention to ease restrictions on travel by journalists in the U.S.S.R., effective March 1, 1976. This action brought the rules for journalist travel into line with those for Western diplomats serving in the U.S.S.R. The United States had originally placed limits on the travel of Soviet journalists in the United States in retaliation for restrictions on American journalists in the U.S.S.R. Accordingly, on January 19, the United States announced reciprocal action, also effective March 1.

In March 1976 the United States proposed regular consultations with the Soviets on the subject of working conditions for journalists. The Soviet response to this proposal was positive. U.S. representatives have subsequently met periodically with press officials of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to discuss specific problems relating to this general question.

During the course of 1976 the Soviets took several additional small steps toward improving working conditions for Western journalists.

—A West German TV cameraman was accorded resident journalist accreditation, thus affording him the status normally granted only to full-fledged correspondents.

—The Soviets announced that official permission would no longer be required for foreign journalists to send films and tape recordings abroad. (This measure formalized a long-standing practice.)

—In July 1976 it was announced that foreign journalists could request interviews with government officials directly, instead of applying—as in the past—through the Foreign Ministry. We are observing how this measure works in practice, in order to determine whether it does, in fact, improve working conditions for journalists. Preliminary indications from some Western newsmen suggest that this measure has led to little improvement in access to officials.

On the other hand, the Soviets refused a visa to a Voice of America correspondent in May 1976, and in October 1976 refused to extend the validity of a visa they had accorded another VOA correspondent. Also, on May 25, 1976, a Soviet newspaper charged that three American journalists in Moscow were linked to the CIA. The newsmen and their papers categorically denied any connection with the CIA. While the CSCE provisions do not specifically cover this type of harassment, the effect of the Soviet charges was to detract from progress made in working conditions for journalists in the U.S.S.R. under the terms of the Final Act.

The GDR also announced that effective July 1, 1976 accredited journalists could request information directly from the press offices of individual government ministries instead of going through the Foreign Ministry. Effective the same date, dependents of journalists accredited to the GDR were entitled to travel documents that facilitate travel between East and West Berlin and between East and West Germany.

C. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Fields of Culture and Education

(1) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

There has been substantial activity in these fields in the 16 months following signature of the Final Act. This activity is to a considerable extent a continuation of a process already in evidence before the initiation of CSCE. The Final Act appears to have improved the atmosphere, however, and to have provided a new impetus.

The Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe have shown an interest in moving ahead in these areas that contrasts with their attitude toward much of the human contacts and information portion of the Basket Three texts. This may reflect both a desire to establish a creditable implementation record and the fact that many of the projects which fall under the rubric of cultural and educational exchanges are easier to reconcile with the nature of their closed societies. They have accordingly shown the most interest in proceeding with projects that can be encompassed within cooperation between governments and between official institutions.

There has been greater reluctance to move ahead on projects that involve a less structured interchange between individuals and between unofficial groups not easily subjected to governmental control. The Soviets and their Allies have also demonstrated a sensitivity to suggestions that they have not permitted a sufficiently free flow of Western cultural material, and they have sought to formulate a counterargument, not supported by either the CSCE texts or the actual facts, that they are more open to Western culture than the West is to Eastern culture.

Eastern receptivity has been particularly marked in the area of formal bilateral agreements intended to provide a framework for more specific individual cultural and educational projects. Shortly after signature of the Final Act, the United States tabled draft cultural/scientific exchange agreements with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. In the case of Hungary, a general exchange agreement was initialed on October 14, 1976, and a work program is now under negotiation. Negotiations continue with Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, and we hope for their successful conclusion soon. Review talks with the Soviet Union in December 1975 and midterm talks with Romania in February 1976 on existing bilateral agreements and informal discussions with Poland in March 1976 reflected the interest of each of these states in expanding cultural and educational exchanges.

Unfortunately, domestic Romanian political imperatives have reduced the size of exchanges with that country in the past 2 years. The GDR is in a somewhat special category. Diplomatic relations were established only in August 1974. Projects in the cultural and educational fields have thus far been ad hoc. We have, however, proposed a number of concrete projects to the GDR, and there have been moderately encouraging signs of a more forthcoming attitude. The GDR has recently agreed, for example, to accept an American film retro-

spective in 1977 similar to a showing of East German films which was put on by New York's Museum of Modern Art in 1975. A small reciprocal academic exchange program is currently in the second year.

A sampling of the broad range of projects and exchanges already accomplished or planned is contained in the subsequent sections of this chapter. While these successes are encouraging, the Soviet Union and, in varying degrees, its Allies, remain unreceptive to projects that would permit unstructured contacts between their citizens and Westerners free of governmental supervision and are reluctant to open their societies fully to the influence of Western culture. The Basket Three texts reflect the Western view that while interstate agreements can play an important role in certain aspects of cooperation and exchange in culture and education, there is also a substantial role to be played by private groups and individuals.

Some Eastern European States have begun to move away from an insistence that contacts should be funneled through central governmental control mechanisms and to permit greater institution-to-institution and individual-to-individual contact. There have also been recent indications that the Soviet Union is prepared to permit a somewhat greater frequency of direct contacts. The U.S. Embassy, for example, is now permitted to approach many Soviet institutions without going through the usual maze of coordination channels. Moscow and Leningrad Universities, with the concurrence of the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education, have shown an interest in establishing direct links with American institutions of higher learning. We have had some success in increasing the frequency of exchanges not only in the more traditional physical sciences fields but also in the social sciences and the humanities.

Soviet defensiveness is evident in assertions that the Soviet Union and the East European States already receive a larger quantity of Western cultural material, particularly books and films, than the West receives of Eastern culture and that the West must correct this alleged imbalance before further progress can be made. There are no comprehensive statistics available on the total flow of books, journals, films and other cultural and educational material. What is received by the West from the East, however, is determined by the interests of the public without government control. What is received by the East from the West almost invariably is what has been determined by official organs to be ideologically safe or of technical utilitarian value.

A high percentage of Western books and films available in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for example, is made up of classics, scientific works or those which portray the problems of Western society, and light entertainment. It is this imbalance, fostered by governmental restrictions and a preoccupation with ideological purity, which is inconsistent with the provisions and the spirit of the Final Act. The United States will continue to work with the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe for further improvement without imposition of artificial tests of governmental acceptability and numerical limitation. In short we believe that individuals, and not their governments, should choose what they read and see.

(2) COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN THE FIELD OF CULTURE

The Chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs visited the U.S.S.R. and several Eastern European countries shortly after the Helsinki Summit. Following this visit, the Commission sent a report to Congress which made a number of recommendations for implementation of CSCE provisions on cultural and educational exchanges. Many of these recommendations accord with policies and action programs which the Department of State has been following for some time. The Commission's report served to focus attention on the field of cultural and educational exchanges in relation to the Final Act and to the importance the United States attaches to this area of activity.

The following are representative examples of activities that have either been carried out, are presently underway, or are in the discussion phase:

(*i*) *Books and publishing*

In November 1975 the Association of American Publishers (AAP) held a seminar with the Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs. At this meeting the AAP proposed and the Government Advisory Committee endorsed a series of measures related to CSCE provisions on exchanges. These included:

—Reinstitution of an Informational Media Guaranty Program (an arrangement under which the U.S. Government would guarantee the convertability of foreign currencies received for the sale of books and other media products);

—Establishment of an American bookstore in Moscow;

—Joint United States-Soviet seminars on publishing and bookselling; and

—Exchange of publishing and library personnel.

AAP representatives held further discussions with U.S. Government officials on ways to implement Basket Three in June 1976. As a result the State Department has given its support to the last three initiatives cited above, and representatives of the U.S. publishing industry and the State Department are looking into the feasibility of reestablishing an Informational Media Guaranty Program.

A delegation of the AAP visited Moscow shortly after the first of the meetings described above to discuss CSCE-related questions with Soviet officials. The AAP broached the question of opening an American bookstore in Moscow, to which the Soviets gave a noncommittal reply. The Soviets have for several years resisted such an initiative, unless they can control the books to be available for sale. They have expressed interest, however, in an exchange of book exhibits and librarian visits between libraries in the United States and the U.S.S.R. American publishers have been reluctant to commit themselves to exhibits without assurance that they could display the books they desired without interference from the Soviet authorities and that they could sell the books displayed in the Soviet Union. The AAP hosted a delegation of Soviet publishing and copyright specialists in the spring of 1976 as a prelude to the joint United States-Soviet seminar on

publishing held in Moscow September 23–28, 1976. At the seminar the AAP tabled with the Soviet State Committee on Publishing the various proposals which it had worked out earlier in consultation with U.S. Government officials. The Soviets, for their part, viewed the seminar as an opportunity to promote the sale of books to the United States and to update their own publishing procedures.

A United States-Soviet Binational Literature Symposium took place at Indiana University on April 8–11, 1976.

During this same period, the Iowa University Press published the first collection in English of works by contemporary Bulgarian poets. A Bulgarian publishing house, in turn, prepared a collection entitled Modern American and English Poetry.

The chief of the Slavic Division of the Library of Congress traveled at the end of September 1976 on an American Specialist grant to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. In each country he discussed the possibilities for book and library exchanges within the framework of the CSCE.

(*ii*) *Films and broadcasting*

During 1975 the American Film Institute of Washington presented Soviet and Polish film festivals, and in December 1975 the New York Museum of Modern Art presented a retrospective of 20 East German films. In early 1976 the Soviets requested a number of films from Walt Disney Productions to commemorate the anniversary of Disney's birth. Representatives of the U.S. Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) visited the U.S.S.R. in early 1976 to discuss possible areas of cooperation.

After the completion of the first joint Soviet-American feature film, "Bluebird," representatives of a U.S. film company and Soviet cinema officials reached agreement in June 1976 on a second coproduction, "Sea Pup." The film will be shot in both countries, with Soviet and American actors; it is scheduled for release in late 1977.

As suggested above, Basket Three cooperation and exchange in the field of films is complicated by the Eastern preoccupation with reciprocity and numerical balance. The U.S.S.R. has charged that Western distributors and festival organizers discriminate against Soviet films, noting, for example, that none were shown at the Cannes festival this year. The essential reason for the paucity of Soviet and East European films in the West, however, is that many have limited audience appeal. As one means to ameliorate this situation, U.S. officials have proposed that the Soviets consider an exchange of young film directors, through which the Soviet participants could learn techniques which might enhance the appeal of their work to Western audiences.

The three commercial U.S. networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC have all concluded cooperation agreements with the Soviet State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. These agreements provide for the exchange of sports and entertainment shows and for technical cooperation in the preparation of programs. CBS was the last of the three networks to sign such an agreement, in October 1976.

Limited cooperation in broadcasting has also proceeded with the Eastern European countries. USIA has done some cooperative work with Hungarian television, for example, and there has been sporadic, modest success in placing nonpolitical American films and TV and radio material in the Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian media. The Bulgarian authorities have provided technical support to the Voice of America correspondent in Sofia.

Hungary undertook an interesting CSCE-related initiative in May and June 1976 by featuring debates between Eastern and Western media representatives on the State Television network. The subjects covered in these debates included CSCE itself, détente, and arms reduction.

(*iii*) *Performing arts*

Exchange in the area of live performances, by individuals and groups, represents one of the most successful aspects of Basket Three-type cooperation and continues for the most part to develop satisfactorily.

Soviet pianist Lazar Berman toured the United States January 11–February 16, 1976. The Don Cossacks of Rostov, a dance troupe, completed a 2-month tour of the United States in April 1976. The Roy Clark Country Music Show performed in Moscow, Leningrad, and Riga January 20-February 2, 1976. Soviet authorities have demonstrated a reluctance, however, to accept tours by Western rock groups despite indications of substantial public interest.

The United States invited a number of Eastern countries to send folk groups to perform here during the bicentennial. Romanian, Polish, and Hungarian groups performed at the Folklife Festival in Washington during the summer.

Also during the summer of 1976, the American Conservatory Theater gave 22 performances of Desire Under the Elms and Matchmaker in Moscow, Leningrad, and Riga, while the North Texas State University jazz band gave concerts in Moscow, Leningrad, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Baku. The Russian Festival of Music and Dance opened its U.S. tour in New York on June 28, and a Soviet quartet played with the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra June 18–26.

The exchange of students in the performing arts, however, has not proceeded as well as had been hoped. Since 1973, only five American students have been placed in the U.S.S.R. under this program.

(*iv*) *Exhibits*

Exhibits represent another fruitful area of Basket Three type cooperation. The U.S.S.R.'s Scientific Siberia exhibit has been showing in various U.S. cities during 1976. The U.S. exhibit, Technology in the American Home, concluded its 18-month tour of six Soviet cities in May 1976.

An exhibit of paintings from six U.S. museums opened in Leningrad in February 1976. The Soviet exhibit of European and Russian Masters from the Hermitage and the Russian State Museum opened in the United States in the summer of 1975 and ran until early 1976.

A new American exhibit, Photography USA, opened in Kiev in July 1976, showed in Alma Ata this fall, and we plan to show it in four additional Soviet cities in 1977. The Soviets provided a Soyuz space capsule for display at the recent opening of the Smithsonian Institution's Aeronautics and Space Museum. An exhibit of Soviet space art was also shown at the Aeronautics and Space Museum in Washington and in several other cities during the autumn of 1976. American artist Larry Rivers visited the Soviet Union, where he showed slides of his paintings, from September 12 to 22, 1976.

A special U.S. Bicentennial exhibit is being shown in Moscow from November 12 to December 13, 1976.

As noted earlier, cultural exchange with the GDR has developed only in recent years, and is still largely a one-way street. A fair number of exhibits and performers come to the United States from the GDR, but few Americans are invited to the GDR. There has been some indication lately, however, of a more balanced East German attitude toward exchanges reflected in the decision to permit an exhibition of American films in 1977. After demonstrating initial reluctance, the GDR agreed to a U.S. exhibit on Working Americans at the March 1976 Leipzig trade fair. The exhibit proved to be a success, and the East Germans invited the United States to provide a similar exhibit in 1977. The GDR has also agreed to a major U.S. photo exhibit during 1977.

(*v*) *Exchange visits among specialists*

As noted in chapter 4, East-West meetings among young specialists in such fields as journalism and politics have been taking place within the framework of agreements predating the CSCE.

In November 1975, the U.S. Society of Architectural Historians sponsored an international conference in New York on the preservation of historical monuments. Experts from the Soviet Union and most of the Eastern European States attended.

In June of 1976, the GDR hosted a visit by Skylab astronaut Gerald Carr to several technical institutes. Mr. Carr was warmly received and his visit was given considerable publicity, indicating again the considerable interest in U.S. space achievements in the GDR.

A Soviet newsman participated in a program on journalism at Syracuse University in early 1976, and in July–August 1976 a four-man delegation of Soviet journalists visited the United States for 3 weeks under the International Visitors (IV) program.

Five Soviet theatrical experts scheduled to visit the United States in October 1976 under the IV program had to cancel. Arrangements are underway to reschedule the visit.

International visitor exchanges are also progressing with Eastern Europe. Hungary, for example, nominated 10 candidates for individual IV grants in 1976 and has shown an increased receptivity to U.S. visitors sponsored by the USIA and the State Department.

(*vi*) *The Bicentennial*

A considerable amount of cultural exchange activity in mid-1976 revolved around the U.S. Bicentennial celebration. Soviet, Polish, and Romanian vessels were among the 225 sailing ships from 30 countries which took part in Operation Sail. The Polish schooner *Dar Pomorza* subsequently sailed to Savannah, Ga., to deliver an urn of soil from the birthplace of the Revolutionary War hero Count Casimir Pulaski, who was mortally wounded during the seige of Savannah in 1779. The Polish Ambassador to the United States made the formal presentation.

On July 4, Polish television broadcast a 15-minute salute to the Bicentennial. It included a ceremony at the Parliament building in Warsaw, where Polish leader Edward Gierek presented the U.S. Ambassador with models of statutes of the two well-known Polish heroes of the American Revolution, Pulaski and Kosciuszko, which will be erected in the United States as a Bicentennial gift to the American people.

Romania's response to the Bicentennial was also positive. High level Romanian leaders, including the Prime Minister, attended the July 4

reception at the U.S. Embassy. Articles by the U.S. Ambassador on Romanian-American relations and U.S. history were published in the Romanian press. Romanian television devoted the entire evening of July 4 to American subjects. The Romanian Academy of Sciences organized a Bicentennial symposium of United States and Romanian scholars.

The other East European States also commemorated the U.S. Bicentennial in lower key observances. In the U.S.S.R., the turnout of Soviet leaders for the July 4 reception at the U.S. Embassy was quite good. On the evening of July 4, Soviet television aired a 5-minute presentation on the Bicentennial by the U.S. Ambassador. On July 6, the Soviets sponsored a reception and Bicentennial commemorative program.

(vii) Multilateral activity

While most of the cultural exchange and cooperation activity outlined in Basket Three is being implemented through bilateral agreements, the CSCE participants are also utilizing multilateral means for the purpose. The principal multilateral forum in the cultural, educational and scientific areas is UNESCO.

Ongoing UNESCO activities which relate to CSCE include: studies on setting up a cultural data bank; exchange of information on cultural festivals; promotion of cooperation in the protection of artistic works and sites of cultural interests; and international training courses for specialists. The Finnish National Commission for UNESCO sponsored a symposium in August 1976 on the principles and forms of international cultural cooperation, which was attended by experts from some National Commission of the European region.

The UNESCO General Conference meeting in Nairobi in November 1976 is scheduled to adopt a new protocol to the Florence Agreement (which facilitates educational, scientific and cultural exchange by removing certain customs barriers). We intend subsequently to urge those CSCE participants not yet parties to the Florence Agreement—that is, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Portugal, San Marino, and the U.S.S.R.—to ratify it.

It should be noted that the Final Act restricts UNESCO activity in implementation of the CSCE to the specific fields of educational, scientific and cultural cooperation. Western CSCE participants have resisted attempts to relate UNESCO activities in other fields, such as human rights or information, to the CSCE because of the very different composition, procedures and interests of that organization.

(3) COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION

(i) Extension of relations: Access and exchanges

In the educational as in the cultural field, implementation progress has been slow but marked. The following are examples of specific activities.

United States-Soviet exchanges.—The Rector of Moscow State University visited the United States in 1975 at the invitation of the State Department to study the organization and functioning of American universities, and to explore the possibilities for direct exchange agreements. In 1976 Moscow State University established a council

for what, in effect, has become a center for American Studies. In addition to offering courses on U.S. law, economics, geography, and history, the university is publishing a journal entitled "Problems in American Studies."

A major development in this field took place on March 15–17, 1976, with the first joint United States-Soviet seminar on higher education. Held at the Educational Testing Service (ETS) in Princeton, N.J., the seminar focused on selection and guidance of students and comparability of academic degrees. In conjunction with the seminar, a six-person Soviet delegation visited the Educational Resources Information Center. In return, a seven-person U.S. delegation headed by the president of ETS visited the Soviet Union in October–November 1976 where it participated in a seminar in Moscow and visited higher education institutions in Tallinn, Kiev, and Tashkent. EST and the Soviet Institute for Study of Higher Education discussed the possibility of additional joint research projects.

A delegation of the five Soviet university librarians visited the United States for 2 weeks in May 1976. They observed library procedures in Washington, D.C., Columbus, Ohio, and New York City. A delegation of U.S. psychologists sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences visited the Institute of Psychology of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in July 1976. The two sides discussed the possibilities for a series of joint seminars over the next several years.

The Director of the U.S. National Institute of Education also visited the U.S.S.R. in the summer of 1976. After meeting with Soviet educators, especially specialists in educational research, he reported a high level of Soviet interest in continued exchanges.

The annual summer exchange of Russian- and English-language teachers between the United States and the U.S.S.R was increased in 1976 from 30 to 35 participants on each side. Under this program 35 American teachers of Russian spent 10 weeks at Moscow State University in June–August, and the same number of Soviet teachers of English spent the summer in the United States. Despite administrative problems, progress was also made in the Fulbright lecturer program with the U.S.S.R. The Soviets have accepted, for example, the initial Fulbright lecturer at the Byelorussian Polytechnic Institute in Minsk for the 1977 academic year.

U.S. officials in both the public and private sectors have been exploring ways to expand the educational exchange program with the Soviet Union. Thus, the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs has been looking into the possibility of the exchange of graduate students and faculty with the U.S.S.R. in the fields of business administration and management. The State Department is also investigating the feasibility of having U.S. law students go to the Soviet Union for a year of study. The Soviets have expressed an interest in increasing such exchanges, perhaps within the scope of the program to be negotiated for the 1977–79 period.

In the private sector, several U.S. universities or groups of universities have proposed direct exchanges with their Soviet counterparts. For example, Temple University of Philadelphia has proposed an in-service teacher education exchange with the Soviet Ministry of Education which the Soviets have under consideration.

This and other recent developments suggest that the Soviets are coming to see the benefit of direct university-to-university contacts.

They are also becoming more willing to accept a greater balance between scientific-technical disciplines, on the one hand, and the humanities and social sciences on the other. These trends were reflected in the exchange agreement signed on October 4, 1976, between the State University of New York (SUNY) and Moscow State University. This is the first agreement for direct exchanges between an American and a Soviet university. The Soviets agreed that the first year's program will emphasize the humanities and social sciences. Exchanges will begin in January 1977, and 10 graduate students and 2 faculty members on each side will take part during the first year.

As United States-Soviet educational exchange has expanded, the American academic community has grown more sensitive to inequalities in access to research facilities enjoyed by Americans in the Soviet Union, as compared with that afforded Soviets in the United States. The American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies discussed this problem at a recent meeting, resulting in a petition and statement which was later read into the Congressional Record.

United States-East European exchanges.—Poland has been the most active East European State in the field of educational cooperation with the United States and has actively promoted direct exchanges with American universities. The most significant development in this regard has been the opening this autumn of an American Studies Center at Warsaw University in collaboration with Indiana University. Its staff is headed by a Polish scholar and includes two American lecturers who are partially funded by a U.S. State Department grant. It is the first such center staffed with Americans in an Eastern country.

In addition, Warsaw University has concluded an agreement for student and faculty exchanges with the University of Kansas, and Marie Curie Sklodowska University of Lublin signed an exchange agreement with Lock Haven State College of Pennsylvania. Both programs went into effect in September 1976.

Romania has also been active in the educational exchange field. In July 1976 Johns Hopkins University and the Institute of Civil Engineering in Bucharest signed a direct exchange agreement for a program in urban planning. The agreement, which calls for the annual exchange of two graduate students for long-term stays and two faculty members for shorter-term visits, became operational this fall.

In other developments, the Romanian Ministry of Education recently gave tentative approval for a cooperation agreement between the University of Illinois and the University of Cluj. In September 1976, the University of Kentucky proposed an exchange of economists with the Romanian Academy of Economic Sciences. Seven U.S. historians and political scientists participated earlier this year in a special session of the Romanian Academy of Sciences which focused on the U.S. Bicentennial. They subsequently lectured on various aspects of American life at several Romanian academic institutions.

Educational cooperation is also beginning to develop with the other Eastern European States. There are small academic exchanges with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria, and visitor exchanges with Hungary and Bulgaria. Exchanges with the GDR are still at an initial stage. The February 1975 agreement between the International Research and Exchanges Program (IREX) and the GDR Ministry of Higher and Technical Education marked the beginning of educational exchange with East Germany. It provides for 20-man-months of ex-

changes yearly in both directions. As in the cultural area, however, educational exchange with the GDR suffers from an overall imbalance. More East German scholars and scientists have been invited to the United States—and for longer periods—than Americans have been invited to the GDR.

(ii) Science

Science, as a subarea of educational cooperation and exchange, overlaps to a certain extent both Basket Two and the cultural exchanges and cooperation section of Basket Three. It therefore has been partially covered elsewhere in this report. Generally speaking, a considerable amount of scientific cooperation takes place between the United States and both the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe.

In the case of the Soviet Union, 11 specialized bilateral agreements regulate exchange visits by scientists. Under these agreements, more than 1,000 United States and Soviet scientists and technicians visited each others' countries in 1975. Productive scientific exchange agreements also exist with Poland and Romania. The umbrella educational-cultural-scientific agreements recently initialed with Hungary and now under negotiation with Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia would also provide for such exchanges.

Looking at science in the broad sense, the American Council of Learned Societies and the Soviet Academy of Sciences established a joint United States-Soviet Commission on the Social Sciences and Humanities in February 1975. This body has been investigating the possibilities for collaborative research in the various social sciences and humanities listed in the relevant paragraph of the Final Act (history, geography, philosophy, psychology, pedagogical research, linguistics, sociology, the legal, political and economic sciences, etc.)

(iii) Foreign languages and civilizations

The National Defense Education Act (NDEA) has for years been an important vehicle in the United States for expanding the knowledge of foreign languages and cultures among the American people. In terms of CSCE implementation, the NDEA has helped to finance language and area studies programs on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at numerous institutions of higher learning and specialized centers throughout the United States.

The annual summer exchange of English- and Russian-language teachers between the United States and the U.S.S.R. also contributes to the expansion of knowledge of foreign languages and civilizations. As noted above, in 1976 the number of exchange teachers on each side increased from 30 to 35. In a related vein, United States and Soviet scholars are collaborating on preparation of a textbook designed to teach Russian to Americans.

(iv) Teaching methods

The United States has taken a number of steps to bring about further cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European States in this area. In November–December 1975, 12 prominent American educators traveled to Moscow for the first joint United States-Soviet seminar on early childhood education. A group of Soviet educators came to the United States in the spring of 1976 for a followup meeting. A U.S. delegation on vocational and technical training visited the Soviet Union in January 1976, and a return Soviet delegation is expected here.

CHAPTER 5—LOOKING TOWARD BELGRADE

Looking toward Belgrade.—Slightly more than 6 months remain before the preparatory meeting required by the Final Act convenes in Belgrade to make arrangements for the followup meeting itself. The United States will use this time primarily to encourage implementation of the Final Act and to prepare for the followup meeting. We continue to believe that the success of the Belgrade meeting will turn fundamentally on meaningful fulfillment of the commitments made in Helsinki.

A major aspect of our preparation for the Belgrade meeting will be continuation of the careful and detailed consultations begun with our Allies immediately after the Helsinki Summit. The United States took the initiative in NATO then to insure that the Alliance would share ideas, experiences and the task of monitoring compliance. Our ongoing consultations, like those which were carried out during the period leading up to the CSCE and during the Conference itself, shape common policies and are significant for the contribution they make to Alliance solidarity and political viability.

CSCE, rather than leading to a loosening of the U.S. ties with Europe, has given the Alliance a broader dimension, and we will continue to demonstrate our interest in moving in concert with members of the European Community and all our other Allies.

For our own part, we are proud of our implementation record. The Helsinki Final Act sets a standard of conduct which the United States and most Western governments have followed for some time. Nevertheless, it will be necessary for the United States to take a hard look before Belgrade at areas in which our own performance could be still further improved. Some Eastern complaints about our performance clearly are disingenuous and motivated by a desire to distract attention from the implementation record of the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European States. One the other hand, we cannot assume that all our practices are immune to criticism. We shall accordingly continue to review our programs and practices to determine what if any modifications might be consistent with legal and financial constraints.

The United States, together with its Allies, views the Belgrade meeting primarily as an occasion for a serious review of implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. We have no wish to see the Belgrade meeting devolve into an exchange of recriminations and polemics. At the same time it is clear that a steady and consistent implementation record is the key to a constructive Belgrade meeting. Progress at Belgrade, if it is to be achieved, will require a realistic, tough-minded approach and an appreciation on the part of all participants of the constraints faced by others.

The CSCE must be viewed in perspective. It has not been a surrogate peace conference. Nor was it expected to change the basic nature of East-West relations or Eastern societies overnight. We believe it can contribute to a relaxation of tensions between states and to practical

improvements in the daily lives of people, as part of the ongoing diplomatic effort to improve East-West relations and to enhance security, stability and cooperation in Europe. As President Ford said in Helsinki, however, if we are to avoid disillusionment, we must be able to demonstrate worthwhile results.

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