

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

Russia and NATO: Moscow's Foreign Policy and the Partnership for Peace



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**Briefing of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC**

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BRIEFING ON RUSSIA AND NATO: MOSCOW'S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE BRIEFING

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Monday, May 6, 1994

Washington, DC.

The Briefing was held at 10:30 a.m., in room 2359 of the Rayburn House Office Building at 1st and Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC, Ambassador Sam Wise, presiding.

Present: Ambassador Sam Wise

Also present: Lawrence DiRita and Phillip A. Petersen.

Ambassador **Wise**. Good morning. Welcome to this briefing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission.

My name is Sam Wise and I am the Staff Director of the Commission, which is chaired by Senator DeConcini and Representative Hoyer.

Its Commissioners include nine Senators, nine Representatives, and three members of the Executive Branch from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce

The Commission has actively participated in the CSCE process, more than just as a legislative adjunct, but in cooperation also with the Executive Branch of the U.S. government, principally, the State Department, and we continue to do so today.

Our primary function, primary focus, I should say, has been on human rights, although we have taken into account all of the provisions of the Helsinki Accords, the ones signed in the Final Act of 1975, and the ones developed since then, which include economic and military questions as well. But, I think in the final analysis we can always make the case that in any of the other areas, military, security and economic relations, that there is a question of human rights at the bottom of those vast subjects as well.

This morning, our subject is partnership for peace and NATO, and the role that Russia may have in this new enterprise. I think all of you probably are aware of the controversy that has surrounded the creation of the Partnership for Peace early this year, and what it's supposed to accomplish, who it is supposed to assure, and reassure, and the reactions of those countries that are deciding whether to participate or not in the Partnership for Peace, and what they hope to get out of it.

And, there are numerous questions, which I hope our speakers will touch on this morning, numerous complications in this whole mosaic, which makes it, not only a fascinating subject, but very important for the post-communist period.

I would only add before introducing our speakers that I noticed in the Washington Post today a report of a visit of an American military delegation to Moscow, and an assessment, at least in this article, of very good cooperation, at least at that level, in arranging mutual military activities with the Russian authorities. Now, that's one level. There are a number of other levels which I think we'll hear about this morning.

Our guests today are well versed in the subject that we are going to be discussing. On my right is Doctor Phillip Petersen, who is the principal researcher at the Potomac Foundation, and is a specialist in security strategy of the post-Soviet States. And, on my left is Lawrence DiRita, Deputy Director for Foreign and Defense Policy at the Heritage Foundation. A former naval lieutenant commander, Mr. DiRita served as a participant, direct participant, in the CSCE process. We knew each other a little bit in Vienna. Mr. DiRita served as Executive Assistant to the Director of International Negotiations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to joining the Heritage Foundation.

Before turning it over to our speakers, I'll ask you to sign a sheet that's circulating of people who are attending, I'd appreciate it if we could have some idea of who is here. And, following the presentations, we'll have an opportunity for questions and answers.

So, I'll ask Mr. DiRita first to begin with an overview of the Russia/NATO state of play, and see what advantages that NATO and Russia might see in Russian membership.

Mr. DiRita?

Mr. DiRita. Thank you, Ambassador Wise.

First of all, I'd like to thank John Finerty and the Commission for, indeed, Ambassador Wise, for inviting me over today, for including the Heritage Foundation in this forum. It's a very important issue, one that has, frankly, I think since the NATO Summit been ignored, understandably because of the activity, primarily in the Balkans, that has sort of overshadowed the longer-term interests or importance of European security.

I mean, everybody understands, I think, that the Balkans suggests a fundamental problem with European security structures, but I think that the architecture that has to be somehow modified has been put on hold while we try to solve this problem, hoping, I think, that solving this problem will somehow solve, or at least lead to a solution of, the bigger problem. I have my doubts about that.

What I want to do is just kind of—the first part of my talk I'd like to just be a little descriptive, and in much more detail this information is available in a paper I put out on the table that came out just prior to the Summit that I wrote that just kind of laid out what the Partnership for Peace was all about, and I'll just be a little descriptive now so that I can make sure that we are all starting from the same point.

In January, the NATO Alliance agreed to the Partnership for Peace Framework document, and, really, that's just a political statement that says that NATO, all 16 countries of NATO, are interested in establishing a partnership with, actually, a great number of countries that go beyond just the former Soviet Union or, indeed, the former Warsaw Pact, to include a number of other European countries in the CSCE.

The document focuses in particular on establishing a relationship with these countries for budget transparency, which is an important issue in NATO anyway, and if we wish to work with the Eastern European countries it will be an important element for their future membership in NATO, budget transparency, democratic control of defense forces is specifically mentioned in the framework document, the Partnership for Peace. Joint training exercises is identified as one of the priorities, one of the hopes that we will

start to establish, perhaps, exercises with individual countries, or even countries in Central and Eastern Europe as a group. And then, some operational readiness issues, military standardization of equipment and things like that. It's just referred to in the document.

So, the document, it's a very broad, and not too terribly specific, framework agreement that lends itself, and I think by design, to an awful lot of interpretation, and what it really does is, it extends the offer to these countries and then puts the burden on these individual countries to come to NATO with a plan. How is it that you wish to participate with NATO? And, what we're seeing now, what we have seen since January, is individual countries coming back to NATO with their plan. So far, 14 countries have signed up, pretty much all of the countries that one might imagine, all the Central and Eastern European larger countries, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, all the Baltic States have signed up, and then a number of other countries that will probably participate to some lesser extent, like Albania, and Romania, and countries such as that.

Of course, the big question mark is Russia, which we are here to talk about today, and I'll talk a little bit more.

The other thing that was agreed to at the Summit, which I think has been ignored and, really, I think is the most important element of what was discussed in January in Brussels, and that is this idea of what are called combined joint task forces. And, what this is, is some way for NATO to respond to the European desire to have its own, what they call, security and defense identity. European security and defense identity are terms lifted right out of the Maastricht Summit Agreement that was signed in December 1991. The Europeans want to have some security identity of their own, whether it's the Western European Union, whether it's some other structure, they want something.

And, I think that the most interesting aspect of what was agreed to in January is this combined joint task force idea, which would, essentially, permit NATO the first right of refusal on any military operation that did not involve a direct threat to the security of a member nation, in other words, an Article V, what would be called an Article V challenge, so something like the Balkans, a peacekeeping operation somewhere, or a humanitarian operation somewhere.

And, if NATO decided not to participate as a whole, then some, what has been referred to as, coalition of the willing could put together some kind of task force and operate within the NATO structure, so they could use NATO facilities, command and control, logistics, individual countries can contribute to whatever degree they wish to contribute. And, in fact, this coalition of the willing might not have to include only NATO countries, it could include some NATO countries and some other countries who are maybe partners in the Partnership for Peace, or maybe not.

So, it's a very flexible idea, and it's this very notion that the Supreme Allied Commander, General Joulwan, is wrestling with now, how do we put some flesh into this idea of combined joint task forces.

It is no coincidence that the combined joint task forces were designed on the Balkan model, as horrible as that might sound because that has been a very bad example—a good example of how not to do business, but what it does do is try and square the circle of how does the U.S. stay engaged in NATO and, indeed, how does NATO get involved in a crisis like this without the U.S. having to agree to send 50,000 troops, or 100,000, or God knows how many troops. So, it attempts to kind of square that circle, and I will talk

a little bit more about that because that's where I think, if there's any opportunity for significant Russian participation it's going to be in something like that. That's my belief anyway.

As I said, since the Summit 14 countries have signed up, and as I also mentioned, General Joulwan now is trying to wrestle with, OK, now we have this wonderful political document, what does it mean and how do I make it work? And, we're here to talk about how Russia is trying to queer this whole thing or maybe trying to cause some trouble, but the reality is that the problems, the inter-NATO problems are as difficult and almost as intractable as the problems with how to solve the Russian situation. There's a great deal of, I don't want to say bickering, but a great deal of concern in Brussels between the allies of how—what does the Partnership for Peace mean, and what do the combined joint task forces mean.

For those of you who do follow NATO issues closely, this sounds a lot like what you would expect the French might want. The French, of course, are not part of the integrated military command structure at NATO, but if we were to have something like a combined joint task force, where NATO facilities are being used, the French might be able to put together a coalition for some particular task force or some particular operation and use NATO facilities without the U.S. being in the way. Now, that was done precisely to bring the French on board, and, yet, ironically, but probably not surprisingly, it's the French who are causing the most trouble now on how to interpret what the combined joint task forces will mean and what the Partnership for Peace means, who do we include, and what do we do once we have these partnership?

So, there is some bickering in Brussels, and those problems in Brussels, I would say, are just as intractable as the problems between Brussels and Moscow, or between Brussels and Prague, and so forth.

So, it's just important not to overlook the fact that this is not a done deal by any stretch of the imagination at NATO, and until we solve those problems we will not find a real long-term solution on how to accommodate Russia's concerns.

Russia's involvement, it's been on again and off again, and I'm sure Phil will go into this in some more detail, but it mirrors—the Russian involvement in the Partnership for Peace mirrors the Russian attitude toward NATO expansion that we saw last year, and what we saw was Yeltsin making one comment, and some other government official countermanding the comment Yeltsin had made. And, when he visited Polish President Walesa in August, he said, in effect, we understand your desire to want to join NATO, and we don't see that as a terrible threat to Russia, and then two months later retracted that after the crisis in Parliament.

That has pretty much mirrored how the Russians have reacted to the Partnership for Peace. Back in March, the Minister of Defense, during a visit to Moscow by Secretary of Defense Perry, said we are ready to join the Partnership for Peace, and we're going to contribute, and we expect to sign the document by some time in mid-April. Well, that date came and went, no signature, the other Russians, primarily in the lower house, the Duma, have really used Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace as a real tag line to oppose the Yeltsin government. And, I don't wish to be too glib, but a lot of the opposition to the Partnership for Peace is domestic politics, although there are some obvious concerns in the foreign policy, Russian foreign policy.

We have a Moscow office, the Heritage Foundation, and our Moscow Office Director was previously the Deputy Director of their, basically, the Russian version of RAND Corporation, a federally funded think tank, very knowledgeable about national security issues in Russia, who ascribed 99 percent of the Partnership for Peace debate to domestic politics. I think that might be high, but the point I think is clear.

Lukin, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, likened the Partnership for Peace to being raped, you either accept it or you fight back, but either way you are going to be raped. I mean, it's a horrible analogy but, nonetheless, I think it's something that we can all understand anyway.

Subsequent to the initial announcement, Yeltsin made similar commitments to wanting to join the partnership. In early April, he acknowledged that they would eventually sign the partnership agreement and then came the bombing, the NATO bombing threat on the Serbs, which Yeltsin claimed he was not consulted prior to, and subsequently withdrew his interest in participating in the Partnership for Peace. So, it's been very much an on again, off again process. I think reflecting sort of an internal battle between—without wanting to make it sound too Manichean, an internal battle between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the one hand, and the Duma, representing sort of the anti-Yeltsin dynamic on the other hand. How this plays itself out, I think remains to be seen.

Most recently, they have said that they will sign the document by May 18th. But, within a day or two of Grachev making that remark, another—a government spokesman said, well, let's not say May, maybe June. So, who knows where this is going.

Let me just make a quick contrast, because if you look at the other countries to whom this partnership has been offered, the Polish government, for example, has made a very aggressive response to the Partnership for Peace, has offered the use of some base facilities in Poland to NATO for training, they've offered the use of designated battalions to NATO for joint exercise participation. They have done what I think all the Central and Eastern European countries should do, which is come back at NATO with a very high offer, and force NATO to scale back.

If NATO is interested in this Partnership for Peace, and, indeed, expanding NATO, the first step will be aggressive participation in any kind of joint exercises. There's a number of things that have to happen before NATO is ready to accept these countries as members, without being a burden on the Alliance.

And, Poland I think has responded quite well. The Czech Republic as well, to a lesser extent, the Poles just have been the most proactive. So, there is, that's sort of the ying and the yang of this thing, the Russians are being very belligerent about whether or not they are even going to participate, on the other hand, the Poles have offered up battalions, they've offered up bases, they are going to—they have begun to modify base facilities to allow the use of those bases by NATO aircraft and ships, so they are definitely engaged.

The Russians, for their part, have said, look, we may or may not participate in the partnership, but, really, the only thing we're interested in, we're interested in a couple of areas, political consultation, they want a seat at the table, they want to be involved in what NATO is doing in Europe, at least from a consultative standpoint. And, I've discussed this with some other folks in this room, this is something they never would have gotten during the Cold War, never could have gotten, the ability to consult with NATO on European security, and I think they see this as something that they are very close to.

They, essentially, imposed themselves on the Balkan crisis, to the degree that they are now involved in the Balkans to a greater extent than they were when Marshall Tito was alive, and when the Soviet Union existed. So, they now have a seat at the table de facto, so they want political consultations.

They also want mil to mil contacts. Ambassador Wise mentioned the Post article today, military to military contacts is something that the Russians want very much, particularly, with the United States, so we will see more of that. We will see more of NATO to Russia military to military contacts.

One of the aspects of the Partnership for Peace is that it permits the presence of a planning cell right in Mons at the SHAPE Headquarters, and I suspect the Russians, if they sign up, will jump on that one. The Russians tried very hard to get themselves on a very low track agreement to get themselves some staff positions at SACLANT, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic in Norfolk. That was denied by General Powell at the time, primarily because we didn't have something like the Partnership for Peace within which to structure this. Now that we do, I suspect we'll see that kind of stuff. The Russians are very interested in that.

They are also interested, or at least they claim to be, in joint exercises. Now, I think what they are really interested in is joint exercises with the United States, and if the only way to do that is through joint exercises with NATO, then so be it, but, frankly, the United States doesn't operate that well with NATO, and that's not something that they are too terribly keen on. They want joint exercises with the U.S., it gives them a credibility and it gives them a cachet that just being another member of the Partnership for Peace does not give them.

And, in these comments about whether or not they are going to participate, that has been a constant subtheme. We are not just—one comment by Grachev was, "Look, we don't want to be on the same equivalence as Albania in the Partnership for Peace," which is, essentially, what the Partnership for Peace is: self-selecting, countries that wish to participate will participate to the degree to which they wish to participate. Russia wants to be a priori identified as a special country, not through its own self-selection process, but because NATO says it is special. I think that would be a mistake, and I think NATO—that is not likely to be offered by NATO.

But, that doesn't mean that NATO then necessarily—that doesn't necessarily follow then that NATO should not recognize that Russia is, indeed, a special case, and it should be NATO trying to reach out to Russia for these kinds of activities, without identifying as much that the Partnership for Peace doesn't exist, because we sold this and it took too much to sell it to the Central and Eastern European countries, and if we now undermine that by saying, oh, by the way, Russia is different, it, obviously, would have no meaning to the Central and Eastern European countries. They are reluctant to participate in this unless it's seen as a first step to ultimate NATO membership.

So, as I said, the PFP needs to continue to push, and it has to be seen as a next step or a first step to NATO expansion, or the countries that have thus far willingly signed up will lose interest, and they will look for other ways to participate in European security.

There are some, I think, non-connected warning signs that a window of opportunity is being missed, a window of opportunity to reestablish NATO as the premier collective security element in Europe, to keep the U.S. engaged in NATO, and the only way I think

to do that is to expand it and the Partnership for Peace is a good way to start doing that, with the Central and Eastern European countries.

Some non-connected warning signs that the opportunity—we may be losing our opportunity, the CFE Treaty is now being challenged by the Russians in Vienna because they would like to relax some of the limitations on the regions in the south that are referred to in the treaty as the flanks regions. They would like to put troops into the Caucasus', because of the border conflicts down there. That's a violation of the CFE Treaty, right now they are taking a low-track approach to it by using the CFE negotiating mechanisms to challenge it. But, this, I think, should be seen as something of a warning sign simply because the CFE Treaty is a fundamental pillar of post-Cold War European security. Without the CFE Treaty, we have a very, very different security environment in Europe. And, if that is somehow undermined by Russian—whether they are legitimate concerns or not, if it is somehow undermined I think, really, all bets are off. Without CFE, NATO's role in Europe becomes a very different role than I think what NATO hopes it to be, which is to be the premier collective security arrangement.

Another, perhaps, disturbing, but certainly something that needs to be looked at, the Germans. The Germans are a very important ally in Europe, or in NATO, it goes without saying, but the Germans are frustrated by the slow pace of what's happening in NATO. And, what they will start to do, and they've already done so, is to reach out independently to the Central and Eastern European countries for joint exercises and certainly short of alliances, but very close security participation, joint participation.

We fought very hard to see that Germany, unified Germany, remained a member of NATO, and to see NATO somehow peel—or Germany somehow peeled away or delinked from NATO, because it was trying to move faster with the Central European security structures than NATO is interested in doing, I think would be a big mistake. So, NATO ought to pace itself at the pace that Germany is comfortable with, and that will be a fast pace, and it will lead to NATO expansion.

Now, what does this mean for Russia? Russia need not be a member of NATO to feel that it is part of the European security environment. Indeed, if Russia were to become a member of NATO, and many people have suggested as much, and it's not a terribly bizarre recommendation, what you are looking at if that happens, I believe, is a pax Americana in Europe, an American-based security structure that includes every country of Europe. It's the pax Romana that we saw during the Roman Empire, it becomes an American empire. If that's something the United States wishes, then that's, I think, what would evolve from Russian participation in NATO.

It need not come to that for Russia to feel unthreatened by NATO. I think that NATO expansion can take place, and, indeed, I think it should take place if the Alliance is to continue in any kind of viable structure.

But, within that NATO expansion context, the partnership and, as I mentioned earlier, the combined joint task forces, is an interesting way to include Russia in the European security. NATO has always been a defensive alliance. NATO members understand that, and, in fact, some of the Central and Eastern European countries are starting to realize that too, because the biggest changes that the Polish are making, for example, to participate in NATO is from offensive mobile air defense systems to defensive air defense systems, stationary, the large NATO-type air defense systems. They are starting to realize that NATO is a stationary alliance.

Russia need not necessarily feel threatened by that if, in fact, we can continue to pull them into this structure through the combined joint task forces, through the Partnership for Peace, and in areas where there truly are—where there is an interest in bringing Russia into consultations it seems, I think, shortsighted not to include the Russians in those consultations. Does that mean the Russians should determine the pace of those consultations? No, I don't think so.

But, to the degree that they are, for example, controlling the Serbs in the Balkans, what kind of settlement can we expect if we don't include Russian participation in consultation? But, they shouldn't be the ones to determine the pace or the direction of those negotiations. That should, I think, continue to be a European—U.S. led European function.

Combined joint task forces may be one way to do that. For example, I suggest that, perhaps, after some kind of negotiated settlement is complete in the Balkans, and we are taking I think a year or two, a negotiated settlement that everybody agrees to, the Bosnians, Serbs, everybody in the Sandzak, Krajina and all the other regions that have been ignored in this recent Muslim/Croat agreement. Once we get to the point where the U.S. has to honor the commitment it has made to peacekeeping operations, a combined joint task force would make perfect sense.

The Euro corps, the rapid reaction corps within NATO, that includes mostly British, and German and French troops, with the U.S., perhaps, providing logistic support, communication support, air cover if necessary, there's some creative and innovative ways that it can be done where it's still a NATO structure but the U.S. isn't involved. And, as I said, that is, indeed, what the combined joint task force was designed to do.

And, to the degree that we can bring Russia along in that kind of operation, and there was a great piece in today's New York Times, you may have seen it, by Flora Lewis, that's an interesting proposal that she's making in that, which is to—she's suggesting other ways to bring the Russians into Western structures without letting them into NATO, for example, maybe letting them into the G7, as a quid pro quo for them to allow NATO expansion without seeing it as a threatening element. It's an interesting idea. I don't—I'm suggesting that it's just that, interesting.

But, there are ways we can do this without, (A) bringing Russia into NATO, which may just be too unworkable; but, (B) expanding NATO without threatening Russia, without Russia seeing it as threatening.

But, first and foremost, and I think I'll close on this, first and foremost, if NATO expansion is in the U.S. interest, and I believe it is because it's the only way I think NATO will remain a viable functioning alliance within Europe, and if the U.S. is to remain engaged in Europe it has to be through NATO, so if NATO is to remain viable it has to expand, I believe.

If that's our priority, we do have to figure out some way to accommodate what will be seen in Russia as a threatening gesture. That doesn't mean we should not do it, but we should be aware of the reality that it will be seen as threatening, and there are other ways to prove to Russia that it is not, indeed, a threatening—it need not be a threatening aspect.

There's a couple of quick recommendations I can make to do that. One might be, for example, at next year's NATO Annual Review Conference, turn that into a PFP, a Partnership for Peace, timetable, by which those countries who are already participating in

the partnership, and who NATO wishes to invite to become members, we can lay down the timetable for that to happen and the criteria for that to happen. That was avoided this year, and it was avoided for good reason, because nobody was ready for that, not the U.S., not NATO, and certainly not the Central and Eastern European countries, and I'm talking primarily about Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, Slovakia.

But, if we lay out a timetable next year that projects into the next couple of years beyond that, what needs to be done for these countries to become NATO members, it's done on a rigorous timetable at NATO's choosing, and it isn't something seen that Russia has veto power, because it's done by NATO within the Partnership for Peace context. By then, Russia may or may not be a member of the Partnership for Peace.

I've already mentioned the combined joint task force advising, another possible way to keep NATO viable within the European context without necessarily dragging the United States into a conflict where we've been reluctant to go.

And, first and foremost to any of this, though, the support for the Eastern European countries that do wish to participate has to be forthcoming, whether it come from NATO, whether U.S. leverage, it has to be forthcoming. It's going to cost a little bit of money, and there's a lot of money, such as Nunn-Lugar funds, that are being used right now solely for the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Russia that might be able to be used in an innovative way to finance this kind of joint training and participation that could lead to NATO expansion.

So, as I said, mostly descriptive discussion of what the state of play is with the PFP right now, I don't think anybody knows what's going to happen with Russia. They have been vacillating, but that vacillation ought not to determine the timetable for what NATO does in its own interest.

And, with that, I'll turn it over to Doctor Petersen, and I think he'll go into Russia more.

Ambassador **Wise**. Thank you very much.

Yes, I think that is what Petersen has indicated. Thank you, Mr. DiRita, for your views, I found them very definitive and I think you'll probably stir some discussion.

Mr. **DiRita**. Good.

Ambassador **Wise**. Doctor Petersen.

Doctor **Petersen**. Thank you.

You know, we are always surprised. Warnings are regularly ignored, and rarely mentioned after the fact, because they raise questions subsequently about the competence of those who failed to adequately forecast emerging events. I would cite as an example this headline that says, "Soviet Empire Will Fall," it came out in a March 1990 issue of the Washington Times. This was based on a study that I did, and I can point out to those of you who may be naive that no good deed goes unpunished.

The Potomac Foundation offered me the opportunity to depart what I considered to be a constipated government, understanding that there were dynamic changes ahead with the demise of the Soviet Union. I felt that it was absolutely imperative that we get out to the 14 non-Russian Republics, and find out who the policy elites out there on security issues would be. When I say security I mean not just military security, but economic security, sociocultural security and environmental security. I feel that all four of these aspects of security are interrelated, and cannot be separated. I wanted to find out who the policy elites would be, what they thought, and why they thought what they thought.

Unfortunately, to my knowledge, I'm still the only person that has been to all 15 Republics, if one includes the Federation. The U.S. Government, and the West in general, continue to act like the surgeon who does not talk to his patient before he begins the surgery, and therein lies the problem.

At the Potomac Foundation, we produced four regional studies. Conducting over 500 interviews led us to conclude that, not only did we not understand the nature of the Soviet Union, but we didn't understand the nature of Russia itself. This has led us to begin a series of regional studies inside the Russian Federation itself. We have already been to Kaliningrad and the Volga region, concentrating on Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, and Chuvacshia.

Now, this leads me to the comments I'd like to make with regard to the Partnership for Peace, and I titled my little piece of ten points, "Partnership for Peace in the Context of a Paradigm Shift on What Russia Is and Who Russians Are." First, my view of what we generally believe Russia thinks about the Partnership for Peace Program is largely shaped by what is said in the two imperial cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. And, in case Washington hasn't yet got the message, the December, 1993 elections in the Russian Federation demonstrated that the elites of Moscow are as equally uninformed about what Russian citizens think as is the West in general.

Second, the West will never be capable of dealing effectively with Russia unless it rejects a paradigm accepting Russia as a nation and Russians as an ethnicity. In fact, Russia is nothing but imperial Muscovy grew large, and Russians nothing but the name given to subjects of the feudal state after its 1552 defeat of the Kazan Khanate.

Third, it is a myth that 85 percent of the residents of the territory of the Russian Federation are so-called eastern Slavs. In fact, this figure represents the percentage of "passport" Russians, that is, not only eastern Slavs, but also the many "Russians" by convenience for privilege. My guess is that the latter may number somewhere between 20 and 30 percent.

Fourth, the "nationalist" voices we hear in the West are largely the voices of those bemoaning the loss of "privileges." The essence of their argument is that "if they won't respect us, at least they used to fear us!" And, you will hear this repeated frequently by Russians. The Russian nationalist is a bully—the old Bolshevik woman who throughout her life informed on her neighbors with the confidence that her "loyalty" would be rewarded with a secure if not comfortable retirement; the imperial Tsarist and Soviet colonist who moved onto an indigenous people's land to displace them and live in their home which the colonist now insists is their "human right" to retain; or the Soviet army officer who threatens recently independent people with violence if they fail to provide for his comfortable retirement with social benefits not available to the indigenous people—and these so-called nationalists greatly resent being labeled what they are, bullies.

Fifth, even the so-called "pro-Western" figures in Moscow quake before the Russian bully. For example, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has written in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs that "Russian foreign policy inevitably has to be of an independent and assertive nature," adding, for good measure, that "if Russian democrats fail to achieve it, they will be swept away by a wave of aggressive nationalism." In truth, the people outside of Moscow simply want to join the civilized world. While they do not yet understand what is to be done, they reject violence.

Sixth, Moscow simply doesn't get it, and won't get it until the West stops subsidizing Moscow's bullying behavior. As soon as the recent World Bank loans were approved, Moscow abandoned its anti-inflationary policy and is attempting to use the money to finance the resubjugation of Belarus to imperial Moscow. Moscow even taxes oil industry equipment purchases funded by both the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In effect, Moscow is holding a gun to its own head and threatening to commit suicide if we don't continue to subsidize its self-destructive behavior. While the West cannot save Russia, it can stop assisting Moscow in the destruction of Russia.

Seventh, to help Russia survive, we must reject the myths generated by Moscow. The Russian Federation is not a nation-state, but rather a multi-ethnic empire. Contrary to the propaganda coming from the Moscow media, there is little anti-Slavic feeling in the ethnic republics and most Russian-speakers support greater autonomy from Moscow. Even if given the opportunity to depart the Federation, almost all the Russian-speaking regions and ethnic republics would choose to remain in a real Federal Russian state—this includes the ethnic republics like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Yet Moscow continues to expend its meager resources attempting to maintain its imperial system—substituting the security services for the armed forces and its Western-subsidized economic power for violence wherever possible because of Western embarrassment at having to watch old friends like Shevardnadze hounded by the vengeful Soviet officer corps. This policy, however, will lead to the destruction of Russia because peoples will not agree to a colonial relationship in the 21st century and the restoration of old economic relations will fail since it was the old economic model that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the first place.

Eighth, many outside of Moscow have already come to perceive Moscow as not being part of the solution to their joining European political culture and the global economy. But as increasing numbers of people outside of Moscow come to see Moscow as part of the problem, the regions and republics will seek an independent path to their objectives. The simple truth is that Moscow no longer has the instruments necessary to maintain the empire by force. The generals and admirals may beat their respective chests, but military garrisons are already becoming instruments of the local governments. If Russia is to survive, it will only be on the basis of agreement to work together, not the threat of violence.

Ninth, we must accept the end of the Third Rome if we are to help Russia survive and, for Moscow to avoid once again becoming Muscovy, it must agree to become the kind of center the regions and republics think they require. This might mean that the center's relationship with the regions and republics will vary, at least initially. Furthermore, those that wish to depart the federation, like Daghestan, for example, must be allowed to do so. While an imperial system can be maintained from the center only at the price of the continuing impoverishment of the peoples of Russia, a democratic and prosperous Russia can only be obtained by the consensus created at the regional and republic level of government. The senior officers and politician of Moscow may not like the message, but they know not their own people and their worst enemy is their own media that is misinforming them.

Tenth, whatever Russian state is to emerge from the process of constructing democracy "from below" it will take time—perhaps a decade or more once the constructive process has begun, which it has not. This is the only Russian state that has a future, and it will not be a state that separates itself from the mainstream of human development. And since NATO's real contribution to European peace and security has been its ability

to preserve the peace between its own members—no more wars between Germany and France, and the prevention of Greece from provoking Turkey into eliminating it from the modern political map of Europe—the new Russia may find a useful place with NATO. But the old imperial Russia has nothing useful to say about NATO.

And, I hope that has been provocative enough that we may have an interesting discussion.

Mr. DiRita. He said I was definitive.

Ambassador Wise. Well, thank you for throwing out a few ideas that I think we can chew and mull over. I think we have a good set of ideas on both sides.

I'm going to exercise the prerogative of the Chair and ask one question first, and then I'll turn it over to the floor. I ask others that when they ask a question they come to the microphone up there and identify themselves before asking the question.

I'd like to go to our Partnership for Peace question, and ask what are the requirements for entry into the Partnership for Peace, and do they include such things as a democratic system for a country, or does it have any relationship to their human rights record, or are they strictly military criteria? That's the first part. And, the second part is, and maybe this is naive because maybe there are no specified requirements for entry into NATO, but if there are what are the differences? I don't know whether that might be better for—

Mr. DiRita. I'll start and then—as far as the Partnership, there is no specific criteria identified, other than you are a member of the CSCE, or the NACC. Those are the two organizations which were offered blanket invitations to participate.

The work plan for the Framework document of the Partnership for Peace identifies a few of those things that I mentioned as the areas where the Partnership wishes to work, budget transparency, so these aren't criteria for partnership but they are considered important elements of working within the Partnership. The transparency of defense budgets, democratic control of defense forces, joint training operations, and some degree of standardization with NATO military, so there's a little bit of political, a little bit of military criteria involved, but not identified as preconditions for membership, for Partnership for Peace membership.

Now, what these, I suspect, will develop into, and they should, are criteria for NATO membership. NATO membership, the NATO Treaty allows for the members of NATO to agree together by consensus on any future membership, so that's the only specific criteria that's in the NATO Treaty for future membership.

These, I think, will develop into criteria. In other words, a country will have to prove that it has defense budget transparency, that it, indeed, has a civilian defense minister, that it is somehow standardized with NATO operating procedures, but that's what I think we need to start doing, is identifying those specific criteria.

The Partnership for Peace is not NATO membership. It is just the first step. And, if there is going to be additional membership, there will have to be specific criteria and a timetable.

Ambassador Wise. Do you have anything to add?

All right. I'll open it to the floor now for questions. Yes, please.

Ms. Bedonis. I'm Asta Bedonis, nice to see you, Ambassador Wise, and I want to thank the CSCE staff and the Ambassador for holding this hearing.

My question goes first to a partial question and comment to Doctor Petersen, and that is, he spoke of the Russian Federation simply not having the tools by which to reintegrate by force the former Republics of the Soviet Union, but what about the economic measures that were announced, I believe, by the Russian Foreign Ministry in February as a massive plan of \$3 billion worth of subsidies to industrial complexes and various businesses who would allow Russian stockholders into their midst as a new mechanism by which to strengthen ties between the center and the former Republics. I have in mind the recent decision by the Lithuanian government to allow one of its major industrial plants, the Azotas Chemical Plant, to be privatized with 40 percent controlling interest of Gazprom, and then the rest of the shares to be held by 30 employees of the company, one of whom is a former Prime Minister and a staunch communist in his thinking. Is the first application? Do we see it in other republics?

Doctor **Petersen**. I would, first of all, want to clarify that not only does the Russian Federation not have the military instruments by which to force the 14 non-Russian Republics of the former Soviet Union back into a union, it doesn't even have the instruments to keep its own oblasts and former autonomous republics within the Federation.

By my estimate, they have about five deployable divisions, and three of those are largely tied up watching each other in Moscow. A fourth one is getting its fanny kicked in Tadjikistan, which is why the Russians are so anxious to get out.

The Moscow policy is to substitute economic mechanisms by which to restore this great Eurasian empire. And, all this will do is further bankrupt Russia and help ensure the destruction of the Russian Federation itself. I believe that the West is an accomplice of Moscow in destroying Russia, because we help finance it. We provide the money with which Moscow can attempt to restore the empire. Essentially, there would be no money available to bring Belarus back into the empire exchanging the Belarus ruble at a one-to-one rate if it weren't for the recent World Bank loan. This Moscow policy is insanity, and we're a part of this insanity.

The Russian Federation cannot afford to continue to subsidize its own industries, let alone absorb the responsibility for Belarus. This is crazy. I don't understand what we think we are doing. It's a terrible burden, and it will fail, and it will fail because Russia wants to go, essentially, back to the old economic relationships, and that's what brought the Soviet Union down. It wasn't us, it was their own insatiable hunger for imperialism supported by a military-industrial sector that was a bottomless pit. This is the very industrial sector that demands the subsidies today, and is threatening warning strikes right now for continuing subsidies. For what? They don't produce anything useful and nothing anyone wants to buy.

In terms of the psychology behind the strategy, nothing has changed. It means disaster for Russia.

Mr. **DiRita**. If I can just follow up on that. I think you are actually right on what the Russian priorities are, the central government priorities, to sort of reestablish the imperial Russia within the boundaries of the former Soviet Union. For right or wrong, I think that's a big mistake too, I agree with you.

But that is, I think, the difference what we are seeing now in Russia, I believe, and how this applies directly to European security is, I think that this is an opportunity for NATO simply because Russian reconstitution I don't think includes reconstituting the

Soviet Empire into Central and Eastern Europe that we saw during the Cold War. Their focus tends to be on reconstituting what has traditionally been the Russian Empire within the borders of the former Republics of the Soviet Union. And, that's why I think we have an opportunity, despite the bluster from Moscow about NATO expansion, I really doubt that they could, if they are not able to maintain some degree of order in Tadjikistan, it is very unlikely that they can do anything about NATO bringing Poland into the Alliance, or the Czech Republic, indeed.

So, this is why I think we've got a good opportunity, as long as the really fervent nationalists, who are tapping into this sentiment that Doctor Petersen has referred to, are not yet in power. And, the longer we wait, I think the less opportunity we will have to do this in a reasonably systematic fashion, and it will become crisis management at the time when we really need to bring, if, in fact, an expansionist Russia reemerges, at the time we need to bring additional countries into NATO it will be much more difficult.

And, to the degree that Russia is not interested in reconstituting the Soviet Empire in Central and Eastern Europe, we should probably take advantage of that.

Ambassador Wise. Yes, please.

Mr. Lukich. My name is Joe Lukich, and I'm the Executive Director of the U.S. Baltic Foundation. And, my question is to Doctor Petersen concerning the situation on both flanks, former flanks of NATO. Before the ink was even dry on the CFE Treaty, the Russians were already in violation, or the U.S. had given away a vital bargaining chip in my estimation, which allowed them to use the ploy of coastal defense artillery to permit them to have self-propelled artillery, tanks, modern jet aircraft, et cetera, located in the Baltic region, specifically, the Baltic States.

At that same time, the Russian negotiators were heavily pressuring the south flank, specifically, Turkey, concerning the application of CFE restrictions on similar equipment, tanks, artillery, self-propelled artillery, modern jet aircraft, and so forth, and the United States and NATO just bargained it away. I guess we just waved it away and it, I guess, didn't matter a whole lot, because the Soviet Union imploded anyway. However, however, what bothers me is it appears a great deal of that equipment is now, and forces, are now relocated to Kaliningrad, beyond Kaliningrad, and as we know there is still some Russian troop presence in Latvia and Estonia greatly removed, but still present there.

I would ask, and as recently as today's Washington Post, I see the Russians again are complaining of the CFE Treaty restrictions down in Turkey, I would just ask your comments on that, Phil. I'd appreciate what you have to say about these two obvious breaches in the CFE Treaty.

Doctor Petersen. Well, in my view it comes back to the fact that we never have all the data whenever we examine anything. You know that from your experience in the intelligence community. It's like putting together a puzzle where you've only got 20 percent of the pieces.

If you think you are trying to build the Eiffel Tower in your picture, that might lead you to assemble things in a certain way. But, if your assumption is that you are looking at a picture, an incomplete picture of an oil field, then what you might see is oil derricks, and that could lead you to radically different conclusions. I mean, you could be in Saudi Arabia as opposed to Paris.

I believe the more or less dominant paradigm, that we are dealing with a traditional nation state, leads us to draw conclusions which will constantly mislead us.

If we adopt a paradigm of the Vice-Chairman of the Businessmen's Association of Kaliningrad we come to different conclusions. He argues that the West went through a 1,000-year process after the fall of the Roman Empire of, first, self-identification, who am I, and accommodation, how do I get along with my neighbors. Through that 1,000 year process we had hundreds of wars and we butchered millions of people.

In Russia, the subject peoples of the "Third Rome" were denied the opportunity to go through this process, and so now at the end of the 20th century they are only beginning this process. It is an inevitable human process, and they're going to go through it.

But, at the same time, we've still got the contemporary equivalent of the commanders of former Roman legions that have been withdrawn from Britain, who dream of restoration of the Empire.

The psychology is such that it is impossible for them to think in what we would consider a conventional modern way. To them, in that sense they don't know what a lie is, or what the truth is. The truth is whatever serves the interest of the Empire.

And, therefore, this insanity that you talk about in the Baltic States, where they turned some of these motorized rifle divisions into anti-landing divisions as a way of avoiding certain treaty obligations, is similar to this insanity of when the Soviet Union was collapsing, taking rolling stock out of service to transport armored vehicles to the other side of the Urals so they didn't have to destroy it under terms of the CFE treaty. Here, the country was collapsing and they were still trying to save armor, which they had no capability to preserve once it got on the other side of the Urals, but they were using the last meager resources available to help Gorbachev keep the Soviet Union survive to drag all this equipment to the other side of the Urals. It's insanity, unless you adopt the Imperial paradigm. If you understand the world from that perspective, then a lot of things which they do makes much more sense.

I would argue that from being able or taking the opportunity we have now to get out from Moscow, to get out into the regions and talk to people, the situation in the East is not as we are told, either by our own media, our own State Department, some of whom come from the media. Nor are my observations reflected in the Moscow media, which does a total disservice to their own government by misinforming them of the truth.

I've had conversations with some of the Moscow reporters, asking them why they say these things they know are not true? And, they would respond that is because it advances their career, because this is what people want to hear in Moscow.

Unfortunately, that's all too frequently a problem here in Washington as well.

Anyway, I hope I answered your question.

Ambassador **Wise**. Do you have anything you wanted to add?

Mr. **DiRita**. No.

Ambassador **Wise**. OK.

Yes, in the front here.

Mr. **Saks**. I'm Mike Saks with the U.S. Information Agency. I just have a basic question, but it does—I just need to know an answer.

We know that NATO is set up as a defensive military organization. Now, the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union are not a threat anymore, and they want to join, so what is NATO defending against? What is NATO deciding is its role? Is it still defensive, and what's it going to do?

Mr. DiRita. I know Phil will have something to say on this, but let me just start, if I may, and that is, as he mentioned in his presentation, NATO has always traditionally had two functions. Well, I guess there were always three historic functions of NATO, and the words of the second Secretary General of NATO is, "Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." And, that's sort of what NATO did during the Cold War, it kept the Germans and the French from each other, it kept peace in Europe and Western Europe, and it was a defensive alliance against what was perceived to be an offensive Soviet threat, which it certainly was. And, it kept the United States remaining engaged in Europe.

So, I still think that there's a role for at least two of three of those function, the United States, I think, for the time being anyway, should probably remain engaged militarily and politically in Europe. The only viable way to do that is through NATO.

CSCE is an important body, but it does very different things from what NATO does. I don't think it needs to be seen as competitive in any sense. It also will keep, it's the best way for the Europeans to have some kind of security and defense identity that I mentioned, and if NATO can respond to the European desire to have something slightly more independent, well, that's something we should encourage. If they are prepared to have some kind of security and defense identity that doesn't include us, but that will preclude the emergence of another single power in Europe, well then, we should—I don't see why that's bad for us. And, if it can be done through the NATO structure, which the PFP, and which the combined joint task forces, tries to do, gives them, essentially, they can use all of NATO's toys, but the U.S. doesn't have to be there in the playground, that's—we should encourage that. Why not?

And, additionally, I think we expand NATO for those same reasons. We want to keep the Poles and the Czechs traditionally Western-oriented countries in the Western fold, and it's kind of money in the bank. I mean, should some emergent Russian threat develop, we haven't disbanded the most effective security structure that we have created within Europe, at least in this century.

So, I still see a role for NATO.

Doctor Petersen. I brought a couple of copies of some of the studies that have been done by Joe Kuns at the Potomac Foundation, on the PFP as seen from the perspective of Poland and Hungary. In my discussions with Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs, they have argued that NATO did not deter the Russians, the United States deterred the Russians with its powerful nuclear forces. What really NATO did, they argue, was that it kept NATO members from fighting with each other long enough so they could learn to live with each other.

Ambassador Wise. Yes, in back.

Ms. Pereyma. Marta Pereyma, from U.S.A.A. I have a question for Mr. DiRita. You spent some time talking about the aggressive involvement, engagement of Poland in PFP. Now, on the other hand, there are many other new partners that have come in from the former Soviet Union. What are they bringing in? What can they offer? What more could be done to encourage more, let's say, some country such as Ukraine?

Mr. DiRita. Yes. Ukraine is a very important, which I never mentioned once in my presentation, at the time the PFP was being negotiated and agreed, Ukraine had still, was still in violation of the protocol to the START Treaty that required them to give up

their nuclear weapons. So, I think Ukraine missed out on a great opportunity to participate in a very high visibility NATO function.

But, subsequently, they have honored that agreement, and Ukraine, I think, in a partnership sense, not necessarily as a future member of NATO, but certainly in a partnership sense, can contribute much the same way the Poles are, with joint exercise obligations. There's no reason why, for example, the Ukrainians can't designate individual units to participate with NATO for training, for professionalism, for some degree of standardization of equipment, the same way the Poles are. It's almost costless to them, why not, as well as providing facilities for NATO.

If they have unique, for example, chemical weapons training facilities, which they do, why not? That's what the Czech's, as a matter of fact, are offering, chemical weapons training facilities. That's great, the Czechs were specialists within the Warsaw Pact for chemical weapons training. So, if they are going to provide that kind of training to NATO on Ukrainian soil, why not? I mean, that's something that they can do, those facilities are already in operation anyway, it keeps the Ukrainian folks trained, trained up to a certain extent, but it doesn't necessarily have to follow then that they will become members of NATO. That's the beauty of the PFP, is that it's a very flexible structure.

From the Eastern and Central European perspective, that flexibility is bad, because they want in. But, from the American perspective, in particular, it allows us to sort of control the pace of who participates and to what extent.

Ms. **Pereyma**. If I can follow up.

Mr. **DiRita**. Sure.

Ms. **Pereyma**. So, the economic situation does not distract from a full participation in this.

Mr. **DiRita**. It doesn't have to. I mean, there's still—for example, they are still paying their armed forces to do what? I mean, they are doing it, they are paying their armed forces to keep them under control. at least the Ukrainian government is trying to pay the armed forces.

So, I mean, this does not have to be an expensive process.

Another aspect that the Poles and the Czechs are doing, for example, is sending a staff officer to Belgium to see how NATO works, sort of get in and see what—you know, there's this Partnership for Peace planning cell, what is the NATO—I mean, NATO is a confusing thing, I mean American officers go there for the same reason. How the heck does NATO work?

And, yeah, that's a little bit expensive, because you are talking about living in Brussels versus living in Kiev, but it's done at the margin. I mean, the cost—the anticipate cost, or the estimated cost for full participation in the PFP by NATO is between—the estimates vary pretty widely, but the highest estimate I've seen is \$30 million a year, that's by 16 countries, so we are talking about a couple million dollars a year per country to support these kinds of operations.

And, when you are talking about \$400 million a year that we are giving to the Russians every year, just to dismantle railroad cars that used to carry nuclear weapons, that's a pretty prudent investment

Ambassador **Wise**. Yes, the lady in the back.

Ms. **Kelly**. My name is Laura Li Kelly, I'm with Representative Elizabeth Furse. Most of my comments are directed toward you, Doctor Petersen.

The ERBD and the World Bank are criticized all over the place on every continent for a lot of their lending policies, and you said that we're subsidizing the destruction of Russia. And, the way I would look at it, the issue is not whether to give support or not, but to whom does the support go and how is it distributed?

It's my understanding that in many former communist countries there is a civil infrastructure that has evolved through the efforts of natives in those areas that's helped by Western nongovernmental organizations. And, I've also heard that those efforts have been very successful in pluralizing policy and creating or further strengthening the civil infrastructure there.

I was wondering how you see NATO policy might encourage and prop up those participatory structures, and an example I would give of that is the Conflict Prevention Center at the CSCE. Do you know if NATO is working with them at all to go in there and prevent adversarial relations or violence from occurring in the first place, and how might we get more of the international public sector to support those efforts? And, do either of you see any movement in that direction?

Doctor Petersen. Well, I have never been a specialist on NATO, so I'll leave that to my colleague.

I would argue that there is a great deal of work to be done in the East, and that international loans could prove very useful if we are not, essentially, providing a mechanism by which the Central government ministries can continue to avoid centralization.

I also believe that we definitely need to regionalize our policy. The American Director of the bank, Bill Curran, was arguing in January 1993 that the bank was not doing enough regionally.

I also feel that the more loans are tied to a mechanism to soak up the rubles that are circulating in the regions, the greater effect the loans will have.

For example, requiring matching fund investment, is a tool that would help soak up rubles to produce inflationary pressures. Essentially, what is happening now is that the money goes to Moscow and is funneled out into Swiss bank accounts, and does nothing to soak up the excess rubles circulating. There's plenty of money in Russia to finance economic development, if it could be engaged in ways that would help build infrastructure, rather than lining the pockets of speculators and gangsters.

We could also help by providing all kinds of police assistance to local law enforcement, that is to the oblast or the republic level interior ministries, because organized crime is running rampant, even within these ministries themselves. It's impossible to have a democracy in such an environment.

So, I don't want to come across as being against Western financial assistance, but I think we've wasted the money and helped undermine Russia as a functioning state.

Mr. DiRita. Just to follow up quickly on the NATO/CPC, Conflict Prevention Center. The ties between NATO and CSCE are more de facto. I mean, when I was in Vienna as a CSCE delegate, I would change hats and go to Brussels for NATO meetings to represent the joint staff at NATO. But, I mean, obviously, I wasn't changing any sort of my perspective, so I go back to Vienna with sort of what are we doing at NATO?

And, in fact, in Vienna there's a NATO caucus, that decisions are sort of cooked ahead of time, before NATO members intervene in Vienna.

So, I don't know that there's a formal relationship that needs to be developed beyond, and that's the same for all NATO members in Vienna. I mean, you see a lot of the same

faces. And, I think that's good. I mean, NATO is a very different structure than CSCE. They both serve a very useful purpose. We don't need to have two CSCE's, which is what a NATO at large would become if everybody became a member. It would be CSCE with a hunting license, which we don't—I mean, that's the last thing we want, you know, CSCE with a lot of guns.

So, NATO serves a very useful purpose, an expanded NATO, if it's done smart, systematically, and if the right countries are included, will serve a useful purpose. The CSCE, the confidence building measures are very important that the CSCE has negotiated. The treaties, the CFE Treaty, is a CSCE product. So, they serve useful purposes, and I don't think there's need for too much more overlap.

Ambassador Wise is certainly welcome to disagree with that, but, I mean, I think for the most part these two organizations work as well as you can expect two big bureaucracies to work.

Ambassador **Wise**. No, I don't disagree at all. As a matter of fact, I was pleased to hear you say earlier that they work in a complementary fashion, and one is not the enemy of the other.

Mr. **DiRita**. Not at all.

Ambassador **Wise**. Because that used to be popular not too long ago in government.

Well, I saw a question on this side, maybe it was you, because you moved over, so I'll call on you.

Mr. **Drummond**. Hello, my name is Daniel Drummond, I'm from Karris & Pickett staff. Historically, Russia has had an allegiance with the Serbian people, and NATO has trouble getting out Serbian aggression. It has also taken some military action recently.

If Russia was to join NATO eventually, and the war in Yugoslavia was to continue, how do you feel Russia would participate, and how do you feel that the Serbians would react?

Mr. **DiRita**. It has some very interesting conjecture. I mean, I think the day that Russia joins NATO is very far off, if at all. I don't rule it out, but I don't see it as anywhere near the next step of where NATO is evolving.

I think there's a tendency to see the Balkan crisis, as tragic as it has been, and as really dangerous as it has been, to see the Balkan crisis as somehow a model for how Europe is going, where Europe is going. And, therefore, and why I think that's dangerous, therefore, we have to somehow alter our structures to somehow respond to the Balkan crisis.

I tend to agree with Doctor Petersen. I think Balkan-type crises can be avoided if we have an intelligent expansion of NATO, where we bring countries in together and turn them into allies who have historic differences that seem insurmountable. The Greek/Turkish example is just the best example of that. Nobody would ever have predicted they would, 75 years ago, that they would be part of a defensive military alliance, and I think that that's why NATO expansion makes sense if it is done smart.

So, you've pulled together two very interesting threads that are certainly current, but I'm not sure that they will be a pattern by which Europe is going to evolve. Those are two big if's, how the heck we'd respond to something like that, I couldn't begin to tell you.

Doctor **Petersen**. I would just argue that in my opinion you should take a close look at Yugoslavia, because that is exactly what you'll have in Europe if NATO should cease to exist and the U.S. withdraw from Europe.

Mr. DiRita. I just want to say, if there's anything I've said that suggests otherwise than what Phil just said so eloquently, let me retract it, because I agree entirely with that.

Ambassador Wise. You had a question over here? Would you take the microphone, please? Let us know who you are.

Mr. Massi. Yes, my name is Joe Massie, I'm from the Armenian Assembly of America. My question is for Doctor Petersen. You said earlier that the West and that the United States is providing the funds for Russia to, essentially, hang itself, and to destroy Russia.

Well, about a month ago, I sat in on a hearing where Congressman Hamilton, Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, sat there and lambasted members of AID and the State Department saying that Congress has appropriate anywhere between \$2.5 billion and \$3 billion since the collapse of the Soviet Union to the newly independent states, and, yet, only \$284 million has actually been spent, of which only \$141 million has gone to Russia. How do you reconcile that?

Doctor Petersen. The figures you are citing are direct U.S. assistance, and I was talking about the funds that are passed from the U.S. and other Western sources through international lending institutions.

Mr. Lutz. Yes, Michael Lutz. I have a question for Doctor Petersen.

You said that in your conversations with regional leaders that you noticed no tendency to support continuing Moscow, Russian hegemony, over either the rest of the former Soviet Union and a tendency to try to fight off Moscow's attempts to retain control of the ooblasts and regions of the Russian Federation.

If you look at the results of the December, '93 election, in which Zhirinovskiy did well, the communists did well, the agrarians did well. Most of the parties that did well, regardless of the other planks in their platforms, stressed some form of Russian hegemony.

And, I'm wondering why you think that the perception among Russians in general is, tends toward a willingness to let the rest of the former Empire go, one, and, two, even if it's the case as you said, that they don't have objectively the means, the instruments to retain control, they may not understand or believe that. And so, between that possible gulf between objective truth and what they see, there could be a lot of possibilities for instability and blood shed. I wonder if you could address that?

Doctor Petersen. Well, first of all, let me say that I absolutely agree with what you just said. There is a great gap between reality and what is perceived in Moscow. And, in truth, I think that there is still a great capacity on the part of Moscow to generate civil war.

It doesn't take a lot of resources to do that. I think we have a wonderful example in the 'Caucuses', where the Soviet officer corps and Moscow Imperialists have played the Georgians, the Armenians and the Azeris like puppets against each other, to continue Moscow's dominance in the region.

On the other hand, when I was in the Ural region in October and in November, I was warned everywhere that the extremists were going to win the December election, and that the reasons were complex. One is that most of the regions decided not to participate in the election as a way of rejecting the Center. For example, in Tartarstan, the government campaigned against the election, although Tatarstan authorities opened all the polls. If you notice that Moscow, to my knowledge, has still not published the election

results, the reason is because the Constitution probably failed. There weren't enough people voting in enough regions for the Constitution to be implemented. Since the Center, with a Parliament and no Constitution, would really be in trouble, I understand why Moscow has avoided the issue.

If one takes the official figures that were first reported, you still come up with Zhirinovskiy having obtained some 24 percent of the vote. If you consider that the economic situation in the Russian Federation is worse than it was during the Great Depression for Americans, the level of Zhirinovskiy's support is not surprising, given the low level of political culture. With the campaign against implementation of the Yeltsin Constitution because it was written without their participation, Zhirinovskiy supporters gained as a percentage of the vote.

Had the republics been involved in drafting the new Constitution, it would have probably been a confederation rather than a federation, but Moscow should take what it can get today. If the republics and oblasts find they need a stronger center Moscow's authority will be restored, but it has to be something that comes from below, it can't be imposed. That's where Moscow continues to fail. That's what destroyed the Soviet Union, and that's what will, I'm afraid, destroy Russia.

I'll give you a little example of the Russian psychological problem. In Bashkortostan I was interviewing a Bashkir who was telling me a story of a cinematographer friend who came from Moscow and, while on a mountain in Bashkortostan, looked out over the beautiful snow covered birches and said, "My God, isn't Russia beautiful?"

And, the Baskin said, "Excuse me, but this is not Russia, this was Bashkortostan before it was Russia. It's beautiful Bashkortostan, a part of the Russian Federation."

And, of course, the Moscovite was initially indignant, although subsequently came to recognize his attitude as imperialist. It's just part of the psychology of their existence, and it's going to take time to change.

So I believe there are lots of reasons to explain the Zhirinovskiy effect. I wasn't surprised, because I had been warned, and I don't find 24 percent of the vote shocking because had the local governments mobilized their own supporters to vote, Zhirinovskiy would have finished with a far lower percent. The people motivated to vote for Zhirinovskiy all got to the polls and voted. In fact, he probably didn't get even the percentage reported because the evidence now emerging suggest fraud.

Ambassador Wise. We are getting near the end of our time, but are there any further questions? Yes, one more.

Ms. Bedonis. Sorry for asking another question, but thanks for the opportunity.

Is anyone within the Clinton Administration, other than Defense Secretary Perry, talking about the reemergence of Russian hegemonic impulses, warning the Russian government that the United States government does not approve of any resurgence of Russian Imperial behavior? What I'm referring to is the early March statement by Defense Secretary Perry in, was it, Munich, and whether he's followed up any of his comments.

Mr. DiRita. Let me just say quickly, I think that the Partnership for Peace, and the general talk about NATO expansion, the Administration did the right thing for the wrong reasons back in January, which was, we need to go slow on NATO expansion. The reasons that they gave were more or less because we have to worry about—we've got the Russians we've got to deal with, and nobody wants to see them all angered.

The reason I think we need to go slowly on Partnership for Peace is because nobody is ready for an expanded NATO. The U.S. is not ready for it, NATO is not ready for it, nor are the countries we would like to bring in ready for it. And, all that implies financially, the security guarantees, we are not prepared to offer Poland security guarantees, and we shouldn't say we are. That's what Munich was all about, offering guarantees that they couldn't honor.

So, you asked, is anybody in the Administration, I believe that they were motivated by the wrong reasons in the first place, so I have my doubts that they have had some kind of an epiphany since then. I think they are still very concerned about, gee, how is this going to play in Moscow?

Perry has been a sometimes exception to that, recognizing that, look, Moscow has got its own—Moscow is going to do what Moscow wants, and we should do what we want. He has sort of suggested that, we should do what's in our interest. But, he's only suggested that. I know that it has been popular to report that Perry somehow a hardliner, I don't see that. I really don't.

I think he is—I don't think he's as bad as Strobe Talbot in that regard. I mean, if you want me to use the "S" word I will, Strobe Talbot is the worst on this, of course, but I don't think that there has been a sea change in the Administration's position on this in any way.

Doctor Petersen. I agree with everything you have said. I would point out that Strobe Talbot made his first post confirmation speech at a small seminar at the Madison Hotel on the 18th of April, and during that speech he did say the kinds of things that I think that we would like him to say.

Now, only time will tell whether Talbot holds these words very close to his heart.

Ambassador Wise. Well, I think on that note we'll end. I think we've had both heat and light here in our discussion, and overall it has been a good meeting, which I thank our two panelists.

Mr. DiRita. Thank you.

Ambassador Wise. Thank you all for coming.

[Whereupon, the briefing was concluded at 12:04 p.m.]