

**SOVIET VIOLATION OF HELSINKI FINAL ACT:  
INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN**

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**HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
AND THE  
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND  
COOPERATION IN EUROPE  
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

—————  
JULY 22, 1981  
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1981

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## SOVIET VIOLATION OF HELSINKI FINAL ACT: INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

WEDNESDAY, JULY 22, 1981

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,

*Washington, D.C.*

The subcommittee and Commission met at 9:45 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (Chairman of the Commission) presiding.

Mr. FASCELL. In December 1979 the Soviet Army invaded the independent, sovereign nation of Afghanistan in contravention of basic principles of international law. Eighteen months later news reports highlight that the fight for freedom against Soviet intervention still persists in that war-torn country.

In 1975 the Soviet Union, along with 34 other countries including the United States, signed the Helsinki Final Act. The first part of that international accord establishes that the conduct of the participating states should be based on well-known principles of international law. All 10 of these principles provide a basis or guidelines for the conduct of states in the international community.

These high-minded principles include those relating to the rights inherent in the sovereignty of a country, refraining from the threat or use of force, the rights of peoples to self-determination and acceptance of principles of international conduct.

The Soviet invasion and attempted occupation of Afghanistan have struck at the very heart of these Final Act principles. The Soviet invasion has clearly undermined the spirit and intentions of the principles embodied in the Final Act. Most importantly the invasion of this formerly independent state has severely damaged the international climate and has done great harm to East-West relations.

As vice chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Madrid review meeting, I strongly condemned the Soviet invasion together with representatives of nearly all of the Western states and challenged the Soviet Union to account for these egregious violations of the Helsinki Final Act.

I would like to submit for the record a copy of that statement made on November 24, 1980, in Madrid.

[Mr. Fascell's statement at the Madrid review meeting follows:]

U.S. STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN BY HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, VICE CHAIRMAN,  
U.S. DELEGATION

Mr. Chairman, in the last two weeks, we have heard delegation after delegation rise to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion of this formerly independent state has severely damaged the international climate. It has done great harm to East-West relations. It has undermined the confidence on which the building of true security and cooperation depends. It has undercut all of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and negatively affected the atmosphere in which this meeting is taking place.

Almost a year since Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan, the Afghan people are still struggling to free themselves of the reign of violence and oppression which has descended on them, imposed by a foreign army.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan cannot be reconciled with the principles in the Helsinki Final Act, and it has special relevance to this meeting. The general political basis of our concern is well expressed in the Final Act itself. In the introductory language of Basket I, the participating states recognized "the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole." It is obvious that events in Afghanistan cannot be isolated from events in Europe or in the world at large, as the Final Act itself acknowledges. The principles guiding relations among states embodied in the Final Act are as valid and as necessary outside Europe as within. But the Final Act is even more explicit concerning the Declaration of Principles, for the participating states declared their intention to conduct their relations with all other states in the spirit of those principles.

The Declaration of Principles is a virtual catalogue of fundamental tenets of international behavior violated by the Soviet invasion. One could cite the discrepancy between Soviet actions and each of the ten principles of the Final Act. In the interest of brevity, I will confine myself to several principles that were openly flouted:

In Principle One, the participating states pledged to respect each other's sovereign equality as well as the rights inherent in sovereignty. Two of the rights specifically mentioned in this regard are the right to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. The Soviet invasion violates these rights.

Principle Two calls for refraining from the threat or use of force, not only against the participating states, but also in international relations in general. No consideration, the Final Act warns, may be invoked to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this Principle. The Soviet use of force in Afghanistan, from the day of the invasion through this very day, violates this commitment.

Principle Three recognizes the inviolability of frontiers. Here the participating states pledged to refrain from assaulting national frontiers and from seizure or usurpation of other states' territories. When it is recalled how hard the Soviet delegation fought for this Principle in the negotiations leading to the Final Act, the Soviet violation of it in Afghanistan is particularly ironic.

In Principle Four, the participating states agreed to respect the territorial integrity of states. They pledged to refrain from making the territory of other states the object of military occupation. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is a manifest violation of this Principle.

The Eastern States have placed great importance on observance of Principle Six, non-intervention in internal affairs. My country shares the belief in its importance, and would note that what this Principle is meant to forbid is precisely what the Soviet Union has done in Afghanistan: commit armed intervention and coercion against another country.

The participating states reaffirmed the universal significance of respect for, and effective exercise of, equal rights and self-determination of peoples. This is Principle Eight, in which they also declared that all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social, and cultural development. All of these commitments are violated by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

I could equally cite the other four Principles of the Final Act infringed upon in greater or lesser degree by the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. But I think the pattern is clear.

The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan have struck at the very heart of the Final Act Principles I described. I would now like to examine the objective reality, that is, the concrete Soviet actions in that suffering country as they relate to the Principles.

In late December 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was launched. Soviet tanks crossed the Afghan border, along with tens of thousands of Soviet troops. The then-leader of the Afghan Government, Hafizullah Amin, was killed after elite

Soviet troops attacked his headquarters. Other members of his family and leaders of his government were also killed. Babrak Karmal was installed as leader by Soviet force of arms. The first speech of Babrak to Afghanistan was on a tape, broadcast from a radio station inside the Soviet Union. He did not return to Afghanistan until several days after Soviet forces had seized firm control of Kabul.

The Soviet Union has claimed that its troops were invited into Afghanistan by the Afghan Government, pursuant to the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, and Cooperation signed in 1978. Article Four of this Treaty provides that the Soviet Union and Afghanistan shall consult each other and by agreement of the two sides take appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries. Before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, whom did it consult? Whose agreement did it obtain? As one Islamic diplomat put it, it seems odd that Amin would have invited his own executioner into the country. Was the Soviet Army invited by Babrak Karmal, who was not even in Afghanistan? As I have noted, the Babrak Karmal regime is a pure invention of the Soviet Union, a fiction imposed on the Afghan people without their consent. Obviously, Article Four of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty was not invoked in any genuine way.

I suggest it might be more fruitful for the Soviet Union to review Article One of that same treaty, which is more pertinent. In this Article, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan declared their determination to develop cooperation on the basis of equality, respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in each others internal affairs. These are sound Principles, but they were honored in the breach by the Soviet armies.

Nor can any reasonable observer accept the contention that compelling Soviet security concerns caused the invasion. We cannot believe that a small, neutral non-aligned country in any sense threatened the security of the Soviet Union. The argument that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan as a response to intervention from other countries is also patently false. The only external interference in Afghanistan has come from the Soviet Union itself.

During the opening statements to this meeting, we have heard a few efforts to justify the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Of the four delegations which spoke in favor of the Soviet invasion, one referred to the "rightfulness and necessity of Soviet assistance to the Afghan people." In view of the character which that assistance took, the Afghan people may be forgiven for wondering—with friends like this—whether they need any enemies.

Efforts to defend the Soviet invasion are as hollow and unconvincing today as they ever were. The international community has spoken clearly. Just last week, one hundred eleven members of the United Nations General Assembly voted to call for the immediate withdrawal of foreign, that is, Soviet, troops from Afghanistan. This was not the first expression of international opinion on this matter. The Soviet invasion was condemned by 104 nations at the U.N., on January 14 of this year, by the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on January 29 and May 21, by the United Nations Human Rights Commission on February 14, by the Foreign Ministers of the European Community and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on March 7, and by the Interparliamentary Union Council on April 12 and again on September 24. Surely, it is time for the Soviet Union to go beyond transparent attempts to justify past actions and to move toward the obvious solution repeatedly advanced in international forums.

Some would tell us that the situation in Afghanistan is improving, that we need not concern ourselves with it. In point of fact, the opposite is true. Soviet troops have occupied Afghanistan for nearly a year now. The firepower available to them continues to increase and the Soviet troop level in that country, at least 85,000 strong, is as high today as before the so-called partial troop withdrawal of June 1980. Widespread and spontaneous resistance by the Afghan people continues, attesting to the fact that the Soviet presence and the Babrak regime defy the popular will. Despite this massive military force, the Soviet Union is unable to establish control of the countryside. Control of main population centers and transportation routes between them is tenuous at best.

Moreover, to the extent that the Soviet Union has established control, it has denied a proud nation its independence. Babrak was and remains a Soviet puppet. He has acquired no legitimacy or significant following among his people. Every ministry and government office is permeated by Soviet "advisors" who make or approve all decisions.

The Soviet army of occupation has resorted to escalating violence in an effort to quell the Afghan insurgency. Tactics used include bombing of villages, destruction of crops, helicopter gunship attacks on innocent civilians, dropping of anti-personnel mines which maim their civilian victims, not only in border areas, but also in

cultivated fields and villages away from the border. Dissent has been ruthlessly suppressed. As testament to the suffering in Afghanistan, more than one million refugees, nearly ten percent of the Afghan population, have fled their country.

In sum, the situation is one of bloody, brutal repression instigated and perpetuated by the Soviet Union, depriving Afghanistan and its people of their independence and freedom. The Soviet Union has made no movement toward withdrawal. The only solution it has suggested is acceptable neither to the Afghan people nor to neighboring countries. That solution would in effect endorse the illegal military occupation of the country and the Babrak regime.

I return to the preambular language of Basket I of the Final Act. In this section, the participating states stressed the need for each of them to make its contribution to the strengthening of world peace and security. More than any other country at this moment, the Soviet Union has the opportunity and the power to make such a contribution, not in words, but in concrete action in Afghanistan.

Accordingly, the U.S. Delegation and the U.S. Government join many others in calling on the Soviet Union to withdraw promptly from Afghanistan and to allow the brave people of that country to determine their own future. We favor a political settlement which would lead to restoration of a genuinely independent, neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan, with a government acceptable to its people. This can only be accomplished through the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops. We have said that we are prepared to consider transitional arrangements to facilitate Soviet withdrawal and appropriate international guarantees. Such a settlement would take into account the legitimate concerns of the Soviet Union in the security of its border.

The opportunity is there. We urge the Soviet Union to take it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. We are here today to follow through on those accusations levied in Madrid and elsewhere around the world. The hearing today will substantiate that the Soviet Union continues to violate these guiding principles in their attempt to subjugate a free and independent people.

Our witnesses today are primarily from Afghanistan or have spent a considerable amount of time in Afghanistan and are very familiar with the current state of affairs. Some of the testimony today will reflect firsthand knowledge of Soviet actions in Afghanistan.

I would hope that today's proceedings, if anything, will serve notice to the Soviet Union and the world that the U.S. Congress is still very concerned with what is happening in Afghanistan and will continue to highlight these transgressions and support those fighting for their right to be free.

[Mr. Bonker submitted the following statement:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DON BONKER, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In the annals of the last 30 years where nations' inhumanity to other nations are recorded, one would have great difficulty in finding a case as horrible as what the Soviet Union is doing in Afghanistan today.

Since the brutal invasion of that country by Soviet forces on December 24, 1979, over 10 percent of the population of Afghanistan has fled and are refugees in either Pakistan or Iran. There is hardly a single international agreement, treaty, rule of law, custom or civilized behavior that the Soviets have not violated during their bloody occupation and suppression of the Afghan population. Every human right of an Afghan citizen has been massively violated. Amnesty International has continually reported details of gross and consistent violations of human rights. Thousands of political prisoners have died while in the custody of the government. Many thousands more have "disappeared." Torture and arbitrary arrests and imprisonment are the rule rather than the exception. All of this goes on either with tacit or active support of the Soviet occupiers.

This outlaw behavior has not been without a heavy price. The Soviets are slowly discovering what the British previously experienced in Afghanistan. They fought three wars against the Afghans during an 80-year period and lost each time. In 1908, a British Colonial Officer reportedly wrote: "Now that our armies are in control of Kandahar and Kabul, the question is: What should we do with the

country?" The Russians now, as the British then, find themselves involved in a long, costly and bloody war where they control the cities most of the time while the Afghan resistance fighters control the countryside most of the time.

Despite the 80,000 to 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and an overwhelming superiority in firepower, the Soviets are caught in a "genuine quagmire". The more they struggle the deeper they sink in. The occupation is costing them dearly in terms of Soviet lives and Soviet treasures. The longer it goes on the less influence and friends the Soviet Union will have around the world. Two recent United Nations Resolutions demanding a complete and immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops passed by a 104 and 111 votes respectively. The occupation has seriously damaged a carefully cultivated relationship with most Third World nations and has weakened considerably the alliance with the Islamic world based on anti-imperialism.

The brave Afghan people have shown the world time and time again that they will not be conquered. Surely the Russians must be learning the bitter lesson that violence only brings on more violence not justice.

The time has come for the Reagan Administration to enlist the aid of our allies in order to persuade the Russians that a genuine nonaligned and independent Afghanistan is in the best interest of all parties concerned. This can be easily achieved if all Russian troops are withdrawn and the people of Afghanistan are allowed to peacefully determine their own destiny. I would hope that as the Reagan Administration continues its negotiations with the Soviets concerning future sales of grain and high technology items that the suffering people of Afghanistan are not forgotten.

I am pleased to join my colleague, Dante Fascell, in conducting this hearing which I am sure will prove to be very informative.

**Mr. FASCELL.** One of our Commission members who suggested these hearings some time ago, Don Ritter, has been a strong advocate of the whole struggle for human rights.

Do you have something you want to add?

**Mr. RITTER.** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am very grateful to you for getting the Helsinki Commission hearings moved forward and for working with the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Foreign Affairs Committee in putting these hearings together.

I am very pleased that the Helsinki Commission has responded to my request for a hearing to highlight the Soviet violations of the Helsinki accords. I am grateful for the effort which was made by the witnesses in being here and by the members of the staff who worked in setting up the hearings.

I hope these hearings answer some very basic questions. One is, why have so many of the academic, political, and religious organizations, so vocal during the Vietnam war, been so silent on genocide in Afghanistan? Why have some of the key individual voices heard during that same Vietnam conflict around the world been so silent? Where are the demonstrations outside Soviet Embassies? Where are the daily denunciations in the media? Where are the war crimes trials indicting Soviet leaders while this corporal and migratory genocide proceeds apace?

As a recent traveler to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas and as one who is deeply concerned by the situation there, I hope these hearings will depict to the American people and to the world beyond the nature of the suffering and the struggle of the Afghan people in their attempt to lift the burden of Soviet occupation, oppression, and genocide.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. FASCELL.** Mrs. Fenwick, would you care to make a statement?

**Mrs. FENWICK.** No; thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no statement except that I think it is time that we consider the suffering



and the courage of these people. I am happy we are having this hearing.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Leach?

Mr. LEACH. I have no statement, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Lantos?

Mr. LANTOS. I have no statement, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to associate myself fully with the comments of yourself and Mr. Ritter. I think it is high time that this most recent and outrageous Soviet aggression against an independent and sovereign nation be given the attention and publicity that it so deserves.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Bingham?

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too would like to associate myself with your remarks and those of Mr. Ritter. I am glad we are having this hearing. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. Our first witness today, currently living in the United States, is Miss Nahid. She fled Afghanistan about 1 year ago after repeated confrontations with Soviet forces in Kabul.

Miss NAHID, we would like to welcome you to the witness table and we are delighted to hear from you. Please pull the microphone very close to you and relax and talk with us. We will be very happy to hear from you.

Miss NAHID. I am sorry that my English is not that good and so if I make a mistake, please excuse me.

Mr. RITTER. Miss Nahid, would you please speak up, perhaps as loudly as you can? We just cannot hear you.

#### STATEMENT OF MISS NAHID, AFGHAN STUDENT

Miss NAHID. On April 29, 1980, Suriya Senior High School started their demonstration. They heard about the demonstration at all of the other high schools and they wanted to start their own demonstrations.

When I arrived at the school at 8:30 a.m., everybody looked worried and different. When I went inside the classroom, all of my classmates were talking and I asked them what has happened and what are we going to do today. They told me we will start our demonstrating and we are not going to study anymore, because Afghanistan was in very troubled times and also everything was very expensive—food, medicine—and nobody could be comfortable.

When we were talking about starting our demonstration, my teacher came in the classroom and told us to take out your books. All of us were quiet. Nobody answered her. She repeated it again and again. We said "We don't need the lessons; all the time you teach us about Taraki and Amin; we don't need to know any more about these men; they are traitors."

My teacher said, "What do you mean?" We said, "We are not going to study anymore because we don't need Russians; we don't need these kind of lessons."

My teacher was not a Communist and said for us to be good and strong in our demonstration.

In my class there were 53 people and 3 of them were Parchami and Khalqi. Fifty were Islamic. One of the Parchami went to the principal's office. After a few minutes, my principal sent for our teacher. He said no students can take a break today.

Then we heard other students from other schools demonstrating in the street. We suddenly started our demonstration inside the class and the Parchami girls took sticks to push us back and to quiet us and then they closed the door. We got out through the window of our room.

Everybody came outside of the school building. We took the sticks away from the Parchami authorities and from our principal. They went to the principal's office and locked themselves in and called for soldiers to come and take us. After 10 minutes, about five Jeeps of soldiers came in and about 10 soldiers came inside my school with machineguns. They were only soldiers, not Communists. They said for us to go back or they would shoot us. We said we are never free; if you know how to shoot, you should shoot the Russians.

Then we had a special scarf from our school and we took this and put them on the soldier's head and said, you are not going to fight, you ask to fight for Russia because you want our country for Russia and we never want to give up our country for Russia; we love our country more than ourselves.

When the soldiers heard us, they were excited very much and they put their guns on the ground and they said OK; you are our sisters; we can never shoot you; the Russians forced us to do it, and we have to. Then when we knew they were not going to shoot us we became more excited. We went to the other side of the school; we tried to push the door and go outside and there were two troop carriers outside.

They left there and then we tried to go to the other side of the street to the boys' school. We tried to get the boys out to start a demonstration with them and go to the Russian Embassy. Then when we got there by the school, there were a lot of soldiers. They were Russian soldiers. I had a green blouse and I put it on a long stick because green is the Islamic color that means freedom. This meant we had an Islamic flag.

When we started demonstrating, we said bad things about Russia. There was an Afghan general, a Communist who approached me and pushed me back and said, "What are you doing with that bad thing?" He meant my flag. I said, "Don't touch my flag; your hand is dirty and you are not a man; you sell our country to Russia and you want to work for Russia; we will never accept this."

The man tried to push me back and then all of the girls pushed him back and he left us. The Russian general said to a soldier: "Shoot these girls; they are crazy; they don't know what they should do." We told him that we don't need your help; we don't want you to be here.

Then the Afghan man shot once in the air. We went to him to take his gun. After that the Russian general shot and the girl who was beside me got shot and I caught her by my arms and after that other soldiers shot and we caught the girls and boys by our arms and ran with them and said for them to kill all of us; we did not want this type of life.

Then they shot again and when we got near to them they left us. After that we wanted to take the girls and boys to the hospital. There was a Jeep with soldiers. We told them to help us take them

to the hospital and they said let them die; we don't need people like this in this country; we hate them too. After that some cars helped us—just regular Afghan people—to take the wounded and dead to the hospital.

After that I was at home for 2 weeks because I looked crazy and all the time I wanted to find a Russian and kill him but I couldn't find him because they were afraid of us. They did not walk on the street. They went with guns inside the cars. It was the same with all of the girls. Nobody went to school.

After I went back to school we started demonstrating again. We didn't study and we said bad things against the Russians and my principal.

Then after that things got worse. They put special gas in my school and after 5 minutes they made us sleepy. They took us to the hospital. After 1 month my principal called some girls to the office and said don't start again; you be quiet and don't repeat your demonstration again; we will not let you come to school; if you want to do it you can't come to school. We said that is good; we don't want to come to school; we will never stop.

After that they let me go back to school. My activities were different, not in school but with different people. But it was so difficult because soldiers were looking for all of the girls to arrest them. And then I tried to come out of Afghanistan because I can do it anywhere. I can work to free my country from outside.

Then I left Afghanistan at 4 in the morning. First I took an old jacket and wore tribal clothes from Afghanistan because they know I am from Kabul and I wanted to leave Afghanistan. I walked 9 hours down the mountain and then I took another old truck and I made it to Pakistan.

When I got to Pakistan I stayed there 2 months and I saw the freedom fighters. They were fighting under hardship. They don't have anything to fight with. I saw a lot of men there. They had left their homes, their families, their country, just preparing for a fight.

But they do not have anything to fight with. They are just sitting and waiting to kill some Russians and take guns from them and shoot them again. They don't have any food. They are fighting but they are eating grass on the mountain. When they get shot they don't have any medicine to fix it. They lose a lot of blood and then they die.

Now I am here in America but I never think of myself as free because when I was at school, all of the time my teacher called me: Nahid, come back from Afghanistan. All the time I am never thinking of myself as free because I had seen a lot of trouble there what was going on. And now I am here to ask the American people and the American Government why they don't care about Afghanistan, why they don't know what is happening there. If the American Government doesn't know what is happening to the Afghan people, I am here to tell you and ask you to help us.

We tried to fight and fight any way we can but we need help. If we don't get help we will have to ask for help somewhere else. We want to find help because we don't want to lose our brave people. We have lost a lot and we fight anyway but we don't want to lose any more.

That is what I want from the American people. Thank you for listening.

[Miss Nahid's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MISS NAHID

On April 29, 1980, "Suriya Senior High School started demonstrating. On that same day, news of the Suriya demonstration spread to all Kabul schools. Many girls were severely wounded during the demonstrations which deeply disturbed all Kabul schoolgirls. As a result, even without a leader, everyone decided to demonstrate.

On April 29, 1980, when I arrived at school at 8:30 a.m., everybody looked worried; all of my classmates were chatting quietly together. When I asked, "What is the program?" they answered, "Today we will auspiciously start our strikes to try to revenge these villains for what they have done to our people and to our nation. So we will no longer attend classes."

When our teacher entered the classroom and said, "Take out your books," we were all quiet. Finally, we all said that we no longer needed lessons: "You are teaching us every day the biographies of Taraki and Hafizullah Amin. We don't need such lessons and we know all about these men; they are traitors to the homeland." We also said that we no longer accepted the Russian villains. Our teacher, who was also on our side, did not insist too much and said, "God make you successful, and we are also behind you." Of the 53 students in my class, there were three Parchami and Khalqi supporters. All the rest of us were Muslims and ready to fight. There are not many Parchami and Khalqi bastards in Afghan classrooms, offices and ministries.

After we decided not to attend classes and start demonstrating at recess, one of the three girls associated with the unclean Russians went to the principal's office to say that the students had refused to study their lessons and planned to begin street demonstrations.

After a few minutes, the principal sent notes to all the teachers that students were not allowed that day to leave classrooms for recess. At 11:30, we heard students from other schools on the streets. We all immediately stood up. The Parchami girls -- armed with sticks -- had closed the doors. So we jumped out of the windows and ran to the school yard where Parchami and Khalqi girls and teachers hit us with sticks to get us to return to the classrooms. Finally, everyone attacked them, taking their sticks and beating them so that they fled and locked themselves in the principal's office.

Then the principal phoned the Interior Ministry and requested soldiers to control us. Ten minutes later, about five military vehicles arrived. Ten soldiers with machine guns entered our school yard and told us to go, "Otherwise, we will fire on you and eliminate all of you." We told them, "If you had had that much courage, today the Russians would not have taken our land, and thousands of innocent Muslims would not have been killed by them. Instead of shooting Russians, you are going to fire on us, your Afghan sisters." We took off our chadors (head cover) and put them on their heads to show them that they are women -- not warriors. We asked them to give us their rifles -- if they feared the Russians, we would fight the foul Russians.

The soldiers, who were neither Parchami nor Khalqi, but had been ordered to stop us, were deeply moved by our words. Some soldiers cried in sympathy. All the soldiers laid down their rifles, saying, "God give us all success. We are all following you. What could we do when those villains forced us."

The Khalqi and Parchami soldiers, who had been too afraid to enter the school ground, were sitting in the jeeps. Through loudspeakers they told us to stop, and urged the Afghan soldiers in the school ground to shoot us. The soldiers retorted, "Go ahead and kill us, but we won't shoot our brave Muslim sisters." We shouted slogans and told the Parchamis that our chests are bastions to the last breath and our claws are daggers in the Russian heart and that we did not fear their threats. We said: "Our faith is our dagger and with it we will stab the hearts of Lenin worshippers."

Outside our school waited five military jeeps and two fire department trucks. One military vehicle blocked the school gate to keep us inside. Many threw stones at the driver who left the vehicle and ran away. All the girls pushed open the gate. I took a green blouse -- green to symbolize the Islamic flag of freedom -- put it on a stick and carried it. We all set out for a boys' school with many students. There the Russian soldiers outnumbered Afghan soldiers and had encircled a huge crowd. The boys had not yet managed to get out.

We waited for the boys at a crossroads and started to shout slogans. Since I was carrying the flag, I was in the first row. An Aghan communist soldier came up to me and said: "Throw away this filthy rag. Otherwise with one bullet I will send you and your flag to the other world." Then he pushed me. I told him, "Withdraw your filthy hand from the flag of Islam. You are a traitor to your homeland. For your wages you are selling out everything: your homeland and your principles."

While that soldier argued with me, a Russian officer got angry and told the Afghan communist: "What are you waiting for? Shoot and pacify her with one bullet." The Afghans shot in the air, thinking we would then run away. After he fired, all the girls attacked him. He tried to run away but fell under our feet. The Russian officer climbed out of his car and fired at me and my flag. The bullet did not hit me, but my friend standing next to me. The bullet hit her in the throat. As I picked her up, her blood spilled all over my head, face and hands and my flag fell from my hands.

After that, the boys got out and ran towards us. With the wounded girls in our arms, we ran towards the Russians, shouting, "The Russian rascals! Kill all of us, we don't want this kind of life." Bullets whistled past our ears as we ran toward them. We threw briefcases, books, stones and whatever we could find at them. As we approached the soldiers, they realized that their shots did not scare us. Fearing that if they did not run away, they would be killed under our feet, they mounted their cars as we ran toward them, hitting them with stones. They fired some more shots and then drove away.

When we looked back, we saw blood-stained boys and girls strewn on the ground. Many students were bleeding very much and some were dead. The wounded told us, "Be careful, but don't be afraid of the Russian army. As long as you are alive, don't abandon the homeland to the atrocious oppressors." We pledged that we would avenge these villains for their deeds to us and to our homeland."

We were on the lookout for a vehicle to take the wounded to hospitals as soon as possible. The road had turned red with blood. All of us were crying out of rage and wondered how to avenge our friends against these Northern Bears. Some girls ran toward an army jeep, in which sat two Afghan communists and four cheerful Russians. These girls asked the soldiers in the jeep to take some of the wounded to a hospital. One of the Afghans said, "Let these microbes of society die. Why do you want their foul corpses to be taken to a hospital?" Now we got really angry and one girl scratched the Afghan soldier's face. We all held the car and also hit the Russians with stones. It was hard for them to get away from us.

Another car driven by a civilian stopped for us. We piled the wounded into this car and others helped us take the wounded and the dead to a hospital. There, everyone was crying. Shopkeepers and people in the bazaar were weeping and saying, "Oh God, help save us from the claws of the oppressor."

I also went home with bloodstained face and head. That day everyone was crying; in bazaars and in all Kabul everyone was in tears. The corpses were taken to civilian hospitals and were later transported by soldiers to the central military hospital. In vain, the families of the dead students searched in hospitals..

At last the families were told that the corpses were not to be given to anybody. If they wanted, they could see their dead for a moment, but they had no right to cry and wail. Afterwards, the families of the dead students went to view the bodies. Men armed with machine guns escorted the families to prevent them from crying and kept the news as quiet as possible. The families were allowed three minutes to see their beautiful, young and brave daughters and sons in their bloody school uniforms. The relatives were not even allowed to cry, since soldiers were pointing machine guns at their backs. Nobody ever heard anything more about the wounded or where the dead had been buried.

Thus, things got worse day by day. The universities also started strikes, as did officials in ministries. The Russians started to fire from helicopters, but whatever they did, they could not pacify the people. Every day about 20 to 30 girls or boys were killed. The Russians used a special gas in schools, which caused fainting. Ambulances took the victims to hospitals. Physicians said that the victims would die or get paralyzed after six months. The official radio and TV kept telling the public that this gassing was done by Pakistani spies and American Imperialists. But we understood that by these acts the government was taking revenge for our demonstrations.

For our outspoken attitude of opposition, some of us were expelled from school. I stayed home for a month and did not go to school. I continued my activities in whatever way I could. Finally, I could no longer tolerate the situation. I sneaked across the border to Pakistan, clad in my special Afghan clothing. I walked for nine hours and rode in an old truck for the rest of the distance. I stayed in Pakistan for two months. I saw Afghan Mujahidin (freedom fighters) there; they are in a bad situation. Because they lack weapons, they were sitting idle. Some of the Mujahidin fought in the mountains and had to eat grass because they had no food. The wounded died because they had no medicine to stop their bleeding. The Russian villains fired on the Mujahidin from helicopters.

But we courageous and valiant Afghans -- men and women, young and old -- will never to our last breath bow down to the Russians. The Russians do not yet know who their adversaries are. With God's help we will regain our land from the filthy Russians -- just as we drove the British from our homeland. It is a pity that with empty hands, one can do little. Nevertheless, God is kind. We accept death, but we will never accept the Russians.

I have described only one recent event in Afghanistan. Even if I write a volume, I could not describe all the Russian atrocities and oppressions against Afghans. I love my beautiful homeland and my brave and valiant people more than my own life. Although life's misfortune has brought me to America, my soul and thoughts are still in Afghanistan. While thousands get killed daily in my beloved homeland, I do not want to be here. I cannot be happy or feel free. I am not happy because while here, I cannot kill any Russians in revenge for their killings of my compatriots. I don't want to die until I get a chance to kill some Russians in revenge. After that, I will be happy to die.

Why should our homeland be like this? Why should we be homeless vagrants? Aren't we human beings? Don't we have the right to freedom? Don't we, just as the rest of the people of the world, want to get an education to serve our nation in the future?

Though our homeland is poor, we were happy with our lot before the intrusion and treacherous acts of the filthy Russians. We didn't want to trade our freedom for anything. But filthy Russia did not allow us to continue our tranquil and comfortable life, and fights us with its overwhelming power while we have only empty hands. The struggle is now in its third year, but Russia will never manage to conquer heroic Afghanistan.

Russia has guns, rifles and planes. But we trust in God. As long as we have blood in our bodies, we will not surrender our beautiful homeland to Russia. Though we have lost and will still lose so many of our courageous and patriotic youth, we will never fear Russia. Either we will regain our land or all of us will be killed by Russians. Only then they will be able to usurp our homeland. We cannot sit idle while Russia takes our homeland. But alas! Our beloved homeland is poor and nobody can provide the help we need. We will continue the war, nevertheless, even though and we don't want to see thousands of our beautiful, courageous and patriotic youth killed by bullets of the filthy Russians.

The war still continues and many are being killed. One cannot fight Russian guns and planes with empty hands. Therefore, we have asked America to give us aid. We want aid from America because there are only two superpowers in the contemporary world, and the other one had invaded our homeland. America should help us because it is the law of the world. If the American government wants to aid the Afghan freedom fighters, it should act soon so as to save the lives of some of our youth. If America wants to keep Russia engaged in Afghanistan to prevent it from creating trouble in other parts of the world, we say that is wrong, and we can't accept that. If America does not help us, then it should please evict all our refugees from America, for we don't like this kind of life.

We need real aid to regain our homeland. We urgently call on the American government to take decisive action.



Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much, Miss Nahid. That is a remarkable story and you are a brave and courageous young lady.

Miss NAHID. I know a lot but I can't say it in English because I have just studied it for 6 months.

Mr. FASCELL. You are doing very well.

Say something in Dari and Tom will translate it.

Miss NAHID. If you have some questions, please ask me and then I will give the answers.

Mr. FASCELL. We will certainly do that.

Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Miss Nahid, you said much about yourself and a school. It was a girls' school and then you told us how you were joined by the boys from the boys' school. Is this kind of resistance, this extraordinary courage, is that mostly among the young people? Or are the older people also resisting, for example in Kabul?

Miss NAHID. They are fighting, women, men, girls, boys. For example in kindergarten when they brought milk for them they said we don't drink Russian milk; we don't need Russia's milk. Everybody is waiting to fight but we can't do everything by ourselves with empty hands. We need help.

The Russians are killing freedom fighters from the air and we don't have anything to stop that. We don't have anything to stop that. We need help, arms.

Mrs. FENWICK. You say you were in Kabul, the capital. Then when you left, as you walked through the countryside to get to Pakistan, were there Russian soldiers in the countryside on the ground or just in the helicopters? What was the situation?

Miss NAHID. They can't be on the ground because they are afraid. They are always in Jeeps or helicopters. But in Kabul there are some in tanks or Jeeps. They can't walk because they are afraid. They have guns but they are afraid of our empty hands.

Mrs. FENWICK. Do you mean in all the time that you walked from Kabul through the country you did not see any Russian soldiers?

Miss NAHID. I saw them a lot but inside the cars or inside the tanks. They are sitting outside the tanks but they can't walk because they are afraid.

Mrs. FENWICK. You spoke of this gas that was used by the Russians. Did you happen to notice what color it was?

Miss NAHID. No; I didn't. It was a smell. It was like a perfume and just like a smell.

Mrs. FENWICK. How was it used? Was it thrown on the floor and something broke? Or was it sprayed from something?

Miss NAHID. I think that was like a spray.

Mrs. FENWICK. Then in your written testimony you spoke of it causing people to faint and then they go to the hospital.

Miss NAHID. I didn't myself. But my friends did but I didn't get that much.

Mrs. FENWICK. Did they get well afterward? Did they recover?

Miss NAHID. They do but some of them have something on their face and the doctor said they will be crazy in 6 months or may not be able to walk.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you. I am so sorry that you have seen such things.

Miss NAHID. We have hope. God is kind.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Ritter.

Mr. RITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Miss Nahid, thank you for coming to testify before this committee. I must say that after all that you have seen and all that you have experienced, you remain remarkably calm and very sweet and softspoken. I think that is to your credit.

How many of the girl students were killed on that 1 day?

Miss NAHID. Seventy girls and boys on the same day.

Mr. RITTER. And how many were wounded?

Miss NAHID. Oh, a lot. I can't count them.

Mr. RITTER. Who actually did the shooting?

Miss NAHID. The first shot was by the Afghans but only into the air. The Russian general, he was a big general of something. He started shooting at us.

Mr. RITTER. He directed the troops to fire directly at the students?

Miss NAHID. Yes.

Mr. RITTER. You mentioned in your testimony something about the bodies when the families wanted to go and visit the wounded or to see the dead. Could you describe what they had to go through in order to see their children?

Miss NAHID. They were all the time helping us. But they said for us to die after you kill some Russians.

Mr. RITTER. But you mentioned in your testimony that they were only allowed to look for moments at the bodies and that they were not allowed to cry. You mentioned that they were not allowed to cry for fear of being shot. Is that true?

Miss NAHID. Yes; when the families asked for their children they said that they didn't want to give them to the families and they could see them for 5 minutes, the mother, father, sister, and brother. They pointed Russian guns at them and said don't cry and don't say anything; just look at them for 5 minutes and come back.

The families said very bad things to the Russians and they cried anyhow.

Mr. RITTER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I have no questions at this time.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. You mentioned the poison gas. Have you heard of other instances in Afghanistan in which poison gas was used against the civilian population?

Miss NAHID. Yes; we heard they were using a lot of different gasses against us; some in bombs.

Mr. LEACH. I can understand this is very difficult. One of the extraordinary events of the 20th century has been the use of poison gasses, and it appears it is being used again in Afghanistan. Their use is unconscionable and, from a practical point of view, difficult for Afghan soldiers lacking appropriate equipment to defend against. I hope to talk further on this subject with some of the other witnesses.

I would like to ask one other question because I think it is interesting with your being a student. When the Russians came in during the last several years in a much bigger way, did the curriculum at your school change? Did they start teaching other types of courses? What happened at your school?

Miss NAHID. In school they repeatedly gave us Communist lessons and biographies of all of the Government people. They tried to change our English books to Russian. In one school all of the girls tore up their books and threw them in the lake. They didn't want to learn such things.

Mr. LEACH. But it would appear, would you say in the school system, that the Russians were teaching such things because they intended to stay in the country for a long period of time?

Miss NAHID. Yes.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Bingham.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Referring to the Afghan soldiers that you saw, about how many would you say were pro-Communist?

Miss NAHID. There were about 10 soldiers from Parchami Party and 30 or 34 were just Afghan soldiers.

Mr. BINGHAM. And the ordinary soldiers would be against the Russians or for the Russians?

Miss NAHID. When the Afghan soldiers saw us they put their guns on the ground and they were with us and they said to us we are behind you; you are our sisters and we are your brothers. But Afghan soldiers don't have many guns. They gave the guns to them that day to push us and right now they have taken all of the guns from Afghan soldiers. The Russians have guns but the Afghans have long sticks.

Mr. BINGHAM. I have one other question. On page 4 of your statement near the bottom you say the Russians do not yet know who their adversaries are. Can you explain that? The paragraph starts: But we courageous and valiant Afghans—men and women, young and old—will never, to our last breath, bow down to the Russians. The Russians do not yet know who their adversaries are.

Miss NAHID. Can you repeat your question please?

Mr. BINGHAM. The question is could you explain that statement: The Russians do not yet know who their adversaries are.

Miss NAHID. Yes; because they don't know Afghan people are very brave. We don't want to give up our country and they think our country is very small with poor people. We don't have arms and the Russians can catch us, but they don't know we have God. God is strong in everything we have there.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. LeBoutillier.

Mr. LEBOUTILLIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You talked about gas. How about little toys that they leave around for children that blow up, do you know about those? Have you ever heard about those?

Miss NAHID. No; I am sorry, I haven't.

Mr. LEBOUTILLIER. How about stories that we hear about Russian soldiers who refuse to fight or refuse to kill Afghan civilians. Have you ever heard of those?

Miss NAHID. Yes; I have.

Mr. LEBOUTILLIER. What happens to those soldiers? Do you know?

Miss NAHID. The Russian soldiers kill all of the people because Russia has the power.

Mr. LEBOUTILLIER. I have heard that Russian soldiers who refuse to fire on civilians are shot on the spot.

Miss NAHID. I am sorry, I don't know about that.

Mr. LEBOUTILLIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Miss Nahid, thank you very much.

Miss NAHID. Thank you for listening.

Mr. FASCELL. You are a very articulate young lady. For just learning English in the last 6 months you are doing extremely well. You are also very brave, and we can all take lessons from you.

Our next witness is Thomas Gouttierre, our interpreter today and currently director of International Studies and Programs and director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Mr. Gouttierre was formerly director of the Fulbright Foundation in Afghanistan, a Fulbright scholar himself in Afghanistan, and prior to that a Peace Corps volunteer in Afghanistan. While in Afghanistan Mr. Gouttierre also coached the Afghan national basketball team to successful victories over the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

You have had a varied career. We are delighted to hear from you.

#### STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. GOUTTIERRE, DIRECTOR, AFGHAN STUDIES PROGRAM, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT OMAHA

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. How long did it take you to learn the language of Afghanistan?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. It took quite a few years. I had the very good fortune of having many individuals who were helpful to me in my studies. The nice thing about the Afghan people is that they are always very pleased and flattered to meet someone who is interested in their culture and their language. They are very patient with people like me and others and I try to learn the language.

Mr. FASCELL. I probably would never learn it but it just occurred to me. Here is a young lady who speaks English in 6 months. How many years did you say it took?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Longer.

[Laughter.]

Mr. FASCELL. Now that I have qualified you as an expert with a deflationary factor, we will be glad to hear from you.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Thank you very much. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you. I am going to confine my remarks to a rather basic number of facts. As Congressman Ritter mentioned we are trying to come to an understanding of some very important basic facts.

Mr. FASCELL. Why don't we put your testimony in the record and you summarize it any way you want.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Fine, it is not a very long one.

Mr. FASCELL. We will also put Miss Nahid's testimony in the record.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. One of the things that has been most disconcerting to me over the past several years, particularly since the time when the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, is that little attention has been paid to the situation in Afghanistan by our media. Indeed, this is the first time that Congress, whether in the House or in the Senate, has had an open hearing on these kinds of things.

I think it is important to repeat the statement that Congressman Ritter made wondering why we have not heard more in the past about the situation in Afghanistan, when in the United States we were so ready and willing to bring the situations in which our own soldiers might have been involved in Vietnam or elsewhere so much to the foreground. This has been very disconcerting to me, obviously because of my interest and experience in Afghanistan, to see that so little attention has been focused on the situation.

Indeed, my own testimony today is somewhat of a challenge to the Congress and the media to see that things like today's hearings might be continued in the future.

In making these opening remarks I want to compliment you, Mr. Chairman and the other members of this committee, for making this hearing possible. I would also like to personally congratulate and compliment the work of one of the members of your staff, Christopher Brescia. I know he has worked very, very hard on this.

I particularly want to extend my sincerest compliments to Congressman Ritter whose leadership, as you indicated, really made this whole hearing possible. I know his interest in this was very heartfelt and sincere. I also know that had you not taken such a deep interest that maybe we might not have had such hearings.

I think that in order for us in the United States to appropriately understand what is going on in Afghanistan and to exercise the kind of responsibility that I feel our free press and also our Government must exercise relating to the situation in Afghanistan, it is necessary to understand the nature of the resistance in Afghanistan.

I would like to use this term "resistance" very emphatically because prior to the time that the Soviet Union came to Afghanistan, in the form of an occupying power in December 1979, the fighting in Afghanistan was primarily a civil war. When the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, they dramatically changed the nature of the war from one of a civil war, in other words one which pitted Afghan troops essentially loyal to the regime of Hafizullah Amin against those who were within the legions of the Mujahadin and the freedom fighters.

I think that there is much in the way of misconception and misunderstanding that we all hold and share now in the West concerning the situation. Many misconceptions are evident in the semantics which have become a part of the jargon associated with the Afghan resistance. The Afghans resisting the occupation of their country by a foreign power are variously referred to as Muslim rebels or Muslim insurgents.

Rebels and insurgents are defined in all of Webster's dictionaries as those who engage in armed resistance against the established Government of their country. The Soviets and their puppets are not the established Government of Afghanistan. Afghans are engaging in armed resistance but against an occupying force.

In this era captivated by what I term the "Khomeini syndrome," the use of the adjective "Muslim" in conjunction with the term "rebels" also serves to mislead regarding the nature of the resistance. It is true that some 99 percent of the Afghan population is at least nominally Muslim. However Islam is no more monolithic than is Christianity. Sunnis, Shias, and Ismailis are united in their opposition to the Soviet occupation, but they are as diverse in the practice of their religion as are Catholics, Lutherans, and Baptists. Many of those most actively resisting the Soviets are leftists who do not observe the practices of Islam at all.

Do we call the Polish labor union members Catholic laborers? Did we define the Hungarian freedom fighters with a religious adjective? To do so in the case of the Afghans conjures up the image of religious fanaticism in the minds of most Westerners. This demeans the concept and the force of nationalism in the Afghan resistance. The Afghans are resisting not to regain Islam but to regain the independence of their country. As in the case of Poland today, religion is but a source for solidarity in the struggle of the Afghans against the oppressor they share with the Poles.

The Afghans resisting the Soviet occupation forces call themselves Mujahadin, an Arabic loan word in Dari which translates as fighters for the cause of liberty, or freedom fighters. President Reagan has rightly noted this definition in his interview with Frank Reynolds of ABC. Many of our media and our Government officials persist in using the term "Muslim rebels," exacerbating the misconception already existing.

Even more damaging and misleading are the persistent portrayals of the Afghan freedom fighters as woefully lacking in unity in their resistance to expansionism by their northern neighbor. Such analyses betray a fundamental lack of understanding of the dynamics of Afghan society and culture. Not coincidentally, the Soviet news agency, Tass, has deliberately portrayed the freedom fighters as murderers and plunderers in the same tradition that Russian imperialists followed in seeking to discredit those who resisted their expansion into Central Asia more than a half century ago.

Western media, perhaps due to their inability to move freely in and out of Afghanistan in order to produce first-hand reports on the conditions and fighting therein, in other words to obtain the actuarials one often hears about, remain fixated on the squabbles evident between the various Afghan groups and political alliances in Pakistan.

While each of these groups has varying degrees of influence and contact inside Afghanistan and some have considerable fighting experience within as well, it must be understood that the burden of the fighting is being borne primarily by units inside Afghanistan who may or may not have links with the groups in Pakistan.

These units operate primarily in those regions in which they inhabit, inspired by their own perception of the nature of the

threat to their cherished age-old way of life. The manner of organization is indigenous, effective, and generally democratic. Allegiance to one's leader is rooted in centuries of custom and tradition and is not lacking in discipline.

Over the past year these units have begun banding together into regional and tribal confederations. One of my colleagues, who unfortunately due to illness is unable to be with us today, Louis Dupree who was the mentor really of most of us who are interested in the study of Afghanistan, has perceptively drawn an analogy between this phenomenon and the pattern which developed in the Yugoslavian resistance to the German occupation forces during World War II.

Such confederations exist in the Hazarajat, the central mountain massif of Afghanistan, in Badakhshan in the upper northeast, in Nooristan in the east, in the Wardak-Ghazni area south and west of Kabul, in the Panjshair area of the Hindu Kush mountains north of Kabul, in regions around Qandahar and others.

In these areas little if any Government control is exercised by the Soviets or their surrogates. Indigenous governing structures are emerging in most regions, based on tribal and kinship patterns. Cooperation interregionally for the transport of supplies and weapons is more and more evident.

Should the Afghans be able to persist in their resistance, it is quite likely that even broader-based federations will evolve. One could conceive of leadership with a national base emerging from these confederations, again somewhat akin to the pattern observed in Yugoslavia after World War II.

Urban guerrilla groups, some of which are Marxist-based and are organized in Soviet-style cells, are increasingly active in Kabul and other cities. Underground letters exhorting the population to actively resist are proliferating in the cities and villages. Meanwhile, the status of the Afghan army deteriorates through continuing defections.

The Afghan puppet government of Babrak Karmal and his Parchami comrades has been unable to develop a viable political base. The feud between the Parchamis and the Khalqis, the other branch of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, continues unabated.

In attempting to counter this disintegration of control, the Soviets are expanding their policy of dual genocide. This is corporal and migratory genocide. Villages and valleys are denuded of their populations through increased bombings and intimidation. Chemical warfare including the possible use of hydrogen cyanide and mines disguised as toys, et cetera, are being used. Areas of major cities have been destroyed in heavy bombardment. Whole villages have been reduced to rubble and the populations executed en masse for being suspected of aiding and harboring freedom fighter groups.

The Soviets and the Karmal government have been forced to resort to forms of impressment in order to replenish the dwindling ranks of the Afghan army. In addition Afghan teenagers are forcibly sent to the Soviet Union for education and indoctrination.

The resistance has by no means gained the upper hand, although the information that I am presenting now would indicate that the

morale and the intensity of the resistance has increased and indeed we were able to come up with some information. When you talk about statistics, particularly statistics related to the population, it is very hard to come up with precise information on Afghanistan. But as far as we are able to determine, there are probably at least 80,000 Afghan freedom fighters under arms in various units around the country of Afghanistan.

But I think it is important to understand that due to the lack of resources, at least I do not believe and I am certain that many others will agree with me, the resistance has by no means gained what one would call the upper hand, particularly in terms of technological and military considerations.

The Soviets continue to enjoy technological superiority. Recent assertions by Carl Bernstein on ABC's 20/20 and in the New Republic notwithstanding—I mistakenly wrote Nation in my statement—little of the weaponry essential to confronting Soviet air superiority has reached any of the units within the confederations within the central parts of Afghanistan. Perhaps even more disastrous is the lack of food supplies in the central areas.

The Soviets show little inclination to leaving. Their genocidal tactics reveal that they do not want Afghans, that they want Afghanistan.

I would hope that Congress would recognize a continuing responsibility to bring focus on the atrocities being committed by the Soviets in Afghanistan. At the same time I would also hope that Congress would accept the responsibility to encourage assisting of the Afghan freedom fighters with the weapons necessary to resist the Soviet occupation and to combat the genocidal policies that proceed from it. With or without this assistance, the Afghans will continue their resistance.

Who here can deny that, in seeking to assist the Afghans, the interest of the United States would be served as well?

[Mr. Gouttierre's prepared statement follows:]



PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. GOUTTIERRE, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR  
AFGHAN STUDIES, THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT OMAHA

THE NATURE OF THE RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE QUESTION OF U.S.  
RESPONSIBILITIES

It is disconcerting to note that, at a time when the Soviet Union is increasing its oppression and brutality in Afghanistan, little public attention is accorded the horrible suffering of the people inside this tragic country. Admittedly, there is little media or other access to documenting the violent acts which follow in the wake of the Soviet occupation. This fact, however, cannot absolve our government or others from the responsibility of drawing continuous and public focus on the Soviet Union's violation of the sovereign and human rights of the people of Afghanistan--rights which have been articulated in the Final Act of the Helsinki accords.

In these opening remarks, therefore, I commend those who have made this hearing possible. I single out the Chair of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Congressman Dante Fascell, and the staff of the Commission, . I particularly extend my sincerest compliments to Congressman Don Ritter, whose leadership has made possible that which so many have been seeking for so long.

It is my hope that, as a result of this hearing, subsequent focus will result. I particularly challenge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to exercise its responsibility in this area.

In order for our government and the American people to appropriately exercise responsibility related to the tragic circumstances forced upon the Afghans, it is necessary to understand the nature of their Resistance. Compounding the lack of access to information regards Soviet brutality in Afghanistan is the misinformation and misconceptions which many in our country hold regarding the struggle of the Afghans.

Many misconceptions are evident in the semantics which have become a part of the jargon associated with the Afghan Resistance. The Afghans resisting the occupation of their country by a foreign power are variously

referred to as "Muslim rebels" or "Muslim insurgents". Rebels and insurgents are defined in Webster's dictionaries as those who engage in armed resistance against the established government of their country. The Soviets and their puppets are not the established government of Afghanistan. Afghans are engaging in armed resistance, but against an occupying force.

In this era captivated by what I term "the Khomeini syndrome", the use of the adjective "Muslim" in conjunction with the term "rebels" also serves to mislead regards the nature of the Resistance. It is true that some 99% of Afghanistan's population is at least nominally Muslim. However, Islam is no more monolithic than is Christianity. Sunnis, Shias, and Ismailis are united in their opposition to the Soviet occupation, but they are as diverse in the practice of their religion as are Catholics, Lutherans, and Baptists. Many of those most actively resisting the Soviets are leftists who do not observe the practices of Islam at all.

Do we call the Polish labor union members "Catholic laborers"? Did we define the Hungarian freedom fighters with a religious adjective? To do so in the case of the Afghans conjurs up the image of religious fanaticism in the minds of most Westerners. This demeans the concept and force of nationalism in the Afghan Resistance. The Afghans are resisting not to regain Islam, but to regain the independence of their country. As in the case of Poland today, religion is but a source for solidarity in the struggle of the Afghans against the oppressor they share with the Poles.

The Afghans resisting the Soviet occupation forces call themselves MUJAAHIDEEN, an Arabic loan word in Dari which translates as "fighters for the cause of liberty" or "freedom fighters". President Reagan has rightly noted this definition in his interview with Frank Reynolds of ABC. Many of our media and our government officials persist in the use of the term "Muslim rebels",

exacerbating the misperception already existing.

Even more damaging and misleading are the persistent portrayals of the Afghan Freedom Fighters as woefully lacking in unity in their resistance to the expansionism by their northern neighbor. Such analyses betray a fundamental lack of understanding of the dynamics of Afghan society and culture. Not coincidentally, the Soviet news agency, Tass, has deliberately portrayed the Freedom Fighters as murderers and plunderers in the same tradition that Russian imperialists followed in seeking to discredit those who resisted their expansion into Central Asia more than half a century ago.

Western media, perhaps due to their inability to move freely in and out of Afghanistan in order to produce first-hand reports on the conditions and fighting therein, remain fixated on the squabbles evident between the various Afghan groups and political alliances in Pakistan. While each of these groups has varying degrees of influence and contact inside Afghanistan, and some have considerable fighting experience within as well, it must be understood that the burden of the fighting is being borne primarily by units inside Afghanistan who may or may not have links with the groups in Pakistan.

These units operate primarily in those regions in which they inhabit, inspired by their own perception of the nature of the threat to their cherished age-old way of life. The manner of organization is indigenous, effective, and generally democratic. Allegiance to one's leader is rooted in centuries of custom and tradition and is not lacking in discipline.

Over the past year these units have begun banding together into regional and tribal confederations. One of my colleagues, Louis Dupree, has perceptively drawn an analogy between this phenomenon and the pattern which developed in the Yugoslavian resistance to the German occupation

forces during World War II.

Such confederations exist in the Hazarajat, the central mountain massif, in Badakhshan in the upper northeast, in Nooristan in the east, in the Wardak-Ghazni area south and west of Kabul, in the Panjshair area of the Hindu Kush mountains, in regions around Qandahar, and others.

In these areas little if any government control is exercised by the Soviets or their surrogates. Indigenous governing structures are emerging in most regions based on tribal and kinship patterns. Cooperation inter-regionally for the transport of supplies and weapons is more and more evident.

Should the Afghans be able to persist in their Resistance, it is quite likely that even broader-based federating will evolve. One could conceive of leadership with a national base emerging from these confederations, again somewhat akin to the pattern observed in Yugoslavia after World War II.

Urban guerrilla groups, some of which are Marxist-based and are organized in Soviet-style cells, are increasingly active in Kabul and other cities. Underground letters, exhorting the population to actively resist, are proliferating in the cities and villages. Meanwhile, the status of the Afghan army deteriorates through continuing defections. The Afghan puppet government of Babrak Karmal and his Parchami comrades has been unable to develop a viable political base. The feud between the Parchamis and the Khalqis, the other branch of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, continues unabated.

In attempting to counter this disintegration of control, the Soviets are expanding their policy of dual genocide--corporal and migratory. Villages and valleys are denuded of their populations through increased bombings and intimidation. Chemical warfare, including the possible use of hydrogen cyanide, and mines disguised as toys, etc. are being used. Areas of major

cities have been destroyed in heavy bombardment. Whole villages have been reduced to rubble and their populations executed *en masse* for being suspected of aiding or harboring Freedom Fighter groups.

The Soviets and the Karmal government have been forced to resort to forms of impressment in order to replenish the dwindling ranks of the Afghan army. In addition, Afghan teenagers are forcibly sent to the Soviet Union for "education" and indoctrination.

The Resistance has by no means gained the upper hand. The Soviets continue to enjoy technological superiority. Recent assertions by Carl Bernstein on ABC's "20/20" and in *Nation* notwithstanding, little of the weaponry essential to confronting Soviet air superiority has reached any of the units within the Confederations. Perhaps even more disastrous is the lack of food supplies in the central areas.

The Soviets show little inclination to leaving. Their genocidal tactics reveal that they do not want Afghans; they want Afghanistan.

I would hope that Congress would recognize a continuing responsibility to being focus on the atrocities being committed by the Soviets in Afghanistan. At the same time I would also hope Congress would accept the responsibility to encourage assisting the Afghan Freedom Fighters with the weapons necessary to resist the Soviet occupation and to combat the genocidal policies that proceed from it. With or without this assistance, the Afghans will continue their Resistance.

Who here can deny that, in seeking to assist the Afghans, the interest of the United States would be served as well?

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much. We will take a short recess while we answer roll call and we will come right back.

[Whereupon a brief recess was taken.]

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Gouttierre, thank you very much, particularly for telling why you place so much importance on semantics. We as politicians understand that.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I am glad you mentioned that because I did indeed devote a considerable number of paragraphs to that in my testimony.

I think that one of the most frustrating things that I have encountered over the last couple of years in going around the country and appearing before various sections of the media and appearing at universities, et cetera, is the constant misunderstanding, really, of the nature of the freedom fighters, what kind of people they are. You hear all kinds of stories, all kinds of labels placed upon those individuals: They are bandits, they have always in the past enjoyed fighting each other anyhow and what they are doing is just a continuation of what they did in the past.

Quite frankly, I have found that to be insulting. I think of course it would be insulting to an Afghan as well. It is true that the Afghans in many areas of the country enjoy a style of life that one associates with the traditional elements of tribal living. Tribal living has elements with which we are not totally I think familiar and able to understand in the United States.

But the kind of thing that is going on now in Afghanistan is not in any way a duplication of any of the kinds of activities that one might have associated in some form or another with this style of living. So when I hear the use of such terms as "bandits" and then elevate it to the term of "rebels"—rebels as I indicated in my testimony are those who are in rebellion against the established government of a country—I fail to understand how the Soviet occupying forces enjoy the term of "established government" other than established through force.

Then also there is the particular use of the term "Muslim." This is a time in which that particular term itself in various parts of the country and various sections of our media have some unfortunately negative connotations because people take a monolithic view of such terms.

The Afghans are in opposition to the Soviet occupation. Indeed as I indicated before, they are in the great majority Muslim. But what we see in Afghanistan is a nationalistic uprising, a war of resistance. I think to call these individuals "rebels" and "Muslim rebels" is somewhat of a pejorative approach and also a demeaning approach, one that really does not attempt from the standpoint of the West to understand what is really going on in another country. Indicative of that is the fact that we have spent most of our youth studying world history that went as far east as Turkey or maybe Jerusalem.

I think this is all very much a part of this misunderstanding of what is going on in Afghanistan. That is why I think it is important before we can understand what is really happening there that we recognize indeed what these people are who are opposing the Soviet Union. They are individuals who are fighting for their own freedom, for their own independence. And to use these terms so

loosely and so widespread creates a tremendously damaging impression.

Mr. FASCELL. Would you support the concept of turning Soviet propaganda around on them and calling this a war of national liberation?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Indeed that is exactly what it is. I thank you for using the phrase. We call it a war of resistance. I use that because it departs in terms of definition from what some scholars previously recognized as a war that is basically civil war in its makeup. This is a war of resistance and indeed as you suggest a war for national liberation.

And many of the units that are fighting use this particular phrase, The Front for National Liberation of Afghanistan and things of this nature. A number of them use this exact phrase.

Mr. FASCELL. Now the Soviets, as I gather from your testimony, are doing the same thing here that they have done in most other places in trying to subjugate people. One way is genocide, wipe them out outright, anybody who resists. Two is mass movement of people. Are they doing that?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Yes. Again it is hard to come up with accurate demographic statistics. But if one considers that the population of Afghanistan is variously estimated and sometimes with some serious scientific enterprises at anywhere from 12 million to 18 million and already there are at least 2 million in Pakistan as a result of migrations, maybe half a million in Iran and possibly as many as half a million people either killed or wounded or in some other form lost to the country, we are talking anywhere from one-fifth to one-seventh of the population of a country that has been eliminated from that country. Those are very dramatic and I think very, very serious figures that people have not really come to grips with.

We talk about things in Cambodia. We talk about things in Somali. We talk about the refugees that come from Southeast Asia, from Cuba even. But it strikes me as ludicrous that we cannot come to grips with these tremendous figures. I know Congressman Ritter has visited the camps in Pakistan.

We are talking about some very significant numbers of people who have been forced to leave their country. There are many here of course now in the United States, those who have primarily enjoyed the privilege of higher education. These people are lost to the future development of Afghanistan, particularly if the status quo maintains itself.

Mr. FASCELL. Of course the other aspect of this effort to suppress is the complete takeover of the educational system which they have done for some time. Is that correct?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. This is correct. Prior to the time that the coup of 1978 occurred and then particularly from that time since the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the Afghans did indeed have control of their own education and the material that was produced for the curriculum of that education. American experts, French experts, Russian experts, British experts, many were used in this curriculum development. But it was a curriculum of which the Afghans themselves had the final approval.

Of course now maybe the Soviets would claim that Mr. Karmal and his associates have final approval over this curriculum. But it

is my belief that what is going on in Afghanistan is a patent use of Soviet material that is being forced upon the Afghan schoolchildren in their attempts to indoctrinate or as I say educate the people.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Ritter.

Mr. RITTER. You talked about the question of unity amongst the Afghan tribal organizations. Recently in the Washington Post a front-page story focused the entire first part of the story on an internecine battle amongst the tribes and at the very end of the story it got to a very successful operation against the Soviets.

Do you think there is some misunderstanding in this country as to the extent of this disunity? Or how would you like to see this understanding promoted of what you might feel is the greater unity?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. First of all I question the source that the Washington Post has. I would be interested to know what their source is.

Yes, indeed, I do feel that there is a tremendous misunderstanding of what constitutes unity in a situation with regards to the situation confronting the Afghans. As I said before, Afghanistan is a society in which many areas of the country are not removed from what we call tribal style of living, a tribal existence. There are age-old tribal rivalries contesting matters regarding land and property, things of this nature. These things have gone on.

I do not know exactly to what kind of internecine squabble that the Washington Post was referring, in other words what the basic cause was.

But I think it is important for us to understand here that the Afghans themselves have in the past been threatened with external aggression. They have opposed this very successfully. They have united. We are talking now about a situation that covers a whole country because of the improvement of communications, satellite communications, cassettes and things of this nature.

Before, in those areas of Afghanistan that were primarily affected by the invading forces of the British during the previous century, the Afghans came together and they came together in their own indigenous forms. I think it is very important to understand this.

Today, the Afghans are also coming together into confederations that band together the various tribal units within regions that have affinities already. But these confederations, however large they may be, have patterns of communication they are developing with confederations in provinces or regions near them. They are cooperating in what I would call communications, supply line materials and things of this sort.

I have just been handed a note saying that the Washington Post story was about a fight between the Hizbe Islami and the Jamiyeti troops north of Kabul. I really am not very qualified to comment specifically on the nature of that particular fight. Again I would be interested in knowing what the source of that information was.

I am not saying that there is not squabbling between units that are fighting against the Soviet Union. We are talking now about the development of an opposition, a resistance to something that is only 18 months old. I am certain that when we all heard, which is when the President of the United States appeared on television in



January shortly after the occupation of Afghanistan, that the Soviets had occupied Afghanistan that few of us thought we would be here today to talk about the fact that 18 months later the Afghans are still resisting and it appears that their resistance is growing stronger.

So maybe it is true that there is some squabbling. But consider where we are 18 months later. Also consider how long it took the Palestinian Liberation Front, for example, to develop its leadership. Yassir Arafat really did not come to the fore until 20 years after the Palestinian question developed.

Mr. RITTER. I would like to interject a point. One of the great strengths I think of the freedom fight in Afghanistan is the fact that it is decentralized. The Soviets cannot just walk in and take over several radio stations, an airport, a main road, and a railroad, and all of a sudden control the country like may be true in some other situations where the Soviets have moved in.

The decentralization of the fight is probably its greatest strength in that the Soviets may be capable of cutting off one head but there are still 400 other heads out there willing to do battle.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I think it is very important for us to try to put something about American culture in perspective. What we are witnessing today and particularly in the broadcast media is a tremendous emphasis on actualities, as they call them. In other words, they report an event, for instance this disaster that happened in Kansas City. So we hear that something fell and then we spend the next 5 to 10 minutes listening to people who have experienced some kind of problem or suffering or whatever injury.

Of course, our media is unable to go into Afghanistan and have actualities like they had with My Lai or something of this nature. They focus in on something. They are unable also to understand the Afghan society and they put things in the context of American military thinking.

Right now, I would concur with what you say, Congressman Ritter, that there is no real advantage to the Afghan freedom fighter who develops a kind of a Western military organization against the Soviet Union which is enjoying technological and military superiority when the Afghans have a dearth of weapons. If, sometime in the future, they have the resources that they need, maybe then they can sit down and decide among themselves militarily how they can direct the use of these weapons.

Right now, the real value of the resistance is that it is decentralized, as you said. It is locally rooted. It has a grassroots strength. That is why it is growing in its development of morale and resistance.

Mr. RITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to inquire a little further concerning the poison gas. You spoke of hydrogen cyanide. What are the effects of hydrogen cyanide?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I used that particular phrase because I have heard about a number of kinds of effects that have been brought upon Afghans by use of various poison substances, particularly those in the provinces. They are delivered by bombs or other

means. I am not an expert on anything having to do with chemical warfare, unfortunately.

I asked some friends of mine who are in the military to label the kinds of effects that I was able to describe. I described the whole gamut of things. We are talking about lethal chemicals. In other words, they are chemicals from which people do not recover after they have been visited upon them. Some of these are bombs, and so forth.

I think that there is an individual who is coming after me who is much more qualified to speak to this subject. I would prefer to pass on it if I may so that you might have a chance to ask him. Maybe he can describe to you the kinds of poison or chemical warfare he has witnessed. I have not been an eyewitness to these things, so anything I would say here would be hearsay.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you.

I have one other thing to ask you. Independent of the hearings, somebody who came to see us the other day has had friends and associates working in Afghanistan in teams and described to us the control of the Afghan people by the Soviet Union and whatever allies they have. It was very limited and is confined to towns, and in fact within a very few kilometers of Kabul, there are no Russians moving freely around. The freedom fighters, the liberation forces, and people connected with them are entirely free.

Is that true? Have you any information on that?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I think that the statement that Nahid made is indicative of that kind of information.

Let me share with you an interesting bit of information that was reported in the newspapers. That is that just north of Kabul, the primary Soviet airbase is at a place called Bagram. It is right now the basic headquarters of the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan. Understand now, this is the headquarters.

Mrs. FENWICK. How far from Kabul is this airbase?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. It is just about 40 kilometers north of Kabul, directly as the crow flies. It is a little bit over some mountains and hills.

So we are talking here about something that obviously the Soviets regard as very important to them. There was a recent attack on this base by some freedom-fighting units that used gas, spreading it on the open sewers or irrigation streams that surround the area, go through the area, and so forth. They lit the gas as it went through there—sort of like the Cuyahoga River used to be in my home State of Ohio—and it caught fire. As a result, the supply dumps for petroleum, weaponry, and I am told even quite a few numbers of aircraft, both jets and helicopter gunships, were destroyed.

Now that to me is an indication that the Soviets, even within that area that they probably feel has to be their most secure within the country, have to feel there is a major threat. They have had tremendous battles around that region. Somewhere a large number of tanks have been lost because of the inability to maintain their own security.

I am told also that foreigners who are not Russian who travel in and around Kabul have to fear for their lives too because most Afghans now recognize the fact that those foreigners who are in Afghanistan are from the Eastern bloc. Therefore, they are not

welcome. There have been some incidents where individuals from Germany, and so forth, and some Americans as well who are still there, have been killed because people thought they were obviously Soviets.

So what is going on now in Afghanistan in the urban centers is increased urban terrorism. Some of this is a part of the organizations that one hears about in Pakistan. They have linkage to that. Others are some of the leftist groups that are opposed to Soviet presence in their country. They may have leftist political views like Tito and Alexander Dubcek. Indeed, one of the groups calls itself the Dubceks, which is significant because they are trying to indicate that they do not support the idea of Soviet occupation, even though they may be leftist in political philosophy.

I think it is important for us to understand that we are talking about a broad-based nationalism here, not just one that has again this religious focus that our media so often brings to bear.

Mrs. FENWICK. I did want to say that the term "Muslim" has for me no pejorative connotation. I think it is a great religion and it has never struck me as something that could be considered pejorative.

I want to ask you also about tanks. We were told that the tanks that the Soviets were bringing into Afghanistan were a remarkably fine make or number or model and were equipped to make the people inside the tanks free of any danger of gas. Do you know anything about the quality of the tanks?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Again I am not an expert in Soviet affairs. Maybe the individual coming later who is an expert on Soviet affairs might be able to comment on that. I do know that use of tanks in Afghanistan in certain locales can be very devastating. They are not very effective in combating opposition in the elevated areas. I have heard that the guns, whatever, that propel missiles and rockets and artillery from the tanks, can only go to a certain level. So if the freedom fighters can get above that level, they can be safe from the kind of attack that brings.

Again I am not really a specialist in that area. I have just heard this.

Mrs. FENWICK. I think my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Is my understanding correct that 85 percent of the countryside is controlled by the freedom fighters?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Again demographically it is hard to come up with exact figures but I think it is safe to say that, except for very small areas within certain urban areas and bases at night in many cases and in many areas throughout the day, the control of the area is in the hands of the Afghans.

Mr. PRITCHARD. What percentage of the people would you say?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. What percentage of the people are under control of the Afghans?

Mr. RITTER. What percentage are under the controlled area or under those controlled by the Soviets?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I always enjoy these demographic questions because those of us who have lived in Afghanistan have struggled

so long in trying to come up with some real accurate demographic information. I do not mean in any way to be offensive to the process.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I would not take it as an accurate figure but is it roughly 50-50?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. We are talking about a country that is not highly urbanized. Kabul itself has been variously estimated at being between ½ million and 1 million strong population. Probably somewhere between that is where most people set it.

Then we are talking about cities like Herat that may be 100,000 or less that at various times is under the control of the freedom fighters. Qandahar during the spring was in the hands of the freedom fighters and then retaken by the Soviet troops and then retaken by the freedom fighters. This kind of thing goes on in other urban centers as well.

But the majority of the Afghan population lives in the countryside.

Mr. PRITCHARD. So a majority move around.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. They are resisting, those who have not been forced out of the country.

Mr. PRITCHARD. The other thing is how about the life of the people in there as far as their ability to raise crops? Obviously they have food problems in that country. Is this a matter of crops not being able to be raised or transportation of crops to the cities? What is happening there?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. One of the real devastating weapons that the Soviets are able to use against the Afghans is the reconnaissance aircraft that are able to take pictures of what one would call agricultural planting and then they follow the later growth. Then when it reaches a certain stage prior to ripening and harvesting, these crops, et cetera, are destroyed through the use of phosphorus or bombs or other incendiary kinds of weaponry.

So that of course is demoralizing. The Afghans have to rely on these things for their lives. During the beginning of this last decade the Afghans were just approaching self-sufficiency in grain, which is their major staple. At various times the amount that they would have to import into the country was dependent primarily on the status of drought conditions or things of this nature.

So they were just approaching the self-sufficiency level and of course that means that there is not a surplus. Most of the planting is concentrated in valleys, which are very observable areas, and in major irrigation projects that were supported by the United States and the Soviet Union in years prior to the occupation. So it is easy to go to these areas and lay waste to any kind of planting that had been made and also to focus in on various fertile valleys.

This is indeed what has happened. There is a lot of bombing taking place in the valleys to wipe out the food supply. This is a very serious problem for the Afghans.

Mr. PRITCHARD. What about the availability of fertilizers and items that are necessary to maintain the food supplies?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. At one time there was a project that the United States was supporting but I am certain that they do not have the availability of fertilizers other than the very basic night soil kinds of fertilizers that the Afghans have been using for centuries.

Mr. PRITCHARD. My understanding is that the Russians have been changing their strategy somewhat in the last 4 or 5 months and have gone to some areas and said we will give you a certain amount of freedom; you will stop your activities, your resistance and we will in a sense kind of allow you to operate as long as we run the foreign policy and the internal policies of the country; we will give you a certain amount of freedom and we will not tell you what to do.

The reports I have show that those efforts have been mainly failures because there has been so much animosity built up that they cannot bridge that gap. Is that accurate and is the result accurate?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Yes; it is accurate. All of the information I have is of the same nature. One must understand that the Soviets never were a popular people in Afghanistan, even in days before the occupation. However, the kinds of suffering that have been visited upon the Afghans is much more devastating than anything they have encountered before.

So the feeling is obviously not one that would promote that kind of thing. You will hear testimony later I believe from one of the individuals who has come here from Afghanistan about an attempt to supply them with weapons to fight against other tribal units. But then these groups use those weapons and turn them back on the Soviets.

Mr. FASCELL. Your time has expired, Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gouttierre, some 17 years ago for NBC I did a documentary on Soviet economic penetration of Afghanistan. I have followed with disgust and disapproval the military takeover.

I would like to ask for just one moment a little bit about the Center for Afghan Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Is that a one-man operation? Is it a major operation? Are you devoting full time to the studies of Afghanistan?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. The Center for Afghan Studies was started back in the early seventies when a group of American scholars were looking for an institutional base for an association that they had started called the Afghanistan Studies Association. They went to a number of major universities that had Middle Eastern study centers, et cetera, and this was at a time when moneys for international programing were decreasing in number and they did not respond favorably.

There was a young man at our university—this is when I was still director of the Fulbright Foundation in Afghanistan—who approached our chancellor at the University of Nebraska at Omaha who is now the president of the University of Nebraska System and said this is an opportunity for our university to enter into the international studies of international education. He took this challenge and the risks attendant with it and they started an Afghanistan studies program.

Mr. LANTOS. Would you say it is the major or one of the major Afghanistan studies programs?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Of course I would say that, but I am not really aware of other centers for Afghanistan studies.

I want to respond to another part of your question. It became the foundation upon which we did build other foci for international studies at our university. We have other programs of a rather extensive nature. But we do have a couple of research associates there who are formerly Afghan scholars themselves who have come to the United States as refugees.

In addition to myself there are two other Americans who are actively involved in research on Afghanistan. We have a large number of research associates considering the study of Afghanistan, most of the scholars who are well known, people like Louis Dupree and Richard Newell, et cetera, who are research associates of our center. We have some 25 or so research associates and they utilize the resources that we have collected. We have the largest or at least we consider it the most centralized and organized library on the study of Afghanistan in the Western Hemisphere.

So that is what the center for Afghan studies is. I am glad you asked. I thought nobody would.

Mr. LANTOS. I thought you might be glad and I am glad you had this chance to put in that plug.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Not many people expect to find a center on Afghanistan studies in Omaha, Nebraska, but it does exist.

Mr. LANTOS. I have a broader question which relates to the aid Afghanistan is receiving from abroad. I wonder if you could run down as best you can, having devoted much of your time to the study of this, the kind, the extent, the scope of aid that the Afghan freedom fighters are receiving from either neighboring countries or from countries far away.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. You talk about aid that the Afghans are receiving. You are talking about the Afghan freedom fighters now, not the Afghan Government?

Mr. LANTOS. That is correct.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. That has become somewhat of an interesting question, particularly in light of the television show that I mentioned in my testimony, the television show that Carl Bernstein put together and also the article that he has had recently published in the New Republic.

The contention is that the Afghans are enjoying the kind of weaponry that they need to combat the Soviet military and technological superiority. There is even the claim that some 60 of these MI helicopter gunships have been destroyed and knocked down by the weapons that the Afghan freedom fighters now have.

I have found no evidence, whatsoever, that would in any way substantiate this particular claim or any other claim that would indicate that the amount of support that the Afghan freedom fighters are enjoying is anywhere near the levels that Mr. Bernstein has been talking about. I think it creates a tremendous misconception.

Mr. LANTOS. Let me be specific. What help are they getting and from whom?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. The help that I believe that they are getting is primarily that they are generating themselves through the interdicting of convoys.

Mr. LANTOS. Leaving all of that aside, leaving the captured weapons from the Soviet army aside, I want to know what your testimony is with respect to outside help.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I think that the freedom fighters are getting a certain amount of Soviet weaponry from the supplies that the Egyptians perhaps or the Chinese might have had. But I have not seen that myself. I think that small arms weaponry, perhaps some antitank weaponry—

Mr. LANTOS. Up to now I have been very much impressed by your testimony, but I believe you are becoming very evasive. As a student of the subject, it is self-evident that unless they continue to receive significant supplies from abroad, their long-term viability is very limited. So this is a very central question to the continuance of their fight.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. You said that unless they continue to receive. I do not believe that they have received yet the kind of weaponry that that would imply or suggest. It is my belief that there is some weaponry that has come to the freedom fighters, probably through Pakistan. With or without their support I do not know. I think that they are having difficulty coming to terms with that. There is some indication that the Pakistanis have interdicted some of the weapons, particularly the SAM-7 kind of weaponry that is so important to combating the helicopter gunships and the other elements of their superiority.

I am sorry. I do not have the numbers of weapons or amounts of dollars. Mr. Bernstein has said somewhere in the neighborhood of \$20 million to \$40 million worth of weaponry has been introduced into the situation in Afghanistan. That is a lot of weapons with regards to the Afghan freedom fighters. I do not see that that kind of weaponry has yet been obtained by the freedom fighters.

Mr. LANTOS. The concluding paragraph of your statement calls on the Congress of the United States to proceed in providing assistance to Afghanistan. What form should that take?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I believe again that the Reagan administration has made a decision or at least some kind of moral if not physical commitment to the providing of some assistance to the freedom fighters. I do not know to what extent that occupies in terms of numbers and amounts and kinds of weaponry.

But what I am talking about is if indeed that question does come up, I hope the Congress when it studies the question itself will take into consideration the kinds of information we have provided about the kind of genocide, et cetera, that has been visited upon the Afghans and to take with them the knowledge that the Afghans are going to continue the resistance.

As the Afghans say, they may destroy our country but they will never conquer us.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Gouttierre, would you introduce the next witness at the table please?

Without objection I have an opening statement from my colleague who is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations. Congressman Bonker could not be here today. He is in Europe attending a conference.

The statement will be inserted in the record right after my opening statement. It starts out: In the annals of the last 30 years where nations' inhumanity to other nations are recorded, one would have great difficulty in finding a case as horrible as what the Soviet Union is doing in Afghanistan today.

Our next witness is Malik Muhammed Hussain Wardak, an Afghan guerrilla fighter leader.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE, are you going to translate his oral statement for him?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Yes; we have prepared an English, translation, of his very brief statement that Malik Wardak will be making. If you want me to translate this by paragraph I am willing to do that. He is going to read his statement in any case in Dari, unless you suggest we read it in English and then we can respond to questions.

Mr. FASCELL. I would like to give him the opportunity to testify so why don't you let him make his statement and we can read it.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Mr. Wardak will now make his statement.

Before he does that, I would like to indicate to you what type of individual he is because I think it is important. We have been talking about the nature of the Afghan resistance. This man comes from the central part of Afghanistan. He has come here under tremendous difficulty to appear before this hearing and to make his testimony.

I think it is important that we take a look and understand that we are viewing an individual here who has seen a great deal of the kind of suffering, et cetera, that has been perpetrated upon the Afghan people and that it is hard to view or to observe or to bring the media in to see because it is located in the remote areas of Afghanistan where the resistance is growing, particularly in what I would call a grass roots opposition to the presence of the Soviets.

So he is a man from the central part of Afghanistan. He will now read his testimony. He speaks both languages of Pashtoo and Dari. Pashtoo is his primary tongue but because I speak Dari better than Pashtoo and we had to work together on this statement, we came to an agreement that it would be done in Dari.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Wardak?

[Mr. Wardak read his statement in Dari.]

We do not want to interrupt him because we want his speech for rebroadcast purposes.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. He says he is finished and if you have some questions we can go ahead. He added a few things that he felt very strongly about.

I will now read Mr. Malik's prepared statement.

**STATEMENT OF MALIK MUHAMMED HUSSAIN WARDAK,  
AFGHAN GUERRILLA FREEDOM FIGHTER LEADER, PRESENTED  
BY THOMAS E. GOUTTIERRE, INTERPRETER**

Mr. GOUTTIERRE [reading]:

My name is Malik Muhammed Hussain Wardak. I am a tribal leader in the war of resistance from Shineez in the Wardak province of central Afghanistan. I have travelled from the center of Afghanistan to be here today before the Congress of the United States of America to give testimony regarding the genocide against and the trampling of the human rights of the people within Afghanistan as a result of the Soviet occupation of my country.



This is a trip that was not without danger. It took me nearly three weeks to get out of Afghanistan and almost two days on an airplane to arrive just last night. However this trip is worth any danger if only to provide an opportunity to describe for you the real situation inside Afghanistan. I appreciate and welcome the opportunity to be here today.

Unfortunately I do not speak English and I know that you do not understand the languages I speak. I could speak literally for hours on the tragic and cruel conditions that confront us in Afghanistan. I realize that a long presentation is not appropriate for this setting.

Therefore I would like to mention those areas about which we are most concerned. I will welcome any questions related to these concerns or to any other areas of importance to you. Given the circumstances, I have the hope that by responding to your questions I will, to the best of my ability, provide you with the best information.

First, we are most concerned about who we are fighting. Not all of the occupation troops are Soviet.

Here he went on to mention that he felt some of the troops that he had seen were from Cuba and Czechoslovakia and other countries of Eastern Europe who are part of the Warsaw Pact [begins reading]:

Second, we are concerned with Soviet tactics to pit one tribal unit against another. For example much of our weaponry has come from the Soviets. Their objective was to persuade us to use these weapons against tribal groups in regions bordering our own. Instead we use these weapons to fight the Soviets.

Third, the types of aerial weaponry utilized by the Soviet forces are devastating to us. There are six basic types that I have seen ranging from reconnaissance planes to deep penetrating bombs with wide devastation capacity to fast white jets dropping fire bombs to MI-24 helicopters, launching rockets, artillery fire, bombs and rapid machinegun fire to immobilizing gas bombs, which also include explosive articles, and camouflaged bombs in the form of toys and pens capable of blowing off limbs.

Fourth, not only are freedom fighters being killed but so are our women and children. No life remains in those areas bombed by the Soviet warships.

Fifth, where do we get our weapons? We inside Afghanistan obtain almost all of our weapons from captured Soviet convoys, defecting Afghan troops and purchases made in the border areas.

Sixth, our ability to maintain contacts and supply lines with other tribal units and similar confederations within Afghanistan is very important. I hope you might be interested in knowing how we began our resistance and how tribal units came to combine into confederations.

I would be glad to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. FASCELL. He got rather eloquent there at the end with some extemporaneous remarks. Do you want to give us the benefit of your interpretation of those remarks please?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I think the information that he was providing at that particular time primarily was devoted to an expansion of the kinds of weaponry that was being used by the Soviets. He described essentially six kinds. I mentioned reconnaissance bombs. He was talking about the ability of these to detect let's say troops of population or war materiel and things of this nature, things that would come up on a screen that would detect iron and things of that nature.

He talked about, as he described them, the fast white jets that dropped fire bombs and he went on to describe these particular fire bombs as the kind that after the bomb had exploded that when a person went into the area if he came into contact with any of the smoke or the ashes, et cetera, that were produced by that, that it would create a kind of burning wound on the body that would take up to six months to heal.

He talked about the MI helicopter gunships which were able to launch rockets and artillery fire, bombs and rapid machinegun fire.

He went on to describe how many thousands of rounds per minute, et cetera, that came from these machineguns.

He talked about deep penetrating bombs, something again I do not really understand. I am not a military expert. This is something he explained to us last night where bombs would come in and enter the ground and an area of some depth would explode. He said sometimes it would bring up water. In other words they went to some kind of water level. It would explode and create a tremendous devastation and in effect create its own sort of shrapnel by all of the ground material that would be raised around the area. It would essentially commit a particular very large area of ground rubble.

He talked about immobilizing gas bombs, bombs that would come down and would explode above the air just like the fire bombs would and would immobilize people for a period of say 40 minutes or so, and then for maybe 2 or 3 days their ability to hear would be eliminated. So, this was essentially an immobilizing kind of gas bomb.

Also these same kinds of immobilizing gas bombs seem to have this kind of residue that came to the ground, after exploding first in the air, that he described as long strings that had kind of a gelatin composition to them and if anybody touched them they had the ability to create their own kind of explosion. It sounds something like a phosphorus kind of explosion.

Again, I use that phrase not with any degree of military or scientific knowledge. That is the kind of description that we obtained. They could sit out in snow for a period of months and if a person went up and touched them or hit them, they would explode.

He also mentioned the camouflaged bombs that one of the members of the panel mentioned before that looked to be in the form of toys or pens. He said, "Who wouldn't want to pick up a pen?" He said, "I like pens." So he said they are capable of blowing off limbs. This is essentially that which he was expanding on.

Then he made one particular point. He said not only are freedom fighters being killed—that is when he was making the emphasis here—but so are women and children. This is one of the major points he was making.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much. On behalf of the commission and on behalf of the subcommittee I certainly want to thank Mr. Wardak for the danger which he has incurred and the time and effort he has made to get here and to make this testimony available to the commission and the subcommittee.

I want you to thank him for us and to assure him that it is very, very important testimony. As far as I know, it is the first time it has ever been presented on the record officially. We want to express our deep appreciation.

Now we are ready for some questions.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I am going to ask another friend of mine to join us because there are some technical things in here and I would like to use his technical expertise.

Mr. FASCELL. Please identify him for the record.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. His name is Professor Bashir.

Mr. FASCELL. Professor, thank you for helping us out. You are very welcome here.

Mr. Ritter.

Mr. RITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I too wish to express my deep appreciation to Malik Muhammed Hussain Wardak for coming to the U.S. Congress.

He has stated that it took 3 weeks to get out of the mountains and exit Afghanistan. How did he make this voyage?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. He said that night and day, essentially, he had to come on foot and that he had to traverse, essentially, three mountain ranges or over three mountain passes to traverse to get into Pakistan itself. So, I think, to answer your question how did he do it, he walked out. He came by foot. In that area there are not any trucks or buses or cars available to us to come out of the country.

Mr. FASCELL. I think on other questions if you do not mind, would you ask your question out loud and let him answer out loud, even though it may not be on the record?

Mr. RITTER. How long was that distance? How many miles across those three mountain ranges on foot?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. We are having a little difficulty. Again we are talking about statistics that are more reasonably explained. We are concerned about miles and kilometers and things like that. They are talking about days of travel.

Mr. RITTER. How many hours a day did Malik travel?

Mr. WARDAK. He said that the majority of the freedom fighters who come out in this fashion spend anywhere from up to 15 to 40 days depending on where they are from. I am paraphrasing. They travel from sunrise to sunset.

Mr. RITTER. I would like to ask Mr. Malik Wardak another question. He mentions that they are not only fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan, that they are fighting some other kinds of troops. You mentioned something about Cuban troops. Have they been able to positively identify them?

I heard, when I was in the border areas, that people suspected that there were Cuban troops, that they looked like Cuban troops. What kinds of identification does he have? What can he tell us?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. He says on some of the weapons and materiel that these individuals bring with them there is indication that they come from other countries other than the Soviet Union. He said also when these soldiers were wounded that they ask them where they are from in the hopes that they will help them get better or take them somewhere where they can get their wounds attended to. They say that they are from Cuba or Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia. He says after that, just as they would do to us, we dispatch them as well.

So this is what he says. They find out most of their information by asking them and these individuals, in the hopes that they will be taken care of in some form or another, say that they are from Cuba or Czechoslovakia or things of this nature.

Mr. RITTER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am particularly concerned about the gas. Has Mr. Wardak noticed any difference in the color of the gas? What color or is it without color?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. He says it has a black smoke and sometimes it has a feature that is like a fire explosion but primarily in terms of color we are talking about it has a black colored smoke.

Mrs. FENWICK. Is that true of all of the gases that are dropped?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. He says essentially other than that it is red but he is talking about the kinds of things that come down in the form like snow. Again, I am not really very knowledgeable on this. He says that its appearance is something like fire afterwards. Then it has sort of a red smoke.

Mrs. FENWICK. Which color is the one that gives the burn on the body that takes 6 months to heal?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. From what he said I am not certain that that is essentially gas, that it might be something like a phosphorus bomb, the effects of that. He said that he did not give it a color like black smoke, that it had sort of a fire effect.

Mrs. FENWICK. Is that one that has the gelatinous fibers, strings?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I don't think so. No; it is not. It is the kind that are essentially incendiary. Do you want me to ask him that same question?

Mr. FASCELL. No; thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is not a terribly pretty subject but I think Mrs. Fenwick is correct in pursuing it. I would like to ask our witness whether he knows of many deaths that have occurred through the effects of gases rather than the effect of more conventional weapons such as rifles and bullets. Is the use of gas a widespread occurrence?

Also what reports does he have from other parts of Afghanistan where he might personally have traveled? And what has he witnessed as far as the number of people who have been killed or injured by the use of gas weapons?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. He answered the question primarily in reference to the Mujahadin themselves coming face to face with these kinds of weapons. He said that three, four, five individuals are in a group because they are not in great convoys or platoons of men and when they see these kinds of weapons being used against them, they flee to areas to where they can avoid it. They go to water to cover their clothing with water and cover their faces so they do not experience the effects of this gas.

He is talking about wherever it is used, three, four, five people feel the effects of this kind of gas.

Mr. LEACH. I think it should be emphasized that we are hearing testimony today of possibly as heroic a struggle as has ever been recorded in history. We are also hearing testimony of a tragedy that is somewhat different and that is the renewed use of gas warfare.

I stress this because there have really been only four recorded instances in the use of gas until the last several years, the first being World War I, the second in Ethiopia in the mid-1930's, the third being Japanese usage in Taiwan and China, and the fourth

being the Egyptians. Now it would appear that the Soviets are experimenting with a kind of gas warfare in Third World settings, not only here but in Southeast Asia as well.

Some of the descriptions of Mr. Wardak are very similar to the descriptions that we have heard from refugees coming out of Cambodia and Laos. I think this is worthy of very serious note. Gas is the most devastating weapon that has ever been created and it is being experimented with at this time in very remote areas of Afghanistan.

I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder if our guest could tell us if the freedom fighters are in larger numbers today than say 5 months ago?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. He says his first answer is yes, that the numbers are greater today than they were 5 months ago but he says the thing that is most important is that he feels their power is stronger. He described the area near the city of Kabul where something would happen that would be recognized as an operation of the Mujahadin, the use of a weapon similar to a Molotov cocktail, something of that nature.

Immediately the people are aware of the fact that the Mujahadin had come and they try to flee the area so that they are not involved in any kind of conflict that would be coming from the kinds of things that would happen with the Army, the Soviet confrontation with the Mujahadin.

He went on to mention the large number of cities in Afghanistan, Herat, Qandahar, et cetera, where he says that the Soviets cannot set 10 feet outside of a city. He says they control the mountains day and night. Even in the day if the soldiers step out of certain areas surrounding various cities, these urban centers or major villages and trading centers, commercial centers, that the Soviet troops are either interdicted or attacked and counted amongst the casualties.

Mr. PRITCHARD. My understanding is that 80, 85 percent of the men in the Afghanistan Army have drifted away but there still is an Afghan Army that is controlled by the Soviet-dominated central government today. I do not know whether it is 15,000 or 20,000 or 10,000 or whatever it is.

Are those people who have stayed with that Army in sympathy with the leaders? Are they Communists? Is it a matter of convenience or survival for them to stay in the Army? For what reason have they stayed in the Army?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. He said that the Afghan soldiers, those with the Soviet forces, who come out to confront them are faced with the situation where they know that if they do not go forward and fight against the Mujahadin that they are likely to be killed from behind by the Russians themselves. So they prefer to take their chances with the Mujahadin. As he described it, they are brothers. They are fellow tribal members, et cetera, and they arrive and say thank God, you have arrived safely and they turn over to them the weapons, et cetera, that they have brought.

So the basic answer is that he is faced in the confrontations between the Mujahadin of his area and the combined Russian and

Afghan forces and that the Afghans, as he has seen them, have felt that they were better off to go forward and to confront the Mujahadin and take their chances in that regard and by implication also I think that they did not feel strongly for the attack in which they were participating in cooperation with the Russians against the Mujahadin.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Pritchard, your time has expired.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Gouttierre, please tell Mr. Wardak that we are very grateful to him for his appearance here today and that we admire his courage, his struggle for independence and freedom.

Mrs. FENWICK. I would like to give him a pen that does not explode and I want to thank you. [Laughter.]

Mr. WARDAK. Thank you very much.

Mr. FASCELL. Now we are going to hear from Karen McKay who is the executive director for the Committee for a Free Afghanistan. Karen?

**STATEMENT OF KAREN MCKAY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,  
COMMITTEE FOR A FREE AFGHANISTAN**

Ms. MCKAY. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will speak in English.

I could not say more eloquently than you did what the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan represents in the most blatant display of naked aggression against a sovereign country since the Nazis invaded Poland. Afghanistan's only error was to be located within the Soviet empire's ever-expanding sphere of influence. The Russians say that they did it to help their neighbor.

In their bestial occupation of Afghanistan, we see the fate of those who would reject Russia's beneficence, those who would remain free.

The Soviet Union's war of genocide and scorched earth, which Professor Gouttierre and Mr. Wardak described to us clearly, will stand in the annals of infamy alongside the Nazi holocaust and the Cambodian holocaust.

The Soviets, as Professor Gouttierre has said, are systematically denuding the soil of Afghanistan of all forms of life: vegetable, animal and human, sweeping in ever-widening concentric rings around their tenuous footholds in their cities and their military installations.

Yet as Congressman Ritter said and Professor Gouttierre said, we, the American people, hear very little about these atrocities against mankind, these basest violations of fundamental human rights to freedom and to life itself. We hear very little of the valiant struggle of the Afghan freedom fighters against the mightiest army on Earth which they have been fighting for a year and a half now with virtually their bare hands and with almost no outside support whatsoever.

For this reason the Committee for Free Afghanistan was formed in January of this year to get the story to the American people, to tell them what is happening to a noble people in a far-off land who, like us, cherish freedom and cherish it more than life itself. The Afghan people alone in the world, we want people to understand,

are standing up to the Soviets in their drive for control of the world.

Afghanistan as you understand is pivotal to Soviet circlment of the Persian Gulf in Asia.

One of the primary purposes of the committee is to try to combat disinformation. I was very pleased that Professor Goultierre went so deeply into the semantics matter. This is something we are trying very hard to teach, that they are freedom fighters or even Mujahadin but for God's sake not Muslim fanatics or fanatic Muslim fundamentalist insurgents, as they have been referred to.

You are about to see a portion of a half-hour film sponsored by the Committee for a Free Afghanistan. The segment you will see portrays but a small tip of the iceberg of what the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan means to the Afghan people.

Since this film was made, assembled from available footage, horror upon horror has been piled upon the Afghan victims of Soviet imperialism. Girls are snatched from villages and nomad camps, taken up in helicopters and raped and their bodies hurled to the earth below. Whole villages are massacred. The fire bombs that have been described are the size of oil drums and they incinerate everything beneath them when they detonate in the air. Bombings and strafings, mines, every kind of weapon is used, chemical warfare, biological warfare. They poison the wells. They use nerve gas which inflicts the most hideous death that man can imagine.

You see, along with playing a role in the Soviet Union's global strategy, Afghanistan is being used as a gigantic research and development laboratory for the weapons technology and tactics the Soviets will use against us, given the opportunity.

It is impossible to know how many Afghan people have died in those terrible, inaccessible mountains, perhaps 1 million, perhaps 2 million. We do not know. We do know that well over 2 million people have been driven from their homes as refugees into Pakistan, and they are coming at the rate now of some 100,000 a month. The refugee camps in Pakistan now comprise the world's largest refugee population. We do not know how many more there are in Iran or other countries.

I ask you now to watch the nightmare that is enveloping this courageous people, a people who have never accepted occupation in their very long history, a people who will fight to the last Afghan in defense of their freedom.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much.

Let's see this segment.

[Whereupon, a film was presented.]

Ms. MCKAY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce to you one individual, another man who has been through all of this. This is Shah Mahmud Safi. He was wounded near the Soviet border shortly after the Soviet invasion. He survived a nerve gas attack that killed a number of his colleagues.

He was then hit from an MI-24 helicopter, wounded in both legs badly. His left leg was blown apart by the exploding bullets. He laid in caves in mountains for 4 months while people put leaves on his leg to try to cleanse the wound. He then rode a horse for 22 days to Pakistan where he was operated on three times and told they could not save him.

His friends found him, brought him here to the United States to Johns Hopkins Hospital where they not only saved his leg but he is going to be all right and is going back to fight again as soon as the cast is removed.

Mr. FASCELL. We are very proud to meet him.

Thank you very much, Miss McKay, for making the film available.

Our next witness is Dr. Bashir. He is currently one of the founding members of the Afghan National Liberation Front, has visited the northwest frontier of the region three times and is working closely with freedom fighters. Dr. Bashir is a graduate of Johns Hopkins University Medical School and has been an associate professor of surgery at the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons in New York City.

Dr. Bashir?

#### STATEMENT BY DR. BASHIR, FOUNDING MEMBER OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

Dr. BASHIR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the committee and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, thank you for giving us this opportunity to appear before the elected representatives of the great people of the United States.

Those of us who have come before you are mostly Afghan nationals and are profoundly involved in the just and noble struggle of our people. We represent a cross section of Afghanistan, a nation of 17 million people who are right now pushed against the oppressive might of the Soviet Union.

We are involved not only because our nation is engaged in a life and death struggle but also because we regard this struggle of our people as a universal struggle for liberty and human dignity, for human rights and the rights of people to determine their own destiny. We are also deeply concerned that the failure of our struggle may not only mean the decimation of our small historical nation but it may mean the decisive defeat of forces of liberty and human dignity against totalitarianism and tyranny.

We believe that our present war of liberation represents the essence of all wars of true liberation that great nations such as yours have fought in the past. Thomas Jefferson, the greatest architect of democracy and statesmanship, wrote in 1813: "If ever there was a holy war, it was that which secured our liberties and gave us independence."

Today's war of liberation for our nation of Afghanistan is also in its truest sense a holy war. Only the strength of our faith in almighty God, only our uncompromising dedication to the highest values of human civilization, those of liberty, human rights, and human dignity, have kept the gigantic war machinery of the Soviet Union dead in their tracks.

As you know, the Afghan people have neither accepted their own Marxist-Leninist Party rule for the last 3 years nor have they accepted the shameless occupation of Afghanistan by all 85,000 Soviet troops for the past 19 months. It is the Afghan people with their local assemblies, the Mujahadin that have hurt the Soviet Red Army and at the end of 19 months the Soviets have gained no



more control over our nation or our countryside than before their invasion.

Ever since the bloody military Marxist coup of April 27, 1978, the liberation movement from Communist aggression sprang among the people inside and outside of Afghanistan. While before the invasion the struggle appeared as a battle primarily between communism and Islam, after the Soviet invasion, and increasingly ever since, the struggle has become a national struggle for survival of our nation under God, struggle for our soil, for our beloved independence, for our dignity, and for our honor.

While many of the organizations involved in this struggle are located in Pakistan and Iran and carry some titles, nevertheless for most of the people of Afghanistan, as it has been for the Irish and the Israelis, it is impossible to separate their feelings of nationalism from their feelings for their religion. Religion has been and is presently in this heterogeneous population of Afghanistan the rallying point, the unifying force of the nation.

While in Afghanistan the freedom fighters are rather united, though not under a single command whose logistics are at present neither impossible nor impractical, the opposition groups against Soviet forces and their puppet government in Pakistan, Iran, Arab countries, in Europe and in the United States seem to be only divided into groups for certain tactics and resistance.

But they are not divided in regard to their first and foremost purpose which unites them, which is the life force of our people: to see the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and for the people of Afghanistan to determine their own form of government without outside interference.

Because of the limitation of time, allow me to summarize the consequences of the Soviet invasion and the wishes of Afghan people to this august committee of the House of Representatives of the compassionate and fair people of the United States.

On the international level in regards to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the consequences of its continued occupation, the following facts may be mentioned. One, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has violated every normal international law and civilized accord which has been overwhelmingly agreed to by two general assembly resolutions, three foreign ministers conferences, the Organization of Islamic Sovereign Conference, by the Third Summit Conference of Foreign Aid, European Parliament of the European Summit, New Delhi Conference of Underlying Nations, Stockholm Conference of Permanent People's Tribunal and Cairo Conference of League of Sovereign and Arab Nations.

However the Soviet Union has continued to defy all of these international resolutions, the right of self-determination, international law and instruments.

Two, the Soviet Union has violated and continues to violate the universal declaration of human rights, international agreements on civil and political rights and the Geneva Convention of 1949 in regard to treatment of the Afghan civilian population and the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan.

As the consequences on the above violation, the U.S.S.R. has eliminated the hopes of international peace and has cast on the international horizon the dangerous clouds of insecurity and pessi-

mism among the great and especially the small nations. In addition, by invasion of Afghanistan the Soviet Union has defied and challenged the credibility of the members of the international community who are defenders of international law, self-determination, human rights, and human dignity.

The future course of many of these nations will be determined by the position taken by the Western democracies facing this challenge.

One, on the regional and strategic levels, the continued occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union has the following factual consequences. One, by occupation of Afghanistan the Soviet Red Army with their already strong military bases in the southwest of Afghanistan has come within effective striking range in the Persian Gulf basin and the Indian subcontinent. Today the Soviet Union is within 300 miles of the Strait of Hormuz which is regarded as the lifeline of the industrialized Western World and Japan.

Two, the border in Pakistan and Afghanistan which formed the scientific borders of the defense of India against the British Army was only possible when Afghanistan was a buffer state. In view of continued occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces, the border cannot possibly hold the spillover of the so-called revolution by limitation, subversion, and most eminently by supreme power intimidation among unstable neighbors. But already separatist Communist movements have been activated.

Three, any compromise on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan would allow free exercise of Soviet power and Soviet influence so essential for the economic survival of the industrial Western World and Japan.

In regard to the war of liberation of the people of Afghanistan against Soviet aggression, the following facts can be stated. One, almost the entire population of Afghanistan is in opposition to Soviet occupation and the puppet government of Babrak Karmal in Kabul. Two, forces of freedom fighters are becoming increasingly effective in their fervent guerrilla warfare.

Three, Afghan freedom organizations inside and outside Afghanistan have been able to orchestrate certain tactical military and international political operations. Four, it is a fact that Afghan freedom fighters have been able to wage an effective war of liberation in the 19 months following the massive Soviet invasion with great sacrifice of lives and material.

Five, there has been an exodus of about 2 million refugees from oppression to Pakistan and approximately over half a million into Europe. Six, Afghanistan has lost almost its entire civil service, military officers, health personnel, and academicians. They have been either imprisoned, executed or exiled.

It is obvious that the Soviets, having gained certain advantages, will not easily let go of their gains. For further consolidation of their gains and fulfilling their purpose, they are pursuing transparent policies.

One, in the international arena they are waging a tremendous campaign for disarmament and diversionary propaganda for political negotiations. Two, having gained the necessary time from the above, the Soviet Union is hopeful of waging a successful ongoing

war of attrition by sophisticated weaponry and famine in Afghanistan.

In search of a political solution, all attempts at negotiation including the latest of Lord Carrington have failed. It seems that the two major factors that may bring about any pressure on the Soviets to withdraw are one, a costly war against the Soviet Red Army by Afghan freedom fighters which will be economically costly, politically costly as far as her Asian republics and European satellites are concerned, and costly as far as the morale of the Red army and the people of the Soviet Union.

In order to accomplish this goal, it is obvious that the Afghan freedom fighter has to be supplied adequate and effective arms.

Two, the political, economic and technological pressures by the NATO forces, Islamic countries and the nonaligned nations have to be exerted on the U.S.S.R. in order to bring her to the table of negotiations.

In conclusion Mr. Chairman, this is a fact that any future negotiations on the destiny of the Afghan people cannot be successful if it is not based on the will of the people of Afghanistan, for they have proven in their past history as well in the past 19 months of their heroic national struggle for freedom that no iron curtain, no iron fist, no iron boots can impose another will over their own or subdue their love and determination for an independent, free, non-aligned and fully sovereign Afghanistan.

We sincerely believe that realization of the will of the people of Afghanistan by their just struggle will be the basis for a durable peace, to international security and real disarmament.

Allow me Mr. Chairman, to submit to the committee the following documents: one, the "Soviet Atrocities in Afghanistan" which documents facts through eyewitness reports; two, "Afghanistan under Soviet Occupation," a publication in Pakistan; three, the "Mecca Declaration of Islamic Sovereign Conference of January 1981"; and four, the "Permanent People's Tribunal, Afghanistan Session," Stockholm, May 1981.<sup>1</sup>

Thank you very much.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Dr. Bashir. We will be very happy to receive for the committee files the material you refer to. I want to thank you for a very cogent statement which delineates the problem so clearly.

Politically, as far as additional pressure is concerned coming from NATO or the United States, other countries, what else do you need in your judgment?

Dr. BASHIR. I think that the emphasis on the problem as it has to be aired for the public opinion and the world opinion will have first of all a tremendous political pressure on the Soviet Union. It is a campaign essentially not only in the United States but in Western democracies and all over the world.

Second, I believe that the Western democracies and especially the Islamic countries have to take certain political measures to force the Soviet Union to negotiation by actually threatening certain withdrawal of their good offices or relations with the Soviet Union.

<sup>1</sup>These documents are on file in the staff office of the CSCE.

I think in this regard it would be very effective if the OIC members would suggest to the Soviet Union that if the Soviet Union would not withdraw from Afghanistan within a reasonable timetable, they will first render their economic relations useless with them and second, they would sever their political relations with them.

In the West I think that this cannot be accomplished. However I think the pressure of the Western democracies would be of great effect on the Soviets and with it of course the world public opinion would exert that pressure.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much.

Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Doctor, for coming and testifying. You recited a number of organizations, almost all of the organizations in the world outside of the Soviet orbit, that have taken stands opposed to the Soviet invasion.

In a political sense, do you really feel that the Soviets are moved by world public opinion?

Dr. BASHIR. As I pointed out, Mr. Pritchard, two factors are necessary to put enough pressure to bring them to the negotiating table. Political pressure as I said has to be mounted, not stated the way it has been since their invasion on Christmas Day of 1979. It has to be mounted. I just related to Mr. Chairman my feeling about that kind of pressure.

But the second thing that is essential, I think to be realistic, the Soviet Union having made these gains is not going to be very willing to get out of Afghanistan. It has many, many advantages, some of which have not been in my report. For that reason I think the Soviet Union has to consider the cost-effectiveness of her occupation. The Soviet Union sees that the cost-effectiveness of her operations in Afghanistan is not to her advantage whether it be from human life losses, materiel losses, economic losses, and their repercussions within its own republics. Then I believe she will have to come to the table of negotiation.

Mr. PRITCHARD. We have not been very successful in getting other nations in the world to go along with us, whether it was to stay away from the Olympic games or to ban shipments. So often our efforts have not been matched by other efforts in the world. It seems to me it does take a world effort, not just a U.S. effort, to be successful in this case.

Maybe I am being pessimistic about the ability to make the Soviets change directions, but it seems to me that it will take a very great effort and quite a bit of time to make them actually pull out of Afghanistan and to change their direction. They are stubborn even in the face of very counterproductive activities on their part. They have been very slow and very unwilling, particularly when it comes to moving out of neighboring adjacent areas.

I think the Soviets have shown an incredible callousness toward world opinion.

Dr. BASHIR. Congressman Pritchard, I believe that that callousness has a measure. No matter how callous the Soviet Union is and how powerful it is, there comes a point when it has to give in. I think the important thing is how to bring about that point.

I agree with you that the Western democracies did not go along fully with the United States on this issue, but we must recognize that there is a psychological effect on the Soviet superpower which has up to now completely dominated Asia, is almost overshadowing Europe and you are seeing its effect in Ottawa.

If we let this trend continue, there is no question of agreeing with you. However I think we can reverse this trend by really putting our efforts the world over and especially I think by the leader of the Western democracies, the United States. I think once that is emphasized I am sure that the Soviet Union will take that into consideration.

I strongly believe and sincerely believe that the superpower policies and psychologies among nations or over nations is a very dominant thing, just like among people. Being a physician I am very aware of it.

So it is also on a state level. When the United States puts down her foot, then I think you will see that other countries in the Western democracies as well as others will rally around.

Mr. PRITCHARD. One of the ways, of course, that the Western World has moved is by television in Europe and the United States. But in this case there is very little footage that is taken. There is a lack of live television footage that comes out which would be dramatic. What we saw here is a good example. But there has been a great shortage of that footage. I think it severely impairs our ability to rally world opinion without that access.

I am sure the Soviets are aware of this and have done everything to cut back on the availability of television access to Afghanistan.

I want to say that there is no reluctance on the part of this member, and that is why I have gone to the camps twice. I went there immediately after the invasion and then with Congressman Ritter. The two of us went over there in January. So this member feels very strongly about it. But I do see the problem as a monumental problem that has far-reaching effects.

I thank you for your testimony.

Mr. FASCELL. Doctor, thank you very much. We appreciate the time that you gave us and your testimony.

Dr. BASHIR. Thank you very much.

Mr. FASCELL. Our next important witness is Mr. Seddiq Farhang, formerly the economic adviser to Babrak Karmal from March 1980 to January of 1981. Prior to that position Mr. Farhang was the Afghan Ambassador to Yugoslavia, a member of the only freely elected Parliament in Afghanistan's history, a Deputy Minister of Planning and a member of the Drafting Committee which rewrote the Afghan Constitution establishing a sharing of power between the King and the Parliament.

Mr. Farhang also spent some time as a political prisoner in the 1930's and the 1950's when his political views differed from those in power.

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you. We are delighted to hear from you.

**STATEMENT OF M. SEDDIQ FARHANG, FORMER ECONOMIC  
ADVISER TO BABRAK KARMAL**

Mr. FARHANG. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the attention of the U.S. Congress to the tragic events in Afghanistan and I do hope that this assembly would help in the better understanding of the justice of the cause of my country and render then better assistance.

I am going to confine myself to the subject which has been assigned to me which is the Soviet control of Afghanistan's administration and economy.

Mr. Chairman, let me start by saying that the Soviet control over the administrative machinery of Afghanistan, like the conquest of the political power, was accomplished in stages over a relatively long period of time through a well-prepared plan of action.

There are reasons to believe that as far back as the year 1955 when Kruschchev and Bulganin visited the southern region of Asia and discovered for themselves the deep-rooted differences left behind by the British withdrawal from the area such as the Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan and the Pashtunistan issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Soviet foreign affairs planners came to the conclusion that potential intrigue and eventual expansion existed in the region.

The subsequent rapid advance of arms technology in the Soviet Union, which enabled that power to accomplish near parity with the United States by the seventies, and the concurrent world energy crisis probably induced the Soviet planners to accelerate enactment of an existing strategy for southward expansion.

It is a well known fact that the Soviet Union is basically a totalitarian power. This means that the aim of the state and the party, which in reality is the other side of the same coin, is to control not a part but the totality of national life. Therefore the conquest of the administration as the executive arm of the state power becomes one of the first priorities of the Soviets whenever they decide to bring a new country or region under their control. However, the tactics used for this purpose are not always the same and may differ from one country to another, taking into consideration local conditions and the geopolitical situation of the region.

In the case of Afghanistan, the objective was achieved on the whole according to the following scenario.

Stage No. 1—preparation: This stage started in 1955 with the granting of credit in the amount of \$100 million for the development of the Afghan economy and concurrently for the supply of modern arms and training of army personnel, both inside Afghanistan and in the Soviet Union. As a result of these agreements, not only did Soviet economic and defense experts arrive in Afghanistan but a large number of Afghan youth and undergraduates were sent for the same purpose to the Soviet Union.

At the same time Soviet institutions were directed to train a large number of Russians including some Uzbeks, Tadjiks, and Turkomans not only in Persian and Pushtu, the two official languages of Afghanistan, but also in the history, geography, ethnology, and other disciplines connected with different facets of life in

the country, while new chairs of Afghanology were created in the universities and institutes.

Yet another aspect of this preparatory work was the foundation of a communist party under the guise of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan under the leadership of Noor Mohammed Taraki. The immediate task of the party was the propagation of ideology among the students, workers, and above all, the personnel of the armed forces.

Stage No. 2—infiltation: This stage began with the coup of July 1973 which was carried out jointly by the frustrated cousin of the King, Prince Daoud, and the Parcham faction of the People's Democratic Party under the leadership of Babrak Karmal. During this stage which continued with varying degrees of success up to the next coup in 1978, the Soviets took advantage of the presence of some Parchamite ministers in the government and introduced under the guise of advisers a large number of their Afghan affairs experts into the body of the local administration.

Since the armed forces and part of the economy had already been infiltrated, they now concentrated their work on planting their agents in the remaining branches of the administration and succeeded for example in the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Education, Agriculture, and Communication. Additionally, besides openly placing Parchamite ministers whom President Daoud tried to downgrade in the later part of his presidency, they had placed a number of their unknown sympathizers in the key positions within the administration, giving them access to all of the information they needed with respect to government policy.

Stage No. 3—began with the coup of 1978 which placed power in the hands of the reunited Democratic People's Party under the leadership of Taraki with a handpicked revolutionary council representing the supreme power of the state. All impediments to complete penetration of the administrative machinery by Russian advisers had now been removed.

They had permeated every division of the government. Delegation after delegation arrived not only from Moscow but in an increasing number from the Soviet central Asian republics. These delegations rapidly concluded agreements and contracts with their Afghan counterparts on such diverse subjects as building a copper smelter to that of printing textbooks for primary schools.

The armed forces was from the beginning the main target of Soviet penetration. With the spread of armed opposition to the regime in different parts of the country and the successive purge of the undesirable—religious and patriotic—elements of the officer corps, it became more and more imperative for the Soviet advisers/trainers to take command of operations and be involved in the actual fighting.

This in turn enraged more and more of the Afghan officers and soldiers who joined the freedom fighters, creating the need for more Soviet officers to command. According to one source, the number of Soviet advisers with the armed forces jumped from 2,000 in May 1978 to 7,000 by August of the same year. In any case it had reached more than 10,000 by the time Soviet troops openly invaded Afghanistan toward the end of 1979.

Although no substantial increase in the number of advisers occurred within the civil administrative apparatus, there was a sharp upgrading in the status of the advisers. If previously those advisers attached to the departments had access to the head of departments, they now had direct access to the ministers themselves.

Another characteristic of this stage, with particular significance for the economy of the country, was the almost sudden dismissal of experts and advisers from the noncommunist countries. Since Afghanistan received financial and technical assistance from different quarters, its body of advisers and experts until that time was multinational in character. In some ministries such as the Ministry of Planning, advisers from the Soviet Union worked side by side with those from the United States and West Germany.

Although in the second stage, during the presidency of Daoud, a slow but steady change could be detected in favor of the Soviets, there still existed an important contingent of Western and Third World experts working either under bilateral agreements or the United Nations programs. The West Germans for example were active in the field of industrial and technical development while the French concentrated in education and culture.

After the 1978 coup most of these Western advisers were induced to leave the country through a mixture of harassment and discouragement and their places were given either to nonqualified party members or to the nationals of Soviet satellite countries such as the East Germans and others. At the same time other changes emerged, most notably in that the administrative style of governing began to mirror the Soviet or other communist bloc models. Meetings were held on all and every occasion with music, banners, and slogans in which the ministers and other party dignitaries made lengthy and repetitious speeches on the sins of the previous regime and the merits of the new one, all sprinkled with servile adulation of everything Soviet and Russian.

The personality cult of the leaders Taraki and Amin reached Stalinist proportion, their pictures of every size adorning every office and shop.

In the case of workers and government employees, if some slight material advantage had been accorded to them, they were forced into so-called voluntary work during the weekends and national holidays, thus revising under a new title the time-bound forced labor which previously had been abolished.

More importantly, official Communist Party cells were organized inside each administrative unit. Party members, composed in most cases of opportunistic elements, not only supervised daily work performance, but spied and reported to the secret police on the private lives and opinions of employees and workers.

Later on the secret police was accorded a special place in the hierarchy of the state, responsible only to the top leaders, Taraki and Amin and now Karmal.

The secret police took advantage of its position and proceeded to arrest and summarily execute all of those who for one reason or another were considered as actual or potential enemies of the regime. Tens of thousands of people mainly belonging to the literate and educated class were assassinated in cold blood.



When I mention the figure of tens of thousands, I am not making an exaggeration in favor of my country. Hafizullah Amin himself declared that as of the time he took power, the first year of Communist rule in Afghanistan, only in one prison, one infamous prison, Pule Charkhi, 12,000 people have been executed. They were taken every night, night after night, to a place for I don't know what reason and they were executed and thrown half dead, half alive into ditches. Most of them were alive there.

This was going on night after night, week after week, month after month and for more than 1 year. This was in one prison, and in the city of Kabul there were many other prisons. And all over the country in every district, in every city and sometimes in every village there were prisons like that and the same execution was going on.

Another change was the creation in both the army and civil administration including the schools of the post of political commissaire. This office is responsible for the indoctrination of all employees, workers, pupils, and students with Communist ideology and the so-called party line response to all questions.

The unpredictable and erratic personality of Hafizullah Amin hampered complete Soviet control of the governmental administration apparatus. When he went so far as to eliminate Taraki and put himself in his place, without Soviet permission, the stage was set for a new and final stage.

Stage No. 4—Control: This period began with the Soviet troop invasion of Afghanistan in the last days of 1979. After eliminating Amin, Babrak Karmal was placed as the president of the Revolutionary Council and party boss. From then on Soviet control of the administration became complete, and in order to give to the new regime a semblance of legitimacy, a provisional constitution, modeled closely on that of the Soviet Union, was prepared and adopted by the self-appointed Revolutionary Council.

Although this document pays lipservice to principles of democratic freedom such as the freedom of belief, expression, and election, all of these are made meaningless by a simple provision announced in the first part of the document, article 4, to the effect that the party is the leading and guiding force of the society and the state in Afghanistan.

This is, in short, the result of more than 3 years of Communist rule and Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. It may be said without exaggeration that besides the invaluable loss of human life, from a strictly material point of view the country has been pushed back at least one generation. However this is based only on the losses inflicted until now. What the future has in store for my unfortunate country is beyond anybody's calculation.

In conclusion Mr. Chairman, I would like to add that what has happened to Afghanistan was a preplanned program for the occupation and the control of the country. This has succeeded. But from now on, there are other countries who are coming to the same position as once Afghanistan found itself.

I remember very well that during that period before the coup d'etat of the Communists in Afghanistan, the Russian papers, the Russian mass media, the Russian politicians, the Russian leaders, whatever, came to Afghanistan, when they went to a third country

they mentioned Afghanistan as an example of good neighborly relations between two countries with different social systems. And they called Afghanistan a good neighbor. But when they saw their chance for taking the country over, they became our worst enemy and this is what happened in my country. I hope that other people will take note of it.

Thank you very much.

[Mr. Farhang's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF M. SEDDIQ FARHANG, FORMER ECONOMIC ADVISER TO  
BABRAK KARMAL

The Soviet control over the administrative machinery of Afghanistan, like the conquest of the political power, was accomplished in stages over a relatively long period of time, through a well-prepared plan of action.

There are reasons to believe that, as far back as the year 1955, when Khrushchev and Bulganin visited the southern region of Asia and discovered for themselves the deep rooted differences left behind by the British withdrawal from the area, such as the Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan and the Pashtunistan issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Soviet foreign affairs planners came to the conclusion that potential intrigue and eventual expansion existed in the region. The subsequent rapid advance of arms technology in the Soviet Union, which enabled that power to accomplish near parity with the United States by the seventies, and the concurrent world energy crisis, probably induced the Soviet planners to accelerate enactment of an existing strategy for southward expansion.

It is a well known fact that the Soviet Union is basically a totalitarian power. This means that the aim of the state and the party (which in reality is the other side of the same coin) is to control, not a part but the totality of national life. Therefore, the conquest of the administration, as the executive arm of the state power, becomes one of the first priorities of the Soviets, whenever they decide to bring a new country or region under their control. However, the tactics used for this purpose are not always the same and may differ from one country to another, taking into consideration local conditions and the geopolitical situation of the region.

In the case of Afghanistan, the objective was achieved, on the whole, according to the following scenario:

Stage one: Preparation. This stage started in 1955 with the granting of credit in the amount of one hundred million dollars for the development of the Afghan economy and concurrently for the supply of modern arms and training of army personnel, both inside Afghanistan and in the Soviet Union. As a result of these agreements, not only did Soviet economic and defense experts arrive in Afghanistan, but a large number of Afghan youth and undergraduates were sent, for the same purpose, to the Soviet Union.

At the same time, Soviet institutions were directed to train a large number of Russians, including some Uzbeks, Tadjiks and Turkomans, not only in Persian and Pushtu, the two official languages of Afghanistan, but also in the history, geography, ethnology and other disciplines connected with different facets of life in the country, while new chairs of Afghanology were created in the universities and institutes. Yet another aspect of this preparatory work was the foundation of a communist party, under the guise of the "People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan," under the leadership of Noor Mohammed Taraki. The immediate task of the party was the propagation of ideology, among the students, workers, and above all, the personnel of the armed forces.

Stage Two: Infiltration. This stage began with the coup of July 1973 which was carried out jointly by the frustrated cousin of the king, Prince Daoud and the Parcham faction of the Peoples Democratic Party, under the leadership of Babrak Karmal. During this stage, which continued with varying degrees of success, up to the next coup in 1978, the Soviets took advantage of the presence of some Parchamite ministers in the government, and introduced under the guise of advisers, a large number of their Afghan affairs experts into the body of the local administration. Since the armed forces and part of the economy had already been infiltrated, they now concentrated their work on planting their agents in the remaining branches of the Administration and succeeded, for example, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Education, Agriculture and Communication. Additionally, besides openly placing Parchamite Ministers whom President Daoud tried to downgrade in the later part of his Presidency, they had placed a number of their unknown sympathizers in the key positions within the Administration, giving them access to all the information they needed with respect to government policy.

Stage Three began with the coup of 1978, which placed power in the hands of the reunited Democratic Peoples party under the leadership of Taraki with a handpicked revolutionary council representing the supreme power of the state. All impediments to complete penetration of the administrative machinery by Russian advisers had now been removed. They had permeated every division of the government. Delegation after delegation arrived not only from Moscow, but in an increasing number from the Soviet central Asian Republics. These delegations rapidly concluded agreements and contracts with their Afghan counterparts on such diverse subjects as building a copper smelter to that of printing text books for primary schools.

The armed forces was from the beginning the main target of Soviet penetration. With the spread of armed opposition to the regime, in different parts of the country, and the successive purge of the undesirable (religious and patriotic) elements of the officer corps, it became more and more imperative for the Soviet advisers/trainers to take command of operations and be involved in the actual fighting. This, in turn, enraged more and more of the

Afghan officers and soldiers, who joined the freedom fighters, creating the need for more Soviet officers to command. According to one source, the number of Soviet "advisers" with the armed forces, jumped from two thousand in May 1978 to seven thousand by August of the same year. In any case, it had reached more than ten thousand, by the time Soviet troops openly invaded Afghanistan towards the end of 1979.

Although generally no increase in the number of advisers occurred within the civil administrative apparatus, there was a sharp upgrading in the status of the advisers. If previously those advisers attached to the departments had access to the head of departments, they now had direct access to the ministers themselves.

Another characteristic of this stage, with particular significance for the economy of the country, was the almost sudden dismissal of experts and advisers from the non-communist countries. Since Afghanistan received financial and technical assistance from different quarters, its body of advisers and experts until that time was multinational in character. In some ministries, such as the Ministry of Planning, advisers from the Soviet Union worked side by side with those from the United States and West Germany. Although, in the second stage, during the Presidency of Daoud, a slow but steady change could be detected in favor of the Soviets, there still existed an important contingent of Western and third world experts, working either under bilateral agreements or the United Nation programs. The West Germans, for example, were active in the field of industrial and technical development, while the French concentrated in education and culture. After the 1978 coup most of these Western advisers were induced to leave the country, through a mixture of harassment and discouragement and their places were given either to non-qualified party members or to the nationals of Soviet satellite countries, such as the East Germans and others. At the same time, other changes emerged most notably in that the administrative style of governing began to mirror the Soviet or other communist bloc models. Meetings were held on all and every occasion with music, banners and slogans, in which the ministers and other party dignitaries made lengthy and repetitious speeches on the sins of previous regime and the merits of the new one, all sprinkled with servile adulation of everything Soviet and Russian.

Personality cult of the leaders (Taraki and Amin) reached Stalinist proportion, their pictures of every size adorning every office and shop.

In the case of workers and government employees, if some slight material advantage had been accorded to them, they were forced into so called "voluntary work" during the weekends and national holidays, thus reviving under a new title, the time bound forced labor, which previously had been abolished.

More importantly, official communist party cells were organized inside each administrative unit. Party members, composed in most cases of opportunistic elements, not only supervised daily work performance, but spied and reported to the secret police on the private lives and opinions of employees and workers.

Later on, the secret police was accorded a special place in the hierarchy of the state, responsible only to the two top leaders, Taraki and Amin and now Karmal.

The secret police took advantage of its position and proceeded to arrest and summarily execute all of those, who for one reason or other, were considered as actual or potential enemies of the regime. Tens of thousands of people mainly belonging to the literate and educated class were assassinated in cold blood.

Another change was the creation, in both the army and civil administration, including the schools, of the post of political commissaire. This office is responsible for the indoctrination of all employees, workers, pupils and students, with communist ideology and the "so-called" party line response to all questions.

The unpredictable and erratic personality of Hafizullah Amin hampered complete Soviet control of the governmental administration apparatus. When he went so far as to eliminate Taraki and put himself in his place, the stage was set for a new and final stage.

The fourth stage: Control. This period began with the Soviet troop invasion of Afghanistan, in the last days of 1979. After eliminating Amin, Babrak Karmal, was placed as the President of the Revolutionary Council and Party boss. From then on, Soviet control of the Administration became complete and in order to give to the new regime a semblance of legitimacy, a provisional Constitution, modeled closely on that of the Soviet Union, was prepared and adopted by the self appointed Revolutionary Council. Although this document pays lip service to principles of democratic freedom, such as the freedom of belief, expression and election, all these are made meaningless by a simple provision, announced in the first part of the documents (Art. 4) to the effect that the party is the "leading and guiding force of the society and the state."

And now with your permission, I would like to say a few words on the impact of communist rule and Soviet invasion on the economy of Afghanistan.

It is true that economically speaking Afghanistan is an underdeveloped country, with few industries and an agriculture just coming out from a long period of stagnation. However, it cannot be said that nothing has been done or that the country's economy is still at a primitive stage. As far back as the twenties, some work on the modernization of the economic and social life of the nation was undertaken by the reformer King Amanullah. Later on, during the thirties, attempts were made to establish modern industries by the private entrepreneurs and in the fifties a more comprehensive program was prepared for the development of the economy, which included planning and a mixture of private and public investment.

Although the pace of development was painfully slow, and it could not be said that every strata of the population benefitted from the fruits of this progress, it nevertheless cannot be denied that some advance has been made in the economic infrastructure, such as in the areas of transport and communications, mines and industries, health and education. As a result of these changes and a decade of democratic freedoms and representative government, brought about by the constitution of 1964, the country came out of its former state of near isolation and expanded its ties with the outside world.

As an example, the number of foreign tourists visiting the country jumped from a mere few hundred to more than one hundred thousand in the course of a few years. The government policy of mixed economy, which was in line with its concurrent policy of non-alignment, was attracting financial and technical assistance from different countries, such as the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., West Germany and China, as well as from the U.N., World Bank and their affiliates. When the new regime took over, its leader who had lost all sense of reality in the euphoria of an easy victory, started by making sweeping promises of economic progress and social reforms. This was followed very soon by the announcement of far reaching measures in such socially important spheres as peasant indebtedness, land reform and the rights and conditions of women. Unfortunately these measures were doomed to failure from the beginning since they were prepared with haste and deep ignorance of local conditions. For example, the program for the distribution of land among landless farmers was implemented, without any attention being paid to provision of credit for the new land owners. The only program which had some chance of success was that which abolished usury, which on the whole was in accordance of the tenets of Islam and immediately beneficial to the farmers. However, even this plus was also lost in the chaos created by simultaneous implementation of ill-prepared measures in a hostile environment. By now the news of the mass execution of religious leaders and the educated class, along with the servile attitude of the new regime towards the Soviet Union, had inflamed the whole country and the acceptance of any measure proposed by such a government was unacceptable to the average Afghan. On the whole, one may say, that the leaders of the new regime had failed

to understand the basic fact that in a predominantly tribal society, like that of Afghanistan, the role of the class struggle was minimal and subservient to such dynamic social forces as religious and ethno-linguistic bonds. It was, therefore, no surprise when their measures misfired as soon as they came in contact with the reality of the socio-economic conditions in the country.

Unfortunately, the negative impact of the government policy was not confined to the failure of their reforms, but engulfed life as a whole, including naturally its economy. As a result of open fighting which ensued and the subsequent invasion of the country by the Soviet Army, not only agricultural and industrial production declined sharply, but a large part of the economic infrastructure, such as highways, power and communication networks, schools and other institutions of learning were either damaged or completely destroyed. Worse than that, the country lost through the war of resistance and liberation as well as by cold blood execution of the patriots, at least half a million of its population, including a large proportion of its burgeoning educated class. Another two million or more were forced to seek asylum abroad and are lost, for the time being, as a productive force. The multi-sided techno-cultural relation build-up, in the course of years with most of the advanced and third world countries was discarded in favor of relations with a single bloc, the Soviet Union and its impoverished satellites, to whom was also diverted the bulk of the country's foreign trade, the main source of its hard currency.

With respect to mineral resources, although Afghanistan cannot be compared with the oil rich countries of the gulf area, geological research performed by Western experts has documented the existence of a number of valuable minerals in exploitable quantities. For example, according to a report published by United Press International, quoting the American Professor John F. Shroder, former Director of the National Atlas of Afghanistan Project, "the chrome, copper and iron are already discovered in Afghanistan, have been listed as world class deposits, by a Canadian consulting firm."

The same firm also noted that more than 1500 other useful minerals and metal had been discovered in Afghanistan and believed beyond a doubt that continued exploration would result in discovery and development of other economically minable deposits. With regard to hydrocarbons, the professor says: "This Texas size country does not have Texas-type oil pools, but it does have plenty to support future development."

Although oil has so far not been located in commercial exploitable quantities, a fairly large reserve of natural gas has been discovered which provides an export capacity of about three billion cubic meters per year to the Soviet Union. On the

authority of the same Canadian report, high grade uranium has also been discovered in the southwestern part of the country and according to a knowledgeable source uranium has been shipped by truck to the Soviet Union.

In the field of economic development, the government Five Year Plan for the period 1979-1983, which has now reached its mid-point should be considered as a complete fiasco. Not only has its targets for the production of important commodities, such as wheat, cotton, coal, textile goods been proved unattainable, but in most cases production in the second year was lower than that of the base year. In the area of social progress, the high sounding promises on the "complete elimination of illiteracy in five years" or school attendance for all children between the ages of 7 and 12, by the same date look today even more unreal than at the time they were made.

This is, in short, the result of more than three years of Communist rule and Soviet invasion, in Afghanistan. It may be said, without exaggeration, that beside the invaluable loss of human life, from the strictly material point of view, the country has been pushed back, at least one generation, on its path to progress. However, this is based only on the losses inflicted until now. What the future has in store for my unfortunate country, is beyond anybody's calculation or estimate.



Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Farhang. I want to thank you first of all for your statement. It is very thorough and it is a classic case history of Soviet penetration with a few embellishments to suit Afghanistan. That is their method of operation.

It would seem after all of these years that anybody would wonder whenever the Soviets put their arms around you and call you friend what is going to happen to you next. I agree with you that the lesson is still being learned unfortunately. Afghanistan is only the latest example. But you are right. It is going on all over the world.

Somewhere, sometime we are going to have to be dealing with this problem which we have had since World War II: Soviet expansionism, penetration, and their desire for unlimited power over people. They make a mockery out of any international law or any principles of human dignity or freedom or any other expressions they use for their own propaganda.

Let me ask you though, what is the principal element of Soviet propaganda today against Afghanistan? What do you think they are trying to convince the world?

Mr. FARHANG. Excuse me. Do you want to know what is their main propaganda line in Afghanistan to convince the people of Afghanistan?

Mr. FASCELL. I would like to know both inside and outside of Afghanistan.

Mr. FARHANG. In Afghanistan the propaganda at this stage is directed toward convincing the people that the present government is not under the control of the Soviet Union. It is an independent government working for the benefit of the population and the Russian Army is there only to defend Afghanistan against intervention by other powers, especially the United States, Pakistan, Iran, China, and others.

But this is the propaganda which has failed completely, 100 percent, and nobody is taking any note of it and it has no influence on the Afghan mind.

In regard to the world I am afraid that the Soviets are trying to convince the outside world that the government they are protecting in Afghanistan is a government which is bringing change and reform necessary for the progress of a backward society into modern life and that the Mujahadin are on the contrary a conservative and reactionary element who for their own benefit and for the benefit of outside powers are trying to prevent these necessary reforms.

Mr. FASCELL. And if they have to kill everybody in Afghanistan to prove it, they are going to prove it.

Mr. FARHANG. I know that Afghans are not accepting their lies. I am not so sure about the United States and other countries.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Ritter?

Mr. RITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to excuse my previous absence for a period of time. There was an extremely important occasion affecting my congressional district, taking place on the floor of the House. I am very happy to be back.

Dr. Farhang, I am very delighted\*to see you again. We have had some very interesting conversations in the past. I just stated in Russian to Dr. Farhang that I know very well what the good neighbor means, especially when it is a Soviet good neighbor. As my distinguished chairman stated, those kinds of neighbors we do not need. We can do without.

I would like to ask you a question about a problem that has come to my attention. I have been very active with a number of different American ethnic organizations who have felt the Soviet boot, who have felt what it is like to have a good neighbor. These people are very concerned about their ethnic brothers and sisters who have been brought to Afghanistan to fight against the Afghan freedom fighters who may not wish to fight those people.

I am talking about people from the Baltic States, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians. I am talking about Ukrainians. The potential is also there for Central Asians and probably people from the Caucasus states of the Soviet Union.

As was stated by one of the witnesses, in this kind of conflict the enemy is rapidly dispatched. One does not have the food. I understand people are on occasion eating grass. One does not have the ability to hold on to many of these prisoners.

But what about defectors? I am speaking in particular of Ukrainian national defectors, Baltics and some of the nationalities from Central Asia. Is there something that could be done to deal with the defectors? I do know that there is some information that is brought to bear in Soviet troop concentrations to try and communicate with the Soviet soldiers as to the illegality and the tragedy of this aggression.

But if, say, one of these individuals decides to defect and he looks just like a Russian, particularly if he is not a Central Asian, how can we encourage this kind of defection?

Mr. FARHANG. Let me start by a general statement. I think that one of the most significant consequences of the Russian invasion and the resistance of the Afghans to that invasion was the fact that much of the Red army has been shut out. If I am not mistaken, after the German Wehrmacht was defeated in the Second World War, the Soviet propaganda machine entertained and projected the concept that the best army of the war and the invincible army of today is the Red army.

Now, I think that not only 18 months but actually 3 years of war of the Soviets in Afghanistan has taken care of this. What is the reason that the Russian soldiers have not been successful in Afghanistan? One reason is as you mentioned. Now we are coming to a problem, that besides the Russians there are numbers of other ethnics in this army who are not all keen on fighting on the side of the Russians.

In the beginning, as you probably know, they sent to Afghanistan a larger portion of the peoples from the Central Asian departments—excuse me for the expression: Their Central Asian departments—which they have occupied under their occupation projects. These peoples were taught that they are going to help the Afghans repulse invasions from abroad, from other nations.

Since they had sympathy for the Afghans, they came to Afghanistan with some enthusiasm. But once they came across to fight,

they saw that they were fighting against Afghans and not outsiders. Pretty soon they realized they did not want to fight and they started fraternization with the Afghans. After that the Russians saw that it was not a good tactic and the bulk of them have been withdrawn and replaced by peoples who in the eyes of Afghans are Russians. The ordinary Mujahadin cannot make a distinction and in most cases is not aware of the existence of peoples like Ukrainians and Georgians or other ethnics in the Baltic region of the Soviet Union.

Now to bring this point to the notice of the Mujahadin should be one of the most important things to be done. I saw in the papers that a group of French intellectuals have decided to establish a free-Afghanistan movement which will be taken from one place to another so that should not be easily detected and destroyed. I think they have a program also to speak in Russian and in the language of other nations.

If this is established and if a movement is started in the United States also to help the same program, then a kind of communication may be established on the one hand between those peoples who understand or those who are coming into Afghanistan who are not Russians to teach the peoples to make a distinction between the Russians and the other nations and on the other hand to say that instead of fighting they could pass them over to the freedom fighters.

Mr. RITTER. Yes, Dr. Farhang, I think that obviously the communication of this message is of first priority and we need to establish far better communications with the Afghan people, whether it is French-supported Radio Free Afghanistan or whether our own Voice of America begins to build up its capacity to much, much, much better communicate the messages that are necessary to communicate to the Afghan people and the freedom fighters.

I would hope that out of these joint hearings of the Helsinki Commission and the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations that we could make some recommendations that would put some effort toward a much better radio communication for the Afghan people.

I shudder at some of the capacities of our Government in the past. I can recall that when Ambassador Dubs was murdered, one of the problems that we had there was that no one in the Embassy was able to speak Russian.

I would like to thank you again for giving us this excellent testimony. I look forward to working with you in the future and to taking advantage of your extremely rounded, rich background.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Farhang.

Mr. FARHANG. I thank you, the members of the subcommittee, and the members of the commission on behalf of the Afghan community.

Mr. FASCELL. Our final witness today has been very patient. He is Dr. Alfred Monks, currently professor of International Relations and Political Science at the University of Wyoming at Laramie, author of two recent publications on Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Soviet military doctrine: 1960 to present. He graduated with a Ph. D. in International Relations from the University

of Pennsylvania and a master's and bachelor's degree from the University of Michigan in Russian studies.

Professor Monks, we are glad to see you. We are delighted to have you here today to make a contribution at this very important hearing. I know you have a prepared statement which you may present or we can put your statement in the record if you want to highlight it. You may proceed as you see fit.

Mr. MONKS. I will read it and I will make it to the point, succinct.

**STATEMENT OF ALFRED L. MONKS, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING AT LARAMIE**

Mr. MONKS. The purpose of my testimony is twofold. First, one is to mention the factors which I think caused the Soviets to intervene in Afghanistan and second to give the implication for U.S. security from the Soviets moving into that country. I suppose the important thing is for me to try to tell you which are the most important of these factors.

It is my belief that the Soviet Union in Afghanistan is a combination of the following reasons. First, is the concern Soviet leaders have for security. If you have ever been in Russia you know the Russian word for security. That is all these people talk: security. This concern for security has been translated by Russian/Soviet leaders into an attempt to make all states with which they form a border into client states or into protectorates or into nonaligned states such as Mongolia, such as Afghanistan, Eastern Europe and so on.

Here is my point, that if the Soviets were to lose Afghanistan, they would feel encircled by what they perceive to be anti-Soviet forces from Japan to Norway. I have not said too much there. I am saying that they are very insecure people.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you think they are paranoid?

Mr. MONKS. I think they are paranoid, yes, of course. Just go there and you will see what I am saying. Go to Moscow; go to Leningrad.

Mr. FASCELL. I cannot get in. I am persona non grata.

[Laughter.]

Mr. MONKS. The second factor behind the Soviet move in Afghanistan in my opinion is the emergence of what I call hard-line antidétente elements within the highest decisionmaking body of the Soviet Union, that is, the Politburo. Incidentally, I consider a man named Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to be one of the most hard-lined guys there is, notwithstanding his peace campaign to the contrary.

But the hardliners believe that the Soviet Union must draw a line beyond which it will not retreat. This sort of imperative, this need to show muscles, to draw this hard line became all the more important in view of what I consider to be a number of political and diplomatic setbacks suffered by the Soviet Union in 1979, culminating in the December 12, 1979 decision by NATO to deploy Pershing II missiles in Europe.

I am not saying that the West should not have done that. But, I am simply saying that it is the perception of the hawks in the

Soviet Union that this is a threat, and in short to have let Afghanistan fall to the anti-Marxist, anti-Soviet forces would have been intolerable to Soviet hawks, Soviet hard-liners. Now I think that is a threat to American security. You have a bunch of individuals in the Politburo who are hard-liners.

Third, is an apprehension felt by the Kremlin that Marxist leader Hafizullah Amin—and incidentally, I am just taking this down; in my opinion Amin was a jerk, a ruthless jerk—would be overthrown sooner or later and his government would be replaced by a Muslim, anti-Marxist, anti-Soviet regime. You may say: so what? Here is the point to so what.

Such a regime according to the Kremlin leaders might have attempted to draw Soviet Muslims living in Soviet Central Asia, that is, the Tajiks, the Uzbeks, the Khergeze, these 32 million people away from the Soviet Union into some sort of political independent entity.

If this were to have happened or if this were to happen now—here is my point—it would have undermined the credibility of Soviet protection in the minds of other socialist countries in the world, thus setting up the scenario for falling socialist dominoes.

Those are the first three reasons. If this were the whole story, we would not have too much to worry about. Unfortunately, there are other considerations too, that some of the previous speakers have alluded to. It has to do with expansionism.

The fourth reason why I think the Soviets went into Afghanistan is a Soviet desire to gain access to the sea. I have a map here. In this case the sea is the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean. It is right here on the map.

Now how could the Soviets gain this access to the sea? It is very easy for an individual to say the Russians want an outlet to the sea. But how are they going to get it? Here is how they could get it. Their access to the sea could be affected by fanning separatist elements in Baluchistan which is in Pakistan and Iran.

Baluchistan stretches for about 750 miles to the Arabian Sea in the Gulf of Oman. If the Soviets were to gain influence in this area by fanning these separatist movements in Baluchistan, that would put them in a very good position to interdict Western oil supplies coming from the Persian Gulf. Seventy percent of the Western oil supplies come from the Persian Gulf. If the Soviets were to get a position along the Arabian Sea, say at Gwadar, that would be a very important gain for them.

Mr. FASCELL. You are talking about a naval base, because they certainly have the ability to intercept by air.

Mr. MONKS. Right, I am talking about a navy position.

Fifth, and this is one that I just came up with myself. Maybe some of my friends back here could rebut me or confirm me. The Soviets may have felt that the creation of an autonomous Pushtunistan, which is an area that straddled the Afghan-Pakistan border, would have shorn up the tottering Marxist regime in Kabul. And they may also have felt that that wonderful person named Hafizullah Amin by his ingenious methods would have frustrated the creation of that. That may not be a significant factor but I think it is a factor.

The last reason I think the Russians went into Afghanistan is the need that Moscow felt and still feels to maintain a credible presence in Southwest Asia. They feel they have to have a presence in that area. And to have let Afghanistan fall to anti-Marxist forces would have weakened Soviet regional and global status and correspondingly increased the status, regional and global, of the West.

In order to understand this point I think one has to comprehend three elements of Soviet foreign policy. When one understands these elements, then my point becomes clear. The first is that the Soviets tend to perceive regional balances to be important, that they constitute what they call the global correlation or balance of forces. Regions are important because they make up the global balance of forces.

Second, is the Soviets tend to view international developments in zero-sum game terms. For the record zero-sum game terms means if I win something, sir, you lose; if you lose something, I win. It is that type of thing, if socialism wins, capitalism loses and vice versa.

The third reason is that the Soviets tend to view the world as a struggle constantly going on between capitalism and socialism. There is this constant struggle.

Those are the six reasons. In short I think of those six reasons why the Soviets went into Afghanistan in 1979, the most important are number one, security; number two, hard-line antidétente elements within the Soviet Politburo; and number three, this desire to gain access to the sea. I think the Russians really want a port in the Persian Gulf. The last one is that they need to maintain a presence in Southwest Asia.

Now for the second part of my testimony, what are the implications of Soviet intervention toward U.S. national security? I am sort of intimidated by this point because it is an awesome point. The first implication toward U.S. national security is that the West is now witnessing a projection of Soviet military power into a volatile area of critical importance to the West.

Do you realize that 70 percent of all the oil comes through the Persian Gulf? Furthermore, the Soviets now possess the capability militarily, that is, navy, airlift, interventionary, air force base. They have all of these things and they can now project their military power more effectively than at any other time in the past. This military capability can be employed to support Soviet economic and political goals any place in the world.

I hope American people understand that point and draw the necessary conclusions. The Persian Gulf is only one flash point. Next year it is going to be something else.

The second implication is that the evidence supports my contention, I believe, that the Russians intend to make the Persian Gulf a part of their own sphere of influence. There is a problem because I think the Americans consider the Persian Gulf part of their sphere of influence and now the Russians consider it part of their sphere of influence. There is a potential for escalation of war there.

Incidentally, let me throw out this point as an adieu. I do not believe the Russian/Soviets are going to pull out of Afghanistan unless two preconditions are met. First, if they feel secure on their

southern border and second, that they feel that the regime of Babrak Karmal or a substitute will remain in Afghanistan. They will not tolerate an anti-Marxist regime in Afghanistan.

Getting back to the second implication, a solidified Marxist regime in Afghanistan could serve as a useful jumping-off point, a staging area from which the Soviets could expand their influence in Baluchi territory in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, and in Iran and thus extend their influence into the Persian Gulf.

You notice I am stressing the Persian Gulf. I think that is of critical importance.

The third implication of the Soviet move into Afghanistan in 1979 was that the Afghan venture indicates, to me at least, that Moscow, the Kremlin, is willing to accept pretty high costs to achieve its objectives. And to reiterate my point, the Soviets' objectives in my opinion are twofold. First, is to shore up that southern border down at the Afghan/Soviet border and second, to use Afghanistan as a possible base from which they can expand their influence.

The fourth implication for U.S. security is that the evidence suggests that in the aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its international consequences, the Soviets believe that the shift in global balance of forces in favor of socialism is slowing down. That dictum that the global balance of forces is slowing down is important because according to their dogma, this shift in the global balance of forces is an objective automatic phenomenon shaped by historical factors. Because this has slowed down, they have to put more stress on subjective factors of change. Incidentally, the Russians feel that there has to be constant change going on all the time.

The objective thing has slowed down; therefore they have to push the subjective factors. Here are some subjective factors that you may be interested in hearing about that the Soviets are going to stress and are stressing. First, they are going to build up the military sectors of the economy more vigorously than in the past, in my opinion. Second, they are going to pursue, in my opinion, more adventuresome foreign policies. Mark my words: more adventuresome foreign policies.

Third, notwithstanding Brezhnev's grandiloquent statement about we want peace—he is going around to all the capitals of the world saying we want this, we want to cut back on arms, and so on—they are going to intensify the arms race, in my opinion. Fourth, they are going to at the same time pursue a more vigorous peace campaign. While they are intensifying the arms race, they are pursuing a peace campaign. If you want to ask me how they can reconcile those two I will answer that question later.

Mr. FASCELL. They do not have to reconcile it at all.

Mr. MONKS. They are pursuing war and peace at the same time.

I would like to make the following proposals, two in number. This is the last part of my statement.

First, the United States and the West in general should supply the Zia regime in Pakistan with more arms if only to complicate the Soviet struggle with the Afghan rebels. I am assuming that if the United States supplies the Zia regime with more arms, it is going to complicate the Russian battle in Afghanistan. By compli-

cating the Russian battle in Afghanistan, it will make this expansionist drive on the part of the Soviets more difficult.

Second, I think that the United States and the West in general should supply the Afghan freedom fighters with more arms. Somebody asked the question: What do they have? In my opinion they have nothing. I was watching that film over there, and if I am not mistaken—you can ask this individual right here—I think that the Afghan freedom fighters are fighting with 1903 and 1917 rifles. Maybe I am wrong.

I am just told they are fighting with the Lee-Enfield rifles. Do you know what the Lee-Enfield rifle is? It was made in 1903 and 1917. It is a rifle that has a clip in it and you put five shells in the clip and you can knock off five shots. Then you have to bolt it back, take out the clip, put five more shells in and knock those off.

Mr. FASCELL. I hate to tell you this but I used one of those in World War II.

Mr. MONKS. But do you know what they are facing? You probably saw it in the movie. These Lee-Enfields are facing Soviet Klashniks and they are facing helicopters. It is not much of a battle.

I think the Americans should help the freedom fighters of Afghanistan with more modern weapons, if only to slow down the Russians.

[Applause.]

Can you imagine an Afghan fighting with old 1903 weapons while the Soviets are fighting with machineguns? You saw them in the film over there. It is no contest.

[Mr. Monks' prepared statement follows.]



PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALFRED L. MONKS, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING AT LARAMIE

THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

Soviet Motives for the Intervention in Afghanistan

The Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan was influenced by a number of factors, some specific, and others of a more general nature. The specific factors included: <sup>1</sup> the cumulative impact of a deterioration of detente, which culminated in December 1979 in NATO's decision to deploy U.S. medium-range missiles (Pershing-II) to be targeted on the Soviet Union and its allies; the seizure of American hostages in Iran and the expected military action by the U.S. in Iran; Vietnam's victory over the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia; the return to power in India of Indira Gandhi; and the support given by China, Iran, and the United States to Afghan rebels operating in Pakistan and in the western provinces of Afghanistan. The first development reduced much of the Soviet's self-restraint, and, along with developments occurring in Iran, probably heightened Soviet fears. The conflict in Cambodia, coupled with the return to power of pro-Soviet Indira Gandhi, probably led Soviet leaders to believe that they could afford to pursue a more adventurist policy in Afghanistan. Support given to Afghan rebels by China, the United States, and Iran contributed to Soviet apprehensions that an anti-Soviet, anti-Marxist regime might be installed in Afghanistan. But we believe that these factors alone did not cause Soviet leaders to feel that they had to, or wished to intervene in Afghanistan. If not coupled with other more basic factors, the above developments would only have been perceived by the Kremlin as a local crisis which would have been settled by some means other than a massive Soviet intervention. When linked with other factors, however, these developments caused Moscow to see that with the Marxist government losing control over the country, and the army falling apart, military intervention

was both necessary and desirable for them. The Soviet decision to intervene<sup>2</sup> in Afghanistan was based on a combination of the following factors.

1. The concern Russian/Soviet leaders traditionally have had for secure borders. This concern for security is linked to the need the Soviets feel to preserve Afghanistan as a Soviet protectorate. The loss of Afghanistan would mean that the Soviet Union would be encircled by anti-Soviet forces from Japan to Norway;
2. The emergence of hard-line elements who may have achieved dominance within the highest decision-making bodies of the Soviet Union. Hardliners believe that the Soviet Union must draw a line beyond which it will not retreat. After a series of diplomatic and political setbacks, and in view of the threat perceived from the NATO and Sino-Japanese-American forces, hardliners could not abandon Afghanistan;
3. An apprehension that Hafizullah Amin would be overthrown and his government replaced by a Muslim, anti-Marxist regime. Such a regime might attempt to draw Soviet Muslims away from the Soviet Union, and attempt to undermine Soviet influence in Afghanistan. To let the Marxist regime in that country fall to such forces would undermine the credibility of Soviet protection in the eyes of other socialists regimes, thus opening up the possibility of falling socialist dominoes;
4. A Soviet desire to gain access to the sea by fanning separatist elements in Baluchistan and Pushtunistan; the Soviets may also have believed that the establishment of an autonomous Pushtunistan might have helped shore up the weak Marxist regime in Kabul;
5. The Soviet Union desired to fulfill Russia's age-old dream of establishing a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean from which it could interdict Western oil supplies;
6. The need to maintain a credible presence in Southwest Asia. To let Afghanistan fall would weaken Soviet regional and global status, and correspondingly enhance Western regional and global status.

#### Soviet Security

The first priority of the Soviet Union is security. The Soviet desire for security is so intense and deep-rooted that it at times borders on paranoia and causes Soviet leaders to exaggerate threats and to misperceive international developments. Invasions of Russia by such forces as the Mongols, the Teutons, the Poles, the Turks, the Napoleonic French, and the

Germans, are sufficiently well-known. Soviet concern for security has been translated into a desire to make all states with which the Soviet Union shares a border into neutral or dependent states by any means necessary and possible at a given time. From the outset of the Bolshevik regime in 1917, Soviet leaders have believed that if any state on their border is not neutral or friendly, the Soviet Union will be threatened by aggressive imperialist powers. The Soviets, therefore, have concentrated near their borders large military forces.

With China seen as increasingly hostile, with the military buildup in Western Europe, and with the resurgent Islamic movements gaining power in the Arab world, the Soviet-Afghan border became more important to overall Soviet security interests. The opening of the new Chinese Karakoram Highway with Pakistan may have caused the Soviets to fear that they were being encircled and might be attacked by a bloc consisting of China, Pakistan, and the U.S.A.<sup>3</sup> The offer to sell offensive weapons, announced by the United States, to Pakistan in the spring of 1981 heightened Soviet fears that Pakistan will continue to supply the Afghan rebels with American arms. (The propensity of the Soviets to exaggerate international developments is evident in that the Soviets apparently believe that American F-15 and F-16 jets will soon be supplied to the Zia regime and used against the Marxist regime in Afghanistan.)

Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev echoed the Soviet concern for security at his press conference on January 12, 1980,<sup>4</sup> and again at the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress in early 1981.<sup>5</sup> Failure to move Soviet troops into Afghanistan would have "created a serious threat to Soviet security interests on the Soviet's southern flank." Consequently, the Soviet Union had to intervene with military force. Brezhnev reiterated this point when he affirmed that Soviet troops

would be withdrawn from Afghanistan when "Counter-revolutionary bands" had completely ceased their activity in that country, and a guarantee were obtained from Afghanistan's neighbors that a revival of the intervention would not occur. Boris Ponomarev, a leading community party official, also stressed the Soviet concern for safe borders in early July 1981, when he discussed the preconditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.<sup>6</sup> The U.S.S.R., he said, would gladly remove its troops, provided that intervention by guerrillas from Iran or Pakistan stop, and Afghanistan's neutrality and security along the Soviet border were guaranteed. Thus, the preservation of a firmly established friendly regime in Afghanistan was seen as necessary in order to protect the Soviet-Afghan border and to enhance Soviet security. A "friendly" Afghanistan was tantamount to the transformation of that country into a Soviet protectorate. This would reduce Soviet fears of being encircled by anti-Soviet forces. The recent Soviet rejection of a proposal to convene an international conference on Afghanistan, sponsored by the 10-nation European Economic Community reflects Soviet insecurity and suspicions of the West.<sup>7</sup> Discussion of a political settlement by such an organization might undermine the Marxist regime in Kabul which is already shaky--by recognizing grievances from the non-Marxist elements in Afghanistan or from tribalists in Pushtunistan or Baluchistan.

Hard-Line Elements in the Ascendancy within  
Soviet Decision-Making Circles

Another factor which might have caused the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was the ascendancy of hard-line, anti-detente elements within the politburo and the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The position taken by moderates within Soviet decision-making

circles has been undermined by recent events on the international scene. Hard-liners in the U.S.S.R. might cite the following as examples of the failure of moderate policies:

- ..the decision of NATO states to increase their military spending substantially over the decade;
- ..the willingness of the United States and its allies to consider economic and military aid to China;
- ..the failure of Brezhnev's regime to respond more vigorously to China's invasion of Vietnam in 1979, thus encouraging further Chinese probes into Asia;
- ..the reaction of the U.S. Congress to the Soviet combat brigade stationed in Cuba;
- ..the reaction in Europe to the Angolan invasion of Zaire's Shaba province, for which the Soviet Union and Cuba were denounced;
- ..the West's firm and swift rejection of Brezhnev's military reductions in Europe, announced in East Germany on October 6, 1979;
- ..the establishment of an American Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), seen by the Soviets as an attempt to extend the U.S. military and political presence in the world;
- ..the near-readiness of NATO states to accept the American plan to produce the neutron bomb, and their decision to deploy American medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles in Europe despite vigorous Soviet efforts to kill this plan;
- ..the U.S. Senate's decision to table SALT II a key component of Brezhnev's policy of detente.

The above developments could be used by Soviet hard-liners as fresh signs of American hostility and attempts by the Carter Administration to force an international confrontation with the Soviet Union.

In politburo struggles between hawks and doves, Mihail A. Suslov, chief party theoretician, led the hard-line faction. Selected by Stalin himself as agitprop leader in 1946, Suslov served at the top levels of party and state longer than any other Kremlin leader. In 1948, he played a key role in expelling Yugoslavia from the Cominform, after Tito's demand for greater autonomy. In 1964, Suslov served as a king maker during the transition surrounding the ouster of former premier Nikita Khrushchev. Although Suslov's role in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia is unclear, it is known that this traditional Stalinist favored a stronger military posture for the Soviet Union, and increased party control over the army.

Suslov has consistently charged that the military-complex holds U.S. ruling circles in its grip and that the U.S. seeks to suppress national liberation struggles everywhere. The Soviet moderates discredited by events, Suslov would surely try to convince his politburo associates of the orthodox Leninist view; that is that world imperialism has not changed and can only be dealt with from a position of strength. While other Soviet leaders have stressed the folly of trying to achieve military superiority over the United States, Suslov declared that the Soviet Union must struggle against the reactionary forces of imperialism--forces that include NATO and China as well as the United States--and that the best way to engage this type of struggle is by building up Soviet military might. Finally, Suslov warned his comrades that the U.S.A. was using the hostage situation as a pretext to undermine the Iranian government and to enhance American influence in the area. The United States, he said, intended to use Iran as a base from which to attack the Soviet Union.

Suslov's position appeared to have grown more powerful after the summer of 1979. Not only did he hold the central position in photos of Soviet leaders (for example, on the occasion of Brezhnev's return from East Berlin on October 8, 1979)--a significant detail in a country where such items as protocol matter a great deal--but in the 1979 and 1980 celebrations of the October Revolution held in Moscow, it was Suslov who stood at Brezhnev's right hand.<sup>8</sup> In November 1979, Suslov chaired a national conference on ideology held in Moscow. Suslov also sat next to Brezhnev in a meeting with French Communist party leaders in January 1980, and at the Warsaw Pact meetings held in early December 1980.

As the official high priest of the ideological pyramid dominating all aspects of Soviet society and the chief theorist and spokesman of Marxism-Leninism, Mikhail Suslov could determine which government or party decisions are compatible with Marxist-Leninist ideology and which are not. Thus, Suslov could strongly influence policy making by using ideology as a weapon against political enemies or as rationalization to justify past or future policies.

That Suslov and his fellow hard-liners gained ground in Soviet policy making was suggested by events in the Soviet Union. For example, until 1979, Brezhnev was typically lauded on the occasion of his birthday (December 19), while former dictator Josef Stalin received little notice on his birthday (December 21). But in 1979, the reverse was true: Brezhnev received relatively little public praise, and Stalin's anniversary was the object of an extensive article in the Communist party newspaper Pravda.<sup>9</sup> This Pravda article was significant not only because it was the most length record of Stalin's career to appear in the Soviet press since 1952, but because policies denounced at the time of Khrushchev's revelations in the 1950s and ever since--such policies as forced industrialization and forced collectivization of agriculture--were called "necessary" during the difficult time when they occurred. The Stalinist purges, which wiped out much of the old Bolshevik leadership during the 1930s, were also called "necessary", though a "violation" of Soviet justice and "excessive."

In the same article, Brezhnev was quoted as condemning Stalin's cult of personality, but in condemning Stalin for "voluntarism," "subjectivism," and "idealism," he was also criticizing himself. For what is of highest importance, the article later stated, are the party, the Soviet government the Soviet people--not the single leader and his "voluntarist" policies. It is an old habit of Soviet political journalism to criticize the present

indirectly in terms of the past. Brezhnev's own politburo comrades probably believed him guilty of the same errors as those he criticized and were warning him not to build his own cult of personality.

A meeting of the central committee of the Soviet Communist party was held on December 16, 1979--only a few days before Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan.<sup>10</sup> A decree issued by this meeting stressed agriculture, the cultural revolution, national problems, a rigid Marxist-Leninist world outlook, proletarian internationalism, and "deepening contradictions" in the capitalist world--all matters of particular interest to hard-line Stalinists. It is likely that Mikhail Suslov had a major role in writing this decree. And it is not implausible that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was engineered by Suslov and other Soviet hard-liners.

Undoubtedly some of the above is speculative and Kremlinological in character. But since it is not the habit of the Soviet leadership to advertise internal struggles over policy and power, the outside analyst often is compelled to sift through such fine details to perceive what lies behind a barrier of secrecy.

In conclusion, one may say that the policy of detente with the West has been abandoned by Soviet leaders. Leonid Brezhnev, who is far from being discredited by his own hawks, may himself, like Suslov, have become a hard-liner. This is suggested by Brezhnev's latest public statements made to leaders from Ethiopia, Mozambique, India, the Congo, Jordan and Libya. Despite Brezhnev's grandiloquent remarks about peaceful co-existence, relations based on mutual respect and equality, non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state, and the need for "deepening detente," Brezhnev's virulent language used to characterize Western states and their policies has placed him squarely in the hawkish category.



Hafizullah Amin and the Political Situation in Afghanistan

Hafizullah Amin was premier of Afghanistan barely three months when Moscow found it necessary to replace him with a man of its own choosing. The reasons centered on Amin's inability to deal effectively with friends of the Marxist regime, with the people of Afghanistan, or with outright foes. Amin was a ruthless, harsh individual with close ties with the Afghan officer corps, the members of which are mostly Pushtuns like himself. Originally he was allied with Nur Mohammad Taraki in the coup against Muhammad Daud and part of his faction within the DPP. Though a pro-Soviet, rigidly doctrinaire Marxist, Amin incurred Soviet wrath by deposing his predecessor, Nur Mohammad Taraki, without Moscow's prior blessing. After he had Taraki murdered, Amin took the premiership himself--something which the Soviets, who had originally backed Taraki, could not fail to resent. Assuming power in the fall of 1979, Amin initiated a campaign against anti-government elements, killing and imprisoning thousands without regard to whether they were real enemies, victims of circumstances, or simply critics. He also used the opportunity to stamp out personal rivals within the Afghan army and to persecute opponents within the Marxist party. Meanwhile, the rebels fighting against this socialist regime grew in strength. Muslim guerrillas, in virtual command of the countryside, initiated attacks against regions still held by the government, until they finally held twenty-two of the twenty-seven provinces.

Amin's main problem was to suppress the rebels--especially in the eastern provinces of Kunar and Paktia. Kunar province was a potential source of trouble because of the presence of an anti-government radio station, Free Kunar, which daily beamed anti-Marxist propaganda to the Afghans. Paktia

posed a threat to Amin's government because of its strategic location on the Pakistani border: through Paktia runs the shortest route from Pakistan to Kabul, and rebels from Paktia often passed through the province on their way to attack government forces.

Amin was unable to stop the rising rate of desertions from the Afghan army, despite his own ties with the officer corps. Finally, Amin's ruthlessness only made the Afghan people hate his regime all the more--a government already despised as atheistic and meddling by most Afghans. Amin simply could not disassociate himself from the heavy-handed reform efforts that occurred under the Taraki regime. As the Muslim rebellion increased in scope and intensity, his focus shifted from efforts to reconcile the people to a crude effort to hang on to power. The brutal methods he used in doing so only strengthened his enemies. There was real cause for fear that, come the spring of 1980, the rebels might mount a successful campaign to dislodge the government's forces from most of the country's major towns. Left to his own devices, Amin would soon have been overthrown. As his Marxist government deteriorated into chaos, the anti-Soviet, anti-Marxist rebels would have been left as the strongest political force in the country. If an anti-Marxist Islamic regime held power in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union would be confronted on its southern border by three volatile Muslim nations, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, with a total population of about 130 million people. A successful anti-communist revolt so nearby might stir up demands for autonomy among Muslims living in Soviet Central Asia--more than 30 million people in all, many of them with strong ethnic and cultural ties to the Afghans. Although nationalist drives in Soviet Central Asia are not as powerful as they are in other parts of the U.S.S.R.--the Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic states, for example--the potential for the nationalist separatism is there. Both the Kremlin and the local communists in Soviet Central Asia know it.

In addition, if the Kremlin had allowed the Marxist regime in Afghanistan to fall, this probably would have undermined the credibility of Soviet protection in the eyes of other socialist regimes in the world, opening up the possibility of falling socialist dominoes. There are clear indications that socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, such as Poland, are becoming increasingly restive. Moreover, Rumania is not as deferential as it once was. Thus, it can be argued that Moscow had to demonstrate to the world in late 1979 that it could and would defend a socialist regime, regardless of how repressive and unpopular that regime was to the masses, and regardless of how much "overkill" the Kremlin displayed. To have acted otherwise might have eroded the already strained cohesiveness of the socialist bloc, and correspondingly, diminished Soviet influence, prestige, and credibility in the world. For these reasons, Soviet leaders probably felt that they could not allow anti-communist rebels to seize power in Afghanistan. Amin had to be replaced by someone more predictable and more useful to Moscow. That man was Babrak Karmal.

#### THE SOVIET UNION AND BALUCHISTAN

Another motive behind the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan may have been Soviet efforts to secure access to the sea by fanning Baluchi and Pushtun separatist elements.<sup>11</sup> The 5 million Baluchi tribesmen live in the inaccessible mountain and desert county of Western Pakistan, eastern Iran, and southern Afghanistan, an area that stretches for about 750 miles along the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. Armed with sophisticated Soviet weapons, a Baluchi guerrilla army, using Afghanistan as a staging area, could proclaim an independent Republic of Baluchistan in a section of what is now southwestern Pakistan. This would expand Soviet influence to the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman.

Baluchi resentments toward the central government in Pakistan run deep. Baluchistan established a political identity in the nineteenth century under the leadership of Nasir Khan who established a loose Baluchi confederacy. The British divided the Baluch area into four parts: in the far west, one third was given to Persia; in the north, the Durand Line assigned a small strip to Afghanistan; and in British India, the Baluchis were divided between a directly administered colonial part, British Baluchistan, and a puppet principality called Kalat. The khan of Kalat collaborated with the British, but also demanded at times that all Baluchi areas be returned to his domain. When the British withdrew from the subcontinent in 1947, the khan refused to join in the newly created state of Pakistan, declaring an independent Baluchistan. But Kalat was seized by Pakistan in early 1948, and since then, Baluchi leaders have been striving to regain their former independence.

The Baluchis feel that they have never received a fair deal from either the regimes of former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, or from his successor General Mohammad Zia ul Haq. Baluchis make up about one-half of Baluchistan's province of 2.5 million people, the province represents almost 40 percent of the land area of the country, and yet the Punjabis control about 90 percent of the Pakistani bureaucracy, and hold all key government posts in the province. Moreover, the Baluchis feel that they do not get a fair return on their main economic resource, natural gas, which is piped to Pakistan's major cities. Baluchistan received about \$25 million annually in revenues from the sale of this commodity but then must repurchase its own natural gas from neighboring Karachi.

Both Bhutto and Zia adopted repressive policies in Baluchistan. For instance, when the elected state government in Baluchistan resisted political and economic pressures by the central government in early 1973, Bhutto ousted

the state cabinet, imprisoned the chief Baluchi leaders on sedition charges, imposed emergency central rule, and sent 70,000 troops to the province. The Baluchis responded with an insurgency which dragged on for four bloody years until Bhutto was ousted by General Zia. The 1973-1977 Baluchistan-Pakistan conflict left a legacy of deep bitterness among the Baluchis toward the central government and a hunger for an opportunity to vindicate their martial honor. As guerrilla leader Mir Hazar put it: "Next time we will choose the time and place, and we will take help where we can get it."<sup>12</sup> The Soviets would be only too glad to provide such help.

Zia's treatment of the Baluchis appears to be no better than Bhutto's. He recently arrested leaders of the two opposition parties in Baluchistan, a development which reflects his barbaric treatment of his opponents.

If the Soviets were successful in fanning popular discontent among the Baluchis toward the central government, they could bring it down or at least undermine it. This in turn could promote the unification of the 1.2 million Baluchis living in Pakistan with the 300,000 living in Afghanistan and the one million in Iran. Soviet support of the second largest opposition party in Pakistan in its efforts to form an anti-Zia united front may be an indication that the Soviet leadership perceives that the option presented here is not unrealistic. In sum, fomenting separatist rebellions such as among the Baluchis may be viewed by Soviet leaders as one way of increasing Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf. A puppet Afghan regime, backed by Soviet military force, would enable the Soviets to interfere more directly in the unrest sweeping the Baluchi regions of Iran and Pakistan. And a pro-Soviet autonomous Baluchistan would put Soviet forces directly on the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman.

Admittedly, many Baluchi elders abhor the Marxist regime of Afghanistan because of its atheism and support of an unpopular regime in Afghanistan.

But they are equally opposed to the United States because of its military aid to Pakistan, which they believe could be used by the central government against them. Thus, while the Russians are perceived as evil by the Baluchis, the United States is viewed in practically the same light, since it is supporting an equally unpopular regime in Pakistan. Moreover, Baluchis of both the right and left are suspicious that Iran, in concert with "World Imperialism," has designs on Baluchistan's oil and uranium deposits. This grievance can be easily exploited by the Kremlin: it is axiomatic in Marxist-Leninist thinking that world imperialism (i.e., the West) exploits other nations, especially weak and underdeveloped ones, and that the Soviet Union, as the enemy of Imperialism will help such nations to protect their natural resources from foreign encroachments.

#### The Soviet Union and Pushtunistan

In addition, the Soviet Union may have intervened in Afghanistan in order to replace H. Amin and to pursue a more adventurist policy in Pushtunistan. The Kremlin may have intended to split off an independent Pushtunistan, an area which straddles the northwestern sector of the Pakistani-Afghan border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moscow, wary of Pakistan's probable resistance to such a move, coupled with the ambivalent attitude toward Moscow shown by some of the independent tribes from the Pushtun areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border, adopted a relatively moderate position on this issue. Nonetheless, Soviet support of Pushtun separatism in Pakistan is not out of the question. This is especially true since the Kremlin perceives Pakistan to be a client of the United States.

Pushtuns live in both Afghanistan and Pakistan--7 million on the Pakistani side of the border and 5.6 million on the Afghan side. The creation of an independent Pushtunistan would draw support from the Pushtun patriots and tribal politicians in both Afghanistan and Pakistan since it would bolster their power. While the Kremlin has been cautious in its opposition on the Pushtunistan issue, the Soviet government supported the Afghan government in the 1950s on the Pushtunistan issue. Moreover, both Taraki and Amin were Pushtuns of the Chilazi clan and the Afghan government, army, and bureaucracy are largely controlled by the Pushtuns. Thus, Moscow by aiding the Pushtun nationalists, and by supporting the separatist movement in Pushtunistan could literally tear Pakistan apart. This would be desirable for Moscow, since the Kremlin considered the Zia regime to be a pliant client of the United States, and thus had to be undermined. Thus, Moscow could have sought to pursue a more adventurist policy in the borderlands in Pakistan and Iran. There is evidence that Amin was viewed by Moscow as clumsy and unsuccessful in his efforts to fan secessionist movements there. Thus, the Kremlin may have felt that the creation of a separate and autonomous Pushtunistan might have helped to shore up the tottering Marxist regime in Kabul by bolstering the position of Pushtuns within the Marxist party, the army, and the government bureaucracy. While Moscow and Kabul did not play a directly manipulative role in the smoldering crisis involving Afghan minorities; they may have reasoned that the leadership struggle between separatists and old guard conservative tribal politicians, who are wary of becoming too dependent on Marxist help, was becoming favorable to the Soviet Union, and that Amin was not exploiting that situation effectively enough.

The Soviet Union and their Grand Strategy

Another possible explanation for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was the Soviet's desire to fulfill Russia's age-old, imperial dream of establishing a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean from which it could interdict Western oil supplies. According to this geo-strategic interpretation, the Kremlin seeks to close the remaining gaps in an arc of influence stretching from the Horn of Africa to Central Asia. One end of the arc is anchored in Ethiopia—a Soviet client state on the Red Sea; the middle span centers on Southern Yemen, another Soviet client state which flanks Saudi Arabia and controls the Arabian Sea approaches to the Red Sea; the final links in the arc which the Soviets allegedly are trying to close are Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, leading into the Persian Gulf. Thus, according to this argument, a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan would put the Soviet military forces within easy striking distance of the Strait of Hormuz, leading into the Persian Gulf.

Sixty percent of the world's proven oil reserves are concentrated in the Persian Gulf, and all this must pass through the Strait of Hormuz on the way to consumers in the industrial nations.<sup>13</sup> Were the Soviets to control this area by stretching a net across the Strait of Malacca in the Indian Ocean, across the Strait of Hormuz which leads into the Indian Ocean from the Persian Gulf, and across the Gulf of Aden which leads into the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, they could block American, European, and Japanese oil supplies coming from the Middle East, and even encircle China and Pakistan. With such a stranglehold on the industrialized nations, the Soviet Union could destroy NATO and any American-Japanese-Chinese alliance without recourse to war, and thereby become a much stronger power vis-a-vis the entire capitalist world.



In addition to interdicting oil supplies going to Europe, the United States, or Japan, and thus seriously undermining these states' economies, the Soviet Union could invade Iran if that country disintegrated into civil war, or peacefully through the establishment of a leftist government in Tehran.

Conquest of Afghanistan could lead to the eventual access by the Soviets to warm-water ports on the Arabian Sea. A puppet Soviet regime in Kabul could promote this goal by allowing the Soviets greater opportunity to interfere more directly in the unrest surging through Baluchistan. Soviet success in gaining a foothold on the Arabian Sea is contingent upon Soviet success in fanning separatist Baluchi elements in these states and in establishing a pro-Soviet entity there. But in order to interfere in Baluchi affairs, the Soviets needed reliable support from the Afghan government. As long as Amin stayed in power, realization of this objective was at best dubious. If the "grand strategy" argument is valid, its execution presupposed a regime in Kabul which Moscow could trust. The Kremlin had lost faith in the unpredictable Amin, and so marched into Afghanistan, deposed him, and replaced him by the more reliable Babrak Karmal.

#### The Soviets and the Regional Balance in Southwest Asia

A final factor believe to be behind the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan was the need Moscow felt in maintaining a credible presence in Southwest Asia, and the need to undermine the influence of the West there. To have let Afghanistan fall would have eroded the Soviet presence in Southwest Asia, and weakened its global influence. To comprehend this point, one needs to grasp a vital principle of Soviet foreign policy:<sup>14</sup> regional areas are significant to the Soviet Union since they represent key components of the global balance of forces (sootnoshenie sil)--a balance that is viewed by Moscow as a struggle

between capitalism and Imperialism led by the United States, and communism, led by the Soviet Union. The main objective for the Soviet Union in this struggle is to bring about a shift in this balance favorable to the U.S.S.R. since this would allow them to advance more rapidly throughout the world.<sup>15</sup> The Soviets recognize that Southwest Asia is an area of increasing importance to Western economies, and thus of importance to them, since it has become an area of "anti-imperialist", national-liberation struggles. This means that Soviet prestige and influence on a global scale can be promoted by making gains on a regional level--the outcome of development on a regional level can either weaken or strengthen the global balance of forces as perceived by Moscow. Thus, Afghanistan must be viewed in relation to the overall power equation in a region that is critical to Western economies, and where the central thrust of Soviet policy is well defined: denial to the West of guaranteed access to Mideast oil. This in turn will undermine the global influence of the West. Thus, Afghanistan is important in regional as well as global terms.

Moscow's chief concern is to weaken the influence and power of the West by denying to it guaranteed access to Mideast oil, and correspondingly increase Soviet influence and power. This mode of thinking (zero-sum game) reflects Moscow's conviction that any Soviet loss is a gain for the West, and any U.S. loss accrues to the Soviet Union since it means a weakening of U.S. power and influence and an increase of Soviet power and influence. It also explains how Soviet leaders could claim that "Imperialist agents," and not the Soviet Union initiated an undeclared war against Afghanistan, and the Soviets were only protecting a besieged country. The Soviet assertion that Afghan rebels, in attempting to bring down the Marxist regime, were acting under the West's orders (The United States, China, and Iran), confirms this description

of the Soviet mind-set--given the Soviet view of the world as a bipolar conflict, the enemy--any enemy--must be perceived as acting under the orders of its capitalist masters. Because the main Soviet objective in the global/regional struggle is to bring about a shift favorable to the Soviet Union, the enemy in Afghanistan must be defeated and the Marxist regime there preserved, since the outcome of this struggle will have a significant bearing on the global balance of forces. The Soviet concept of the regional/global balance of forces also indicates that Moscow must convert Afghanistan into a Soviet protectorate. This is confirmed in the statement made by the Afghan ambassador in Moscow in early July 1981:<sup>16</sup> "My government will not accept any policy, any maneuvers, any political subterfuges aimed at making the problem of Afghanistan international." Since this proposal was put forth by the European Economic Community--and not the Soviet Union or one of its socialist allies--it represented to Moscow an attempt by the West to meddle in the affairs of a Soviet protectorate. The West should have learned from the lessons of Hungary, Czechlovakia, and Mongolia that Moscow will not allow this.

#### Implications for U. S. National Security

Certain implications for U.S. national security can be drawn from the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan. One implication is that the West is witnessing a new projection of Soviet military power into a volatile area of vital importance to the West. While it would be an exaggeration to declare that the Soviets have "outflanked" both Iran and Pakistan, and they intend to invade these countries it is clear that the Soviets now possess the capability to project their military power more effectively than at anytime in the past. This is partially confirmed by the growing number of Soviet military writers who argue that war and military power can serve as a useful tool of Soviet policy.<sup>17</sup> Thus, the ability to project military power is seen as a form of war serving as an instrument of policy.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represented a major departure and potential precedent for employing Soviet troops outside of Eastern Europe.<sup>18</sup> Afghanistan did not mark the first instance of regular Soviet army units fighting in a non-European country. That honor goes to Iran where Stalin used Soviet military force to occupy that country in the 1940s. But the Soviets now have the military capability--a larger naval force, including much improved amphibious troops and equipment and an air-lift capability, to move their forces quickly and over longer distances. With this improved interventionary capability, the Soviet Union can be expected employ its maritime and land capabilities as economic and political weapons to undermine non-Communist states, and to buttress such a policy by a further buildup and deployment of naval and other mobile elements of their military power. Given the volatility of the Persian Gulf area and its importance to the economies of the industrialized world, the Soviets, imbued with a new sense of power, coupled with their suspicions of "imperialism," will probably not exercise as much restraint in the near future in employing its forces outside of Eastern Europe. The threat to the economies of the non-communist industrial world, posed by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, is real. While it is true that direct Soviet interdiction of Western oil supplies from the Persian Gulf would be tantamount to war, it should not be assumed that the Soviet Union will desist from seeking more subtle means of gaining control over the area. If the Soviets could gain influence in states located in the Persian Gulf area, such as Pakistan, Iran, and Oman, they could gain a powerful bargaining position in any future negotiations over Persian Gulf oil, without directly meddling in the Persian Gulf per se.

The Soviet move into Afghanistan represented a departure from previous Soviet policies because it reflected the Kremlin's willingness to accept exorbitant costs--military/political/diplomatic/economic, to achieve their objectives. In one sense, the Soviet move differed from previous Soviet invasions, such as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, in that the Soviet leadership must have reasoned that the war in Afghanistan might become a protracted guerrilla conflict and cost the Soviets much in bloodshed, and result in widespread international resentment. Nonetheless, the Soviets invaded the country. The lesson to be learned from this is that the Kremlin can be expected to intervene in a country if the loss of a strategically important area is threatened. Further, the Kremlin can be expected to put pressure on Western states if it believes that by such a move the regional/global influence of the West is weakened and that of the Soviet Union is bolstered.

The present Soviet leadership, aided by the leverage provided by the separatist movements in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, along with the support given by the friendly government in India, intends to do what it can to make the Persian Gulf area a permanent sphere of Soviet influence, or at least to deny it to the West.<sup>20</sup> If this reasoning is valid, a Soviet-controlled Afghanistan represents a useful staging area from which the Soviets can conduct further probes in Southwest Asia. The recent proposal offered by Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev to transform the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf into a "zone of peace" by removing all military bases and military weapons from these areas and making the region free of foreign interference, reveals the Soviet motive:<sup>21</sup> to exclude all Western forces from the area and to enhance Soviet influence there (since the terms "peace" and "peaceful" denote in Marxist-Leninist terminology anti-Western forces). While this proposal may not seem realistic at the present time, the underlying motive suggests that Moscow will take advantage of every

opportunity to establish for itself a permanent strategic-political foothold in Southwest Asia. Believing that the global balance of power favors them, Moscow can be patient and can pursue low-cost, low-risk policies to promote this objective.

Another implication of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan for U.S. security interests has to do with the Soviet concept of the balance of forces (correlation of forces). Beginning around mid-1980, Soviet thinkers began to imply that the military balance (tactical and global) had surpassed the broader, global correlation of forces as the main vehicle of change in the world. This may mean that Soviet leaders feel that they must continue their military buildup in order to accelerate changes, now seen as a slowing down, in the distribution of forces in the world. The Soviet move into Afghanistan, and the concomitant international resentment toward the Soviet Union because of it, may have convinced the Soviets that the shift in the correlation of forces either is no longer favorable to the Soviet Union, or that such a shift is attenuating in intensity. Since the correlation of forces is described in Marxist-Leninist ideology as being based on "objective" factors of social development,<sup>22</sup> a weakening of the effect of such factors may mean that the Kremlin will put more emphasis in the future on "subjective" factors in promoting world changes. Further, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may have convinced the Kremlin that they must stress "subjective" factors of change (which they can control) because of the solid resistance to the intervention from non-communist states in the world. If this is true, the Soviet Union can be expected to stress such "subjective" factors as a military buildup, or more adventurist foreign policies, or a vigorous peace campaign designed to win more friends. Given the Soviet conviction that the only power equation which is acceptable to them is one where the overall global balance favors socialist states, coupled with the perception that such a shift is not as automatic as before, they can be expected to push and probe in soft spots, such as the Middle East, Southwest and Southeast Asia, and in select Third World countries. The Soviet Union, it can be concluded, must be viewed as a threat to American security interests in these and other areas of the world. The West should be alert to forestalling such moves.

## CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper was to examine the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979-1981 and to determine the possible motives behind the Soviet move. Six factors were seen as crucial in the Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan: (1) a need to secure the Soviet's southern border and to preserve Afghanistan as a Soviet protectorate; (2) the possible ascendancy of hard-line elements within Soviet decision-making circles in the wake of political/diplomatic setbacks suffered by the Soviet Union; (3) a fear that Hafizullah Amin would either be overthrown by anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan or would remain in power but pursue policies incompatible with Soviet interests in Afghanistan and Southwest Asia in general; (4) A Soviet desire to gain access to the sea by fanning separatist elements in Baluchistan and Pushtunistan; the Kremlin may also have believed that the establishment of an autonomous Pushtunistan might have helped shore up the weak Marxist regime in Kabul; (5) a Soviet desire to fulfill Russia's age-old dream of obtaining a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean; and (6) the need to maintain a credible presence in Southwest Asia, which would enhance Soviet influence in that and other areas of the world, and at the same time reduce American influence.

What are the implications for U.S. national security interests of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan? One implication is that Afghanistan represents a new projection of Soviet military power into an area of vital importance to the West, i.e., the Persian Gulf. It appears likely that the Soviet Union will attempt to fan secessionist movements in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran in order to make the Persian Gulf a permanent sphere of Soviet influence.

This is a threat to the West because about sixty percent of the oil supplies to the industrialized world must pass through this area. Further, since the Soviets, steeped in Marxist-Leninist thinking which postulates inherent struggle between capitalism and socialism, a concept of the balance of forces which favors them, and a view of regional balances closely related to the global balance will certainly attempt to increase their influence in Southwest Asia and reduce that of their adversaries. On the other hand, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the negative international reaction to it may have helped convince the Kremlin that the shift in the global balance of forces in favor of socialism has slowed down; accordingly, they may attempt to manipulate the military balance (tactical/strategic) in order to promote a variety of changes in the world. Regardless of which interpretation is accurate, the Soviets must be viewed as troublesome and threatening, not only to the United States, but to the rest of the world.



ENDNOTES

1. Vladimir Petrov, "New Dimensions of Soviet Foreign Policy: Evolving Strategic Realities, Implications for U.S. Policymakers." (Washington, C.C.: National Defense University Press, 1980), pp. 26,30-31.
2. See Alfred L. Monks, The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), pp. 18-30.
3. T.V. Parasuran, "Is Detente Dead?" World Press Review, March 1980, p. 21.
4. Pravda, January 13, 1980.
5. Pravda, February 24, 1980.
6. Quoted in Pravda, July 1, 1981.
7. Ibid.
8. For other examples, See Izvestiya, June 16, August 31, October 9, 1979; Krasnaya Zvezda, May 11, 18, 28, 29, June 26, July 4, December 6, 1980; and Pravda, May 14, June 27, September 1, October 9, November 11, 1980.
9. Pravda, December 21, 1979. Stalin was praised by Marshal K. Moskalenko in his victory day speech in 1980, but not in 1979. See Izvestiya, May 9, 1979, May 9, 1980.
10. Pravda, December 16, 1979.
11. The facts on Baluchistan and Pushtunistan were taken from Selig S. Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan" Foreign Policy, No. 32 (Fall 1978), pp. 136-160.
12. Ibid., p. 140.
13. The Soviets claim that seventy percent of the developed oil reserves in the capitalist world are concentrated in the Persian Gulf. Cf. G. Kirilenko, "The Persian Gulf in the Sights of the Pentagon," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 11(June 1981), p. 76.
14. Foy D. Kohler, Leon Goure, and Mose L. Harvey, The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War: Implications for Detente. (Miami: Center for Advanced International Affairs, 1974), pp. 21-25.
15. Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy (London: Faber & Faber, 1966), p. 84.
16. Quoted in Pravda, July 1, 1981.
17. Monks, The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, pp. 41-42.
18. Petrov, "New Dimensions of Soviet Foreign Policy," p. 174.

19. It appears that the Kremlin is also attempting to gain influence in Saudi Arabia, Bahrein and Kuwait. See Kirilenko, "The Persian Gulf in the Sights of the Pentagon," p. 79.
20. Characteristically the Soviets, in an attempt to conceal their own motive, assert that the Carter/Reagan Administrations, controlled by "monopoly-capitalists circles which need to extract superprofits from the oil in the Persian Gulf, have converted this area in to a key component of U.S. national security interests. See Kirilenko, "The Persian Gulf in the Sights of the Pentagon," p. 77.
21. Pravda, December 10, 1980.
22. "The Leninist Foreign Policy in Action," (Book Review of the History of the Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R., 1917-1975, ed. by A. Narochitskiy and J. Glagolev. Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 8(May 1976), p. 119.

Mr. FASCELL. I want to thank you for a very concise excellent statement. By the way, we put your entire statement in the record. We appreciate it very much and also your suggestions.

Mr. MONKS. Help the Afghan freedom fighters. Give them something other than a 1903 rifle.

Mr. FASCELL. I want to thank you and all of the witnesses who came here today. This is our first effort to document, to make a record. We hope it will have a wide readership. It is our effort to put on the record one of the bloodiest, most blatantly inhuman acts in history so that we can help freedom fighters and those who support them wherever they are in the struggle to get world opinion focused on this issue and to get some material help.

I want to say again that I am grateful to our visitor who came all the way from Afghanistan and went through all of the trouble to get here and to all of you who took the time to prepare testimony and to make this substantial contribution to what I think is a very important cause.

Thank you very much.

[Thereupon, at 2 p.m., the joint hearing of the subcommittee and the Commission adjourned to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]