

# IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

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## HEARING BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

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SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

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MAY 3, 1990

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(II)

## PUBLIC HEARING ON SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

THURSDAY, MAY 3, 1990

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,

*Washington, DC*

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 430 Dirksen Senate Office Building, at 2:10 p.m., Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman, and Representative Steny H. Hoyer, Cochairman, presiding.

In attendance; Commissioners, Representative Don Ritter and Senator Malcolm Wallop.

### OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DeCONCINI

Chairman DeCONCINI. I would like to welcome our witnesses and all our guests today to the Commission's fourth hearing on the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

Previous Commission hearings have documented the horrible price paid by the Afghan people for their noble resistance to the Soviet invasion of their country.

We are here today to examine the current situation in Afghanistan. Mr. Gorbachev once called Afghanistan a "bleeding wound." And, indeed, it has been a war which has cost Moscow dearly in terms of financial, military and human resources.

Given the war's unpopularity with the Soviet people and the seriously deteriorating state of the Soviet economy, we find it difficult to understand why the Soviet Union is continuing to spend significant amounts of money and resources to assist the Kabul Government.

We also have questions about where U.S. aid is going and whether it is being properly spent. We want to know if there has been any overall improvement in the human rights and humanitarian situation for the Afghan people.

Our four distinguished witnesses may be able to answer some of these questions today. Mr. Mohammad Saljooque is a former Afghan diplomat who has seen the effects of Soviet policy in his country from the inside.

Mr. Barnett Rubin of the U.S. Peace Institute is a veteran observer of human rights practices in Southeast Asia. He has written or co-authored several thoroughly documented accounts of human rights violations and suffering in Afghanistan under the Soviet occupation.

Mr. David Isby is an authority on the Soviet Armed Forces and has written and lectured extensively on the Soviet military effort in Afghanistan.

And Mr. Khalid Sekander was born in Afghanistan and has written several articles on his native country.

We regret the State Department did not care enough about these hearings to send Ambassador Peter Tomsen, the United States' special envoy to the Afghan resistance, as the Commission had requested.

I want to compliment Congressman Ritter for his steadfastness in bringing to the attention of the Commission, time and time again, the human rights violations in Afghanistan, and that is one of the reasons we are here today.

The Commission has a very busy schedule this year, with East European countries and the Balkan nations, but we have not forgotten about other parts of the world, and a great deal of credit for that goes to Mr. Ritter.

I will now yield to my Co-Chairman, Congressman Hoyer.

#### STATEMENT OF CO-CHAIRMAN HOYER

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to reiterate Chairman DeConcini's welcome to our witnesses and guests today to this Commission hearing on Afghanistan. In my opening statement at the Commission's third hearing on Afghanistan in March 1988, which focused on Soviet Army defectors and prisoners of war from Afghanistan, I stated that there was still unfinished business in Afghanistan.

Today, more than 2 years later, and an alleged peace agreement later, I still say that we have some unfinished business and even new business to attend to in Afghanistan.

Allegations of continued Soviet military and economic spending to the tune of \$5 billion a year, when the Soviet economy itself is in such poor economic straits, is very discouraging. The alleged presence of Soviet military and intelligence advisors calls into question the Soviet commitment to the 1988 Geneva Accord.

But recent reports of violence between Mujahadeen groups is also very disturbing. Clearly, the lack of coordination and sometimes undefined goals raises questions about continued U.S. support for such activities.

Furthermore, I am extremely concerned about reports of a recent rise in opium production and heroin refining. Some of this increase can be attributed to activities of groups that the United States directly or indirectly supports.

These are obvious concerns raised by what may appear to be at least tacit support of groups involved in narcotics production and distribution. We must avoid, as we fight our own war on drugs in this country, even the appearance of contributing to a problem which affects the lives of Americans and millions of others.

I look forward to the witnesses' comments. This Commission continues to be concerned about the human rights of all of those in Afghanistan who have paid the price of this war.

I am particularly interested in the actions of the Soviet Union, a Helsinki signatory state, in continuing to compromise the citizens of Afghanistan.

So, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming the witnesses and am looking forward to their testimony. Thank you.

Chairman DeCONCINI. Thank you, Chairman Hoyer.

I will now yield to the Congressman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Ritter.

#### STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE DON RITTER FROM PENNSYLVANIA

Representative RITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, regret the unwillingness of the State Department to permit Ambassador Peter Tomsen to be with us today. I do not believe that there is any rational line of thinking that supported their actions, and I, along with my fellow Commissioners and fellow Members of Congress, would like to express my sincere misgivings at the State Department's decision.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, we could dedicate this hearing to all of the Soviet and Afghan people who daily experience severe shortages and untold hardships, and to the forgotten 6 million Afghan refugees, 50 percent of the world's refugee population, who long to return to freedom in their homeland.

While the Soviet people are suffering from severe economic problems and shortages which threaten violent social upheavals in some republics and potentially Russia itself, Soviet officials provided the Afghan Communist regime last year with a massive \$3½ to \$4 and some people say \$5 billion in military assistance, plus assistance for food, for a land whose agricultural infrastructure they have destroyed by war.

These figures are from U.S. intelligence sources. It is quite tragic the Soviets are spending such vast amounts of money to supply weapons to an unpopular regime at a time when people in Herat and western Afghanistan are starving and dying of hunger.

While Stalinist-type regimes are falling all over Eastern Europe, the Soviets are still staunchly providing billions of dollars a year in weapons to arm a criminal regime in Afghanistan, led by murdering Secret Police Chief Najibullah.

It is apparent that the regime is not only detested and hated by a vast majority of Afghan people. It is not even acceptable to the Communists themselves, as the recent coup attempt by the Khalq faction of the PDPA demonstrates.

As a result of recent Communist infighting, weakening the Najib regime, the Soviets have begun moving more military and civilian advisors into Afghanistan to fight the war and to manage the faltering proxy government. It is known that over 500 Soviet military advisors are now in Afghanistan, many engaged in direct combat roles, such as the firing of SCUD missiles and commanding Afghan Army, Air Force and paramilitary KHAD units.

This is in direct violation of the Geneva Accords. In addition, Soviet KGB and, "educational advisors," remain in Afghanistan to direct the secret police and run the propaganda and ideological war.

It is doubtful that Communist leader Najibullah would have survived the recent coup attempt without the assistance of Soviet troops. From Mazar-i-Sharif air base, Soviet military crews fired SCUD missiles at General Tanai's main rebel base at Bagram Airfield, destroying the base and decapitating the coup.

The Soviet military airlift to Afghanistan has now topped 5,600 flights. In October of last year, the Soviet reprioritized air cargo space on the military transport planes bound for Kabul: 80 percent weapons and 20 percent food and supplies.

Yet publicly the Soviet Union bemoans to the United Nations and the world community the suffering and starvation of the Afghan people. The sheer hypocrisy of it all.

Since the Soviet withdrawal of troops, air escorted military convoy of up to 1,300 vehicles originating at Soviet military bases within the Soviet Union, like the Soviet base at Kushka, are supplying huge quantities of weapons, ammunition, fuel and food to Communist garrisons in the major cities of Afghanistan.

Even as I speak, military supplies flown into the Soviet-built air base at Shindand, Afghanistan by Soviet planes and Soviet pilots are being transported by a convoy of approximately 150 Soviet supplied vehicles, APCs and tanks to a Communist garrison nearby.

Cross-border Soviet air strikes have been witnessed by Mujahadeen in proximity to Kushka, U.S.S.R., probably operating out of the Mary air base. Since the troop withdrawal, cross-border Soviet air strikes, in total violation of the Geneva Accords, have been witnessed by a wide variety of Mujahadeen sources, as well as by Robert Darr, the Director of UNHCR-funded projects.

Sovietization of Afghanistan continues apace. Last year, Mujahadeen commanders in the Herat area captured a number of young Afghan DRA soldiers who spoke Russian, Afghans who said they had spent up to 10 years in the Soviet Union. Mujahadeen fighting around Jalalabad have reported capturing DRA soldiers with similar testimonies and characteristics.

Thousands of Afghan children and young people, forcibly abducted by the Soviets in the early 1980's, are now forming a vital part of the Afghan regime's military security and ideological infrastructure. According to Captain Hamim Gul, a KHAD defector, up to 3,600 Afghans per year were sent by the secret police to the Soviet Union. Thousands more were sent by various Soviet armed forces.

Former Chief of Security and Immigration at Kabul International Airport, S. Karim Mahmud, who fled Afghanistan in 1981, witnessed the loading of Afghan children by Soviet troops into transport planes bound for the Soviet Union. Mr. Mahmud also witnessed the transfer of 350 Afghan boys, aged 14 to 16, Paghtuns from the Jaji, Mangel and Shenwar tribes, to the Soviet Union for training for the KHAD, the Afghan secret police.

Captain Abdul Malik Jamdar, who defected in January of this year to the Mujahadeen, to NIFA, was trained at the Police Academy of Leningrad. While in the Soviet Union, he visited a center where Afghan children who had been forcibly abducted were being indoctrinated.

In addition to the little known examples I am providing here, in December 1986, Helsinki Watch and Asia Watch published the arti-

cle "To Win the Children: Afghanistan's Other War," which cites numerous other examples.

Even Communist officials themselves on Radio Kabul have announced the transfer of children and young people to the Soviet Union. For example, on November 5, 1984, Radio Kabul, Dari Service, reported that 870 children between the ages of 7 and 9 years were being sent to the Soviet Union for 10 years of education, 10 years. That is a long time to be away from home when you are so young.

Since the withdrawal of the bulk of the Soviet forces in February of last year, President Najibullah has recalled thousands of Afghan young people from the Soviet Union who were being trained at security and military academies. "Jane's Defence Weekly," May 27, 1989, reported last year that the arrival of 300 of these officers in Kandahar earlier this year caused dismay amongst the Mujahadeen, who described them as "worse than the Russians."

It is apparent that despite the pull-out of most of the Soviet troops last February, the Soviets are waging their war in Afghanistan as fiercely as ever, albeit this time a secret war, but yet a war totally inconsistent with Glasnost and Perestroika.

Finally, this hearing has been called to focus attention on continued violation of the Helsinki Accords by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as far as human rights violations and military intervention by a Helsinki signatory nation and a neighboring nation.

There are many other forums, and many of us have participated in them for bringing other issues to light about the war in Afghanistan. I would hope that today we would and our witnesses would stick to the subject of the hearing, and that is the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in contravention of the Helsinki Accords.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, and I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses.

Thank you.

Chairman DeCONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Ritter.

We will now start and hear from all four of the witnesses before asking questions, and we will start with Mr. Saljooque.

Mr. Saljooque, again, welcome and thank you for participating.

#### STATEMENT OF MOHAMMAD SIDDIQ SALJOOQUE, A FORMER AFGHAN DIPLOMAT

Mr. SALJOOQUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman, and Mr. Ritter, Congressman Ritter, for your vigilance and your talks of my country, and really I appreciate it.

So I will go through what I have written here.

The world is well aware of the agonies which the Afghan nation has suffered through the last 11 years of Communist repression and the brazen Soviet invasion. Thousands of our people were executed without any reason. There have been mass killings by dousing of people with gasoline and burning them alive, burying people alive in mass graves, and in many instances throwing people out alive from helicopters and planes onto mountain tops and into rivers. These have been well documented.

Thousands of people have been subjected to indiscriminate torture and degradation. The newest techniques of Soviet torture de-

vices were applied and tested on Afghan prisoners. About 1½ million Afghans lost their lives due to indiscriminate bombing and shelling by the Soviets and their puppet regimes.

They did not refrain from deploying napalm, chemical weapons and toy bombs, which have killed and maimed thousands of our innocent men, women and children.

More than 5 million Afghans have been forced to leave their homeland and take refuge in neighboring countries. Millions of other Afghans have been displaced and are reduced to being internal refugees.

One of the most distressing effects of the Communist regime and the Soviet invasion has been the tremendous drop in literacy and education in Afghan society. Thousands of our educated people have been murdered and many others forced to leave the country for their safety.

In the refugee camps where about 5 million Afghans are living in forced deprivation, at least two school-worthy generations of youngsters have missed the blessings of knowledge and education and are almost illiterate.

On the contrary, the Soviets have forced tens of thousands of Afghan children from their homes, despite their parents' protests, and brainwashed and trained them in the Soviet Union.

According to well informed sources, there are still more than 10,000 thousand young Afghans in the Soviet Central Asian Republics. These young people are very unhappy and homesick, and they are pleading to return to their parents in Afghanistan or to the refugee camps to join their families.

Also, there are approximately 3,000 Afghan infants in the Soviet Union who virtually have been kidnapped by the Communists. The Communists claim that these infants are the orphans of the war, which was imposed on us by the Kabul/Soviet regime. Many of these young Afghans are being trained for intelligence and espionage, while others are brainwashed into being zealous Marxists.

Unfortunately, education and the establishment of training facilities have been neglected by the friendly donor countries who have been supplying military and humanitarian aid to the Afghan freedom fighters and refugees.

I have pleaded many times to our Western friends and sympathizers that special care should be given towards education of the Afghan youths so that the number of Soviet educated Afghans could be somewhat counterbalanced, and at such a time, it was imperative that hundreds of vocational schools should have been established to train a significant number of Afghans to fill the gap of illiteracy and the shortage of skills.

For instance, there has been a constant flow of Soviet educated Afghans who are steadily filling the vacancies in many ministries, and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Seventy-five percent of these officials are Communist Party members. Most of them have been trained in Moscow.

Such takeovers by these Soviet-trained personnel and the shortage of Western-trained patriotic Afghans will remain a serious threat to the future of Afghan administration. There must be a sufficient amount of short courses and free education for Afghans in order to counterbalance the Soviet oriented expertise.

After the Soviet withdrawal and because of increasing pressure from the Afghan freedom fighters, the Kabul regime, for the time being, has postponed Marxist-Leninist teaching in the schools, but there are other Marxist institutions in Kabul where Marxism is taught and where party members are still being trained.

Russian advisors played a dominant role during the Soviet occupation and continue to maintain a significant role since their military pull-out from Afghanistan. Just a few months ago, a press interview between some Western journalists and the Afghan Academy of Science was proposed and accepted by the Kabul Government. Just prior to the interview, Soviet advisors handed written directives to each member of the Afghan Academy to conduct the interview in accordance with the provided directions.

There are still a significant number of Soviet advisors in Afghanistan, and they are primarily military advisors.

There is no doubt that divide and rule has been a very old and effective means of imposing domination. The Soviets have greatly resorted to such classic methods. But even our friends and sympathizers have not refrained from sowing seeds of dissension through the methods of uneven distribution of arms and supplies so as to manipulate the resistance, encourage favoritism by empowering their favorite ones, and impose hegemony in Afghanistan through them.

In the past 11 years, KHAD has been established in line with the Soviet secret service, KGB, and Soviet expertise has improved and equipped this repressive institution. At this stage, KHAD is a self-imposing at a well advanced institute of espionage, disinformation and repression.

The exploitation of Afghan mineral resources by the Soviets is nothing new. They have been extensively exploiting our natural gas at a very unreasonable price. Even the gas meters have been installed on Soviet soil.

Uranium and other radioactive ores have been plundered during the Soviet occupation by the Russians. The valuable artifacts of the Afghan Museum, which had the richest of the Greco-Bakhterian Era, has been plundered and flown to Moscow.

Scores and scores of treaties have been concluded between the Kabul regime and their masters. These have no legal validity and should be reconsidered when a true national government is established in Afghanistan.

Regarding the last coup attempt of Hekmatyar and General Tanai, there has been much complicity by our brothers, enemies and our friends. It would be in the best interest of all the perpetrators that, as an Afghan, I should keep silent.

Only I must say that General Tanai is the proven butcher of Herat, Jalalabad and Khost. He is the greatest contributor of bloodshed in Afghanistan.

Mr. Hekmatayar is the ally and collaborator of General Tanai, on one hand, and the favorite of the ISI of Pakistan and even a favorite of a number of American notables, on the other hand. This makes the matter very complicated.

In view of all of the complications and complexities which are further aggravated by alien interference, the only solution for the problem of Afghanistan could be in the restoration of the right of

self-determination for the people of Afghanistan, which could be only manifested through the traditional Grand Assembly of the people of Afghanistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Saljooque.

Now, Mr. Barnett Rubin, the Chairperson of the South Asian Coordination Group of Amnesty International.

#### STATEMENT OF BARNETT R. RUBIN OF THE U.S. PEACE INSTITUTE

Mr. RUBIN. Let me say first of all that I am not here representing Amnesty International. It should not even be mentioned that I have that role in my private capacity. I am here as an independent scholar who is a specialist in the region, someone who has also personally done research on human rights and many other questions with regard to Afghanistan.

In that capacity, I would like to thank the Chairman, Co-Chairman and Congressman Ritter for giving us this opportunity to discuss this much neglected subject.

I have not prepared a written statement which deals extensively with the issues Congressman Ritter raised, because I felt that the U.S. Congress was not the organ that could do the most about Soviet policy in Afghanistan. I have addressed these issues specifically in an article I recently published in the Soviet press. I wrote about the Soviet policy of supplying immense amounts of sophisticated weapons to an unpopular regime, which has ended up using them against itself in internecine fighting, and about the continued presence of the former head of the secret police, who is responsible for jailing and torturing about one-tenth of the population of Kabul City, at the head of the Government.

Both of these are formidable obstacles to a peaceful solution.

If I can just make one comment about the Soviet arms supply with respect to the economic situation in the Soviet Union, I discussed this recently with some Soviets. First of all, it is not accurate to say that, because they are supplying weapons worth \$300 million a month, it is costing them \$300 million a month. These are largely, although not entirely, weapons that are being moved out of Eastern Europe and dumped in Afghanistan.

Second, one of the Soviets said to me,

Well, you see, it is no problem for us. We are a very rich country. We have done nothing but destroy our economy for 70 years, and we are still here. So it really does not matter. We do not even know how much it is costing.

This indicates that the process of democratization in the Soviet Union, which would provide for greater accountability over the use of resources, would be a great contribution to the Helsinki process and also to world peace and specifically to Afghanistan.

If I could just say something more about the Helsinki process, the United States and the entire world, and I would say especially the peoples of the reuniting halves of Europe, owe a tremendous debt to the people of Afghanistan. Their sacrifice of over 1 million lives, as Mr. Saljooque mentioned when I was talking to him last night, and their sacrifice of what little wealth they had has been a very important factor in the Soviet Government's reevaluation of

the effectiveness of the use of military force in international conflicts.

The bravery of the Afghan Mujahadeen has also severely damaged the prestige of the Soviet military within the Soviet Union and discredited the conservative faction of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. Hence, I believe that the United States, Europe and the entire world have a moral debt to the people of Afghanistan which will not be easy to repay.

Traditionally, we always felt that the internal political arrangements of Afghanistan were not of interest to us. I hope we, one day, reach the state where that is true once again.

However, at the moment, given the unsettled situation in the area, we also have, besides the moral concern, geo-political grounds to continue to be involved to assure stability in the region.

Therefore, it would be wrong for us simply to end our involvement and abandon Afghanistan to fragmentation and civil war. We have to continue our commitment, and it may take years of continued commitment.

However, I think that the nature of that commitment must change as the situation in Afghanistan, the region and the world has changed. The strategy of the past, supplying more weapons through the same channels, through Pakistan to the resistance fronts in Afghanistan, although actually we are not sure where all of the weapons go, and of simply portraying it as a struggle between the Soviet Union and the Kabul regime, on the one hand, and us, the Mujahadeen, Pakistan and the Saudis, on the other, will not lead to peace.

Our goal has to be a political settlement in which Afghans choose the Government themselves, along the lines described by Mr. Saljooque, and I must say I believe along the lines described in this morning's article in the New York Times, according to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are moving toward a solution to the conflict in Afghanistan based on free elections under international supervision.

I have more details and a proposal for how this might be carried out here, but I will omit them. I will be happy to answer questions on them later.

I think that the alternatives to such a political settlement are simply more fragmentation, more destruction, more loss of life, and more refugees, and after all they have gone through, the people of Afghanistan deserve better, and they deserve our help in attaining it.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much.

I might say that Mr. Rubin has quite an extensive statement, which we will include in the record at this time without objection.

[The prepared statement of Barnett R. Rubin follows:]

The Situation in Afghanistan  
 Testimony before The Commission on Security and  
 Cooperation in Europe, U.S. Congress  
 May 3, 1990

Barnett R. Rubin  
 United States Institute of Peace<sup>1</sup>

The United States and the entire world, most especially the reuniting halves of Europe, owe a tremendous debt to the people of Afghanistan. Their sacrifice of over a million lives and of what little wealth this desperately poor country had was an important factor in the Soviet government's re-evaluation of the effectiveness of the use of military force in resolving international conflicts. The bravery of the Afghan mujahedin has severely damaged the prestige of the Soviet military and the conservative factions within the Communist Party of the USSR. Withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan has so far been the main benefit the people of the Soviet Union themselves have derived from Gorbachev's program.

Hence I believe that the U.S. and the entire world owes a debt to the people of Afghanistan that will not be easy to repay. Despite the confusing and frustrating situation in that country today, it would be wrong simply to end our involvement and effectively abandon Afghanistan to fragmentation and civil war. The country requires the help of the U.S. and the international community, first, to exercise self-determination and thus make peace, and, second, to rebuild itself. Both these processes may require years of commitment.

The nature of that commitment, however, must change, as the situation in Afghanistan, the region, and the world has changed. A strategy which succeeded in the past -- supplying more and more sophisticated weapons through exiled leaders in Pakistan to uncoordinated resistance fronts inside the country -- will lead our policy, as well as Afghanistan, to disaster. Any attempt to use continued aid to force the Afghans into one or another form of "unity" made in Washington, Islamabad, or Riyadh, will fail as

<sup>1</sup>All views expressed herein are those of the author alone, not those of the United States Institute of Peace.

ignominiously as the AIG is failing -- or as the PDPA's made-in-Moscow "unity" is failing.

American policy toward Afghanistan is undergoing some gradual evolution in a positive direction, but it retains some fundamental flaws.

First, the policy is confused in its goals: our principle objective was accomplished with the departure of Soviet troops, and we have been unable to articulate clearly what our remaining objectives are.

Second, the policy is based on a mistaken conceptual framework derived from an outdated image of bi-polar conflict both within Afghanistan and in the international system over Afghanistan. In reality there are multiple forces involved at both levels.

Third, the policy is inconsistent in its execution. Partly because the conflict is complex and multilateral, partly because the policy is executed by operational agencies whose goals may differ from the stated policies of their governments, and partly because there is no unified political leadership of the resistance, neither we nor anyone else can coordinate military activity of the mujahedin with political objectives, which Clausewitz singled out as the major determinant of success in war.

Judging by the questions I was asked to address, some of the originators of this hearing share the predominant misconceptions. My letter of invitation asked me to address two themes: "Continued Soviet troop and force deployment in Afghanistan, and the continued violation of human rights in that country." Behind these questions apparently lie two beliefs: that the reason the mujahedin have not triumphed by capturing Kabul and setting up a new government is that Soviet troops are still supporting the government in Kabul, and that the government is still successfully engaged in ruthless repression. Of these two assertions, the former is false, and the latter a half-truth; most important, the real reasons for the evolution of the political and military stalemate lie elsewhere.

In brief, for many Afghans, including mujahedin, the war is no longer a jihad between two starkly opposed sides, but a struggle for power among self-interested actors supported by a variety of foreign powers, not only the US and USSR, but also Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, India, and Libya. This trend has become accentuated since the failed coup d'état of March 6. This coup ended in a de facto



alliance between, on the one side, the most extreme factions formerly supported by both the USSR and the US (PDPA-Khalq and Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar)), together with the Pakistani intelligence services, and, on the other side, Najibullah's regime, tacitly supported against the Hekmatyar-Tanai alliance by most of the mujahedin.<sup>2</sup> Both the US and the USSR emerged as relatively marginal actors in this conflict that they are doing so much to fund.

#### Goals

Our goal should be a political settlement in which Afghans choose their own leaders without any conditions set by outsiders; Afghanistan becomes a neutral buffer state; and all foreign powers cease to supply weapons or engage in covert operations. Only insofar as such moves promote such a settlement do we have an interest in removing Najibullah or the PDPA or in strengthening the AIG or any other specific organization. Such a settlement would also be most likely to meet the legitimate interests of Pakistan by encouraging refugee repatriation and reconstruction.

There is some evidence, however, that powerful actors with whom we are allied, and perhaps some within our own government, have other goals, goals which require not the free choice of Afghans but the installation or at least continued supply of particular groups. Pakistan's Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, continues to speak of the Afghan fundamentalist groups as useful for the liberation of Soviet Central Asia. He said as much to Undersecretary of State Robert Kimmitt a few months ago. Saudi Arabia continues to favor militant Sunni fundamentalists over a more broad-based leadership of the resistance in order to counter the influence of Iran and advance its own agenda within the Islamic world; and some in the U.S. government have claimed to me, although I cannot verify it, that some of their colleagues regard Afghanistan in part as a

<sup>2</sup>According to resistance sources, during the coup mujahedin in Qandahar offered prayers for the welfare of Najibullah. Both Pashtun mujahedin of Hezb-e Islami (Khales) based in Paghman and Tajik mujahedin of Jamiat-e Islami based in Kohdaman blocked some of the approaches to Kabul during the coup attempt to stop attempted advances by the Hekmatyar-Tanai forces. The six remaining parties affiliated to the AIG in Peshawar also opposed the coup. Najibullah later publicly thanked the mujahedin for their assistance. The motivation of the mujahedin, of course, was not to help Najibullah, whom they still do not recognize, but to stop Hekmatyar.

potential base for operations affecting future struggles in Iran and Central Asia.

Those who support such goals have an interest in continuing the war, not just until the Afghan people can exercise self-determination, but until particular groups they favor take power. They oppose not only the regime in Kabul, but an indigenous nationalist alternative to that regime. Such goals are part of the reason there has been so much resistance to broadening the political base of the mujahedin leadership. The U.S. government, and first of all the president, must clearly state in public and, most important, in private, that such schemes are not in the interest of the U.S. or, for that matter, the Afghans. We must use all our influence to stop those who are ostensibly on our side from pursuing them. Only then will we be in a position to offer a genuine alternative to the Soviets and find out how far they will go to pry their clients loose from the Afghan state.

#### Conceptual Framework

The debate about policy in Afghanistan continues to unfold within a bi-polar conceptual framework derived from the Cold War, which is true to the realities of neither Afghanistan nor the contemporary international system.

According to this framework, there are two sides in Afghanistan: the Communist government, supported by the Soviet Union, and the patriotic, Islamic resistance, supported by the U.S. and its allies. The reality is different. There are not two but many sides in Afghanistan. The country has indeed undergone a certain ideological polarization, but even more fundamental, and becoming stronger since the Soviet troop withdrawal, is that it has undergone a process of tribal, ethnic, sectarian, political, geographical, economic, urban/rural, cultural, and generational fragmentation. The coup attempt of March 6 illustrated both that this fragmentation continues within the Kabul regime as well as the resistance, and that tribal-ethnic ties can outweigh ideology among even the most ideological segments of the population.

A military solution cannot work not only because neither side can defeat the other, but, more fundamentally, because there are not two sides one or the other of which could win; a victory by any of the many contending forces would provoke a civil war on the part of those who are excluded.

Similarly, a political settlement cannot develop out of negotiations between two sides. A political settlement could only develop out of a process similar to a round table, or in Afghan terms, a shura or jirga.

The same is true at the international level. There are five nations with different interests and perspectives actively involved in the supply of weapons to various factions in Afghanistan: the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Libya is also supplying millions of dollars in cash to Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar), and India provides key technical assistance to the government, especially the air force. The policy which is supposedly *ours*, of supporting the mujahedin, is coming increasingly under the influence of Saudi Arabia, which now pays for over 60 percent of the arms.

Although we have been cooperating with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, these two countries' intelligence agencies, as well as the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia, have very different interests in Afghanistan than we do. Their attempts to manipulate the resistance are bitterly resented by many Afghans, who wonder why the U.S. permits such actions. Iran shared our interest in the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but since last summer it has clearly shown that it prefers the continued power of Najibullah to the installation of a Sunni fundamentalist government backed by Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Ironically, it has improved its relations with the moderate Sunni groups, even the supporters of Zaher Shah, out of fear of the Saudi-supplied Sunni fundamentalists. There is a danger of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan.

### Means

The current policy also cannot succeed because we do not have the means to carry it out. For instance, we have rightly protested against the imbalance resulting from the USSR's massive supplies of sophisticated weapons to the Kabul regime. Until now, however, we have virtually ignored Soviet offers to negotiate a withdrawal of the stockpiles that create the imbalance.<sup>3</sup> Instead we have tried to

<sup>3</sup>There have been a number of statements by Soviet officials indicating that they might be willing to negotiate the withdrawal of weapons stockpiles as part of an agreement on negative symmetry -- an arrangement which has come to be known as "negative symmetry plus." For instance, according to an article in the Washington Post of July 19, 1989, in an interview with reporter James Rupert, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov "repeated the

balance the Soviet supplies with new supplies to the mujahedin. Since November we have allocated \$280 million from the U.S. and \$435 million from Saudi Arabia.

The fact is, however, that these arms do not go to "one side," balancing the supplies on the "other side." They are distributed by the Pakistani ISI and the Saudis largely in accord with their own criteria, which often contribute to divisions among mujahedin. I might add that all the talk from Washington and Islamabad about trying to unite the mujahedin applies at best to the attempt to create a united front in Peshawar. Inside Afghanistan these pronouncements are blatantly contradicted by the actions of the operational officers who use the distributions of weapons to break commanders off from large mujahedin organizations on order to pressure them into carrying out military plans conceived by Pakistan or the U.S. (This is known as "subcontracting.") One result of this is that in late February, after over three months of this resupply effort, a regime convoy successfully reached Khost, one of the easiest areas to supply from Pakistan. When Soviet troops were in Afghanistan, no land convoy had been able to reach Khost without a major offensive. The effect of divisively distributed weapons supplies has been to demoralize, not strengthen, the mujahedin.

Politically, we have been committed to "broadening the base of the AIG." At the ministerial meetings in Moscow we even offered the Soviets a broadened AIG in a first stage if they would agree to remove Najibullah in a second stage. Since the Tarni coup attempt, however, the AIG has virtually collapsed.

In sum, we have neither the military nor political means to carry out our stated policy.

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Soviet offer to negotiate a cutoff of the arms flow to both sides and said *Moscow would consider in principle removing weapons already supplied to Kabul.* [My emphasis.] In an article containing a proposal for an Afghan settlement which appeared in Izvestia on February 14, 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze wrote: "One of the key issues on which it would be desirable to reach international consensus is complete termination of all arms deliveries to the warring parties in Afghanistan, no matter where they come from, along with announcing a break or suspension of hostilities. . . . In order to support measures to fully stop arms deliveries, it would be reasonable to discuss the removal from Afghanistan of all weapon stockpiles and not to deliver them to that country in the future." [My emphasis.]

### An Alternative: A Strategy for a Political Settlement

The goal of American policy should not be to arm the resistance to "overthrow" the Najibullah regime. There is no single politically organized resistance that could replace it. Instead we must combine whatever military pressure we can bring to bear with negotiations to bring about a genuine act of self-determination by the people of Afghanistan.

Najibullah and the Soviet Union have repeatedly stated that they will accept the results of elections. Events in Eastern Europe, Nicaragua, and inside the Soviet Union itself make such assurances worthy of serious exploration in tough negotiations, even though they could justifiably have been dismissed before. Our goal should be to negotiate conditions under which the people of Afghanistan can take part in a genuine representative process, with a minimum of outside pressures and no preconditions. This process could be an election, a shura, a Loya Jirga, or some combination -- that should be a matter for Afghans. Moderate resistance leader Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, president of the largely defunct AIG, but still an important personality, recently endorsed the concept of elections to a Loya Jirga monitored by a commission jointly approved by both sides, provided that it was preceded by the departure of Najibullah from office. He even said Najibullah could participate in the elections "if he becomes a good Moslem."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>The following is a partial text of a Reuters report from Peshawar, April 24, 1990: "Afghan guerrilla leader Sibghatullah Mojadidi hinted on Tuesday that mujahideen Moslem fighters might be prepared to compromise with the Soviet-backed government in Kabul over a political settlement."

"Mojadidi, president of the Afghan rebel government in exile, told a news conference that if he were sincere about peace, president Najibullah should step down before elections."

"If this becomes reality, a joint commission from both sides can be appointed to do the needful," he said.

"Up to now the guerrillas based in Pakistan have adamantly refused any deal with Najibullah, but Mojadidi said: 'If he becomes a good Moslem then we will allow him to participate in the elections.'"

"The United States and the Soviet Union, the main backers of the two sides in the Afghan conflict, have been talking about an interim commission that would organise elections but have become stuck on whether Najibullah should have any role."

"The United States and the Afghan mujahideen want him to step down at the beginning of any peace process while Moscow is insisting he remain in power while elections are organised."

This means, first, that as long as we are providing weapons, we should make every effort to see that they go to forces that support genuine self-determination. In particular, the long-standing alliance between our CIA and the Pakistani and Saudi intelligence agencies ought to be broken, unlikely as this is in view of our other priorities in the region. Both of these agencies are pursuing independent sectarian or political goals in Afghanistan, sometimes with our resources. Our aid should go to political forces inside Afghanistan who have shown themselves capable of unity and popular support, such as Massoud's Council of the North and the shura of mujahedin of Qandahar. If the current efforts by Massoud, Abdul Haq, and others to constitute an independent military council of commanders succeeds, then this body should be the main one with which we deal. (We should be very wary of ISI-sponsored efforts to establish a Pakistan-based council of Peshawar-based "commanders.")

Frankly, however, I have the greatest skepticism as to whether the United States has the capacity or will to do this. Continuing to supply weapons through the same channels, which have largely been controlled by the Pakistani ISI, will not strengthen the resistance but divide and weaken it. Weapons do not win battles, motivated, well-organized fighters do. Hence, while I urge that immediate efforts be directed to changing the supply channels, in the medium term I support the cessation of all arms supplies to Afghanistan as an early step in a political settlement.

The components of a political settlement such as is being discussed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could be the following: The U.S. and U.S.S.R. jointly announce that there is no single legitimate authority in Afghanistan and hence call on the international community and especially the Islamic world to provide assistance to the Afghans in constituting such an authority. To implement such a proposal, they ask the U.N. Secretary General's Office and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to accelerate their existing consultations with all Afghan parties to establish a group of prominent Afghans to oversee some representational

"Mojadidi confirmed that the guerrilla leadership was discussing proposals for internationally supervised elections to a Loya Jirga, a traditional grand council, in both government-held and mujahideen-held areas."

"Under the plan being promoted by moderate guerrilla leader Syed Ahmad Gailani, the jirga would draft a new constitution and organise general elections."

process.<sup>5</sup> The U.N. is already in contact with many such people, such as the former king, Zaher Shah, Abdul Sattar Sirat, a former Justice Minister and Islamic scholar now in Saudi Arabia, former deputy Prime Minister Samad Hamed, and others. The National Salvation Society (see below) could also play an important role, as could the council of commanders, if it is formed. The minimal responsibility of this group would be to organize the elections. It might also have the responsibility of overseeing security.

The U.N. and the OIC should also constitute an international body, with a strong Islamic participation from countries such as Turkey, Algeria, and Tunisia, who have not been involved in the conflict, to monitor the fairness of the elections. This body could be modelled on the experiences of Namibia and Nicaragua. Once these bodies begin functioning and all parties have committed themselves to respecting the outcome of the process, all weapons supplies should be cut off to all sides. As a confidence-building measure, the Soviets should withdraw SCUD missiles and perhaps MiG-29s from Afghanistan at the beginning of the process. Furthermore, the international community should pledge a large amount of financial and other support for reconstruction to whatever government emerges from this process.

All internal Afghan questions, such as control over the security apparatus, the degree of participation in the elections (in particular the participation of the PDPA, Najibullah, or other specific personalities) should be left to the Afghan body and its consultations with all parties.

I will now address the two questions mentioned in my invitation. I will then offer a broader analysis of the background of the current situation and further comments on my own policy recommendations.

<sup>5</sup>One may call this process "elections" as a form of shorthand, but it will probably not take the exclusive form of secret balloting by individuals, a method which is a departure from Afghan traditions and which requires a degree of administrative control that does not now exist in many parts of the country.

According to Xinhua, Islamabad, April 26, President Mojadidi "said the proposal for holding elections in PDPA-controlled areas under the supervision of the United Nations and in mujahideen-controlled areas under the supervision of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) was being considered by the AIG, but no decision had been taken yet."

#### Continued Soviet Troop Deployment in Afghanistan

There is no credible evidence of continuing Soviet troop deployment in Afghanistan after February 15, 1989, the date set for the end of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. There may have been some relatively minor infringements, but, even if these thus far unproven charges prove true, they are not the reason for the present situation.

Since there are apparently no Russian or Slavic soldiers in Afghanistan, charges have been made that some units fighting on the side of the Afghan government composed of members of ethnic groups (Uzbeks and Tajiks) that are also present in Soviet Central Asia are actually Soviet troops in Afghan uniform. The major such unit is the Jawzjani militia. The available evidence indicates that far from being Soviet troops in Afghan uniforms the Jawzjanis are Uzbeks from Afghanistan in Soviet uniforms. An unclassified report prepared for the CIA by a highly regarded group of researchers stated, as part of its analysis of regime deployments in the Qandahar area:

In the Qandahar area . . . the best Afghan [government] soldiers were probably the Russian-officered and uniformed Uzbek Militia Brigade from Jowzjan, reportedly composed of some 700 Uzbek tribesmen. Resistance sources claim that it was withdrawn along with the [Soviet] 70th Motor Rifle Brigade and was temporarily sent back to Jowzjan. However, when the situation became critical in October 1988, the brigade was airlifted back in. Due to their Russian style uniforms they were mistaken for Soviet troops.<sup>6</sup>

The Jawzjanis are one of many militias, often consisting of former resistance fighters, who have joined the government out of a variety of motives: resentment at manipulation by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, desire for arms and money in order to compete with traditional rivals who have gained the same resources from resistance organizations, or kinship ties to prominent individuals in the government. In a previous debate with Rosanne Klass, a proponent of the thesis that these Jawzjanis were KGB border guards, I described the basis of recruitment of the Jawzjanis:

Klass makes a number of claims about the secret introduction of Soviet troops and militia. The only specific case she mentions is the Jawzjani

<sup>6</sup>Afghanistan: The Southern Provinces, The Orkand Corporation, April 1989, p. 158.

militia in Qandahar. She claims that "Jawzjani" means "Mongol," which is wrong. Jawzjan is a province of northern Afghanistan having a border with Soviet Uzbekistan. The peasant population is mostly Uzbek and Tajik, but the landlords in the area are mostly Durrani Pashtuns (members of the same tribal confederation as the Afghan kings). Anthropologists have found that this was one of the few regions of Afghanistan where significant economic and social inequality coincided with an ethnic cleavage. They found considerable resentment among Uzbek and Tajik peasants of the Durrani Pashtun *khans*.<sup>7</sup>

Hence it is not at all unthinkable, given that this flat area has been under consistent Soviet control since 1980, that the Soviets have managed to organize some Uzbeks and Tajiks of Jawzjan into an anti-Durrani militia.<sup>8</sup> This militia has been sent to Qandahar, the center of the Durrani Pashtuns, where the Jawzjanis have committed acts of great cruelty. According to reports, the militia has very poor, even hostile, relations with the local party and army organizations, which are also Pashtun. "For this reason," Naim Majrooh writes, "the Russians are trying to reduce the number of the militiamen in Kandahar."<sup>9,10</sup>

There were equally questionable reports that Soviet planes helped Najibullah during the March coup d'état. Sources in the administration have informed me that there is no intelligence supporting such assertions. There have been occasional reports by defectors or by resistance commanders that Soviet pilots are flying Afghan air force planes, that Soviet planes have crossed the border to participate in fighting in Northern Afghanistan, or that Soviet advisors are helping to fire SCUD missiles. Such charges should be investigated and, if found to be true, protested vigorously. If the Jawzjanis are still deployed with Soviet officers (not much has been

<sup>7</sup>Richard Tapper, "Ethnicity and Class: Dimensions of Intergroup Conflict in North-Central Afghanistan," in M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield, eds., Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1984), pp. 230-246.

<sup>8</sup>The Orkand Corporation's study of Northern Afghanistan reports (p. 187) that after the Soviet invasion Uzbeks in that region received land previously held by Pashtuns. This naturally would make them loyal to whoever gave them the land. (This footnote was not in the original.)

<sup>9</sup>Naim Majrooh, "Special Report from Kandahar and Helmand," Afghan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin, December 1988, pp. 29-30.

<sup>10</sup>The above excerpt, including the footnotes, is from "Correspondence," Orbis 33 (Spring 1989), p. 278. The section also includes Klass's comments on a previous article of mine.

heard of them lately), this should also be protested. None of these charges, however, even if found to be valid, has much to do with the current trends inside Afghanistan.

### Human Rights

I am the author or co-author of many reports on human rights in Afghanistan, which are the major English-language sources for those who wish to document the atrocities committed by the Soviets and the Kabul regime.<sup>11</sup> Today the Kabul regime has largely ceased offensives in rural areas, but the firing of SCUD missiles has killed hundreds or thousands of civilians. These weapons are only accurate within a mile of the target and carry a payload of 1000 kg. More of them have been fired in Afghanistan in the past 18 months than in the entire war between Iran and Iraq.

In Kabul, WAD (the Ministry of State Security, or secret police) continues to spread fear, and the press and public life are still largely, though not entirely, controlled by the Party. Arrests are fewer than in the past. It is not so dangerous to speak privately against the government. The once omnipresent indoctrination in Marxism-Leninism has been greatly reduced or even eliminated. The PDPA has been affected by the fates of ruling Communist Parties elsewhere in the world.

Some prisoners are still tortured, but, from the small evidence I have, it seems that it is no longer standard practice to do so in all cases. Over 600 people were arrested after the March 6 coup attempt, and some executions have already been reported. Prison conditions have improved. The ICRC has access to many prisons, which it was denied for years. I know of several cases where missing persons have been located in Kabul prisons by the ICRC.

Most important for the future of a peace process, the government is beginning to tolerate some pluralism of opinion, and it is promising to do more. Najibullah has recently written hundreds of letters to prominent Afghan exiles, promising toleration of diverse opinions and an end to the monopoly of power. One such letter was

<sup>11</sup>These include: (with Jeri Laber) A Nation is Dying: Afghanistan under the Soviets, 1979-1987 (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1988), and two reports for Helsinki Watch and Asia Watch, Tears, Blood, and Cries (1984, with Jeri Laber), and To Die in Afghanistan (1985).

published in the Afghan magazine published in California, Aineh-ye Afghanistan. One prominent Afghan who was a delegate to the resistance shura in Rawalpindi in February 1989 described the letter by saying, "I could have written it myself." Najibullah, in a pledge that has yet to be tested, has offered to accept the results of elections, as did the Communist leaders in most Eastern European countries and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

More important than words, however, are deeds. It remains disturbing that, according to Amnesty International, the Afghan Government arrested and imprisoned the founding members of a new party, the National Unity Party, in June 1989. Some of those arrested are listed in an Amnesty International Urgent Action of January 1990, which I have included as an appendix.

On the other side is an event whose importance can hardly be exaggerated: the founding on September 9, 1989, of the National Salvation Society (NSS) in Kabul. This organization has continued to function openly in Kabul and can be reached at the Afghan Tour Hotel there. Its members are former officials of the Royal Government of Afghanistan who have remained in Kabul but have never collaborated in any way with the regime or the Soviets. Indeed, freedom from the taint of such collaboration is a condition for membership. The NSS is chaired by Dr. Mohammad Asghar, a graduate of the University of Illinois (B.A., B.S.) and Columbia University (Ph.D.), former rector of Kabul University (1954-60), and Minister of Justice (1967-69).

This organization is not a government front organization, and its formation and continued activity have caused much hopeful discussion among Afghan exiles. It originated when several of its distinguished members were nominated by the government to join an official "Peace Jirga," charged with mediating between the government and the resistance. Those nominated went in a body to inform the National Front, the parent body of the Peace Jirga, that they would not participate in any body organized by the government. In discussions among themselves afterwards, however, they concluded that such a body would be indispensable if it were truly independent rather than government-sponsored. I include their declaration of intent as an appendix to this testimony.

The government has thus far tolerated the NSS's activity and allowed it to rent offices with money raised from donations by Afghan businessmen. It still restricts the NSS's activity by, for

instance, refusing permission for some of the Society's members to accept invitations to travel to conferences abroad. The U.S. should make full freedom for the NSS a key test of the possibility of holding genuine elections in Afghanistan.

The Kabul regime and the Soviets, however, are not the only parties guilty of human rights violations in Afghanistan. Members of resistance organizations supported by the U.S., Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are also culpable. For instance, in many of the areas overrun by the mujahedin after the first phase of Soviet withdrawal, the fighters ran into the cities with no plan and engaged in arbitrary killings, rapes, and looting. All my information on this comes from resistance and pro-resistance sources. An Afghan resident in the U.S. who was Governor of Kabul under the royal regime and a delegate to the resistance's shura last February wrote that when resistance forces overran Kunduz in Northern Afghanistan in August 1988, one commander ordered the summary execution of 650 government officials as "Communists."<sup>12</sup> Other sources give higher numbers for civilians killed there. According to European relief organizations aiding mujahedin commanders in the area, there were also many rapes in Kunduz, for which the fighters were merely "reprimanded." (The usual punishment for rape in Afghanistan, or even for some kinds of voluntary sexual relations, is instant death.) Similar events occurred in Kunar, Eastern Afghanistan, where not only Afghans but Arab volunteers were involved in the killings.

Another case, which had a direct impact on the battle for Jalalabad, was the killing and mutilation of the garrison at Torkham. In early November 1988, the government garrison at this key border post (where the Peshawar-Jalalabad-Kabul highway crosses into Afghanistan) defected. The Pakistani army remanded the prisoners into the custody of the Hezb-e Islami of Yunus Khales. Seventy four of them were killed and their bodies dumped in tea crates inside Afghanistan.<sup>13</sup> The continued shelling of cities, especially Kabul, as well as the explosion of car bombs, has also reinforced fear of the resistance.

<sup>12</sup>Ghulam Ali Ayeen, "Shura-ye Mushawwarati wa-Ayendeh-ye Afghanistan" (The Consultative Council and the Future of Afghanistan), Qalam dar Khedmat-e Ichad, n.d.

<sup>13</sup>A meticulous Afghan scholar who had been imprisoned for years by the Kabul regime and was then living in Peshawar counted the bodies.

It would be wrong to use these events to justify prejudices that Afghan mujahedin are bloodthirsty or fanatical. Many mujahedin were outraged by these events. Talk about "the two sides" is always misleading in Afghanistan, and particularly so on the subject of human rights. Respect for human rights by mujahedin groups varies along a very wide spectrum. For instance, after the Torkham garrison was retaken by the government and then defected again, in late November 1988, the soldiers insisted on defecting to the party of Mojaddedi, who protected them and allowed the ICRC to interview them. Furthermore, while the extremist ideologies of some leaders, such as Khales or the Wahhabis in Kunar, played some role, those who committed most of these atrocities were simply young men whose entire youth has been consumed by this brutal, imposed war. I have in my possession lists provided by the Jamiat-e Islami of Kunduz Province of 629 villagers massacred by Soviet soldiers in one operation in the area in December 1984, and I have interviewed some of the survivors.<sup>14</sup> A thirteen-year-old boy who had seen his mother bayoneted and shot in 1984 might have been a seventeen-year-old mujahed rushing into Kunduz in July 1988, after spending the interval in conditions of unbelievable deprivation and risk. Such feelings are liable to build up in all wars; discipline may avert their consequences, but such discipline does not exist among most of the mujahedin.

In addition, there has been a reign of terror against "insufficiently Islamic" intellectuals in Peshawar. The main leaders responsible are Hekmatyar and Khales, who have been responsible for hundreds of killings, if not more. Eng. Ahmad Shah, a member of Sayyaf's party, Prime Minister of the interim government of June 1987, and minister of health in the current AIG, appeared to justify the murder of Prof. Sayd Bahauddin Majrooh, publisher of the Afghan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin, a noted poet and philosopher, and former dean of Kabul University, when he told me last January that, after all, Majrooh was "not a Muslim." (There is considerable evidence that Majrooh was killed at the order of Hekmatyar, because he had published a survey showing that 72 percent of Afghan refugees preferred the exiled former king, Zaher Shah, to any of the Peshawar leaders as a future leader of their

<sup>14</sup>See Barnett R. Rubin, To Die in Afghanistan (New York: Helsinki Watch, 1985), pp. 18-23; Jeri Laber and Barnett R. Rubin, "A Nation is Dying": Afghanistan under the Soviets 1979-1987 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), pp. 25-28.

country.) Asia Watch has published several editions of *News from Asia Watch* on this subject, which I helped to research, but here I will just quote from an interview with President Mojaddedi by Richard Mackenzie of *Insight*:

Mojadidi, showing considerably more emotion than usual, says Hekmatyar has tried to assassinate him on several occasions and is responsible for the murder of "hundreds of innocent" people in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

"A hundred times he has done it and more than that. And then he denies it and he tells lies about it and he is not ashamed to tell lies. There are hundreds of cases of his assassinating innocent people here in Peshawar with the knowledge of the police and military people here. But because of the protection of the government from the time of Zia-ul-Haq, he has been protected 100 percent. No one has even questioned him."

In the strongest language ever used publicly by an Afghan about Hekmatyar, the president says, "His behavior is harmful to the *mujahideen*, harmful to our cause and harmful to the people of Afghanistan."<sup>15</sup>

It is worth underlining Mojaddedi's point that Hekmatyar has committed these crimes on the territory of Pakistan with complete impunity. He also did so for ten years while continuing to receive American aid. Within the last few weeks another Afghan refugee intellectual, Dr. Sadat Shegawal, who ran a clinic for Afghan refugees, was gunned down in the Shaheen Town section of Peshawar, presumably by fundamentalist death squads. As in other such cases, there have been no arrests.

Some mujahedin have also fired rockets into populated areas, especially Kabul city, and set off car bombs there. Such actions are exactly the same as the Soviet policy of bombing villages controlled by the resistance or the Kabul regime's policy of firing SCUD missiles blindly toward resistance-held areas.

According to information I have received from a variety of sources over the past year or so, most of the random shelling of Kabul city is done by small commanders who are not strongly affiliated to any party, but who work directly with the Pakistani ISI. In some cases they are former sub-commanders of larger commanders like Abdul Haq, who have been broken off from the

<sup>15</sup>"When Policy Tolls in Fool's Paradise," *Insight* (September 11, 1989), p. 10.

main organization by "subcontracting." I cannot verify this, and it may be a case of Afghans trying to blame foreigners for some of their countrymen's misdeeds. Some of my sources, however, are Western diplomats, not Afghans. Furthermore, no one suggests, even if the shelling takes place at the behest of ISI officers, that it reflects the official policy of the government of Pakistan.

#### Heroin Trade

The expansion of the heroin trade does involve some violations of human rights. I include a discussion of it here mainly because it is another issue related to the war with important humanitarian consequences. The administration also claims that eradicating drug trafficking is a major policy goal.

Both some resistance commanders and some of the Peshawar leaders are extensively involved in the heroin trade which has made the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area into the second largest source of opium in the world. The evidence is much clearer for the commanders, as one can see the poppies growing in the areas under their control. Mullah Nasim Akhundzada of Harakat-e Inqilab, who won last summer's opium war in the Helmand Valley, and who until his recent assassination, possibly by rival drug traffickers, presided over a large, fertile area where poppies are grown on land irrigated by the U.S.-built Helmand Valley Dam Project, was only the best known. (In a May 22 speech, Najibullah included him on a list of fifteen commanders invited to participate in the government and receive full autonomy in their areas.)<sup>16</sup>

Opium has traditionally been grown in the mountainous land of North Helmand, which has very good climate for it. The war and pressure from some resistance commanders has led to the expansion of the crop throughout the Helmand Valley, and also, of course, as the highlands of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.<sup>17</sup> Before the war, the landowners of South Helmand grew cotton, oilseeds, and melons, which they sold for either industrial processing or export.

<sup>16</sup>Kabul Times, May 23, 1989.

<sup>17</sup>The director of an American relief organization operating in a border province of Eastern Afghanistan reported that the landowners were trying to expel the American organization, because they feared pressure against the growing of opium poppies, which offered greater opportunities for profit than foreign assistance.

Now, however, they have neither the transport nor markets. Furthermore, as a result of years of Soviet and Afghan government bombing of the irrigated lands of South Helmand, the landowners can cultivate only 10-20 percent of their lands. Hence they grow opium, although the yields are not so high there as in the North. First of all, they need not concern themselves with marketing -- the buyer comes to them -- and, second, they were compelled to do so by Commander Mullah Nasim Akhundzada.

Mullah Nasim decreed that 50 percent of the land had to be in opium cultivation. He gave delivery quotas to the landowners. If they failed to produce enough to meet their delivery quotas, they had to purchase the difference. Mullah Nasim maintained this degree of control through ruthless methods. According to resistance sources, he has killed many people, and even castrated them.

Mullah Nasim was involved in negotiations with USAID and the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. He met directly with Ambassador Oakley, who offered him \$2 million in USAID programs if he would cease production of opium. This is a sharp contrast to our government's opposition to negotiations with drug traffickers in Colombia. After his recent assassination, Mullah Nasim also reportedly received a warm eulogy as a good commander in a cable from the U.S. diplomatic mission in Pakistan. Although in conformity with our policy of not aiding known drug dealers, the U.S. stopped direct supply of Mullah Nasim, he was still in good standing with his party, which the U.S. does assist. In fact, Mullah Nasim was killed while leaving a meeting with Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, leader of Harakat-e Inqilab. Furthermore, he was the Deputy Defense Minister of the AIG, which the U.S. government has purported to see as the most legitimate political leadership in Afghanistan and the most desirable channel for transferring arms to the resistance inside Afghanistan.

The main transit point for drugs in southwest Afghanistan is Robat, a traditional Baluch smuggling center, where Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran meet. The refineries are in Koh-e Sultan, about a half hour to an hour's drive north of the town of Gird-e Jangal, the financial center for the trade. In Gird-e Jangal there is reported to be so much currency of all denominations that the dealers do not count it but weigh it.

In Koh-e Sultan, usually reliable sources report that there are over 6 opium refineries making heroin. Most of them belong to



Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar). There are many groups of "mujahedin" there to protect the factories. The raw materials come from Helmand, Mullah Nasim's area, and from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area in the east.

For each pickup there are about 10-15 men who get about 50 kg of heroin. Then it is trucked to Taftan (Pakistan), to Bazargan (Iran), and from there into Turkey. Each of the drivers is paid Rs. 10,000 for each such trip. The Iranians permit the transit of heroin through their territory as long as it goes to the West.

Mujahedin, of course, are not the only people involved in the heroin trade in the area. It is a big business. One must observe that Afghanistan depends on Pakistan for its outlet to the rest of the world, and the heroin trade is no exception. In fact, the largest U.S. backed group many of whose members are involved in the heroin trade is probably the Pakistan military. The government of Benazir Bhutto has been committed to eradicating this trade, and it has made some courageous efforts. Let me quote from a much longer article that shows how difficult it will be to succeed, especially as long as the "covert" supply of arms to the resistance continues:<sup>18</sup>

Over the past decade allegations [of drug trafficking] involving the Pakistan army have come closer and closer to that select cadre which have been most intimately involved in the "covert effort" in support of the Afghan war and the arms pipeline which has supplied that resistance in its brave fight against the Soviets. But around the war has grown up an enormous illicit trade in arms and narcotics. The Pakistani press has repeatedly noted the widely held belief that the principal conduit by which weapons reach the Afghan resistance in the north is in fact one of the main organized routes by which heroin reaches Karachi for trans-shipment to Europe and the United States. "It is really very simple," wrote *The Herald* (January 1987). "If you control the poppy fields, Karachi, and the road which links the two, you will be so rich that you will control Pakistan."

The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pipeline for weapons to the Afghan mujahideen is organized and coordinated by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). It is under the ISI's direction that weapons and supplies move north by two principal means. One route utilizes Pakistan Air Force transport. But the main carrier of supplies is an organization called the National Logistics Cell (NLC). It is the largest transport organization in the country and is wholly owned by the Pakistan army. All drivers and leaders are Pakistan army personnel and security is tight at its main installations.

<sup>18</sup>Lawrence Lifschultz, "The Heroin Empire," *Newsline* (July 1989), pp. 66-74b.

According to reports that have appeared in a section of the press, NLC trucks have been used repeatedly in the shipment of heroin from the Frontier to Karachi port. In its September 1985 issue *The Herald* gave the following eyewitness report: "The drug is carried in NLC trucks, which come sealed from the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] and are never checked by police. They come down from Peshawar where they deliver their cargo, sacks of grain, to government godowns [warehouses]. Some of these sacks contain packets of heroin. . . . This has been going on for about three and a half years."

The report went on to describe an incident, again quoting an eyewitness, in support of the allegations against the NLC. According to this report, "A few months ago, an NLC truck was involved in an accident near Thana Bula Khan. The driver was thrown out of the cab and lost consciousness. When he came to and found a number of people gathered around him he became anxious. Not surprisingly -- because when the trailer had overturned, a white powder spilled out all over the road."

Similar accusations against the NLC were made in January 1988 by the former Sindh Provincial Minister for Excise, Murad Ali Shah. The minister demanded that the police be given the authority to search vehicles for narcotics, specifically those operating under the authority of the NLC. According to police sources, the NLC has remained strictly out of bounds. "If we want to investigate the NLC or military personnel who we believe may be involved in the narcotics trade we are told to 'keep out' by the army," says a senior police official referring to his experience over the last half decade. "If you pushed too hard, you ended up transferred. It's that simple." . . . .

The role of the NLC in the heroin trade was confirmed to me by a logistics specialist of the mujahedin. As we were riding through Khyber Agency on the way back from Afghanistan, he pointed out to me the palace of one Ayub Kukikhel, a major heroin trader, right by the side of the road. After recounting some anecdotes about this colorful figure (since arrested by the Bhutto government, although he had enjoyed the protection of Gen. Fazle Haq, Zia's governor of NWFP), he confirmed to me that Kukikhel transported his heroin to Karachi in NLC trucks. My source is a highly educated man who has worked closely with the NLC for years, supplying resistance fronts inside Afghanistan.

As for the mujahedin, refugees, and ordinary Afghans, all of them are in desperate need of resources. If there will be war, they need guns and ammunition to fight, and if there will be peace, they need money to rebuild. In neither case do they feel confident that they can rely on us for what they feel they need, and, in any case, relying on us, even if we come through, involves costs -- loss of

independence, loss of pride. An easy-to-raise, immensely profitable cash crop is the obvious answer.

Furthermore, in the Pakistani tribal territories and the vast expanses of Afghanistan ruled by local forces lies probably the largest expanse of territory in the world without any government presence. It is also an area where what we call smuggling (and what the Afghans call trading) has always been a major activity. In fact, as one mujahed once explained to me, the small trucks that transport mujahedin and supplies back and forth across the border are the same trucks that were -- and are -- used by smugglers. The infrastructure already existed in part when the war started, and now it has been expanded.<sup>19</sup> Add to this that this area is also one of the most devastated and poverty-stricken places in the world, and one can only conclude that it would be amazing if these resourceful people did not respond to the demand generated, let us remember, mainly by *our own immensely wealthy society*.

#### Background

From 1980 to 1988, American policy was to increase the military, political, and economic costs to the Soviet Union of its invasion of Afghanistan. Some analysts believed that the Soviets would never leave, but that it was important that they learn that such ventures are costly. Others felt that sufficient military pressure could drive them out. In 1985 and 1986 the latter group won out, and our supplies to the mujahedin increased in both quantity and quality.

Through all this time we gave little thought to the politics of the groups we were supporting. Certain groups had established themselves on Pakistani soil, and the Pakistani Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the regime of Gen. Zia took care of getting the weapons to them. The role of these Afghan exile groups was to get the arms into Afghanistan in order to inflict costs on the USSR. The relevant question was, in the words of Pakistani

<sup>19</sup>Another incident -- I was once walking through a part of the Nasirbagh refugee camp in Peshawar which is inhabited by Mohmand tribesmen from the border area. My escort, himself a Mohmand with an advanced degree in statistics, pointed out a garishly painted truck parked in a refugee compound belonging to an acquaintance and remarked, "Here is one of the trucks with which they bring the heroin for your country." This illustrates that the drug trade provides refugee relief as well as reconstruction funds.

Ambassador Jamsheed Marker, who was "good at killing Russians?" Policy makers paid little attention to the history of the leaders recognized by Pakistan or their relation to the fighters inside the country.

Our policy makers stoutly rejected the evidence that Gorbachev intended to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan, despite clear indications to that effect by early 1986. Hence we did not reconsider our approach to the Afghan resistance.

By the time the Soviets withdrew, our policy-makers had spent years trying to build up the exiled leaders in Pakistan through whom we had been shipping arms and were committed to the proposition that these men were the legitimate leaders of the Afghan people. Hence we prepared for them to take over after the Soviet withdrawal in the wake of a general uprising which would not even require major new weapons supplies. This did not happen. Nonetheless until very recently we have been wed to the idea that this exiled leadership should act as the core of a transition to a new government.

The resistance movement inside Afghanistan is indeed a broadly supported indigenous movement against foreign troops and an invasive, illegitimate central state. The organizational forms of the exiled leadership of that movement, however, depend on those who provide a territorial base, money, and weapons. The ultimate base of local organization in Afghanistan -- where the real power lies -- is not in the parties but in the traditional tribal and religious networks, and in some cases in new organizations led by commanders, through which the parties function. These networks, some of which also operate in the PDPA, frustrated Soviet attempts to build a viable puppet party in Kabul. They are now frustrating attempts by the intelligence agencies of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps the U.S. to impose their own goals on the people of Afghanistan.

Pakistan has been supporting three of the seven leaders of Peshawar (Hekmatyar, Rabbani, and Khaled) since 1974, before the Communist coup and the Soviet invasion. These leaders began their struggle against the governments of Zaher Shah and President Daoud, which the U.S. supported. These Islamic revolutionaries, along with Sayyaf, who joined them later (see below) were -- and are -- fighting not for the self-determination of Afghanistan but for their own version of an Islamic state. Considerable evidence indicates that

most of the people of Afghanistan, although they want a loose form of Islamic government, are opposed to the Islamic revolutionaries' concept of a centralized Islamic state. The Islamic revolutionaries thus oppose not only the Soviets and the Kabul regime but also other Afghans -- including others in the resistance and Zaher Shah -- who oppose their ideology. I do not subscribe to the view that the U.S. should necessarily fear or oppose Islamic political movements in Afghanistan or elsewhere; but it is not our business to support them in pursuing goals that contradict our interests and values. It is up to the Afghans whether they want one or another type of Islamic state; our interest is solely in letting them decide for themselves.

The Pakistani military initially established close relations with these leaders, especially Hekmatyar, in order to pursue the Pakistani goal, inherited from the British Raj, of securing the northwest frontier against Afghan nationalism. After the Soviet invasion, it was the Pakistani military regime, not any representative body of Afghans, who decided that six particular leaders would be recognized, and that all of those recognized would be religious rather than nationalist or tribal leaders. Subsequently, the large financial involvement of Saudi Arabia led to the formation of a seventh party based entirely on Saudi money (Sayyaf).

U.S. government documents show that since 1978 representatives of the exiled former king of Afghanistan, Zaher Shah, tried to reach the Afghan refugees and mujahedin but were denied access by Pakistan.<sup>20</sup> When the U.S. government expressed an interest in supporting the Afghan mujahedin, Pakistan chose which leaders would meet with the American representatives. The first meeting between a special envoy of the CIA and Afghan resistance leaders selected by Pakistan reportedly took place in Peshawar in May 1979.

The U.S. agreed to a division of labor with Pakistan, based on our differing interests and capacities. Of course, Gen. Zia was a very respected figure among senior policy makers in the Reagan administration, and his views were always weighed very carefully. Nonetheless, it would be inaccurate to say that we passively let him set the agenda. The U.S. goal was to increase the cost to the USSR. Pakistan, we estimated, not unreasonably, had the contacts and

<sup>20</sup>CIA cable 20781, Los Angeles, August 31, 1979; DOS cable 5531, Islamabad, June 14, 1979.

knowledge to manage the details of how this was to be done. Therefore we subcontracted the choice of which Afghans to support to Pakistan.

Saudi Arabia was also involved in this sub-contracting. The Saudis provided much of the funding for both the political offices of the resistance parties and the transportation of weapons and supplies inside Afghanistan. Since the Saudis funded many of the offices, they have had a disproportionate influence over the various unions of mujahed groups. For instance, the "Islamic Unity for the Liberation of Afghanistan," originally a coalition of several parties, chose Sayyaf as its leader because of his ability to get Saudi funds. He later made this "Unity" into a separate party with himself as leader. Saudi money is also a principal reason why Eng. Ahmad Shah (not Ahmad Shah Massoud), a member of Sayyaf's party, was named Prime Minister of the interim government chosen in June 1987, and why Sayyaf himself became the spokesman for the February 1989 *shura* and later was chosen as Prime Minister of the AIG.

As for transport, it is vital to recall that the resistance has no centralized logistics, as it has no general staff or command and control. Commanders take possession of weapons from ISI or party "godowns" (warehouses) in the tribal territories and then must hire pack animals or trucks to take the supplies in. The Saudi Red Crescent office in Parachinar was the major funder for logistics. According to a moderate party logistics specialist whom I know well, the Saudis paid 100 percent of expenses, plus a 5 percent contingency fund, for the fundamentalist parties, but only 15 percent for the moderate-traditionalist parties, whom they judged to be too *watani*, or nationalist. This may explain in part why the moderate parties have such a small presence north of the Hindu Kush mountain range.

These arrangements appeared to work for many years, but they left us peculiarly ill-equipped to affect the outcome of a political settlement in a way consistent with our interests and values. The most powerful groups we have strengthened have goals that go far beyond what we intended to support. Since the ideological goals of some of these groups require these leaders to oppose not merely Communists but all Afghans they consider to be Westernized or un-Islamic, they are in principle opposed to broadening their political base to include the masses of relatively non-ideological nationalist, Muslim Afghans. This ideology also provides a rationale for

maintaining the narrow ethnic base (Ghilzai and Eastern Pashtuns) of most of the exiled leadership. As far as I can determine, the U.S. has done nothing to strengthen the hand of those Afghans who incline toward a more liberal interpretation of Islam that would, to the extent possible in trying circumstances, respect human rights and democracy. Contrary to stereotypes, such political forces still exist, despite their repression in both Kabul and Peshawar.

If recent reports are to be believed, our influence is likely to be diminishing. A report by Robin Wright in the November 19, 1989, Los Angeles Times claimed that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were mounting a three-month effort to re-supply the mujahedin. The total cost of the effort was to be \$715 million, of which the U.S. was to supply \$280 million, or 39 percent.<sup>21</sup> On the same day, the New York Times reported that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the most radical of the resistance leaders, most of whose efforts are dedicated to fighting other elements of the resistance, notably commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, and who has a human rights record as bad as anyone in Afghanistan, would no longer receive "any direct supplies of munitions purchased with American money." The arrangement with Saudi Arabia, whose funds (61 percent of the total) are not subject to any such restriction, makes a mockery of this decision in a way reminiscent of the Iran-Contra scandal. In reaction to increased activity by Shi'a Iran, its main rival in the Islamic world, Saudi Arabia is reported to have increased its support to Hekmatyar, the most militant Sunni Islamic revolutionary among the Afghans, while also continuing to support Sayyaf.

The main shortcomings of the leadership of the AIG are that:

- 1.) It has a narrow social and ethnic base, mainly coming from disfavored sectors and religious leadership of the Ghilzai and Eastern Pashtun tribes of Eastern Afghanistan, and largely excluding traditional tribal leaders (including those of the Ghilzai and Eastern Pashtuns), Western-educated professionals of the old regime whose skills would be vital for reconstruction, Shi'a Muslims, Persian and Turkic-speaking ethnic minorities, and Durrani Pashtuns from Southern and Western Afghanistan; 2.) Its leaders are not accountable in any way to the refugees or the mujahedin inside Afghanistan. The latter is not solely a result of the personality of the

<sup>21</sup>The same article reported, "A recent CIA assessment predicts that a new [mujahedin] offensive could topple the regime by the end of February." See above.

leaders but of the mechanism through which they have gained and kept their position, namely by acting as representatives authorized by foreign supporters of the mujahedin.

Furthermore, the AIG has made it clear through its decisions that it wishes to dominate rather than consult with the commanders inside Afghanistan. I believe that Tip O'Neill was thinking of Boston when he said, "All politics is local," but this is even more true of Afghanistan. Under the old regime and the Communists, the local administrators (provincial governors) were appointed by the center and were meant to control not represent the local people. In order to assure that they would represent the center, they were generally drawn from a tribe or ethnic group other than the predominant one in the area.

In the course of the resistance, commanders have built up local organizations, many of which are beginning to develop representative institutions, although not Western-style democracy. These local *shuras* have appointed their own governors in some cases. Such arrangements could go a long way toward alleviating ethnic tensions in Afghanistan, as the different groups would have local self-government without having to negotiate formal quotas for representation of the type that have torn apart Lebanon. The AIG, however, has passed a "law" stating that its Interior Ministry will appoint the governors. When it tried to do so a few months ago in Kunar province, directly on the Pakistan border and easily accessible to Peshawar by paved road, the AIG nominee was expelled by the local *shura* of mujahedin. The AIG was powerless to do anything, as it commands no forces. A minister of the AIG to whom I spoke in January did not even know that a *shura* in Taleqan had approved a Governor of Takhar nominated by Massoud, although I had read about this in a newsletter published by Jamiat-e Islami.

Finally, while the mujahedin inside Afghanistan have often had to withstand extremes of privation and danger, the exiled leaders have lived in comfort and have taken advantage of the opportunities afforded by their position to accumulate personal wealth. Yunus Khales, for instance, who before the war was a partner with his brother in a bicycle repair shop, now owns a fleet of 50 buses operating between Mardan and Swat. More sophisticated leaders are reported to have substantial foreign investments. Some are reported to be involved in the heroin trade (see above). Confidential records of relief organizations that I have seen in Peshawar are filled with

detailed reports of officials of the resistance parties profiteering by selling weapons, vehicles, and other supplies meant for use in the war. According to Christina Lamb of the *Financial Times* (February 15, 1990), "Much of the \$700m arms recently sanctioned [see above] are being sold in Sind." (Sind province of Pakistan is the scene of bloody battles among several ethnic groups.) The refugees and the mujahedin are fully aware of this corruption and often see the party leaders, or at least some of them, as people profiting from their misery.

#### The Political-Military Stalemate

There are no prospects whatever for a complete military victory by the mujahideen in the next year. Such a victory would require organizational work that resistance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, for instance, estimates would require 3 to 5 years. Even within such a time frame, there would be no guarantee of success. Under certain circumstances *some* of the mujahideen, in particular Massoud, would be capable of inflicting immediate, politically significant military costs on the Kabul regime. At present these circumstances do not exist, and, as I mentioned above, I am increasingly skeptical that they will exist.

The origins of the current stalemate go back to the way the resistance movement was organized, as described above, but its immediate antecedents are to be found in the effects of the Soviet withdrawal. The Soviet withdrawal took place in two stages. During the first three months, half of the Soviet troops left Afghanistan, and the remainder were deployed in defensive positions around major cities and communications arteries, especially those vital to the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the supply of the Kabul regime. As a result of the first stage of withdrawal, the Afghan government had to concentrate its troops in defensive positions. It could no longer maintain such a far-flung presence and was unable to use troops in any offensive operations against rural areas. The government lost control of all posts along the border with Pakistan, including two provincial centers, which greatly eased the logistical situation of the mujahedin. It also lost control of several areas in more isolated portions of the center of the country, including at least two provincial capitals.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup>In the south the government lost all presence from the border post of Spin Baldak nearly to Qandahar. The regime lost the provincial center of Paktika.

Since November 1988, the territorial situation has not changed much. It is important to emphasize that notions of "control" derived from images of a static war or images of two antagonists confronting each other at every point of contact give a false impression of much of Afghanistan. There are many areas where there is no fighting and which both sides could claim to "control." Let me illustrate this with some quotations from an article published in *AFGHANews*, the biweekly English-language newsletter of Jamiat-e Islami, the largest group in the resistance, a moderately radical Islamic party mainly supported by Tajiks from northern Afghanistan:

In Totom Dara, despite being close to the enemy base and the Salang highway, Mujahideen have opened schools for the children. The voice of children singing [Islamic] revolutionary songs can be overheard by the enemy posts along the road side. . . .

We crossed the road to enter Qarabagh. We passed close to the regime posts and they did not disturb us. It seemed that if the Mujahideen did not attack the regime troops they would not bother the Mujahideen. . . . The regime controls the district headquarters of Qarabagh. We passed close to the regime positions on our way to Istalif sub-district. . . . Jami'at is in control of Istalif and the people there live in peace. . . . The government has a symbolic presence in Istalif but it does not have anything to do with the people. The Mujahideen have tolerated the presence of an enemy outpost in return for free passage of food and other essential goods from the regime controlled areas. . . .

Urgun. In Paktia the garrison of Khost became the regime's most forward position with the fall of Jaji. In Ningrahar, after the fall of the Torkham border post, mujahedin advanced down the road toward Jalalabad and overran the important garrison of Shinwari district. The regime fell back to the post of Samarkhel, just outside of Jalalabad and then abandoned it after the first offensive there last March. In Kunar, the border post of Barikot was evacuated, Asmar fell, and the mujahedin advanced up the river valley and overran the provincial capital of Chaghasarai (also known as Asadabad), where they have established a provincial government. In the center of the country, the resistance took over Waras, the capital of Bamiyan. In the north, near the Soviet border, the demoralized regime garrison in Kunduz disintegrated, and the mujahedin rushed into this major economic center, although the government managed to drive them out with fresh troops and perhaps some bombing from across the Soviet border. In the same region, the well-organized mujahedin of Ahmad Shah Massoud's Supervisory Council of the North (SCN) took over several garrisons and managed to take and hold Taleqan, the provincial center of Takhar, about 50 km from the Soviet border, where they have established a local administration. Undisciplined resistance fighters killed many civilians and prisoners, raped women, and destroyed property during many of these advances, as described below. For more details and a chronology, see Barnett R. Rubin, "Afghanistan: 'Back to Feudalism,'" *Current History* (December 1989), pp. 421 ff.

The Chack power plant (in a resistance-controlled area) is presently idle. Its workers are being paid by the Kabul regime based on a tacit agreement between the Mujahideen and the Kabul regime.<sup>23</sup>

There are numerous factors contributing to this result, and there is no objective method of weighing them all. Those who favor a continued military effort emphasize the Soviet Union's supplies to the Kabul regime. Others emphasize political factors. I would like to draw the committee's attention to the conclusions of two outstanding experts in the field, Napoléon Bonaparte and Carl von Clausewitz. Napoléon said, "In war moral factors [e.g. morale, organization, discipline, unity] are three fourths, and the balance of material forces is only one fourth." Clausewitz wrote, "The means and forms that a strategist employs are so very simple . . . that it seems ridiculous in the light of common sense when critics dismiss them, as they do so often, with ponderous solemnity. . . . It is even more ridiculous when we consider that these very critics usually exclude all moral qualities from strategic theory, and only examine material factors."<sup>24</sup>

The sources of political weakness and material strength of the Kabul regime and the sources of political strength and relative material weakness of the resistance are relatively well known. The Kabul regime is so lacking in legitimacy because of its Communist background and Soviet imposition that it has been unable to field an army even half the size of the pre-1978 Afghan army, and the loyalty of its troops has been questionable. The PDPA and the government administration have virtually no organizational presence in the country outside of a few major population centers. They have been wracked by conflict between the two major PDPA factions, Khalq and Parcham, as well as among sub-factions of each. They do, however, have a unified command, a well-trained officer corps, a large, well-trained, ruthless intelligence organization, assured supplies, motorized and air transport, electronic communications, and

<sup>23</sup> Abdul Hafiz, "A short walk around Kabul after the Soviet withdrawal," *AFGHANews* 6 (February 1, 1990), pp. 6-7. Other parts of the article describe fighting between the resistance and the government as well as between Hezb-e Islami and other parties. While Abdul Hafiz walked unmolested by several regime posts, he and his companions had to detour to avoid posts set up by Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar).

<sup>24</sup> Napoléon, from his correspondence, commenting on the war in Spain. Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 178. Similar lessons are to be found in Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*.

relatively secure supply depots located at the center of their transportation network. The resistance enjoyed immense prestige and support as a movement against foreign invaders and an anti-Islamic government. While supplies improved after 1985, it always suffered from lack of transport and communications and from the only relatively secure depots being in Pakistan, at the edge rather than the center of its supply network. The first stage of the Soviet withdrawal and the resulting retreat of the government, however, improved its communication and supply lines significantly.

Of course the Soviet Union has supplied the government with an unprecedented amount of weapons, including new sophisticated weapons, while for some time after the Soviet withdrawal there appeared to be a halt or delay in the supply of weapons to the mujahedin. Since the military task of the mujahedin had shifted from guerrilla raids and defense to conventional attacks on compact, well-defended targets, this imbalance counted for even more than it would have in the previous period of the war. Weapons, however, are effective only in the hands of an army ready to fight. The military imbalance between the Communist-controlled militaries and the opposition was of course even greater in the countries of Eastern Europe, yet it had virtually no effect on the political outcomes.

The early optimistic assessments, which predicted a collapse of the Kabul regime from within, were correct in concentrating on the political-moral factors; where they erred was in estimating what those factors were. The major error was in the evaluation of the resistance, although Najibullah has also shown himself to be remarkably skilled at profiting from the faults of his opponents.

The central problem is that the resistance has failed to organize itself as a credible political alternative to the regime in Kabul. This is the key not only to the surprising morale and determination of Kabul's forces, but also to the lack of progress toward conventional military organization within the resistance. Conventional attacks require command and control, which enable a force to coordinate in space (concentrating against a target) and in time (hitting several targets simultaneously). Command and control under a unified, politically legitimate, skilled leadership is also essential for what Clausewitz and all other students of war see as the most essential task: subordinating military decisions to a political strategy with clearly defined goals. The mujahedin do not have this capacity at the national level. They are unlikely to attain it, especially as long as

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and Iran are pushing and pulling them in different directions.

The lack of discipline manifested itself in the treatment of civilians, prisoners and defectors as described above. The result has been what Solidarity leader Adam Michnik calls "the Kabul syndrome." Arguing that the Polish opposition must discipline itself to relieve the fear of the Communists, Michnik observed, "In Kabul, the people in the government know that only the guillotine awaits them if they cede any power."<sup>25</sup> They feel they are fighting for their lives and honor, regardless of their political views. Many resistance leaders have made statements condemning the mistreatment of defectors, and some have made concrete efforts to protect them. It may be too late, however.

The opposition between a foreign-installed PDPA government supported by Soviet troops and a patriotic, Islamic resistance has also become less definitive for many Afghans.<sup>26</sup> The Soviet troops have gone, and Najibullah is still fighting, even after analysts around the world predicted his defeat. On the other side, the failed attempts by the resistance to mount major offensives and to constitute themselves as an alternative government have revealed both selfish squabbling among the leaders and, most important, their dependence on foreign patrons. Afghan nationalism now works increasingly against the exiled leadership of the resistance (as well as those few commanders with strong foreign ties).

The *shura* in Pakistan in February 1989 became a focus of such resentment. Afghans believe, with some reason, that the Peshawar leaders allowed themselves to be manipulated by Pakistan, the U.S., and Saudi Arabia. A close Afghan friend of mine, a mujahed for ten years and an official of the seven-party alliance, summarized this

<sup>25</sup>Quoted in Jim Hoagland, "The World Turned Upside Down," *Washington Post*, February 8, 1990.

<sup>26</sup>Olivier Roy comments, "As long as the *Mujahedin* were fighting Soviet troops, the Afghan war was considered a *jihad*, a holy war against invaders and infidels. An East-West dimension was added when the Reagan administration decided to apply the 'roll-back' policy to Afghanistan, even if the *Mujahedin* did not wait for US support to start their struggle against the communists and the USSR. Now that the Soviet troops have withdrawn, the domestic and regional factors are slowly prevailing upon the East-West ideological dimension." ("Afghanistan: back to tribalism or on to Lebanon?" *Third World Quarterly* 10 (October 1989) 4: 70.)

view when he said that the purpose of the *shura* was "to choose a Pakistani government for Afghanistan." The increasingly visible role of Arab volunteers, distributing what to Afghans are huge sums of money, propagating the alien Wahhabi sect of Islam, has also increased resentment. One commander near Jalalabad told me how he had rejected Arab offers of money in return for following their ways and commented, "I spit on their shoes. They think *jihad* is a business, where we sell ourselves for the highest price."

The same commander at that time (February 4, 1989) expressed his resentment at attempts by the ISI (supported, as we now know, by the CIA and the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad) to force him into an attack on Jalalabad to install the government to be chosen at the *shura*. He and a number of other commanders in the area described to me their own strategy of forming a local council of commanders which could enter into negotiations for the peaceful surrender of the Jalalabad garrison. The pressure from foreign sponsors eventually pushed them into the offensive, with disastrous results. The Afghan government has played up -- and exaggerated -- foreign involvement with the mujahedin. Najibullah now claims that the only foreigners fighting in Afghanistan are Pakistani officers and Arab Wahhabi volunteers with the resistance. These charges have had some effect.

Of course, this was nothing new, although it had taken on new dimensions. From the very beginning the ISI has tried to micro-manage the war effort by distributing weapons in return for undertaking specific operations. As noted above, the resistance has no general staff or command and control. Most strategic military planning, at least for Eastern and Southern Afghanistan, near the Pakistan border, has been done by the ISI.

The methods used are the traditional ones of tribal policy. Since the ISI does not have a direct chain of command over the resistance groups (just as the Pakistani administration has no power to enforce decisions in tribal territory), it uses offers of money and guns in conjunction with the rivalry between different commanders to pressure mujahedin into undertaking the operations they want. This is known as "subcontracting." This is how the mujahedin were pressured into attacking Jalalabad. The commanders were told that if they agreed to make the attack, they would receive money and weapons. If they refused, it was up to them, but they would not receive anything, and their rivals in other parties would.

In Qandahar the ISI tried the same thing. Here I would like to quote from a memorandum of conversation I had with an Afghan who has worked with the Qandahar resistance for over ten years:

When the attack on Jalalabad was launched, no one told the Qandahar shura [of mujahedin] or consulted with them. When they heard it was being planned, they sent a delegation to Peshawar to ask the ISI and AIG to postpone the attack so that they could prepare simultaneous attacks against targets in the Southwest, from Qandahar to Herat. No one listened to them.

Then in May [two months later], when the attack on Jalalabad had failed, the ISI came to the Qandahar shura and asked them to attack Qandahar city. They offered money and guns.<sup>27</sup> They had several plans of action. One was to blow up the Dahla Dam, about 40-50 kms upriver from Qandahar on the Arghandab, in Shah Wali Kot district.<sup>28</sup> Since then the Shura has moved Cmdr. Lalai to the area in order to guard the dam against the ISI and Gulbuddin. The shura refused all of this and said that we have offered before and you didn't listen to us. Now you are asking us to attack for no reason and kill a lot of innocent people in the city.

Then they sent Nabi and Khales there [two of the leaders, both Pashtun from Eastern Afghanistan] to try to persuade them. The mujahedin asked them what authority they had in Qandahar? At the shura that chose the AIG there were 18 people from all of Southwestern Afghanistan (6 provinces), but there were 47 people from Hissarak, Khales's home village.

After this the ISI and the AIG declared that the Qandahar shura was "illegal" and began to create a new "shura." (The court of the Qandahar shura under Mullah Parsaneh of Moqor responded to this by handing down a fatwa or decree in August that Wahhabis were kafer and could be shot on sight.) The ISI paid some smaller commanders, from Khales's and Gulbuddin's parties to start a new shura. They got about a dozen of them, but they were very small commanders, with a total of only about 300 men among them. They shelled the airport, but nothing came of it.

Then they sent Gulbuddin to Qandahar in July. The shura of Qandahar warned him not to come. When he came in a convoy, Haji Abdul Latif [NIFA commander] shelled him, not to kill him but to frighten him away. He was forced to leave Qandahar that night. The next month Haji Abdul Latif was assassinated, poisoned. Everyone believes it was by

<sup>27</sup>According to another Afghan source, "The ISI invited commanders to a meeting, pulled up about eight trucks filled with weapons, and 'covered a table with money.' They told the mujahedin that if they attacked Qandahar city, they would receive all the money and weapons."

<sup>28</sup>According to a third source from the area, the purpose of this plan was to flood the city so the mujahedin could "shoot the Communists like birds."

Gulbuddin, but to preserve unity among the mujahedin, his son said it was by KHAD. They killed the two who confessed to it very quickly, even by mujahedin standards, instead of doing an investigation. This was to hush it up.

Then the ISI brought 2 commanders from Wardak [a Ghilzai Pashtun area in Eastern Afghanistan] who paid each of their mujahedin Rs. 500 per day, plus Rs 50,000 in case of death and Rs. 20,000 in case of injury. This created a terrible reaction. It was not jihad but a mercenary war. People began to ask themselves, is this still a jihad? This has become a very big debate. This is very important for the Afghans, because if you die in jihad you go to heaven, but if you die killing other Muslims in a struggle for power, you will go to hell. Now with the alliance of Gulbuddin and Tanai, people are saying that jihad is finished. It is just a power struggle. This will make a settlement easier. [My emphasis -- BRR]

Since none of this worked, by August, three months later, the ISI said there should be an economic siege of Qandahar. But by this time even the smaller shura was turning against the ISI. The ISI had named a Sayyaf commander the head of it and all of the supplies went through him. But only half of the supplies reached Qandahar. The rest were sold either in Sind or to the government. There is a lot of cash in Afghanistan now. They call Afghans "containers," because the banknotes are just brought in containers from the USSR, where they are printed.

As a result of the ISI-ordered blockade of Qandahar, bread in the city went from 20 Afs. a loaf to 60 Afs. But the governor, Ulumi managed to supply bread to the people for 10 Afs. a loaf. All they had to do was sign a paper at the government office, so people who had had nothing to do with the government for 10 years signed it. What they said was that the ISI made Ulumi into "Ulumi Saheb."

This also failed. So they gave up on it by October-November. By this time there was open anti-ISI feeling among the mujahedin. It was growing at all levels. Cooperating with the ISI was being equated with cooperating with the KGB. The average Afghan was beginning to feel he would prefer to cooperate with Najib than with the ISI.

It was after this sorry sequence of events that a delegation of the mujahedin finally met with the governor, Gen. Ulumi, and were taken to Kabul one night to meet Najibullah.

It is partly in order to insulate the resistance from such pressure that Cmdr. Massoud has advocated the formation of councils of mujahedin similar to his SCN. Since the council makes collective decisions and prevents defections, the ISI has had a harder time making strategic and tactical decisions for the resistance in northeast Afghanistan. This presumably is why Massoud has been starved for weapons by the ISI.



Of course, the U.S. also occasionally participates in such decisions. It was reported in the New York Times, and never denied as far as I know, that the decision to launch the attack on Jalalabad last March was taken in a meeting in Islamabad attended by Pakistani officials, Ambassador Oakley, and not a single Afghan.

As far as political decisions are concerned, it was Pakistan, the U.S., and Saudi Arabia who pressured the exiled parties into particular forms of "unity" and into forming a series of "interim governments." As noted above, the plan for a new *shura* this year was also primarily at the initiative of the supporters of the mujahedin.

Finally, in the one area where the mujahedin have a regional organization with command and control and a political strategy, rivalry among the organizations undermined them. Last July, Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the Supervisory Council of the North, was finalizing plans for an attack that used all the classic elements of strategy. He was going to concentrate his most disciplined forces against the city of Kunduz, while launching simultaneous diversionary attacks across northeast Afghanistan. When the key commanders of the operation were returning from a strategy meeting, they were ambushed by a commander of Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar), Sayyad Jamal, and later executed, apparently with the approval of Hekmatyar's Peshawar headquarters.

Later, when Massoud tried to move against Faizabad, the capital of Badakhshan Province, his forces were again attacked from the rear by Hezb forces in Ishkamish. Massoud claims that throughout the entire past year he has received no shipments of weapons. His representatives privately say that the reason is that he has refused tactical and strategic direction from the ISI, whose operational officers are allied with Hekmatyar against him. Pakistani officials always deny this. It is mainly Massoud and, secondarily, some other independent large commanders who could impose real military costs on Kabul. These commanders, however, are often undermined by foreign supporters intent on micromanaging the war at their expense.

I could recount other events from other regions: how Ismael Khan in Herat drove many of his supporters away by imprisoning landowners who sold grain to the government; how the resistance in Helmand was torn apart by battles over control of a bridge vital to the transportation of opium to processing facilities in and near

Pakistan; how the resistance in Paktia has been torn apart by the reluctance of some of the tribesmen to shell the town of Khost, for similar reasons. The point, I want to emphasize, is not simply that Pakistan or the ISI or the CIA or the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad or the Saudis are to blame. In the absence of institutions of command and control among the mujahedin, their supporters attempt to supply it. This is natural, even inevitable, as long as they are supplying weapons and hope to reap some political benefit from this policy. It is also inevitable that when they attempt to manage strategy and tactics they apply their own criteria, which creates nationalist resentment among those who are disfavored. Such attempts, moreover, do not address the underlying social and political reasons that the resistance lacks command and control and only aggravate internecine conflicts.

At the moment, as a tribal leader and former diplomat from Qandahar put it to me, however much the mujahedin inside Afghanistan may want to fight against Najibullah, they do not know what they are fighting for. That is the fundamental reason the resistance has not advanced militarily since the end of the Soviet withdrawal.

#### A Political Settlement

First, let us be clear what a political settlement is. It does not mean settling all political conflicts in Afghanistan. It means, at best, finding a transitional arrangement that will allow gradual de-escalation of the conflict, disengagement of all foreign powers in the context of neutralization and demilitarization, and the emergence of a political system within which Afghans can pursue their conflicts by means other than firing missiles at each other.

Second, I am assuming that such a political settlement, in which Afghans choose their own leaders without any conditions set by outsiders, is in the interest of the United States. We have no interest in removing Najibullah or the PDPA or in strengthening the AIG or any other resistance organization except insofar as these moves promote such a settlement. I believe that such a settlement would also be most likely to meet the interests of Pakistan by encouraging refugee repatriation and reconstruction.

Contrary to stereotypes of the fanatical, warlike tribesman, the Afghans have many traditions for the settling of disputes, including disputes involving violence and blood feuds. What makes the

current situation harder to resolve are three factors: the immense supplies of weapons and money that are available to the protagonists from foreign supporters as long as they continue to fight; the immense scale of the human casualties, with deaths estimated at nearly 10 percent of the population, or 1.5 million, which has embittered feelings far beyond the traditional range; and the introduction of ideological politics, in particular Marxism-Leninism, which in the view of many Afghans has placed the PDPA outside of Islam, whose universalism provides the framework for resolving tribal or personal disputes. The growth of revolutionary Islam also militates against traditional dispute settlement, since many of the traditional procedures turn on respect for old men of distinguished lineage who act as mediators, while the most radical Islamists reject the authority of such leaders.

These suggest the components of an evolving resolution. Measures are necessary both to reduce the level of violent confrontation and to weaken ideological polarization. Negative symmetry plus would contribute to both. It is obvious why the end of arms supplies and the withdrawal of weapons stockpiles would lower the level of violence; it would also deprive the most ideological groups of one of their principal sources of strength. It would also be extremely helpful if the PDPA, prodded by its Soviet friends, would reorganize and rename itself, shedding its monopolistic control over mass organizations and the press and mass communications, as some of the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe have done. This, of course, is out of the control of the U.S. According to an April 30 press conference of Farid Mazdak, a member of the PDPA Politburo and Najibullah confidant, the PDPA intends to take some such actions over the course of the next few months.

There must also be some kind of framework for discussions among Afghans. The American attempt to "broaden" the AIG to create such a framework is no more likely to succeed than the attempt by the PDPA to preside over "national reconciliation." Nor should we look for a mediator between these "two sides." In order to weaken ideological polarization, a process of political settlement should have the form of a round table where *multiple sides* of Afghan society are represented. It should include representatives of major commanders, religious and tribal dignitaries, ethnic and religious minorities, former government officials, and former king Zahir Shah or his representative. Such a round table would have to be constituted under the aegis of a relatively neutral organization,

such as the U.N., perhaps acting in conjunction with the Organization of the Islamic Conference. This is the body which could organize the elections mentioned above or act as a weak transitional government until elections are held.

There are a number of proposals for bridging the gap over whether the PDPA should be represented there. One alternative is to include members of the current regime whom the mujahedin accept as Good Muslims. For instance, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar accepts former Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanai, and Ahmad Shah Massoud has met with Vice President Abdul Hamid Mohtat. Alternatively, both Najibullah and the leaders of Peshawar could be omitted from initial meetings in favor of relatively non-partisan neutrals, such as Zahir Shah or the NSS.

Finally, the round table should submit whatever proposals it makes to the approval of the Afghans through an election, a *Loya Jirga*, or a representative *shura*. Neither the Peshawar parties nor the PDPA have ever submitted themselves to the judgement of the people they claim to represent. A political settlement will begin to endure only when there is some mechanism to make Afghan leaders accountable to Afghans.

Linking all elements of such a proposal would be complex. As I suggested earlier, a joint announcement by all arms suppliers that they intend to stop further supplies by a date certain could be accompanied by a declaration that, since there is no accepted framework for politics in Afghanistan, the U.N. and the O.I.C. should undertake urgent consultations with all Afghans about the form of discussions to choose a transitional government. These powers could ask both the Kabul regime and the AIG to dissolve themselves while a caretaker regime, such as the one envisaged by U.N. Under-Secretary-General Cordovez in 1988, assumes authority (if not power). Deciding on a precise formula would require negotiations and consultations beforehand.

Such a solution would be difficult and, at best, unlikely to succeed. But the military option alone means only certain death and destruction, without any political resolution for the people of Afghanistan.

## APPENDIX A

**amnesty international**

**AFGHANISTAN**

**ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT OF MEMBERS OF  
THE NATIONAL UNITY PARTY**

JANUARY 1990

AI INDEX: ASA 11/04/89  
DISTR: SC/CO/GR

In June 1989 arrests were carried out by the WAD, the security police, of the founding members of the newly formed National Unity Party, an association of university lecturers, scientists and army officers which has stated its aims as being the establishment of democracy and respect for human rights in Afghanistan through peaceful means. The party's supporters have said it has sought to create an atmosphere for the peaceful transfer of power to a government elected by the people of Afghanistan, and to be committed to a campaign for civil liberties and equality between men and women.

Among the detainees are Professor Mohammad Mohsen Formoly, member of the Academy of Science, Kabul University, sentenced to six years' imprisonment; Colonel (Dgarwal) Dr Abdul Jalil, lecturer at the University of War, 70 years old, sentenced to two years' imprisonment; Colonel (Dgarwal) Mohammad Hakim, lecturer at the Institute of Social Sciences; and Abdul Gharib Khairkhah, lecturer at the School of Ideological Studies. Amnesty International does not have the names of all the detainees. Some army officers on active service were also among the reported members of the National Unity Party detained.

According to the law on political parties, any association with 500 or more members with peaceful aims and which accepts the government's official policy of national reconciliation can apply to be registered a political party. In accordance with this law, the National Unity Party reportedly undertook to compile a list of members to enclose with their application for registration. Before the list could be completed, security personnel known as agents of WAD (formerly KQAD) raided the houses of the founding members of the National Unity Party in June 1989 and arrested dozens of them. The detainees included the prisoners mentioned above. Some of the prisoners are believed to have already been tried by a special revolutionary court, probably in August 1989; their reported sentences are cited above. Amnesty International does not have other details of the trials. The procedures of the special revolutionary courts, however, fall far short of internationally established standards for a fair trial. The prisoners do not have access to a lawyer of their choice and have no right to a judicial review by a higher tribunal.

law and political science, who had been adopted as a prisoner of conscience during his previous imprisonment between 1982 and 1987, and had no direct association with the National Unity Party. He was denied sleep for four days and nights during interrogation, but was released after four weeks.

The full number of prisoners, including army officers, held in connection with the membership of the National Unity Party is not known. The prisoners are reportedly held in Pul-e Charkhi Prison in Kabul. Amnesty International believes they may be prisoners of conscience, detained solely for the exercise of their freedom of conscience and expression.

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, 1 EASTON STREET, LONDON WC1X 8DJ, UNITED KINGDOM

## APPENDIX D

DECLARATION OF INTENT BY  
NATIONAL SALVATION SOCIETY

Dear Compatriots,

For more than a decade the fire of war and bloodshed is aflame in our beloved country, Afghanistan, and every day it is increasingly intensified. Almost every day bombs, rockets, shells and bullets are falling on our cities and villages, mountains and deserts. The worst of it is that today Afghanistan has turned into a ground on which the destructive and lethal weapons from the aliens' arsenals are tested, demolishing our Fatherland and dragging its people to annihilation.

As a result of this destructive war many cities and villages, economic and social establishments, and historical and cultural institutions have been ruined, hundreds of thousands of our citizens including innocent children weltered in dust and blood or became wounded or disabled, several millions of our citizens fled to foreign countries, living in a miserable plight, the national economy went bankrupt, and our beloved homeland has drifted to the verge of destruction.

The main reason behind all these misfortunes is the fact that the alien powers have changed our free country into an exercise board of their policies as well as a theatre of international confrontation in order to expand their political sway and economic influence. Launching deceitful propaganda and giving fatal arms and boundless financial aids to the warring sides, they add, at every moment, fuel to the flames of war.

Afghans, obviously have the right to decide their own destiny in an atmosphere void of various internal pressures and of biased external influence and interference. Barring the few, all Afghans want to lead a peaceful life, and are opposed to any state or government to be imposed on them by force or by use and threat of bayonet, cannon and tank.

At this very time, Afghans pressingly need to revive their ruined country. Men of culture, scholars, intellectuals and skilled and experienced people who have, in fact been our national asset either sought refuge abroad or faced, in one way or another, a worse fate. The phenomenon of leaving the country still continues and to fill this gap is not an easy job. What is never recoverable is the extermination of Afghans, the Afghan - your brother and my brother. We will probably reconstruct buildings, but revival of those who eternally passed away in this long and destructive conflict is impossible until the resurrection at doomsday. We had in our country good, admirable and human traditions which are about to vanish.

Dear Compatriots,

Look, what happened to the education of the country's children. We lost millions of teaching hours due to the destruction of schools in a country where the number of literates is very few. The rest of the children for whom educational facilities are available whether inside or outside the country, are educated under an alien system. Every opposing group, in our country regrettably, calls its opposite group "an enemy", antagonistic and irreconcilable, and considers it a target to be shot at. And the worse so, the prevailing conditions threaten the nation to ethnic and national, territorial and linguistic disintegration.

To destroy our country and kill the Afghans, the alien powers are massively supplying lethal arms to this land already devastated, where the people badly need food, clothes, medicine and shelter and, in one word, are aspiring a peaceful day of life without fear and anxiety.

Brother Compatriots,

Have you ever imagined what will be the fate of this land and of this free people? For many long years we, a number of Afghans, have looked forward to the return of the peaceful day, waiting to see the destiny of the Afghans to be decided by the Afghans themselves without foreign interference. But regrettably we witness that with the passage of time the roots of this calamity are deepening and widening, and aliens, who have been greedily watching this land, the sacred legacy of our ancestors entrusted to us by the martyrs fallen along the path of God and homeland are trying continuously to sow the seeds of corruption and fratricide in this suffered soil and irrigate it by the blood of the nation's youth. That is why we are convinced that it is a great and unforgivable sin to still wait and witness the deplorable condition of the country. Therefore, without any fear and apprehension and only based on national interests and motivation of conscience, with full freedom and without bias or inclination to any side but simply in the spirit of benevolence, in order:

- to create an atmosphere conducive for negotiation among all the parties involved and to find a solution acceptable to the people and opposing groups;
- to pave the way for declaring a ceasefire and ensuring control over its compliance;
- to preserve the country's independence, national unity and territorial integrity;
- to stop foreign interference in the affairs belonging to our people and country;

- to secure cooperation and assistance in forming a provisional national unity government including the concerned parties, and to renew the Constitution by a Loya Jirga, genuinely representing the people;
- to cooperate in the free elections to the National Assembly and in participation of all parties;
- to contribute to the establishment of a state system based on the principles of the sacred religion of Islam, national history and culture and the exigencies of the time;
- to consolidate the policy of non-alignment and to avoid tailing after in the international politics; and finally
- to restore peace with justice in the country and to ensure the nation's pride and the rights of its citizens;

We the founding members of the National Salvation Society, relying on God, the Almighty, decided to commence our activity through our contacts with all the Afghan warring parties, political personalities and organisations, national forces inside the country, Afghan parties and groups in Pakistan, Iran and other countries, armed commanders in various areas of the country, the ex-King and his advocates in and outside Afghanistan, the Afghans living abroad urging them to find a solution to the pressing national and internal problems on the basis of negotiation, and in compliance with individual and social rights. Because in these conditions where there is no family that has not either lost a member or had a wounded, disabled or wanderer, where prices are increasingly hiked up and a big deficiency of essential commodities threaten our people, where an unprecedented inflation has subjected our national economy to bankruptcy, conditions from which our people have been severely suffering, we hold that remaining indifferent and keeping quiet is a big and unforgivable sin.

To achieve our objective, we will refer to the international community, the United Nations Organisation, the Non-Aligned Movement, Organisation of Islamic Conference, notable national and religious figures, effective and influential personalities in the neighbouring countries and national and international non-governmental organisations.

We will take to each and every humanistic individual the voice of the oppressed and offended Afghan people who demand peace and peaceful coexistence, their civil, political, social and human rights on their soil, and will thus awaken the conscience of humanity in this regard. We will cooperate with any individual or group that would proceed from these objectives. We call the Afghans, whether outside or within the country, for this benevolent cause.

Perhaps, a limited number of individuals, who make their subsistence through fire and guns, who owe their survival to the murdering of their countrymen and who seek benefit from the war, will conspire and take a stand against us. However, since our objective is only to ensure the satisfaction of God,

observance of humanism and rights of the homeland regardless of personal gains or temporary luring flashy life, we believe in the fact that anybody who takes a step along the welfare and prosperity of the people, the Almighty will guarantee his victory. In this we are guided by the following saying of Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon Him)

Our stand is borne out by the fact that over the past ten years we have not even been in agreement with the current policies of the time. Similarly, we have had no collaboration with those who have been opposed and hostile to the present regime.

We do not see as permissible any cooperation with any state or super-power, unless they refrain from direct and indirect intervention in the internal affairs of our country.

We urge the entire Afghans to help us materially and morally. We want the human community, whose humanistic affection and conscience are still alive, to save our nation from the verge of annihilation.

We wish all the Afghans, whose hearts beat for the love of their homeland and compatriot, to form such groups where ever they are, become united, and take their voice of righteousness ever louder to reach the human community.

Dear Compatriots,

Wherever you are, get united, join hands, forget the motives that split you, put aside previous differences in accordance with the Afghan tradition, become helpers of each other and embrace one another. Your country is living through critical and crucial moments of its history. It is only by unity and oneness, tolerance and forgiveness that we can successfully and proudly get through these delicate and complicated moments of Afghan history.

The statement was agreed upon and endorsed by the founding members of the National Salvation Society in their meeting of September 30, 1989.

No. Name:

- 1- Prof. Mohammad Asghar, former vice-president of Helmand valley development project, rector of Kabul University, Kabul city Mayor and Minister of Justice, as chairman.
- 2- Dr. Mohammad Aman, former president of Industrial Development Bank and Minister of Finance, as deputy chairman.
- 3- Ret. General Abdul Hakim Katawazi, former commander-in-chief of police force as deputy chairman.
- 4- Eng. Abdul Qudos Majid, former deputy Minister of Mines and Industries, as secretary.
- 5- Sheikh Ali Ahmad Fakoor, a spiritual figure, as secretary.
- 6- Mohammad Anwar Ziaie, former Minister of Finance, as member.
- 7- Ret. Col. Gen. Mohammad Azim, former Minister of Public Works, as member.
- 8- Prof. Abdul Wasai Saraj, formerly lecturer at the Law faculty of Kabul University, as member.
- 9- Prof. Mohammad Anwar Arghandiwal, former Minister of Justice and lecturer at Law faculty of Kabul University, as member.
- 10- Dr. Mohammad Akbar Omar, former Minister of Commerce, as member.
- 11- Abdul Hakim, former Minister of Agriculture, as member.
- 12- Dr. Abdullah Wahidi, former rector of Kabul University and Governor of Kabul, as member.
- 13- Ret. Gen. Mir Mohammad Osman, former vice-president of Military Court, as member.
- 14- Lal Gul Faried, former deputy in the National Assembly, as member.
- 15- Hafizullah, former president of bus enterprise, as member.

20.9.1989

Co-Chairman HOYER. The Commission thanks you both for the depth of work that obviously went into the preparation of the statement. Thank you.

Mr. David Isby, who is a specialist in Soviet military affairs, used to work for a Member of Congress, Ms. Fiedler, I understand, and has been published widely on the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.

Thank you for being with us, and you can proceed with your statement. We will include it in the record at this time in full, and you can excerpt it or proceed in whichever way you choose.

STATEMENT OF DAVID C. ISBY, A SPECIALIST IN SOVIET MILITARY AFFAIRS

Mr. Isby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A year ago, who would have thought that Najibullah would outlast Ceausescu, that communism would endure in Kabul when it had collapsed in East Berlin?

In Afghanistan, the Soviets are unwilling to move towards the peaceful transition of power away from a discredited Communist regime, as happened in Eastern Europe. Self-determination for the Afghan people still remains an unrealized goal.

Soviet policy in Afghanistan today amounts to a continuation of the war started by their 1979 invasion in direct contravention of their obligations under the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The elements of Soviet policy in Afghanistan, viewed together, amount to an ongoing policy of waging war and large scale violation of human rights. The war in Afghanistan, I am afraid, is still the Soviet war. Only the Soviet combat troops have left.

The regime in Kabul remains as physical evidence of this continuity in Soviet policy. It is still the regime put in place by the Soviets on 27 December 1979, shooting the previous head of state. Najibullah is still the Afghan head of state, the man hand picked by Gorbachev in 1985 from his position as head of the secret police, a position he earned by his loyalty, not to Afghanistan, but Moscow.

The human rights record of the Kabul regime still remains terrible. The KHAD Secret Police and Pul-e-Charki Prison have not gone out of business.

The presence of what is euphemistically called Soviet military advisors in Afghanistan indicates the Soviets have continued to be committed to a military solution.

Until the events described in today's New York Times, Soviet diplomatic proposals appear to be still aimed at sustaining the current regime, its military and its secret police, rather than looking towards peace.

There is a great deal of evidence that not only are Soviet soldiers present in substantial numbers inside Afghanistan, but they have engaged in combat since the withdrawal. According to unconfirmed resistance reports, they were instrumental in defeating the recent coup attempt in Kabul. Soviet advisors retain a great deal of power and influence in Kabul as they did throughout the 1979 to 1989 period.

The Soviets have provided massive amounts of weapons to the Kabul regime. This has been made possible by Soviet moves to reduce their forces in Eastern Europe, especially in the case of the SCUD surface-to-surface missile.

The Soviets have been providing hard currency to Afghanistan for the purposes of bribery, as well as massive economic aid for Kabul's war effort. Not only are Soviet aircraft and trucks delivering weapons to Kabul, but it appears that the Soviets are still repairing Kabul regime weapons systems, training Afghans in their use, and possibly even flying combat missions across the border from the Soviet Union.

Substantial numbers of Afghans, including children deported with or without familial consent, for indoctrination and education in the Soviet Union, remain there. This is in violation of the family contact and reunification provisions of Basket III of the 1975 Final Act.

While the Soviet war effort in Afghanistan no longer includes large numbers of Soviet combat troops, it appears that this change, rather than heralding a move to end the conflict, has so far represented only a reassessment of the utility of these forces as a policy tool, not the abandonment of the policy that the Soviet forces were there to implement throughout the long and bitter war, 1979 to 1989.

It would appear that this Commission's strong concerns that it repeated throughout the 1980's—that the Soviet actions in Afghanistan are in violation of the 1975 Final Act—are still valid today and need to be strongly reiterated.

Thank you.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Isby. We appreciate that statement.

Now Mr. Sekander, who not only was born in Afghanistan, but works with us here on Capitol Hill. We appreciate your being with us, Mr. Sekander.

**STATEMENT OF KHALID C. SEKANDER, BORN IN AFGHANISTAN  
AND WRITTEN SEVERAL ARTICLES ON HIS NATIVE COUNTRY**

Mr. SEKANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Your statement also will be included in the record, and you can proceed in any way you want.

Mr. SEKANDER. Thank you, sir. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you.

I come today to express my concerns towards the present situation in Afghanistan. I wish to use this forum to express and illustrate inconsistencies in policies practiced by all nations presently providing vital assistance programs to the Afghan people and, respectfully, recommend to this worthy Commission a simple solution to these complex problems in Afghanistan generated by these misguided policies.

Certainly, the repercussions of these mismanaged policies towards the Afghan people has resulted in a delay in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, has intensified factionalization within the Afghan community, and has prolonged the misery and suffering of all Afghans.

Unfortunately, the forced Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has not resulted in a free Afghanistan. On the contrary, the recovery of Afghanistan from a decade of Soviet butchery has been prolonged by the Soviet Union's continued intervention in our affairs.

The estimated \$350 million per month in military assistance that Najibullah enjoys from the Soviet Union has, indeed, sustained his regime of terror and prolonged any peaceful resolution towards a free and democratic Afghanistan.

However, the Soviet Union is not alone in contributing to the delay in resolving the dilemmas the Afghan people face. The United States, Pakistan and other assistance providing nations have unwittingly compounded the Afghan dilemma with an inconsistent and uncoordinated administration of their vital assistance programs to the Afghan people.

I am concerned that these inconsistencies in policy by all assistance providing nations are actually inhibiting the reconstruction efforts, undermining the self-determination, and perpetuating polarization within the Afghan community.

I will now address some of these inconsistencies, if I may. Firstly, inconsistency in U.S. policy towards the Afghan people can be evidenced by the January 1990 suspension of a \$33 million food program sponsored by the Agency for International Development.

This suspension occurred in the cold winter when Afghanistan gets frightfully cold and food becomes scarce. At a time when the Afghan people needed food most, they were starved because of political indecisions and/or inconsiderations.

Another example of reckless decision-making took place in the summer of 1989, when critical arms shipments to the Mujahadeen were halted. This occurred at a time when the Mujahadeen desperately needed these military supplies to defend their homeland and to protect their families from the encroachment of Najibullah's determined and well supplied army.

If these supplies had been available, not only would the chances of a Mujahadeen victory over Najib's army have been significantly increased, but more lives and limbs would have been saved.

However, due to this U.S. imposed suspension of arms shipments, the defeat of Najib's Soviet backed regime of horror was slowed down and, therefore, resulted in yet another delay to our reconstruction efforts.

Moreover, this U.S. policy gave the Soviet Union and Najib the advantage of prolonging the survival of their regime in Afghanistan, while at the same time continuing the murderous campaign against us.

According to Congressman Ritter, American officials, because they have not taken greater charge of the aid distribution program in Afghanistan, are potentially countermanding the will of the Afghan people.

The stalemate in Afghanistan is also compounded by the present U.S. policy of funneling aid through Pakistan. Rumors are flying around that some Pakistani officials are biased in their distribution of assistance programs. If true, this type of behavior on the part of the Pakistani officials ferments an environment where corruption, greed and suspicion become commonplace. This, in turn, will increase factionalization within our community.

On the same note, the Saudi presence in the affairs of the Afghan people is also a concern. The Saudis, in their meritorious efforts to assist the Afghan people, have unknowingly and unintentionally perpetuated the factionalization within the Afghan community through their policy of favoring Sunni fundamentalists in order to offset the Shiite influence.

As long as the United States, Pakistan and other assistance providing nations formulate policy in a self-interested and unsynchronized fashion, all efforts towards reconstruction, redevelopment, self-determination and freedom for the Afghan people will be restricted and, at best, incremental.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Commissioners, within 1 year of the forced Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the world has witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet empire. The past events at the recent May Day parade will attest to this.

Truly, the Pandora's Box of the Soviet Union, nationalism, was opened by Afghan hands. The credit is due, and the Afghan people are waiting for a consistent plan of action.

Therefore, I respectfully recommend that this Commission advise, recommend, influence or, if possible, mandate that all nations providing any form of assistance to the Afghan people formulate themselves into a unified international task force targeted with resolving the Afghanistan question.

I firmly believe that such an approach towards the Afghan people will insure unity and cohesion within the Afghan community since, if such a body exists, there would only be one source for valuable assistance upon which the Mujahadeen and the Afghan people could depend upon. There would be, more importantly, one purse string. Also, it would provide morale and a good example for the Afghans to follow.

Moreover, such an entity should eliminate the many self-interested groups seeking to extend their influence and impress their beliefs on the Afghan will, which would subsequently diminish factionalization within the Afghan community.

Also, such an organization comprised exclusively of nations presently providing assistance to the Afghan people can, as a whole, pressure the Soviet Union to the negotiating table and thereby expedite a peaceful resolution towards a free and democratic Afghanistan.

In conclusion, as long as nations providing assistance to the Afghans operate assistance programs independently of one another and with differing motivations, factions will emerge professing the ideology and beliefs of their supporter, which is human nature.

As evidenced by the present in-fighting within the Afghan community, inconsistent and self-interested policies have resulted in an unhealthy form of competition between us.

For these reasons, I appear before you to implore this Honorable Commission and distinguished Commissioners to advise and influence all assisting providing nations to coordinate, implement and administer their assistance programs via a unified body tasked with the liberation of Afghanistan from the ravages of war, death, poverty, and famine.

Thank you. I will be happy to answer any questions.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Sekander for your statement. We appreciate it.

At this time, I am going to hold on any questions that I might have and recognize Mr. Ritter for such questions as he would want to propound.

Representative RITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank our distinguished witnesses for excellent testimony.

Let me ask David a question about the SCUD missiles. Peter Tomsen mentioned that 1,700 SCUD missiles have been applied in Afghanistan, brought to Afghanistan. What is the cost of one of these missiles?

Mr. ISBY. The costing of any Soviet weapon, especially one that is, as in the case of some of these SCUDs, are over 20 years old—is a difficult and unexact process.

Representative RITTER. Are they simply transferred from Eastern Europe?

Mr. ISBY. Whether the missiles physically have come from Eastern Europe is unknown without checking lists of serial numbers.

Representative RITTER. Are SCUDs part of the original pact between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce the immediate range?

Mr. ISBY. No. They do not fall under that. The highest range of the SCUD is 480 kilometers. All SCUDs are basically made for use against NATO. If you have no further need of them or reduce need of them in Eastern Europe, to be used against NATO, they can be reduced from the force structure.

These weapons which cost each individually several million dollars to produce—\$1 to \$3 million, it has ranged in different estimates—can now be removed from service and, in fact, instead of sold or kept in storage, used to kill Afghans.

Representative RITTER. Dr. Rubin mentioned the cost of the aid program to the Soviet economy. It is hard to figure out what is there already and being shipped in and, therefore, transportation costs and what it is that has to be replaced by hard currency purchases. Certainly grain and the wheat, 500,000 tons of grain that went into Afghanistan last year because of the destruction of Afghan agriculture, that is certainly a commodity that must be imported to the Soviet Union in the world market; is that correct?

Mr. ISBY. That is correct. More significantly, fuel oil and bombs are being supplied in large amounts. The Soviets are still producing and making these commodities. One fighter bomber in intense action can consume 25 tons of fuel and bombs in a day, such as was done at Jalalabad.

The petroleum that they are supplying to the Kabul regime to sustain their military operations could otherwise be sold on the world market. The Soviets are still making bombs and ammunition today at direct cost to the Soviet taxpayer and Soviet economy.

So there is a very real cost to the Soviets even without looking at amortized weapons systems.

Representative RITTER. What about the deployment of the Buterfly bombs and the so-called jumping fragmentation bombs? Didn't they deploy millions of these small, toy weapons, toy bombs, and not only toy bombs, but just the small bombs, scattering them around in concentric circles around their cities prior to leaving?



What is the status of the supply line of these similar kinds of weapons since the Soviet Army has left?

Mr. ISBY. The weapons are still there. The damage they are doing is still going on, on a daily basis. This includes not only mine fields, but a whole variety of exotic weapons systems.

The Soviets have been willing to transfer to the Kabul regime a variety of sophisticated weapons that previously they had been reluctant to transfer even to their most trusted allies. I cite as an example the BM-22 220 millimeter multiple rocket launcher, the 2S9 120 millimeter self-propelled mortar, and the BTR-80 armored personnel carriers.

These are just three examples.

Representative RITTER. This is post-withdrawal?

Mr. ISBY. Yes.

Representative RITTER. So there is a common conception that the scrap heap worth of weapons from Eastern Europe goes into Afghanistan, and that you are saying is not quite factual?

Mr. ISBY. Not today. Some of the weapons are different. Sometimes it is for very good military reasons. The T-72 tanks that are leaving Czechoslovakia have automatic transmissions that do not work on many Afghan roads. Similarly, their guns are designed for use against NATO tanks and, therefore, do not present much of an advantage when you are killing Afghans.

So the decision on which systems are transferred and which are not, perhaps is not so much just avoiding the 350 man-hours it takes to scrap one battle tank. There is a good deal of military logic and a willingness to transfer sophisticated weapons systems demonstrated as well.

Representative RITTER. Dr. Rubin?

Mr. RUBIN. If I could just make a comment about the anti-personnel mines, I am not sure to what extent they are still being distributed, but as David said, they are still on the ground, and we do not know how many, maybe millions, and they are a major problem for the people in Afghanistan.

In order for people to return to Afghanistan, if that should ever become possible, it would be necessary to remove them. In order to remove them, it would be very helpful for whatever body engages in the de-mining to have the technical specifications, learn how they work and so on.

I know that when I spoke to Sadruddin Aga Khan in Geneva last year, who is responsible for, among other things, organizing the de-mining programs, he said that he had requested some technical specifications about these mines from the Soviet Union and not received them.

Later there was an article in the New York Times about the mines, to which an official of the Soviet Embassy, responded by a letter denying that these mines had been sown indiscriminately. This was after the Soviet withdrawal. So it was not under the old regime in the Soviet Union. I then replied in another letter, and I would just reiterate what I said then, that certainly it is the duty of the Soviet Union, having withdrawn from the territory according to the laws of war, to make known, first of all, the placement of the mines. Of course, there is no way of making known the placement of these aerially distributed mines, but the equivalent would

be to give the technical specifications that are necessary for deactivating them.

So far, as far as I know, they are still stonewalling on that and not admitting that they distributed these mines.

Representative RITTER. Mr. Sekander?

Mr. SEKANDER. From what I have learned, these mines are being de-mined by the refugees. With all of the technical specifications that are supposed to be learned in de-mining, I do not see how refugees can learn how to de-mine within a week.

And, moreover, they are refugees from war. Why are we using them to de-mine?

Representative RITTER. I guess my question is: are they still sowing these Soviet built mines against Mujahadeen and other populations, Mr. Saljoogue?

Mr. SALJOOGUE. Yes, Mr. Congressman. There are two in Khost, and in places, in garrisons.

Representative RITTER. But the question was: are they still laying these mine fields anew?

Mr. SALJOOGUE. Of course. Yes, they are constantly laying new mine fields. In Kabul, I know they were uncovered in several places, and especially around the new posts which they make.

Representative RITTER. We have a witness that videotaped from Herat, I might add, where we watched a young man, a 16-year-old true hero, go out ahead of his compatriots with a stick and draw in these mines and very meticulously take them apart, and he became very adept at it.

On one occasion something went wrong, and his head was blown off by that mine.

I would like to just explore the idea of the internecine struggles are legendary in Afghanistan, and yet the Soviets, in their own Central Asia Republics at the beginning of consolidation of the Soviet Union, was brilliant at promoting factional internecine conflict.

Not long ago, I guess it was Bill Keller in the New York Times wrote a brilliant piece as to how the Soviets, the KGB went into Afghanistan, I mean, Azerbaijan, and supported the most radical element there to bring into conflict with the normal order the popular front, the Liberation of Azerbaijan, and eventually the whole story came out and was reported very well in the Times.

But it was essentially the KGB in there inciting to riot. Given all of the Afghans that have been part of KHAD and that have studied and worked in the Soviet Union, what kind of a role does Moscow play today in fermenting the conflicts and promoting the differences between the already tribalized Afghan society?

Does anybody want to take a crack at that? David?

Mr. ISBY. I believe the Soviet Union is still playing a very significant role in maintaining the divisions within Afghanistan. Afghanistan is certainly by no means a unitary society. Tribal, religious, ethnic divisions are, as you know, ancient.

But the Soviets, so long as their policy is to maintain the regime in Kabul, they must then divide and conquer, to try and play groups against groups, and indeed, throughout Afghanistan tribal loyalties have proven stronger than ideological loyalties.

The Khosti, the Matun tribesmen, who are the people inside Khost, they are there largely because not of their loyalty to communism, but because they hate the Zadrani tribesmen who are with the Mujahadeen outside and have hated them for centuries. So the Soviets and Kabul, largely through money, through use of these divisions, are still carrying on this policy, which we saw in 1979 to 1989.

Representative RITTER. Mr. Rubin?

Mr. RUBIN. It is certainly true, what David says. At least the Kabul regime is doing it, and I must say one of the reasons that Najib was chosen to be the leader of the PDPA is that unlike Babrak, he has a tribal background from the border region with Pakistan and is more adept at playing these games.

But I want to make two points. First of all, I do not think it is really accurate to attribute a great deal of the division which exists today in Afghanistan to machinations by the Government, implying that if there were not any such machinations there would not be any such divisions. There would be, first of all, because of the social structure of Afghanistan and, second, because the Kabul Government is not the only foreign power that is playing on these divisions.

The Pakistanis are the past masters in this respect. They are the inheritors of the British Raj and are playing the tribal game along the frontier. So I would say it is really a mutually reinforcing situation, where both Islamabad and Kabul, as before 1978, but with many more weapons and a greater ideological stake, are playing the game among the tribesmen.

And from the point of view of the tribesmen, they stand to benefit by playing one off against the other, which they do.

Representative RITTER. Today in the New York Times, I think there was a glimmer of hope in Michael Oreski's article as to what the future of Afghanistan might hold, and it seems the Soviets who have been waiting for us to blink may be beginning to blink.

There seems to be a possibility that the Najib regime would not necessarily be in control of an elections process. They mentioned Pir Gailani. Mr. Saljoogue, you are familiar with Pir Gailani. Who is he and what is his role and why is it that there is such a firm opposition to conducting any elections while Najib is in control of the central government?

Mr. SALJOOGUE. Well, Pir Gailani from the beginning of the resistance was advocating that the alliance cannot be a strong alliance until they do not have a sure or an elected political body which could be, I mean, a binding factor among the Mujahadeen. So that was his idea from the very beginning.

And now, I mean, he has come to the conclusion that the only solution for Afghanistan to get out of the quagmire of this what you call fragmentation would be a (inaudible) of the people of Afghanistan. I mean, through that sort of body truly leadership could emerge, and that would be very much binding for all of the people of Afghanistan.

Representative RITTER. And as I mentioned, the presence of Najib and the regime in Kabul during the time of the elections does not seem to be, or in control, does not seem to be acceptable to people like Gailani; is that correct?

Mr. SALJOOGUE. Well, Mr. Gailani has proposed that, while we claim that 80 percent or 90 percent of the lands are in our hands and we have got most of the population, so there should be dual what you call sort of elections at the same time. One should be in the liberated areas under the auspices and supervision of the OIC, and in the what you call occupied areas, the election, there should be a fair election held under the supervision of the United Nations.

Representative RITTER. So the United States' supervised elections would occur in the Government controlled area?

Mr. SALJOOGUE. That is true.

Representative RITTER. Did you want to comment?

Mr. RUBIN. Just to clarify. There are actually two separate points here with respect to the role of the current Government and elections. One is who organizes the elections, and the other is who is in control of the security apparatus while the elections are taking place.

As I understand it, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed on the formula, which is not really inconsistent with Pir Gailani's proposal, that the elections themselves should be organized by a body of distinguished Afghans, relatively neutral. Of course, there are no truly neutral Afghans with respect to the Soviet invasion of their country, but distinguished figures who have not been involved militarily, of whom there are some, would organize the elections.

The disagreement at this point is over who would control the Government and the security apparatus. Obviously the concern is, how do you have a free election in a situation with a repressive apparatus in control?

So there are various formulas that are being considered either for a transitional government or for some kind of international monitoring of the elections beyond the purely administrative monitoring of it. But that is certainly the most difficult question.

Representative RITTER. Did you see this morning's article? The information in there is somewhat of a shift in the Soviet position.

Mr. RUBIN. I see it in a way as more of a shift in the American position. It is a shift in both. I believe this proposal was first made fully by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in his February 14 article in Izvestia.

One thing I noticed in this article is that there was no mention of the international conference about Afghanistan involving the United States, Soviet Union, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and perhaps some other countries, which the Soviets had previously asked for as a precondition, which the U.S. objected to, and there was no request for a coalition government or negotiations between the resistance and Najib, and there was no request for a cease fire between the two sides.

If the Soviets have, in fact, given up those three demands, then it is an extremely significant move on their part, and that is new.

Representative RITTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I yield back.

Chairman DeCONCINI. Senator Wallop, do you have any questions?

Senator WALLOP. Just a couple.

One, I would like to express my dismay that Mr. Tomsen was not permitted to come here.

Did I understand you to say that the Mujahadeen controls 90 percent of the countryside?

Mr. SALJOOQUE. Well, there is a variation from 75 to 90 percent.

Senator WALLOP. What does that mean in terms of population?

Mr. SALJOOQUE. Well, in population it is very inconsistent because Kabul, the population when it was controlled by the Russians was up to more than 2 million people. Now, it has dropped back to a little more than 1 million. So that is not a very constant thing that one should push for.

But I mean in proportion of land, when we see Kabul, the Government has got a little edge over population in comparison to land they have.

Senator WALLOP. And there is still a major Soviet resupply and support level that takes place?

Mr. SALJOOQUE. Of course.

Senator WALLOP. Is the State Department's estimate somewhere in the neighborhood of \$5 billion a year approximately accurate?

Mr. SALJOOQUE. Does the State Department state that amount? No, I do not this so. I wish—

Senator WALLOP. Not for you; the Government.

Mr. SALJOOQUE. By the Soviets?

Senator WALLOP. Yes.

Mr. SALJOOQUE. It is something between, they say, something between more than \$300 million, within \$300 to \$450 million per month.

Senator WALLOP. So it is a significant effort.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that anybody who knows anything about elections has got to worry about somebody who has that kind of an economic resource. It means food; it means security; it means intimidation; it means control; virtually of all the handles of what might be called democracy, regardless of who may be monitoring the election.

Mr. Rubin, would you agree with that?

Mr. RUBIN. Certainly I agree with it, but I would, first of all, point out that there are people with a lot of money on the other side, too, although not to that extent.

And, second, I should say as part of the agreement on elections, there, first of all, will also be an agreement on—

Senator WALLOP. The proposed agreement.

Mr. RUBIN. Yes, proposed agreement. I am talking hypothetically because the war is going on as we speak.

But there would be, first of all, an end to weapon supplies to both sides once there is an agreement on elections, and I know that one proposal we are making, and which Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had even said could be the subject of discussion, was also the withdrawal of stockpiles that create an imbalance, and I would hope that we would insist on that as one of the conditions for moving forward on this.

Senator WALLOP. Well, you are not suggesting that the several groups the Mujahadeen have supporting them are equivalent to that which the Najibullah government is receiving, are you?

Mr. RUBIN. No, not financially, but if you are talking about food and money, as one chief of the Momand tribe expressed it to me one time, because of the ideological difference between the two sides, 1 of our rupees is worth 10 of theirs.

Senator WALLOP. That strikes me as the kind of thing that the United States would be willing to tell itself when it was suffering from a guilty conscience. I think it is important. I mean, I was not really thrilled with the agreement in Geneva, and I suggested to Secretary Schultz at the same time that any time that the United States entered into an agreement which it says at the moment it is going to break, as Schultz described it, we gave a very public wink. It does not strike me that we have any complaint about what the Soviets are doing by way of resupply or support.

It does not strike me as though we have got a very good position now to really force hard decisions on either side in order to bring some resolution that would allow the Afghan people self-determination.

How can we achieve this thing?

Mr. RUBIN. How can we achieve what thing?

Senator WALLOP. That is what I was afraid of. Very specifically I am just saying, you know, that when we have said that we have laid down a program which we did not intend to abide by, and now we find the Soviets are certainly violating the spirit of the agreement, and the one people who were not consulted in all of this were the Mujahadeen; how now is it that we can find a way out of this that amounts to genuine self-determination for the Afghan people?

Mr. SALJOOQUE. Well, that is not very difficult. I mean if the Afghans are left alone and, I mean, if the alien powers are interested to have hegemony in Afghanistan and have a sort of world in which they want an Afghanistan, if they refrain from interfering in the affairs of the people of Afghanistan, I think it is not very difficult.

Senator WALLOP. But do you anticipate under any set of circumstances that the Soviet Union is about to refrain? We refrain rather a lot.

Mr. SALJOOQUE. Well, I will tell you one thing. If there is a government in the Afghanistan backed by the people, the Kabul is going to wither and fade away in a very short time, and that is a fact.

Senator WALLOP. That I believe. That is what I am trying to get to, but I wonder how you get there with Najibullah being backed so heavily by the Soviet Government.

Mr. SALJOOQUE. Well, I think one thing. Let the Soviet Union alone. They did not prove very much on the battlefield. They have not proved very much on the political side also.

But if the Afghans are left alone and they decide for a government that is acceptable to the people, then the people of Afghanistan will unite as one power, and I think there will be no room for Najibullah to stay there, and that is, again, a fact.

Senator WALLOP. That is what all of us, I think, would like to see. My guess is that the way we have structured it, it is one of the things that unfortunately we are not likely to see because we have essentially invited the Soviets to stay there unchallenged.

Mr. RUBIN. If I may, please correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Saljooque, but if I may elaborate on what I think you may have meant by your remarks, when you talked about the alien forces that are preventing the Afghans from choosing their own government, I believe you were not solely referring to the Soviet Union.

Mr. SALJOQUE. No, no. When I said forces, I did not say "alien force." I said "alien forces."

Mr. RUBIN. You said "alien forces." While I will not say what he is saying, I will say what other Afghans have said to me when they make the same statements. They are very much concerned about interference by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran in Afghan affairs, in pressuring various groups in one way or another and favoring one over another, and they believe that if these countries, in some cases operating with our money and weapons, were not promoting their own regional and sectarian agendas in Afghanistan, it would be much easier for the Mujahadeen, the refugees and others to form a program which would, indeed, be attractive to many people who now find themselves in Kabul on the side of the Kabul regime, including people who are now members for one reason or another of the PDPA.

But so far there have been many obstacles in the way of their doing that.

Senator WALLOP. Does that include us, too? Does that include assistance from the United States?

Mr. SALJOQUE. Your friends, not you.

Senator WALLOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you.

Let me ask Mr. Rubin one question that I think you can answer or you can at least give us an opinion, and maybe someone else will have relevant information also. There are continuous reports of Mujahadeen or some groups of Mujahadeen, who receive support from the United States, involvement in the heroin trade.

Can you give us any substantiation to these reports? Is there any substance to these allegations? We have received intelligence reports that I cannot discuss, but I would like to know what you think.

Mr. RUBIN. Well, I have written basically what I know in my written testimony. First of all, since the Government did not send someone here, I will say what their policy is, which is that we do not provide assistance to anyone whom we know to be involved in the drug trade.

Let us take the two specific cases where I have strong information, although at least in one case not information that would hold up in court. Take Commander Mullah Nasim Akhundzada, the late Commander Nasim who was just assassinated recently, and Hezb-e Islami of Hekmatyar.

In the case of Mullah Nasim, who grows opium poppy in the Helmand Valley, we did stop direct supply of his operation, as far as I know. However, he was still a member in good standing of his party, which we did assist and still assist, and he was the Deputy Defense Minister of the Afghan interim government, which we supported at least until recently as the main legitimate political leadership of Afghanistan.

That is not as bad as it sounds because, in fact, the Defense Ministry did not function.

Second, because he was engaged in the opium trade, of course, he had a lot of money, and there is a market in all of these things. So he could obtain what he needed.

As for Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin, I believe our policy is, although it is classified and I cannot have direct access to it, but it has been reported that our policy now is that nothing that we provide directly goes to him. He has been reported to me by many people as owning a number of opium refineries in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, and in particular in Baluchistan.

Nevertheless, we do not have very good control over what happens to our weapons once they are in warehouses that are controlled by the ISI of Pakistan, but mainly I would say it is not Mujahadeen as a political movement but some individuals and factions who are dealing drugs.

You have to understand that opium has been grown for hundreds of years in Afghanistan, and there has been cross-border trade, what we refer to as smuggling, in the area for as long as we have known about it.

What has happened is, as a result of the war, the same infrastructure that we use to support the Mujahadeen serves very well for opium smuggling. The trucks go up with weapons. They have to come back with something, not always opium, but sometimes, which also explains the involvement of the Pakistani military, in part, in the trade, not officially of course, but some members of that organization.

Chairman DECONCINI. Yes, sir.

Mr. SALJOQUE. In 1973, when I was initially here in Washington, there was Mr. O'Keefe working with the White House, and he was complaining that lots of poppies are cultivated in Afghanistan, and so I said, well, the man in Afghanistan is selling opium for \$50 a pound, and that is sold in the United States for \$1 million a pound. So who is the culprit?

The best thing is, I told him, and it is very easy, go and buy the opium on the fields for \$50 or \$60 a pound and destroy it there. I mean the cultivator is a poor man. He will also be happy, and other hands will be cut off. Nobody listened to me.

Chairman DECONCINI. Well, Mr. Saljooque, I would not listen to you either, quite frankly, because any country that does produce those kind of substances, and not taking away from the responsibility of the United States as the demand the user—we have our own problems—but that is exactly the argument Mexico uses with the United States for not doing something about curtailing drug traffic in their country, and I just do not accept that because I think it is a lot of passing the buck on any responsible government.

Now, here you do not have a responsible government, in my opinion, and my concern on the question was only as to the Mujahadeen. But let me tell you any government that takes an attitude that, "Well, United States, you are the users. You take all of the responsibility," we need to address that. We need to take that responsibility, but no country can, in my judgment, legally go after and permit the growth of those kinds of poppies or the manufac-

ture of cocaine or anything else and say, "Well, you guys are the users." I object to that myself.

I just wanted to put that in the record.

Mr. SALJOQUE. Could I add here something, Mr. Chairman? If you go to (inaudible), everybody has got land, about 10 or 12 square meters, and from his great grandfathers he has cultivated opium.

If we cultivate gold, it might compensate, or silver, but he cannot cultivate gold or silver on this one plot. So the only thing we can compensate for him is opium. What should he do?

Chairman DeCONCINI. Well, how do you explain the success of the U.S. support for a crop substitution program in Turkey during the 1970's? It lost us some money, but the farmers stopped growing opium, and I thought it was a good investment.

I just do not accept that, Mr. Saljoque. I am sorry.

Yes, sir.

Mr. ISBY. Now, there is potential within Afghanistan. Of course, the absence of any non-Kabul authority, of course, prevents the implementation of anti-drugs actions in most of Afghanistan.

Chairman DeCONCINI. Certainly.

Mr. ISBY. I will point out, however, that the opium trade is still painted as non-Islamic in many areas. Certainly it does go on, but I would point out that in northern Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Massoud, the foremost commander, has even banned cigarettes, and opium has very little standing in an Islamic approach.

Therefore, if you do have a situation in which the resistance can make themselves a force on the ground, the Afghan people can act against drugs; I think we should see a freer cooperation. But unfortunately guerrilla warfare rarely breeds cooperation or reasonable approach.

Chairman DeCONCINI. Let me ask two questions, and it may be that your testimony made reference to this, and if it did, excuse me because I had to go to another hearing.

What is the extent of the Soviet advisors' involvement in combat activities today or recently? Do you know?

Mr. ISBY. There seems to be fairly clear and convincing evidence that there has been involvement by Soviet advisors since the withdrawal in February 1989, mainly associated with the use of the SCUD surface-to-surface missiles and the FROG long-range rocket. These first arrived in Afghanistan, in the case of the SCUD, in late 1988. There were no Afghans trained in their uses. The Afghan Army had not had these weapons beforehand, and it stands to reason that the Soviets did, indeed, fire these.

There is evidence from both U.S. Government sources and defectors that this is the way advisors were being used, and now the numbers of advisors were flying combat missions. This has also been reported by advisors, Afghan resistance sources, by U.S. witnesses in northern Afghanistan.

Representative RITTER. By defectors, you mean, not advisors. Defectors.

Mr. ISBY. Yes, defectors.

So there is a good deal of evidence that this practice has gone on since 1989. The number of advisors is reported at 500 to 600 military personnel.

Chairman DeCONCINI. Now?

Mr. ISBY. As of the month of March. Senator Gordon Humphrey used that figure. I think it was current as of March.

So there is some evidence that this is ongoing.

Chairman DeCONCINI. I have no further questions.

Mr. Ritter, do you have any other questions?

Mr. SEKANDER. I have.

Chairman DeCONCINI. Mr. Sekander.

Mr. SEKANDER. I would like to concern this Commission with the fact of, if I may rhetorically ask, why is the operation inside Afghanistan covert? It seems that we cannot really tackle any problems when it is covert, when there is an agency who is funding this, you know, and it is not in the open, and we cannot really deal with the true issues.

I mean it is covert.

Chairman DeCONCINI. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, and I believe Senator Wallop, who served on that committee, will agree, the executive branch may consult the intelligence committees, but it makes the decision about which activities are considered covert and which are not. To me, you can question whether or not this action should continue to be classified as covert. From the standpoint of news coverage, I am no longer certain it should be.

Mr. SEKANDER. Mr. Chairman, that is my point. I mean, we all know what is going on, but we cannot tackle the issues until we put it in an arena where everybody can see it.

Senator WALLOP. Mr. Chairman, if you will, that was the core and basis of my objection to the very public wink statement of Secretary Schultz and the agreement that was created in Geneva, which nobody intended to abide by.

So you have to have, in a sense, the covert. I agree with you. It is the wrong purpose, and the purpose is not well served by the way in which we do it.

Representative RITTER. I think for the longest time it ended up covert because an overt operation would have meant war with the Soviet Union, I guess, on the battlefield of Afghanistan.

Mr. SEKANDER. Aren't we directly fighting the Soviet Union? The Afghans have been used as the strong arm.

Representative RITTER. I am not sure that this is the place to get into this, but we wrestled with this from Angola to Nicaragua to other places in Central American, and Afghanistan, as well, and it is a kind of uneasy truce in a free country that does not seek to make wars any larger than they have to be, to somehow limit them via the use of this covert umbrella.

But these two Senators are far more knowledgeable than I.

Chairman DeCONCINI. If the Congressman would yield, I think the Congressman properly puts it that way. I do not know. I did not make the judgment from when this operation got started, but I believe that what the Congressman has said probably is the reason.

Representative RITTER. You have to declare war if it is not covert.

Chairman DeCONCINI. But nobody has told me because if we were directly sending aid there in an overt manner, then we might have advisors, and then we might have military personnel, and that was something that somebody in the executive branch did not want to do, nor did I, quite frankly. This is the only way they fig-

ured they could do it. It is hardly covert any longer, but it is still considered that.

Representative RITTER. I have a few other questions.

Chairman DeCONCINI. Yes.

Representative RITTER. We keep getting reports of over-flights, bombing over-flights coming from bases in the Soviet Union, of fighter planes coming over. Then we try to dig around, and we do not see the confirmation by so-called national technical means.

Could you tell us something? You are more than military specialists here. Could you tell us something about how come we are getting all of these personal attestations of combat planes coming over the Soviet border, on the one hand, and we are not supposedly picking these up, on the other hand?

Mr. ISBY. Certainly it is a very difficult problem for the technical means. There are obviously fighter planes shuttling back and forth across the border. Whether these are going back to be repaired and refitted, because the Soviets never invested in large scale aircraft maintenance facilities in Afghanistan, or whether they are carrying out combat missions are difficult for national technical means to distinguish.

The Soviet transport aircraft flying the airlift to Kabul are, as the Soviets told a New York Times reporter, military freighters that have been repainted for purpose of the airlift. Therefore, these are military aircraft. They use military radios. The intelligence indicators are very difficult to pick up.

The Afghans and American witnesses claim to have used resistance intelligence to claim this cross-border combat activity is an ongoing process. Certainly we cannot claim this is confirmed, but the amount of evidence, the fact that it has come from several sources, I think, certainly merits this being looked into very, very deeply and very hard.

Representative RITTER. Let me ask—did you have a question or comment?

Mr. SALJOQUE. Yes. On the continuation of Mr. Isby, on the battle of Jalalabad and even our commander saw that these freighters were used. They were just filled with tons and tons of bombs, 60 or 70 tons, and they were used for indiscriminate bombing, and they were used as bombers.

Representative RITTER. And where did they come from?

Mr. SALJOQUE. Directly from the Soviet Union.

Representative RITTER. Directly from the Soviet Union. We have had a lot of reports that those so-called freighters were coming over the border, but they were actually used as high altitude bombers; is that correct?

Mr. SALJOQUE. Yes, and they could bomb for about 1½ continuously, I mean, just circling and bombing because of the amount of the bombs they could carry.

Representative RITTER. Yes. I think it is in line with the State Department's not coming to this hearing today that we are not releasing critical information about Soviet involvement in Afghanistan that I think would show without a shadow of a doubt that the involvement there is far more massive than is reported in the newspaper, and particularly when it comes to what is a repair flight versus a combat mission in the Soviet air situation.

Let me ask one question. What in your minds, each of you in a very brief response, is the best thing that we Americans could do now to get the Soviets to back off from their military commitment to Afghanistan and back off of their support of their puppet regime and allow the Afghan self-determination? What is the most significant thing we could do?

Mr. Isby, do you want to start?

Mr. ISBY. Yes. The United States, should implement perhaps not one thing, but perhaps a 3-track policy. First, on the ground, continued aid for military pressure, for unless there is military pressure on Kabul which requires a robust weapons flow, there is no impetus on the Soviets not to hold out for a military solution.

Second, the United States needs to work with the Afghans, with the regional actors, such as Pakistan, to hopefully get the Afghans to resolve their very real problems, the political designs of other regional actors, in such a way as to present what the Left calls a "united front" that could present an alternative to the regime in Kabul.

And the third track, and I think the one most important to the Congress, is in our relations with the Soviet Union. This is a very important issue. If the cold war has ended, this is now setting the rules for how we are going to deal with the Soviet Union in the post-cold war era in the Third World.

So we need to have a vigorous, strong action. The United States and the Soviet Union, both, have an interest in self-determination in Afghanistan, just as we both had an interest in seeing Honecker go and Ceausescu go, the Stasi and the Securitate go out of business. We both should want to see Najibullah and the WAD also go out of business.

And it is very important for the Congress, in their dealings with the executive branch and in foreign policy, to say it is very important that Afghanistan remain at a high level of the U.S./Soviet dialogue.

Representative RITTER. Thank you.

Mr. SALJOQUE. I must repeat an agreed phrase that we do not like a Communist regime in Afghanistan, and we are fighting, and we are giving our lives for it. Nobody would like what you call a very—what you call a strict, sort of fundamentalist government in Kabul.

But as far as what you call your friends are pushing for that, that makes the Russians more obstinate for having a regime in Kabul, and in an indirect way that is fortifying the Mujahadeen.

Representative RITTER. What is the single most important thing that the United States should do? There may be three things, as Mr. Isby pointed out, but what should we do in order to stimulate the Soviet's withdrawal and allowance of self-determination in Afghanistan?

Mr. SALJOQUE. Well, it is your own direct talks with the Soviet Union because we cannot be a party to that because we are a party in conflict, I mean. You have many more chances with the Soviet Union.

But as concerns Afghanistan, I think the best thing would be to ask what you all alien powers to refrain from interfering into Af-

ghanistan, and once that is settled, then I think the attitude of the Soviet Union might get much more soft.

But let me say that pressure should be there. I mean that is a must.

Mr. SEKANDER. I agree. I think the fragmentary approach that the United States, Pakistan and other assistance providing nations have taken for the Afghan people is creating an environment where the Afghans cannot cooperate with each other because they have got other interests to look up to.

I think what we need—

Representative RITTER. I have got to differ with you. I mean to blame Afghanistan's tribal fragmentation on the outside forces, I think, is a bit much. I think they probably feed off one another, and that makes the problem of removal of the so-called interferences far more difficult.

It would be nice to do what you would like to do, to put this unified council together, but you know, it is not necessarily—we can work towards that, but it is not in the cards for tomorrow.

Mr. SEKANDER. Well, I think that is the solution, to be truthful, because right now, you know, all of these nations pressuring the Soviet Union individually, they just shrug if off, you know.

But if a concerted and unified and strong economically, you know, I think like a little NATO, I think it will prove to the Soviet Union that the world is interested in a resolution towards this major, major dilemma that I am feeling every day, that I am sure every other Afghan in this world is feeling every single day.

We need an end to this debauchery on the part of the Soviet Union, and I think this Commission has the powers and the influence to be able to implement a program where a unified body that I have suggested could be initiated to resolve it.

If we could just get together and pressure the Soviet Union that way, we could do it and maintain the pressure that we are using right now and the assistance. But if we can coordinate the assistance, I think we will reduce, and as an Afghan I can tell you we can reduce, the factionalization.

Mr. RUBIN. I do not believe that the Soviet effort today is taking place because the Soviets are determined to maintain a Communist regime in Afghanistan, anymore than they are determined to maintain Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

Representative RITTER. Or Cuba, for example?

Mr. RUBIN. Well, I believe they are cutting back on their aid to Cuba.

I believe that the reason that they are doing it is for something like Mr. Saljooque said, because they are afraid of a fundamentalist regime coming to power with the aid of Saudi, Pakistani and perhaps American intelligence services.

For this reason, I think that emphasizing elections, and I do not mean secret ballot for individuals, but some form of representative method, in Afghanistan suits our interests because we could be confident that the Communists will not win—

Representative RITTER. That reasoning, by the way, Dr. Rubin, would indicate that somehow the Soviets were more satisfied with the Shah of Iran in deep military alliance with the United States than they are with Ayatollahs who hate the United States and co-

operate with them to a far greater degree than the average American understands.

Mr. RUBIN. Well, the Soviets were much happier with the regime of Zaher Shah in Afghanistan and the relationship they had with Afghanistan at that time than they are with the relationship they have with Afghanistan today. Certainly the current Soviet regime is.

I do not even know if they believe that they can have that good a relationship with the future government of Afghanistan for a long time, but if they could, I believe they would be quite pleased.

But I think we could be confident the Communists could not win in such a representative process, and the Soviets can be confident, as Mr. Saljooque said, that the fundamentalists would not win in such a representative process.

I think the important thing is to indicate to them that we are interested in elections, if they are willing to make the moves to allow elections to be free; continue the military pressure until such time as they are; and indicate to them clearly that we are willing, in the context of such an agreement, to stop supporting our side, if they stop supporting their side; and in particular, to put pressure on our regional friends to stop supporting the forces that make them most fearful.

Representative RITTER. And you say that in the context of a Najibullah regime stepping down or stepping aside, do you not?

Mr. RUBIN. Certainly.

Mr. SALJOOQUE. Well, I am telling you something real practical, which I was not wrong about a month ago when a high ranking political officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Mr. Nagafi, who was the head of the Afghanistan, India and Pakistan desk. He told me that, well, if Saudi Arabia is trying to install a Wahabi government in Afghanistan, it will never sit quiet. We are never interfering in your affairs, but after this, we are going to interfere.

And then he said, "I will tell you one thing very clearly, that when it comes to a Wahabi government in Afghanistan in comparison to Najibullah, then we have to reconsider the whole matter."

Representative RITTER. This shows that things are not totally simple when it comes to the future of Afghanistan, but I think we all agree that elections that are truly free and fair and not dominated by anyone, either the Najib government or whomever, is what we should shoot for.

I think if the article today in the New York Times, and it was Robert Pear, not Michael Resby, is any indication, we might be moving in that direction.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding these hearings.

Chairman DeCONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Ritter.

Thank you, gentlemen, very much for your fine testimony. The Commission will stand in recess, subject to call of the chair.

[Whereupon, the Commission was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]