

The Situation in Cyprus



December 4, 2001

Briefing of the
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ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. As of January 1, 1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The membership of the OSCE has expanded to 55 participating States, reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.

The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of the participating States' permanent representatives are held. In addition, specialized seminars and meetings are convened in various locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government.

Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the fields of military security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian concerns, the Organization is primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage and resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The Organization deploys more than 20 missions and field activities located in Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The website of the OSCE is: <www.osce.org>.

ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage compliance by the participating States with their OSCE commitments, with a particular emphasis on human rights.

The Commission consists of nine members from the United States Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. The positions of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the Senate and House every two years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff assists the Commissioners in their work.

In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports that reflect the views of Members of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing details about the activities of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating States.

The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of U.S. policy regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the Commission have regular contact with parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and private individuals from participating States. The website of the Commission is: <www.csce.gov>.

THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 2001

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THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 2001

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
WASHINGTON, DC

The briefing was held at 10:09 a.m. in Room 340, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, DC, Ronald J. McNamara, Chief of Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, moderating.

Witness present: Ambassador Thomas G. Weston, United States Special Coordinator for Cyprus.

Mr. McNAMARA. Good morning. My name is Ron McNamara. I'm serving as the Chief of Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation and Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission.

We're very pleased this morning to have the point person in Washington on developments in Cyprus with us. By way of background, several months ago, our Chairman, Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, had some meetings and thought that it might be good for the Commission to focus on developments in Cyprus in the form of a briefing such as the one that we're convening today.

Little did we anticipate the particular timeliness of the event even as recently as a few weeks ago.

The nation of Cyprus was an original participating State in the then-Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, now known as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. We have a brochure that gives a brief description of the OSCE process, and if one looks at the Final Act's Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between participating States, you see that many of those 10 Principles are applicable to the situation on Cyprus although that situation on the island-nation certainly predates the 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act.

Back in January of 1998, I visited Cyprus for the first time as part of a delegation of Members of our Commission. There were four Commissioners present, and about half the delegation had never visited Cyprus. It was their first trip, including mine.

One thing that, during our brief stay, struck me, is really what I would term the human dimension of this long-standing conflict. One might even call it a frozen conflict, and it is one that the United Nations, as opposed to the OSCE, has really taken on board through the deployment of significant numbers of U.N. peacekeeping forces and long-standing efforts by the U.N. to broker discussions in terms of a resolution of the impasse.

Nevertheless, again, the thing that struck me very much was the human dimension of this conflict. For those who may be too young to recall the mid-1970s, a walk down the Green Line certainly is a very powerful experience. I can recall rifle emplacements that were closer to one another than the span of my arms outstretched.

So you can get some appreciation of the tensions in that environment. Again, our focus is on the human dimension at the Commission, and in that regard, in several OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meetings dealing with human contacts issues and other human rights issues, the human dimension on Cyprus has come up, particularly questions regarding freedom of movement and other basic human rights.

We have the unique situation on Cyprus of enclaves of individuals who are effectively living in islands within an island nation that we are here to discuss today.

So it's my pleasure to introduce Ambassador Thomas G. Weston, who has, since August 1999, served as the Special Coordinator for Cyprus. He is a Career Foreign Service Officer and has been a member of the U.S. Foreign Service since 1969.

During 1996 and 1997, he was Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., to Canada. Before going to Ottawa in June 1996, he was Director of Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

Prior to that, Ambassador Weston served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs responsible for multilateral diplomacy with Europe, including the U.S. participation in NATO, the OSCE, and the OECD and U.S. relations with European Union and the Council of Europe as part of his responsibilities.

He has also served as the Chargé and Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Mission to the European Communities.

During much of his career, Ambassador Weston specialized in German affairs, serving in Bonn, in Bremen, and in the Office of Central European Affairs in the Department of State.

He has also served in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs at the Department of State, both in the Office of Congressional Relations and in the Office of the Under Secretary for Management.

With that brief introduction, we're very pleased to welcome Ambassador Weston here.

There will be a transcription of the proceedings, as is the case with all of our briefings, and at the conclusion of the Ambassador's remarks, we'll be happy to entertain questions from the floor.

We would ask that individuals identify themselves and any affiliation that they may have. If you could, come forward and I will make the microphone available for your questions to the Ambassador.

Thank you, Ambassador.

Amb. WESTON. Thank you, Ron.

It's a real pleasure to be here. As you noted in my biography, I have spent a lot of time working on multilateral diplomacy with Europe, including with the OSCE and in the formation of this Commission many years ago, in the late 1970s, but this is the first time I have been here for a meeting of the Commission to talk about Cyprus as opposed to all the other things.

I have spent a lot of time talking about Germany in this format over the years as well. So it's a real pleasure to be here.

I see an awful lot of familiar faces out there, many folks that I know have much expertise and knowledge, not to mention opinions, on the Cyprus issue. But I see many new faces as well. So I'm not sure if we're all going to be dealing with the same body of information and facts.

So what I'd like to do is to start with the announcement made today in Nicosia, but then go back a couple of years and talk about how I think we got there, go to where I think we're going, and then have the discussion which you suggested with the members here.

For those of you who have not heard yet, there was an announcement made by Alvaro de Soto, the U.N. Secretary General's Special Advisor on Cyprus, in Nicosia this morning after the first direct meeting between the two community leaders in 4 years, which announced—well, if you haven't seen it, I can just read it to you:

“De Soto said that at the meeting held today, 4 December 2001, between His Excellency, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot leader, and His Excellency Mr. Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader at the residence of the U.N. Chief of Mission and in the presence of Mr. Alvaro de Soto, the Special Advisor to the U.N. Secretary General on Cyprus, the two leaders agreed to the following:

- That the Secretary General, in the exercise of his mission of good offices, will invite the two leaders to direct talks;
- That these talks will be held in Cyprus starting in mid-January 2002 on United Nations premises;
- That there will be no preconditions;
- That all issues will be on the table;
- That they will continue to negotiate in good faith until a comprehensive settlement is achieved, and nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed.”

This obviously represents a major step forward in what we've been trying to do. I know there will be questions about it, which I will welcome, but let me try and put this in a little bit of context.

Obviously efforts to settle the Cyprus problem have been going on a long, long time, and we can date that from '74. We can date it from '63. We can date it from the mid-1950s. Take your pick.

Nevertheless, this most recent effort to solve the Cyprus problem was undertaken in the spring of 1999 because there was a view on our part and of many other nations and organizations interested in this question that the prospect of integration of the Eastern Mediterranean into the wider institutions of Europe, in particular the European Union, presented a new opportunity to, if you will, solve the division of the island.

That opportunity was pursued initially through the G-8 in a call in spring of 1999 for negotiations to get a settlement in which, if you will refer to that language in the spring of 1999 by the G-8, find a surprising similarity of language to what I've just read to you agreed today in Nicosia.

So I think what you're seeing here is a culmination of a long effort rather than something which just came out of the blue.

That call for negotiations, endorsed by the Security Council of the United Nations in June 1999 led to the commencement of something called proximity talks in the late fall of 1999, closely associated with the European Council at Helsinki, which actually took some decisions on the integration of the Eastern Mediterranean into the European Union.

Those were proximity talks and designed to prepare the ground for negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement. That was the actual language because at that point we

could not achieve agreement to go directly to direct talks on the substance of a settlement, as opposed to only preparing the ground.

Now, that was interpreted in different ways by different people, and many of you know the background of that. So I will not go into the detail unless you want to ask questions.

Nevertheless, those proximity talks did start, and basically went through five different sessions between New York and Geneva, culminating in some statements, in the delivery of remarks and various other methodologies which put forward a great deal of substance on what a comprehensive settlement might be in this process.

Whether because of those remarks or other factors, during the fifth session of talks there was a move by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktash, endorsed by Turkey, to interrupt this process. That took place in November 2000.

Since November 2000, we have been engaged in an effort to restart talks. We were engaged in an effort to restart the proximity talks, but that has obviously evolved into something else.

We thought that we were on the edge of restarting this whole process back in early September, but some other things intervened, including some actions on the Turkish side, and September 11th intervened and created all kinds of difficulties of a logistical nature in even doing what we were trying to do.

But we continued with our efforts, and by "we," I mean the United States obviously. That's whom I speak for, but the United Nations and many others interested in the Cyprus question also, most particularly the European Union and its member states.

At any rate, we went through a series of actions in this process which in one way or another culminated in an exchange between the two leaders suggesting direct talks.

I should make very clear that the suggestion for direct talks did come from the Turkish Cypriot leader, and I think that needs to be acknowledged, that now that suggestion for direct talks seems to have resulted in a very positive development, that is, direct talks on substance coming up. I think it's important to remember who actually suggested it and give credit where credit is due.

Okay. We now have this meeting which took place this morning. We, the United States, welcome this development in the strongest possible terms. I think it puts the whole process on a far more positive, optimistic track than we have seen in many, many years.

I think both leaders are to be commended for agreeing to these direct talks. I think the efforts of all others who have been pushing in this direction, including Greece and Turkey, but all others, are also to be strongly commended.

I think the efforts of the U.N., the Secretary General, his direct involvement in this process repeatedly over the last 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ years and the excellent work done by his Special Advisor in getting us to this point, all are to be commended.

What can we expect to come from the process is obviously the key. I think the fact that these two leaders have agreed to go to direct talks under these circumstances, with no preconditions, all issues on the table, and with a commitment to continue to negotiate in good faith until a comprehensive settlement is achieved, are very dramatic indications of a willingness by both leaders to actually try and get a comprehensive settlement in the short period of time we have available before Cyprus accedes to the European Union.

I do not believe that this should be underestimated in any way in terms of what it indicates about the willingness of these two leaders to move forward.

Will that lead to a comprehensive settlement in time to permit a unified Cyprus in the European Union at an early date? I can't answer that now, but I am certainly much more hopeful that can be achieved, and I think what this indicates if these two leaders are willing to make these efforts, it is incumbent on all of us interested in a just and durable settlement of the Cyprus problem to redouble our efforts in support of this effort to get a comprehensive settlement in that time.

I could go on to a long discussion of the timing and European Union membership and all of that sort of thing, but I think because of the obvious level of knowledge that many you have about this issue, I think it would probably be best if I limited my opening remarks to those I have just made and go to your questions.

Mr. McNAMARA. Thank you, Ambassador.

I have a question. Our Commission's delegation to Cyprus arrived in January of 1998. It was shortly after the EU had extended basically a preliminary invitation to Cyprus in terms of possible future membership.

One immediate fallout from that was the interruption of a program that the United States had been very instrumental in promoting, and again, with our natural orientation toward the human dimension, the U.S. had funded and facilitated actual contacts, direct contacts, if you will, between average Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish leader, Mr. Denktash, immediately put a freeze on those contacts.

I know that is just part of the effort that the United States has had over the long haul, if you will, to try to provide some assistance and to actually provide some way of bringing the parties, not only the political parties or leadership, but average citizen together and have an impact in that sense.

I wondered if you could just briefly discuss U.S. assistance and those kinds of contacts, and where do things stand on that level?

Amb. WESTON. Sure. Well, you mentioned a freeze, and you are talking about following the Luxembourg European Council decision on Cyprus in December of '97, and whether "freeze" is the appropriate word or not we can dispute.

Mr. McNAMARA. Please.

Amb. WESTON. But there was certainly a slowing of activity in bicomunal programs, not only those supported by the United States, but those fostered by a whole series of other people in response to that activity. It was not a complete freeze, but there was certainly a slowing, a much greater wariness about these things.

Since 1998, we and others have continued to make efforts to foster bicomunal programs and bicomunal projects, but we have run into a very wary attitude on the part of the Turkish Cypriots. We have run into some wariness on the part of Greek Cypriots as well, which relates more to the status issue, that is, Turkish Cypriot insistence, frequent insistence, that these programs can only be done through "Turkish Cypriot governmental" (in quotes since you're reporting this) institutions, which of course is a status problem for the Government of Cyprus. So they have been very difficult.

That being said, there has been some success in bicomunal programs and projects. The most successful ones, I think, over time have related to the educational sector at all levels. In the last year-and-a-half, there has been a Seeds of Peace bicomunal program for high school students. You are probably aware of the major Fulbright program that we have going on there. There are a lot of bicomunal programs in the educational sector.

There have been others in other sectors, as well. The most recent major agreement accomplished was on the restoration and maintenance of cultural sites on the two sides,

Apostolos Andreas Monastery in the north and Hala Sultan Tekke in Larnaca, which we hope to expand into a wider bicomunal project.

Another one underway now relates to mapping water resources on the island to create a common database.

So there are things going on. I think the United States' involvement in these programs and projects is extremely important and of increasing importance because, absent these programs, there has been so little contact in almost a generation now between, you know, Mr. Smith on the streets of Kyrenia or Limassol.

So they are of great importance, and they are things that we will continue to support.

I should mention because we are on the Hill that these programs have been received extremely favorably on the Hill. You know, I work in the executive branch and have been working for years trying to get funding for one thing or another, and the one thing which we have enjoyed great, great support for are funding for these sorts of programs on the Hill, and for that I, as a Special Coordinator for Cyprus and as a representative of the executive branch, am very grateful.

But there are a lot of things going forward. I have talked about a couple of them from the U.S. point of view. There are others being pursued by other organizations and nations. It's very important.

Mr. McNAMARA. I'm pleased to note that Congressman Ben Gilman from New York has joined us and certainly I would invite him if he has any remarks that he would like to make either orally or for the record.

Mr. GILMAN. I am here to listen and to learn.

Mr. McNAMARA. Well, thanks a lot for joining us.

Mr. Gilman is a long-standing friend of the Commission, I should note. Even though he is not a member formally of the Commission, I remember meeting the Congressman back in the 1980s when we were dealing with Soviet Jewry issues and other human rights issues in Eastern Europe. So welcome.

At this point then we will open the discussion to the floor, and again, those who have questions, please come forward, indicate your name and any affiliation, and direct your question to Ambassador Weston, please.

Thank you.

Amb. WESTON. I've answered all of the questions.

Mr. McNAMARA. Oh, I know there will be questions.

QUESTIONER. Hi, Ambassador Weston.

Mr. McNAMARA. Hi, Christy.

QUESTIONER. Good morning. I'm Christy Stefadouros. I work for Chairman Bilirakis.

Mr. Weston, Chairman Bilirakis has legislation that he has introduced, a resolution that expresses support for Cyprus' accession into the EU. My question is how timely do you think that this legislation is, and how important do you think it is that it passes the House and possibly the Senate?

Amb. WESTON. Well, we have talked about this a lot. As you know, the United States has consistently supported the entry of Cyprus into the EU, and although we are not actually a decision maker on that, not being a member of the EU, we have supported that, and we have noted Cyprus' progress towards membership.

It is now in the front—well, it has accomplished the most in terms of preparing for membership and having closed, 23 of 29 chapters is obviously better prepared economi-

cally for meeting that key factor of being able to perform competitively within the EU than any other candidate member.

So we expect, even though it's not our decision, early accession of Cyprus to the EU, and as I say, it is something that we have consistently supported.

We have also, of course, consistently supported a comprehensive settlement and believe that accession to the EU should be of a united island, that is, with the division of the island having been settled.

We now think that we have a chance of accomplishing that, and that's what I work on every day.

I think we now have a much greater chance of accomplishing that than would have been my view yesterday. So I think that we should be concentrating our efforts on doing whatever we can to make this effort successful in direct talks.

I think that is best accomplished by the sort of support that the United States—and by the United States I mean not only the executive branch, but the Congress—has extended to the good offices mission of the Secretary General. I think that's where we should concentrate our efforts, and that's where we should be pushing to make this successful.

QUESTIONER. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Mr. GILMAN. I'm sorry I didn't hear your opening remarks.

Mr. McNAMARA. Here, why do not you take a seat?

Mr. GILMAN. No, no. I have been sitting too long today.

Ambassador, welcome, and it is good to know that you're working continually on this issue.

In the past we've found that while there was a tentative agreement between Mr. Denktash and Mr. Clerides, when Denktash would go back to Turkey, he would find a great deal of resistance in the military, and over the years I've urged that we should be spending a lot more time trying to convince the Turkish military of the need to resolve this issue.

Can you comment on whether or not we have made any advances with the military and what your contacts may have been with the military leadership in Turkey?

Amb. WESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You see old habits die hard.

You're absolutely right in pointing out the crucial role of the military—the Turkish military—in dealing with the Cyprus issue. Obviously there are more than 30,000 Turkish troops on the island of Cyprus. Cyprus is seen very much as a security issue by many circles, including the military in Turkey. So it's very important.

What I would say is that we're meeting on a day in which we have had a really exceptionally positive development, which is this agreement to direct talks with all of the provisions that I've outlined, but you may not have heard that there are talks without preconditions, with a commitment to negotiate until reaching a settlement by the two leaders announced today in Nicosia.

That statement was immediately very warmly endorsed and supported by Turkey, the Government of Turkey. I'm not sure if I even have that with me. Oh, yeah, I actually have it with me. I could read it if necessary, but it's a very warm, strong endorsement looking toward this resulting in a comprehensive settlement.

I think for those of us who have spent a lot of time dealing with the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean this would not be so warmly endorsed and supported by the Government of Turkey if it were not strongly supported by all elements in Turkey, including the military.

So I read this strong endorsement by the Government of Turkey of this decision is also very positive in terms of your question.

QUESTIONER. Good morning, Mr. Ambassador. I'm John Sitalides with the Western Policy Center.

I'd like to note that on my way here, I also picked up a bit of information on the talks. I believe that Clerides and Denktash will meet tomorrow night for dinner at Denktash's home in the north, and it will be the first time in I do not know how many years that a Greek Cypriot official has crossed into the Turkish zone.

Amb. WESTON. It has never happened before at the presidential level, nor has it happened at ministerial levels. So it's unprecedented.

QUESTIONER. A little bit more good news.

In my personal opinion, it is not a surprise that today's good news comes a day after an announcement that there has been, it seems, a compromise reached between the EU and Turkey on ESDP, and I'm wondering if in the year ahead you mentioned the EU accession process for Cyprus. I'm wondering how the State Department and the U.N. officials view EU-Turkey relations and the progress that might take place in that relationship is impacting the talks on Cyprus.

Thank you.

Amb. WESTON. Well, John, you have, as usual, identified a crucial issue, and it is very significant that we have made progress on both of these issues right now because of what it indicates both in terms of possibilities between Turkey and the EU, as well as inclinations in Turkey vis-à-vis the EU. I'm sure you know, but maybe not everyone does, that just as we support Cypriot accession to the EU, the United States has long supported Turkish accession to the EU, and I think both of these developments are very positive in support of that policy.

Although I do not underestimate the difficulties ahead, when I look at the total picture of Turkish-EU relations, of which Turkish-Greek relations are a not unimportant component, and I think this total relationship has probably been best described in the Commission report of November 13, which has just been published and is available. It gives a kind of unvarnished EU point of view on what that relationship is.

There's a lot to do. There's a lot of work ahead, but the signs—on the two issues you mentioned, but also internally—in Turkey are positive. So, as always, I am optimistic.

Good morning. An old friend from New York.

QUESTIONER. Wayne Merry from the American Foreign Policy Council.

I'd like your comments on two aspects of the relationship with the European Union to the Cyprus issue. First, when Cyprus first became an issue in the early 1960s, it was taken on by the United Nations not as a European issue, but really as a decolonization problem. It was, in fact, at that time, not even in the European Bureau of the State Department. It was in the Near Eastern Bureau.

Both the United Nations and the United States have devoted a great deal of diplomatic effort and time to this issue, but as the European Union increasingly comes to dominate both political and economic aspects of life on Cyprus, I'm wondering what you see as the potential for New York and Washington to be in whole or in part relieved of the diplomatic responsibility for long-term pursuit of Cyprus issue, which is obviously not just a matter of a piece of paper, but a long-term implementation.

Second, this is the first time that a country has negotiated the *Acquis Communautaire* of the European Union while not exercising full sovereignty over its own territory or

population, and there are questions that have been raised in Europe as to the legitimacy of a state becoming a state party to the Treaty of Rome when it does not exercise full sovereignty over either its territory or population and whether that potentially comes into violation with aspects of the European human rights code.

I would welcome your comments on that.

Amb. WESTON. Well, on the first point, although the European Union role on Cyprus, as you pointed out, is increasing rather than decreasing, the European Union role in Turkey is doing the same thing. That's inevitable when you're moving toward membership in these organizations.

That being said, I have to tell you from direct experience over the last couple of years—and that goes through periods of great acceleration in the EU role, including the Helsinki Council decisions, as well as those of Nice that I have seen no diminution in necessity of a strong U.N. role, and whether it was started in an atmosphere of decolonization or not, it has obviously evolved and is now, I believe, still the only process in which both side posit confidence.

I also have seen no diminution whatsoever in the necessity of a very strong role by the United States, and that relates to a lot of different things, including that we're also not a member state of the European Union, which puts us in the same position as other non-members, although we're not a candidate or an accession country either.

The necessity of a strong diplomatic role in support of a comprehensive settlement and, in particular, in support of the good offices mission has not changed or become smaller at all.

On your other point about Cyprus not—you phrased it—not exercising full sovereignty. I think the Government of Cyprus might disagree with that phraseology, but they obviously do not technically control part of the territory.

I have spent a lot of my life dealing with the EU, and one thing that has always astonished me is the ability of the European Communities and then the European Union to make the necessary adjustments to deal with whatever unusual situations it has to deal with.

I would mention the case of Germany. You know, Germany was one of the founding members of the Coal and Steel Community. As a divided country with a second country recognized by a lot more folks than recognized northern Cyprus and was able to deal with that in terms of the European Steel Community, then EURATOM, then the European Common Market, and then the European Union, up to and including the point of the unification of the two states.

I mean, I know from your background that you know about this and how it was done, but it is a good illustration of the adaptability of the European Union to these various things.

I think that I should point out though that there have been some very significant statements made recently by the European Union on how to deal with the problem that you're referring to. The most recent that I've heard directly was of the Commission President, Romano Prodi to the parliament of Cyprus. (I do not remember the exact date. It was about 4 or 5 weeks ago. I always look at my colleague Jim Seevers for help on dates).

He started saying Cyprus is going to join the European Union, but he also pointed out that the European Union would not find it a problem of adapting that accession to the requirements of a comprehensive settlement.

He specifically pointed out that it would be able to adapt to the requirements of the settlement in the security field and in the field of what we have come to call the “three freedoms.” He didn’t use that term, but this is property settlement and free movement of people. That adaptation was possible, and he pointed that out.

So I am, I think, less concerned about that aspect of the problem than your question poses.

Mr. McNAMARA. I shall take advantage to ask a somewhat related question, picking up on Wayne’s question.

When the Commission delegation visited Cyprus in January 1998, one of the possible prescriptions, if you will, that was presented when we were in Nicosia was, well, perhaps the solution might be the deployment of a sizable number of U.S. forces on the island, and certainly that was a prescription that didn’t seem to resonate very well with delegation participants.

But the question of implementation, now obviously there have been many notions in terms of what an agreement on Cyprus might look like, but I wondered if you could address the question of the likely role of the United States or what the United States is willing to do in terms of implementation of an agreement on Cyprus.

Amb. WESTON. Well—

Mr. McNAMARA. Realizing again that it’s somewhat theoretical, but I’m sure it’s something that the Department has given consideration to.

Amb. WESTON. Well, it’s hypothetical. You know, obviously you can’t answer the question without knowing what the contents of the settlement are, which is something which has to be agreed between these two gentlemen. So I can’t answer the question directly.

What I can say is we do have a lot of evidence here. UNFICYP has been on the island since 1963, which is the U.N. peacekeeping force. Now its role has obviously evolved and changed and so on and so forth, but you know, you’ve got a history now of whatever that is, 38 years of the U.N. peacekeeping mission on the island, and that has obviously been something which has been supported by the United States as a member of the Security Council.

We’re voting for its renewal every 6 months and have been doing that since 1963 and are about to do that again in the next couple of weeks. The Congress has appropriated the necessary funds for its support throughout that whole period of time.

I think you can only conclude from that that the United States is very willing to do what is necessary to foster a settlement on the island, and to assure that the settlement one reaches is maintained.

But it’s obviously impossible to answer directly your question without knowing what the settlement is.

Mr. McNAMARA. Okay. Well, thank you.

Amb. WESTON. Thank you.

Mr. McNAMARA. Are there any further questions?

(No response.)

Mr. McNAMARA. If not, then we are, again, very appreciative of the Ambassador taking his time out to come before the Commission in this public briefing.

I would encourage those who are interested in issues on Cyprus, but also elsewhere in the OSCE region to visit the Commission’s web site, which is www.csce.gov. There’s a

considerable archive of information available on developments in the OSCE region, and we thank you for coming today.

Amb. WESTON. Thank you, Ron.

[Whereupon, at 10:53 a.m., the briefing was concluded.]

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