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THE CONFLICT IN YUGOSLAVIA

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THE CONFLICT IN YUGOSLAVIA


COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Washington, DC.

The Commission met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in room 628, Dirksen Senate Office Building; Hon. Steny H. Hoyer [Chairman of the Commission] presiding.

Present: Representatives Hoyer, Smith, Wolf, Senators DeConcini, D'Amato, and Craig.

Also present: Representative Bentley.

Staff present: Sam Wise, Staff Director; Mary Sue Hafner, Deputy Staff Director; Jane Fisher, Deputy Staff Director; Robert Hand and Mike Amitay, Staff Assistants.

Chairman Hoyer. The hearing of the Helsinki Commission will come to order. Today's hearing of the Helsinki Commission will focus on the conflict in Yugoslavia and the efforts of the United States, the European Community, and the CSCE process to bring that conflict to an end.

We hear many confusing and contradictory reports on the fighting in Yugoslavia. We hear of new cease fires, followed by reports of continued fighting and an exchange of accusations regarding who was the first violator. We hear reports of atrocities by both sides of the conflict.

A few things, however are clear. First, people are dying, leaving and losing their homes and watching the world around them collapse into chaos and destruction.

Second, the rest of the world has condemned the violent course that has been taken in Yugoslavia and those responsible for it.

Third, the European Community with a CSCE mandate, has offered its assistance in restoring the peace and its office to mediate the dispute.

Fourth, despite these international efforts and the willingness of most of the republics to cooperate, peace seems more distant than ever.

Finally, while there is clearly fault to be found in the actions of practically all of the disputing parties, the government of President Milosevic in Serbia and its apparent ally in the Yugoslav Army stand out for their preference for force and repression instead of genuine dialogue to solve what may be legitimate concerns, from the rights of Serbs in Croatia to the aspirations of Albanians in Kosovo.

The crisis in Yugoslavia comes at a time when relationships between European states are rapidly changing. This is visible in efforts to enhance the Helsinki process and the higher expectations
its Member States have for it in resolving the problems of a Europe in transformation. The CSCE meeting schedule has been regularized, institutions have been created and mechanisms have been established to respond to emergencies and other events of concern. Yugoslavia is the first real challenge for the new, enhanced CSCE in many respects. The mechanism for addressing Unusual Military Activities has been invoked by three of Yugoslavia’s neighbors as I understand. Four emergency meetings of the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials have been held in Prague. I had the opportunity of briefly discussing one of those with Jack Maresca when I was with him in Vienna some weeks ago. At a regularly scheduled meeting of the Committee last week, it was agreed that the CSCE would establish a Mission to Yugoslavia to examine human rights violations. These efforts have supported and complemented the efforts of Lord Carrington and the EC peace conference in The Hague, as well as United Nations efforts.

The purpose of today’s hearing is to bring greater clarity to the situation in Yugoslavia, and to discuss the effectiveness of the international response to date, especially in the CSCE, and how that response could be made more effective. The Commission had invited the head of the EC Monitoring Mission in Yugoslavia, Dutch Ambassador van Houten, to appear before us today. The Ambassador could have answered many questions in her opinion, regarding what is happening in the field in Yugoslavia. He agreed and was on his way but, unfortunately, the distressing situation around Dubrovnik in Croatia forced him to return to Yugoslavia from The Hague just recently. Hopefully, he will be able to come to the United States in the near future so that we can hear his views sometime.

We do, however, have two important witnesses today. First, Ralph Johnson, who is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs at the Department of State who will discuss U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia, both bilaterally and in the context of EC and CSCE diplomacy. A career Foreign Service Secretary Johnson served overseas in Guyana, Poland and Bolivia. He also served in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and at the Department held various positions in the Bureaus of Economic and Business Affairs and European and Canadian Affairs prior to becoming Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in July of this year.

Our second witness, Dr. John Lampe, is Director of East European Studies at The Wilson Center and Professor of History at the University of Maryland in College Park. By definition, a professor at the University of Maryland is a distinguished scholar before this panel. I knew all of you would understand that. A well-known and respected scholar, Dr. Lampe is particularly well versed in Balkan affairs. He has recently visited Yugoslavia and will give his assessment of the situation there, and comment as well on policy options before us.

Mr. Secretary, we’re pleased to have you with us and if you will allow us, I want to recognize my three colleagues for such brief opening statements they would like to make and then we would look forward to hearing from you.
personally believe there's been a failure on the part of the Administration not to have President Bush speak out earlier than even now.

But the fact that it hasn't been done up to this date, it's still not too late. And in speaking out—and it should not be by the State Department Spokesman, Mr. Boucher but by the President himself, making the point that there should be an immediate cease-fire, the Yugoslav Army should return to the barracks, and also to speak out and make sure that the Croatian government respects the right of the 600,000 Serbs that live in Croatia.

But I believe that unless our government directly, vocally speaks out and makes clear that there will be repercussions if these things don't take place I think the killing will continue. It would have been better had the President spoken out and the Administration had been more forceful. I think, in the first week of September, the second week of September or the first week of October but it's now the first week of November and now is the time to speak out because the longer you wait I think the more people will be killed. And just because we're not guaranteeing that it won't work isn't a good enough reason not to do it. But I thank you, Mr. Chairman for the hearing.

Chairman HOVER. Thank you, Mr. Wolf. Next I'd like to introduce somebody who is not a member of the Commission but who has been working very hard with the Commission and whose contributions have been very valuable. She is probably as knowledgeable as anybody in the Congress with respect to Yugoslavia, no one doubts the views of Congresswoman Bentley. She has very strong views on this issue—not least because of the depth of her knowledge. Congresswoman Bentley, we are pleased that you could join us today.

Ms. BENTLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my colleague from Maryland. I ask unanimous consent to have a formal statement entered into the record.

Chairman HOVER. Without objection.

Thank you, Mrs. Bentley. Next I'd like to recognize Senator Al D'Amato from New York. Senator D'Amato is the ranking Republican member of the Commission, a former Chairman of the Commission and somebody who has worked untiringly on behalf of the Commission and on behalf of human rights Senator D'Amato.

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, thank you and I'm anxious to hear from the witnesses. But let me, if I might, attempt to spell out what I think has become rather obvious. It's rather obvious that there are vast areas of territory that are within the borders of the republic of Croatia, which are under unprovoked attack, attack launched by the Serbian controlled Yugoslav Federal Army.

Now this is not simply an observation that I make from the Capitol of the United States. This is an observation that has been reported repeatedly by the United Nations, by human rights groups, by Lord Carrington, and by the European Community. Many of those people do not have any partisanship for one side or the other. They are advisors and observers from the UN and the international community.

It should not be a matter of supporting Serbs over Croats, or Croats over Serbs. This comes down to the simple fact that what we have here are repeated unprovoked attacks by the federal government, by Milosevic, by his generals against innocent civilians. The city of Dubrovnik, which is of no military consequence whatsoever, doesn't even have a military, has been under constant bombardment and siege. This is a fact.

I think that our own handling of this matter, I'm now talking about the U.S. State Department, has been an abysmal failure. What we have done over an extended, protracted period of time has been to appease Milosevic. We have chosen to appease in an effort to keep Yugoslavia in one piece. But this time has passed. There is a civil war under way. Our policy is backward and has put the sword in the hand of Milosevic. It's reprehensible.

I'm not suggesting that we have to commit troops or force of arms. But I do believe that we must take the leadership in an economic embargo. I am suggesting that long ago we should have cut off the things that make a military run. We should at least see to it that the European communities and others cut off fuel. So that they can't run those tanks and those planes indefinitely.

I am suggesting that we work to bring about a real embargo that relates to munitions and weapons, etc. And see to it that this weapons embargo is enforced. I don't understand who that would prejudice. Certainly, a cessation of the arms and the hostilities that take place in this area would not prejudice Serbians or Croats.

I think they're being used. They're being used by a hardcore Communist. That's exactly what Milosevic is. A man who, under the guise of nationalism, has brought about this absolute rape and pillage of the people of Croatia. And that doesn't mean that there may not be some people who, as the good Congresswoman has indicated, may be outside the pale of the law, who are Croatian, who are killers, who are any of these things, but let's not deceive ourselves. What you see taking place is nothing more than an unprovoked brutal attack lead by the Federal Army under Milosevic and his generals.

We have failed to respond as a great nation should. We make these little statements which mean next to nothing. I believe that the State Department bears a great deal of responsibility for this lack of action. I thank the Chair.

Chairman HOVER. Senator DeConcini, the Co-Chairman of the Commission.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry I was late. I'm going to make one of those statements. Senator D'Amato, I agree with you, that's all I can do right now because I'm as frustrated as you are. You say it much better, I guess. I am pleased that we're having the hearings and I want to thank Chairman Hoyer for his leadership in this area. He and I have visited Yugoslavia and various republics there as well as Kosovo, the province and it is really discouraging. I have taken some deep interest in this country and have visited a number of times. Congresswoman Bentley has been with us and is a real expert in the area, with contacts and understanding that is greater than I will ever achieve.

Mr. Chairman, I know you're frustrated with this situation as we all are but thank you for putting together these hearings. At least we can start some dialogue in this country and focus some attention on it. Maybe we can get some answers from our own govern-
ment as to why we haven’t done more. I think it is very proper for the Helsinki Commission to do that.

I am gravely concerned about the tremendous loss and the tragic devastation that is going on in particularly Croatia but also in other parts of Yugoslavia. Many, if not most, including myself believe that the responsibility for the crisis is shared by many of the disputing parties, at both the republic and the federal level. It’s not just one side.

The real question, therefore, before us and the question which I hope is the main focus of these hearings is what, if anything, we can do to restore the peace and to convince those who have repeatedly broken it time and time again that peace is the only lasting solution to the Yugoslav crisis. A peace achieved in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. In my view, the European Community and the CSCE process have taken the appropriate steps in offering their assistance but now additional efforts are needed if an even greater catastrophe is to be avoided. This especially applies to the United States. I think our Ambassador to Belgrade, Warren Zimmermann and his staff are doing the best they can. They’ve done an excellent job in Yugoslavia. Our government nevertheless can and should become much more active in the responses to the Yugoslav crisis.

I’m at a loss to understand why President Bush said nothing about the Yugoslav crisis in his address to the United Nations. What an inappropriate forum to call attention to this tragedy. His regrettable silence leads many to speculate that the United States really doesn’t care about Yugoslavia. I know Americans do care. Even in my state of Arizona with very few Serbians, Croats, and Slovenians, and other republic heritage there, there is concern in Arizona about Yugoslavia.

I believe greater U.S. involvement in diplomatic efforts to restore the crisis especially in the CSCE would not undermine but complement the efforts underway at The Hague. The Commission has made several suggestions in this regard such as the holding of an emergency meeting of the CSCE Council. I hope that today we can discuss these and other ideas including economic sanctions and recognition of the republics. I hope we can also discuss what other action can be taken to attempt to divert or reverse the tragedy in Yugoslavia and bring some resolution to the conflict not only in Croatia but in other problem areas such as Kosovo where the Albanian population has been brutally repressed by the authorities and the Serbian Republic.

I share my friend from New York’s real disgust with President Milosevic having meet with him. I trusted that he was telling us that there was a way to solve this short of the brutality I believe he is responsible for. It doesn’t mean that there isn’t brutality on the other side and prejudice and discrimination towards Serbs in Kosovo—in Croatia, I’m sure there is. But Mr. Milosevic has to stand up and he has to account for his activities and I just cannot believe that the Serbian people will continue to follow that kind of leadership if they have an opportunity to voice their views. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoeyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, we’re sorry we kept you waiting so long but we appreciate your patience and look forward to hearing from you.

Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a statement that I would like to enter for the record. And I would like to offer a somewhat abbreviated version of that if I may in a presentation now.

Chairman Hoeyer. Without objection.

Mr. Johnson. First, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I appreciate the opportunity to be with the Commission and the efforts that individual members of the Commission have made—the enormous efforts that members have made to personally familiarize themselves with the situation in Yugoslavia. I think that while we may not at the end of this session find ourselves in agreement, the dialogue will be much richer for the fact that this Commission has taken the trouble to inform itself very thoroughly on the situation—on a firsthand basis on the situation in Yugoslav.

Chairman Hoeyer. Mr. Secretary, we have just received notice of a 15-minute quorum call preceding a vote on the Schumer proposal on the banking bill. We will have to leave here in about 7 or 8 minutes, so if we can sort of hear your comments in that time we will return; we’re not ending but we have to go vote.

Mr. Johnson. Fine, good, okay.

Chairman Hoeyer. You’ll have the Senators here.

Mr. Johnson. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoeyer [continuing]. It’s not as good as having the House members here but—

Mr. Johnson. I won’t go into that.

Chairman Hoeyer. The Senator at the end of the table vehemently applauds.

[Laughter]

TESTIMONY OF RALPH JOHNSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Johnson. You’ve asked me here today to discuss the international response to the crisis in Yugoslavia and the role of the CSCE process in that response. I’d like to begin by reiterating what I have said a week ago before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Neither we nor the CSCE can prevent Yugoslavs from killing one another so long as they are determined to do that.

What we can do, it seems to me, is to use our influence and our powers of persuasion to convince the parties to this conflict that they cannot win and indeed they can only lose if the violence is not stopped. We can support efforts to mediate an end to the fighting and we can work to keep doors open for a peaceful resolution of disputes, but we cannot resolve the conflict. Only the peoples of Yugoslavia and their leaders can do that.

We have believed from the beginning of the crisis that CSCE could play a crucial role in achieving a peaceful settlement. In August 1990, we and others invoked the Human Dimension Mechanism in response to serious violations of human rights throughout Yugoslavia. Late last year when it became increasingly clear that
We imposed an arms embargo in July, long before the UN took action on a global basis. In fact this was a U.S. idea that first surfaced on the 3rd of July. We have also restricted our economic assistance to projects supporting democracy and economic reform. Deputy Secretary Eagleburger and many other officials have met with a long list of Yugoslav central and republic leaders as well as with opposition politicians and human rights activists.

I believe that without the CSCE framework there would not have been a coordinated international response to the tragic situation in Yugoslavia. The current peace process which despite its frustrations has made an essential contribution to laying the groundwork for an ultimate settlement would not have been organized without the CSCE, and we would not have had a mechanism for the regular ongoing consultations with other concerned countries such as those that lead to the tri-partite U.S./Soviet/EC Statement on Yugoslavia of October 18. So I think it's fair to say that CSCE has been of crucial importance to the efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. And I'm confident that it will continue to be.

I also think the CSCE has been strengthened institutionally as a result of the Yugoslav crisis. Remember that it was only in November of 1990 that CSCE established a formal political consultation process consisting of annual meetings of the Council of Ministers and more frequent meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials. This emergency meeting mechanism by which the COSO can be summoned on short notice was established only in June of this year. Thus the Yugoslav crisis has proved to be something of a "baptism of fire" for these new mechanisms, one which the CSCE has weathered well.

In particular, the crisis has demonstrated the value of the COSO as a standing, consultative body within CSCE. Its ability to meet frequently, on short notice, to discuss the situation and to take action has made CSCE an operational capability it did not previously. The U.S. role here has been critical. Our delegation to the COSO meetings has played an active role in creating consensus, mediating among the parties to the discussions in the COSO, as well as a vehicle for developing broad support for specific CSCE actions such as the sending of the human rights rapporteur mission to Yugoslavia.

Although I hope that no other country or region of Europe descends into the bloody chaos that we have seen in Yugoslavia, I believe that the experience we have gained in dealing with this crisis has strengthened the process and will make CSCE more effective in the future.

As far as additional steps within CSCE, much will depend on what happens on the ground in Yugoslavia and the attitudes of the peace process participants. Now the outlook is not bright, and the European Community has said that it may impose sanctions next week against those parties to this conflict who are blocking agreement on a framework for achieving a settlement. We are prepared to support the EC if it determines that such steps are necessary, and we are considering actions that we might take ourselves.

We have also given our full support to the UN Secretary General's efforts to support the EC's work in Yugoslavia.
I can’t tell you that there is a light to be found at the end of this tunnel, or that the crisis will be over by Christmas. But we believe there is no better approach to resolving the tragedy than the one that we and our CSCE members have embarked upon. I would be happy, Mr. Chairman, to answer any questions.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. The House members will be back but let us proceed here. I do have some questions. Is it the obvious reason we have not taken a more forceful position on what’s going on there because of the EC leadership, so to speak, in this area and is that true or false? And secondly, has the European Community asked us to stay low-key, to not beat the drum or explode at least verbally and other ways as well?

Mr. Johnson. Two comments, Mr. Chairman. I think the real reason that we have not taken the higher profile some would argue for related to our conclusion, outlined in my statement, that this is a crisis in which the European participants not only have the greater leverage but also the immediate, most immediate stake in a successful outcome of the problem.

I’m not in any way downplaying the significance which we attach to the bloodshed and the violence taking place in Yugoslavia. Nor am I implying that we even see the Yugoslav crisis as one which is contained within Yugoslavia. Clearly, the potential for broader implications of the Yugoslav crisis to Europe—realize that is a small for broader impact within Europe is evident. But it has been our judgment that it if you think about the economic links with Yugoslavia, more than half of Yugoslavia’s trade is with Europe. We have about 5 percent of Yugoslav trade. Just looking at the economic relationships and the political relationship that Yugoslavia has tried to develop with the European Community means that those countries, the neighbors, if you will, to Yugoslavia and near neighbors to Yugoslavia have the greatest stake and the greatest influence in trying to bring about a solution. We have been in touch, obviously very closely with the European Community, with Lord Carrington, with Yugoslav leaders from all parts of the country, and the message that we are getting is that they do not question our commitment, they do not question our views. We’ve had very strong conversations with Yugoslav leaders, Serbian leaders, for example. There can be no doubt about our feelings on this conflict, and we are not being urged to do anything differently, quite frankly, from what we are doing.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Well, let me pursue that a little bit if I may, Mr. Johnson. Are we being urged not to do more? Are we being urged because only five percent of their trade is with us or not to take an economic embargo? I realize that is a small percentage of trade but don’t you agree that the United States taking some demonstrative step like that would have a tremendous amount of world impact and bring the focus on what’s going on there and maybe bring Europe to be even stronger about it?

Mr. Johnson. Well, a couple of comments, Mr. Chairman. With all respect, I don’t agree with that.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. You don’t, that’s fair enough. I just want to know.

Mr. Johnson. We haven’t asked the question, “Are you going to be offended if we were to take action to declare a trade embargo?” Our calculus has been based upon our analysis that with the very small percentage of the trade which we have, our action might in fact undermine our influence when it became apparent that it did not have any appreciable effect. If we take action on sanctions, it’s our judgment that action should be taken in a very strong way, meaning covering as much of trade, if it’s going to be trade, as possible.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Okay, well are we urging the European Community to take a stronger position?

Mr. Johnson. What we’ve told—we what we have said to the European Community is that as the party which is at the center of the negotiating process, in our view, they must make a judgment and they should take an international lead in making the judgment as to whether sanctions are called for at a given moment. We have been in dialogue with them on the kinds of sanctions they would envision if they take that step. We are not pressing them to impose sanctions.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Why not?

Mr. Johnson. I’d agree with that only up to a point. It’s clear that it hasn’t solved the problems of Yugoslavia; what is also clear, however, is that the level of the fighting—and this is not very significant if you happen to be in a village in Eastern Croatia and you are still under attack, in Vukovar, for example—but that the level of the fighting has reduced. The result of the cease-fire has seemed to have been reduced. Now, no one can judge whether that’s a long-term result or a short-term result. But the level of the fighting has clearly been reduced. And so I think one can argue that if that means that there now is a greater window for the negotiating process it ought to be pursued.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. I wish I could agree. I’m afraid I’ve put myself in one of those villages just because of electronic coverage of what’s going on there and I find it just absolutely repugnant to me that our country is not taking a forceful stand notwithstanding what the European Community is doing. What kind of a nation are we, if we won’t stand up to that kind of brutality and at least lay out what we think is proper and if the Europeans don’t want to do it, fine. If we have no effect on it, at least, our conscious if nothing more is clear, and we’ve staked out a good human rights position. And now I get a feeling that we’re seen as—I want to use the term—seen as just having no character and no principle and I think it’s a big mistake. Do we have observers, Mr. Johnson, at the peace conference at The Hague?

Mr. Johnson. No, we do not. No other country does apart from the members of the EC—in fact it’s not even clear that there are Community observers. It’s Lord Carrington leading the conference. It’s the Yugoslav participants on the other side. In fact, we inquired about this at the beginning of the conference: that is would
it be welcome for us and for others to have observers at the conference, to put observers there.

You may recall that when this process got started, it was at a time when the Soviet Union was in a somewhat different situation from which it finds itself now. There was concern not only on the part of the European participants but also on the part of the Yugoslavs that they would just as well keep the Great Powers on the sidelines.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. The last—not question but observation is that I have on my desk a resolution for the Senate to vote on whether or not the United States ought to recognize these republics as independent nations. And I’ve been persuaded not to put that in or attempt to attach it to something by our government and Ambassador Zimmermann.

But I tell you I’m very disillusioned with where we are going for whatever that’s worth to you and it may be worth nothing but I really think it’s a disgrace that our country has not taken a forceful position, and that President Bush has been absolutely silent or if he’s said anything about it, I sure have missed it. The Senator from New York.

Mr. D’AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share the Chairman’s frustration. Let me go back to quite a while ago, when I was in Kosovo. Along with seven other U.S. Senators, I met 10,000 Albanians, many had been beaten, some killed, tanks were used to drive them away, all because they were gathering to meet a delegation of United States Senators. I have some difficulty understanding our policy which borders on indifference. But that’s my characterization, that’s how I see it, a smidgeon better than indifference.

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman, I think there was an amendment as the Nickles-Bentley Amendment that was passed by the Congress relating to the suspension of aid to those republics that violated basic human rights. And I think it also directed various international funds under U.S. control to vote in opposition for any aid to those who violate human rights. What is the status of that legislation?

Mr. Johnson. Senator D’Amato, I’ll need to refresh my memory a bit on this because I was not in my current role when the Nickles-Bentley Amendment was adopted. But the concrete result of the amendment in our case, is that OPIC is not operating in Serbia. There is no OPIC coverage in Serbia.

Mr. D’AMATO. Was the practicality of that amendment totally vitiated by some kind of Administrative action?

Mr. Johnson. There was an Administrative decision of which the Hill was informed, the details of which, if I may call on one of my colleagues here who may know it better than I—

Mr. D’AMATO. Would you? Yes, why don’t you refer to one of your colleagues. That was vitiated as a result of the Administration’s suspension of aid.

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of State on the 24th of May indicated to the Congress, in a full statement, that we would use the waiver provisions of the Nickles-Bentley Amendment. The reason for doing that as explained in the statement was that in our judgment the effect of the Amendment would be to affect the wrong people in Yugoslavia, that is it would affect those who were pressing for reform rather than affecting those who were the source, the primary source of Yugoslavia’s problems.

Mr. D’AMATO. In other words, that there would be a curtailment of some aid, I think it was about ten million dollars?

Mr. Johnson. I think that figure rings a bell with me. I’d be happy to confirm it though.

Mr. D’AMATO. And so the logic was that “people” wouldn’t get that aid and therefore we’d be punishing the wrong people, is that correct?

Mr. Johnson. No, I don’t think it was our own people. I think it was the question of what would the impact on the ground in Yugoslavia. What parties would be affected.

Mr. D’AMATO. Yes, people. People would be denied. Well, I have to tell you something, if that isn’t the most backward logic that I’ve ever heard. We passed legislation with a waiver provision to curtail. But then, on May 24, we suspended that legislation. Now I must ask you, did human rights violations cease? Did they stop using the military against citizens? Were these the reasons for the suspension of action?

Mr. Johnson. Senator, I suppose one could also ask if had we taken that step, would we have had an impact on the situation that was greater and who would we have affected. The aid which we have continued to make available represents approximately $5,000,000 in technical assistance this year in Yugoslavia. That assistance has been limited in its use to a narrow range of projects which are intended to better the life of the people rather than to have any supportive impact on Serbia or the JNA or those whom we see as primarily responsible for the current bloodshed.

Mr. D’AMATO. Was that decision made after consultation with the governments in Bosnia and the JNA and the Yugoslavia?

Mr. Johnson. I don’t have the answer to that, Congressman—Senator. But I would say that is not normal that we would consult on a decision of that kind with foreign governments.

Mr. D’AMATO. I would expect that that wasn’t the case and that, in fact, what you were doing was consulting with the federal government of Milosevic. Let me ask you, on page 3, you say, “We can support efforts to mediate an end to the fighting and work to keep the doors open for a peaceful resolution of disputes. But we alone cannot resolve this conflict.” Well, we agree that you alone can’t. Look at your next sentence. “Only the people of Yugoslavia and their leaders can do that.” You really subscribe to that theory? Because I think our policy subscribes to that. Our policy is, and you’ve articulated it several times, that the people of Yugoslavia and their leaders are the only ones who can end this war and the pattern of systematic human rights violations. I suggest that’s been our policy.

Mr. Johnson. Senator, I would say that that has in fact been our policy and I would say that it’s a view that is shared not only by us with others that we work with in the world community.

Mr. D’AMATO. Well then, what you’re saying is you’re ignoring those who don’t have the guns, the weapons or the wherewithal to repel aggression. What you’re doing is assigning them to whatever fate will befall them. We might plead and beg that the bombardment not be as severe, but what we’re really talking about is that
the areas that have been under attack basically have no voice. You’re not talking about a cessation of the hostilities in the truest sense, Mr. Johnson. Are you really?

Mr. Johnson. I wouldn’t say that, Senator. I would say that if you look at what the negotiating process now is attempting to bring about with mixed success is a situation in which JNA troops would be withdrawn from Croatia; not only withdrawn from areas that they now occupy but withdrawn entirely, ultimately from Croatia as part of a political settlement. There is some evidence that JNA troops are withdrawing from some areas.

So what you are saying is that if there is to be a resolution of this conflict it seems to us impossible that it can be imposed by force from outside of Yugoslavia. I find no one in Europe or in the United States who I know of who supports the notion of forceful intervention by us or by the Europeans.

Mr. D’Amato. Did you hear me mention force? Why would you bring up force? Isn’t that an attempt to inject into this presentation the fact that if someone raises an objection of the policy that is being administered then your contention is that force isn’t going to be the answer. You’ve never heard this Senator or Senator DeConcini suggest that force should be used.

Mr. Johnson. No, I didn’t mean to imply that.

Mr. D’Amato. Well, that’s the implication, the clear implication by your statement. So why would you want to bring up this business of force?

Mr. Johnson. Well, there are two things. One, I would say—

Mr. D’Amato. I’m talking about the importance of ostracizing those who are carrying on these military activities. I’d suggest to you that indeed the United States has a key role and simply to say that twenty percent or twenty times more in terms of trade in goods and services comes by way of Europe and other countries does not wash as an excuse. There is absolutely no reason for this country not to become involved in a process whereby we build a coalition and say that we are not going to stand by and allow this to happen. And to say, well it’s up to the Europeans to provide this leadership. This is simply the wrong policy.

Let me just suggest something to you by way of history. I’ve been told that the first country, which was a city-state at the time, to recognize the United States, 200 plus years ago, in our battle for independence, was the city-state of Dubrovnik. Did you know that?

Mr. Johnson. No, I didn’t.

Mr. D’Amato. Well, maybe some people at the State Department should begin to look at history and understand what this country is about.

Mr. Johnson. Senator, I think that we have not and we are not in any way giving, implicitly or explicitly, any kind of sign of our acceptance or support of events in Yugoslavia.

Mr. D’Amato. Well, I’m going to suggest to you that what we have done is too little, too late, and almost non-existent. All of this nice business about our Ambassador being there. What is he doing? Has he gone to the English, gone to the French, and said: “My gosh, let us begin to do something here. Let us begin to tighten the economic screws; let us tie up the oil, the petrol, the gas; the ammunitions that makes the tanks run.” How can you run tanks and planes without fuel? I’m not suggesting that we use force, no one has suggested that. But to sit by and say, “Well, we’re having some success.” The only success you’re having is because these poor people are being beaten and shot and killed until they have no choice but to fold. The Serbs withdraw because there is no one left to kill. Let’s stop this nonsense about saying a cessation of the hostilities has occurred.

They only cease fighting after they’ve acquired whatever properties they want, only after the opposition drops their arms and surrenders. Certainly, if you have the firepower that the Milosevic troops possess, you’re going to overrun these people, and pull away. That’s exactly what they’re doing. So if you say the level of bombardment and hostilities has diminished, you’re correct, but that doesn’t answer the underscoring question or give a true perspective. I do not suggest that we can impose the solution. Yet, we can use our economic leverage and power in the world community to work with others and make a very real difference.

We’re not going to settle the dispute overnight, maybe not ever in our lifetime. We’re talking about a very complicated matter involving the hostilities of ethnic groups and history. But this is not a reason to say that we can’t come up with a final solution to this terrible situation, that we simply sit back and do nothing. This has been our policy to date and I think we should be ashamed of ourselves because people are dying while we idle.

Mr. Johnson. Senator, I would simply add that we were the first to call for an embargo on arms shipments into Yugoslavia. We took the lead in the international community.

Mr. D’Amato. What are we doing to see to it that the arms embargo is effective and that we ostracize those nations and those areas that are continuing to supply these weapons that kill innocent citizens? What are we doing to cut off the fuel that runs those planes and tanks? What are we doing to let them know that we are serious?

To call for something is not nearly enough, to say that we want to embargo munitions, that’s not enough, to work for the implementation of that policy, now that’s something. I’d like you to tell me what we’ve done to work to achieve that policy.

Mr. Johnson. We worked, Senator, together with our allies to get a UN Security Council resolution which calls for all states of the UN to embargo arms shipments. We have talked—

Mr. D’Amato. Is that embargo effective? I understand that embargo is not effective.

Mr. Johnson. Well, we feel that there continues to be leakage of arms into Yugoslavia. We have approached any and all countries that we think may be wittingly or unwittingly transit points for arms. We have worked together with our allies to do that as well. Short of steps which would impose a physical embargo which I think is not thought to be possible or practicable, it’s difficult to know what more one might do to try to implement the arms embargo.

On oil, the only question, the only issue I would raise here is that effectively about eighty percent of Yugoslavia’s oil comes in through the Adria Pipeline through Croatia. That pipeline has been inoperative, it was first rendered inoperative by
Croatian forces but since that time Serb forces have cut it off. So the oil shipments into Yugoslavia through this main avenue of oil supply are virtually eliminated. It’s true that the EC has been talking about the possibility of an oil embargo, an action that might be taken in the UN, that’s certainly something that we have not objected to. I think there are some questions about—if eighty percent of the oil is already stopped, it’s not quite clear what effect it would have.

Mr. D’Amato. Well, the 20 percent runs the army.

Mr. Johnson. Well, it’s not clear where the twenty percent is going since the pipeline comes through Croatia.

Mr. D’Amato. Listen, my peers here have been more than patient with me and I thank the Chairman and I thank Senator Craig for their patience.

Mr. Craig. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Johnson, I appreciate your testimony. I ask unanimous consent that my statement be entered into the record.

Co-Chairman DeConcini. Without objection.

Mr. Craig. Mr. Chairman, I arrived after opening statements were made. Mr. Johnson, what you say we are doing and the perception of what we are doing are two different things. I don’t have any questions of you. I think my colleague from New York did an excellent job pursuing many of the questions that I would have asked.

Let me read to you portions of a letter from a friend of mine in Payette, Idaho, by the name of Ed Lettunich. Ed is not a constituent, he’s a friend. We were in the ranching business out there. He and his brother are still ranchers, and this is his perception. This letter came to me last Wednesday. He said that, “we have just received news from Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia. My relatives in Yugoslavia are alive but the city is without electricity, very little water, and nothing but bread to eat. Everyone is very frightened and the city is being overrun with refugees. Senator, can you please explain the indifference and the lack of action by our President and State Department in this area. And these are American citizens who with a very critical eye watch what’s going on over there because of the obvious stated reason. The Russian Premier had both the Serbian and Croatian Presidents in Moscow this week in an attempt to help the peace process. In the meantime, Secretary Baker continues to shuttle between Washington and the Middle East. I realize that this is very important but at least people aren’t dying there today.” That’s pretty profound. That’s the perception in the hinterland, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Johnson. Senator, my only comment would be first that I wish I could offer you a more encouraging view of the situation in Dubrovnik. I can’t. We had people in Dubrovnik yesterday and while we have confirmed that the old city has only been lightly damaged, very little evidence of damage there, it’s quite clear that the sanitary conditions not to mention the physical devastation of the villages around Dubrovnik is overwhelming. And so it’s quite evident that the situation, not so much in the old town, but of the people around Dubrovnik is just as bad as your constituent and friend has described it.

I think that the criticism of Secretary Baker, however, in being absorbed in shuttling to the Middle East and not paying attention to Yugoslavia is misguided. That may be our fault for not publicizing sufficiently what has been done. But I would call attention to the role that the Secretary took in the most recent case in the United Nations in which we managed to get with the help of others, a resolution in the Security Council that did impose a Security Council embargo on arms.

I think no one was as clear, in terms of the question of accountability, who we see as being accountable for this conflict as we were. So we may differ in the question of how we can effect the outcome, but there is no difference, I think, between us in the sense that we have not been at all shy about identifying whom we see as culprits and we have identified people on all sides of this conflict. I think that if there’s a difference that emerges here today, it concerns what instruments can effectively be used to try to bring about the outcome. Our sense of frustration, though it may not appear so, is not much less than which I see here.

Mr. Craig. Well, I am personally not going to criticize our Secretary. I think he’s done a marvelous job with the Middle East Peace Conference which is underway right now in Spain; I think we’re all very excited and pleased about that. But there is a perception in the land at this moment that we are relatively indifferent to certain things going on in Yugoslavia and it may well be a failure of the part of some to adequately tell us or to tell the rest of the country what the U.S. Government is, in fact, doing.

At the same time, I think we’re all vividly aware of the circumstance of the situation and the conditions at this moment. And I think all of us are extremely frustrated that more is not being done. An embargo on paper is a nice expression of desire or intent. However, is it in fact happening? Is it on the ground? Is it working? Is it measurable? Have the flow of arms stopped? Are we pressuring other nations to be cooperative? Or are we merely providing the necessary and appropriate lip service?

Mr. Johnson. No, we are indeed pressing other nations. Part of the problem here is that there is significant arms production within Yugoslavia itself. Obviously, there were significant store of arms which were accumulated within Yugoslavia before the conflict started. We are not satisfied that the embargo is being totally enforced. That’s probably true of almost any embargo we’ve ever had any experience with unfortunately.

Mr. Craig. That does seem to be the nature of them, yes.

Mr. Johnson. But we are certainly pressing wherever we see any indication of that there’s an attempt to evade the embargo.

Mr. Craig. If that is the case, then shout a little louder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Co-Chairman DeConcini. Mr. Johnson, what is your prognosis—what’s going to happen in the Republic of Slovenia? Will they start to be recognized by European nations and will they get their independence whereas Croatia will not?

Mr. Johnson. I don’t have a very fixed answer to that, Mr. Chairman, but let me offer a couple of thoughts. Earlier on in the conflict, it seems to me that there was more enthusiasm on the part of Western Europe to recognize both Slovenia and Croatia. I
think with the passage of time two things have had an impact on that situation and now I sense that there is less enthusiasm for early recognition. To make our policy on this point clear, we said that recognition is something we would envision as a possible outcome of a successful negotiation. The two reasons I see that the situation has changed, are first of all, that many in Europe began to ask them what would be the situation if they recognized Slovenia and Croatia and found that nothing happened to reduce the level of the conflict. Having recognized these two republics, it seems to me that they felt they would run the risk of implicitly conveying some sense that they would try to rescue them if the conflict did not come to an end.

And it's quite clear that the view in Europe, to generalize although I don't know who would differ with this, is that they are not prepared and do not think it would be wise to commit military forces. That was my reference to force earlier. The second issue that I think is on the minds of those in Europe is the question of the precedent that would be created with regard to recognition in Slovenia and Croatia, or for that matter other republics, in the wake of developments in the Soviet Union. And I think they began to wonder whether if they move to recognize Slovenia and Croatia in this situation, they might not be setting a precedent that they would not feel comfortable with in looking at the republics of the Soviet Union. So I don't say that recognition is out of the question, if the negotiating process breaks down, it may indeed turn out that Europe would move either in part or as a group to some kind of recognition. But I don't see that right now as likely as I did two or three weeks ago.

Co-Chairman DeConcini. Why did the federal troops withdraw from Slovenia? Was that merely in order to cause more pain and suffering and violence in Croatia? Is that the reason they pulled them out in your judgment?

Mr. Johnson. I don't know many people who think they could read the mind of the JNA right now. I think they found themselves in an untenable position in Slovenia. I also think that it will be the view of those in Serbia that they are less concerned about what happens with regard to Slovenia because there's not a Serb minority there, and that it's the Serb minority in Croatia that is most important.

Co-Chairman DeConcini. As soon as the ceasefire agreements are reached, they seem to be immediately violated. Is this a reflection, in your opinion, of a lack of good faith on the part of the military leaders signing these documents and these peace agreements? Or the lack of control over the forces that they field?

Mr. Johnson. I can't be sure. Certainly, it's evidence of a lack of control because the information we've had is that EC monitors have in many cases gone out to local communities in order to broker local ceasefires, feeling that that was the most effective way to go about their business. After leaving the area, the ceasefire then often broke down and it was very hard to tell whether this was because there were Croatian irregulars or Serbian irregulars or active JNA units in the area that were responsible for breaking the ceasefire. So it's often very difficult. I think there are reasons to doubt either that the JNA is effectively under the control of Milosevic or certainly of Markovic. But there are also reasons to doubt that the irregular units which one sees operating in Croatia are effectively under the control of Mr. Tudjman.

So one doesn't have to get as far as bad faith in order to figure out that these ceasefires are hard to stick to.

Co-Chairman DeConcini. Mr. Johnson, the House members are returning. Can you wait a little bit, in case they have some questions?

Mr. Johnson. I'll be happy to, sir.

Co-Chairman DeConcini. I'll go on to the next witness and have them begin if you like. If you want to stay there, we can bring another chair or—

Mr. Johnson. No, that's fine I'll—

Co-Chairman DeConcini. Let me please ask Dr. John Lampe of the Wilson Center and the University of Maryland if he would come forward and present his statement. I appreciate your waiting, Mr. Lampe.

Mr. Lampe. No problem, Senator.

Co-Chairman DeConcini. We'll change your nameplate here shortly.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN LAMPE, DIRECTOR OF EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, THE WILSON CENTER

Mr. Lampe. Yes, I'm John Lampe, Director of East Europe Studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center and should also mention even though Congressman Hoyer is not here yet, a professor of history at the University of Maryland from whence I just came. I cannot say that I am pleased in these grim circumstances that surround Yugoslavia today, but I feel obliged to be here after 25 years of studying the country.

I just returned several weeks ago from visiting Belgrade briefly and visiting Sarajevo for a longer more instructive time and learning a good more. So in my remarks today I draw on previous study of Yugoslavia but also I wish, in a sense, to speak for people in the media and concerned citizens from Bosnia and Sarajevo. They are tremendously worried that this terrible civil war will spread to Bosnia-Hercegovina. As Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic said recently, if it starts here, it will be a 100-years war and fighting will spread to the countries neighboring Yugoslavia as well. After the apparent Yugoslav Army bombing of Barcz in Hungary within the last few days, that risk is already all too apparent. I also want to speak today in favor of the ongoing EEC negotiation process in The Hague, both from what I see from the outside and what I hear from the inside in Sarajevo.

Yes, if the Conference on Security and Cooperation could join in the process, if the United States could play a larger part through that medium, that would be good. But the process itself in The Hague has been an instructive one, forcing the principals to speak to each other and now putting on the table this proposal for recognition of all of the republics of Yugoslavia simultaneously but only in return for their agreement to immediately begin negotiating minority rights, mutual relations. At the same time the Yugoslav National Army should withdraw from its forward positions.
I think that's the most hopeful enterprise that we have going, especially because within the last week or so, the only Serbian ally in this process in the meeting at The Hague has withdrawn. The Montenegrin Assembly has voted for declaring its own sovereignty, is ready to participate, leaving Serbia the only republic that holds back. I am, however, told that in the sessions themselves there is some Slovenian resistance to being part of any process that's connected to Yugoslavia—they just feel that they are going to lose.

I don't know if the Committee or the Montenegrin parliament will recall the irregular military units and the Yugoslav National Army reserves surrounding Dubrovnik that are often identified as the Yugoslav National Army, in fact the overwhelming majority of those troops are either irregulars or reserves from Montenegro. Many haven't come back but their authorization has been removed. I regard that as a hopeful sign for this November 5 deadline to comply with The Hague meeting's request that all of the republics agree. What happens to Serbia, in particular, after November 5 remains to be seen. We have some statements from the Serbian opposition in Belgrade from Vuk Draskovich, a nationalist leader to be sure, that the Presidents of Serbia and Montenegro should disassociate themselves from these actions around Dubrovnik and speak out. I think that in Belgrade, there are many other people opposed to what is happening especially around Dubrovnik but they haven't said anything in a long time.

Perhaps this statement of Draskovich will give others the nerve to speak out.

That's one thing I want to be certain to present to the Committee today. Another thing is my—is my—another point is my feeling that the Yugoslav National Army is not under a tight command and control now. As one observer in Sarajevo put it recently, "It is the last relic of self-management." Why is it that that army has not been able to take a single town, not even Vukovar, that it's been hammering on? I think it's a combination of faulty command, unprepared reserves, and the failure of new draftees to show up. We sometimes hear that 15 percent only of the young men in Serbia are answering the draft call this fall. It runs for one year—the 1st draftees should have been finished in the late summer.

The army extended these current draftees for 2 months; that time is up now and they're trying to recruit in Serbia and Montenegro, and I think no place else. They're definitely not going to Bosnia or Macedonia. So that raises a question about whether this is not the last campaign of the Yugoslav National Army.

None of this will help stop the fighting for this fall however. It's not going to help the villages that are under fire. I bring you word from Sarajevo that the estimate of the total number killed that we read in our press of a little over one thousand is now a serious underestimate. I tried to talk my observers down under ten thousand and I did not succeed in doing so. I don't have documentation, but I think this is worth reporting. Also worth reporting is the reason that number stays low: all three sides, the army, Milosevic Serbs and the Croatian regime don't want the size of those losses revealed and also don't want to reveal that all three of them have in fact have so little control over the forces in the field.

It's very clear to me that the bulk of the atrocities, the senseless killings are in fact not the result of direct orders from any of these headquarters but from irregular units and also from units that are supposed to be in the regular Croatian forces or the regular Yugoslav National Army. They too have carried out senseless killings and some outright atrocities. Unfortunately the media in both Zagreb and Belgrade have publicized only what the other side did, with no mention of what has been done by their own people.

I was in Belgrade briefly when 13 Yugoslav National Army reservists were caught on a bridge by Croatian forces and shot and then mutilated. We saw the pictures graphically on television. On one previous occasion just mutilated Serbian bodies were reportedly shown for 10 minutes with no comment. A Serbian friend of mine is married to a Croatian woman, so many mixed marriages do exist, and she was called later that evening anonymously and asked why she was a whore of the Ustasa.

The Belgrade media addresses Croatia as the Fascist regime, and its Ustasa forces and that's all one ever hears. At the same time from Zagreb comes a stream of invective characterizing Serbs as the Bolshevik, Cetnik/terrorists. Both medias create a very difficult atmosphere for any conciliation.

I want to call the Commission's attention as I did in a Wilson Center presentation (a text of that expanded report that has been made available to you) to the courageous efforts of two journals, Vreme in Belgrad and Danas that had been in Zagreb and now is forced out to print from Ljubljana to tell the truth about the problems and the excesses on their own sides. Unfortunately they are not available in English but I believe both are well worth the attention. And reading the Commission report does not deny risk of not seeing the detail and the nuances of the Yugoslav subjects that are treated therein. I want to compliment a staff that seems to be doing their own homework very well.

So with those dismays about the media and with the small consolation that the army probably can't continue in the spring, I turn to the question of what we do now. I leave you with the profound hope from Sarajevo that this process in The Hague can continue to go forward. The frustration of the monitors, the fine representative from the Netherlands who was supposed to be here today, their frustration level if you had a chance to hear that would be very high, too. I should close with some effort to answer concerns from constituents about why the United States can't do something.

Co-Chairman DeConcini, Please.

Mr. LAMPE. I honestly think that now the lack of control that the three principal leaderships have is the most serious obstacle. The repeated violations of the cease fire which I'm told are made by all sides are primarily the result of the lack of central control. That's not very encouraging for The Hague process. It's also not very encouraging to wonder about the petroleum and gas reserves of the Yugoslav National Army because I don't think we know. I know there isn't any gasoline for citizens in Belgrade and there isn't any in Sarajevo either.

But the army reserves may well frustrate an embargo on oil and perhaps other supplies and leave, for instance, the medical provisions in Belgrade that are already in desperately short supply for
civilians because they are being used for the wounded, to become even more scarce. So I'll close there.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Mr. Lampe, thank you for that update, it is very helpful indeed. The picture you painted of the disarray among the Croatians is of interest as all of your testimony is. I take it there are several forces within the Croatian coalition or the Croatian effort there for independence that are not coordinated. Can you identify the players there beside Tudjman and his national forces? What else is there on the Croatian side?

Mr. LAMPE. Well, there is certainly pressure from several people inside Tudjman's own cabinet and own party, to take a harder line, not to meet with Milosevic, not to make any kind of concession. But then beyond that increasingly this Party of Pure Right—

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. They have forces, the Party of Pure Right?

Mr. LAMPE. They have forces, and these are the forces that were seen in the Washington Post photo recently wearing the black shirts and the silver crosses. Those black shirts mean something in Yugoslav history during World War II. These are the emblems of the Ustase, that is the Croatian fascist SS, a small group in a small party that didn't represent the spectrum of the Croatian people even then.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI And has Tudjman divorced himself from that and condemned it?

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, he has. Yes, he has.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. And so what is there roaming around there militarily on the Croatian side?

Mr. LAMPE. Well, military roaming around in the Party of the Pure Right and also in the local Croatian units of the Council of the National Guard, the Zenga and also the Interior Minister, the MUPovsti, the local police that are huge in number, roaming around there are emigres who have come back. And I know there are stories about soldiers of fortune or young men from Denmark or wherever who have also come in or people from the French Foreign Legion. I suspect there are such individuals but I think the more significant number are returned emigres, not just older but some younger too.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. And they have taken up arms.

Mr. LAMPE. They have taken up arms and they are part of these irregular units. There is a man named Paraga, for instance, that has come back and I don't have the first name but he was just interviewed by the newspaper, Borba in Belgrade, a paper that tries to be somewhat objective. Paraga just said openly, "Tudjman is over, Tudjman is finished, he's too much of a compromiser, he doesn't take a hard enough line."

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Do you have any estimate of how many of these rogue groups that are at least not on Tudjman's side if there are sides to call that are operative there? Are there dozens and how many people do they represent?

Mr. LAMPE. I don't have good numbers but it's certainly more than dozens, it's certainly a number of units that are active. I think what they do not represent is the overwhelming mass of Croatian people, even those who voted in this election for Tudjman's party.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. And they are just operating on their own militarily from what you can tell us.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. There is no umbrella of communications or anything from your observations?

Mr. LAMPE. No. Particularly in Eastern Slovenia and around Knin and in the areas from whence either they or their fathers came, it's those mixed areas of the old Hapsburg military border that generate localized conflict. This is conflict not because they were at each other's throats for centuries, because Serbs and Croats were not at each other's throats for centuries. It's mainly grievances from the Second World War.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Do you think, Mr. Lampe, there is room on the Croatian side, on Tudjman's side, to give up some territory to find a peace, some territory that the Serbs could have? Is that out of the question and are the Serbs so dispersed through Croatia that that wouldn't do any good even if they would give up some?

Mr. LAMPE. They're not—they dispersed but they're not so dispersed and some on the Serbian side speak now of the only solution as population transfers, as with the Macedonian issue with Greece 70 years ago. But what Serbs mean when they say that is we'll take that slice of Eastern Croatia. I do not believe that the Tudjman government can make that concession now.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Can politically afford to do it or whatever—

Mr. LAMPE. Politically they cannot afford to do that. And that's another reason that the current EEC proposal to withdraw and leave the existing republic borders in place and then try to work from there can be recommended.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. In your opinion, and I'm not trying to draw you in this and I'm really seeking some professional assistance. You're certainly one of those qualified to give us an opinion. Would if help if the United States took a more belligerent, forceful and I would say position such Tudjman is in?

Mr. LAMPE. I would be tempted to feel that the United States is punishing us and doesn't understand.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. And you don't think it would have any effect?

Mr. LAMPE. I don't think it would have any effect unless there's better information on what the reserves, particularly of petroleum are within the Yugoslav National Army.
Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Well, I don’t mean effect on—economic effects but effect psychologically and world opinion in particular on the European Community. Would it have any effect on them? Adverse or positive?

Mr. LAMPE. I don’t see that it could compared to coordinating as closely as possible with The Hague initiative and somehow linking the Conference on Security and Cooperation and all of the countries not just the United States more closely with that Hague process.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. What about a CSCE or for that matter a UN peacekeeping force, is that an option?

Mr. LAMPE. It’s an option when there’s a ceasefire; it’s an option when there’s a peace to be kept. Now who to send in, probably the UN would have the experience and also I think the best reputation in Yugoslavia, neutrals or New Zealand or whatever that would not raise the problem posed by any Western European force. If one German soldier sets foot on soil that’s perceived to be close to a Serb, that’s just giving away a tremendous propaganda advantage.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. But before we even move in that direction, we have to find a ceasefire that will last more than fifteen minutes.

Mr. LAMPE. More than 15 minutes and with better security than these poor European Council observers have received. With their white uniforms, they’re called the "ice cream men" in some circles there.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. What about recognition of any of the republics? What would happen if the United States said we recognize Slovenia tomorrow? We’re going to send an ambassador and recognize them as an independent state?

Mr. LAMPE. You’ve chosen the question carefully, picking just the wrong one.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Yes, there’ll be a follow-up question.

Mr. LAMPE. There’ll be a follow-up question, yes. I think the signal would be negative even if it was just Slovenia, that’s more ethnically homogeneous and where these problems of human rights for minorities really do not arise.

But still a sufficient signal would be sent with that recognition: Both to the Croatian side to expect imminent recognition and also to the Serbian side that they’ll have to dig in their heels and be all the more bitter and determined and uncompromising because there’s no way to deal with an outside world that is only going to betray us.

And so therefore we have to—

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. But can they operate without the outside world, Serbia?

Mr. LAMPE. They can for the fall campaign, by next spring, no.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. The follow-up question is what if the United States recognized Croatia and attempted to send an ambassador and said we recognize you as an independent state; we move your admissions into the United Nations and other international monetary funds and that’s how we see it, folks. What would happen?

Mr. LAMPE. I think there would be three problems in ascending order. First of all, the assumption that Croatia would fully meet the standards of having a democratic government, free press, could be called into question. The last word I had from Sarajevo was that “nobody here thinks that Croatia is a democratic country.”

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Is that right?

Mr. LAMPE. That’s right.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Even witnessing the last elections?

Mr. LAMPE. As a participant in the meeting in Sarajevo said just having free and democratic elections which absolutely did take place in Croatia, doesn’t mean that democratic parties and a democratic process come into play. But that’s a question that’s open to more discussion and to some doubts.

But two further problems from recognizing Croatia are not open to doubt. The position of the large Serbian minority in Croatia without any kind of further guarantee, I think would be too uncomfortable. There’s too much evidence that a combination of a media campaign that threatened violation of Serbian human rights, from virtually the time of Tudjman’s election forward and then local violations that the Tudjman government did not orchestrate or authorize. They didn’t authorize the loyalty oaths and the firing of Serb enterprise managers, but it happened. It happened and it seemed to be orchestrated.

So cutting that Serbian minority loose is one further problem. But the largest problem of all is that then the rest of the Yugoslav republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular, are left in a completely untenable position, to face whatever Serbia and the Yugoslav National Army would wish to do.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. And of course, the Serbian minority in Croatia would only harden their position, I presume?

Mr. LAMPE. Absolutely.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. If there was recognition.

Mr. LAMPE. That’s right. Their determination would harden to just fight on until they could be relieved.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. It’s hard to say, it is so discouraging. I equate it a little bit, I know there’s a great difference but a little bit, to Northern Ireland. But maybe there isn’t a solution here. Do you think there is a solution?

Mr. LAMPE. I think there still may be a solution because I don’t believe that the ethnic hatreds and the animosities in fact have the several hundred years background that they really do in Northern Ireland.

If somehow the fighting can be stopped and the economic reality of what a disaster they have brought upon themselves remains, there is a chance. As one person in Sarajevo said, “The devil’s own plan could not have done to us what we are doing to ourselves, we’re destroying in days what it took years to build." There is a hard, horrible winter ahead and it’s going to be especially horrible in all of these cities. It may, if there isn’t any fighting during that period give us a chance that it won’t start again in the spring.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Mr. Lampe, thank you. Mr. Chairman, are you aware of what’s pending here? Mr. Johnson has—

Chairman HOVER. Has got to leave at 4.

Co-Chairman DeCONCINI. Well, yes, perhaps he does and he is available to answer questions of the members who had to leave and I believe Mr. Lampe can stay a little longer.
Chairman HOYER. Doctor and Secretary Johnson, let me apologize for the House members, not for doing something wrong, but simply because we could not be here to hear your testimony. I'm not going to ask any questions because I don't want to prolong the hearing repetitively. I am going to read the record of the responses that both of you have given but I would like to recognize Mrs. Bentley for any questions she may have. Secretary Johnson has to leave at 4 p.m., so he's got 10 minutes.

Ms. BENTLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and offhand I don't have any; I know that there are some that I would like to, but not having heard all of your statements and having time to think about it, I don't. But I would like the opportunity, Mr. Chairman to review the record and maybe to submit some questions to him later for the record if that would be all right.

Chairman HOYER. If that would be acceptable to the both of you, we'd appreciate that. The problem, I want to explain to you and to the members of the audience is that banking bill is on the floor and there have been a series of amendments. There are going to be in the very near future some more amendments coming up and there was a debate intervening; we knew there was going to be a quick vote so we couldn't get back here in a timely fashion. But we do feel badly that we did not hear all of your testimony.

But I assure you that every House member who was not here, as well as members of the Commission, will get a transcript of your testimony and we will discuss it. And of course, Senator DeConcini has had the opportunity of being here firsthand.

Co-Chairman DeConcini. Mr. Chairman, the testimony was very helpful. Though there was a lot of disagreement with Mr. Johnson and the members that were here. It certainly told our country's side of the position from the executive branch and it was very helpful to Mr. Lampe. Mr. Lampe has been extremely helpful with some of his recent experience having just been to Belgrade and Sarajevo.

Chairman HOYER. Well, Dr. Lampe is close by so perhaps I could avail myself of sort of a private meeting to get personal advice and counsel, I'd appreciate that.

Mr. LAMPE. Please.

Co-Chairman DeConcini. He mentioned that.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Chairman, do you have any additional questions?

Co-Chairman DeConcini. No, I do not have any additional questions.

Chairman HOYER. All right, I want to thank both of you for being here and I must apologize again for the bell problem and for people having to go in and out. As the Co-Chairman said, as everybody on the panel said, in either stronger or less strong terms, I think that everybody feels very, very strongly to the extent that the United States can—we need to engage ourselves with the Europeans to stop the fighting.

That's obviously the first objective that everybody has and from that point on to try to bring to bear such international pressure—particularly from our standpoint as the Helsinki Commission through the CSCE process in conjunction with the EC and indeed perhaps the United Nations for a peaceful resolution of this dispute. We had an opportunity to meet with Foreign Minister Genscher. I don't know if you heard from some of the people here, I don't know if you mentioned that Dennis?

Co-Chairman DeConcini. No, I didn't.

Chairman HOYER. We discussed his perception, as to what needed to be done and what could be done. Quite obviously you have to have the agreement of both parties to have observers come in or any kind of peacekeeping force to keep the parties apart. Neither obviously is going to be wedged in by military means, but by agreement.

There was also some discussion of more expansive action through the Security Council of the United Nations. All of us are very, very concerned as in any of these instances with the suffering by innocent people. Obviously there is wrongdoing, there are people with bad motives, there are people doing things they cannot be dissuaded from doing anything less than confrontational means whether an arms embargo as Senator D'Amato talked about or an economic embargo, whatever. Or even beyond that. But there are as usual the majority of people who are taking the brunt of this and who are effectively innocent in terms of being perpetrators, exacerbators of the problem.

Ms. BENTLEY. Mr. Chairman, there is one thing I would like to say, I just remembered. Senator D'Amato spoke very critically of what was happening in Dubrovnik and I think we all have a certain amount of strong feeling for Dubrovnik but I think that it is only fair that the record should show that when our U.S. Embassy spokesperson and I know a person from the Greek Embassy went into Dubrovnik day before yesterday there were only two minor pieces of damage inside the walls.

This has been confirmed by I talked to Ambassador Zimmermann today on that. I think the record should show that. And I also think it should show that part of the other side of the question is that the Croatian military went inside the wall and they were anxious to—they started down there because they wanted to control the bay of the port going into Montenegro in order to keep shipments from going in through Montenegro into Serbia and this is part of the problem and why the fighting began down there. I have it from the Greeks and not the Serbians please, that this was provoked by the Croatian military to get the sympathy of the people for Dubrovnik against the Serbians, I'd like the record to show that.

Chairman HOYER. It's got to be clear to everyone in the room that there are a number of different views represented in the membership on this issue. It's a very complicated one. Once again let me say that we do appreciate Dr. Lampe and Secretary Johnson, your being with us and we look forward to perhaps working with both of you further on this. Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the Commission was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
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Statement of Steny H. Hoyer, Chairman
Hearing on the Conflict in Yugoslavia
October 31, 1991

Today's hearing of the Helsinki Commission will focus on the conflict in Yugoslavia and efforts of the United States, the European Community and the CSCE process to bring that conflict to an end.

We hear many confusing and contradictory reports on the fighting in Yugoslavia. We hear of new ceasefires, followed by reports of continued fighting and an exchange of accusations regarding who was the first violator. We hear reports of atrocities by both sides of the conflict.

A few things, however, are clear:

First, people are dying, leaving and losing their homes, and watching the world around them collapse into chaos and destruction.

Second, the rest of the world has condemned the violent course that has been taken in Yugoslavia and those responsible for it.

Third, the European Community, with a CSCE mandate, has offered its assistance in restoring the peace and its offices to mediate the dispute.

Fourth, despite these international efforts and the willingness of most of the republics to cooperate, peace seems more distant than ever.

Finally, while there is clearly fault to be found in the actions of practically all of the disputed parties, the government of President Milosevic in Serbia and its apparent ally in the Yugoslav Army stand out for their preference for force and repression instead of genuine dialogue to solve what may be legitimate concerns, from the rights of Serbs in Croatia to the aspirations of Albanians in Kosovo.

The crisis in Yugoslavia comes at a time when relationships between European states are rapidly changing. This is visible in efforts to enhance the Helsinki process and the higher expectations its member states have for it in resolving the problems of a Europe in transformation. The CSCE meeting schedule has been regularized, institutions have been created, and mechanisms have been established to respond to emergencies and other events of concern.
Yugoslavia is the first real challenge for the new, enhanced CSCE. The mechanism for addressing Unusual Military Activities has been invoked by three of Yugoslavia's neighbors. Four emergency meetings of the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials have been held in Prague. At a regularly scheduled meeting of the Committee last week, it was agreed that the CSCE would establish a Mission to Yugoslavia to examine human rights violations. These efforts have supported and complemented the efforts of Lord Carrington and the EC peace conference in The Hague, as well as United Nations efforts.

The purpose of today's hearing is to bring greater clarity to the situation in Yugoslavia, and to discuss the effectiveness of the international response to date, especially in the CSCE, and how that response could be made more effective. The Commission had invited the head of the EC Monitoring Mission in Yugoslavia, Dutch Ambassador van Houten, to appear before us today. The Ambassador could have answered many questions regarding what is happening in that country. He agreed and was on his way, but, unfortunately, the distressing situation around Dubrovnik in Croatia forced him to return to Yugoslavia from The Hague. Hopefully, he will be able to return to the United States so that we can hear his views sometime in the near future.

We do, however, have two important witnesses today. First, Ralph Johnson, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs at the Department of State will discuss U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia, both bilaterally and in the context of EC and CSCE diplomacy. A career Foreign Service officer, Secretary Johnson served overseas in Guinea, Poland and Bolivia. He also served in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and, at the Department, held various positions in the Bureaus of Economic and Business Affairs and European and Canadian Affairs prior to becoming the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in July of this year.

Our second witness, Dr. John Lampe, is Director of East European Studies at The Wilson Center and Professor of History at the University of Maryland in College Park. A well known and respected scholar, Dr. Lampe is particularly well versed in Balkan affairs. He has recently visited Yugoslavia and will give his assessment of the situation there, and comment as well on policy options before us.

I am pleased that we are having this hearing today to examine the conflict in Yugoslavia and discuss the international response to that conflict. In recent years, I have taken a deep interest in that country, and have visited many of its republics and provinces in my capacity as a Co-Chair of this Helsinki Commission. I am gravely concerned about the tremendous loss of life and the tragic devastation of towns and villages.

The problems which the peoples of Yugoslavia face are complex and understandably difficult to resolve. What is clear, however, is that the violent course which many have chosen to follow is not acceptable in the new, united and increasingly democratic Europe which is today being built. The Yugoslav Army's attack on the historic and culturally rich Adriatic city of Dubrovnik symbolizes the absolute senselessness of the conflict which is taking place in many other parts of Croatia and threatens other republics and provinces.

The Helsinki Commission, the United States, the European Community and all of Europe through the CSCE process have condemned in very strong terms the use of force to solve the Yugoslav crisis. Many if not most, including myself, believe that the responsibility for the crisis is shared by many of the disputing parties at both the republic and federal level but falls especially on Serbian President Milosevic and his government for taking its violent character.

The real question therefore before us -- and the question which I hope is the main focus of this hearing -- is what if anything we can do to restore the peace and to convince those who have repeatedly broken it that the only lasting solution to the Yugoslav crisis is one achieved in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. In my view, the European Community and the CSCE process have taken the appropriate steps in offering their assistance, but now additional efforts are needed if an even greater catastrophe is to be avoided.

This especially applies to the United States. I think our Ambassador in Belgrade, Warren Zimmermann, and his staff have done excellent work in Yugoslavia. Our government nevertheless can and should become much more active in its response to the Yugoslav crisis. I am at a loss to understand why President Bush, for example, said nothing about the Yugoslav crisis in his address to the United Nations. His regrettable silence leads many to speculate that the United States does not care about Yugoslavia. I know the American people do care. I believe that greater U.S. involvement in diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis -- especially in the CSCE -- would not undermine but complement the efforts already underway in The Hague.
The Commission has made several suggestions in this regard, such as the holding of an emergency meeting of the CSCE Council, and I hope that today we can discuss these and other ideas, including economic sanctions and recognition of the republics, with a view to taking the additional action that can help bring the tragedy in Yugoslavia to a quick conclusion, and not only in Croatia but in other problem areas such as Kosovo, where the Albanian population has been brutally repressed by the authorities of the Serbian republic.

I look forward to hearing from our witness and discussing these matters with him.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is holding this hearing and giving us this opportunity to gain further insight into the conflict raging in what is known to most of us here as Yugoslavia. I am also interested in hearing what the witnesses have to say regarding the role of the CSCE in this sort of conflict.

While the world has been focusing attention on Madrid and the Middle East Peace Conference, seeing hope for an end to that ongoing conflict, war rages on in Yugoslavia. It is a tragedy Mr. Chairman, that the world cannot ignore. I have found that this tragedy hits close to home for many Americans. Even in Fayette Idaho, some of my constituents are directly impacted by this conflict, with relatives in Dubrovnik. I'd like to take a moment to share part of a letter from my constituent and friend, Mr. Ed Lettunich:

This Wednesday I received news from Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia. My relatives in Yugoslavia are alive, but the city is without electricity, very little water, with nothing but bread to eat. Everyone is very frightened, and the city is being overrun with refugees.

Senator, can you please explain the indifference and lack of action by our President and State Department in this area? The Russian Premier had both the Serbian and Croatian Presidents in Moscow this week in an attempt to help the peace process. In the meantime, Secretary Baker continues to shuttle between Washington D.C. and the Middle East. I realize this is very important, but at least people aren't dying there today.

As you can see Mr. Chairman, there is a community of Americans with Yugoslavian heritage that are very frustrated. The United States has not been as vocal as it could be. Granted our options are limited, but they are not depleted. One point Mr. Lettunich made in his letter is that, 'The only thing that the Croats and Serbs need to agree upon is their respect for the United States.' He goes on to say that, 'This problem will not be solved without a more active involvement by the United States.' These points are not criticisms of this Administration, but rather, an expression of frustration and an appeal for action.
This conflict becomes more frustrating every time we see the failure of an attempted cease-fire. The international community, both individual members and collective groups, seems to have little effect on this domestic conflict. I recently read an article which stated we should immediately recognize the opposing parties as independent entities, rather than treating this conflict as a domestic Yugoslavian problem. The essence of this argument is that the conflict has no clear-cut lines because we are treating an international problem as a domestic one -- there is no Yugoslavia. The argument continues that if the international community treats each of the conflicting parties as independent states, boundary disputes, human rights abuses and the other deep-rooted problems in this conflict can then be approached through some sort of international arbitration.

I am interested in hearing from our witnesses today, their insights on this conflict and their thoughts on how we, as a nation, as part of the CSCE and the international community, should proceed to help bring this conflict to an end.

Mr. Chairman:

I would like to thank the Helsinki Commission for inviting me to take part in today's meeting. The subject at hand, the current conflict in Yugoslavia, is a very serious one, and as we speak, more lives are being lost on both sides of this ugly ethnic turmoil.

One of the core reasons for the current conflict is the fear of the ethnic Serbian minority in Croatia to live under the regime that exists in that republic. The human rights of this over 600,000 strong minority have been seriously violated, both previous to, and especially after the outbreak of hostilities. Perhaps if Mr. Tudjman's government had shown a little more tolerance, and not had been so open in its words and actions in expressing its animosity towards this minority, the current situation could have been very different.

Unfortunately, this is not the case, and that, Mr. Chairman, is the reason that we are sitting here today.

A number of things seriously disturb me about the current crisis, including the growing level of intolerance towards the Serbian minority in Croatia demonstrated by extremist groups such as Dobroslav Paraga's Croatian Party of the Right. This is a movement claimed to be between 150,000 and 200,000 strong by its deputy president, Milan Vučević.

This is a very real problem, and from my understanding of the situation, Mr. Paraga's movement represents a very real threat to the current regime in Croatia.
I submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, a number of articles regarding the rise of Mr. Faraga's party and other extremist groups, in order that my colleagues have the chance to realize the severity of this threat to the human rights of the Serbian minority in Croatia.

Mr. Chairman, I also submit for the record an article just off the wire today regarding the Austrian Jewish community's concern of rising anti-Semitism in the Republic of Croatia, and to complement that text, the text of the World Jewish Congress' Special Report on Antisemitism in Central and Eastern Europe that deals with Yugoslavia.

Finally, I also ask that my article on Yugoslavia written for the Fall 1991 edition of the Mediterranean Quarterly, that it be submitted in order that my colleagues might better understand the history of and current situation in that country.

Mr. Chairman, what is happening in Croatia appears to be a rekindling of the intolerance that the Croatian regime demonstrated in the Second World War, and which was suppressed for over 40 years under communism.

That is not to say that human rights violations do not exist throughout Yugoslavia. However, there are two sides to every coin, and the Western press has done very little to show the plight of the 600,000-plus Serbian minority in Croatia, many of whom have been forced to flee their homes and now exist as refugees in Serbia, other areas of Europe, and even in the United States.

With the growth of groups and attitudes as extreme as this, is it any wonder that this minority is in fear of living in an independent Croatia, haunted by the specter of the genocide committed against them in the Second World War.
Yugoslavia: History Must Not Repeat Itself

Helen Delich Bentley

American press coverage of the crisis in Yugoslavia has been too sparse to help readers uneducated in Central European history to make heads or tails of what is going on. Reports of the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation and of growing civil strife among ethnic groups of disparate religious beliefs hint at a replay of the geopolitical machinations that created the tinderbox for the First World War. Analyses of the forces underlying the crisis, however, can be difficult to find.

Occupying the western half of the Balkan peninsula, the modern nation of Yugoslavia has been the historical no man's land where the East and West meet. Here religions clash, and social mores—in a single community, a single province—can differ from one neighbor to the next to the same extent that "typical" American behavior in Des Moines differs from "typical" Egyptian behavior in Cairo.

The historical East-West line was first delineated during the years of the Ottoman Empire, when the Islamic Turks were stopped from entering Europe at the battle of Kosovo in the ancient kingdom of Serbia in 1389. Although the Ottomans won, defeating the Serbs and their Balkan allies, the leader of the Ottomans, Murad, was killed, and his son, Bayezid I, was unable to consolidate the gains of the victory. However, during the next fifty years of Ottoman intrigue and Western internecine rivalry that diluted the power of the crusaders, the Turks were able to secure a frontier on the Danube that lasted until the nineteenth century. North of this line, Hungary controlled the territory now known as Slovenia and Croatia, with the Serbian

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city of Belgrade in the no man’s land north of Kosovo holding out against the Turkish armies marching through to attack Europe. In August 1512 Belgrade finally capitulated. Its historical resistance is the foundation for the reputation of the Serbs as the fiercest fighters in the Balkans.

Throughout the five-hundred-year period of Ottoman control, the southern half of the Balkan peninsula was used as a redoubt for various Turkish forays into Europe against the Hungarians and the Habsburgs, which brought the Turks to the gates of Vienna in the 1600s. Not only were Slovenia and Croatia the exposed southern frontier of Christian Europe, but as the power of the Habsburgs grew, supported in turn by the power of the Roman Catholic church, Slovenia and Croatia identified with their European protectors, accepting as a given that all the Slavic groups caught behind the demarcation line at Kosovo, be they Christian or Muslim, were irretrievable to the West. This perception was more easily accommodated as most of the Christians under Turkish rule were Serbs who were not of the Catholic church but were rather European remnants of the Byzantine or Orthodox church. The religious bitterness and intolerance common in this region over the centuries flares up sporadically from the ashes of old politics and old schisms where two different gods — and differing denominational affiliations of the same god — meet head-on.

I

It is difficult today for Western Europeans and North Americans to understand the force of these ancient rivalries in Yugoslavia. Some commentators, especially in the British press, have wisely observed that the fighting in the summer of 1990 was not over the future of that economically depressed area but over the religious and political wars of the past. One must consider the temptation for politicians, faced with current problems too great to solve in any expeditious manner, to resort to demagoguery. It is so much easier to appeal to the bonds of a known past than to exhort the people to go forward into a cloudy future for which, at this time, no maps exist. That no wonderfully working plan has seemingly come out of the Yugoslav leadership should come as no surprise to students of this tragic confederation; for a thousand years the individual states have all been mere satellites for many of the greater powers in both the East and West.

There is no history of self-determination for a people who not only have been used as political pawns but have been manipulated also by their religious leaders in the service of the politics of religion. Ties between church and state may have been weakened in much of the West, but the Los Angeles Times reported on 21 August of this year that the pope sent his foreign minister to Yugoslavia in order to meet with “Yugoslav bishops who publicly supported Croatia’s bid for independence.” The report continued, “Vatican analysts said they would not be surprised if [Foreign Minister] Tauran also seeks to temper the bishops’ outspoken nationalist fervor in the interests of dialogue and a peaceful settlement.” These are welcome, constructive efforts by Rome based on its centuries-old power in Croatia and Slovenia.

Against this historical background, the survival of the old Communist structure developed by Tito in Serbia can be understood. His alliance with the Russians in the Second World War is easily understood when one considers that the Serbian majority in Yugoslavia had for centuries looked to Orthodox Russia for support. As has been recognized in the recent period of glasnost in the USSR, the Eastern Orthodox church survived the seventy years of communism. For the Serbs, having experienced religious “conversions” at Turkish sword point over the centuries, despots would come and go, but their faith and country would survive forever. It would be more important for the Serbs that the Russians were Orthodox than that they were, in a historical sense, “temporarily occupied” by Communists.

In the first two years of the Second World War, the Serbs sided with the Allies against both the Nazis and Communists, and Colonel Draža Mihailović, the Serbian guerrilla leader, fought Tito. It is possible that an alliance of the ancient enemies of Austria, Germany, and Hungary weighed more heavily in Mihailović’s decision to fight communism than that Russia, the ancient ally, had fallen on the wrong side. That Tito was Croatian and represented the Communists must have made it seem that survival for Mihailović’s people, the Serbs, rested only on an alliance with the new world and that there was no hope left in the old. If indeed Mihailović was such a visionary among people wedded to the past, it is a double tragedy
that recently discovered evidence suggests that his wartime efforts on behalf of the Western alliance were misrepresented and sabotaged by Communist sympathizers in the Philby-McLean network, important in British foreign policy at the time.

In the wake of Tito's execution of Mihailovich and the shambles left by the Second World War, the Serbs, like other Yugoslavs, profited from the stability of Tito's dictatorship no matter how harsh it was. After all, Tito's independent stance vis-à-vis the Soviets created the most durable image of self-determination and resistance to foreign meddling in Yugoslavia's short history. (Unified in 1918 under the Serbian House of Karadjordjevic, the nation-state of Yugoslavia did not actually come into being, under its current name, until 1929.) Although the price of Tito's rule was high for individual Yugoslavs, they had never known a real Western-style democracy, and their pride in a strong nation compensated for their hardships.

II

The history of Yugoslavia should have taught us that the recent wreck of the Yugoslav Federation was an accident waiting to happen. The rivalries among several figures jockeying for power in Yugoslavia, a nation welded together by one strong charismatic leader, Tito, not only are natural but should have been anticipated by foreigners. The last thing needed in this volatile mixture is the taking of sides by outside interests.

The first timid response of the European Community to the need for some peacekeeping effort in the more volatile regions of Yugoslavia did not inspire confidence that any strong contingency plan existed during this past summer. It is hoped that as the Yugoslav economy declines because of civil strife, the leadership of the various republics in the federation will be open to the kind of compromise needed to create the civil stability necessary to attract loans and investments from the EC. This kind of foreign “interference” would be not only constructive but reasonable. Creditors worldwide are expected to set the conditions under which their capital is to be risked.

The most visible of efforts by the U.S. Congress to intervene in Yugoslavia's civil conflict, through a series of ill-conceived resolutions of condemnation, not only reflect misinformation on the current situation but ignore out-of-hand the troubled nation's history. If one acknowledges any wisdom in the assessment of blame by foreign nations, then as indiscriminately as the rain itself this assessment falls on the just and unjust alike. There are so many mistakes of judgment being made each day by almost every major figure on the Yugoslav scene that such extraterritorial partisan condemnation as the Congress engages in serves neither the United States nor Yugoslavia well. These resolutions mirror political pressure on the U.S. Congress by Americans of Croatian and Slovenian extraction, and fuel also seems to be supplied by professional lobbyists employed by the Albanians to keep the political pot boiling in Kosovo where live most of the Albanians who are in Yugoslavia, some 8 percent of the Yugoslav population. These resolutions, setting democratic standards unknown outside Western Europe and North America, are not only counterproductive but also ludicrous, considering the fact that the two states most involved in the dispute, Croatia and Serbia, have authoritarian governments chosen in free elections monitored by international referees.

As stated, press coverage of the Yugoslav crisis in the United States has not been very useful in helping us understand the crisis. For example, many news stories make ominous reference to Serbian and Montenegrin domination of the Yugoslav political system and particularly of the military. The Serbian nation constitutes 37 percent of Yugoslavia's population, compared with Croatia's 20 percent and Slovenia's 8 percent, yet this crucial information is rarely mentioned when statistics are used to explain Serbian success in national elections or in military leadership. Perhaps the refusal of Croats and Slovenians to accept the victory Milosevic's protégé in the 15 May 1989 presidential election, claiming that it represented the will of the “alien” Serbs, should come as no surprise, but the roots of this problem are ensnarled in the thousand-year history of politics and religion in the region and not in the simple parliamentary arithmetic of yeas and nays.

Turning to Yugoslavia's military and diplomatic services, when the American press decries the “Serbianized” federal army, the fact that the defense minister is a Croat and the chiefs of the navy and air force are a Croat and a Slovenian, respectively, is seldom mentioned. Indeed, the top leader-
ship of Yugoslavia’s foreign affairs apparatus—the president of the federation (the de jure commander in chief of the armed forces), prime minister, and foreign minister—is all Croatian. While constituting almost half of Yugoslavia’s population, the Serbs and Montenegrins fill 23 percent of the its ambassadorships; Croats are represented in numbers almost exactly equal to their percentage of the general public (20 percent), and Slovenians are overrepresented, with 18 percent of ambassadorial appointments.

Considering the recent posturings of the U.S. Congress on Yugoslavia, it is unfortunate that reporting on these stories needs greater effort in getting firsthand information and checking sources. The British press seems to be best at obtaining behind-the-scenes information, all of which is necessary for outsiders to make proper judgments about how to deal with the situation. In an article in the “Weekend Section” for 19–21 July 1991 in London’s European, headlined “Lies Win Balkan War of Words,” Simon Freeman reports on a very sophisticated propaganda war being waged from Zagreb and Ljubljana to sway the world’s media to the side of Croatia and Slovenia:

The Croats’ strategy today is clear. They are bombarding the world with information, which is usually so petty that it seems that it must be true. But this is an illusion; it is impossible to check most of these reports precisely because the clashes were so minor that, even if they happened, they left no mark. And, in between the recital of these so-called facts, the Croats toss quite incredible allegations; this week’s favorite is to claim, straight-faced, that the Serbs have hired assassins from the Romanian Securitate.

Zagreb has launched this propaganda blitz after carefully analyzing how the Slovenians managed to out-maneuver Belgrade in the fight for international sympathy. The Croats realized that the decisive engagements, which virtually guaranteed Slovenia’s independence, took place in the pages of the foreign media and even more important, in the news bulletins of the major television networks.

The Serbs, meanwhile, are struggling badly in this propaganda relations battle. They have a leader, Slobodan Milosevic, whose brand of stubborn nationalism and hardline Marxism is a public relations disaster.

Croatia’s success at public relations in the United States is all the more surprising, given the monitoring by the Wiesenthal Center of Croatian president Franjo Tudjman’s insistence that the Holocaust death figures have been exaggerated and of other remarks on issues of contemporary importance to Jews and other minorities in Croatia. And yet the cause of his republic continues to attract substantial congressional support, and Tudjman is frequently pictured as a champion of democratic resistance against Serbian domination. It is no wonder that Serbs living inside Tudjman’s republic fear a repeat of the Croatian atrocities of the Second World War, a fear made all the more pressing by Tudjman’s denial of the evidence of the infamous Janosevec concentration camp—second largest such camp in the Nazi system—where 750,000 Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies were put to death by the Croatian Ustashe regime; Tudjman will grant that “only” 30,000 died there. And he is quick to argue that the Serbian resistance leader Mihailovich killed many Croats, even though a large number of these were probably wearing Nazi uniforms while the Janosevec mass graves revealed the bones of many defenseless women and children.

Up until the current troubles, the tragic memories of the Second World War were put aside after 1945 by both Serbs and Croats in the name of a common Yugoslav citizenship that allowed Croatia and Slovenia to achieve the highest standard of living in the federation. One wonders how “Serbian domination” could have worked so well for the Croats and Slovenians if it were not that the Serbs were genuinely interested in an integrated society. Any action on the part of the present government of Croatia to rekindle these fears—the adoption of the old flag or the change of the names of major squares in Zagreb to reflect the old times—is most unfortunate.

III

The kind of political and geographical isolation the Balkan peninsula—east and west—has experienced, reinforced by poverty and a lack of opportunity for the peoples involved, has created a time warp that is difficult to comprehend in nations run through telecommunications networks, where people climb aboard wide-bodied jets with the same
confidence that the peasant in a Serbian village mounts his mule. Of course, Yugoslavia has its share of wide-bodied jets, too, but at the village level of Serbian existence nothing is more important to the peasant than the land, which he knows and loves, and the God to whom he looks for help, represented by the Orthodox priest in the village. Whoever threatens either threatens his very existence, his survival, and the survival of his family.

The Greeks recognized this affinity of land and nation, labeling love of the land patris, or “fatherland,” from which spring the English words patriot and patriotism and, more meaningfully, in the context of the Balkans, from which the word expatriate is derived. In a time of globalism and fascination with international affairs, these words seem to be dated. But in the time warp of village life in Central Europe it is not so. Every nation in this region has ethnic minorities who still quite literally identify with their father- or homeland even though they are citizens of other countries, in which they see themselves as Ausländer, that graphic German word for “foreigner” that literally means “those who live outside the land.” These are Hungarians and Germans, Slavs and Armenians, Greeks and Albanians who have never assimilated themselves and who, in their dreams, long for their “homeland.”

Many of these ethnic pockets are the result of age-old political cruelty and expediency, when tyrants used civilians as extensions of their armies, leaving farm families behind to dilute the power of the populace when the troops withdrew. Years later, when hostilities between nations ceased, these ethnic minorities were orphaned in what their history would have them believe was hostile territory. Thus emerged a patriotism defying not only belief but reality.

Yet real it is, because, as true expatriates, they believe it and they will call upon every nation in the West, at some point, to help settle these ancient issues as well as the more modern ones of ethnic dislocation in cases as diverse as Vietnam and the movement of European Russians into the eastern provinces of the Russian empire. The most worrisome flash points in the Yugoslav dispute, in the heavily Serbian districts of Krajina and Slavonia inside Croatia and in the heavily Albanian region of Kosovo in Serbia, are the legacies of Tito’s efforts to divide and conquer the Serbs by diluting their overwhelming majority inside the old Serbian kingdom. What is seen from the outside as expansionism on the part of the Serbian leadership in the federation, as it reaches out to incorporate lost Serbian border districts threatened by Croatian nationalism, should be understandable even if it also seems wrongheaded.

IV

The most reasonable answer, the fairest treatment for any of these ethnic minorities in Yugoslavia, would be to recognize by plebiscite the legitimate claims of any Yugoslav ethnic group to territorial self-determination, where the disputed territory is adjacent to a territory or nation controlled by interests more similar to the Ausländer. The legitimacy of the claim would be established by proving that the ethnic settlement in that territory existed before 1941. By accepting 1941 as the end of the first state of Yugoslavia in the interwar period, every mischief of the “illegal” governments during the Second World War could be fairly and legally addressed. If this were adopted in the current climate, it is likely that Slavonia and Krajina would vote to be part of Serbia. Bosnia-Herzegovina would probably remain part of a confederation, but the activist Serbian minority there might desire to return to one of the neighboring Serbian districts. Montenegro would ally itself with the Serbs. Kosovo province would remain Serbian, and the ethnic Albanians, not allowed a petition for plebiscite because they were moved in by Tito after 1941, would have to accept citizenship in the new Yugoslavia, or they too might wish to return to Albania, their homeland. Macedonia might choose to join Bulgaria, and Istria and Dalmatia to become part of Italy. Croatia and Slovenia have already decided on independence.

For the above plan to work, each province would have to accept the plebiscite as a legitimate mechanism for restless minorities to use. The leaders of the various states or nation-states arising from this reshuffling of territories and peoples must also accept the more difficult burden of enforcing the duties of citizenship in the newly configured territories. This means that all further separatist movements and guerrilla activity, after the will of the majorities is worked out through the plebiscites, will be resisted by the central government as illegal and will be handled as any other threat
to the safety of the state, no matter what the politics of the insurgents involved. It cannot be stressed too strongly that in accepting the principle of the plebiscite, self-determination, the critical mass of the idea of the rights and will of the majority must be extended to protect the rights of any remaining minorities, if this plan is to be workable.

If this sounds like a major effort and commitment on the part of the numbers of people involved, one only has to consider the long drawn-out tragedy of Lebanon, which, when finally played out, left the country a hollow shell. There was little conviction, on the part of anyone, that the Lebanese people had been able to salvage a cohesive nation from the ruins. What now stands is a country salvaged by Syria under an accord reached in another foreign country, Saudi Arabia. If the histories of the Lebanese, the Kurds, and the Palestinians have taught us anything, it is that a nation must have a national integrity based upon a commonality of interests and goals. It is no longer acceptable to hold minorities captive by force of arms; conversely, minorities must accept the rule of the majority with the guarantee that their rights will be respected.

A new nation of Yugoslavia, minus half of its old territories, would struggle to overcome economic problems, but it would face those problems unified in spirit and cause. At some economic point of no return, I have hope that when the Second World War generation passes on, Slovenia and Croatia will find, in facing the twenty-first century, that a genuine realpolitik is increasingly an economic one in a time when dimensions of scale in international markets threaten not only small business but small countries.

Those who are eager to see the Yugoslav Federation disbanded must at least ask themselves a fundamental question: What will happen to the 4.6 million people, mostly young and not burdened with the hatreds of the 1940s, who call themselves “Yugoslavs”? The misguided advocates of tribalization in American foreign policy, who also hold lawmakers hostage in both parties, must realize that in a violent dissolution of the federation these persons could be reduced overnight to refugee status. Democratization is a noble goal, but it is not achieved by a return to phony tribalism concocted by mythmakers. In Yugoslavia’s case, a cardinal principle of democracy has been ignored, that the democratic keystone is the individual and not some ethnic aggregate. Must we all forget the “one man, one vote” notion? If the answer is yes, how far down the line do we go to promote the politics of tribalization in a region known as Europe’s tinderbox?

In the life of a nation, the struggling federation of Yugoslav republics is just now at the starting line, when anything, good or bad, is possible. If the plebiscite that I propose seems revolutionary to some, it holds the promise of being a legal, contained revolution, hopefully offering the least disruption to the minorities involved. And if some must make major changes in their lives, with the strong support of the governments involved, they will have the opportunity of planning their future rather than fleeing their past in terror. If this can be worked out for Yugoslavia, it would truly be an end to a tragic history.
AUSTRIAN JEWS FEAR REVIVAL OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN CROATIA

Croatia's Jewish Community said on Thursday that an article in the latest edition of the community's monthly newspaper Die Gemeinde (The Community), to be published on Friday, accused Croatian President Franjo Tudjman of making anti-Semitic remarks.

"Even before this civil war broke out there was an anti-Semitic build-up," the article said.

During Croatia's first free elections last year, Tudjman told a rally he was proud that his wife was "neither a Serb nor a Jewess," it said.

And a book published by Tudjman two years ago talked disparagingly of Jews and expressed understanding for Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler.

During World War Two Croatia was nominally independent under the patronage of Nazi Germany and Italy, and in vicious fighting between Serbs and Croats at that time the Croatian Ustasha regime massacred Serbs and Jews and gypsies.

Serbia has justified its role in protecting ethnic Serbs in Croatia by fears that such massacres could be repeated.

Croatian authorities have repeatedly denied accusations of anti-Semitism and promised to respect the rights of all peoples living in their republic.

But the Vienna Jewish Community article said that Ustasha nexuses were openly on sale in Zagreb, and some members of the Croatian National Guard, defending Croatia against Serbian irregulars and the Serb-led Yugoslav army, were wearing Ustasha badges on their uniforms.

Croat authorities were keen to remain on good terms with Jews today, not least to prove their democratic credentials, it said.

"The state organs of Croatia have striven recently for correct relations with the little Jewish community with the establishment of a Jewish community centre (on the former site of Zagreb's main synagogue, destroyed in 1941)," the article said.

But Zagreb police had so far failed to come up with any explanation for a bomb attack on the present Jewish community centre last August.

A 5,000 to 6,000 Jews live in Yugoslavia today, with 4,000 to 5,000 in Belgrade, 1,200 in Zagreb and 1,000 in Sarajevo.

David Albahari, President of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia, told the newspaper that many were now emigrating to Israel, notably because of anti-Semitism but for fear of being drawn into the Serb-Croat conflict.

"A young Jew from Zagreb told me the very idea that he could be in a situation in which he had to shoot at his Jewish friend from Belgrade, made it impossible for him to remain in Yugoslavia," Albahari said.

REUTERS JL JMN JR
Croatian extremist spoiling for wider war

Associated Press

NASTIC Yugoslav's "Y" emblem of Croatia's World War II Ustasha fascists, daubed on garish yellow posters in this battle-scarred east Croatian town, is a disturbing sign of the region's growing extremism.

Banned during decades of communism, ultranationalism is on the rise in Croatia, fueled by what many Croats see as their government's inability to win a war against Serb insurgents and the Yugoslav army, and the West's unwillingness to stop it.

The "Y" symbol, splashed on posters outside Naisce, a central hotel, invited locals to join the Croatian Party of Rights.

A second poster advertised the party's aim: an independent Croatian state, free of the "Serbo-Communist Yugoslav army," extending southeast to the Drina River and on to Belgrade, the Yugoslav and Serbian capital.

Such dreams of territorial expansionism are also held by Serb ultranationalists who want to carve off chunks of Croatia from the Hungarian border to the Adriatic Sea to form a "Greater Serbia."

The most extremist Serbs envision extending the war beyond Yugoslavia's borders. "By New Year, we will have war with Hungary," predicted Arkan, the leader of one of Serbia's myriad militias, who would not disclose his last name.

Founded in 1981 on a radical anti-Serb platform, the Party of Rights is Croatia's oldest political party.

It was banned when Yugoslavia became a royal dictatorship in 1929, and its leader, Ante Pavelic, fled to Italy. There he founded the Ustasha movement, before returning in 1941 as the puppet Independent State of Croatia, which he governed until 1945.

The party was again legalized in 1950, but remained firmly on the fringe of Croatian politics until recently, when it began gathering mainstream support.

The Party of Rights has two main selling points. It is harshly critical of Croatia's nationalist President Franjo Tudjman for losing control of one-third of Croatia's territory since declaring independence on June 25.

The second is the strong battlefield performance of its military arm, the Croatian Defense Unit.

Milan Vukovic, the Party of Right's deputy president, says membership has rocketed from 110,000 two months ago to "definitely more than 150,000 and maybe over 200,000."

In recent weeks, more than 20 new branches have been founded, mainly in conflict hotspots such as the east Croatian towns of Osijek, Vukovar, Vinkovci and Naisce.

"The people there feel Tudjman has sold them out," said Vukovic, a smooth-talking ethnic Croat, who is a resident of Houston. "We can't print enough membership forms."

The party is funded by Croats living abroad, who belong to more than 200 branches in 10 countries. The Party of Rights initially supported Tudjman, a former communist general, "as the least of all evils," in the spring 1990 elections, Vukovic said.

But, he said, Tudjman has since demonstrated "he's not a good general, he's a lousy politician, and he's winning enemies."
As Croatia’s defense collapsed in several ethnically-mixed regions amid widespread rumors of leadership corruption and war profiteering, ever more Croats have lent their support to the Party of Rights.

Well-armed troops of its Croatian Defense Units can now be seen fighting on most east Croatian front lines.

Vukovac said regular Croatian guard units, disgruntled by lack of weapons and strategy, have defected en masse to the party’s militia.

The Party of Rights president, Dobroslav Paraga, denies his party has fascist tendencies, and says Tudjman is afraid of the growing power of the party and its militia.

Krešimir Pijacko, deputy chief editor of Croatia’s leading daily Vjesnik, said he could not verify the party’s claims of burgeoning support, but said Paraga’s rise was worrying. “Paraga is not under any control, he’s outside Parliament ... and he can’t really lose.”

Antisemitism in Central and Eastern Europe

A CURRENT SURVEY

October 1991

Institute of Jewish Affairs
11 Herford Street
London W1Y 7DX
5.6.3 The recently published draft of the country's new Constitution forbids any discrimination on racial grounds (Article 30.7). In a recent debate on a draft law on national security the Assembly of Deputies (one of the parliament's two chambers, the other being the Senate) declined after a vociferous debate to re-introduce the interdiction on antisemitic manifestations in the law. The interdiction had been replaced by a more general one forbidding "racist" manifestations. Some deputies used the debate to launch personal attacks on Rabbi Rosen who, they claimed, had sought to hold the entire Romanian nation "culpable" by raising the issue of past and present antisemitism.112

6. YUGOSLAVIA

6.1 The Jewish community and past experience of antisemitism

6.1.1 The Jewish community of Yugoslavia is currently estimated at 5,000 (equal Sephardi and Ashkenazi). The first Jewish settlement on what is now Yugoslav territory is believed to have been established over 2,000 years ago. Owing to the civil war that has broken out in the country the state of Yugoslavia no longer effectively exists.

6.1.2 It is generally accepted that there is no tradition of antisemitism in Yugoslavia. There are no antisemitic organizations in the country as such. As far as can be ascertained, no opinion polls related to Jewish affairs have ever been conducted in Yugoslavia. Under Yugoslav law, all nations and ethnic minorities are guaranteed full and equal human rights and there are laws against incitement to ethnic hatred. There are no specific laws with regard to antisemitism.

6.1.3 Since the Second World War Jews have held important posts in Yugoslav government, scientific, cultural and research institutions.113

6.1.4 Despite the strong pro-Arab orientation of Yugoslav foreign policy following the Six Day War in 1967, Jews in Yugoslavia have not suffered particular harassment. Although Yugoslavia severed diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967, the countries have maintained bilateral economic and cultural relations.

6.1.5 It has been suggested that Jews have ceased to identify themselves as such and find it more practical to change their Jewish names to Slavonic ones. The Yugoslav Jewish writer and translator David Alahari, who is now


113 Jews prominent in Yugoslav life include: Moshe Pijade, the highly celebrated partisan who served as Vice-President of Yugoslavia and President of Yugoslavia's Federal Assembly in the 1950s; Branko Horva, Yugoslavia's most prominent economist, former director of the Economics Institute in Belgrade and Nobel Prize nominee; Slavko Goldstein, well-known publisher, former president of the Jewish community of Zagreb and former director of Zagreb University Press, and one of Croatia's first and most active proponents of a Western-style multi-party system; Danilo Kis, internationally acclaimed novelist and short story writer.
President of Yugoslav Jewry's representative body, the Federation of Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia (FJCY), has remarked that Jews in Yugoslavia have undergone assimilation which, he says, "will continue despite the fact that the Jewish faith does not recognize the process of assimilation". The majority of Yugoslav Jews have married non-Jews and more than half are over the age of forty-five.¹¹⁴

6.1.6 Antisemitic manifestations and incidents have occurred during the history of Yugoslav Jewry but have been sporadic and limited for the most part to local disputes among businessmen. The role of the Jews in interwar (1918-41) Yugoslav politics was minor and no organized antisemitic movement existed in Yugoslavia before 1941.

6.1.7 In the interwar period there was no clear pattern to the various instances of antisemitic activity. Antisemitic manifestations and incidents were never officially sanctioned either by local or regional governments. Boycotts of Jewish businesses normally failed and most expressions of antisemitic activity were suppressed by the police. In the 1930s several newspapers in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia published articles of an antisemitic nature and small right-wing parties increasingly made antisemitic remarks.

6.1.8 The Nazi genocide did not spare the Jews of Yugoslavia. There were about 76,000 Yugoslav Jews and another 2,000-3,000 Jewish transients from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Germany in Yugoslavia when Axis forces invaded the country in April 1941. Over 80 per cent of Yugoslav Jewry perished between 1941 and 1945. Around 5,000 Jews joined the Communist partisans; 1,300 of them were killed.

6.2 Antisemitic publications and literature

6.2.1 In May 1989 photocopies of an antisemitic pamphlet originally published in 1934 and containing the notorious antisemitic forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion appeared in Belgrade.¹¹⁵ Publication of the Protocols had been banned by officials in 1985 following its re-appearance in a book entitled Tajanstveni Svet Masona (The Mysterious World of the Freemasons), which was written by a Macedonian named Vlado Popovski. Popovski was accused by a founding member of the FJCY of popularizing a "sinister and twisted document... which Nazi German propaganda used as further proof that the world should be liberated from the Jewish plot (resulting in the call for massive annihilation of the Jews)."¹¹⁶ It is unknown how many copies of the pamphlet were distributed in 1989, but the Belgrade authorities swiftly confiscated copies from book stores and kiosks near Belgrade University and the student dormitories.

¹¹⁴ Interview, 17 February 1984.
¹¹⁶ Aleksander Mosic, Interview, 17 February 1984.

6.2.2 In August 1989 the Protocols were again published in Yugoslavia—on this occasion in installments by Tribuna, the bi-weekly of the students' association at Ljubljana University.¹¹⁷ That October the FJCY, describing the student magazine's actions as a "neo-Nazi manifestation", filed a criminal suit against Tribuna.¹¹⁸ The Jewish organization stated that "it is simply unbelievable that such material is being spread in cultural and civilized circles", adding, that it did not believe that "Slovenes would support such an irresponsible pro-Nazi act committed by the magazine". Ljubljana's Public Prosecutor dismissed the criminal charges. On 9 November 1990 the Society of Serbian-Jewish Friendship protested strongly to Ljubljana's officials against this and other manifestations of fascism in Slovenia.¹¹⁹

6.2.3 The Russell Tribunal, then headed by the prominent Yugoslav historian Vladimir Dedijer, launched an investigation into the Tribuna affair and issued a statement sharply critical of the publication and Joze Skoč, then President of Slovenia's Socialist Youth League (now the Liberal Party). Dedijer pointed out that in March 1989 Skoč had told Mladen, the official voice of the Slovenian Socialist Youth League, that "Jews are against the Slovenian Youth League because they requested money from [us] and did not receive it". Dedijer concluded that the incident was "unfortunate because throughout Slovenian history the Slovenes have fought against the German genocidal yoke and clerical violence".¹²⁰

6.2.4 In an interview with the Zagreb bi-weekly Start (a toned-down Yugoslav version of Playboy) in 1986, Slavko Goldstein, a prominent Jewish leader in Zagreb, emphasized that there was no antisemitism in Yugoslavia.¹²¹ However, in March 1990, Goldstein reversed his earlier assessment.¹²² The issue pointed out that he was disturbed by the publication of an interview with Ivko Omrčin, a representative of Croatia's fascist government to Berlin during the war who had subsequently become an American citizen, and who had appeared in the Independent Split weekly Slobodna Tjesnica. Omrčin had told the weekly that Goldstein, in his capacity as President of the Croatian Social Liberal Alliance, had received over $120,000 from American Jewish organizations and that Franjo Tudjman (who became President of Croatia in May 1990) is "the best man to govern his people". Goldstein said that "not since 1945 have I read such an obscene antisemitic article in our press" and added that he was particularly disappointed by the Omrčin interview for "as I stated in Start over three years ago that there is no antisemitism in Croatia. My views have frequently been cited in the domestic..."
Indeed, with the end of the Communist system and the emergence of nationalist republican governments throughout Yugoslavia after multi-party elections in 1990, there has been growing concern on the part of several Yugoslav scholars about the rise of right-wing extremism. The most disturbing phenomenon is the emergence of Croatian right-wing parties, some of which are represented in both the local and republican government and have glorified the war-time Ustashe regime. Dr Tudjman has made efforts to distance his regime from this period of Croatian history and told US Jewish leaders in autumn 1990 that his government would not tolerate any manifestations of antisemitism. More recently, in October 1991, István László, Co-Chairman of the Governing Board of the World Jewish Congress and a leading member of the Australian Jewish community, met in Melbourne with Tomislav Bosnjak, Secretary General of the Croatian National Congress. The Croatian representative declared that an independent Croatia would not tolerate antisemitism and would dissociate itself from its pre-Nazi past.

6.3 Antisemitic manifestations and incidents

Antisemitic manifestations have, however, persisted in Croatia in recent months. On 19 August 1991 two bombs exploded in Zagreb, one damaging the Mirotal Salam Freibergar Jewish Community Centre, the other destroying two graves in a Jewish cemetery. The Croatian authorities immediately blamed the attacks on “Serbian terrorists anxious to discredit Croatian efforts” and the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs offered a reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those responsible. However, local Jewish community leaders criticized the Croatian authorities for “having reached a conclusion without beginning an investigation.”

On 21 August 1991 President Tudjman told Ante Obrad, President of the Croatian-Jewish Society of Los Angeles who was in Zagreb, that Jews in Croatia need have no fear that they would be a target of recrimination. At the same time, Stevie Goldstein told the Zagreb daily Vjesnik that the bombings provided an opportunity for the Croatian authorities to distance themselves from the acts of small vendors of Ustashe and other fascist and Nazi symbols and publications in the city’s Ban Jelacic Square which had apparently been going on since spring 1991. Despite complaints by local Jewish leaders and human rights activists, the vendors reportedly continue to sell their wares.

The Jerusalem Post recently noted that there had been no reported cases in which Jews had been endangered during the civil strife in Yugoslavia and that there had been no mass exodus of Yugoslav Jews to Israel. The newspaper observed that in the past three years only forty-five Jews had emigrated from Yugoslavia to Israel.

Stevie Goldstein recently described the “active backing” by Serbia’s ruling League of Communists (now the Socialist Party) of the founding of the Serbian-Jewish Friendship Society in March 1989 as the first attempt to manipulate the Jewish community. Goldstein said that Zagreb’s Jewish community “for the first time ever had to distance itself from its Jewish associates in Belgrade”. He added that the current Croatian leadership was “refusing to admit that Zagreb’s Jewish community should say that antisemitism... never existed in Croatia and that Jews have always lived better here than in Serbia. Unfortunately, this is not true.”

According to Aleksandar Miozic of the FJCY, “As Holocaust victims, we feel deeply shaken by all nationalistic disturbances and frictions among nationalities in Yugoslavia since we feel it on our skin how far this can go.” That Yugoslavia’s small Jewish community will be singled out by any side as a target of ethnic-religious hatred is unlikely. But a near state of anarchy prevails in many parts of Yugoslavia today, and Yugoslavia’s Jews again find themselves in the midst of a fratricidal war.

184 Danas (Zagreb), 13 November 1990. See also IJA Briefing, vol. 1, no. 4, December 1990.
**Canadian defends support for private Croatian army**

Donations used for clothes and food, not weapons

BY ROGERS

The Canadian government has been criticized for its support of the Croatian army, and the government's position has been defended in an interview with a Canadian journalist.

"We support the Croatian army because they are fighting for the independence of Croatia," said Mr. Pauke, a representative of the Canadian embassy.

The army, he said, is fighting against SERBS and Croats, and has been fighting for the last 10 years.

"We believe that the army is necessary to maintain peace and stability," Pauke added.

But some critics argue that the army is not fighting for peace, but rather for the personal interests of its leaders.

"The army is a tool for the personal enrichment of its leaders," said Mr. Dukic, a member of the opposition party.

"We believe that the army should be reformed and made more transparent," Dukic added.

The Canadian government has been under pressure to explain its support for the army, and has faced criticism from some quarters.

"We believe that the army is necessary to maintain peace and stability," Pauke added.

The Canadian embassy has been defending its position, and has been engaging in a media campaign to explain its support for the army.

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REPORTER: REUTER 09-25-91 01:45 PCT

BY PAUL HOLLIS

ZAGREB, Yugoslavia, Sept 25, Reuters - An ultra-nationalist Croatian militant shot dead by police was buried on Wednesday amid calls from his party for a Greater Croatia and calls from his family for his political assassination to be uncovered.

The Croatian Interior Ministry has said a policeman opened fire on Parazidk's car when it failed to stop. The HNS says the car did stop and that the policeman fired intentionally, hitting Parazidk 13 times.

"We look for those who committed this crime in police circles as well. There will be no peace until the truth comes out," HNS leader Dobravlja Paradzik said in an oration at Zagreb's Miroglo cemetery.

His brother had been killed recently, who was a member of the movement for an independent Croatian state, seen as a threat to the Drina river.

The river cuts through the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, Yugoslavia's biggest war-ravaged region.

The HNS's Serbian people, a prisoner against its declaration of independence in June.

Parazidk's death has heightened tension between the minority HNS and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, who was against the idea of a joint government.

The former (communist) regime killed my friends, and I believe that..." he said.

Police have killed our vice-president because people from the communist regime are in top positions in the new government in Croatia," Paradzik said on Sunday.

He has made little attempt to disguise sympathy for the war's puppet regime set up by the Nazi which massacred Serbs, Jews and Gypsies, and has described its leader Ante Pavelic as a fascist and liberal Democrat.

A European Community-sponsored ceasefire plan, whose implementation Tudjman is negotiating with the Serb leadership, has failed to stop the fighting.

"There is a political decision to get rid of them,"

Croatian Information Minister Branko Salaj said of the HNS.

Salaj termed the figure "absolutely wrong" but gave no estimate.

REPORTER: JMN JN

10 AP 08-27-91 06:03 PCT

BY SLOBODAN KONJACI

Associated Press Writer

Croat guardsmen were lowered into the coffin of their fascist salute, the HNS, which was shot in the air three times as the coffin of HNS President Ante Paradzik, draped in the red, white and blue Croatian flag, was lowered into a grave under the eyes of 5,000 mourners.

His grave was decked with wreaths of flowers bearing the words "Sa Dom Spratnik" (To fight for the Homeland) -- a slogan much used by the Ustasa fascist regime in Croatia in World War II.

Paradzik, 47, was shot dead at a police roadblock on the edge of Zagreb on Saturday night when he returned to the Croatian capital from a party meeting in the province.

The Croatian Interior Ministry has said a policeman opened fire on Paradzik's car when it failed to stop.

The HNS says the car did stop and that the policeman fired intentionally, hitting Paradzik 13 times.

"We look for those who committed this crime in police circles as well. There will be no peace until the truth comes out," HNS leader Dobravlja Paradzik said in an oration at Zagreb's Miroglo cemetery.

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Salaj termed the figure "absolutely wrong" but gave no estimate.

REPORTER: JMN JN
Statement of Congressman Dennis Eckart
CSCE Hearing on the Conflict in Yugoslavia
October 31, 1991

Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the opportunity to attend today’s hearing. I appreciate your holding this hearing to focus attention on the ongoing conflict in Yugoslavia.

As you know, the people of Slovenia and Croatia, through free elections, have demonstrated their desire to establish a democratic society with a market economy. Unfortunately, another ethnic majority in Yugoslavia has suppressed their hopes and aspirations with violence. The violence occurring in Croatia has overtaken any real progress towards the establishment of democracy in Slovenia and Croatia. Innocent people are being killed in the senseless shelling; cities, like the historic city of Dubrovnik, are being destroyed.

The United States, the beacon of democracy, has sat idly by as newborn democracies are being crushed. These republics look to the United States for moral support and encouragement during their time of crisis. I have written several letters to President George Bush urging that he take a stand on the situation in Yugoslavia. As a Slovenian American, I will continue to encourage the United States to stand up for democracy, self-determination and market economies and seek to end this abominable violence.

Ralph R. Johnson was named Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs in July 1981. Mr. Johnson previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs. In that position, he was responsible for Northern Europe, Southern Europe and European Community affairs, and was the Bureau’s Economic Deputy Assistant Secretary. Prior to that assignment, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade and Commercial Affairs in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (August 1986 to June 1989).


In Washington, Mr. Johnson occupied positions in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (1979-1981). He served as the Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Bilateral Affairs, Japan and Eastern and Western Europe at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (1983-1985). In September 1985, he returned to the Department of State to become Director of the Office of European Regional Political and Economic Affairs in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs.

Mr. Johnson received a Presidential Meritorious Award in 1989 and a Superior Honor Award in 1987.

Mr. Johnson holds a B.A. from Seattle University (1963) and an M.A. from Columbia University (1965). He speaks Spanish and Polish. He is married and has two children.

1991
BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN R. LAMPE

John R. Lampe, Director of East European Studies, at The Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. since 1967, is also Professor of History at the University of Maryland, College Park. He received his B.A. from Harvard University, his M.A. from the University of Minnesota, and Ph.D. in 1971 from the University of Wisconsin. He was a Foreign Service Officer in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria from 1964 to 1967. He is the author of The Bulgarian Economy in the 20th Century (1986), and co-author of Balkan Economic History, 1550-1990: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations (1982), which won the Vucinich Prize of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, and Yugoslav-American Economic Relations since World War II (1990).

STATEMENT BY RAFAEL JOHNSON,
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
OCTOBER 31, 1991

Mr. Chairman:

When the leaders of the United States, Canada and the nations of Europe met in 1975 to sign the Helsinki Final Act, they could not have imagined the changes that would sweep Europe and the world in the course of the next 16 years. They knew they were making history, but they could not know just how important their work would become, or the extent to which the Helsinki Final Act would serve as a powerful beacon for the forces of democracy and human rights throughout Europe and the world. Today it is taken for granted that the principles enunciated at Helsinki are fundamental to securing a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future for all.

Today, thanks to NATO's stalwart defense of freedom and the power of democratic ideas embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, the Iron Curtain is history. The countries of Eastern Europe are joining the democratic community of nations, and CSCE principles of democracy and human rights are at the heart of the current transformation taking place in the USSR. As Secretary Baker stated in Berlin last year, a Euro-Atlantic community
based on the shared values expressed through the CSCE process, and extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok, is taking shape.

No one would dispute that this is a success story, and that CSCE has played a vital role in it. Yet CSCE’s work is far from done. Many of the challenges that confronted the leaders who gathered in Helsinki in 1975 have been met, but in their place are new and difficult problems that require the engagement of the United States and its fellow CSCE members every bit as much. For in Eastern Europe and the USSR, the problem of repressive communism has given way to a new set of challenges which arise from the transition to democratic government and civil societies. Among the most serious of these challenges is inter-ethnic tension and aggressive nationalism. Inter-ethnic tension helped set off the European powder-keg in 1914, and today it is again one of the greatest threats to democracy, human rights, peace, progress and stability in post-Cold War Europe. That threat has been most clearly demonstrated in Yugoslavia.

You have asked me here today to discuss the international response to the crisis in Yugoslavia, and the role of the CSCE process in that response. Let me begin by reiterating what I said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee earlier this month: the most constructive thing that we can do, together with the international community, is use our influence and powers of persuasion to convince the parties to this conflict that none of them can win, and indeed all of them can only lose, if the violence is not stopped. We can support efforts to mediate an end to the fighting, and work to keep doors open for a peaceful resolution of disputes. But we alone cannot resolve this conflict. Only the peoples of Yugoslavia and their leaders can do that.

We have believed from the beginning of this crisis that CSCE could play a crucial role in achieving a peaceful settlement. In August 1990, we and other CSCE members invoked the Human Dimension Mechanism in response to serious violations of human rights throughout Yugoslavia. Late last year, when it became increasingly clear that Yugoslavia was heading into crisis, the U.S. took the lead in pressing for a coordinated response among CSCE members. In our initial consultations with other CSCE members as early as October 1990, we proposed a number of possible steps, including CSCE mediation and a coordinated public posture by all CSCE members. Since that time, we have held regular consultations on Yugoslavia within CSCE, including at the Berlin Ministerial meeting in June. In Berlin, CSCE established a procedure for calling emergency meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials. Recognizing the urgent nature of the Yugoslav situation, the U.S. supported the rapid convening of the first such emergency meeting on Yugoslavia, which met July 3-4. This was followed by emergency meetings on August 6-9, September 3-4, and October 10. These meetings have served
to focus high-level CSCE attention on the Yugoslav crisis. In particular, they:

-- established the CSCE mandate for the EC's mediation and monitoring efforts;

-- expanded the monitoring effort to include non-EC member states;

-- reinforced the consensus against the use of force in Yugoslavia to settle political disputes or to change internal or external borders;

-- established the principle of holding individuals responsible for the continued violence accountable under international law; and

-- insisted that an effective political solution to the crisis must contain international guarantees for the protection of the rights of those belonging to minorities, in accordance with CSCE principles.

The Committee of Senior Officials also agreed on October 22 to send a human rights rapporteur mission to Yugoslavia, to obtain accurate information on the human rights situation in all the republics.

I believe that without the CSCE framework there would not have been a coordinated international response to the tragic situation in Yugoslavia. The current peace process, which despite its frustrations has made an essential contribution toward laying the groundwork for an ultimate settlement, would not have been organized. And we would not have had a mechanism for the regular ongoing consultations with other concerned countries, such as those that led to the tripartite U.S./Soviet/EC statement on Yugoslavia of October 18. So I think it's fair to say that CSCE has been of crucial importance to efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, and I am confident that it will continue to be.

I also think that CSCE has been strengthened institutionally as a result of the Yugoslav crisis. Remember that it was only in November of 1990 that CSCE established a formal political consultation process, consisting of annual meetings of the Council of Ministers and more frequent meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials (COSO). The emergency meeting mechanism, by which the COSO can be summoned on short notice, was established only in June of this year. Thus, the Yugoslav crisis proved to be something of a "baptism by fire" for these new mechanisms, one which CSCE has weathered well.

In particular, the crisis has demonstrated the value of the COSO as an "on-call" consultative body within CSCE. Its ability to meet frequently, on short notice, to discuss the situation as
events unfold and to take action has made CSCE's role a critical one and given CSCE an operational capability that it never had previously. The U.S. role in this has been critical. Our delegation to the CSO meetings has played a very active role in creating consensus on several sensitive issues, as well as developing broad support for specific CSCE actions such as the sending of a human rights rapporteur mission to Yugoslavia.

Although I certainly hope that no other country or region of Europe descends into the bloody chaos that we have seen in Yugoslavia, I believe that the experience we have gained in dealing with this crisis has strengthened the process and will make CSCE more effective in the future.

As far as additional steps within CSCE, much will depend on what happens on the ground in Yugoslavia and the attitudes of the peace process participants. Right now the outlook for a lasting ceasefire and comprehensive settlement is not very bright, and the EC has said that it may impose sanctions next week against those parties to this conflict who are blocking agreement on a framework for achieving a settlement. We are prepared to support the EC if it determines that such steps are necessary, and we are considering actions that we might take ourselves. We have also given our full support to the U.N. Secretary General's efforts to support the EC's work in Yugoslavia.

Some have asked why the U.S. has not pushed for a more active role for CSCE in resolving the Yugoslav crisis. This ignores an important fact: the current peace process is a CSCE-mandated effort. The EC mediation and monitoring efforts are being carried out under a CSCE mandate. The Dutch EC Presidency and EC member states have taken the lead in mediation and monitoring in their capacity as members of CSCE, and at the unanimous request of all CSCE countries. We have supported this arrangement for several reasons. The EC was acceptable to all parties in Yugoslavia as a mediator, and it actively sought that role.

Others have asked why the U.S. is supporting the EC's efforts, rather than taking the lead ourselves. We believe that Europe has the most at stake in this crisis, and also that Europe's practical leverage -- economic as well as political -- is greater than ours. Taken as a whole, Europe's trade and investment ties with Yugoslavia are nearly 20 times larger than ours. That doesn't mean, however, that we are not actively involved. Along with to Ambassador Maresca's work in CSCE, our Ambassador in Belgrade is in almost constant touch with the leaders of all parties to this conflict. He and his staff have been engaged every day in working to bring the parties together and prevent a worsening of the conflict. Here in Washington, we too have been active. We imposed an arms embargo in July, long before the U.N. took action on a global basis, and we have restricted our economic assistance to projects supporting
democracy and economic reform. Deputy Secretary Eagleburger and many other officials have met with a long list of Yugoslav central and republic leaders, as well as with opposition politicians and human rights activists.

I cannot tell you that we see a light at the end of the tunnel, or that this crisis will be over by Christmas. But we believe there is no better approach to resolving this tragedy than what we and our fellow CSCE members have done and are continuing to do.

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YUGOSLAVIA FROM CRISIS TO TRAGEDY

"Only the devil's own plus could have designed what we are now doing to ourselves, destroying in a few days what took decades, even centuries to build." These sad words from someone who still feels Yugoslav refer not only to the physical damage done to a city—now buzzes to say "like Dubrovnik," because there are some like it—but also to the damage done to ethnic relations in a region of interminably mixed populations. Reporting on recent visits to Belgrade and Sarajevo before a large audience in a Wilson Center Noon Discussion on October 9, John Lampre found no master plan or international conspiracy at work to explain the death and damage, but rather a series of failures on the Croatian side as well as the more publicized Serbian side, now compounded by the failure of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to maintain its neutral role in the eyes of non-Serbs. He especially lamented the effects of inflammatory propaganda in the Belgrade and Zagreb media.

Lampre introduced himself not only as Director of East European Studies at the Wilson Center, but also as a scholar whose quarter-century of studying the Yugoslav economy made even distant witness to the emerging civil war personally painful. Now the lessons encoded in his Yugoslavia-American Economic Relations since World War II, with Russell O. Prickett and Lyubka Adamevac for Duke University Press (1990), seemed suddenly irrelevant. He nonetheless rejected the conventional wisdom often found in the Western press that the Yugoslav was an "artificial Allied creation" in 1918, binding together long-standing ethnic enemies, or that its Communist regime since 1945 had remained what it surely was at the start, a "totalitarian region under Tito's rigid dictatorship." The political failings of the interwar and postwar regimes were of course considerable. But they must be balanced against the absence of ethnic violence or even widespread Serb-Croat antagonism before the First World War and some genuine economic and cultural binding together in the first and second Yugoslavias. The present militancy on both sides refers most uncomfortably, Lampre noted, to settling scores left from the destructive internal division of the Second World War. Now the killing has resumed, against the prospect of either new divisions or a forced Serbian-led unity that Tito's demonized Yugoslavia of the 1970s had made impossible. All this suggests that a new single framework—perhaps now of virtually sovereign states—is essential for this multi-ethnic space still called Yugoslavia to survive in peace.

What this agreed framework might be, the current civil war makes it impossible to say. The Yugoslav National Army's full offensive seems to discredit permanently the old "socialist, federal" framework of the Communist era. The prospect of separate nation-states for each of the major ethnic groups may work well enough for homogeneous Slovenia, but badly for Serbia and Croatia and not at all for Bosnia-Hercegovina, where Serb and Croat minorities are intermingled with a Bosnian Muslim plurality of 46 percent that resists inclusion in either camp. Lampre devoted most of his subsequent remarks to doubts about how much longer the army could sustain its campaign around almost all of Croatia's long frontier, largely with Bosnia-Hercegovina, and to lament lost opportunities in Croatia as well as Serbia for avoiding open conflict. In addition, more hopeful impressions from Sarajevo that were mentioned only briefly in his oral presentation are appended here as a separate piece. They address the crucial role that Bosnia will now play in stopping or spreading this civil war.

The latest news combined with the army's asserted weaknesses may, by the time of this publication, have brought the fighting to a conclusion. The poor training and distribution of equipment to Serbian forces has not been accurately reported in the Western press. Little attention has been given, Lampre went on, to the supply of new one-year draft conscripts to areas hardest hit in Serbia (if not in Montenegro) and impossible elsewhere. Perhaps the most important of the fail-offensive, the central problem of command and control has not worked well enough to use a huge advantage in firepower to take even one major town in vulnerable eastern Slovenia. One observer at a recent public meeting in Sarajevo that debated the army's role in a democracy called its
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The same September issue exposed the resistance in Serbia to mobilising reserve units and the severe, sometimes tragic, consequences of units sent to the front. Meanwhile, the complex of publications around the once-respected newpaper Politika continues to work under Milosevic-appointed editors and to avoid such issues. They suggest instead that Serbs' ethnic survival, even in Serbia, depends on resistance to a Croatian regime ruminated from the Second World War and linked to some dark German plan to reconstitute influence that the Third Reich failed to sustain.

Western journalists reporting primarily from Zagreb have joined the Croatian press in skewering three intractable continuities in the former Yugoslavia's internally divided society. They have generally paved less sensitive to the failure of Croatia's democratically elected government to live up to the promises a free press, free markets, and the protection of minority rights that would have reassured in 600,000 Serbs and challenged the Serbian public to demand that their government follow the Croatian model. Instead, we have seen less polarisation in Zagreb than in Belgrade and the transplanting of constitutional provisions and national symbols that make Croatia the only "nationality" (others are "ethnics" or "nationalities") or at least, "nationality group". While the new government did not order the loyalty oath to Croatia and the feelings of Serbs at enterprises that has widely occurred, neither has it managed to prevent a growing backlash.

The recent fate of the respected journal Dana provides perhaps the only case of how the communist organs have dealt with dissent. One of its first steps was to set up a new board to oversee the independent publications of the weekly magazine Vijesti and now, the tabloid newspaper Vjesnik. Dana included. The admirable effort starting from Sarajevo to create a single YUSET network for balanced, coordinated news efforts has been cut off, first in Zagreb and now in Belgrade. With two major exceptions, the local press has fled the other side, as well as the criticism of its own government. President Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia. The two major exceptions are the independent weekly magazines Vjesnik from Belgrade and Dana from Zagreb. Vjesnik has published the transcripts of dicta meetings where Milosevic's own words acknowledge the existence of the so-called RAM plan to use the army to cut a corridor to the Adriatic coast that would split Croatia and leave it isolated.

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his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 95 percent of the votes in last year's free elections cannot however be fairly said to accept such restrictions as a prelude to relinquishing the strict restrictions of the wartime Ustaše regime. They are a later generation reacting instead to more recent events. They share the inescapable fact that the Serbs of Croatia were favored in high-level enterprises as well as positions throughout the Communist era. They also have the key debatable impact that the Serbian political leader since 1956, Slobodan Milosevic, advocated a Yugoslav in which Serbian and Communist hegemony would predominate. The early departure of economic liberals from the new Milosevic leadership of the Serbian League of Communists left the field to political survivors from the prewar period. The subsequent set of policies that have engendered the political and now the educational representatives of the huge Albanian majority in Kosovo, on the admittedly belatedly expressed Serb minority leaned to Croats in Croatia to foreshadow similar restrictions against them on behalf of their Serb majority. That this was Milosevic's actual plan is obvious. Indeed, the notion of him as a "Bolshevik" or any other kind of ideologue is unconceivable even to his political opponents in Belgrade. They seemed to have the upper hand in March, when police assaulted student demonstrators in Belgrade and popular discontent with a falling economy and Serbian political isolation in Europe was ready to boil over. Both the democratic and nationalist opposition groups had their advantages, however, and the moment passed, partly because of Milosevic's superior skills as a politician. The military and the cabinet minister that had pushed Milosevic's approval rating back over 30 percent. The independent media campaign against Croatia and aligned Central European co-publishers has also revived. Lango concluded, helping to keep Jews isolated. It is separate from more than its people deserve, diplomatically from Europe and politically from traditions of multi-party democracy and a free press that disestablished it their politics before and after the First World War and might have provided a model for other republics today. From both sides, in the words of Paul Newman before he was shot in the film Cool Hand Luke, is a failure to communicate. The modern world's ethnic relations and the Sarajevocian need to see a working model for constructive communalisation.

Neutral Russia as a Last Yugoslav Chance

When Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic proclaimed Bosnia's neutrality in that 'crazy war' on 6 October and then the republic's sovereignty on 15 October, 1991 he did more than give citizenship of this republic the right to refuse mobilisation into the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) or the several ethnic militias. He also recognised the rest of the world that Bosnia-Hercegovina can only lose lives and probably its own territorial integrity if both sides do not back away from their tragic confrontation in Croatia. The Serbians and army leadership's so-called RAM plan to link Serbia with the Adriatic Sea and split Croatia's Dalmatian Coast in two depends on a broad corridor that would cut south into Bosnia and include much of that republic's western border areas before turning back through Croatia to the sea. Only the details of the shadow plan and the army's capacity to carry it out remain in question, not its existence. Neither does Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's grandiose scheme to discuss a possible federation of Bosnia in an earlier meeting with Milosevic bode well for this quintessentially multi-ethnic republic. In addition, a fully independent Croatia leaves Bosnia with no clear way to prevent Serbian domination in a new Yugoslav federation. One look at the 1991 ethnic map of Bosnia-Hercegovina should convince any outside observer, as it reportedly did Secretary of State James Baker, that the intervening of Bosnian Muslims (fully 44 percent), Serbs (31 percent), Croats (27 percent), and mixed family Yugoslavs (6 percent) makes it impossible to split the republic between independent Croatia and greater Serbia, or even to subdivide it into three or six Swiss-style cantons. Several residents of Sarajevo recalled at this prospect by noting that their own apartment buildings and even individual apartments would have to be parcelled out. One way to preserve the existing Bosnian borders, essentially unchanged since the pre-1914 period, would be for the republic to seek international recognition as an independent entity, before either Croatia or Slovenia. This is the September suggestion of the outspoken editor of Politika, Kemal Karadzic, a month before the 13 October 'declaration of sovereignty' by President.
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Izegbović. His proposal was hardly intended to isolate Bosnia-Herzegovina from the other Yugoslav republics, as in the Slovenian initiatives in particular, but rather to push the others into immediately negotiating a compact between them that protects minority rights and allows the economic interaction that is essential for survival, even in Slovenia. This is the sort of simultaneous process on which EEC negotiators are now insisting before recognizing Croatia or Slovenia.

Kurzphahliq and his two principal editors reviewed Bosnian options at a working lunch in the editorial offices of the major daily that houses Bosnia's largest newspaper. Long under party control but run since 1989 by editors selected by secret staff bulletins, Oslobodilica is now arguably the best and undoubtedly the most independent newspaper in Yugoslavia. The paper's staff is a microcosm of the Bosnian laboratory for living together that has worked without ethnic segregation, let alone violence, since World War II. Kurzphahliq is a Bosnian Moslem, or Bosniak, while his chief political editor is a Serb with Croat in-laws. The foreign affairs editor also has a mixed marriage. A frequent contributor to the paper's weekly magazine is a Croat Francais, which is French. Marko Orelšević, was around the table as well. (His profound efforts to maintain interethnic understanding include a journal simply called Together, in Serbo-Croatian.) The pages of Oslobodilica are alternately in the Cyrillic and Latin alphabet, and its coverage of the civil war cites Zagreb, Belgrade, and international sources as well as offering separate sections.

Yet the paper itself is also subject to the pressures for ethnic separation that have followed from the free Bosnian elections of last year. Most of the votes were divided between the three ethnic parties, that appeared overnight and left the Communists far behind the SDA (Moslem) and the HDZ (Croat) were seats in the parliament roughly proportional to their shares of the population. But as the democratically elected parties behave like democratic parties, a question raised in a recent roundtable at Sarajevo's Odak literary paper. The parties' parliamentary representatives have not been able to agree on much beyond two measures, neither of which enhances the republic's standing as a model for multi-ethnic integration. School children are now being asked to fill out forms requiring their ethnic identity so they can be assigned to teachers of the same origin. A press law was also passed to require equal ethnic representation and control on the editorial board of Oslobodilica and the other papers. But Kurzphahliq and his colleagues took their case against this prescription for a pasted together "three-party" paper into the republic's constitutional court and have just won the right to their own independence.

Kurzphahliq calls for a Bosnian declaration of independence and the subsequent proclamation of internal sovereignty by President Izegbović faced certain opposition from at least from the Serb SDS and its pro-Milosevic leader, Radovan Karadžić, a former psychiatrist from Mostar who now turned politician. No one was surprised when the SDS delegates walked out of the Bosnian parliament rather than vote on the proclamation. This insistence on sovereignty neutralizes the Sabildoh's best efforts to push the field from parts of the civil war from erasing inside its borders. Some 15,000 peace demonstrators assembled in Sarajevo in late September to express their hopes that it will be.

Even a cease fire in Croatia and any accompanying withdrawal of JNA forces from besieged territories or their own lines carries little the\nnew risk of their relocation in Bosnia. The war would further complicate the badly needed demilitarization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If instead more militarized, then peace within the republic could hardly be preserved and, in the words of Izegbović's foreign minister, Haris Silajdžić, there would be no way to stop the Yugoslav civil war from spreading across the entire country, and to its neighboring countries as well.

Activities of the CSCE Process Regarding the Situation in Yugoslavia

The CSCE, or Helsinki, process has responded to the crisis and conflict in Yugoslavia through its network of regular and emergency consultations, which was established by the CSCE Charter of Paris in 1990.

The Council

A Supplemental Document adopted in Paris, which gives effect to various provisions in the Charter, established the "Council," which consists of the foreign ministers of the CSCE States, as the central forum for regular political consultations within the CSCE process. It meets at least once a year. The Berlin meeting, held on June 19-20, 1991, has been the only meeting of the Council to date, although the CSCE Ministerial held in New York in October 1990 could be considered a precursor to the Council. The Berlin meeting made several decisions of importance to the future of the CSCE, among them a statement which expressed concern about the growing Yugoslav crisis.

The Committee of Senior Officials

Below the Council is the Committee of Senior Officials, which prepares Council meetings and, as necessary, carries out its decisions. It also has a mandate to review current issues and consider future CSCE work. The Berlin Council meeting agreed to a procedure for holding emergency sessions of the Committee of Senior Officials as envisaged in the Paris Charter. First, a participating State may request a clarification regarding an emergency situation that has developed and is of concern, and the recipient State is obligated to respond. If the situation remains unresolved, however, a request can be made to the Chairman of the Senior Officials Committee at the time, requesting a two-day emergency session of the committee. As soon as 13 or more CSCE States have seconded this request, the Chairman will notify the participating States of the meeting, which must be held no earlier than 48 hours or later than 3 days from that time.

This procedure was put to its first test almost immediately thereafter, when the nine countries of the West European Union (WEU), along with Austria, Hungary, and Poland, called for the holding of an emergency session in regard to the Yugoslav military's actions in Slovenia. The Committee met in Prague on July 3-4 and issued an urgent appeal for a ceasefire, offered a "Good Offices" mission to Yugoslavia to facilitate political dialogue and supported an initiative of the European Community to send a team to Slovenia to observe the implementation of a ceasefire. Fighting subsided in Slovenia based upon a subsequent EC-brokered ceasefire agreement, only to erupt fiercely in neighboring Croatia. The OAS Chair of the Senior Officials Committee therefore reconvened the Prague meeting on August 8-9, during which agreement was reached to expand the scope the of CE observer mission to Croatia, to expand its size and to include personnel from other CSCE States. A "Good Offices" Mission was again evidenced, the Committee agreed to meet again when called by the Chair. It did so on September 3-4, during which the CSCE States welcomed the formation of a peace conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague and agreed to impose an arms embargo on Yugoslavia for the duration of the conflict, which was subsequently overtaken by a UN embargo. A fourth emergency meeting took place in Prague on October 16, which condemned the continued violence, stated that those responsible for this violence should be held personally accountable under international law for their actions, and banned the use of heavy weapons.

A regularly scheduled meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials, from October 22-23, also issued a strong statement on Yugoslavia, and agreed to form a Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia to inform the CSCE on the situation in Yugoslavia with respect to human rights, including the rights of national minorities.
Conflict Prevention Center/Unusual Military Activities

To assist the Council of Ministers in preventing conflict, the Paris Charter established a Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) in Vienna. Initially, the role of the Conflict Prevention Center was limited to working with Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) to which agreement had been reached at the CSBM negotiations, including the holding meetings to discuss implementation of CSBMs as well as meetings for clarification of unusual military activities, if necessary. One such meeting was held in early July 1991 at the request of Austria in light of Yugoslav military activities in Slovenia, which led to some Yugoslav invasion into or over Austrian territory. In September, Hungary also implemented the procedure for unusual military activities in regard to Yugoslavia, but held a bilateral meeting with Yugoslavia rather than the exercise its right to call for a meeting in Vienna. The CPC is also collecting information regarding the arms embargo.

Other CSCE Meetings

Two regularly scheduled inter-sectional meetings of the CSCE process also took place during the course of the Yugoslav crisis. The first was the Geneva Experts Meeting on National Minorities held in Geneva from July 1-16, 1991. The second was the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, held from September 10 - October 4, 1991. In addition, a Seminar on Military Doctrine was held in Vienna from October 8 - 18, 1991, as part of the ongoing Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. All three of these meetings focused heavily on the Yugoslav crisis as it related to their respective mandates.

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The Honorable Dennis DeConcini, Co-Chairman
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
H2-237 Ford HOB
Washington, D.C. 20515

September 5, 1991

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Last night I returned from a difficult, somewhat dangerous but extremely productive and useful trip to Croatia and Serbia. I was joined by Rep. Frank Wolf and former Under Secretary of State Richard McCormick.

In Zagreb, we held meetings with Croatian officials including a two hour working lunch with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

The President expressed deep appreciation for our physical presence in Croatia as the violence was escalating in and around his capital and told us how vital U.S. and EC involvement was to a peaceful outcome. He said that the borders of his republic "should not change by force" and lamented, at one point, that Croatia did not have sufficient firepower to adequately defend itself. Presidential advisors at the table were quick to point out that Croatia contributes financially and sends its young men to the Yugoslav army which was now fighting against its own republic. President Tudjman said the U.S. was "missing the train" by not being more active in the earlier weeks of the crisis and said it was his view that U.S. policy was wrongly predicated on the notion that the "Yugoslav nation can and will be saved."

Our delegation's message stressed military restraint, negotiation and reconciliation. President Tudjman expressed solidarity with our view and said how pleased he was that we were there on the eve of his ultimatum that the Army pull out of Croatia before the situation quickly escalated into a full fledged civil war.

President Tudjman said he was encouraged that the U.S. State Department had just officially endorsed the EC blueprint for a cease-fire and peace conference.
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We attempted to visit Serb leaders in Zagreb to obtain their point of view but were advised by U.S. officials and Croatian leaders that most had fled as the fighting intensified.

We spent an hour with Cardinal Kohutic and Archbishop Koksha at the Roman Catholic Cathedral in Zagreb. The Cardinal said the faithful were being implored to pray and work for peace, and that approximately 40 churches were either destroyed or adversely affected by the clashes thus far. He said Croatian prisoners returning from Serbia had been "severely beaten" and that the Yugoslavian Air Force had been bombing civilian populations.

We met with Marco Hennies, one of the leaders of the EC observers who operate in Slovenia pursuant to a memorandum of understanding hammered out in July. A discussion of their apparent success in Slovenia and the need for similar activity in Croatia was discussed. He said they were "satisfied" with the "mediating role" the EC is playing. According to Hennies, the EC daily deploys approximately 10-15 small teams to observe compliance with the cease-fire in Slovenia. He expressed his opinion that a cease-fire in Croatia was needed but that the "situation in Croatia is of a different nature."

In order to more adequately assess the situation on the ground where active fighting was occurring and to tangibly underscore a compelling U.S. concern for peace and an end to the fighting, we visited two Croatian cities under intense military siege.

At Osijek, we met with Dr. Zlatko Kranjcar, President of the city. We were briefed by the President, held an impromptu press conference with reporters from the Associated Press, Reuters, and The Los Angeles Times, as well as journalists from Croatian print and broadcast media. We visited injured civilians and Croatian soldiers in the city's general hospital and heard several testimonies of brutality by chetniks, Serbian "terrorists," and Yugoslav soldiers. A fresh reminder of the horror of war greeted us as we walked out the door: a badly wounded Croatian soldier was rushed by us on a stretcher having just suffered his wounds at Vukovar -- our next stop.

Surrounded by more than 200 Yugoslav army tanks and a combination of "irregular" Serbian militia and regular army troops, Vukovar is a city that has suffered much, especially since a stepped up offensive by the Serbs that began on or about August 25th.

Owing to the fact that every road to Vukovar is sealed off and possibly mined by Serbian "irregulars" and the Yugoslav army, we gained access to this border city via a small path through a cornfield.

Once inside the largely evacuated city, we witnessed dozens of buildings including homes that had been pulverized, we were told, by hostile mortar fire and Yugoslav MiG fighter jets.

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Accompanied by a small number of Croatian special forces we walked several blocks through the city clinging closely to buildings so as to avoid becoming an easy target. In open areas we jogged or ran to mitigate the danger of being fired upon. We were advised that several people had been shot by Serbian sniper teams that slipped into the city under the cover of night. According to Marin Vidić, the city official who escorted us, approximately 20 people were killed and approximately 80 wounded in various types of attacks in the days immediately preceding our visit.

Mr. Vidić also told us that many residents still in Vukovar were either too stubborn or too frightened to evacuate and were spending much time in underground cellars or makeshift bomb shelters.

One shelter we visited in the city -- an old wine cellar cut into the side of a small hill -- housed between 150-170 city residents. One man said that the people in the shelter hadn't ventured out of the cave-like refuge since Sunday, August 25. The agony and fear of bombardment and sniper fire was etched on the faces of several of the men, women and children.

Our delegation, then proceeded to walk to St. Phillip's Catholic Church, an historic church that had taken some hits either from MiG bombing raids or mortar fire. While we walked outside the Church, two Yugoslavian MiG fighters made two passes overhead. I photographed one of the fighters just before being halted by the special forces into the church for cover. After the MiGs passed overhead, without incident, we heard, in the distance, two explosions, but we could not confirm the source of the noise.

Our delegation was inspired by the obvious courage and commitment of Fr. Branimir Konec, O.F.M., who along with the other priests and nuns of the parish had decided to stay in Vukovar to aid the people. In answer to a comment concerning his courage, Fr. Konec simply said his courage is from God.

In Vukovar, the Croatian army leadership was anxious that we see a number of bomb fragments and debris, that they claim were cluster bombs. Both Mr. Wolf and I took several photographs of the bomb remnants and are sending them to appropriate U.S. government agencies for analysis.

Confronted with our observations in Vukovar, two days later, Yugoslav Vice Minister of Defense, Admiral Brovet told us the MiGs were "not" dropping ordinance on Vukovar.
On Monday, September 2, our delegation, joined by U.S. Ambassador Zimmerman met with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Foreign Minister Jovanovic.

Our meeting with the Serbian President came on the heels of Milosevic's agreement to a cease-fire and to a conference under international auspices. While we commended the President for signing the agreement, we frankly stressed that, in our view, he bore a significant responsibility for the military offensive thus far and the future of the fragile peace.

In a very firm but diplomatic way we conveyed our concern over the potential for a blood bath and that Serbia and the Yugoslavian armed forces would bear the brunt of international criticism. One consequence of initiating new hostilities would be Serbian isolation, we told him.

The President spent much of his time describing what he perceived as the mistreatment of the 600,000 Serbs living in Croatia and the fear in Serbia that Croatia was evolving in a way not unlike it had 50 years ago when it allied itself to Nazi Germany. He spoke much of the atrocities committed by Croats against Serbs during that dark period and it was clear to me that past horrors are being employed as a rationale for current policies.

While fear of past Croatian genocidal behavior appears to be unwarranted in the current situation, it was, nevertheless, a dominant feature in our talks with the President and every other Serb leader. We had a rich exchange with Patriarch Pavle, head of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Metropolitan of Zagreb.

The Patriarch said the clergy was admonishing the faithful to pray for peace and reconciliation. The Metropolitan, however, was much more cautious suggesting that Serbs could forgive the Nazi area atrocities, but not forget. He said he was fearful for his own life in Zagreb.

Our delegation suggested that the Patriarch and the Cardinal consider a dramatic, highly visible joint appearance, or series of appearances to urge their respective flocks to pray and fast for peace, reconciliation and forgiveness. We suggested that this appeal might help break the cycle of hate and revenge which is on the verge of causing out of control. While we didn't get an immediate answer from the Patriarch to this suggestion, we intend to pursue this idea.

Our meeting with Admiral Stavil Jervet, Vice Minister of Defense, provided insights into the Yugoslav army position -- or at least his personal opinion. He said that the Yugoslav army was in the uncomfortable role of separating the two sides. He said the MiGs over Vukovar hadn't dropped any bombs. We told him that the clear perception among many EU diplomats and others was that the Army had sided with the Serbians, a view he rejected by explaining, in part, how the command structure works.

We met with Sudimir Lencar, Foreign Minister of the federal government, whose staff made a special point of expressing their gratitude for our trip. According to Mr. Lencar, active participation by the international community is a prerequisite for peace and a resolution to the many vexing problems Yugoslavia is experiencing. Our argument that Serbia in particular would likely be isolated if they initiated new and expanded hostilities didn't go unnoticed. Much of the discussion was focused on financial aid and access to credit which he considered crucial to economic reform and progress.

Other meetings in Belgrade included a dialogue with four intellectuals from the Serbian Academy of Sciences and a talk with Tanja Petrovic, cofounder of Hikuski International, Yugoslavia's affiliate, who gave a very negative assessment of President Milosovic.

On behalf of our delegation, we look forward to meeting with you very soon.

Sincerely,

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH
Member of Congress
Helsinki Commission Efforts Regarding Yugoslavia

The Helsinki Commission has followed events in Yugoslavia closely and has sought to encourage a positive resolution of the present crisis. A Commission delegation led by Co-Chairman Dennis DeConcini and Senator H. Hoyer first visited the country in April 1990 and visited Serbia to observe the elections in that republic, the first multi-party elections in post-World War II Yugoslavia. The delegation also met with high-level leaders and Serbian officials in Belgrade and visited the autonomous province of Kosovo. After the Commission staff observed each of the remaining five republican multi-party elections during the course of 1990, Co-Chairman DeConcini led a return Commission delegation in March 1991, which visited Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in addition to Belgrade.

In 1991, Chairman Hoyer and Co-Chairman DeConcini and members of the Commission staff have met with a number of Yugoslav visitors to Washington, including both public officials and private citizens, among them the president and a Serbian member of the collective presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatian parliamentarians, the foreign ministers of Slovenia and Macedonia, the former foreign secretary of Montenegro, opposition party leaders in Serbia, representatives of the Albanian communities in Kosovo and Macedonia, and journalists from Croatia and Montenegro. The Commission also maintains contacts with U.S. State Department officials who cover Yugoslav affairs, the Embassy of Yugoslavia in Washington and Americans of Yugoslav descent.

In addition to the above-mentioned activities, the Chairman and Co-Chairman of the Commission regularly raise human rights and other concerns regarding Yugoslavia in correspondence with Yugoslav officials, Congressional Record statements and numerous press releases. The following public statements were made by the Helsinki Commission Chairman and Co-Chairman in 1991:


The question now is whether these leaders can produce an agreement that is acceptable to all the peoples of Yugoslavia, or whether irreconcilable differences will lead down the road to violent uprisings and perhaps civil war.

Principled, responsible behavior is needed if Yugoslavia is to find a peaceful, just, and lasting solution to its current dilemma. The peoples of Yugoslavia have found their way through difficult times in the past and they hopefully will rise to the challenge now before them rationally, wisely, and peacefully.

Many who follow developments in Yugoslavia have suggested that the CSCE, or Helsinki process, can serve as an international forum through which the United States, along with Canada and Europe, can encourage a positive outcome.

As cochairman of the Helsinki Commission, I would like to submit, for the Record the following statement on the situation in Yugoslavia and how the CSCE can help ensure that a democratic result be peacefully achieved. I hope that my colleagues will find this statement useful.

I ask unanimous consent that a statement prepared by the Helsinki Commission, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the U.S. State Department be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
YUGOSLAVIA: PUSHTING A CSCE BLEND

In April, Slovenia and Croatia, the two northernmost of Yugoslavia's six constituent republics, held the first multi-party elections in that country since World War II. In November, more than six months later, the republics and Bosnia-Hercegovina did the same, followed by Serbia and Montenegro in December. Opposition parties with nationalist leanings were the winners in the first four, while the communists retained power in the latter two, including Serbia's President, Slobodan Milosevic.

The degree to which these elections were free and fair varied considerably, but these quarrelling republics nevertheless have finally all crossed the line from the one-party state into the world of political pluralism. The question now is whether they will be able to work together peacefully in resolving the problems of Yugoslavia as a whole and will instead sink into the depths of civil war. A six-hour meeting of the republic presidents on January 10 was a positive sign: it resulted in agreement to meet further, first in smaller groups and then again as a whole. However, the Yugoslav military, judging by its recent and ominous rumblings, is willing to come to the federation's rescue by cracking down on independent-minded republic governments, but the army can provide no long-term solution and may find that dissent in its own ranks and stubborn resistance among the population will deny it even short-term success. The economic reforms introduced last year by the federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, created hopes for finding a more peaceful and lasting solution through economic rather than political means, but the reforms have, at best, stabilized the economy and are limited by opposition from disgruntled sections of the population doing very much more. Given the poor performance of Markovic's party, the three-year-old Alliance of Reform Parties, in the republic elections in which it took part, the population seems to be interested first in shaking out their various national positions than in trying to cure the ills of the Yugoslav economy.

Why all the delay and trouble, at a time when most of Central and Eastern Europe has moved on to the greater experiment of building democratic institutions at home and pursuing the goals of the European Community? The major reason is that the communists' main goal was the preservation of the federation, and they knew that to keep Yugoslavia together while defending the interests of their respective nationalities required compromises toward other ethnic and national minorities. The communists have been the dominant power in Yugoslavia, but the political situation was complex, and the communists were not able to dominate the entire country. The opposition parties, which were not strong enough to form a single government, were divided, and there were no clear winners in the elections.

A common thread of the elections is the heavy nationalization in the programs of each of the major political parties. The communists, in most cases, have simply been re-elected, but a few small regional parties have been able to make gains. The right-wing opposition has attempted to maintain Yugoslavia's unity, but there is a strong possibility that the military will step in. Senior Yugoslav military officials and hard-line communists have, in fact, organized a party with an apparent aim of doing just that.

The alternative—tolet each republic peacefully go its own, independent way—seems, on the surface, the simplest course. After all, it could be argued, Yugoslavia, in all its diversity, was only created in 1918 as an expression of the national aspirations of the South Slav peoples who had finally and fully been liberated from centuries of division and domination by the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. Spanning the divide between Central Europe and the Balkans geographically, historically and culturally, Yugoslavia was only able to function briefly under conditions of democracy and equality for its diverse national and ethnic groups. By the time World War II commenced, Yugoslavia had been in the awkward state of being both in front of and behind the upsurge of latent nationalism which swept through the region in 1989 and 1990.

Essentially, the republic elections have divided Yugoslavia into three camps. In the north, Slovenia and Croatia, two independent, nationalists parties to power and are poised for outright accession to the EU. The north has formed a new, loose confederation. The people of Slovenia and Croatia, live in the north of Yugoslavia.

In the center, Serbia and Montenegro, alternative, have chosen to stay with their current governments. The majority of those who voted for the communists in Serbia and Montenegro, the former Yugoslavia, also voted for the communists in Bosnia-Hercegovina, where a Slavic people officially considered to be ethnic "Muslim" Herzegovina has a large Muslim population. The communists in the area have been able to maintain their grip on power.

In the south, Bosnian and Herzegovina, majority of the population still lives in the south, and the majority still lives in the south. The southern republics have been able to maintain their grip on power.

Similar fears of carving new national borders exist among most of the south. The majority of the population in the south still lives in the south, and the majority still lives in the south. The southern republics have been able to maintain their grip on power.

Moreover, within the confines of the federation, there has been a small, but growing, overt expression of nationalism among the Albanian population. The overwhelming majority of the population of Kosovo, one of two provinces in the Federation, has endured harsh repression and no longer want to remain part of Serbia. For this reason, they have almost universally boycotted the recent Serbian elections. An attempt to gain complete independence is likely if the federation were to dissolve. But the Serbs view this province as the birthplace of their nation and culture and will not let it go. The situation there has already been violent, and a full-scale popular uprising, likely to be met by brutal military force, would only be a matter of time outside the federation. Developments in neighboring Albania may exacerbate the tensions which now exist.

Given this rather dire picture, the question of what the United States and other concerned members of the international community can do to encourage the most democratic, peaceful result is of immediate importance. Our historical support for human rights, a democracy and the self-determination of peoples (ironically, reasons once used by Woodrow Wilson in advocating the formation of Yugoslavia) seems to be fundamentally at odds with our traditional policy of support for the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and our own reasoned approaches to dispute resolution seems to have few ears in a place where anger and hatred have such deep-seated roots. By tradition, strong support of a united Yugoslavia is of less importance to our own national and Western security interests, and, of course, the United Nations has been an important factor in the current crisis. With the threats to which it is now exposed, the dissolution of Yugoslavia into independent states, to happen easily or peacefully, one reason is that the newly-independent national groups, the Serbs and Croats, are in fact at odds with each other and some of the other republics in addition to their own ethnic and national groups. The creation of independent statehood will lead to dispute and conflict over resources, especially in regard to Bosnian-Hercegovina, where a Slavic people officially considered to be ethnic "Muslim" Herzegovina has a large Muslim population. The communists in the area have been able to maintain their grip on power.

The solution to the current crisis seems to be a federal system, similar to that of the United States, with a strong central government to oversee the federation. The United States could provide assistance to help establish a federal system, possibly through economic aid or support for democratic institutions. The goal would be to create a federal system that is representative of all Yugoslavia's peoples and respects their territorial integrity.
The newly revamped Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, commonly known as the CSCE or Helsinki process, is viewed by many as a forum where Europe, along with the United States and Canada, might help Yugoslavia—a CSCE member—to find a way out of its quagmire. Developing CSCE mechanisms in conflict prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes have been suggested for the task. But so far these mechanisms are considered to apply, in the CSCE context, more to peace and security between states than within states. This does not have to be the case, but Yugoslavia may already be in flames by the time new institutions are set up and mandated to deal with the situation. In any event, given the history the Yugoslavs are unlikely to give the necessary consent to having their problems handled directly by anyone but themselves.

While the CSCE cannot provide immediate answers to the troubles plaguing Yugoslavia, it can provide the ground rules for constructive dialogue from within Yugoslavia itself. This can be accomplished by holding the main Yugoslav players—the republics—to strict compliance with the commitments contained in the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent CSCE accords, regardless of whether they keep the federation, negotiate a new confederation or simply go their own separate ways. The leaders of the republics seem to share one common objective: to be integrated into the whole of Europe to which they feel they belong. None of them feel that their interests would be best served outside the community of free European nations, and joining this community can only be achieved by adherence to Helsinki’s principles in their relations with each other.

Thus, if we are to have any role at all, we must not only hold the present Yugoslav federal government accountable to the CSCE commitments it has already undertaken, but also obtain the agreement of each of the constituent republics to abide by and be held accountable to these commitments in their relations with each other. In practice, this means first having the republic leaders in Yugoslavia express publicly a willingness to live by the same CSCE standards to which the Yugoslav federal government has committed itself. The government and assembly of Slovenia has already taken steps in this direction. The following principles are of particular relevance to the Yugoslav situation:

Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This includes the right to free association and expression, the latter of which has been particularly restricted by new verbal criminal law in Serbia. It also includes the equal application of the cultural, religious and other rights of all national and minority groups, from the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia to the Serbs in Kosovo and Croatia.

Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples. This could be an important test of the need for a new federal constitution, and to argue for and support these rights and the right to secession and independence, a frequent and mistaken assumption. In fact, unlike the Soviet situation in which it is often compared, the essentially voluntary nature of the original joining of the Yugoslav peoples brings less sympathy to arguments for Yugoslavia’s breakup. This principle certainly does include, however, the right of any of the democratically elected republic governments to suggest revising their relationships with the others if they feel the current political configuration does not reflect the will of the people they represent, and a subsequent commitment on all sides to sit together and work things out. The meetings of republic presidents are a fortunate first step that can happen. It also means that Albanians, the third most populous people in Yugoslavia, and other peoples in Kosovo as well as the mixed population of Vojvodina, Serbia’s other province, must be allowed to participate in this process through their freely chosen representatives.

Territorial Integrity, Inviolability of Frontiers. Despite the minority and other problems which may arise from the current borders of Yugoslavia, the principle should not be altered except in cases when it can be done peacefully, with the full and mutual consent of everyone directly involved. Such cases rarely come about, and seeking instead to improve the situation for people within current borders combined with an opening of borders will be much easier to achieve.

Resisting the Threat of Use of Force. Regardless of the eventual political configuration of Yugoslavia and its six republics, the result cannot be brought about by the threat or use of force. A solution brought about by force would not only be wrong but, as a practical matter, would be neither stable nor lasting.

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. A clear, firmly stated commitment to resolve disputes within Yugoslavia peacefully through willing and mutual agreement to arbitration, mediation and other means for finding solutions to differences would add a degree of trust among the Yugoslav republics which is now absent.
COMMISSION URGES YUGOSLAVIS TO REFRAIN FROM VIOLENCE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
January 24, 1991

WASHINGTON—Following is the text of a telegram sent today to Borisa Jovic, President of Yugoslavia, by Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) and Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), chairman and co-chairman of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission).

"There are numerous reports of threatening movements by the Yugoslav Army in Croatia and especially in the Zagreb area. We are deeply concerned about the possibility that military force will be used in that republic, which, as Co-Chairmen of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, we would consider to be counter to the aims of the Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE documents, including the Paris Charter for a New Europe which you signed last November. Military force cannot provide a just and lasting solution to Yugoslavia's crisis. We therefore urge you to order a halt to any planned military action in Croatia or any other republic, to reaffirm your commitment to a peaceful and serious dialogue, and to call upon all those concerned to do the same."

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PRESS RELEASE
STATEMENT OF THE HELSINKI COMMISSION DELEGATION AT THE CONCLUSION OF ITS VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA
March 27, 1991

From March 24-27, 1991, a delegation of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe—also known as the Helsinki Commission—visited Yugoslavia. Led by Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ), the Commission’s Co-Chairman, the delegation included Representatives Bill Richardson (D-NM), a member of the Commission, and Representatives Clay Shaw (R-FL), Bob McEwen (R-OR), Bob Dornan (R-CA), and Helen Delich Bentley (R-MD), and Mr. William Fritts, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Commerce and also a member of the Commission. Senator DeConcini, Representatives Richardson, Shaw, McEwen and Dornan, and Mr. Fritts made the following statement at the end of their visit:

"The delegation of the Helsinki Commission came to Yugoslavia with a deep concern over recent crises and tensions. We came with an open mind as to the future character of the country and the relations of the republics and provinces of Yugoslavia with each other, a matter which is for the Yugoslav peoples themselves to decide. What is important in our minds is that any changes in these relations be carried out peacefully, in accordance with democratic principles and respect for equal rights towards all.

"During the course of our visit, we travelled to Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia and the republic of Serbia, and then to Zagreb, the capital of the republic of Croatia, and to Sarajevo, the capital of the republic of Bosnia Herzegovina. We met separately with representatives and Vice-President of the collective Presidency of Yugoslavia, the President of the Federal Executive Council (Prime Minister), the presidents of each of the three republics and many other high-level government and parliamentary officials. We also met with opposition parties and members of various groups, including various religious denominations and organizations representing the Albanians of Kosovo and the Serbs of Croatia. We are extremely grateful to those who took time from their busy schedules to meet with us, and who extended our warm hospitality to us during our visit.

"Yugoslavia today is at a crossroads where it seeks to define its future against the background of political uncertainties and economic crisis. The future of Yugoslavia is for the Yugoslav peoples to determine. Our main concern is that decisions be made in a peaceful, democratic fashion, regardless of what future political arrangement will emerge. We found, in our meetings, general agreement among Yugoslavs on this critical point, regardless of their nationality, religion or political persuasion. We were encouraged to hear from many Yugoslavs that the path to a solution of Yugoslavia’s ethnic problems lies in the greater democratization of the country. We fully agree with these observations and believe that this path must be pursued urgently and universally throughout Yugoslavia.

"We encourage the Yugoslav to solve the economic problems which have exacerbated political tensions. We see the continued efforts by the federal government of Prime Minister Markovic to bring about economic reforms as key in this regard. Free market economic principles and private enterprise must be driving forces of the Yugoslav economy if it is to improve, painful as the reforms may sometimes be. The Prime Minister also indicated the urgent need for Western assistance in achieving economic recovery and helping the reform process.

The U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is mandated by law to monitor and encourage progress in implementing the provisions of the CSCE Final Act, commonly known as the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1975, is made up of nine Senators, nine Representatives and the official each from the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense.
"Particularly in the area of democracy, the delegation noted positive developments since the last Helsinki Commission visit almost one year ago. For one thing, each of the six Yugoslav republics has now held multi-party elections. While they varied in the degree to which they were free and fair, these elections have ushered in a new, long-awaited period of growing political pluralism in Yugoslavia, and a consequent increase in the openness of society and respect for human rights.

"At the same time, we learned that the situation in Yugoslavia had worsened in some respects. The once promising reforms of Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, are threatened by a lack of support from republic governments. The Serbian authorities, after taking a few positive steps last year, have reverted to a policy of political repression in Kosovo and have, in fact, stepped up their crackdown on the Albanian population there, which has led to many human rights abuses, in clear violation of the human rights commitments in the Helsinki Final Act.

"Although personnel changes may bring welcome changes, freedom of expression, including press freedoms, remain unduly restricted in Serbia and, to a lesser extent, complete freedom of expression has not been attained in some other republics as well. The Serbian community in Croatia maintains that its rights are not protected fully in the new republic constitution and that there has been a pattern of discrimination in employment in the public sector and other areas.

"Our main concern during the visit, however, was the current crisis of Yugoslavia itself, which has created, in the past few weeks, a period of turmoil unsurpassed in the country's post-World War II history. This turmoil, and continued differences among the republics on the future character of the country and their mutual relations, have raised fears of either armed ethnic conflict or a military effort to maintain the unity of Yugoslavia by force. We would strongly oppose such efforts, which would be neither just nor lasting, and would almost certainly lead Yugoslavia into civil war. Clearly, the use of force will not solve Yugoslavia's problems and would complicate the traditionally good relations Yugoslavia has had with the United States of America and possibly with its neighbors and most of the free world as well.

"Fortunately, we saw in our meetings a new desire to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in Yugoslavia. Republic and federal leaders have exercised restraint at the very moment when open conflict seemed almost inevitable, and what we hope will be a constructive dialogue between the republics seems to have begun in earnest during the course of our stay. The republics should remain committed to this dialogue to find a common agreement instead of undertaking unilateral action.

"Yugoslavia, as a signatory to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Paris Charter of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), has pledged to act in conformity with detailed and clearly worded commitments regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, the free flow of information and economic development based on market principles. Acceptance and adherence to these provisions are, in a real sense, prerequisites for the integration of Yugoslavia, including all its parts, into a democratic and prosperous Europe. We remain committed to our efforts to encourage full Yugoslav compliance with CSCE commitments. We hope that these efforts will bring to all of Yugoslavia the democratic, pluralistic conditions and mutual understanding which are key to its peaceful future."

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Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, this week we are witnessing a tragedy of enormous proportions in Yugoslavia. Following declarations by the republics of Slovenia and Croatia proclaiming that they were, in effect, seceding from the country, Yugoslav military units moved in to ensure that this would not happen. The result, among other things, is the abhorrent violence of loss of life, the death of Yugoslavs at the hands of fellow Yugoslavs. The unfortunate news today is that the conflict seems to be escalating.

Yesterday, as Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I joined with Representative STENY HOYER, the Commission's Chairman, in condemning the use of force and violence in Yugoslavia, much as the deployment of the Federal armed forces in Slovenia. We opposed the use of force in Yugoslavia as a method by which to solve the country's many problems, including the use of force to stabilize the federation.

The CSCE, or Helsinki process, has been viewed as a forum where the United States, along with Canada and Europe, can work to bring peace and dialogue back to Yugoslavia. Indeed, the crisis in Yugoslavia is increasingly being on the agenda of recent CSCE meetings. Now, several West European countries have called for an end to the conflict for the first time. A number of Western European countries have now called for an end to the conflict for the first time.

Bringing Yugoslavia back to peace must be our first priority. Making Yugoslavia fully democratic must be an immediate accord if further outbreaks of violent clashes are to be avoided in the future.

Whether Yugoslavia will remain a federation, a confederation, or a supranational state or fully independent country is, of course, for the people of Yugoslavia to decide for themselves. One thing, however, must be clarified. The steps Slovenia and Croatia have taken at times may not have been the most preferred by the international community, but nobody, I repeat, nobody, has done more to undermine democracy or to illegallyrosse a serious threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia than those who have sought to maintain it through undemocratic means. These officials reside not in Belgrade but in Zagreb, or in Belgrade. They have given to the Slovenes, the Croats, and increasingly the Albanians and Macedonians all the reasons they need for wanting to go their way. Choosing republic independence has therefore, over time, become the only choice for human peace and freedom.

Distrust between opposition groups in Kosovo, and in Belgrade this year, indicates that all Yugoslavs, in fact, want to live peacefully and in freedom. If respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, along with other aspects of democratic government, does not become universal in Yugoslavia, no dialogue will produce mutual understanding among all parties in Yugoslavia on the fate of that country, and conflict and violence can be expected both to continue and spread. I truly hope that the leaders of Yugoslavia choose the democratic course before it is too late.
A SOLUTION MUST BE FOUND IN YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. Hoyer. Mr. Speaker, we are all aware of the severe economic and political problems which the people of Yugoslavia have been facing for the past several years. The situation in Yugoslavia is complex and cannot be easily explained. However, it is important to understand that Yugoslavia is a country which has a long and rich history. It is home to many cultures and traditions, and it is important to respect the diversity of its people.

In the wake of the recent events, there is a need to find a solution that will ensure peace and stability. This is not an easy task, but it is crucial for the future of the region.

Mr. Speaker, we are committed to working towards a peaceful resolution. We believe that dialogue and cooperation are the keys to a successful outcome.

Thank you for your attention.

Mr. Speaker, we are aware of the current situation. We must work together to ensure that peace and stability are restored.

Mr. Hoyer. Mr. Speaker, we are committed to finding a peaceful solution.

In conclusion, the situation in Yugoslavia is complex, and it is important to understand the challenges that it faces. We must work together to ensure that peace and stability are restored.

Thank you for your attention.
CSCE NEWS RELEASE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

U.S. Congress • Washington, D.C. • 20215
Steny H. Hoyer, Chairman
Dennis DeConcini, Co-Chairman

HELLENSKI COMMISSION LEADERS SEEK FURTHER CSCE EFFORTS
TO BRING PEACE TO YUGOSLAVIA

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Contact: Jamie Ridge, Robert Haas
215-467-3810

August 19, 1991

Washington, DC—Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-Md.) and Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), Chairman and Co-Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), today made the following statement in regard to events in Yugoslavia:

"We are extremely concerned about continued fighting in Croatia, a republic in Yugoslavia, in violation of a fragile cease-fire established earlier this month. Unless the violence stops immediately, it will become very difficult to reestablish peace and avert full-scale civil war.

"We agree with the decisions reached at the recent CSCE emergency meeting on Yugoslavia, held on August 8-9 in Prague, to expand the coverage of the European cease-fire observer teams to Croatia in addition to those already deployed in Slovenia, and to move toward the inclusion of additional CSCE States as observer teams. We also view the second offer of a Good Offices Mission under German leadership to facilitate the political dialogue in Yugoslavia as a positive step that should be acted upon. It is unfortunate that these decisions could not have been made more quickly, but the main point now is that these decisions be implemented fully to bring fighting to a permanent halt and to initiate genuine dialogue across the future of the country.

"In this regard, we are deeply concerned that renewed fighting may not only easily escalate but quickly spread to other parts of Yugoslavia as well. This would essentially be the case if there is any attempt to impose by force a solution along the lines of the recently announced proposal of Scitign and Montenegro, along with some representatives from Bosnia-Hercegovina, for a smaller federation. Such an effort, we believe, would likely be resisted not only in Bosnia-Hercegovina, but could also set-off unrest in Kosovo and possibly Vojvodina. Indeed, the potential exists for the fighting to move to Macedonia as well.

"We believe that if it is necessary to act now, before there is more bloodshed, to obtain some political solution to the Yugoslav crisis, or at least an agreed framework for dialogue in which all parties in Yugoslavia can participate to resolve their differences. This would establish a greater degree of stability, which would in turn help end the violence. The Good Offices Mission would be a good first effort in this regard, but it might be better now to move to a broader and ongoing mediation effort, perhaps under CSCE auspices, to get things moving.

"As Chairman and Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, we have repeatedly stressed our desire to see a solution to the Yugoslav conflict that is peacefully achieved, democratic in nature, and agreeable to all. This remains our view, and we oppose any use or threatened use of force in Yugoslavia. The United States and other CSCE States should make clear that the violence must cease completely and immediately and that the only viable solutions which remain are those achieved through negotiation. The longer such solutions are resisted and conflicts continue to occur, the more likely Yugoslavia stands to brand itself a pariah state in Europe."

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The U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is mandated by law to monitor and encourage progress in implementing the provisions of the CSCE Final Act, commonly known as the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1975, is made up of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense.
"Restoring peace is the first priority, but seeking a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis, or at least an agreed framework for dialogue in which all parties in Yugoslavia can participate to resolve their differences, must be an immediate second. This would establish a greater degree of stability, which would in turn help prevent further violence. The Good Offices Mission offered by the CSCE is a good first effort in that regard, but it would be better now to move to a broader and ongoing mediation effort, perhaps under CSCE auspices, to get things moving. The European countries countries have suggested a five-person mediation panel, which might help and could be supported. A larger international conference that would include each of the republics and perhaps other Yugoslav parties has also been suggested and should be given full consideration along with all other options for obtaining a political solution.

"If, in the meantime, fighting continues, the United States and other democratic countries in Europe and around the world should be prepared to respond more positively to declarations of sovereignty and independence made by any of the Yugoslav republics based on the clear will of the people. The right to self-determination means, first and foremost, the right to a democratic system in which to pursue goals which have clear support of the overwhelming majority of the population, and a subsequent commitment on all sides to act in good faith in working out a mutually agreeable solution. While all have had their own shortcomings, we believe that the leaders of most of the Yugoslav republics have in fact chosen this path, and their future should not continue to be determined by those few who have not."
FURTHER ACTION MUST BE TAKEN TO STOP THE FIGHTING IN YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. President, the latest efforts by the European Community to restore peace in Yugoslavia have just failed. The recent agreement to cease-fire in Croatia was broken before the ink was dry, and all signs point to a further escalation of the conflict. The prospects for bringing about any semblance of peace in Croatia and the rest of Yugoslavia are dimmed.

In my view, the CECEH States should be lauded for their efforts in the last several months. However, the recent agreement to cease-fire in Croatia was broken before the ink was dry, and all signs point to a further escalation of the conflict. The prospects for bringing about any semblance of peace in Croatia and the rest of Yugoslavia are dimmed.

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