Special
Report
No. 134

Implementation of Helsinki Final Act

April 1, 1985–October 1, 1985

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Nineteenth Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, April 1, 1985–October 1, 1985.

Chapter One

General Assessment of the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document

OVERVIEW

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) represents a framework for the 35 participating states to work to resolve the humanitarian, economic, political, and military issues that divide Europe. The Final Act underscores that each area is of equal importance to genuine security and cooperation in Europe. The Western objective has been to preserve and strengthen this process by a thorough review of implementation of the Final Act and the Madrid concluding document and agreement on balanced and constructive steps forward.

The Final Act recognizes that followup meetings are essential for maintaining the Helsinki framework as a vigorous means of addressing problems in Europe. The Madrid followup meeting, the second such CSCE review conference, began on November 11, 1980, and came to a close on September 9, 1983. The Madrid concluding document confirmed and expanded upon the original Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It includes significant new provisions in the areas of human rights, trade union freedoms, human contacts, free flow of information, access to diplomatic and consular missions, and measures against terrorism.

It also mandated seven follow-on "experts" meetings leading up to the next review conference to be held in Vienna beginning in November 1986. The United States is participating actively and fully in these meetings, both as a means of assessing existing problems in implementation and seeking balanced progress in the CSCE.

This is the 19th semiannual report submitted by the President to the CSCE Commission under the provisions of Public Law 94-304 of June 3, 1976. It surveys significant developments in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid concluding document during the period April 1 through October 1, 1985. The purpose of the report is to assist the CSCE Commission in its task of monitoring and encouraging compliance with the Helsinki Accords and the Madrid concluding document. These reports are themselves an important element of the U.S. Government's effort to assess the progress and shortcomings in achieving the CSCE goals of strengthening security, expanding cooperation, building mutual confidence, and promoting human rights.

Review of Implementation

For most of the CSCE participating states, the status of implementation over the current reporting period did not change significantly from earlier periods. The overall record of compliance of the Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe with their CSCE undertakings remained seriously flawed, although limited encouragement could be taken from a few positive developments. The Polish Government is apparently taking the problem of family reunification more seriously than in the recent past, although our Embassy's list of divided family cases continues to grow. And in the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) the number of emigrants allowed to depart was approximately 40% higher than in recent years but remained substantially lower than in 1984 when the G.D.R. allowed 40,000 of its citizens to depart. The Czechoslovak Government's May 8 amnesty reduced the sentences of five political prisoners by up to 1 year and provided for the release of a Hungarian minority activist held for a year pending trial on charges of "subversion" and "harming the interests of the republic abroad." However, the amnesty provided no relief for the two Charter '77 signatories serving the longest prison terms or for those political prisoners held for leaving or seeking to leave Czechoslovakia without official permission. In Hungary, the government allowed U.S. evangelist Billy Graham to conduct a worship service before 15,000 Hungarians in Budapest's indoor sports arena—the first time Graham had been afforded use of a public facility, other than a church, in any Warsaw Pact country. The Bulgarian Government continued to take positive steps to resolve family reunification cases represented by the United States, permitting emigration by family members in 14 of the 16 cases it agreed to resolve. And, despite continued repression of religious activists, the Romanian Government allowed Father Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa to emigrate with his wife and son to the United States in August 1985, after he had spent 5 years in jail and a year under house arrest. These relatively bright spots must be viewed, however, in the context of strict governmental control and limitations on political and religious expression as well as violations of basic human rights in many of these states.

And there were continuing negative developments. The number of political prisoners in Poland has nearly doubled in the last 6 months, with most new arrests apparently aimed at Poland's flourishing underground publishing industry. In the most important political trial of the reporting period, a Gdansk court on June 14 sentenced three Solidarity activists to multiyear prison terms on charges that they participated in an illegal organization—Underground Solidarity. G.D.R. authorities sentenced a prominent environmentalist, whose young daughter reportedly suffers from effects of chemical spraying, to 3½ years in prison for charges which included "defamation of the G.D.R." The G.D.R. continues to use coercion and threat of arrest to prevent its citizens from contact with foreign embassies and cultural centers. The Czechoslovak Government denied permission for Pope John Paul II as well as cardinals from Austria, France, and the United Kingdom to attend ceremonies marking the 1100th anniversary of the death of St. Methodius. In addition, three Slovaks were sentenced to long prison terms for attempted importation of religious materials from Poland. The Hungarian Government granted its police the unrestricted power to conduct surveillance upon and to internally exile any resident, 16 years or older, whose "attitude" poses a permanent danger to internal order and public security. Although the police have reportedly not yet exercised these powers against dissidents, it provides them with an important tool for use should the political climate in Hungary begin to deteriorate. And in Romania, authorities continue to prosecute individuals for attempting to bring Bibles into the country; during the review period, five persons were sentenced to terms ranging from 10 months to 7 years for offenses related to Bible smuggling. The Bulgarian Government

continued its campaign to assimilate its Turkish minority, using its militia and paramilitary units to enforce curfews, conduct arrests and interrogations, and imprison ethnic Turks who refused to give up their cultural identity. A fine is now imposed on Bulgarians who speak Turkish or wear Turkish-style clothing.

Once again, the continued unsatisfactory Soviet implementation of the Helsinki and Madrid agreements during the 6-month review period gave greater cause for concern. In the international arena, continued Soviet prosecution of war against the Afghan people was in flagrant violation of the basic principles guiding relations between states. The Soviet Union also has undermined these key principles by continuing to support the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and Vietnam's war against the Cambodian resistance.

Persecution by the Soviet authorities of Soviet citizens who attempted to express themselves freely continued at an alarming rate during the 6 months under review. Religious believers, proponents of greater cultural and political rights for ethnic minorities, human rights monitors, and peace activists alike were subjected to harassment and often to arrest and imprisonment. A campaign against Hebrew teachers and Jewish cultural activists continued, bringing the number of Jewish political prisoners to at least 22. Assertion of religious and cultural identity brought arrests to Ukrainians, Pentecostal Christians, Baptists, and others. An independent peace group was subjected to harassment, arrests, and convictions.

Andrey Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner remained in isolation, apparently still confined to the closed city of Gor'kiy. Doubts increased concerning their whereabouts and condition as they were denied contact with friends and relatives. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy spent most of the review period in the internal prison of a labor camp. Yuriy Orlov remained exiled and isolated in the desolate Province of Yakutia, while many other human rights activists remained prisoners, some with newly extended terms. Political prisoners often endured strict confinement and frequently were not permitted family visits or letters. Soviet abuse of psychiatry for political purposes continued unabated, as did poor conditions in labor camp cells and some beatings. Ukrainian dissident poet Vasyl Stus died in a labor camp on September 4.

Despite commitments under the Helsinki Final Act to facilitate family reunification, the rate of emigration from the Soviet Union remained low. Some 457 Jews left the Soviet Union from April 1 to August 31, 1985; 178 ethnic Germans left during the same period. The extremely low level of Jewish emigration was accompanied by a continuation of official "anti-Zionist" propaganda.

The Soviet authorities continued to exercise tight control on travel outside the country, with only 766 Soviet citizens allowed to make private visits to the United States during the past 6 months. Only 90 Soviet citizens (including spouses) received exit permission enabling them to join relatives in the United States.

The Soviet authorities maintained their traditional strict control of information media, essentially denying Soviet citizens access to filmed, printed, and broadcast information which might call into question the tenets of Marxism-Leninism or the official line of the Communist Party. Jamming of Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Liberty (RL) native language broadcasts continues.

The Stockholm CDE Continues

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) mandated by the Madrid CSCE review meeting opened in Stockholm on January 17, 1984. The mandate calls for it to negotiate measures which are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe—including the European portion of the Soviet Union. During the review period, Ambassador Robert L. Barry succeeded Ambassador James E. Goodby as head of the U.S. delegation.

The NATO Approach. During the period under review, the NATO countries have continued to focus discussion on the package of concrete confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) they introduced 2 weeks after the conference opened. This package is designed to increase mutual understanding and reduce the risk of surprise attack. It fulfills the requirements of the mandate and builds upon the confidence-building measures (CBMs) adopted as part of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. It provides for the following CSBMs:

- Mutual exchanges of information about the organization and location of the significant military units of all participating states;
- Exchanges of annual forecasts of planned military activities;
- Mandatory notification 45 days in advance of out-of-garrison military activities involving 6,000 or more personnel (in the Final Act, notification is required 21 days in advance only for major military maneuvers involving 25,000 or more troops);
- Mandatory invitation of observers of all participating states to all activities requiring notification (in the Final Act, invitation of observers is voluntary);
- Specific arrangements to monitor and verify compliance with these CSBMs; and
- Improvement of the communications facilities among the 35 participating states.

The Eastern Response. The East continued to focus on its set of declaratory measures but, in round six, introduced proposals on CSBMs, some of which fall outside the mandate for the CDE. Eastern proposals feature:

- A non-use of force treaty;
- A no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge;
- A ban on chemical weapons use in Europe;
- Regional nuclear-weapons-free zones in Europe, including the Balkans and the Baltic;
- Reductions in military spending; and
- Limited improvements in the confidence-building measures agreed upon in the Helsinki Final Act along with proposals which fall outside the Madrid mandate for the CDE.

President's Speech to the European Parliament. On May 8, 1985, in his address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe, President Reagan called for progress at CDE as one of four practical steps that could be taken to reduce East-West tensions and improve U.S.-Soviet relations.

He urged the Stockholm conference to "act promptly and agree on the concrete confidence-building measures proposed by the NATO countries." He went on to repeat the offer originally made in Dublin to "discuss the Soviet proposal on non-use of force in the context of Soviet agreement to concrete confidence-building measures."

Presidential Statement. Just before the beginning of the sixth round on May 14, the President issued the following statement:

> Tomorrow, May 14, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) enters its sixth round. The Conference includes all the NATO, Warsaw Pact, and European neutral countries and is thus in a unique position to play a major role in improving East-West relations. I attach great importance to this Conference.

The NATO countries have worked together at Stockholm to introduce a series of concrete confidence-building measures designed to make European military activities more predictable and more stable and to ensure that no weapons of any kind are ever used. These measures would require the mandatory notification and observation of all military activities above a certain level, together with appropriate verification measures, such as information exchange and on-site inspection. They are designed to reduce the risk of war by miscalculation and misunderstanding, guard against a surprise attack, and increase significantly the political cost to any state which would use the threat of force to intimidate another.

This ambitious program has the full support of all the nations of NATO as well as bipartisan political support here at home. The neutral and nonaligned countries of Europe also support the general principles outlined in the NATO proposal.

In my address to the European Parliament last week I urged once again that the Stockholm Conference reach prompt agreement on this package of measures proposed by the NATO countries. And I reiterated our pledge that the United States is prepared to discuss the Soviet proposal on nonuse of force in the context of Soviet agreement to concrete confidence-building measures. We hope the Soviet Union will give this serious consideration.

In Stockholm we have an opportunity to work in practical ways to reduce tension in Europe. The Conference is now at a point where it could move into a more intense negotiating phase, if the Soviet Union is prepared to join the rest of the Conference in negotiating meaningful confidence-building measures which go well beyond existing arrangements.

Rounds Six and Seven. The sixth round opened on May 14 and ended July 5. The West used this round to draw the conference into a more detailed discussion of the genuine confidence- and security-building measures which form NATO's package of proposals. Exploiting the working group structure agreed on in round four, the West sought to build support for the concepts embodied in the NATO package and expose the vacuity of the East's declaratory proposals. The Warsaw Pact continued to defend its declaratory proposals as the centerpiece of CDE, with special emphasis on their non-use of force proposal. The East also introduced proposals to require notification of ground maneuvers and military movements involving more than 20,000 troops, independent air activities involving more than 200 aircraft in the air at any one time, and independent naval manuevers involving more than 30 vessels. The proposal for notification of military manuevers on land represents only a nominal improvement over the CBMs in the Helsinki Final Act. Moreover, the other Eastern CSBM proposals only detract from Stockholm's purpose, since they lie outside the mandate for CDE agreed on at Madrid.

Round Seven began September 10 and continued past the end of the reporting period. Although the proposals before the conference were discussed both in plenary and in the working groups, the main focus of the seventh round was procedural. Shortly after the end of the reporting period, the conference agreed to move to a more informal stage preparatory to drafting an agreement. This move was important, since it allowed the West to explore more informally and in detail with the East and the Neutral and Nonaligned areas for possible agreement.

Prospects for the Future. The West believes the new, more informal stage of the negotiations offers hope for narrowing the differences among the participating states and for building support for the NATO package of concrete confidence- and security-building measures. The eighth round of CDE began November 5 and will continue through December 20. Although a schedule for 1986 has not yet been agreed on, the conference will conclude in advance of the Vienna CSCE followup meeting. The Vienna meeting is charged with assessing the progress achieved in Stockholm.

The Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting

Delegates from the 35 CSCE participating states met in Ottawa on May 7–June 17, 1985, to consider "questions concerning respect, in their States, for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in all their aspects, as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act." This was the first CSCE experts meeting devoted exclusively to human rights. The Madrid concluding document mandated the meeting to draw up conclusions and recommendations to be submitted to the governments of all participating states. The meeting was preceded by a 2-week preparatory conference held in Ottawa from April 23 to May 6.

The U.S. delegation, led by Ambassador Richard Schifter, went to Ottawa to work for improved implementation of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid concluding document. The United States, together with its NATO allies and many neutral and nonaligned countries, engaged in an extensive, serious review of the Soviet record and those of other East European states. U.S. statements, drawing on individual cases, expressed concern over abuses in such areas as freedom of expression, religious liberties, and discrimination against national minorities.

The United States and its NATO allies also put forward a series of practical proposals aimed at improved adherence to these provisions. When it became clear that the Soviet Union would block agreement to these individual proposals, the NATO countries, joined by Ireland, decided to combine them in a single comprehensive proposal—OME 47 [Ottawa Meeting of Experts document no. 47]—which was introduced June 15. This document, which sets forth a series of highly specific steps, identified Western goals for Ottawa as well as the future.

The Soviet Union rebuffed U.S. efforts to engage in preliminary discussions of human rights and Soviet human rights practices. This cast a shadow over the likely outcome of the meeting. In the end, Soviet-bloc intransigence prevented agreement on conclusions and recommendations. Even the short document advanced by the neutral and nonaligned countries—and accepted by the Western countries—which included the important recommendation for future experts meetings on human rights was not acceptable to the Soviets. While the United States and its allies would have preferred a substantive final document in Ottawa, neither the Western nor the neutral and nonaligned countries were prepared to agree to one that obfuscated the fundamental issues which were the topics of discussion at Ottawa.

Notwithstanding the lack of agreement on a final document, the meeting was worthwhile and served Western interests in a number of important ways.

- The 3-week review of implementation provided an opportunity for Western and neutral and nonaligned states to draw attention to Eastern failures to live up to their CSCE commitments, and it delivered another blow to the now weak Eastern claim that such criticism is an interference in a sovereign nation's internal affairs.
- The tabling by 17 Western countries of a common human rights agenda was a significant demonstration of Western unity and resolve.
- The neutral and nonaligned states, in tabling their substantive draft report, joined the West in rejecting Soviet efforts to undermine the Final Act's provisions on human rights and fundamental freedoms.

• The neutral and nonaligned states and the West stood together at the close of the Ottawa meeting, preferring no final document to one which compromised principles or papered over differences. This underlined the fact that the issue of human rights is not tied to military alliances but is one which concerns the conscience of the civilized world.

The issues discussed in Ottawa and proposals advanced on human rights and fundamental freedoms will be returned to when the Vienna CSCE followup meeting convenes in November 1986.

Chapter Two

Implementation of Basket I: Questions Relating to Security in Europe

The first section or "basket" of the Final Act has two main parts. The first part is a declaration of 10 principles guiding relations among states. It sets forth generally accepted precepts of international behavior which the CSCE participating states agree to observe in their relations with one another as well as with other states. The second part of Basket I is devoted to security issues. Here the participating states endorse certain confidence-building measures that are designed to remove some of the secrecy surrounding military activities; they also make certain more general pledges with respect to the importance of arms control and disarmament.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS AMONG STATES

There are 10 principles in the declaration of principles guiding relations among states in the Final Act:

Principle One: Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;

Principle Two: Refraining from the threat or use of force;

Principle Three: Inviolability of frontiers;

Principle Four: Territorial integrity of states;

Principle Five: Peaceful settlement of disputes;

Principle Six: Nonintervention in internal affairs;

Principle Seven: Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief;

Principle Eight: Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

Principle Nine: Cooperation among states; and

Principle Ten: Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

The Madrid concluding document contains complementary principles which strengthen and extend the Final Act. These include pledges to take effective measures against terrorism; prevent territories from being used for terrorist activities; assure constant, tangible progress in the exercise of human rights; ensure the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and freedoms; ensure individual freedom to practice and profess religion; consult with religious organizations; favorably consider applications for registration by religious communities; ensure respect for the rights of national minorities; and ensure the right of workers freely to establish and join trade unions and the right of trade unions freely to pursue their activities and other rights.

Implementation of Principle Seven

Although the Eastern countries gave considerable publicity to their signing of the Final Act and, more recently, the Madrid concluding document, the Eastern record of compliance with the Helsinki principles has deteriorated in important respects, especially in the Soviet Union. The United States remains dissatisfied with the implementation record of the Eastern countries so far, particularly with regard to Principle Seven. This principle calls on the participating states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief.

The following section provides a detailed survey of implementation of the Helsinki principles and related provisions of the Madrid concluding document. It treats specific cases in an illustrative rather than comprehensive fashion. Lack of information detailing abuses in a given country may not indicate their absence.

Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has continued to violate both the letter and spirit of principles guiding relations between states as set forth in the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet Union persists in its occupation of Afghanistan and in its efforts to eradicate national opposition. In conducting its ruthless war against Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has used chemical weapons, bombed civilian targets, used ground and air forces to destroy villages and crops, and employed weapons intended to cripple or maim noncombatants. The Soviet Union also supports the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and Vietnam's war against the Cambodian resistance. These actions are in direct and willful violation of the general principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act, including respect for the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, and self-determination of peoples.

Soviet performance in the field of human rights (Principle Seven) continued to be poor during this 6-month review period despite the May Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting. Mandated by the 1983 Madrid concluding document, this meeting addressed questions concerning respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms "in all their aspects" as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet delegation to the Ottawa meeting generally refused to discuss human rights violations in the U.S.S.R., responding to Western charges with allegations about violations in the West. Such a Soviet approach to human rights became more evident in the Soviet media in the late summer and early fall when the official media began to stress allegations of human rights violations in the West, especially in the United States. Meanwhile, Soviet persecution of dissidents, *refuseniks*, and religious activists continued unabated, as did suppression of national minorities and harassment of political prisoners and their families.

The current review period was marked by a continued crackdown on Jewish (primarily *refusenik*) cultural ac-

tivists and teachers of Hebrew. (A *refusenik* is a Jew who has been denied permission to emigrate.) Moscow Hebrew teacher Dmitriy (Dan) Shapiro was brought to trial June 26. After reportedly being subjected to threats of severe punishment and other forms of pressure, Shapiro signed a "confession" to Zionist and anti-Soviet activities. Later broadcast on Soviet national television, Shapiro's statement named several Jewish "collaborators," many of whom, in fact, did not know him well. Shapiro was given a suspended sentence, but his public "confession" was widely interpreted as a stern warning against assertion of Jewish culture and identity.

Other arrests and trials of Hebrew teachers reinforced the climate of repression. Leningrad Hebrew teacher Roald Zelichonok was tried August 8 and sentenced to 3 years in a labor camp for anti-Soviet slander, apparently on the basis of statements made in private letters. Leonid Volvovskiy, already exiled from Moscow to the closed city of Gor'kiy, was arrested June 25 and charged with anti-Soviet slander after hostile local newspaper articles were published and anti-Semitic slogans appeared on a wall outside his apartment. Yevgeniy Koifman was arrested June 18 and tried in mid-September in Dnepropetrovsk for alleged possession of narcotics. He was sentenced to 2½ years of strict parole away from home. Yevgeniy Aisenberg of Kharkov was sentenced in early June to 2½ years in a labor camp for anti-Soviet slander. Since teaching Hebrew is not illegal, the authorities continued the pattern of finding other pretexts for arrests.

The wave of arrests and trials of Hebrew teachers and other Jews in the previous review period left many imprisoned in the current period. Iosif Begun was transferred from a labor camp to Chistopol prison, apparently for violations of camp rules. His wife and son were repeatedly warned by Soviet authorities to cease activities on his behalf, such as hunger strikes and press conferences. Iosif Berenshtein underwent medical treatment following an attack inside a labor camp but was transferred back to a camp at Zholtye Vody with little chance of regaining his sight. Aleksandr Kholmyanskiy, another imprisoned Hebrew teacher, also suffered ill health. Semyon Shnirman, serving his second labor camp term, was being investigated in September for violation of camp rules under a new law which permits extension of labor camp sentences for such offenses as washing clothes or wearing a cap at an improper time. Samuel Epshtein, serving a term for anti-Soviet slander, had his term extended by 2 years under the same law. The number of Hebrew teachers and other Jews imprisoned for political reasons was conservatively estimated at 22 at the end of the current review period.

The current review period has also witnessed a continuation of past patterns of thinly veiled and hostile "anti-Zionist" rhetoric. Soviet propaganda maintains that Israeli and Western intelligence agencies encourage emigration in order to obtain state secrets from Soviet citizens. It further alleges that "Zionists" collaborated with fascists during World War II to send many innocent Jews to their death. These "Zionist elements," so the argument goes, now comprise the ruling circles of Israel, which have inherited Hitler's fascist mantle. The "Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public," an officially sanctioned group, continues to lead the propaganda attack against Jewish *refuseniks* and "Zionists." A Soviet TV documentary and a new Soviet "White Book" have alleged links between "Zionist" activities and Western intelligence organizations.

Individual Jewish *refuseniks* have responded in various ways to official intransigence on emigration. Some, in resignation, have currently stopped applying to leave, while others apply as frequently as possible—once every 6 months.

Ethnic German emigration remained at low levels throughout the reporting period. From April 1 to September 1, a total of 178 ethnic Germans left the Soviet Union, in comparison to 273 who left during the first 5 months of the previous reporting period.

Jews were by no means the only religious group which saw its members harassed, arrested, and imprisoned. A community of Pentecostal Christians in the village of Cheguyevka in the maritime region of the Soviet Far East has continued to suffer difficulties for its stubborn refusal to cease their religious activities. (They believe it is wrong to register with the authorities and accept their supervision, as Soviet law requires of religious groups.) Pastor Viktor Valter was sentenced April 11 to 5 years in a labor camp, and six others—Anatoliy Sheludkov, Pyotr Valter, Nikolai Vins, Oleg Lobanov, Viktor Pavlovets, and Bernhard Rosher—received labor camp terms on April 23. Two more Pentecostalists are serving 1-year camp terms for violation of internal passport regulations, and others are under investigation under the same law. There have been deep disagreements between the Pentecostal community and the local authorities over schooling and medical services, and hostile articles have appeared in the official local press. Some Pentecostalist parents have withdrawn their children from school because they were subjected to regular humiliation and occasional beatings. Several families from the village have sought unsuccessfully to immigrate to West Germany.

Unregistered Baptists also continued to feel heavy pressure. Ivan Peters and Wilhelm and Viktor Rogalskiy, three Baptists from Gagra on the Black Sea, were reportedly sentenced in mid-May to labor camp terms of 2–3 years. Several other arrests of Baptists were reported in April and June: Vasiliy Gritsenko in the Kiev region; Pavel Razorvin in Perm; Aleksandr, Anatoliy, and Pavel Andriyets in the Voroshilovgrad region of the Ukraine; Pavel Goloshchapov in the Tula region; Nikolai Tkachenko in Belgorod region; and Nikolai Savchenko in Omsk. Three Baptists were convicted in August in Alma-Ata of possessing an illegal printing press. They are I. Steffen, Igor Worlf, and Andrei Woln. Valeriy Barinov continues serving a 2½ year term, including 6 months in punishment isolation, for allegedly preparing to leave the country illegally. Two other Baptists, Vladimir Khailo and Mikhail Khorer, remained prisoners. We estimate the total number of unregistered Baptists currently imprisoned for their religious activities in the Soviet Union at 200.

In the Ukraine, the campaign against defenders of the long-repressed Ukrainian (Uniate or Eastern Rite) Catholic Church continued. Iosif Terelya, a leader of the unofficial "Initiative Group of the Committee for the Defense of Believers of the Catholic Church," was sentenced August 20 to 7 years in a labor camp and 5 years of internal exile on charges of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. His colleague, Vasily Kobrin, was convicted in March on charges of anti-Soviet slander. And Ukrainian Catholic priest Mikhail Vinnitsky was arrested in Lvov on charges of "parasitism" in June 1985. These three men were moving forces behind the *samizdat* "Chronicle of the Catholic Church in the Ukraine." The "Chronicle" had publicized systematic Soviet repression of the Uniate Church, including church burnings and the fact that hundreds of Ukrainian Catholics had renounced their citizenship in protest over religious persecution and Soviet subjugation of the Ukraine.

The traditional religious affiliation of ethnic Russians and East Bank Ukrainians is the Russian Orthodox Church. The Soviet Government estimates that 8–10% of urban dwellers are religious

and that the rural percentage is higher. Even by this measure, there would be about 800,000 Orthodox believers in Moscow, where the authorities permit only about 40 churches to function, or one church for 20,000 believers. On Easter Sunday, when large crowds seek entry to services, police often make access to churches difficult, taking names and otherwise seeking to intimidate those wishing to attend. Believers going beyond ritual observance of their religious convictions may encounter more serious difficulty. Orthodox activist Feliks Svetov, arrested in January 1985 and charged with anti-Soviet slander for publishing a novel in the West, was held in prison for an extended investigation which is not expected to conclude before December. His wife, Zoya Krakhmalnikova, is reportedly serving a term of exile in Siberia for publishing a religious journal, *Hope*.

Attempts to further "Russify" the Ukraine continued unabated. Recent Western visitors to Kiev have commented on how little Ukrainian is actually spoken there. Those who inquire why this is so are frequently told that spoken Ukrainian is regarded by local officials as a manifestation of "bourgeois nationalism" and strongly discouraged. Ukrainian cultural and historical objects have been neglected and Uniate churches burned.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, whose forced annexation by the Soviet Union in 1944 has never been recognized by the United States, have long been characterized by resistance to assimilation into Russian language and culture. During the reporting period, human rights and religious activists in the Baltic States continued to endure Soviet repression. On June 16, Vladimir Frenkel of Riga was sentenced to 18 months in a labor camp for anti-Soviet slander. A Jewish *refusenik* who converted to Christianity, Frenkel was charged with contributing to an underground Jewish cultural journal and with publishing articles on Orthodox Christianity in the West. In another case, a Soviet citizen of a Baltic nationality was fired from his job for simply visiting a Western embassy in Moscow. Ionas Maturlonas, a Lithuanian priest, continued serving a 3-year term for disrupting public order. Father Vaclovas Stakenas, a member of the Catholic Committee to Defend the Rights of Believers, was violently attacked by two unknown assailants and then thrown into a pond on August 22. In Estonia, Lutheran pastor Garri Mytsnik was sentenced to a 3-year term for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" for his sermons and open letters to Bishop Hark and the Estonian KGB. Imprisoned Estonian activist and noted scientist Johannes Hint died in a prison hospital in Tallinn; Hint suffered from a heart condition.

The Soviet authorities are exerting steady pressure to encourage Muslim inhabitants of Central Asia and Azerbaijan to abandon their religion and use the Russian language. Very few mosques in these regions are open for use, and there are few officially recognized clergymen. Muslim clergy not sanctioned by the authorities are attacked in the official press as "vagabonds." One of them, Akverdy Eshkulov, was reportedly arrested in Samarkand region during the review period and sentenced to 2 years in a labor camp for serving as a mullah without official sanction.

Even tiny religious groups are not immune to severe pressure. In a trial ending July 3, five members of the Hare Krishna sect—Vladimir A. Kustrya, Sergei A. Priporov, Yuriy A. Fedchenko, Aleksei M. Baida, and Valentina P. Samoilova—were sentenced to terms of from 2 to 5 years in a labor camp for "encroaching on the individuality and rights of citizens under the guise of conducting religious rites." The trial took place in the north Caucasus village of Kurdzhinovo. Jehovah's Witnesses also continue to encounter serious obstacles to the free exercise of their religion.

An international youth festival held in Moscow in early August was the occasion for preventive repression and control by the Soviet authorities. The festival itself was channeled as much as possible along the lines of Soviet propaganda, and delegates from Western countries were strongly discouraged or prevented from expressing opinions critical of Soviet policy in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Movement of Soviet citizens into and within Moscow was severely restricted to minimize their contact with foreigners. Soviet authorities took steps to ensure that dissidents would not meet youth festival delegates. Vladimir Ryabakon was placed in a guarded psychiatric hospital during and after the festival and given drugs causing physical discomfort. Inna and Boris Begun, wife and son of imprisoned Hebrew teacher Iosif Begun, were given a rare opportunity to meet briefly with him but had to wait a week at the labor camp—a week which coincided with the youth festival. Mikhail Shipov was detained outside Moscow during the festival and was threatened with further imprisonment. Many other persons reportedly left town or stayed home during the youth festival because of warnings or heavy surveillance.

Members of the Group to Establish Trust Between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.—an independent group of concerned Soviet citizens whose nonpartisan, nonpolemical approach to the discussion of arms control and confidence-building stands in sharp contrast to the statements of the officially sanctioned Soviet peace committee—were particularly affected by the youth festival crackdown. The arrest of group member Dr. Vladimir Brodskiy on July 17 appeared timed to take him out of circulation during the festival. His trial was twice scheduled at obscure locations outside official courthouses and suddenly cancelled without explanation before finally taking place on August 15 after the festival concluded. Brodskiy was sentenced to 3 years in a labor camp for malicious hooliganism. Another peace group member, Nikolai Khramov, was placed in a hospital for venereal diseases during the youth festival, although he had obtained a clean bill of health from a doctor only days earlier.

The charges against Brodskiy stemmed from an attempted peace demonstration May 16, prevented by a police roundup of about 20 group members. Khramov was held then for 15 days. The day before, two group members, Olga Kabanova and Natalya Akulenok, were taken by police to a psychiatric hospital; they were held 2–3 weeks, and Akulenok reportedly was given injections of the drug Sulfazin. On June 11, several group members were arrested, and Khramov was taken by seven civilian police auxiliaries to a wooded area and beaten. Other group members were detained and questioned. Aleksandr Shatravka, already a prisoner, was moved from a general-regime to a strict-regime camp.

Nobel prize laureate Andrey Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner, evidently remained in exile in the closed city of Gor'kiy throughout the review period, although a further decrease in already scanty information about them contributed to increasing doubts and uncertainty about their location and condition. Soviet authorities have held the couple under virtual house arrest. During the reporting period, telephone contact with them was prohibited, and they were permitted to send only censored telegrams and postcards. Just before the August 1 commemoration of the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki, Soviet authorities released to a West German news organization film purportedly showing glimpses of Sakharov moving inside a hospital window. Otherwise Sakharov and Bonner remain almost

completely isolated, even from close family members. Rumors of their possible transfer to another location cannot be confirmed.

Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, was confined during much of the current review period to the internal prison of a labor camp in the Perm region. Five sentences of 11 days each to the punishment cell of the prison (a bare room where food and clothing are kept to a minimum) extended his 4-month term in the internal prison, after which he was to remain in the labor camp. Soviet authorities have rejected repeated appeals for clemency for Shcharanskiy, sentenced to a 13-year term on a patently false charge of spying. Another Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group member, Ivan Kovalev, has spent a total of 501 days in the punishment isolation section of a labor camp since he arrived there in the summer of 1982.

Yuriy Orlov, the leader of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, continues to serve a 5-year term of exile in a remote area of the province of Yakutia. He is permitted visits from his wife but is subjected to harassment by local inhabitants. He subsists on minimal food rations. His small house has no running water. Orlov's health is reported to be fairly good despite the harsh climate. Appeals on his behalf continue to go unheeded by Soviet authorities.

Another former member of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Naum Meiman, continued to encounter obdurate resistance as he persistently sought permission for his wife to travel abroad for medical treatment not available in the U.S.S.R. He and Inna Meiman, who underwent a fourth serious cancer operation in July, were again denied exit permission in August.

Former Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group member Vasyl Stus died September 4 in a labor camp after years of brutal treatment at the hands of Soviet authorities. He was the fourth Ukrainian human rights activist to die from mistreatment or neglect in a Soviet labor camp in the past 18 months. These deaths leave little doubt that Ukrainian political prisoners are singled out for particularly brutal treatment. Another former member of the Ukrainian Helsinki group, Iosif Zisels, was sentenced in April to 3 years in a labor camp, his second sentence for human rights activities. His colleague, Mykola Horbal, was also sentenced to 3 years of labor camp in April. Cruelly, he had been rearrested on anti-Soviet slander charges just 2 days before his scheduled release from a 5-year sentence on trumped-up criminal charges. The difficult circumstances of Ukrainian human rights activists are reflected in the fact that although Ukrainians account for only 20% of the Soviet population, they account for 40% of all Soviet political prisoners.

On June 6, Grigoriy Goldshtein, Isai Goldshtein, Tengiz Gudava, Eduard Gudava, Enriko Tvaladze, and Ilya Boroda issued a statement in Tbilisi announcing the revival of the Georgian Helsinki Monitoring Group and protesting the continuing imprisonment of Merab Kostava, a founding member of the original Helsinki group in Georgia. Isai Goldshtein was kept under close surveillance by the authorities after that announcement and threatened with arrest for espionage. These threats may have been an effort to discourage contacts with foreigners. Gudava and Emmanuil Tvaladze, also of Tbilisi, were arrested in late June on unspecified charges.

Other dissidents, sometimes too young to have belonged to the original Helsinki Monitoring Groups, have also been arrested. Kirill Popov of Moscow was taken to Lefortovo prison on June 19. He was later charged with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda under a law which carries a maximum term of 5 years. Tatyana Osipova, a former Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group member, was due to be released from labor camp to internal exile in May, but her camp term was extended for "maliciously" breaking camp rules. Former Helsinki monitors Viktor Nekipelov, Ivan Kovalyov, and Anatoliy Marchenko, all serving camp sentences, were reported to be suffering ill health. Viktor Grinev, already in a labor camp, was sentenced to 2 additional years for anti-Soviet slander. Anatoliy Koryagin, a leading critic of Soviet psychiatric abuse and another labor camp inmate, was reportedly in very bad health.

Independent labor unions are not accepted by the Soviet authorities. Vladimir Sytinskiy of SMOT (an independent trade union group) was reportedly sent to a psychiatric hospital after being tried for anti-Soviet slander. Belorussian worker Michail Kukobaka, who was to have been released from labor camp in October 1984, has been given a new term for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." The use of psychiatric facilities for political purposes continued in the Soviet Union during the reporting period. For example, Lydiya Koifman, the wife of arrested Hebrew teacher Yevgeniy Koifman, was sent to a psychiatric hospital after trying to help her husband.

Soviet authorities continued to arrest cultural activists. Former political prisoner and unofficial art collector Georgy Mikhailov was rearrested in Leningrad September 19. *Samizdat* writer Lev Timofeev was accused of sending his writings to the West; on September 30 he was sentenced to 6 years in a labor camp plus 5 years' internal exile. At the end of August, imprisoned poet Irina Ratushinskaya had her head shaved and was placed in a punishment isolation cell for six months.

Despite commitments under the Helsinki Final Act to facilitate family reunification, the Soviet Union continues to deny exit permission to thousands of its citizens who wish to join relatives living abroad. Jewish emigration continued at a very low level compared to the peak year of 1979, when over 50,000 left the country. (See Chapter IV, Human Contacts.) The Soviet authorities continue to maintain, in the face of abundant evidence to the contrary, that the vast majority of Jews who wanted to leave the country have already left and that the rate of emigration is declining naturally as fewer and fewer families remain to be reunited. The authorities have also stated that family reunification refers only to those families divided by World War II.

Romania. The Government of Romania continues to comply with the first six Helsinki principles and repeatedly advocates them in policy statements, bilateral discussions, and international forums. Romania has placed on the agenda of the current (40th) UN General Assembly session an appeal for peaceful settlements of disputes and for noninterference in the domestic affairs of others.

Romania's observance of basic human rights (Principle Seven) continues to be poor. The Romanian Constitution contains guarantees of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The same document, and Romanian law, in many cases either explicitly limits these guarantees or set a standard of state control so vague as to make the guarantees meaningless. The constitution names the Romanian Communist Party as the guiding authority in the country. Under this mandate the party, the Government of Romania, and its internal security apparatus tolerate no significant opposition. All forms of mass media are tightly controlled. Freedom of conscience has little meaning in a society where behavior is conditioned on the widespread belief that one out of four of one's neighbors is a police informant.

Freedom of thought is constricted by Romanians' belief that every conver-

sation and meeting might be monitored by the security apparatus. Freedom of association and assembly are limited by these same fears and by government policies that allow meetings and assembly only for officially approved purposes.

In discussing human rights, Romanian officials often assert that economic, "quality-of-life" benefits are the most significant human right. They say that, first and foremost, citizens have a right to the essentials of life: food, shelter, employment, and economic security. By implication, lesser standards of performance should be tolerated in the area of human freedoms in order to achieve rapid progress toward the primary goal. Romanian performance in the area of economic rights, mentioned in paragraph two of Principle Seven, is poor by any European standard. Once a primary agricultural supplier and a country whose living standard compared favorably with Bulgaria's and the Soviet Union's, since 1980 Romania has become a country where even basic foodstuffs are rationed and, often, simply unavailable. Its living standard is Europe's lowest, save Albania's.

Following a grueling winter without heat or electricity in many homes, with private cars banned from the streets and public transportation severely curtailed, the spring and summer months of the reporting period have brought considerable improvement to life in Romania. Despite the summer and fall harvests, however, many basic food items continue to be rationed. Even the government's own projections have been revised downward toward reality in the face of a poorer harvest than last year. Travelers in the countryside, where private plots traditionally have kept the rural population adequately fed, now report that there are food shortages there as well. Current shortages mean many city dwellers are unable to get the usual supplies of food to preserve for the winter.

Neither has there been any discernible improvement in the energy situation. Electrical outages occur regularly. Many city dwellers fortunate enough to have had uninterrupted power last winter expect to be cut off this season, since throughout the summer crews have been rewiring the main electrical distribution system, allegedly so that residences may be cut off without disturbing power supplies to industry. Numerous articles report deficiencies in the coal mining industry, and stockpiles are lower than predicted. The unavailability of even poor quality coal has led many householders throughout the country to stockpile wood as a hedge against the gas cutoffs which left so many dwellings and public buildings unheated last winter.

Despite constitutional guarantees, the practice of religion in Romania continues to be severely circumscribed by the government. Religious activity is restricted to the 14 denominations officially recognized by the government. These include the Romanian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Hungarian Reformed, Unitarian, German Lutheran, Baptist, Pentecostal, Seventh-day Adventist, and Jewish faiths. Attempts to gather for worship by members of other faiths are treated as "illegal assemblies," with participants sometimes arrested and fined. Among the denominations refused recognition by the Government of Romania are the Church of the Latter-day Saints (Mormons), the Nazarenes, and the Jehovah's Witnesses. The latter two were singled out for attacks in government periodicals this summer.

Romania's 14 officially recognized religions are administratively supervised by the government's Department of Cults, which subsidizes salaries of the country's clergy (although the Baptists do not accept official subventions) and approves building permits, seminary admissions, and printing of religious materials. The degree of authority exercised by the Department of Cults varies among the religious groups. Unrecognized religious groups are discouraged through harassment and intimidation. Government policy tends to restrict the evangelistic faiths more than the Romanian Orthodox Church, to which a large majority of Romanians belong.

The growth of "neo-Protestant" religions—Pentecostals, Evangelical Brethren, and unofficial Baptists—during the last 15 years has led to continued friction with the government. Official attempts to discourage these groups are stimulated by their insistence on the primacy of religious belief over state authority in matters of conscience. During this period, there was no visible improvement in the government's restrictive policy on repair and construction of new churches; authorities demolished major portions of one Bucharest Baptist church, and bulldozers were poised to level another in the provinces. Two Baptist pastors were tried on apparently flimsy charges; one pastor was convicted. Another recalcitrant activist Baptist pastor was forced to leave Bucharest despite his wife's advanced pregnancy and his mother's terminal cancer. Many others were called in by state security officials. The shortage of Bibles continued to lead many to risk the penalties of smuggling; during this period, five persons were sentenced to terms ranging from 10 months to 7 years for offenses related to Bible smuggling.

Romanian authorities remain somewhat sensitive to foreign opinion. Thus, for example, government officials told visiting Congressmen in Bucharest this summer that the Romanian Government would be willing to permit and facilitate the import of large numbers of Bibles, if a need were demonstrated that could not be met from domestic resources.

Public image was undoubtedly a large factor in the government's decision to allow Billy Graham to preach in Romania in September 1985. He was greeted by massive crowds in his early appearances, despite the absence of any domestic publicity. A crowd of more than 40,000 gathered in the western city of Timisoara but was unable to hear him because external loudspeakers were cut off. Their protests led authorities strictly to control crowd sizes later in the visit, but Graham still managed to reach a total Romanian audience estimated at over 110,000. In moves seemingly related to congressional hearings on the renewal of Romania's most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status, two celebrated dissidents were allowed to emigrate. After 5 years in jail and a year of house arrest, Father Gheorge Calciu-Dumitreasa, along with his wife and son, was allowed to immigrate to the United States in August 1985. The announcement of his release followed numerous high-level representations made by the U.S. and other Western governments on Calciu's behalf. Dissident writer Dorin Tudoran was also allowed to immigrate to the West at the time of the MFN hearings. He staged a hunger strike in April, and his case had attracted Western support.

Other dissident figures did not share in Calciu's and Tudoran's good fortune. Constantin Sfatcu was arrested in April when he was found with approximately 600 Bibles in his possession that had been smuggled in from the West. In July, he was convicted and sentenced to 7½ years for the "attempted murder" of the arresting police officer. U.S. Embassy observers at the trial reported that the evidence clearly did not sustain the charge. The case was subsequently retried on appeal; in October, Sfatcu was convicted of the lesser charge of "assaulting a police officer" and sentenced to 4½ years. Petru Popescu, a Baptist lay pastor in a small village, disappeared early this summer, the day after giving a tour of his village to two U.S. Embassy officers who visited there unannounced. It was later learned that he had been arrested, hurriedly tried, and sentenced to 2½ months' imprisonment for "hooliganism." Most of the

charges leading to this sentence arose from events alleged to have occurred during that visit. Available information indicates that much of the testimony regarding these events was false. Popescu is now back in his village, but his church (whose reported confiscation by local authorities motivated this visit) remains a nursery school.

Bunian Cocar has been pastor of a Bucharest Baptist church since 1982. Although licensed and under contract to the church, he was never able to obtain a Bucharest residence permit from local authorities. In June, in the midst of a confrontation Cocar provoked over new church construction, the authorities ordered him to leave Bucharest with his wife and terminally ill mother. His wife, in an advanced state of pregnancy, later miscarried. Cocar later returned to Bucharest; though he has been fined several times for such offenses as leaving debris on the site of his partially demolished church and seeking to erect a tent over the demolished part of the building, the authorities appear prepared to tolerate Cocar's continued efforts to protect his church, at least for the moment. He was able to meet with visiting U.S. Congressmen in June.

Elisei Ruse, Cornel Mich, Nicula Levi, and Ilie Dociu, four members of the "Open Brethren" Church (*Chrestini dupa Evanghelie*), were convicted September 13 of "distributing literature without a license" when caught giving away Bibles and other religious literature. Their sentences ranged from 10 months to 1 year at "socialist labor"—menial agricultural, factory, or construction jobs at reduced wages, but without actual imprisonment. While they, thus, remain at home, their reduced wages make them dependent on the charity of relatives and fellow church members for food and other necessities. Dociu and his wife have eight children; the Ruses have three; and Mich, one. The court also relieved Ruse of his job as editor of the church's magazine and ordered the confiscation of other religious materials.

Following his departure from Romania, Father Calciu listed Ilie Neamtu, of the "Open Brethren" Church in Ploiesti, as having been arrested "for his faith" in August. It appears Neamtu may have been arrested as early as July 1. One source of unknown reliability claims that the family say they have no knowledge of Neamtu's fate. Another usually reliable source says that, although Ploiesti police deny they have Neamtu in custody, his wife has been ordered to come to the central police station there once a month, exchanging a set of her husband's clean clothes for soiled ones. A Western source backed by a highly reliable source in Romania reported that Father Chilici (or, in Hungarian, Csilik), a Roman Catholic priest in the city of Oradea, was badly beaten last summer by internal security police because of his Hungarian ethnic background and his success as the leader of a "charismatic" evangelistic group within the church. During the reporting period, there were no new developments in the case of Dorel Catarama, a Seventh-day Adventist activist convicted on charges of economic crimes and imprisoned since 1982.

Romania's minority populations of Hungarians, Gypsies, Germans, and a number of other ethnic groups live in a country infused with Romanian nationalism. School texts, history books, and mass media purvey a Romanian version of history which often ignores or belittles the role these minorities have played in Romanian history. Although some basic schooling is still available in minority languages, recent administrative measures have made it increasingly difficult for minorities to get higher education in their own language and to enjoy more sophisticated forms of their ethnic culture, generating discontent among Hungarians and Germans. There is little evidence of any economic discrimination; minorities have suffered along with the Romanian majority.

The Government of Romania officially condemns terrorism and seeks to prevent its territory from being used for the operation, organization, or commission of terrorist activities. It does, however, openly support a number of "national liberation movements," all of which espouse terrorism. The PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization], SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization], and the ANC [African National Congress] have diplomatic or quasi-diplomatic missions in Bucharest. However, the Romanian Government has been reluctant to join in international action to suppress terrorism.

Domestically, Romania is somewhat vulnerable because of its large number of Middle Eastern students—some estimates run as high as 30,000—among which are thought to be represented almost all of the radical Middle Eastern terrorist factions. Following the assassination of a senior Jordanian diplomat in Bucharest last December, security measures aimed at this student community were increased. In May, however, a bomb in an Arab student's car killed three police officers attempting to defuse it. Though reliable information is lacking, it appears the bombing resulted from friction between Arab student terrorist factions.

Labor unions are integrated with and controlled by the party and state. There are continuing unconfirmed reports of instances of labor unrest. During the reporting period, Romania refused to appear before an International Labor Organization (ILO) commission investigating charges that Romania denies freedom of association to its workers.

Poland Throughout the reporting period, the Polish Government continued to accuse the U.S. and other Western governments of interference in Polish internal affairs. The Polish Government most frequently cited remaining Western sanctions against Poland as the most prominent example. But it also expressed concern over the activities of U.S. and other Western diplomats and journalists in Poland and regularly criticized Polish language broadcasts of RFE (Radio Free Europe), VOA, and other Western stations. Polish authorities detained and later expelled two U.S. diplomats observing a May Day demonstration, alleging that they were participants in the protests and, thus, interfering in Polish internal affairs. Police also frequently temporarily detained journalists who observed such demonstrations, an action the government justified as a legitimate defense against foreign interference in Poland's internal affairs.

During the review period Poland was not involved in any situation which could entail the threat or use of force against another state.

Polish sensitivity regarding its western border remains high. The Polish Government has continued to accuse some F.R.G. (Federal Republic of Germany) politicians of "revanchism," claiming their statements on German reunification represent a threat to the maintenance of the western frontier. The Polish Government celebrated the 40th anniversary of the incorporation of its western and northern territories with festivals, parades, and exhibits, all attesting to the Polish character of the territory. In addition to expressing special sensitivity about its own borders, Polish statements on territorial integrity issues, peaceful settlements of disputes, and non-use of force are selective and parallel Soviet foreign policy pronouncements.

The most important single human rights violation of the reporting period was the June conviction and sentencing of Solidarity activists Adam Michnik, Bogdan Lis, and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk to prison terms of 3, 2½, and 3½ years,

respectively. The government accused the three activists of membership in an illegal organization (the Temporary Coordinating Committee of Solidarity, or TKK) and fomenting public unrest. Although the authorities' decision to close the trial to all Western observers precluded independent observation of the proceedings, reports based on information from trial participants indicated that unusual abrogations of the defendants' rights occurred. Reportedly, for example, court authorities frequently refused to allow defense attorneys to confer privately with their clients. Despite the content of the charges, the presiding judge reportedly refused Michnik the possibility of mentioning anything about his relations to the TKK in testimony and, on several occasions, expelled him from the courtroom to ensure his silence. Defense attorneys complained that they were denied full access to the evidence gathered against their clients and given insufficient time to study that which was available to them. Much of the government's case was based on a tape recording allegedly made of a conversation with Lis, which the defense claimed to be fabricated. After the conviction, all three defendants appealed the decision. A Supreme Court decision is expected before year's end.

On a broader scale, the government continued a selective crackdown on the political opposition throughout the reporting period. In the process, the number of political prisoners swelled to well over 360. In their arrests, police seemed primarily to have targeted the printing and distribution centers of Poland's flourishing underground publishers. The limited press accounts of such arrests often mention that the suspects were caught with either illegal printing equipment or with large numbers of illegal documents in their possession. Many of those arrested are tried under the recently enlarged provisions for summary justice. One of the first sentenced under the amendments, which went into effect on July 1, was Henryk Grzachzielski, who was arrested that very day for "leading a strike" against meat price increases. On July 3, he was sentenced to 1 year in jail. Police have also regularly used their power to detain citizens for up to 48 hours to intimidate opposition activists. For example, at the end of April, Gdansk police used this procedure to round up dozens of Solidarity supporters in order to remove them from the streets prior to the government-organized May Day celebrations.

The Polish Government allows a significant degree of religious freedom. Although it has made clear publicly that it has not given up its long-term goal of restricting religious influences, churches are free to preach, publish, and proselytize. The Roman Catholic Church is allowed to broadcast Sunday mass over state-run radio, and the small Protestant denominations are permitted to do so on a rotating basis. The government continues to allow mass religious gatherings, including pilgrimages and conventions, to take place without significant interference. But it makes clear that it expects these gatherings to maintain their purely religious character. Although the vast majority of the populace are religious adherents, persons who openly profess their religious belief still find it difficult to rise to leading positions in government and industry. The Roman Catholic Church is the predominant religious force in Poland. A substantial majority of all ages and social groups participate regularly in Catholic religious services. The next largest religious community is the Orthodox Church, with about 800,000 members. Approximately a dozen other denominations exist in Poland, and the Polish Government allows them to practice their faiths freely as long as they avoid political activities.

Despite the Catholic Church's firm position in society, church-state relations continue to be thorny. The government and the official press have repeatedly criticized those priests it considers to be politically active, prompting Cardinal Glemp to counter that the church and clergy have a duty to play a role in national discussions of important issues. Cardinal Glemp and General Jaruzelski met in June, the first time in more than a year. Their meeting apparently failed to resolve outstanding church-state issues, such as the church-proposed foundation to aid private agriculture. There are occasional reports of physical attacks on priests under suspicious circumstances. In a notable example, Krakow priest and Solidarity adviser Tadeusz Zaleski reported on April 6 that he was attacked by a hooded assailant who gassed him unconscious and burned him repeatedly. He charged the security police with responsibility for the attack. A police investigation of the matter concluded that Zaleski, an epileptic, had a seizure during which he set his clothing on fire and burned himself, an explanation greeted by widespread disbelief. Public prosecutors have continued to threaten priests whose sermons or church exhibits they consider to be too political. In June, an Orthodox priest in Bialystock died under mysterious circumstances. There is widespread doubt concerning the conclusion by official investigators that he committed suicide.

The Polish Government has breached its commitment under the Madrid concluding document to respect the right of workers to freely establish and join trade unions: a Warsaw court on April 12 officially registered the All-Poland Agreement of Trade Unions (OPZZ), the state-approved union, as the only official nationwide trade union organization in Poland. The government ruled out a return to trade union pluralism in the near future by amending the Trade Union Act to codify the concept of only one union per workplace. As a result, workers may not freely organize alternatives to the officially backed unions. The government granted the OPZZ consultative rights in enterprise decisions on work regulations, work hours, holiday schedules, and the allocation of welfare and housing funds. The inclusion of the OPZZ in these decisions undermines the influence of the heretofore relatively independent factory worker self-management councils, in which many Solidarity activists have been influential. On June 22, the Polish Government transferred all funds and assets seized from Solidarity and other independent unions to the OPZZ. Polish authorities estimated the total value to be 3.4 billion zloties, $22 million at the official rate of exchange. Despite government support, official union membership continued to lag far behind Solidarity's highwater mark of 10 million. OPZZ chairman Alfred Miodwicz in August claimed a membership of 5.5 million but acknowledged that only 60% of these were actually active workers. Poland's withdrawal from the ILO in the wake of that organization's criticism of Polish labor policy has rendered the question of worker representation on that body moot. In keeping with other unions from Warsaw Pact nations, the OPZZ joined the communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions.

The Polish Government officially subscribes to the principle of equality for all citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious background, age, or sex. Belorussians and Ukrainians differ linguistically from the majority, and many are members of the Orthodox or Uniate Churches. While they have somewhat greater difficulty building churches, training clergy, and maintaining their languages, there is no legal discrimination against them. Whatever prejudice they may encounter appears to occur in the context of their small numbers and the region's history. There are small Protestant communities in Poland, as well as a very small group of Muslims. At present, only a few thousand Jews,

most of them elderly, remain in the country.

Women have equal rights under the law, and there is no evidence that discrimination based on sex is a serious problem. Traditional views of women as wives, mothers, and homemakers remain strong. A large majority of working-age Polish women, including almost all those who live in rural areas, are employed. Many women have reached positions of responsibility in the professions, but relatively few have high government or party posts.

Poland engages in many bilateral and multilateral cultural, scientific, economic, consular, military, educational, labor, and recreational agreements which involve exchanges and participation in conferences. Poland is a member of the United Nations and related organizations, the Warsaw Pact, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).

The Polish Government adopts a carefully legalistic approach to the question of international obligations and, in that context, generally fulfills the letter of the obligations it assumes—as it interprets those obligations.

However, certain Polish Government actions have been found to be in conflict with ILO conventions, and Poland has, on occasion, failed to carry out its obligations under the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. In public statements the government condemns terrorism. However, its pronouncements on this issue, as on territorial integrity, tend to be selective. Domestically, Poland has a select antiterrorist unit, controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which has been used to help protect important visitors such as the Pope.

Hungary. In practice, Hungary has continued to enjoy a relatively good human rights record. There were no new significant instances of human rights abuses during this reporting period. The status of dissident economist Gyorgy Krasso, who was placed under police surveillance (i.e., a limited form of house arrest) last November, has not materially changed. The authorities liberalized some portions of his surveillance order, such as permitting him to use his telephone. But during the summer months, his apartment was visited regularly by the police, who noted who was present and examined the premises carefully without touching anything. A disturbing factor which occurred during the period was the enactment of a new law which gives the police increased administrative power over Hungarian citizens and residents. Under the new law, the "head of the police station having jurisdiction over the territory where the interested person resides or stays may apply coercive measures, such as (a) police surveillance, (b) expulsion, or (c) police surveillance and expulsion together, against any Hungarian citizen or resident alien above 16 years of age living in the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic whose attitude imposes a permanent danger to the internal order of the Hungarian People's Republic or to the public order and public security." The decree also provides that the basic term of a police surveillance order is 2 years and can be extended by a further year. This is a change from the previous 12-month order, which could be extended by 1 year.

Other decrees in recent years have strengthened the power of the police to search citizens without cause and tightened state control over duplicating machinery and those who are without regular employment. Although this strengthening of police power has not resulted in a tightening of control over political dissidents, in the event of a change in political climate, the authorities would have strong legal coercive powers already in hand. Some leading dissidents have surmised that the increased administrative police powers were designed for use against criminals. Dissidents fear, however, that the same powers could be turned against them, with or without central government approval. They have pointed to the instances of police abuse in Poland as a sobering example of what could happen in Hungary.

Hungarian *samizdat* continued publication throughout the reporting period and even increased in number with the appearance of a new issue devoted to non-Hungarian affairs. Occasional police harrassment of *samizdat* distributers and writers continues but does not seem to mark a campaign or major effort to close down the underground publishing houses. Some local observers believed that the authorities sought to minimize actions against dissidents before the October 15 opening of the Budapest Cultural Forum.

The settled relations between the churches and the state continued during the reporting period. American evangelist Billy Graham visited Hungary for the third time on September 17-23, 1985. He preached before a crowd of 15,000 in the southern Hungarian city of Pecs, using a 12 by 8 meter "diamond vision" screen as well as sound amplification to reach those who could not see him on the cathedral steps. Graham also conducted a worship service in Budapest's indoor sports arena, drawing an overflow crowd of about 15,000. This was the first time Graham had been afforded use of a public facility, other than a church, in a Warsaw Pact state. Inexpensive Hungarian versions of two of Graham's works and the Bible were on public sale in Pecs and Budapest. Hungarian authorities cooperated with the Graham organization throughout the visit and made no attempt to dissuade the public from hearing the evangelist.

Roman Catholic and other conscientious objectors to military service continued to be tried and sentenced. We believe there are approximately 10-15 currently serving prison terms of from 1 to 3 years. Hungary's record of cooperation with overseas organizations interested in its small Jewish community continued during the reporting period. Numerous delegations visited Hungary to examine and discuss with officials proposals for preserving Jewish culture.

German Democratic Republic. There have been no changes in G.D.R. practices regarding the first six principles. The G.D.R. has respected the rights inherent in sovereignty; not used or threatened force; not violated frontiers; respected territorial integrity of states; not settled disputes by other than peaceful means; and there is no clear proof of G.D.R. intervention in internal affairs of other countries, although the G.D.R. continues strong support for Soviet activities and so-called national liberation movements in developing countries.

The G.D.R. continues to restrict the fundamental freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, and belief among its people. The activities of the Ministry of State Security's secret police are pervasive. Without judicial controls, the police may install listening devices, open private mail, or interrogate whomever they choose.

With the exception of church-sponsored events held on church grounds, private groups are not allowed to organize events without official approval. Participants in some meetings on church grounds have encountered difficulties with G.D.R. authorities.

The following is a summary of reported examples of G.D.R. violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms during this reporting period.

- G.D.R. citizens whose relatives in West Berlin had demonstrated for their release were arrested on charges which included maintaining "illegal contacts" and "provoking slander of the state."

One such case was taken up by Amnesty International, according to press reports.

- Prominent G.D.R. environmentalist Udo Zeitz (whose young daughter had reportedly suffered from effects of chemical spraying) was arrested for campaigning vocally against official environmental policies and openly protesting official denial of his right to emigrate. After 3 months' pre-trial detention, Zeitz was sentenced to 3½ years' imprisonment for charges including "defamation of the G.D.R."
- There have been repeated reports of official discrimination against Christians, including children in public schools. Practicing Christians are regularly denied higher education or training in many fields at the university level.

There were also some positive developments to note. New churches continue to be built in limited numbers with government approval. The government continues to show a slight liberalizing trend in its treatment of minority religions. A Mormon temple was dedicated in Freiberg near Dresden during this reporting period. Christian Scientists have begun receiving church literature promised to them during a meeting with state officials last December, although they, like the Jehovah's Witnesses, are still under court order restricting their religious practice. And an American Jewish organization's early efforts to arrange for a rabbi to be sent to reside in East Berlin has received encouragement from G.D.R. authorities. For years there has been no rabbi to serve the tiny Jewish community.

West German media reported in July that G.D.R. security forces apprehended two terrorists transiting Schoenefeld Airport near East Berlin who had intended to hijack an American airliner at West Berlin's Tegel Airport. If true, this could indicate the G.D.R. is growing more aware of the negative consequences of appearing to condone terrorist activities launched from or via areas under its jurisdiction. However, the G.D.R. continues to avoid explicit international commitments or consistent actions against the terrorist threat.

Self-determination by means of democratic elections is unknown in the G.D.R. Every 5 years, G.D.R. citizens are presented with a list of candidates, most unopposed, for the "People's Chamber" (*Volkskammer*) and various local assemblies (*Volksvertretungen*). Though a 1976 election law states that voting is secret, it is not, in fact, always so. East Germans who refuse to vote or who reject entire ballots may suffer reprisals.

Foreign diplomats in the G.D.R. are effectively protected by G.D.R. security forces. However, the G.D.R. reportedly provides military training to members of groups which have been associated with terrorist incidents directed against diplomats and diplomatic missions.

Only government-controlled unions are allowed. Strikes are not permitted in the G.D.R., and union assemblies are strictly controlled by the state. G.D.R. unions are a captive political arm of the government and are used to carry out official and party policy.

Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak performance in respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms (Principle Seven) remains unsatisfactory. As a result of the May amnesty and a trend toward suspended sentences on human rights cases, there are only a few human rights activists currently in prison. However, the government continues to use a variety of measures—including threats, interrogations, short-term arrests, job dismissals, and denial of educational opportunities—to stifle political, religious, and cultural activities that have not been organized by the Communist Party or affiliated institutions.

Inside Czechoslovakia, the government's implementation of the Final Act continues to be monitored by a small group of private Czechoslovak citizens who are signatories of Charter '77. An associated group, the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS), gathers and publicizes information concerning individual cases of human rights abuses. According to VONS, five political prisoners benefited from the May 8 amnesty by having up to 1 year dropped from their prison sentences. In addition, Miklos Duray, a Hungarian minority activist, was released from prison, where he had spent a year awaiting trial on charges of "subversion" and "harming the interests of the republic abroad." These charges, which stemmed from Duray's opposition to proposed changes in the Hungarian language educational system in Czechoslovakia, were dropped under the amnesty. Neither Rudolf Battek nor Jiri Wolf, the two Charter '77 signatories who are currently serving the longest prison terms—5½ and 6 years, respectively—benefited from the amnesty. Another group of prisoners excluded from the amnesty were those convicted of leaving or seeking to leave the country without official permission. There are no government statistics available on Czechoslovakia's prison population, but VONS estimates that there are about 1,000 prisoners currently imprisoned under such charges. Most are sentenced to 1-2 years, but VONS has documented cases of individuals serving terms of 10 years or more for this offense.

Previous reports have noted that in March 1984 the Czechoslovak Government, for the first time, imposed "protective supervision" against two Charter '77 signatories who had served prison terms for political dissidence (Ladislav Lis and Jan Litomisky). There are now five individuals, including Lis and Litomisky, who are subject to this punishment. The conditions that they must abide by differ in each case, but they include travel restrictions, curfews, and the necessity to report frequently to the police—in Mr. Lis' case, for instance, more than seven times a week. Using this form of punishment, which is intended for habitual violent offenders, against persons who have never committed a violent crime is an infringement of fundamental freedoms.

The 18th semiannual report noted that, in the spring of 1985, foreign diplomatic representatives had been permitted, for the first time, to observe a Czechoslovak human rights trial. Experience in this area during the current reporting period has been mixed. A U.S. Embassy observer was allowed to attend the September 27 trial of Jan Keller, a former minister of the Czech Brethren Evangelical Church whose license had been withdrawn by the authorities and who was accused of "obstructing state supervision over churches." Keller was not convicted but remains forbidden to carry out his functions as a minister. On the same day, however, U.S. observers and friends of the defendant were barred from the Prague trial of Charter '77 activist Petr Cibulka, who was given a 7-month prison term for "insulting the nation."

One area where the Czechoslovak Government remains in serious violation of its obligations under Principle Seven concerns the freedom of individuals to profess or practice their religious beliefs. Although the Czechoslovak Constitution states that there is freedom of religious practice, in reality this right is strictly limited by a variety of regulations. The government makes considerable efforts to discourage religious activity, especially among the young. In many cases, higher education is denied to those who engage in religious activity or to their children. Such discrimination in education is also commonly practiced against children of political activists, especially those affiliated with VONS or Charter '77. Individuals who are employed in education, health, and certain other professions are frequently sub-

jected to sanctions at work or loss of their jobs if they openly go to church or attend other religious ceremonies.

Organized religious practice is hampered by restrictions, both written and unwritten. A regulation in 1950 forcibly dissolved all male religious orders and barred female orders from accepting new members. Charges remain pending against a number of individuals arrested in 1983 and 1984 who are believed to be members of the Franciscan order, which has reportedly continued its activities despite government repression. An additional restriction on religious liberty is the requirement that priests and ministers be licensed by the state. Only a small number of new candidates are given a license, and licenses can be withdrawn at any time without explanation. Clergymen who continue to follow their calling despite revocation of their licenses are liable to criminal prosecution. Religious education of children and intending clergy remains strictly controlled, and unofficial gatherings such as privately celebrated masses, prayer meetings, or educational sessions are forbidden. The printing and distribution of unauthorized religious materials is treated even more harshly. On April 11, five Prague Catholics were arrested and numerous others interrogated on charges of "obstructing state supervision over churches" because they were allegedly producing and copying religious literature. All have since been released from prison, but criminal charges remain pending.

Independent organizations are not permitted in Czechoslovakia. Membership in the state trade union, the Revolutionary Worker's Movement (ROH), is virtually compulsory, and the ROH is controlled from the top, not the bottom. Independent trade unions are forbidden, as are strikes and other forms of independent labor activities. Intellectuals such as artists, writers, and others are organized in professional associations which are under strict party control. The government's unwillingness to tolerate independent initiatives on the part of these organizations was evident during the reporting period in the saga of the Jazz Section of the Czech musicians' union. The Jazz Section was a legally constituted assocation of jazz fans throughout Czechoslovakia. It organized jazz festivals and sponsored publications on music and the arts for its members. In March 1985, the Jazz Section was dissolved under a 1968 statute banning "counterrevolutionary activity." Leaders of the section protested and addressed a series of letters and petitions to the authorities. The result was surveillance, interrogations, loss of their jobs, and other forms of harassment. In September, the Jazz Section's offices and leaders' apartments were raided by the police, and the section's financial and legal records and membership lists were confiscated. Despite this pressure from the authorities, the Jazz Section, thus far, has refused to acquiesce in its dissolution.

Czechoslovakia publicly maintains its opposition to all forms of international terrorism. To what extent official internal policy and actions mirror this public stance is impossible to say. Occasionally, Western press reports carry stories alleging that there are terrorist training camps on Czechoslovak territory. We, are, however, unable to verify these reports.

Bulgaria. The Government of Bulgaria continues to respect Principles One through Six and Principles Nine and Ten. During this reporting period, the regime has committed severe and widespread violations of Principles Seven and Eight: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The two most glaring violations have involved the continued suppression of the right of the ethnic Turkish minority to exist with a separate identity and harsh punishment of a group of dissidents who demanded basic human rights for Bulgarians. Bulgarian official suppression of religion continues, with most of the regime's effort directed against Muslims.

Our Embassy in Sofia has continued to receive eyewitness reports from villagers in predominantly ethnic Turkish areas that the combined forces of the militia and the "Red Beret" paramilitary organization continue to enforce curfews, conduct arrests and interrogations, and imprison ethnic Turks who have resisted the government's assimilation campaign. We have confirmed information that regular army forces have been used to help pacify villages. According to this information, resistance to the assimilation campaign continues, and the regime has attempted to restrict the movement of the population in ethnic Turkish areas. A fine has been imposed for any citizen who speaks Turkish or wears Turkish-style clothing.

Bulgarian authorities have increased efforts to deny access to certain ethnic Turkish villages to diplomats and journalists. One village, Yablonovo, where eyewitnesses state armed resistance to government forces was particularly severe, remains closed to Western observers. Unofficial closure of areas that were open to westerners 6 months ago signals the regime's inability to suppress the local inhabitants in those areas. During the period, numerous ethnic Turks have been imprisoned at the Danube Island prison camp, Belene, and at prisons in the towns of Sliven and Stara Zagora.

Coupled with efforts to assimilate the ethnic Turkish minority, the Bulgarian Government has stepped up its propaganda campaign against the Muslim religion. Numerous articles have appeared in regional newspapers attacking Muslim beliefs, customs, and religious practices. Another article called for Communist Party workers to promote assimilation by acting as teachers to assist ethnic Turks in learning Bulgarian. Many mosques in ethnic Turkish areas remained closed. In the ethnic Turkish areas, Muslims were discouraged and even forbidden from celebrating the holy feast of Kurban Bayram, which occurred this year at the end of August. Last year, there was no official objection to Bayram celebrations. Our Embassy has learned that since 1945 only three Bulgarian Muslims have obtained permission to leave Bulgaria for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Despite this, there is information that attendance at services is again rising, particularly in areas where ethnic Turks constitute a minority of the local population.

During the past 6 months, the membership of Sofia's oldest Protestant church, the Congregational-Evangelical Church, has dropped from 180 to approximately 20. A government-appointed pastor who has dissolved congregations and demolished other churches in Bulgaria seems to have successfully driven out members from this church as well. The pastors selected by the congregation, two bothers named Kulishev, were convicted in May of "misappropriating church property" and forbidden to practice as pastors. This government tactic allowed the appointment of the current pastor and the steady decline in church membership.

The situation of Roman Catholics in Bulgaria has not improved during the period. Although Catholics are permitted to hold Mass, priests are subject to official harassment. Catholics had hoped that the visit of Austrian Cardinal Koenig during the last reporting period would break the stalemate on the Bulgarian Government's refusal to accept the Vatican's appointee as the Bishop of Plovdiv, but this post remains vacant.

Independent sources confirm that Bulgarian dissident Yanko Yankov received a 5-year prison sentence, which he is currently serving in the notorious Pazardzhik prison. Yankov has reportedly suffered beatings by prison

guards, resulting in at least one broken rib, and he has allegedly been denied medical treatment. According to court records, Yankov and a confederate were sentenced for slandering the Bulgarian State, agitation, and organizing an anti-state group. Both were members of a small human rights group that operated near the city of Mikhailovgrad during 1983–84. The group operated clandestinely, but successfully brought attention to the human rights abuses of the regime. The group consisted of as many as 17 members but was disbanded after its betrayal by one member and the subsequent arrest of Yankov and another member. Court records also indicate that part of Yankov's "crimes" involved his March 1984 appeal for political refuge at the U.S. Embassy in Sofia, as well as subsequent telephone calls to our Embassy from a chemical plant in Devnia where he was assigned to forced labor while awaiting sentence.

During the period, the Bulgarian Government has not taken any steps toward greater cooperation on the prevention or suppression of international terrorism. Bulgaria not only did not condemn the hijacking of the TWA aircraft in June, but its official media accused the United States of using the incident to build up its military position in the Middle East. The government continues to receive the leaders of so-called liberation groups, including those of PLO factions. Bulgaria boosted its efforts to thwart internal terrorism during this period. Authorities are still unwilling to inform foreign missions about specific threats, yet heavily armed security forces are often stationed in front of those missions. As during the last period, heavy security remains a probable corollary to the campaign against Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish minority. Embassy officers from Western embassies witnessed incidents of police-state tactics during this period, as in the past, when security forces subjected citizens to document checks, roadblocks, and rough treatment.

DOCUMENT ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

The signatories to the Helsinki Final Act are required by the act's Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament to give prior notification of "major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with possible air or naval components." Notification is required for maneuvers that take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State and must be made 21 days or more in advance of the start of the maneuver. The notification "will contain information on the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the maneuver, and type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, and the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. Participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces."

In addition, signatories are encouraged to engage in other confidence-building measures on a voluntary basis. These voluntary CBMs include the invitation of observers to maneuvers and prior notification of major military movements and exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops.

Implementation

The United States and its NATO allies continued their excellent record of implementation of these CBMs. The United Kingdom notified participating states concerning the major maneuver, Brave Defender, which took place from September 2–13, 1985, on the territory of the United Kingdom and involved 65,000 troops from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. The Federal Republic of Germany provided notification of the major maneuver, Trotzige Sachsen (Defiant Saxon), which took place from September 12–21, 1985, involving 60,000 troops from the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. Observers were invited to attend both of these maneuvers.

Among the neutral and nonaligned (NNA) countries, Switzerland notified participating states of the military maneuver, Tornado, which took place from October 7–17, 1985, and involved approximately 25,000 Swiss troops. No observers were invited.

The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies provided notification of three major maneuvers during the reporting period. The U.S.S.R. notified participating states of the military maneuver, Kavkaz 85, which took place from July 15–21, 1985, in the Caucasus region of the Soviet Union, involving approximately 25,000 Soviet troops. In a rare move, the Soviet Union invited observers from Turkey, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, as well as Malta and Yugoslavia, to attend the maneuver, in addition to Warsaw Pact observers. The U.S.S.R. and the German Democratic Republic also provided notification of an unnamed maneuver which took place on G.D.R. territory from July 6–14, 1985, with the participation of about 25,000 Soviet and East German troops. No observers were invited to attend. Czechoslovakia notified participating states of an unnamed maneuver conducted on Czechoslovak territory from May 25–31, 1985, involving about 25,000 Soviet and Czechoslovak forces. No observers were invited.

The Soviet and Warsaw Pact notifications provided the bare minimum of information required under the CSCE provisions, consistent with the East's practice of maintaining a very restrictive interpretation of its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet invitation of selected Western observers to the major maneuver, Kavkaz 85, was a notable exception. In the last 5 years, Western observers have been invited to only one other Soviet maneuver, Dnestr 83. That exercise, involving less than 25,000 Soviet troops, was also the first voluntary notification by the Soviet Union. In the current reporting period, Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces participated in at least two smaller scale maneuvers which could have been notified on a discretionary basis. Danube 85 in Hungary involved some 23,000 Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and Soviet troops from June 28–July 4. Friendship 85 took place in Poland in the first half of September, with Polish, East German, and Soviet troops participating.

Chapter Three

Implementation of Basket II: Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology, and of the Environment

The implementation of Basket II provisions by the Soviet Union and East European countries showed no significant improvements during the reporting period and continues to remain generally unsatisfactory. Business operating conditions were, for the most part, unchanged, with the one bright spot being the return of international direct dialing telephone service to the Moscow business community. The quality and quantity of economic and commercial information deteriorated during this period, partly as a result of poor economic performance and partly from decisions to make less material available. Economic difficulties have forced the Eastern European countries to continue to restrict imports. And most of the East European countries placed increased emphasis on countertrade practices in a continuing attempt to cut hard-currency debts. Eastern Europe suffered the consequences of the unusually severe 1984–85 winter, affecting its ability to import Western goods and services. Some progress occurred in the area of economic and commercial cooperation, with most East European countries expressing a willingness to entertain an increased number of joint ventures. There have been some positive developments in East European cooperation in environmental protection, as these countries, especially the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, realize the need to deal with the problems of water and air pollution.

Soviet Union

General Assessment. Soviet implementation of Basket II provisions continued to be poor. General business conditions remained, for the most part, unchanged during the reporting period. Soviet publication of economic performance data became even more restrictive when, in September, monthly statistics were slashed by half. On the positive side, U.S. firms report that they have largely regained access to direct telephone lines to the West after a 5-year hiatus.

Business Working Conditions. U.S. business representatives are generally able to obtain appointments with Soviet trade officials and have few complaints about interference in their business activities. However, access to end-users has never been good in some industries and has not improved. U.S. firms report less difficulty in obtaining inquiries from Soviet foreign trade organizations (FTOs), partly as a result of the May meeting of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission.

One U.S. firm gave up its business accreditation during the period under review. There are now 25 accredited U.S. firms with offices in Moscow and one, U.S.-USSR Marine Resources, with an office in Nakhodka. Marine Resources plans to open an office in Moscow as well.

Sovincenter rents for nonaccredited offices were increased from 150–300% on June 1 (up to a standard 26 rubles per square meter per month), creating serious difficulties for the many small firms which have established nonaccredited offices in the residential wing of the International Trade Center. With the absence of other office options, these firms have no choice but to pay high rents. Most nonaccredited firms continue to have problems in meeting their requirements for office equipment, vehicles, and clerical support.

Hotel and housing conditions for businessmen have not changed. Visiting businessmen generally are able to obtain suitable hotel accommodations. Housing is satisfactory, although there remains an ongoing problem with adequate provision for fire safety in the housing made available to business representatives.

Travel and visa restrictions are essentially unchanged from our last report. Business representatives have lodged few complaints about travel and visa restrictions, but ongoing problems occur for business representatives traveling by automobile for equipment installation inspections. Representatives are barred from using restricted roads and face increased travel time as a result. The Nakhodka-based representative of U.S.-USSR Marine Resources must use the Khabarovsk airport instead of the much closer one at Vladivostok.

Accredited representatives of U.S. firms, whether actually resident in Moscow or not, have occasional difficulties in renewing their individual accreditation. While no specific cases have arisen during the reporting period, past denials have tended to reflect official opposition to marriage to, or the emigration of, Soviet citizens.

In the area of international communications, most of those Western firms which have sought new telephone lines for direct dialing out of the U.S.S.R. have received such service.

There continues to be a question of whether companies with offices in Moscow should be liable for Soviet income taxes on income derived from services provided by subsidiaries and affiliated companies without offices in the Soviet Union.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The availability of economic and commercial information decreased markedly at the end of the reporting period, although it is too early to know whether the reduction is permanent. In September, the report of monthly production statistics was slashed by half, with the elimination of performance data for individual ministries and republics. There was also a slight decrease in the data published on production of individual products during the reporting period. In general, the availability of information on the economy remains limited, and the quality of data is often poor. Access to Soviet officials for discussion of current economic development remains restricted.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. Soviet policy toward cooperation arrangements has not changed. Soviet officials encourage such cooperation under mutually beneficial terms whenever an opportunity arises, although there is some skepticism about long-term relationships with U.S. firms. Our Embassy in Moscow is not aware of any new complications for existing cooperation arrangements with U.S. firms.

Official Visits. There were three Cabinet-level visits to the Soviet Union during the reporting period as well as several congressional delegation visits related to economic questions. In May, Secretary of Commerce Baldrige cochaired a meeting of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission, which met for the first time since December

1978. In August, Secretary of Agriculture Block visited the Soviet Union to discuss bilateral issues related to agriculture. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Pierce met with Soviet construction officials in September as part of a series of bilateral consultations on housing. The various congressional delegations included on their agendas talks with Soviet trade and economic officials.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. The trend toward a diminution of the requirement for Western firms to link sales and purchases continues. For single transactions, the Soviet emphasis now appears to be more on obtaining evidence of general purchasing activity by Western firms.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Policies affecting small and medium-sized enterprises remain no different from those affecting other companies.

Romania

General Assessment. Romanian foreign trade policy continues to be based on enlarging its trade surplus to build up foreign exchange reserves and retire foreign debt. Trade officials remain under instruction to limit hard-currency imports and generally to require that Western firms concluding sales contracts with Romania accept payment in counterpurchase of Romanian goods. 1985 preliminary trade figures indicate Romania's trade volume is increasing, but not as substantially as in 1984.

The Government of Romania, during this last 6-month period, has increasingly stressed the need for expanded efforts to obtain advanced technology from abroad. While this has led to greater emphasis on scientific and technological exchange, it has been at the expense of exchange in other areas, primarily the humanities. Our Embassy knows of no cooperative efforts by Romania in the field of environmental protection.

Business Working Conditions. Our Embassy officers continue to have good access to government officials concerned with U.S.-Romanian trade and economic relations. Visiting U.S. Government officials and businessmen obtain appointments with their Romanian counterparts easily in most instances. Senior-level U.S. officials and business leaders are often received at the highest official level of the Romanian Government. Businessmen have adequate access to directors of foreign trade organizations and their staffs. However, as a result of recurring personnel changes at FTOs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, businessmen have difficulty pinpointing responsible decisionmakers for negotiations.

During the review period, two U.S. firms opened Bucharest offices. Thirty-one U.S. firms with separate offices are now represented in Romania. Authorities continue to take 6–8 months or longer to process Western firms' applications to open business offices. Commercial office space in one of the several downtown hotels in Bucharest is commonly offered to Western firms. Firms may also rent space on premises owned by the Romanian Government agency "Argus." Romanian employees of foreign businesses must be hired through Argus. The cost of maintaining business offices in Romania is high. Rents charged by official Romanian agencies are comparable to market rates in major world commercial centers. The extremely high cost of telecommunications services is an impediment to the development of commercial relations.

Acceptable hotel accommodations are available for transient businessmen at rates comparable to world commercial centers. Resident businessmen are referred to the National Tourist Office to locate housing. The search for adequate housing is difficult and time consuming. Prices for residential space are comparable to those in Western Europe, though furnishings and facilities are often inferior. Rental and utility charges have remained constant over the past few years.

Visa restrictions are minimal, and business travel is not impeded.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Businessmen seeking Romanian commercial contacts find information readily available. Romania continues to distribute, in several languages, a range of information on doing business in the country. Romanian performance on publication of statistical data, however, is very poor and is noteworthy for the omission of basic statistical information common to government reporting elsewhere. Organized data on the performance of the domestic economy are published only once a year, generally 12–14 months after the close of the year covered. Data often are not comparable from year to year, and indices are neither reliable nor adequately defined. As a result of debt rescheduling negotiations, Romania continues to provide more financial information to foreign banks, foreign governments, and international financial institutions than it provided in the past.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. As a policy, the Romanian Government promotes the concept of joint ventures and production collaboration. However, only one such venture involving a U.S. firm (out of a total of five) now exists in Romania, while Romania participates with U.S. firms in at least four joint ventures in the United States. There has been no further legislation or progress in expanding cooperation projects in Romania. Romania remains interested in cooperation with American companies in third-country markets, particularly in the development of natural resources and large construction projects, although no such projects have come to our Embassy's attention.

Official Visits. The 12th plenary session of the Romanian-U.S. Economic Council took place in Bucharest on September 9–10 and was attended by representatives of 38 U.S. firms. President Reagan's message to the session noted the imbalance in Romania's favor in bilateral trade and the need for Romania to import more U.S. goods. No contracts were signed, but contacts made during the session could generate sales worth as much as $50 million. U.S. participants were received by President Ceausescu, and the Romanian press gave wide coverage to the event.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Romania employs a strict system of countertrade aimed at reducing its foreign debt. Romanian purchases of Western goods without countertrade have continued to decline significantly. Romanian enterprises routinely ask Western firms seeking to sell goods here to take payment in counterpurchases of Romanian-manufactured goods from the machine building and machine tools industry. In those few cases where U.S. firms buying Romanian goods have sought to pay through "barter" arrangements of their own products, Romanian organizations have refused, insisting on hard-currency payment.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Romania trades regularly with small and medium-sized U.S. firms. Such companies are often represented in Bucharest by agency firms, which helps reduce the cost of establishing representation. Agency firms are also better able to deal with Romanian pressures for counterpurchases, which might otherwise force smaller firms out of the market.

Poland

General Assessment. The official government policy and attitude toward economic and commercial cooperation remain basically unchanged. However, state and private enterprises are able, through newly granted foreign trade rights, to deal directly with Western businessmen. The June Poznan Trade Fair saw a number of business contacts. Relaxed passport regulations facilitated business travel, but, generally, the economic crisis has, as it did in the previous reporting period, kept Western commercial interest low. Debt rescheduling agreements with Western creditor governments have led to the restoration of short-term, trade-related credits in one instance, but Poland's financial outlook remains sufficiently troubled to limit severely Western business interest in Poland in the near term. There has been full cooperation in permitting travel of U.S. business, commercial, and agricultural representatives to Poland. The increase in U.S. business travel to Poland reported during the last period continues.

Business Working Conditions. Access to Polish business contacts and commercial officials in Poland remains excellent compared to most other East European countries. While no American firms applied for permission from the Ministry of Foreign Trade to open representative firms, U.S. business representatives continue to establish so-called Polonian businesses. Many of these firms endure bureaucratic delays in securing permission to open, but there is no evidence of discrimination aimed especially at U.S.-owned firms. Hotel accommodations for visiting business representatives remain readily available. Business representatives who wish to reside in Poland can generally find suitable housing, although it is expensive. Foreign visitors were required to exchange 20% more currency daily as of March 31. There are no restrictions on business travel within Poland, and, for the most part, business visas are not difficult to obtain. Air service to and from Poland is adequate.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The Western business community continues to have full access to accounting information at the enterprise level. However, the accounting methodology is different from that used in the West and is sometimes of little use to the business visitor. The government publishes regular economic statistics, which include foreign trade and industrial production data. Most of the disaggregated information is not current and does not contain enough detail to permit thorough economic analysis or adequate market research.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. There were no changes in Poland's policies concerning economic and commercial cooperation during the reporting period. Poland continues to seek foreign investment in underutilized or idle industrial capacity but has yet to pass enabling joint-venture legislation. The government, however, is considering a new joint-venture law which recognizes joint-venture trading and limited liability companies. Licensing arrangements remain possible, as does joint production in and for third markets, both for goods and services. A March 31 law raises the obligatory hard-currency deposit at the time of establishment of Polonian firms from $5,700 to $50,000. While there have been no major cooperation arrangements involving U.S. firms during the reporting period, small-scale cooperative arrangements continued to be made with firms from other Western countries.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Poland neither encourages nor discourages countertrade, and no new countertrade legislation was passed during the reporting period. The frequency and nature of countertrade requests vary; generally, it is possible to procure as countertrade goods only those products with which Poland is oversupplied.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises have not experienced any particular problems during the reporting period, with the exception of certain firms operating under the Polonian law. The Polish Government levies up to 85% income tax on earnings by these firms, thus making it difficult for many of them to operate profitably. Despite these obstacles, most Polonian firms continue to prosper, and their existence enjoys official backing when their operations help fulfill Polish Government economic aims. Firms which would compete directly with a Polish enterprise or exporting agency are often, however, denied permission to operate. During the reporting period, there has been no new legislation affecting these small and medium-sized enterprises' participation in trade and industrial opportunities.

Science and Technology Cooperation. The Polish Government has not interfered significantly with visits by U.S. scientists to Poland except for excessive delays in granting visas to U.S. citizens for visits in May–June 1985. Many Polish scientists have received permission to travel to the West for periods of up to 1 year. However, many others who have invitations for long-term visits are not being allowed to accept them, especially if they work in institutes from which significant numbers of scientists have chosen to remain abroad indefinitely.

Hungary

General Assessment. Hungary has experienced a substantial rise in hard-currency imports and a fall in exports during the review period. While Hungary retains hard-currency reserves of $2.5–3 billion, equal to its short-term debt, net indebtedness rose to about $5 billion. Foreign debt continues to be rolled over through new medium-term and concessional interest loans. Serious problems have begun to arise in Hungary's current account position. Hungary needs to seek new hard-currency markets for its agricultural goods and manufactured items and develop new export products if it is to continue to generate a current account surplus. For the moment, Hungary remains in good stead with the international banking community, and private bank lending is available to help meet Hungary's needs. The larger question of restructuring the economy was again avoided at last year's April Central Committee meeting. Therein may lie the seeds of Hungary's future problems.

Business Working Conditions. Operating conditions for Western businessmen remained satisfactory during the reporting period. Deluxe and first-class hotel accommodations for business travelers, as well as for convention and tourist purposes, are still expanding. The availability of medium-level, medium-priced hotel rooms is increasing as several hotel projects approach completion.

Business access remains generally satisfactory. Businessmen with small and medium-sized firms still experience some difficulty and delay in getting access to end-users. On the other hand, some end-users are exercising new autonomy with recently gained foreign trading rights and have actively sought out Western business partners without a governmental or foreign trading organization middle man. The total number of Hungarian firms permitted such full foreign trading rights is approximately 250 and growing.

The representatives of three U.S. firms with accredited offices (Pan Am, National Bank of Minneapolis, and DOW

Chemical) are well established, but costs of operation are high in comparison to local standards. Business representatives are hampered by the need to work through a Hungarian Government "facilitative" office and are sometimes neglected because no Hungarian office wants to take responsibility for decision-making, particularly in regard to issuing certain permits (e.g., rental contracts). Western firms seeking office and housing accomodations can expect delays. Other facilities, such as telephone and telex, also require substantial time to obtain.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Business and commercial information, while only sporadically available in forms such as Western-style annual reports, is disseminated fairly freely in newspapers, journals, and specialized economic publications. Enterprise and plant visits continue to provide detailed information since Hungarian commercial representatives and managers have shown a disposition to discuss matters freely when specific questions are posed. Government economic indicators and other data are widely available and reasonably accurate, but they have become less timely during the review period.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. The number of active cooperation arrangements between U.S. and Hungarian firms remains about 60. Western companies are encouraged to explore new ways of doing business beyond traditional buying and selling and one-time-only commission work. Industrial cooperation arrangements continued to be touted as the basis for Hungary's trade expansion program. The Hungarian Government has maintained its commitment to promote joint venture and other forms of cooperation, pursuing systematic trade promotion and marketing programs directed at regional markets in the United States. In late 1982, the Hungarians announced new, more liberal regulations on the use of internal duty-free zones by foreign investors. So far, they have not proven to be a substantial inducement to expanding foreign investment. New tax regulations under consideration may provide more of a boost.

Official Visits. U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Block, Secretary of Transportation Dole, a delegation from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and several congressional delegations visited Hungary during the past 6 months.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Hungarian enterprises continue to require substantial countertrade arrangements for almost all new business.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Hungarian policies toward small and medium-sized enterprises do not differ significantly from the general pattern of commerce described above.

German Democratic Republic

General Assessment. Cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment showed some slight improvement during the last 6 months.

Business Working Conditions. During the 1985 Leipzig Fall Fair, access to G.D.R. officials was better than at the 1985 Spring Fair. While some improvement had been experienced at the Spring Fair, the character of the G.D.R. access changed in the fall. Many more scientists, engineers, and end-users in general received permission to talk with Western suppliers than at previous fairs. Also, the average age of the visitors dropped considerably, with many of the scientists and technicians in their thirties. Otherwise, access has remained about the same. The G.D.R. continues to require prior approval for U.S.-G.D.R. business and social contacts. The requirement that foreign businesses deal through a limited number of G.D.R. service organizations is one factor which keeps access below the level desired by foreign business representatives.

Operating conditions for establishing business offices in Berlin remain unchanged. Four U.S. companies have offices there. Of the four, two are staffed by G.D.R. citizens, one by an Austrian national, and one by a Belgian national. Western firms wishing to establish an office in East Berlin are required to rent space either in the International Trade Center, which has strict access controls, or in a building which is only for the use of the firm.

Visiting business representatives must normally stay in expensive hotel accommodations which require payment in convertible currencies. In cities without such hotels, accommodations are less expensive, and payment may be made in local currency. Subject to these conditions, however, travel is otherwise virtually unrestricted. No U.S. business representatives have complained to our Embassy about unavailability of hotel accommodations.

Resident business representatives are allowed to rent, but not buy, housing in the G.D.R. Available housing is usually expensive, and standards vary, although some is quite good. All housing services must be obtained through a state-operated agency which determines the rent as well as the location of housing for foreigners.

Restrictions on travel and visas for foreign business representatives have not caused problems, to our knowledge. Persons in possession of G.D.R. hotel vouchers are generally issued visas upon arrival at border-crossing points. In addition, visas for day visits to East Berlin are obtainable at designated Berlin sector-to-sector crossing points with little delay. Western business representatives residing in, or maintaining offices in, the G.D.R. often are issued multiple-entry visas valid for 1 year. Nonresident business representatives generally receive one-entry visas unless multiple-entry visas have been requested on their behalf by a G.D.R. trading partner.

As is the case for virtually all visitors to the G.D.R., nonresident foreign business representatives are required to exchange approximately $10 per day into G.D.R. marks during their visits to the G.D.R. Of this sum, any unspent G.D.R. marks cannot be converted back into Western currency upon departure, but must be either forfeited or deposited in a special account for use upon the visitor's return.

G.D.R. customs regulations prohibit the importation of printed material with the words "German" or "Germany" in the text or in the address. This has continued to create problems when business literature containing this word arrives and cannot be distributed.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The type, quality, and timeliness of economic and commercial information released by the G.D.R. is considered unsatisfactory by Western business. The main source of G.D.R. economic data is the Annual Statistical Yearbook published by the G.D.R. State Central Administration for Statistics. The yearbook is not published on a timely basis; it appears about 10 months after year's end. The small portion of the report devoted to foreign trade usually lumps export and import figures together in one number. Thus, the user normally knows only the total amount of trade between two countries, not how much the G.D.R. purchased or how much it sold. Furthermore, Western business representatives often question the reliability of the figures given.

The G.D.R. foreign trade bank (*Deutsche Aussenhandelsbank*) annual report offers only highly aggregated information on the hard currency value of

G.D.R. imports and exports and provides no specifics on G.D.R. foreign debt. It does not fully serve the needs of banks and firms seeking to evaluate potential business relationships. Moreover, the G.D.R. does not provide information on total balance of payments, aggregate net and gross foreign debt, cash flow projections, and statements of sources and uses of funds.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. Joint ventures involving joint ownership and foreign ownership of business in the G.D.R. are not permitted under G.D.R. law. However, the G.D.R. is interested in engaging in joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements in third countries. A few French and Austrian firms have been involved with the G.D.R. in cooperative ventures in third markets. The G.D.R. prefers to pay for Western technological investment, at least in part, by shipping products back to the Western partner.

During the last 6 months, a program begun last October to assemble multipurpose street service vehicles in the United States using G.D.R. engines and chassis was expanded. Plans also are underway to include the assembly of railcar loading and unloading equipment in this venture. U.S. participants are "Technik and Trade" of Cleveland and "Trident Motors" of Columbus. Interest on the part of the G.D.R. in such ventures with Western firms seems to be increasing.

Official Visits. G.D.R. Foreign Trade State Secretary Beil visited Washington in early May 1985 and met with Secretary of Commerce Baldrige.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Often the G.D.R. will purchase goods from abroad only on the condition that payment will be made in part with G.D.R. goods rather than with hard currency. Cooperation agreements for production within the G.D.R. are also coupled with countertrade or "buyback" features. Most U.S. firms dislike such arrangements due to the difficulties in obtaining the quantity and quality of goods desired and the unmarketability of some G.D.R. products offered. G.D.R pressure for countertrade seems to have eased with recent improvements in the G.D.R's hard-currency situation.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises do not generally encounter problems different from those faced by larger enterprises.

Science and Technology Cooperation. The G.D.R. has, during the past few months, acknowledged, for the first time, serious pollution problems. G.D.R. officials at various levels have told Embassy officers that sulphur dioxide and other pollutants will be controlled. Plans apparently have been made to import pollution control equipment and technology.

Czechoslovakia

General Assessment. Czechoslovakia's economic and trade policies have not changed significantly in the past 6 months. The Czechoslovak Government continues to emphasize its political and economic relations with its Eastern allies and does comparatively little to foster expanded trade with the United States and other Western countries. In some respects, however, Czechoslovakia remains open to persistent efforts by European and, to a lesser extent, American businessmen to foster bilateral trade.

The trend toward increasing trade with the Soviet Union and other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance continued. In the first half of 1985, trade with these countries accounted for a record 80% of overall foreign trade turnover. Czechoslovakia retained its conservative attitude toward international borrowing and continued to reduce its already small hard-currency debt. In July, Czechoslovak bankers borrowed $100 million from a syndicate of Western banks, the most significant borrowing by Prague in several years. There was no evidence to indicate, however, that this signaled a departure from Czechoslovakia's conservative financial policy.

Czechoslovakia's strained political relations with the United States continued to have a negative effect on direct bilateral trade. However, the United States and Czechoslovakia continue to conduct a small but significant trade through Austria, West Germany, Switzerland, and other West European countries. Czechoslovak officials periodically raise with U.S. officials the question of most-favored-nation tariff status.

In May, the new chairman of the U.S. side of the U.S.-Czechoslovak Economic Council, James Witcomb of General Foods Corporation, visited Prague for meetings with Minister of Foreign Trade Urban, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Johanes, and other officials. These meetings were a prelude for the seventh plenary session of the Bilateral Economic Council, held in Chicago on September 23-24.

Business Working Conditions. No new American business offices were established during this period, nor were any existing offices closed. U.S. firms with representation in Prague reported no significant problems during the past 6 months with their office accommodations. There are no resident American businessmen in Czechoslovakia. Foreign businessmen in Prague appear to have suitable housing obtained either privately or through official channels.

Contacts between foreign businessmen and their counterparts remain strictly controlled by the Czechoslovak Government. Foreign businessmen often find it frustrating and time consuming to attempt to do business in Czechoslovakia. Many businessmen report considerable difficulty in making initial contact with end-user enterprises, though such contacts are generally possible after relations have been established with an appropriate foreign trade organization. To a certain extent, the difficulties foreign businessmen encounter arise from the cumbersome and bureaucratic nature of the Czechoslovak economic system rather than deliberate discrimination against foreign businessmen.

Within the context of a general shortage of tourist/visitor facilities in Prague and other major Czechoslovak cities, foreign businessmen report few problems with hotel accommodations or other impediments to visit here. Visas for foreign businessmen are generally not a problem and are rarely denied. The exceptions usually involve individuals born in Czechoslovakia who were once recognized as Czechoslovak citizens but subsequently left.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Foreign businessmen and government analysts continue to regard as inadequate the extent and timeliness of economic/commercial information available in Czechoslovakia. Foreign trade information is particularly insufficient for market research. Information on the 1986 economic plan and on the upcoming eighth 5-year plan (1986-90) remain vague. Although this problem, in part, results from a government policy of limiting information of this sort for the general public as well as for foreigners, it also reflects the sluggish decisionmaking apparatus which has delayed action on important aspects of the upcoming economic plans.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. Currently there is no joint-venture law in Czechoslovakia and no corresponding opportunity for direct foreign investment. However, various

measures which would allow joint ventures have been under discussion recently. The Czechoslovak Government has announced its readiness to accept direct Western investment in the form of cash, equipment, or know-how. This investment will likely be concentrated in areas of electronics, computers, and machine tools. Depending on the scope of the joint ventures, Western participation may be as high as 49%. Some observers expect that appropriate guidelines and implementing regulations for joint ventures, at least on a test basis, will be introduced within the next year.

There are a considerable number of Czechoslovak-owned and controlled firms in Western countries. These firms are generally involved in promoting the sale of Czechoslovak goods, in maintaining inventories, and in installing and providing service for Czechoslovak-manufactured equipment. In the United States, such firms are involved in the sale of machine tools, motorcycles, textile equipment, and other manufactured items.

A U.S. firm signed the first pharmaceuticals licensing agreement with Czechoslovakia in September.

Official Visits. The seventh plenary session of the U.S.-Czechoslovak Economic Council was held in Chicago on September 23-24. Representatives of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Trade, various foreign trade corporations, and other organizations participated in this session, which reviewed the state of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations and considered ways to facilitate bilateral trade.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Czechoslovak enterprises continue to seek countertrade commitments as a quid pro quo for buying Western goods. Several Western firms have reported significant problems in identifying available Czechoslovak-produced merchandise. However, not all firms face countertrade demands. At least some U.S. firms engage in countertrade because they believe it engenders goodwill and, thus, contributes to future trade prospects despite short-term costs incurred.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. There was no apparent change in policy toward small and medium-sized enterprises during this period. Private enterprise remains restricted to a small segment of agriculture and certain services. Isolated cases of government-sanctioned, if not authorized, private enterprises have been reported recently.

Bulgaria

General Assessment. Although Bulgaria remains committed to working within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Bulgarian Government encourages expanded contacts with Western businessmen, particularly in those areas of high priority to the Bulgarian economy. Bulgaria produces a number of low-quality products and, despite exhortations from CEMA trading partners and its own media, the Government of Bulgaria has had little success in spurring its workers toward more efficent industrial achievement. Business operating conditions have deteriorated, as has the availability of economic information. Since Bulgaria produces few goods that are marketable in the West, it has increased countertrade pressures during the review period in order to help balance its trade.

Business Working Conditions. Bulgarian industry continues to rely heavily on Western licenses, processes, and equipment for advances in production techniques. The Government of Bulgaria makes great efforts to attract Western businesses using advanced technologies. Their businessmen are treated well. Those who represent industries of little interest to the government still encounter difficulties.

No U.S. firms opened business offices in Bulgaria during the period. Bulgarian bureaucracy and red tape continue to surround most cooperative ventures, discouraging Western interest in joint business activities. Contacts between Western businessmen and Bulgarian commercial officials and plant managers have not improved. The Bulgarians allow Western businessmen who may be able to provide needed technology a certain degree of freedom, but many others face difficulties in obtaining access to information and statistics that would help them make business decisions. Despite this, Bulgarian officials continue to go out of their way to court certain businessmen. On some occasions these businessmen have had discussions with the highest levels of the Bulgarian Government.

The hotel, housing, and office accommodations situation has changed little during the period. Housing is inadequate by Western standards, and most businessmen face the same electricity and water rationing that affects ordinary Bulgarians. Because of the severe winter and drought conditions and an unresponsive bureaucracy, Bulgaria has become a more difficult assignment for resident businessmen. At the end of the period, the Government of Bulgaria opened an International Trade Center designed to house most foreign businessmen in Bulgaria. However, businessmen continue to lodge numerous complaints about exorbitant rents, reaching as high as $20 per square meter of office space. Representatives of Western chemical industries have considered pulling their offices out of Bulgaria. Western airlines receive cramped space at Sofia airport but are required to pay fees similar to those charged at large, modern Western airports.

Some Western embassies have reported that the Bulgarian embassies in their countries are no longer permitted to issue visas of any type on their own initiative; all visa decisions must be referred to Sofia. As a consequence, businessmen complain about delays in receiving visas, sometimes extending beyond the maximum periods established by bilateral agreements.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The availability of useful statistical and commercial information has further deteriorated during this reporting period. No doubt a reflection of the severe winter and drought situation in Bulgaria, less information is available, and there are more obvious examples of fabricated information. Different officials give widely varying answers when asked for the same information.

Official Visits. There were no official visits by U.S. trade officials during this period. While the United States and Bulgaria exchanged delegations in the field of agriculture, the Bulgarian side was unwilling to provide substantive briefings to a USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture) agricultural research official. A bilateral working group in the field of agriculture continues to function.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. There is some flexibility in the establishment of business arrangements. Most take the form of licensing agreements or joint ventures. A Western business is likely to have more success in establishing a cooperative agreement with Bulgaria if it is willing to enter into a licensing agreement. More U.S. businessmen visited Bulgaria during the period, but few of these visits resulted in agreements. The Sheraton Corporation, however, signed a contract to manage a local hotel.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. The trend toward increased countertrade demands by Bulgaria continues. As during the last period, Western businesses often find that Bulgaria has little to offer that

would sell in the West. The increase in countertrade demands is a reflection of the poor performance of Bulgarian agricultural products in traditional markets and the Bulgarian need for hard currency. Countertrade demands will probably increase if Bulgarian economic problems continue.

Science and Technology Cooperation. Arrangements for scientific and technological cooperation are generally one way. The Bulgarians insist on sending researchers to the United States but they are usually unwilling to receive research scientists in return. The Government of Bulgaria sponsors researchers in such areas as computers and biochemistry for trips to the United States. American exchange visitors, however, are ordinarily granted only limited access to Bulgarian facilities.

Chapter Four

Implementation of Basket III: Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Basket III is intended to promote the free flow of information, ideas, and people among the participating states.

This section of the Final Act contains specific measures which the participating states resolve to undertake to foster human contacts, improve access to information, and promote cultural and educational exchanges. Basket III and Principle Seven of Basket I, strengthened by provisions of the Madrid concluding document, constitute the principal human rights provisions of the Helsinki process.

HUMAN CONTACTS

In the Final Act, participating states commit themselves to facilitate family reunification and meetings, marriage between citizens of different states, wider travel for business or professional reasons, improvement in the conditions of tourism, meetings among young people, and sports contacts.

In addition, the Madrid concluding document contains a number of provisions that strengthen and extend the human contacts commitments in the Final Act. The participating states have pledged: to deal favorably with applications for family meetings, reunification, and marriage; to decide upon marriage and family reunification applications within 6 months; to ensure that rights of applicants for family reunification are not prejudiced; to provide necessary forms and information to applicants for emigration; to reduce emigration fees; to inform emigration applicants of decisions expeditiously; to assure access to diplomatic missions; and to facilitate contacts among representatives of religious faiths.

Family Visits

To some extent, the Helsinki process has led to freer travel policies in the East, but much remains to be done to achieve CSCE goals in this field. In general, Eastern countries maintain a policy of stringently limiting and controlling their citizens' movement abroad. It should be noted that the U.S.S.R. has ratified the UN Charter and other international documents on human rights, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in which the right to leave one's country and return thereto is enumerated. But, in practice, the Soviet Government denies its citizens this right. Travel outside the U.S.S.R. is prohibited except for the departure of limited numbers of authorized personnel. Even in those cases, travel is restricted primarily to Eastern countries and is under strict government control. The reunification of divided families is the only officially recognized basis for emigration from the Soviet Union, but the actual Soviet record of compliance even in this regard is poor.

Restrictive practices in the countries of Eastern Europe vary considerably. Some countries are nearly as restrictive as the Soviet Union. Others have been relatively lenient in allowing their citizens to travel abroad.

The U.S. Government regularly intercedes with Eastern governments on behalf of relatives of American citizens who have been refused permission to emigrate to join their families in the United States. U.S. Embassies abroad submit periodic lists of these people to local governments. The accompanying table shows the number of these cases being monitored officially by the United States as of October 1, 1985.

Soviet Union. Soviet practices with regard to family meetings remain as described in previous semiannual reports. In general, few Soviet citizens are granted exit permission to visit relatives in the United States; those who are allowed to leave on visits have close family members in the United States. However, in a few exceptional cases, Soviet citizens have been granted exit permission to visit American friends. It is rare for an entire Soviet family to receive permission to travel to the United States at the same time. Typically, a father/son, mother/daughter, or husband/wife combination visits a U.S. relative. Also, husbands and wives may alternate visits several years apart. The few Soviet citizens allowed to make multiple trips to the United States may do so only at 2- or 3-year intervals.

We have no access to Soviet statistics on the number of people granted exit permission to visit the United States. During the period April 1–September 29, 1985, the United States issued visas to 766 Soviet citizens for private visits to the United States. Soviet authorities often arbitrarily refuse visas to U.S. citizens seeking to visit relatives in the U.S.S.R. During the period covered by this report, several Americans were denied the opportunity to visit their Soviet spouses and fiances. Others have been permitted the opportunity to visit only after purchasing expensive tourist packages. The U.S. Government continues to make regular representations to the Soviets on behalf of applicants for U.S. visitor's visas. Regrettably, during the reporting period, the interventions have not achieved results.

Romania. There was an increase in the number of exit permits issued for visits to family members in the United

States during the reporting period in comparison with the previous reporting period, resulting, at least partly, from the fact that summer is the traditional European travel season. Opportunities for Romanian citizens to travel to the West, however, remain an unobtainable privilege for most. By contrast, relatives of Romanians are encouraged to visit Romania and rarely encounter problems obtaining entry visas. During the reporting period, the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest issued 1,968 tourist visas to Romanians, most of which were for visits to relatives in the United States.

Opportunities to travel abroad for most Romanians remain strictly limited. Passport issuance procedures are arbitrary and unpredictable, and only those persons approved by the Communist Party are assured of receiving tourist passports. Many Romanians who would appear to qualify under Romanian law are refused without explanation. Others may receive tourist passports only after months, or sometimes years, of waiting. Rarely are entire families issued passports at the same time for a visit abroad. Usually, at least one member of the immediate family must stay behind to ensure that his relatives return. Should travelers not return to Romania, it is often years before their families are permitted to leave the country. Family members remaining in Romania often endure considerable pressure to divorce or renounce those who have left and are harassed if they refuse.

Americans rarely encounter problems in obtaining visas to visit relatives in Romania unless they themselves are former Romanians who left the country illegally. Although some visitors obtain Romanian visas in advance of travel, the majority arrive at Bucharest's international airport or at land borders without visas. Entry permission is almost always granted on the spot, and the fee is moderate ($11.50). First-degree relatives of Romanian citizens are exempt from the prohibition against staying at other than government-run facilities, as well as from the requirement to purchase $10 of local currency for each day of the anticipated stay.

Poland. The liberalization of passport issuance, which was announced at the end of martial law in July 1983 and took effect during the spring of 1984, has continued. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw estimates that over 25,000 exit permits were issued for visits to family members in the United States during the reporting period. Despite the liberalized issuance policy, certain Poles, particularly professionals, still experience problems in obtaining passports. There are two difficulties in obtaining passports for travel to the United States:

- Applicants must obtain an invitation certified by a Polish consulate in the United States. Since these invitations are valid for only 6 months and often expire before the passport has been issued, a second invitation is required in many cases.
- Trained professionals such as engineers, doctors, and skilled artisans are considered essential personnel and often cannot obtain passports for unofficial travel.

Our Embassy in Warsaw knows of no restrictions or difficulties for Americans visiting their relatives in Poland.

Hungary. Hungary continues to follow a relatively liberal family visitation and travel policy for its citizens. The 4,447 visas issued this review period is slightly higher than the 4,251 issued during the April-September cycle in 1984.

Hungarian citizens enjoy the legal possibility of visiting the West at least once each year if financial support is available from friends or relatives for hard-currency expenses. Hungarians can purchase hard currency for one private tourist trip every 3 years. The duration of the exit permission reflects the amount of leave time authorized by the place of employment.

In addition to seldom-applied reasons involving public interest and state security, the two most frequent reasons for which exit permits are denied Hungarians who wish to visit the United States are insufficient time (less than a year) since the last visit to the West or insufficient proof of the ability of the U.S. sponsor to provide support. Also, a Hungarian usually may not visit a person who has remained away from Hungary under circumstances considered illegal under Hungarian law until 5 years have elapsed. An exit permit may also be denied if the potential visitor is responsible for a close relative having remained abroad illegally.

Some Hungarian applicants of military age are receiving exit permits for tourist travel to the West which, experience indicates, would have been denied several years ago. The Hungarian authorities have published regulations that, for the first time, provide prospective travelers with military obligations an indication of their rights. They provide that normally an applicant in this category may not be denied permission to travel because of pending military obligations unless service is scheduled to begin within 6 months. This apparently is a step to increase the predictability and reduce the arbitrariness of the travel system as applied to military age applicants.

Visas are seldom denied to Americans for family visits to Hungary. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry never supplies reasons for visa refusals but will consider our Embassy's request for review, sometimes with positive results. Favorable reconsideration is often granted to such applicants for demonstrable concerns such as the illness of a close relative.

German Democratic Republic. The G.D.R. continues to limit severely travel by its citizens to the United States or noncommunist countries for family visits. Approval or denial of applications to travel for such visits is a political decision made by G.D.R. authorities, and criteria for these decisions are not made public. As an exception, pensioners (age 60 for women, 65 for men) are generally permitted to travel to the West. Nonpensioners can apply to visit close relatives, as a rule, only on the occasion of a specified family event, such as a death, birth, life-threatening illness, wedding, 25th or 50th wedding anniversary celebration, confirmation, first Holy Communion, and 50th, 65th, 70th, 75th, and further birthday celebrations. In all cases, the applicant wishing to travel in the West must provide documentation proving both the relationship and the purpose of travel. The total number of applications submitted and denied is not publicly available, but there are many cases of applicants in the above categories who are refused permission to travel.

During this reporting period, our Embassy in Berlin issued 790 visas for family visits to the United States. Of these, 150 were issued to nonpensioners. We are aware of only one case in which an American citizen has been refused permission to visit the G.D.R. since December 1982. G.D.R. citizens in positions deemed "sensitive" by their government may not be visited by or even maintain contacts with close relatives who live in the West. Emigrants from the G.D.R. must generally wait 5 years before they can return to the G.D.R. to visit relatives.

Czechoslovakia. Travel of Czechoslovak citizens to the West continues to be severely restricted. The number of exit permits issued for visits to family in the United States and the number of U.S. visas issued for such visits was 2,654. This represents a decrease of 84 visas over the same period a year ago.

The majority of Czechoslovak citizens who are allowed to travel to the United States to visit relatives are retired. Persons in the work force are not usually allowed to travel abroad with all members of their immediate family. Most U.S. citizens obtain visas to visit Czechoslovakia without difficulty, often in 1 day. However, many U.S. citizens of Czechoslovak origin continue to be refused visas with no explanation given, sometimes after having received several visas in the past. Our Embassy in Prague has made representations on behalf of 12 such citizens during this reporting period. Since the replies received from the Czechoslovak Government are often equivocal (e.g., "the person should reapply at the Embassy in Washington, D.C."), the success rate is difficult to determine. However, we estimate it to be around 30%. The United States has been told by the Czechoslovak Government that citing special humanitarian considerations—extreme age or serious illness of family members—may be helpful, and in a few such cases, such representations were successful.

Bulgaria. During the reporting period, 352 visas were issued for family visits. Although this is due partly to seasonal variations, it is still roughly 100 more than were issued during the last period. Visa applicants still report that they encounter numerous bureaucratic problems when they apply for passports and exit visas.

The passport/exit visa system remains heavily bureaucratized, and travel documentation often is issued on an arbitrary basis by local officials after applicants have waited months or years. The average wait for those few who succeed appears to be about 2 months. Bulgarians who apply for permission to visit relatives in the West have experienced official harassment during the process and sometimes after the visit. Because of this, some decide it is not worth the trouble to apply for an exit visa.

Americans wishing to visit Bulgarian relatives still face difficulties when they reach Bulgaria. There are minimum requirements for changing foreign currency, and many are forced to stay in hotels rather than with their relatives in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government still considers any person born in Bulgaria, no matter what his or her current citizenship, subject to its jurisdiction. For this reason, many Americans and other Westerners of Bulgarian origin are subjected to harassment when they come to Bulgaria to visit. During the reporting period, the U.S. Embassy in Sofia had to intervene on behalf of several American citizens of Bulgarian origin who had difficulties with authorities. The Bulgarian authorities were generally cooperative once the Embassy became involved.

Family Reunification

Soviet Union. Soviet authorities continued their poor performance in fostering family reunification during the review period. In one long-standing case involving a Soviet citizen seeking to join his wife in the United States, Soviet authorities finally granted exit permission to Israel. Family reunification is the only grounds for issuance of exit permission, but the Soviet definition of family is so narrow that only immediate family members receive exit permission. In some cases, Soviet authorities have refused exit permission if any applicant in a family has more relatives in the Soviet Union than in the United States. Soviet authorities continue to deny applications for exit permission on the grounds that applicants had access to "state secrets"—a broad and undefined concept. In many cases, applicants have been denied exit permission with no reason given or with only the vague comment that emigration was not currently feasible or not warranted by the international situation.

During the reporting period, persons who received exit permission to immigrate to the United States reported that the process took from 1 month to 1 year. The authorities responded to applications for exit permission in an average of 2-4 months. Emigration officials continued to refuse to accept certain applications for emigration to join family members in the United States. In some of these cases, the relative left the U.S.S.R. with temporary exit permission and then remained in the United States. In other cases, the relative in the U.S.S.R. obtained exit permission to Israel but then went to the United States. The Soviet authorities in Yerevan, the capital of the Armenian Republic, have recently begun asking roughly two-thirds of the individuals to whom they grant exit permission to sign pledges that once they are abroad they will not forward invitations for permanent residence to relatives in the U.S.S.R.

Persons applying for Soviet exit permission continued to experience reprisals in the form of loss of employment or harassment by employers or the police. Persons seeking to emigrate often experienced difficulty in getting past the Soviet guards in front of our Embassy in Moscow. In some cases, persons seeking access to the Embassy were arrested by Soviet authorities.

From April 30 to October 1, 1985, 44 Soviet nationals applied for and were issued U.S. immigrant visas for family reunification. In addition, 46 Soviet citizens applied for reunification with relatives in the United States and were processed under the accelerated third-country processing program (ATCP).

It is difficult to estimate the number of Soviet citizens who are refused exit permission, since many refusals are not reported to U.S. authorities. We now have on file 444 immigrant and fiance(e) visa petitions. In addition, approximately 1,000 other families, or 3,000 persons, have expressed interest in being reunited with relatives in the United States. Some individuals have been seeking Soviet exit permission for more than a decade. Our Embassy in Moscow also has a list of individuals who have repeatedly been denied Soviet exit permission to Israel but continue to apply. From April 1 to September 1, 1985, a total of 457 Jews departed the Soviet Union via Vienna, the primary exit point, compared to 327 for the first 5 months of the previous review period. A large number of the approximately

Divided Family Cases

	Nuclear Families		Non-Nuclear Families	
	Cases	*Individuals*	*Cases*	*Individuals*
Soviet Union*	108	391	—	—
Romania	78	111	640	1,318
Poland	198	401	160	851
Hungary	1	2	0	0
G.D.R.	0	0	12	30
Czechoslovakia	2	2	2	8
Bulgaria	5	7	2	3

*The Soviet Union does not differentiate between nuclear and non-nuclear families.

2 million ethnic German Soviet citizens continue to apply for emigration to West Germany, although only 178 were successful from April 1 to September 1. It remains clear that each year several thousand Soviet citizens apply for and are denied exit permission to join relatives abroad.

While we continue to intervene in support of Soviet citizens applying for exit permission, Soviet authorities have been completely unresponsive to these representations during the reporting period. In every case in which the authorities have responded to our representation on behalf of a divided family, the response has been negative. The U.S. Government maintains a representation list of names of Soviet citizens who have repeatedly been denied permission to join relatives in the United States. In only two cases, involving seven persons, have individuals actually been able to leave the U.S.S.R.

Romania. The Government of Romania's performance on family reunification remains largely unchanged since the last reporting period. A large number of family reunification cases which our Embassy in Bucharest has brought to the Romanian Government's attention are still unresolved. The average waiting period from initial application for emigration permission to final approval continues to be well in excess of the 6 months envisaged in the Madrid concluding document. Our experience is that a minimum of 8–12 months is required in the average case.

Political and economic factors have contributed to great pressure among Romanians for emigration. The Romanian Government officially opposes emigration. It allows a substantial number of departures under the rubric of family reunification, although it seeks to hinder these in order to reduce overall interest in emigration. It also allows relatively large numbers of departures of ethnic Germans to West Germany and of Romanian Jews to Israel. In recent years, the Romanian Government has approved more departures of people qualified to go to the United States than we have been able to accept promptly.

Romanian emigration procedures have been a concern for many years. Once the decision to grant emigration permission has been made, applicants are typically required to show they have divested themselves of all real property—at limited, state-established rates. Some are required to rent the housing they formerly owned; those in employer-supplied apartments have sometimes faced eviction. Typically, this has resulted in would-be emigrants crowding in with family or friends. Emigration applicants are often demoted or fired. Other employment is offered, although this sometimes means digging ditches in a distant city, cutting wood in forests, or farm labor in the provinces without provision for family accommodation at the job site.

Most of those granted exit permission are officially given the opportunity to renounce Romanian citizenship so that they automatically become stateless persons, thus losing—if they have not already lost—employment, housing, and entitlements to medical care, schooling, and coupons for rationed food items. Access by visa applicants to the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest is restricted; even some properly documented American citizens have encountered difficulties.

During the reporting period, the U.S. and Romanian Governments reached an understanding on procedures for emigration to the United States aimed at alleviating hardships encountered by individuals who have received exit permission but are awaiting U.S. visas or other travel documentation. Final details and a written conclusion to the understanding are still being worked out; the actual effect of the understanding on emigration procedures is not yet clear.

In testimony before the International Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee on July 23, State Department Counselor Edward Derwinski characterized the new understanding as follows:

> Up to now, Romanian citizens have forfeited jobs, access to social services, and sometimes housing after receiving their emigration passports before ascertaining whether they were even eligible for admission to the U.S., or if eligible, whether they could be accommodated under statutory quotas and admission ceilings in the near future. If we could not accommodate them, would-be emigrants became "trapped" between Romanian emigration law and procedures and U.S. immigration and refugee law. Their situation has been of great humanitarian concern to us.
>
> During my visit to Bucharest June 17-18 we informally worked out the basic elements of a procedure which will prevent this from happening in the future. The Romanian authorities agreed, in the future, to omit the issuance of passports with exit visas for the U.S. to those individuals whom we are promptly able to accept for U.S. immigration processing. We will identify those people through issuance of letters of eligibility sent by the American Embassy in Bucharest. The Romanian authorities will in turn issue certificates to individuals stating that their passport applications have been approved, and that the individuals may obtain their passports on producing a letter of eligibility from our Embassy.
>
> Once concluded, this agreement will be one of the most important and positive developments in the area of Romanian emigration procedures in many years. Receipt of a certificate of passport approval will not involve loss of citizenship, jobs, access to social services, or other hardships hitherto experienced by passport holders awaiting U.S. visas. The new agreement should also help to raise the passport approval rate for individuals in whom we are most directly interested.

During the reporting period, the number of Romanians making initial application for U.S. entry documents in order to be reunited with their families was 792. Immigrant visas and third-country processing (TCP) cases completed during the reporting period represented 185 and 1,102 persons respectively. Approximately 10% of TCP issuances are for the purpose of reunification with close relatives. The U.S. Embassy in Bucharest also issued 288 visas for humanitarian parole and to unite persons previously granted refugee or asylum status with their spouses and children.

Our Embassy in Bucharest currently has 141 cases (413 persons) on its immigrant visa representation list for periodic presentation to the Romanian authorities. Approximately 900 cases involving spouses and minor children of persons previously granted refugee status in the United States are pending due to Romanian failure to issue passports promptly. Of the 3,452 persons registered for the TCP program who are awaiting passports, approximately 350 are seeking emigration for the purpose of reunification with close family members.

Romanian authorities have been reasonably responsive to our Embassy's representation list of immigrant visa cases, with a few notable exceptions. Of the 146 cases (471 persons) on our Embassy's April 1984 representation list, 20 cases (63 persons) remain unresolved.

The cost of Romanian exit documents is high in relation to the Romanian worker's average monthly income (2,500 *lei*). A Romanian passport (with citizenship) and exit visa cost 1,165 *lei* and the cost of an extension of the exit visa is 965 *lei*. The cost of a stateless passport is also 1,165 *lei*, but renunciation of Romanian citizenship adds an additional 3,000 *lei* to this figure. (One U.S. dollar equals 11.4 *lei*).

Poland. The Polish Government is apparently taking the problem of family reunification more seriously than in the recent past. During the reporting period, our Embassy's list of divided families has grown more slowly than previously.

During this 6-month period, approximately 1,080 individuals applied for immigrant visas to join family members. Immigrant visas were issued to 1,030 persons for the purpose of family reunification. Our Embassy further facilitated the travel of 262 spouses and children of asylees and refugees to the United States for family reunification.

In this period, a total of 117 families involving 272 persons were added to our Embassy's divided families lists, while 37 families involving 82 persons were resolved and removed from the list. On October 1, 1985, the list contained the names of 278 families consisting of 1,068 individuals.

Our Embassy's representation appears to be helpful in many cases on the divided families list. We are unable to measure precisely the impact of interventions, since the Polish Government does not indicate whether issuance of an emigration passport is linked with U.S. representations. Many recent issuances appear to be based on the provisions of the new passport law.

Hungary. Hungarian performance in family reunification continues to be good. For example, in many recent cases the government has granted emigration permission to achieve family reunification at the first application even though the applicant may have been ineligible under strict application of Hungarian law, such as in the case of infants.

Divided family cases have declined. Our Embassy in Budapest issued 52 immigrant visas for family reunification during the reporting period; two refugee applications were processed to reunify families. There is only one outstanding case whose resolution is not expected soon because of the nature of the applicant's prior employment. One case has been dropped because the U.S. party divorced the Hungarian spouse. The delay in the spouse's departure from Hungary is at least partially responsible for the divorce. During the reporting period, the Hungarians authorized the departure of one family that had been presented as an emigration problem.

There are several official reasons for refusing emigration permission:

- Requesting emigration to join a relative remaining abroad illegally for a period of less than 5 years (or for whose illegal absence one is responsible);
- Not having attained the legal minimum age for emigration (55);
- Requesting emigration to join a relative not prescribed by law;
- Lack of permission from the Hungarian Ministry of Defense—in the case of males of military age who have not partly or completely fulfilled their military obligation; and
- A catch-all prohibition against emigration when it would be contrary to the public interest.

An emigration passport costs 1,000 *forints* (approximately $20). Minors under 14 are included at no extra charge. In addition there is a passport application fee of 250 *forints* (approximately $5). If the passport is refused, the cost of the passport is refunded, but the application fee is forfeited.

German Democratic Republic. The G.D.R. issued approximately 8,500 emigration visas during this reporting period. This rate of approximately 1,400 a month is higher than the norm of 600–1,000 visas a month that prevailed in recent years, except in 1984, when the G.D.R. allowed approximately 40,000 of its citizens to emigrate. Many of these people left for family reunification, others for political reasons. Only a fraction of those desiring to leave the G.D.R. have been allowed to do so; some Western sources estimate that as many as 300,000 to 500,000 applications are still pending.

An October 1983 G.D.R. law on emigration addresses only emigration for the purpose of reunification with "first-degree" relatives (parents and children) or joining a spouse. While some applicants with relatives in the West who are not first degree have been allowed to emigrate, the law has, in general, been used restrictively against those who do not have first-degree relatives in the West.

The experiences of exit visa applicants vary. In most cases, applicants wait at least a year for exit permission, but some cases have taken 3 or more years. While some East Germans have been able to lead normal lives after submitting an exit visa application, others have been subject to reprisals of varying degrees of severity. West German human rights groups believe that half of the estimated 7,000–10,000 political prisoners in the G.D.R. were imprisoned after filing for exit permission or attempting to leave the G.D.R. illegally. Some applicants have lost their jobs or have had to take menial work. G.D.R. authorities sometimes visit the homes of exit visa applicants to try to intimidate them into withdrawing their applications. Occasionally, children face discrimination and harassment in school. Successful applicants must usually renounce their G.D.R. citizenship and are issued a stateless passport.

G.D.R. officials commonly tell applicants that it is "not possible" to submit an exit visa application, but if applicants persist with submission of a written statement, it will generally be accepted by G.D.R. authorities as a de facto application. Applicants are usually not informed of the status of their cases until a final decision is made. Denial of the application is given orally without explanation. Some people thus refused are advised that any future application could lead to difficulty with the police or worse.

A few G.D.R. citizens who have applied for emigration to West Germany or West Berlin intend eventually to join relatives in the United States. Others apply for emigration directly to the United States, though they intend to remain in West Germany or West Berlin. It is, therefore, difficult to know the exact number of persons allowed to leave the G.D.R. for family reunification in the United States.

The continued G.D.R. practice of severely limiting access to Western missions has inhibited potential emigrants from visiting these missions to inquire about immigration procedures. Virtually all nonofficial visitors to the U.S. Embassy in Berlin can expect to be stopped by G.D.R. police, have identification cards checked, and possibly be detained following their visit to the Embassy. Many East Germans have been warned to have no contact with Western missions under threat to their well-being, and some people have been required to sign a document acknowledging that visiting a foreign mission without permission is a violation of G.D.R. law which makes them subject to prosecution.

Our Embassy in Berlin makes representations to the G.D.R. by periodically presenting a list of cases of direct interest to U.S. citizens. Lists given to the G.D.R. Foreign Ministry during the reporting period included 13 cases involving 34 people who wished to go to the United States for family reunification. Two of these cases involving four people were resolved by the end of this reporting period. The most recent list presented to the G.D.R. Foreign Ministry on June 12, 1985, contained 12 cases involving 30 people under family reunification, of which one case (four people) was resolved in July. One additional case (one person) was added in August.

Emigration fees are not burdensome. A passport costs about $4 and a single exit visa about $2.

Czechoslovakia. Generally, the Czechoslovak record on family reunification is good, at least for immediate relatives—spouses, children and parents—of U.S. citizens. The Czechoslovak Government does not regard married sons and

daughters or siblings of U.S. citizens as meriting reunification, since, in its view, their basic family units are with them in Czechoslovakia.

During the reporting period, our Embassy in Prague received 20 new immigrant visa cases, nine fewer than during this period last year. It also received 12 new cases involving 24 spouses and children seeking to join family members already granted refugee status in the United States. Our Embassy issued 21 immigrant visas to family members of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens during this period, a decrease of seven from a year ago. Also, two cases of family members of refugees were processed. Our divided families list for Czechoslovakia includes four cases consisting of eleven persons: two sons of U.S. citizens, two married daughters of U.S. citizens, and their children.

Generally, immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are allowed to emigrate relatively expeditiously. However, since Czechoslovak policy is to discourage emigration of the work force, married sons and daughters of siblings of U.S. citizens frequently experience great difficulty in obtaining exit documents and often must wait many years, reapplying repeatedly before receiving exit permission. Decisions on exit documentation often seem arbitrary and as dependent on where the applicant lives and applies for permission to emigrate as on the merits of his or her case. Our Embassy in Prague has approved petitions for over 100 immigrant visas on file but has had no word from most of those concerned since they were sent notification of their petition approval, presumably because of the difficulty in obtaining exit documentation. Families of refugees usually must wait until the refugee is naturalized as a U.S. citizen before they can obtain exit permission. In two cases, families of refugees renounced Czechoslovak citizenship in order to receive exit documentation, which was granted almost immediately. Families of non-Czechoslovak refugees (i.e., third country) in the United States are usually granted exit documentation without difficulty.

Assembling the documents needed to apply for emigration usually takes a minimum of 6 weeks. Processing an emigration application takes from 6 weeks to 6 months from the date the completed application is submitted; the average time is 3 months. If the application is refused, it is possible to file an appeal within 15 days; but if it is refused a second time, the applicant must wait 3 months before resubmitting an application. Often, people are told it is useless to reapply, but it is rare that a new application is not accepted.

An emigrating Czechoslovak's heaviest expense is often the education payment levied, in theory, to reimburse the government for university and postgraduate education. Some applicants have had to pay up to the Czechoslovak *koruna* equivalent of $1,000—6 months' wages for the average wage earner.

Bulgaria. The Government of Bulgaria has taken positive steps in a number of cases to resolve family reunification cases presented by the United States. There has been little movement during the period on cases presented by other Western missions. Hence, family reunification appears to have taken on a bilateral character rather than a general commitment to reunify families. The Bulgarian Government during this period has allowed persons in 14 of 16 cases it agreed to resolve to leave Bulgaria to join family members in the United States. We expect Bulgarian authorities to grant passports to persons in the remaining two cases. Our Embassy in Sofia follows up on cases in which the authorities show no initial willingness to grant approval.

One Western country has evidence that Bulgarian Embassy officers have tried to extort money from relatives for "consideration" in more than one divided family case. In one case, the Bulgarian Embassy officer demanded a "contribution" to the Bulgarian 1300-year Jubilee Fund of the equivalent of $10,000 in local currency. Although the family was willing to pay, they were finally told 2 months later that the case would never be solved. Another case involved a barter arrangement.

Binational Marriages

In accordance with the Final Act, the participating states pledged to consider favorably applications for entry or exit for citizens to another participating state. There is a mixed record of implementation of this commitment by the Soviet Union and East European countries. In the Madrid concluding document, the participating states committed themselves further to deal favorably with binational marriage applications and to decide on applications normally within 6 months. The following chart indicates the cases the United States was monitoring as of October 1, 1985.

Soviet Union	20
Romania	47
Poland	0
Hungary	0
G.D.R.	10
Czechoslovakia	0
Bulgaria	1

Soviet Union. Of the 41 spouses whose applications were processed by the Embassy during the review period, 30 received exit permission on the first application. At the same time, 10 spouses who had been refused exit permission at least twice previously were again denied permission to join their spouses in the United States.

Americans who marry Soviet citizens are not required to register with our Embassy in Moscow or consulate general in Leningrad. We generally learn of binational marriages when an American files an immigration petition for a Soviet spouse or asks our Embassy to notarize a statement required by Soviet authorities to register the marriage. Between April 1 and September 23, 1985, 27 American citizens and three permanent resident aliens requested a "marriage statement" at our Embassy.

During the review period, 23 individuals were issued immigrant visas to join American spouses. In addition, 18 Soviet citizens received exit permission and were documented for U.S. entry through the ATCP program to join spouses. We are aware of at least three cases in which fiance(e)s have sought reunification without success. Not infrequently, the American is denied a visa to enter the Soviet Union to marry, while the Soviet citizen is denied exit permission.

The United States maintains a representation list of Soviet citizens who have repeatedly been denied permission to join American citizen spouses. Our Embassy in Moscow makes frequent representations on behalf of the individuals. The Soviet response has been far from satisfactory. During the reporting period, one spouse was granted exit permission to Israel and departed the Soviet Union. Reportedly, two other spouses have received promises of exit permission.

Romania. Marriage to foreigners is officially discouraged, and obtaining approval is difficult. Although most applicants are eventually successful, securing official approval is a trying and time-consuming undertaking which typically requires a wait of 12–24 months. There has been no appreciable change in Romanian performance concerning binational marriages during the reporting

period. Romanian authorities approved 19 binational marriages during the reporting period. We estimate that the total number of exit permits and entry visas issued to spouses for the purpose of binational marriage is 15. We believe that 30 binational marriage cases have been delayed more than 6 months.

Poland. Marriage of American citizens to Polish citizens is much easier to accomplish in the United States than in Poland. Permission of a Polish court must be sought to marry in Poland, with the average court proceeding lasting about 4 months. Complications arise from the fact that the United States does not issue documents stating that an American citizen is free to marry, so the U.S. citizen must convince the court that he or she is unmarried. But we understand changes are in progress to simplify this procedure. Also, as the Polish Government does not recognize U.S. divorces involving Polish nationals, an American divorce must be repeated in the Polish courts. This process generally takes 6 months.

The number of binational marriages is impossible to estimate, as no formal statistics are compiled on the subject. During the review period, our Embassy in Warsaw issued 25 visas to Polish citizens for the purpose of binational marriage. During the same period, Polish authorities issued 25 exit permits to Polish nationals for the same purpose. No exit permits were delayed for more than 6 months.

Hungary. Binational marriages continue to present no problem in Hungary. During the reporting period, our Embassy in Budapest received or approved 27 petitions for binational marriage immigrant visas. Our Embassy issued 35 immigrant visas to Hungarian spouses of American citizens and one to a legal resident of the United States.

German Democratic Republic. The G.D.R. appears to be following faithfully the letter of its October 1983 law which provided that applications for binational marriage cases would be settled within 6 months. The G.D.R. does not consider an application to have been made until all required documents have been presented, and assembly of documentation in requisite formats can cause significant delay. Once the documents are accepted, permission to marry and emigrate is generally granted within 6 months, provided the couple marries in the G.D.R.

Before mid-1983, applicants were permitted to emigrate to marry a foreigner in his home country. With the law of October 1983, this permission was generally restricted, forcing applicants to apply first for permission to marry in the G.D.R. Now emigration can normally be granted only after marriage, although our Embassy is aware of a few exceptions having been made to this rule.

Of the 12 binational marriage cases on our Embassy's list as of June 12, 1985, three cases were resolved in August and September 1985. No other cases were resolved during the reporting period. One additional case came to our attention during the reporting period.

Czechoslovakia. Although the processing of the marriage application is lengthy (approximately 3 months), the Czechoslovak record is generally good on binational marriages. However, there have, in the past, been cases of U.S. citizens of Czechoslovak birth being refused entry visas and of the Czechoslovak fiance(e) being refused exit visas for the purpose of marriage. One such case was resolved during this period.

During this reporting period, 13 binational marriages came to the attention of our Embassy, the same number as a year ago.

Our Embassy in Prague estimates that 13 entry permits were issued to U.S. citizens for the purpose of binational marriage and that 10 exit permits were issued to spouses of U.S. citizens.

Bulgaria. There were eight binational marriages during the period, up from five during the previous period. This does not, however, seem to represent a significant change in the Bulgarian Government's attitude toward such marriages. While the authorities do not officially discourage binational marriages, obtaining the necessary approval is a cumbersome process, and some applicants are forbidden to marry foreigners.

Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons

The Final Act signatories agreed to facilitate travel for personal or professional reasons. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union and most other East European countries basically do not permit personal or professional travel abroad by their citizens, except under conditions of strict government control and monitoring. They generally encourage visitors from the West. However, visitors who attempt to see *refuseniks* or dissidents or who bring in forbidden religious articles or literary materials are subject to harassment.

Soviet Union. As a general matter, the Soviet Union encourages tourism by westerners as a source of hard currency and potential ideological benefit. Relatively inexpensive rates are offered to large groups, which are less troublesome to program and easier to control than individual tourists, who pay premium prices for comparative liberty. Soviet authorities seek to define tourism in an increasingly narrow way which rules out contact with Soviet citizens other than in meetings arranged by official Soviet hosts. As in previous reporting periods, American and other Western tourists were occasionally detained or even expelled for contacting Soviet citizens who have been denied permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

Our Embassy in Moscow has no means of estimating the total number of tourist and other visitor visas issued to Americans by Soviet embassies and consulates. It appears, however, that the number of American tourists during the summer of 1985 increased by approximately 20% (although one Western tour organizer estimates an increase of as much as 50%) over the previous year and a half, when tourism by Americans was reduced after Soviet fighters shot down a Korean airliner in September 1983.

Travel within the Soviet Union by American tourists and all other foreigners is extremely restricted. Large portions of the country are closed entirely to foreigners. Virtually all tourists must plan their itineraries and pay for transportation, accommodations, and even food in hard currency before a visa is issued. As a result, Soviet authorities have no currency conversion requirements for tourists. Changing an itinerary once a visa has been issued and the tourist has arrived in the country is extremely difficult. Further barriers to normal tourism are imposed by strict and often harshly applied customs regulations, which tourists sometimes fail to observe through no fault of their own. During the reporting period, Soviet customs officials confiscated substantial amounts of currency and other valuables from American tourists. Our Embassy's efforts to effect recovery have, thus far, been unsuccessful.

Approximately 497 visas were issued to private Soviet visitors during the reporting period. A total of 1,613 visas were issued during the same period to Soviets whose applications were submitted under cover of a note from the Foreign Ministry. These included diplomatic, UN Secretariat, journalist, business, exchange, and transit visas, as well as visas for officially sponsored tourist trips.

Americans applying for visitor visas must wait varying lengths of time, dependent upon the purpose of their travel and how the Soviet authorities perceive the trip. Authorization may be granted in as little as 2 days; more commonly, a private visitor must wait 2 or 3 weeks, often until the very eve of departure, to learn whether his visa has been granted or denied. U.S. visitor visas are generally issued to private Soviet visitors on the day of application. To reciprocate for the Soviet practice of charging a $10 fee for tourist and business visa applications, the United States, in February 1985, introduced a $10 charge for issuing visitors visas for tourists and business travelers. Soviet citizens must pay 200 *rubles* for a foreign travel passport. This compares to an average monthly income of about 250 *rubles*.

Romania. Opportunities for Romanian citizens to travel abroad for tourism remained restricted during the reporting period. Western tourists, on the other hand, are encouraged to visit Romania and rarely encounter problems obtaining entry visas. The number of tourist visas issued to Romanians during the reporting period was 1,698, and the number of other nonimmigrant visas issued to Romanians was 1,556.

There were approximately 15,500 arrivals in Romania by Americans during the reporting period, according to Romanian Government estimates. These figures count arrivals (i.e., border crossings) rather than the number of visas issued, and we assume the number includes some multiple entries by the same individuals. American tourists generally encounter no restrictions on travel within Romania, but they are required to convert $10 per day into local currency.

Tourist visas for the United States are normally issued on the day of application, unless a waiver of ineligibility is required. Waiver cases generally take from 3 to 5 working days to complete. U.S. visa fees are set to reciprocate the fees collected by the Government of Romania for corresponding visas. Romanian Government and U.S. fees are currently 84 *lei* ($7) for a single-entry visa and 540 *lei* ($45) for a multiple-entry tourist visa. Romanian Government policy is to encourage tourism, and visas are granted freely to tourists on application abroad, usually within 3-5 working days, or upon arrival at points of entry.

The time required for Romanians to complete exit formalities varies from weeks to years. Such travel remains a rare privilege. The total cost for a new tourist passport with exit visa is 440 *lei* ($37). If a person has a valid passport on file with the passport authorities, the cost of the new exit visa is 75 *lei* ($6).

Poland. The Polish Government welcomes and actively seeks U.S. tourism, an important source of hard currency for the Polish economy. American tourists visiting Poland during the reporting period generally experienced few difficulties with local authorities. However, four American tourists were detained in early May in Krakow and expelled from Poland on trumped-up charges of leading antigovernment demonstrations. There are no restrictions placed upon American citizens for travel within Poland. There is little necessity for the U.S. Government to facilitate travel and tourism by American citizens to Poland. According to Polish authorities, approximately 25,000 visas were issued to American tourists during the past year. The estimated average duration of the visa application process for Americans visiting Poland is about 2 weeks.

Our Embassy in Warsaw and consulates in Krakow and Poznan issued 28,365 nonimmigrant visas in the reporting period, of which 24,917 were tourist visas. This represents continuing growth following the large increase mentioned in the last report. Nonimmigrant visa applications for tourism from Polish citizens are processed within 3 hours, unless a waiver of ineligibility must be sought. Waivers of ineligibility can be obtained within 7-10 days. Tourist visas cost $10 or the equivalent in local currency; as in all other countries, the United States imposes a visa fee requirement on Polish travelers as a reciprocal gesture for Polish Government practice.

American visitors to Poland are required to exchange $15 per day at the official exchange rate. If they are visiting family in Poland, only half this amount must be exchanged. For Polish citizens, the average duration of government exit formalities for tourist travel is 2 months. The estimated average total cost is $20.

Hungary. According to official Hungarian statistics, almost 5 million Hungarians traveled abroad in 1984, about 20% more than in 1983. Of these travelers, 4.1 million went to Warsaw Pact countries and 500,000 to Western countries. In 1984, 13.4 million tourists came to Hungary. Hungarian travel agencies continue to allow certain Hungarian travelers to purchase a wide variety of services, including airplane tickets, hotel rooms, and some tour costs, in Hungarian currency (*forints*), thus reducing, to some extent, the pressure on the private traveler to obtain convertible currency. In many cases, it is possible to purchase Western airline tickets in *forints*.

Since mid-1983, more liberal provisions for Hungarians to work abroad for up to 5 years have been in force. According to Hungarian press reports, several hundred applications have been approved during the reporting period. Most approved applications were for work in the F.R.G. and Austria. Regulations require that the individual have a firm job offer or contract before application is made. The promulgation of the new regulations, however, appears consistent with the commitment in the Helsinki Final Act to increase the opportunities for travel for professional as well as personal reasons. The program is designed to meld with the European nations' guest worker system. Only in rare cases can the American immigration structure accommodate these applicants. At the same time, Hungarian authorities continue to respond arbitrarily to the applications for travel for personal or professional reasons submitted by dissidents. Some applications are approved, but others are denied or delayed without explanation to the individual concerned.

Our Embassy in Budapest issued 3,070 tourist visas to Hungarians during the reporting period. Seasonal factors account for the substantial increase from the last reporting period, but the figure is a large increase from the equivalent period a year ago (2,478). It appears to reflect the attractiveness of the new possibilities for purchasing air tickets in *forints*. Other nonimmigrant visas were issued to 1,955 Hungarian citizens, a seasonably adjusted increase of 365.

Seventy percent of Hungarian applicants, i.e., those without meaningful affiliation with a communist organization, received visas in 1 or 2 days. Thirty percent, for whom waivers of ineligibility were required, received visas within 2 weeks. Emergency waiver cases were handled within one day. A single-entry U.S. visa cost $8, a double-entry $12, and a multiple-entry cost $60. The United States increased its prices for visas this spring as a reciprocal response to Hungarian visa price increases.

Generally, a 30-day period is necessary to receive a passport for tourism to the West. Processing for a visit to a socialist country takes 2 weeks. Exit permits for tourism cost 350 *forints* ($7). Western permits are usually valid for a single trip. Permits to socialist countries are for multiple trips and valid until the passport expires.

Hungary has continued to streamline the possibilities for foreign tourists to

visit the country. A new modern border-crossing point opened July 1 on the Austrian border (Kophaza) to handle the increased volume there. Based on information received from the Hungarian Government, the estimated number of American tourists visiting Hungary during January to June 1985 was 55,000. One hundred thousand American tourists are expected to visit Hungary during 1985, an increase of approximately 10%.

The Hungarian Embassy in Washington and consulate in New York generally issue visas within 24-48 hours to nonofficial visitors. Visas are available at the Budapest airport and some land borders, but the Embassy is aware of five to six refusals annually to Hungarian-Americans. Official U.S. Government visitors are generally covered by a 7-day reciprocity agreement.

Hungary has no currency conversion requirements for U.S. visitors. Applicants may have to produce proof of sufficient funds to cover planned stay and departure, particularly when extensions of stay are requested. There are no travel restrictions except for military areas.

German Democratic Republic. Most G.D.R. citizens remain unable to travel to the West. Only pensioners can obtain permission to go to the West with relative ease. Exit formalities for G.D.R. citizens who can travel abroad usually take 4-10 weeks. The total cost of a G.D.R. passport and visa is about $6.

The continued currency exchange requirement diminishes travel to the G.D.R. by westerners. Westerners can, however, generally obtain visas to visit the G.D.R. without difficulty. Exceptions are those who have emigrated recently from the G.D.R. or who wish to visit East German relatives who have filed exit applications.

The processing of G.D.R. tourist and business visa applications takes about 6 weeks if the application is made in the United States and less time if made in West Germany or West Berlin. If a traveler is in Berlin and purchases a voucher showing prepaid reservations in G.D.R. hotels, a visa can be obtained the same day. Day visas limited to East Berlin can be obtained by Americans in a few minutes at specified Berlin sector crossing points.

G.D.R. single-entry tourist or business visas cost about $5, multiple entry about $14. A day visa for East Berlin costs about $2. In addition, if the official G.D.R. travel agency processes a visa application, it charges those over 16 a handling fee of $22 per person. With the exception of most F.R.G. pensioners, who must purchase about $5 in G.D.R. currency per day, the G.D.R. requires those 15 and over to purchase about $10 in G.D.R. currency per day. Those under 15 are exempt from such currency conversion requirements. This money cannot be reconverted into hard currency or taken out of the G.D.R.

U.S. visitors are prohibited from traveling in areas adjacent to G.D.R. military installations, and permission must be obtained for travel within 5 kilometers of the G.D.R. border, except when entering or leaving the country.

Our Embassy in Berlin issued 790 tourist visas and 600 other types of nonimmigrant visas to G.D.R. citizens during this reporting period. These represent normal figures for such a period. No information is available on how many visas were issued to Americans.

U.S. tourist visas are issued within 1 working day, except for cases which require waivers of ineligibility. The latter take an average of 10 days to 2 weeks. Because of affiliations with communist organizations, the majority of applicants require waivers of ineligibility. Those wishing to travel to the United States for business reasons who are not ineligible generally wait 5 working days for a visa. A U.S. tourist visa costs $8 for a single entry, $16 for two entries.

The U.S. Embassy has not intervened in any case involving tourism and travel.

Czechoslovakia. Theoretically, Czechoslovak citizens are allowed to travel to the West every 3 years. The actual granting of exit documentation for this purpose, however, varies considerably. Some individuals travel to the West every year; others are never allowed to leave Czechoslovakia; others may only travel to other countries in Eastern Europe. One major restraint on tourism of Czechoslovaks to nonsocialist countries is the need to receive foreign currency allotments. When the Czechoslovak tourist has a guarantee from a U.S. citizen immediate relative that all expenses will be paid, the exit document is often forthcoming. Tourism to Czechoslovakia in general is encouraged, although former Czechoslovak citizens frequently experience difficulties in obtaining entry visas.

Our Embassy in Prague issued 3,316 tourist visas during this period (a decrease of 84 over a year ago); total nonimmigrant visa issuance was 4,434 (a decrease of 16 from last year).

Officially, the Czechoslovak Government is required by its own regulations to respond to all applications for exit permission within 30-60 days of submission. In fact, the process often takes much longer. In addition to applying for passports and exit permission, persons desiring to visit countries outside the Warsaw Pact must submit applications for hard-currency allocations in January of the year in which they wish to travel. The maximum allocation is currently $350, based on a total of $18 per day per adult ($9 for children). In obtaining this hard currency, Czechoslovaks must pay 25 Czechoslovak *koruna* for each dollar, a rate which may approximately reflect the free market rate in the West, but one which is more than twice the current "official" ratio of *koruna* to dollars which is given to U.S. tourists in Czechoslovakia. Those Czechoslovaks visiting close relatives in the United States are not required to change more than a minimal amount, however. Czechoslovaks applying to travel also need permission from their employer and a police certificate.

U.S. tourists are required to change about $11 into local currency daily. Children and certain exceptional cases are required to change only half the amount. Currency exchange regulations are strictly enforced, and our Embassy frequently receives after-hours telephone calls during peak travel months from tourists who failed to exchange enough money, allowed their visas to lapse, and found, as a consequence, that Czechoslovak hotels were not allowed to house them. Embassy officers have had to contact police authorities and arrange for exceptions to be made until the tourists were able to change money and extend their visas.

Tourists are not restricted in their travel around the country, although certain localities, for example, areas around military establishments, are declared off limits. If a tourist loses his travel and identity documentation, he usually has to wait 3-5 days before he receives exit permission. Our Embassy's efforts to assist in hastening departure approval in such cases have met with very limited success. A 3-day delay is usually the minimum.

Bulgaria. Bulgarian officials issue passports and exit visas arbitrarily, often after an applicant has waited months or years. The average wait for the fortunate few who do receive travel documentation is reportedly 2 months. Bulgarians who apply for documentation to visit Western countries are often victims of official harassment before and after the visit. During the review period, our Embassy in Sofia issued 352 tourist visas for family visitation and 438 for business, sports, and cultural travel.

We estimate that more than 3,000 Americans visited Bulgaria as tourists during the period. U.S. visas are normally issued to Bulgarians within 7 days

of receipt of a complete application; American applicants for Bulgarian visas often must wait longer than 7 days. A tourist exchange rate of 1.8 *leva* to the dollar is offered at some major hotels. The free market rate is between 3 and 5 *leva* to the dollar, but official exchange receipts are often required to purchase services or accommodation in *leva*. There are no minimum hard-currency exchange requirements, and hard currency need not be declared when entering Bulgaria.

American visitors, except diplomats, may visit most areas of Bulgaria, with the exception of frontier zones, which are off limits to Bulgarian citizens as well without special permission.

Religious Contacts

The Final Act confirms the legitimacy of religious contacts among the participating states. In the Madrid concluding document, the 35 CSCE states committed themselves to implement the Final Act further so that religious faiths and their representatives can "develop contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information." Nonetheless, as noted in more detail in the section on religious freedom in Chapter Two of this report, unfettered religious contacts and exchanges of information are actively suppressed in the Soviet Union and some East European countries, where strict state supervision of religious activities is the rule.

Soviet Union. The Soviet Government does not oppose contacts with religious groups from the West as long as only approved representatives of officially registered churches participate on the Soviet side. The Russian Orthodox Church, indeed, is an active propagandist for official Soviet policy on questions of arms control and disarmament. Russian Orthodox representatives attended church meetings in the United States and elsewhere in the West during the review period. A group of over 80 U.S. religious leaders spent 2 weeks in the U.S.S.R. during the summer.

It is not uncommon for Soviet church leaders to invite individual Western clerics to the Soviet Union. In addition to introducing such guests to places of religious and historical interest, church leaders emphasize the theme that the Soviet people sincerely want peace and that the only roadblock to reduced tensions in the world is the intransigence of Western political leaders.

Travel abroad is also allowed for certain church representatives, and a number of registered Soviet Baptist leaders visited various U.S. Baptist churches during the reporting period. They, like the Russian Orthodox clergy, are careful to echo official Soviet propaganda in their dealings with foreign leaders.

Romania. Romania's record in the field of religious contacts is mixed. Official church leaders are allowed to travel to the West for meetings with their coreligionists and to attend ecumenical conferences. There have been several such trips during the reporting period. On the other hand, activist religious leaders have reported that they are told they cannot travel outside the country or that, if they do, it can only be one way, and they will not be allowed back in. While a few American religious leaders have been denied visas or prevented entry at the border, large numbers of American and other Western ministers travel to Romania, where they are able to visit churches and attend services wherever they want. In the September visit by Billy Graham, he was able to meet with all religious leaders with whom he wished. While religious visitors to Romania have been relatively unfettered in their movements, their ability to "exchange information," as required by the Madrid concluding document, is severely hampered by strict Romanian border controls of religious publications. Visiting ministers often complain that Bibles and other religious literature have been seized by border authorities.

Poland. Our Embassy in Warsaw currently issues nonimmigrant visas to members of the clergy at the rate of approximately 4 per week. Most Polish clergy seem to have no difficulty in obtaining passports for travel abroad. Frequently, they are able to do this on significantly shorter notice than other travelers. Representatives of various U.S. religious denominations have also been able to travel to Poland without government interference.

Hungary. Hungary has a good record in this field. There are substantial contacts, and travel is considerable in both directions. Our Embassy in Budapest is not aware of particular difficulties for any denomination.

German Democratic Republic. Clergy and lay members of Western churches have been permitted to attend church synods and conferences held in the G.D.R., and some G.D.R. religious leaders have been allowed to attend similar meetings in the West. There is a small private exchange of U.S. and G.D.R. pastors. During this reporting period, one American theology student is known to have studied at a seminary in East Berlin.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak record on facilitating travel by religious officials to and from Czechoslovakia is spotty. When the proposed visit serves the purpose of the state and takes place between an officially recognized religious institution in Czechoslovakia and its counterpart outside, visas are often granted. In the case of the Catholic Church, however, the government has followed an extremely restrictive policy. Pope John Paul II was not permitted to visit Czechoslovakia during the summer, despite an invitation by Cardinal Tomasek and petitions signed by thousands of Czech and Slovak Catholics inviting him to lead ceremonies at Velehrad in honor of the 1100th anniversary of the death of St. Methodius. Catholic leaders from other countries, including Cardinal Koenig of Austria, Cardinal Lustiger of France, and Cardinal Hume of Great Britain, were also denied visas to attend the celebrations. Similarly, activist Catholic priests and other religious leaders who manifest too much independence are frequently denied permission to travel outside Czechoslovakia.

Unofficial or unsanctioned travel by religious groups for purposes considered illegal by the Czechoslovak Government (e.g., importing religious literature or objects, carrying on religious training, and similar activities) is severely punished. The Czechoslovak press reported in July that three Slovaks were sentenced to terms of 32–66 months for attempting to import religious materials from Poland to Czechoslovakia.

Bulgaria. Religious institutions continued to endure tight official scrutiny, with the Bulgarian Orthodox Church enjoying a favored position. There were no significant changes noted in the frequency of religious contacts or Bulgarian policy toward proselytizing. Church sermons tended to stress matters of personal devotion. If social topics were touched on at all, the clergy was careful to hew to officially approved positions.

INFORMATION

The Final Act signatories agreed to facilitate freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage cooperation in the field of information and exchange of information with other countries, and to improve the working conditions of journalists. The Madrid concluding document contains a number of provisions which strengthen the Final Act. Included among these are provi-

sions that commit the participating states to: encourage the sale and distribution of printed matter from other states; decide journalists' visa applications without undue delay; grant permanent correspondents and their families multiple-entry and -exit visas valid for a year; provide more extensive travel opportunities for journalists; increase possibilities for foreign journalists to establish contacts with sources; and allow journalists to carry with them reference material and personal notes.

Dissemination of Information

Soviet Union. There have been no changes during the period under review regarding access by Soviet citizens to information in general and to U.S. media specifically. American newspapers and magazines are not available at Soviet newsstands, with the exception of very rare copies of American communist newspapers. American noncommunist periodical publications are circulated only among a select elite and are treated as confidential material. Much the same is true of publications from other Western countries. The Soviet state organization which makes newspaper and magazine subscriptions available to the public lists for the United States only technical, scientific, and communist periodicals, at costs considerably higher than for domestic and East European journals. Although *Ameryka* magazine remains very popular in the U.S.S.R., it is available in very limited quantities for newsstand sales, in addition to a limited number of subscriptions through Soviet distributors. A large number of copies of each issue is returned to the Embassy. American films continue to be shown to Soviet audiences on a select basis only. All Voice of America native language programs and Radio Liberty broadcasts are still jammed.

Romania. Overall, the Government of Romania seeks to control domestic dissemination of information. Though the censorship system officially was abolished some years ago, all media are state-owned, rigidly controlled, and used primarily as vehicles for government and party propaganda. As such, they are widely ignored or treated with extreme skepticism. Foreign and even local news items are carefully selected. However, VOA, RFE, and other foreign broadcasts are not jammed. Libraries generally control access to materials carefully; in the current reporting period, there has been an increase in the number of books reportedly banned.

There are no American or other Western books or periodicals sold at Romanian newsstands, even in those hotels used primarily by foreigners. Limited numbers of Romanians gain access to American and Western publications through foreign missions' information centers and libraries; some very few have subscriptions to Western periodicals, usually individually purchased during foreign travel. The Romanian Government does not grant permits for its citizens to use foreign exchange for Western periodical subscriptions. Occasionally, American books, usually out-of-date scientific or technical works, are available in secondhand bookstores.

Romanian TV shows at least one American film every 3 weeks and at least one American science item per week. Older American films are shown commercially on a regular basis in Romanian theaters. Due to the severe energy crisis in Romania last winter, Romanian TV cut back its air time to approximately 20 hours per week, a restriction which remained in effect throughout this period. As a result, opportunities for the airing of American productions were severely reduced. Due to budget restrictions, the state-owned TV network has not purchased any American productions for several years.

Poland. Although not as open as during the Solidarity heyday, the Polish media still remain among the least shackled in the Warsaw Pact. While following the approved Polish Government line on international issues, and attacking VOA and Radio Free Europe, the press continues to be a forum for lively debate on some domestic issues. Long articles appearing in such periodicals as *Tygodnik Powszechny, Kultura,* and *Polityka* present contending views on economic reform, party ideology and cadre policy, the extent of dialogue with various spheres of society, cultural issues, the role of the church, administrative reforms such as the proposed territorial self-management councils, and, most recently, the parliamentary elections. The press also freely discusses social and family problems, acute housing conditions, drug and alcohol abuse, poor delivery of medical services, problems in education, difficulties faced by students, and many other issues highlighting the imperfections of life in Poland. Well-known officials and journalists participate in press and media discussions of public issues. Many journalists who were dismissed under martial law are now active again in small-circulation periodicals.

The more orthodox government officials attempt to retain tight control over what they consider the most influential print and electronic media. Their goal is for journalistic products to be characterized by single-minded adherence to the prevailing government line. In much of the print media, however, they often have to be satisfied with an absence of criticism as opposed to enthusiastic backing. Poland is still a country where formal press censorship is practiced, and many articles are also self-censored before they reach official eyes. Controversial articles which do appear are often the result of prolonged bargaining with the censors. Within the imposed and perceived parameters, however, the Polish audience is exposed both to ideas and to means of handling controversial issues which would receive little or no public exposure in most other East European countries. The official press has published results of recent public opinion polls which reflect widely shared views unpopular with the government, and there have been several articles in major papers presenting both critical and positive reviews of this year's most popular book, which was published only in the underground press.

No American periodicals are sold publicly in Poland. Personal and institutional subscriptions to some titles are still possible, depending on the availability of hard currency. The USIA-produced *Ameryka* and *Problems of Communism* continue to be banned from distribution.

No American periodicals or books are presently sold at newsstands, although some U.S. news weeklies are found in public reading rooms. Public and university library purchases of new books and periodicals from the United States are severely limited by lack of hard currency. Our Embassy in Warsaw has received no reports of removal of books from library shelves. Thus, American books and periodicals already in library collections—principally university libraries—remain available to users.

Control of hard-currency expenditure outside of Poland makes it almost impossible for an individual to subscribe to an American periodical. Gift subscriptions paid for abroad usually arrive through the Polish mails. One exception to this rule, which caused quite a stir among subscribers, involved an issue of *National Geographic* which contained an article on Afghanistan. Subscribers received notices from the Polish customs office saying that the issue contained unacceptable material critical of the Soviet Union and would not be allowed into the country. Our Embassy in Warsaw has heard of a few instances, however, in which subscribers challenged the decision and subsequently received their copies. Public sale of books and periodicals from the U.S.S.R. and other communist countries is

widespread, and prices are comparable to those for Polish publications. The Government of Poland facilitates private subscriptions to periodicals from communist countries by permitting subscribers to order them through the Polish central subscription office.

Currently, 13 American films are playing in Warsaw's cinemas. Titles which have arrived most recently include "Return of the Jedi," "To Be or Not To Be," "Zelig," "Airplane II," "E.T.," "Superman III," "Blue Thunder," "Blues Brothers," and "Being There." A recently-published list of the 10 most popular films in Poland during the first half of 1985 was dominated by seven American titles. Polish television continues to show old American films with fair regularity. Although the lack of hard currency has made new acquisitions extremely rare, recent television offerings include "Mr. Majestyk," "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum," "Little House on the Prairie," and "Escape From Alcatraz."

Approximately 75% of VOA Polish service shortwave broadcasts were jammed during this period. No VOA Polish mediumwave broadcasts have been jammed, and reception on this band continues to be good. Eighty percent of Polish RFE broadcasts are jammed. VOA English service has not been jammed.

Hungary. Western publications from the United States, France, Germany, and other Western nations are available at major international hotels in Hungary and can be purchased for *forints*. However, certain publications that have "embarrassing" articles do not appear. For example, copies of the June 1985 *National Geographic* containing an article on Afghanistan were not delivered. Copies of publications from socialist countries are, of course, ubiquitous. Hungarian citizens are permitted to subscribe to Western periodicals, paying in *forints*, but we have no statistics on how this works in practice. Hungary translates and publishes a large number of foreign literary works.

Hungarian media regularly follow the Soviet line and often quote TASS as a means of registering Hungarian disapproval of American policy. Hungarian media representatives have met with American policymakers and spokesmen, but the results of these talks seldom find their way into reporting. For the most part, Hungarians may listen to or watch Western radio or television. Hungary claims that it does not jam RFE, VOA, or other Western stations, but recent reports indicate that Hungary did interfere with RFE when it ran an interview in Hungarian with former Prime Minister Hegedus, the Prime Minister during the 1956 uprising.

German Democratic Republic. To the maximum extent feasible, the Government of the German Democratic Republic attempts to control the information available within its territory. All media have as a prime responsibility the inculcation of values and beliefs favorable to the government and to the economic and social system it has established. A subsidiary goal is to present countries with differing political, social, and economic structures, including the United States, as unsuccessful in meeting the basic needs of their citizenry. G.D.R. coverage of U.S. foreign and domestic affairs continues to be, on the whole, critical, often quoting negative comments from the U.S. press out of context or presenting distorted pictures of life in the United States. Occasionally, positive comments about the United States are made, but these are exceptions to the rule.

Print media are effectively controlled. In general, only publications listed in the G.D.R.'s postal publication register may be imported. Materials not so listed are regularly confiscated at border and sector crossings. Our Embassy in Berlin has been able to distribute to official and unofficial contacts a variety of printed materials, including the USIA-produced magazines *Dialogue*, *English Teaching Forum*, and *Problems of Communism*. To our knowledge, these publications usually reach their recipients, whether mailed or delivered by hand.

G.D.R. broadcasting stations are state-owned and -directed, but television and radio from abroad cannot be easily controlled. About 80% of G.D.R. households receive television from West Germany, and practically every household receives Western radio stations. The state does not try to discourage receiving foreign broadcasts but does try to counter criticism in foreign newscasts with stories on its own programming.

U.S. magazines and newspapers, other than those published by the U.S. Communist Party, are not available to the general public. Libraries and official institutes do receive U.S. magazines, scholarly journals, and daily papers. Circulation of all of these publications, even within those university sections or institutions permitted to subscribe to them, is restricted. Small numbers of the *International Herald Tribune* and other Western papers are also sold, upon request, for hard currency to foreigners in a few hotels catering to Western visitors.

It is difficult to purchase U.S. books and periodicals, other than those of the U.S. Communist Party, at bookstores and newsstands. U.S. materials in libraries are for restricted circulation. Only a few researchers and scholars receive subscriptions to U.S. publications. Although that is due, in part, to the difficulty of paying for them in hard currency, it also reflects official reluctance to grant the postal license necessary to receive such materials through the mail. About 30 U.S. titles each year are translated and printed by government-owned publishing companies, mostly titles in the public domain. However, the printings are small and the books often hard to obtain. Our Embassy in Berlin sends books to recipients in the G.D.R. and has exhibited books at the book fair in Leipzig. G.D.R. law provides that books "whose content violates the preservation of peace or in some other way is counter to the interest of the socialist state and its citizens" may not be distributed. There is no encouragement of any kind for wider usage for U.S. books and periodicals. Visitors are occasionally permitted access to our Embassy's library facility to attend a special event, not merely to use the materials.

In theaters in the German Democratic Republic, approximately 120 foreign films will be shown in 1985. Of these, about 15 will be U.S. films. In addition, G.D.R. television will purchase older U.S. feature films for broadcast. A wider variety of films on American life is now shown than 2 years ago; some of the films are chosen for their entertainment value and not just because they present negative or violent views of U.S. society.

VOA, RFE, and Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) broadcasts are not jammed. G.D.R. journals, however, have printed articles accusing these services of being agents of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and presenting anti-G.D.R. propaganda.

Czechoslovakia. The performance of the Czechoslovak Government concerning the dissemination of printed, filmed, and broadcast information continues to be poor. Although information originating from socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, is prominently published and broadcast, information from Western sources is hard to obtain and often restricted by the Czechoslovak Government. Broadcasts and publications that shed unfavorable light on Czechoslovak or Soviet society and policy are particularly disapproved of by the authorities.

There are no American publications sold openly in Czechoslovakia, except for a few copies of the U.S. Communist Party newspaper *Daily World* which appear on newsstands irregularly.

American books and periodicals are not generally available, although some are available on a restricted basis in technical and university libraries. During the reporting period, the Government of Czechoslovakia did not interfere overtly with the operation of the American Embassy Library in Prague, which makes its nearly 5,000 American books and 114 current U.S. periodicals in the English language accessible to the public daily. However, free access to the library is not facilitated by the presence of armed Czechoslovak guards outside the Embassy and the widespread fear among Czechoslovak citizens, by no means discouraged by their government, that they will have difficulties should they visit the library. English departments at the major Czechoslovak universities maintain collections of American literature, but these contain many gaps, particularly in recent American fiction and criticism. Moreover, the departmental libraries are generally open only to faculty members and students majoring in English.

Our Prague Embassy's Press and Culture Section distributes 164 subscriptions to American periodicals (105 titles) to Czechoslovak individuals and institutions under our periodicals presentation program. The Press and Culture Section, however, continues to receive complaints from private Czechoslovak citizens that subscriptions to American magazines, American Embassy library "outreach" materials, the USIA Czech-language magazine *Spektrum*, and other publications are often interrupted. A 1983 directive, issued by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Communications and the Federal Office of Press and Information, that changes the terms of payment for subscriptions to periodicals from nonsocialist countries from Czechoslovak *koruna* to U.S. dollars or other convertible currency is still in force. Since payment by individuals and institutions (even those relatively few who are permitted access to Western publications) is a real burden, the long-term result of the directive probably is a substantial reduction in the number and variety of foreign publications purchased from the West.

American films make up a sizable percentage of films shown commercially, more than for any other Western country. Among the U.S. films screened in Prague's dozen principal central city moviehouses during the reporting period were "The Black Stallion" and "On Golden Pond." Most U.S. films are productions that are at least several years old and which contain nothing that could be considered offensive to socialism or to the Czechoslovak Government. American films rarely appear on Czechoslovak television.

Radio Free Europe is jammed heavily in Prague and other major cities, but it is often possible to receive its transmission in the countryside or, by changing frequencies, to pick it up in the big cities from time to time. The Voice of America is not jammed.

Bulgaria. The media in Bulgaria is tightly controlled by the Communist Party and there is no likelihood of any change. Censorship remains a way of life. No Western periodicals, except those published by Western communist parties, are sold in Bulgaria or otherwise made available to Bulgarian citizens. When foreign publications are provided for Westerners who are here for conferences, Bulgarian citizens are prevented from having access to these publications. One Western diplomat watched security authorities confiscate a Western magazine from a Bulgarian woman who obtained it at a recent international conference in Sofia.

During the review period, Bulgarian television has shown Western programs on a regular basis. Western films and, in particular, American films are regularly shown in Bulgarian cinemas. Two recent films were "The Empire Strikes Back" and "Tootsie." The national film archives continue to show an American film every Monday and Friday as well as other foreign films. The archives' film theatre is open to the public. "Casablanca," "Singing in the Rain," "Death on the Nile," and "Murder on the Orient Express" were aired on television, but a U.S. film exhibit under the bilateral exchanges agreement was rejected by the Bulgarian Government. A number of Western plays are performed at Bulgarian theaters, and Western music is regularly heard on Bulgarian radio. The New York "Philomusica" chamber group performed in Sofia in June at a government-sponsored festival. Pianist Leonard Pennario also gave a recital. In official cultural exchanges, Bulgaria has attempted to limit volume while dictating taste and content to Western exhibitors. A number of carefully selected articles from the American and Western press are translated and reprinted in Bulgarian publications.

Working Conditions for Journalists

Soviet Union. During the reporting period, harassment of journalists continued. A reporter returning from Helsinki, where he had covered the ceremonies commemorating the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Final Act, was detained for several hours by customs officials in Leningrad. His notes and other materials, including a copy of the Helsinki Final Act, were confiscated. After vigorous protests by our consulate general in Leningrad, the materials were returned on the following day. However, an official inventory of the seized items the correspondent had signed the previous day had been tampered with to make it appear that fewer documents had been confiscated than, in fact, had been. Videotape from the BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation] and a U.S. network was confiscated at Moscow airport from a dependent of a British journalist. Two American reporters were attacked in the Soviet media for allegedly tendentious reporting during the review period. These quasi-private and public attacks and harassment are apparently crude attempts to intimidate Moscow-based reporters as well as journalists coming to the Soviet Union on specific assignment.

Soviet authorities continue to withhold approval of the long-standing application of the *Wall Street Journal* to open a Moscow bureau. They have not denied the request, but have said frankly that they will take their time "studying the application." In discussions regarding the application, Soviet authorities have made it clear that the cause of the long delay is official Soviet displeasure with the *Journal's* editorial policies. The *Washington Times* has also applied for permission to open a Moscow bureau. They have met the same stonewalling tactics encountered by the *Wall Street Journal* and for the same reason—the Soviets do not like the editorial opinions expressed in the newspaper.

There are 31 U.S. journalists accredited on a permanent basis in the Soviet Union. This number includes journalists representing *Pilot* and the *Daily World.* In addition, there are 10 resident, permanently accredited technical personnel. Finally, there are two additional nonresident correspondents who hold full accreditation. All have multiple-entry/exit visas valid for 1 year.

Romania. Romania regards foreign journalists with suspicion and openly seeks to manipulate and control them. During this reporting period, the representative of a major U.S. daily was told by Romanian authorities that he was *persona non grata* and, though he had a valid multiple-entry visa, would

not be allowed in the country. A senior Romanian official subsequently complained that the journalist's notably objective reporting had been "anti-Romanian." Later, another representative of this paper, as well as a Pulitzer Prize-winning correspondent for another highly respected, major U.S. newspaper, were severely lectured by a representative of the official news agency, *Agerpres* (technically, the "host" for all journalist visitors), regarding "unprofessional" and "biased" reporting. He made it clear they would be barred from Romania if their reporting was uncomplimentary. Western journalists frequently complain of bureaucratic frustration, obfuscation, and misrepresentation, despite government protests of frankness and cooperation. Visiting journalists are told that all interviews must be cleared by *Agerpres* or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Many Western journalists manage to make unofficial contacts with Romanian citizens and officials. By and large, Western journalists depend heavily on diplomatic and Western business contacts as sources of information.

There are no permanently accredited American journalists resident in Romania. Approximately 20 visas per year are granted to visiting American journalists. Three nonresident American journalists are accredited in Bucharest, but they, too, are granted only single-entry visas. At least one American journalist was refused a working visa during this reporting period. Also a three-person TV crew arrived without visas, having been assured by the Romanian Embassy in Washington that airport visas could be obtained. They were denied entry and forced to depart. In previous reporting periods, some journalists have been granted visas immediately, while others have encountered long and seemingly arbitrary delays. During this reporting period, one journalist, returning without a visa after some years away from Romania, was granted an airport visa without difficulty.

The Romanian Government provides opportunities for journalists to travel under strictly controlled conditions, usually only to government-approved destinations and always with official escorts.

By Romanian law, citizens must report contacts and the substance of any conversation with any foreigner. Romanian authorities vigorously discourage all but officially approved contact by their citizens with Western journalists. Some American and Western news agencies employ Romanian citizens as stringers in Romania, hired with Romanian Government approval.

During this period, there were no problems getting Romanian authorization for radio and television journalists to bring their own technicians, equipment, and professional reference materials into the country. There is a meticulous recording of serial numbers. In the case of typewriters, a sample of the typeface must be submitted as well.

Between five and ten U.S. visas are granted each year to Romanian journalists, primarily for short visits. Visa applications are handled expeditiously, but the passports are usually received from Romanian authorities on very short notice.

American and other national press centers are allowed for certain events. There is an operating Romanian foreign press club, at which periodic press conferences are held; otherwise, activities at this press club are very rare.

Poland. Although interviews with government officials must be arranged through the government press enterprise *Interpress* and the Foreign Ministry Press Department, resident and visiting American journalists rarely report difficulty in obtaining access to important sources and, in fact, rank Poland high on the list of East European countries in terms of general access. The Polish Government spokesman schedules weekly press conferences for foreign correspondents, which are well attended and often include newsworthy announcements and considerable give-and-take. Foreign journalists may travel freely without prior permission, although many have been stopped by provincial authorities for document checks and inspections of the content of their motor vehicles. TV correspondents have been subjected to harassment, including temporary detention and seizure of equipment, when they attempt to cover demonstrations.

Technical equipment is imported without restriction, but technical assistance is not: American television networks are allowed one permanently accredited correspondent as well as an accredited producer. Additional technical personnel, such as film crews, must be hired locally. Although resident correspondents are not required to hire personnel through a central government office, as is the case in some East European countries, Polish national employees must be approved and registered with the Foreign Ministry. The authorities continue to harass some news organizations with bureaus in Warsaw by refusing to allow selected employees of these organizations to continue working and rejecting work permit requirements for others.

Three new permanent accreditations were granted to U.S. media representatives during the review period. Our Embassy in Warsaw estimates that some 20 visas have been granted to U.S. journalists not permanently accredited.

The only visa refusal of which we are aware involves the Voice of America Vienna correspondent who has applied for a visa four times during the past 6 months and been turned down each time, with the clear understanding that the refusal is directly related to his VOA connection. We know of no delays in issuing visas for visiting correspondents.

There are now 15 U.S. journalists and two television producers permanently accredited in Poland. They and their families have multiple-entry visas, which must be renewed every year. The Polish Government has extended the validity of multiple-entry visas for resident foreign correspondents from 6 months to 1 year. There are no travel restrictions in Poland for resident or visiting foreign journalists.

Visiting radio and television journalists may bring their own equipment and crews. Our Embassy has heard no reports of either visiting or resident journalists not being able to carry reference material for professional use.

One visa for permanent accreditation was issued to a Polish journalist during the reporting period. We issued 12 visas to journalists for short visits to the United States. No U.S. visas were refused to Polish journalist applicants.

One press center, *Interpress* in Warsaw, is open to both national and foreign correspondents.

Hungary. American journalists visit Hungary often and have no difficulty getting visas. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center, *Pressinform*, assists foreign journalists. Reports of its cooperation and efficiency have been generally favorable, and it is open to national as well as foreign journalists. By appointment, foreign journalists also have access to the press center of the Hungarian Journalists Association.

Several U.S. journalists enter Hungary on multiple-entry visas approved in 1982. After notifying either a Hungarian Embassy or the Foreign Ministry, radio and television journalists can bring their own technicians and equipment, which must be registered with Hungarian Customs both upon entering and leaving the country. They can also take with them reference materials for professional personal use without any difficulty. Our

Embassy in Budapest is not aware of any difficulties imposed on foreign journalists who seek to establish and maintain personal contacts and communications with either official or nonofficial sources, and there are no areas closed to travel in Hungary. We know of no American correspondents who have been expelled from Hungary. During the reporting period, nine visas were granted to Hungarian journalists permanently accredited to the United States, a figure which includes six family members. Eleven were issued to Hungarian journalists for shorter periods. No such visas were refused, and none delayed more than 6 months.

German Democratic Republic. Foreign journalists are accorded courteous and correct treatment. Their ability to report on events in the G.D.R. is hampered by laws which limit their ability to travel without prior permission, to make appointments directly with G.D.R. officials and individuals, and to receive needed information. These laws, however, are not always applied.

A representative of the communist *Daily Worker* and an AP correspondent, who is not a U.S. citizen, are permanently accredited to the German Democratic Republic. The number of temporary visas issued to American journalists during this reporting period is unknown. An unusually large number of newsmen visited the G.D.R. in connection with events marking the end of World War II in Europe, and, to our Embassy's knowledge, none were refused a visa. Occasionally, visa requests for technical crews, television cameramen, and the like are denied—evidently to encourage the use of local crews—but our Embassy knows of no such instances during this reporting period.

No American journalists have been refused visas, to our knowledge. Visa applications from journalists are usually decided upon without delay. The non-American journalist employed by AP and the *Daily Worker* correspondent have multiple-entry visas valid for 1 year.

All travel by journalists outside Berlin must be approved by the Foreign Ministry. In practice, the authorities usually are tolerant of travel without prior approval, but they have the legal basis to stop such travel if they wish.

Western journalists must have Foreign Ministry approval for interviews or any significant contact. By G.D.R. law, many G.D.R. citizens may not maintain contact with foreign journalists. Access to information and people remains carefully controlled by the state.

Authorization to bring technicians and equipment into the G.D.R. has generally been granted. For certain events, the G.D.R. has claimed insufficient time to process applications. G.D.R. authorities insist that foreign journalists, like other foreigners, are subject to restrictions on the printed material they can bring into the G.D.R. In fact, however, journalists generally have had no trouble bringing in needed materials.

We know of no instance in which an American journalist was expelled. The U.S. Embassy in Berlin issued two visas to ADN (the official G.D.R. press service) correspondents assigned to Washington. However, G.D.R. journalists, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on their behalf, have claimed that U.S. issuance of only single-entry visas and the requirement that new visas be requested when journalists travel outside the United States (to Canada, for instance) infringes upon freedom of travel for journalists. G.D.R. officials also complain that it usually takes about 2 weeks for a G.D.R. journalist to get a U.S. visa, whereas corresponding G.D.R. visas are issued within a couple of days to U.S. journalists.

An International Press Center with facilities open to foreign journalists is located in East Berlin. During the Leipzig fairs, a press center is also open in Leipzig.

Czechoslovakia. The Government of Czechoslovakia's handling of Western journalists in Czechoslovakia has not changed significantly since the last reporting period. Press centers for foreign journalists function in Prague and Bratislava, but the quality of information provided is poor. Working conditions for foreign journalists are not dangerous, but access to government officials and "newsworthy" data is sharply restricted.

More than two dozen short-term visas were granted to American newsmen by local authorities in connection with permanent accreditation. Visas for Western journalists not permanently accredited totaled approximately 70 during the reporting period.

According to the Government of Czechoslovakia Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Section, eight American organizations have accredited (or accreditation-pending) correspondents at the present time. The organizations include the Associated Press, Time-Life, *Newsweek*, the *Washington Post*, the *Detroit Free Press*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the Voice of America, and the *Daily World*. Two CBS-TV correspondents have been waiting since February 1984 for a response to their requests for permanent nonresident accreditation. (One has since withdrawn his name.)

The sole resident U.S. journalist was the representative of the *Daily World*. That correspondent has returned permanently to the United Sates, and there has been no request as yet for a replacement.

There are no travel restrictions on accredited journalists, except in security areas. Several journalist tours for resident correspondents are organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Department each year. However, the Government of Czechoslovakia has not undertaken measures to provide more extensive travel opportunities for American journalists.

There have been no increased possibilities and/or improved conditions for foreign journalists to establish and maintain personal contacts and communications with their sources.

The Czechoslovak Government permits radio and television journalists to bring their own technicians and equipment but encourages use of locally supplied technical personnel and equipment. Journalists are permitted to carry reference material for professional purposes with them, but such material can be, and usually is, perused by border guards and customs officials both on entering and on leaving Czechoslovakia.

To our Embassy's knowledge, no American journalists were expelled during the reporting period.

During the reporting period, three new U.S. visas were granted to Czechoslovak journalists for permanent accreditation and shorter visits. At present, there are four accredited Czechoslovak journalists in the United States.

Bulgaria. Working conditions for foreign journalists in Bulgaria are still poor, and harassment of them has increased. If a journalist is willing to follow a government-prepared program, he is likely to be treated well during his stay in Bulgaria. However, those journalists who try to seek out news and report is as they find it, regardless of whether or not it is favorable to the regime, often are frustrated by the authorities.

At the end of May, VOA's Eastern Europe correspondent was detained twice by militia when he attempted to visit ethnic Turkish areas; theoretically, all areas of Bulgaria are open to journalists. A journalist from West Germany was also detained during this period when he tried to visit ethnic Turks.

The Government of Bulgaria continues to use the denial of visas to journalists as a way of showing its displeasure over a particular article a journalist has written. An *Agence*

France Presse correspondent was denied a visa for 7 months after he wrote an article critical of the regime's handling of the ethnic Turkish situation.

There are no resident American journalists in Bulgaria. The VOA correspondent in Vienna has been accredited, raising the number of Americans accredited to six. TV and film crews are permitted to bring their equipment into the country, as are radio journalists. The "Sofia Press" organization, which is responsible for visiting journalists, charges a fee for making appointments with officials and others in Bulgaria. The average cost for this service is $200 for 3 days of work, and more if the journalist stays longer.

COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN THE FIELDS OF CULTURE AND EDUCATION

This section of Basket III commits the signatories to facilitate cultural and educational changes, improve access to cultural achievements, expand contacts between educational institutions, increase international scientific cooperation, and encourage the study of foreign languages.

General Considerations

Exchanges are an integral aspect of relations among the 35 participating CSCE nations. The examples listed in this section constitute a partial accounting of exchanges between the United States and East European countries during the reporting period. These highlights are indicative of the scope of the exchanges and cooperative ventures in progress, many of which have been underway for some time. Some are conducted under U.S. Government auspices with U.S. Government financial assistance. Others are strictly private and only come to our attention through the visa application process or when problems arise.

Soviet Union. Negotiations on a new official exchanges agreement on cultural, educational, scientific, and technical and other fields between the United States and the U.S.S.R. continue in Moscow. If an agreeement is concluded, it will be the first official bilateral exchanges agreement since 1979.

While bilateral cultural exchanges and cooperation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. generally remained at the same comparatively low level as during the previous 6 months, there were several noteworthy performances by American artists during this period, including a series of concerts in Moscow, Leningrad, and Tallinn by singer/songwriter John Denver.

The United States was well represented at two other major Soviet cultural events during the summer of 1985: the Moscow International Book Fair and the Moscow International Film Festival. At the film festival, the official American entry, "A Soldier's Story," shared the top prize with a Soviet and a Greek film and received considerable favorable media coverage. A number of other recent American films were shown during the period of the festival at Moscow movie theaters.

A handful of American artists performed privately for invited audiences, including Soviet citizens, at the official U.S. residences in Moscow and Leningrad. The residences have also hosted an active program of feature film shows, which have given invited Soviet audiences an opportunity to see first-run films such as "Amadeus" and "A Passage to India." The range of such activities continued to be quite narrow, however, and Soviet authorities continued to block most efforts to extend American cultural programs beyond the confines of official U.S. premises. Individual Americans continued to participate in international fairs, festivals, and cultural meetings in the Soviet Union, although levels of participation have been generally lower than in the 1970s. Some Soviet artists and performers were invited to the United States for similar purposes, but one of them, a ceramicist, was denied permission to attend an international ceramics symposium in August.

Access by Soviet nationals to foreign culture remained tightly controlled. The Soviet Union claims to be the world's largest translator of foreign books, with more than 2,000 foreign authors published every year. However, such translations are selective and tendentious, with huge runs of "acceptable" authors such as Mark Twain and Jack London, occasional pieces by contemporary American and other Western writers, and nothing critical of the U.S.S.R. A fair number of Western films are shown. As in the case of books, the selection is tendentious, including few good films. Nonetheless, even Western films of lesser quality are very popular with the Soviet public and, in large cities, sometimes account for as many as 30–40% of all films being shown at any given time.

Soviet treatment of regional and national minority cultures continued to be ambivalent. On the one hand, the Soviet Government has often stated that it upholds the many national languages and cultures of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet mass media present the official point of view in dozens of languages. Regional folk music and dance groups and theaters are funded by the government. On the other hand, Russians (who make up about half the population of the Soviet Union) tend to dominate the country culturally, as they do politically. Non-Russians are expected to know two languages, Russian and their own, and to honor Russian cultural heroes like Pushkin. Some smaller nationalities, such as the Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians, are concerned about eventual assimilation by the Russians. Cultural expression which stresses pride in the history, religion, and literature of minority nationalities runs the risk of being officially labeled "bourgeois nationalism" and repressed as anti-Soviet or subversive.

Although participation in educational exchange programs held steady at about 60 exchangees per side, administrative difficulties at the Ministry of Higher Education continued to hobble our exchange program. Eleventh-hour or inappropriate placement, lack of dependent housing, and delays in visa issuance sometimes resulted in withdrawal of U.S. candidates. And difficulties in obtaining research access or professional travel for consultations often diminished the quality of in-country programs.

Soviet sponsors continued to have difficulty in getting Soviet clearances for their own grantees to travel, with the result that many Soviet scholars arrived late at their U.S. institutions, and some withdrew at the last minute.

Approximately 250 Russian-language students and teachers of Russian study in the Soviet Union annually on summer, semester, or year-long programs. A much smaller number of Soviet English-language teachers travel to the United States on both U.S.-supported and private exchanges. The American Field Service-Ministry of Higher Education exchange of high-school language teachers was cancelled after the Korean airliner incident. It has not resumed but may be revived under the bilateral exchange agreement currently being negotiated.

Hopes that the Fulbright lecturer program would return to "normal" levels of 15 per year for each side were not fulfilled. To the contrary, problems plaguing the program as it began its 1985–86 cycle suggested that it might be further reduced, possibly to six or seven per side.

Romania. There have been only minor changes in the state of U.S.-Romanian bilateral cultural relations over the past year. A 2-year cultural

agreement was successfully renegotiated in December 1983 and signed later the same month; it is expected to be renewed at the end of 1985 by mutual consent.

Visits, exhibits, film showings, book fairs, magazine exchanges, and performing arts exchanges all come under the cultural exchange agreement or the agreement which originally established the American and Romanian libraries in the two countries. Film showings, for example, are a regular feature of the program of the American library in Bucharest, and various exhibitions have been held at the library in the past 6 months. Access to these showings and the library is generally unimpeded, though frequent visitors may be questioned and discouraged by the authorities. Continuous closed-circuit television displays outside the Embassy have drawn large crowds and no objection from the authorities.

Following a highly successful run in Bucharest during the last reporting period, another major exhibit on American theater was mounted in the late spring of 1985 in the two major provincial cities, Cluj and Timisoara. It was well attended and a major success at both locations.

Other Western countries report a gloomier picture during this reporting period. Most report shrinkage of cultural exchange programs, with even some long-standing activities eliminated. Financial restrictions typically are cited by Romanian authorities as the reason. Romanian priorities reportedly exclude academic exchange in nontechnical areas.

Romanian compliance with the Helsinki Final Act's provisions on translation, publication, and dissemination of written works from other states remains poor. Although the Romanian-Hungarian cultural exchange agreement provides for the import of a large number of Hungarian-language books here each year, Romanian authorities have interdicted such imports almost completely. The U.S.-Romanian cultural agreement calls for increased exchange of materials for translation and publication. Though the Romanian Council of Culture originally asked us to investigate possibilities for a seminar on this subject, interest in such a project seems to have flagged.

The Government of Romania has shown no inclination to promote dissemination of and access to books, films, and other forms of cultural expression. Foreign exchange shortages and rigid ideological controls have made it unlikely that this situation will change. Attempts to circumvent this policy face bureaucratic obstacles and continue to result in confiscation; in the case of Bibles, the importers face harassment and, occasionally, long jail sentences.

In theory, the sizable Hungarian, German, Jewish, and other minorities enjoy the same rights as ethnic Romanians, and, in fact, the government some years ago instituted special programs for those groups. Recently, however, these groups, especially the Hungarians, have been subjected to increasing discrimination, official if unacknowledged, and a program of "Romanianization" apparently continues. Despite previous government guarantees, opportunities to study general subjects at the university level in Hungarian or German have become almost nonexistent. We understand that German and Hungarian libraries have been removed from their respective ethnic regions and transferred to Bucharest, where they are under the control of the ethnically Romanian central government and less accessible to the concerned nationalities. There is one Hungarian-language and one German-language high school in Bucharest, and in each the proportion of Romanian-language classes has risen dramatically over the last few years. Some of the provincial ethnic language schools, established years ago, have recently been completely converted to Romanian. When Romanian history is treated on TV, the historic contributions of the minority groups are given little or no emphasis. Within the last year, signs denoting ethnic origin of folk art displays have been removed in at least some museums.

Relations with the Romanian Ministry of Education are correct, but the Ministry all too often appears recalcitrant in dealing with the needs and requirements of American scholars. While the American side always sends the maximum number of exchangees allowed under the agreement, Romania continues to allow its quotas for study in the United States to lapse barely touched. The principal reason given is that the teaching load and length of the school year in Romania does not allow sufficient time for most professors to undertake lengthy research projects abroad. American researchers continue to experience unreasonable delays in getting access to research and archival materials. There are no open-access libraries in Romania, except those associated with diplomatic missions. Foreigners other than official grantees are usually not allowed to use library or archival facilities.

Poland. There is no official bilateral exchanges agreement between the United States and Poland. Through nongovernmental organizations, Poland continues to send orchestras, art exhibits, and other such attractions to the United States. Various American artists and musicians continue to visit Poland, and Poles continue to visit the United States under private arrangement. A shortage of hard currency to pay Western performers tends to keep the number of visiting American artists at a low level.

The U.S.-Poland Fulbright Program and private academic exchanges remain active. Americans in Poland under the IREX [International Research and Exchanges Board] exchange program have no problems with access to open archival material. However, the Government of Poland continues to forbid Poles to accept invitations to participate in the U.S. Government-sponsored International Visitor Program.

Polish publishers continue to publish translations of American and other Western authors, although much of what is currently appearing in print results from contracts signed as long as 5 years ago. In the future, fewer American titles may appear unless some means can be found to assist in the hard-currency purchase of publication rights. Recent press articles have mentioned the need to concentrate more on the publication of works from "fraternal Socialist countries" and, consequently, to spend less time and effort on translating and disseminating works originating in cultures perceived (at least officially) as unfriendly. Customs duties do not play a role in the shortage of Western books, magazines, films, and other sources of information. Censorship and lack of hard currency do.

In the cultural field, government policy toward Poland's minorities can be described as benign neglect. Although there has been a great deal of public attention to the importance of Poland's Jewish cultural heritage, official attempts to preserve it have been largely of an archival, museum nature. There have also been projects organized on a local level to restore and maintain some Jewish cemeteries, although many suffer continued neglect. Other national minorities (i.e., Ukrainians, Belorussians, Tatars, etc.) maintain their cultural identity mainly by virtue of their own efforts.

Hungary. The current 2-year bilateral exchanges agreement between the United States and Hungary will be renegotiated in January 1986. These 2-year programs have expanded steadily since the signing of a general agreement on exchanges between the two countries in 1977. The first privately funded chair in American studies, in memory of Otto

Salgo, at Budapest's Eotvos Lorand University, is in its third year. During this period, the Salgo Professor organized the first American Studies conference in Hungary, on the topic of "Popular Culture."

One indication of the state of U.S.-Hungarian educational relations is the increased interest in academic exchanges. The U.S.-Hungary Fulbright Program is set officially at two lecturers and researchers in each direction each year. Informal expansion continues, however, as scholars in both countries are invited by their colleagues, and the Fulbright Program provides full or partial funding. The Hungarian Ministry of Culture has cooperated fully in this expansion. The universities in Pecs and Szeged continue to ask for American lecturers, and placement of an English-language teaching specialist is being considered for one or both of these institutions in the future. Several American universities have sent representatives to Hungary in an attempt to develop private exchange programs. In addition, the Hungarian Ministry of Culture has expressed interest in starting a Fulbright graduate student exchange program with the United States. It would involve the exchange of six students in each direction yearly.

Hungarian minority policy is liberal in theory and practice. Members of the Romanian, German, Serb, and Slovak ethnic minorities make up a very small percentage of the population. They have full legal equality and substantial opportunities to obtain at least some education in their native language as well as foster their native culture.

A much larger number of Gypsies (estimates range up to 5% of the population) live in Hungary. Although they are not recognized as an official minority, they do have a national council that reports to the Council of Ministers. As individuals, they have equality before the law. In practice, the Hungarian Government engages in many programs specifically designed to raise the standard of living of Gypsies and help them adjust to the mainstream of Hungarian life. However, Gypsies are, on average, considerably less well-educated and poorer than the native Magyar population or the recognized ethnic minorities. In recent years, candid discussion has been increasing in the press and specialized literature about the social and economic difficulties experienced by Gypsies, including the fact that considerable popular prejudice exists against them.

German Democratic Republic. The United States is required to arrange all cultural programs through the G.D.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a procedure that unduly delays and confuses arrangements. The G.D.R. continues to assert that cultural relations should be arranged under a bilateral cultural agreement and that ad hoc arrangements outside of such an agreement are much less acceptable and more difficult to arrange. Certain programs proposed during the review period could easily have been arranged by the G.D.R. but were obviously refused for political reasons.

The United States has had only limited success in setting up exchange visits, festivals, exhibits, and film showings. U.S. cultural figures have not been able to address general G.D.R. audiences or to lecture at G.D.R. universities except under university-to-university agreements in which the U.S. Government's role is indirect. The United States has regularly assisted with the scheduling of lectures for G.D.R. writers, filmmakers, and musicians in the United States, including, on occasion, the financing of such visits. The foreign and cultural ministries have proven unwilling or unable to set up equivalent programs in the G.D.R.

We requested, over a year ago, permission to show a major film exhibit in late 1986. The exhibit has been tentatively accepted by the G.D.R., but final arrangements have not yet been made. There is occasional American participation on a commercial basis in G.D.R. cultural festivals. There are no existing performing arts exchanges, although some travel of performing artists is arranged through the U.S.-G.D.R. Friendship Society. There are also several private arrangements for exchanging publications.

The G.D.R. views culture as a government tool and carefully controls access by its citizens to Western cultural events and figures. Security and other state organs carefully consider every cultural program in the light of political and ideological considerations. Except for cultural programs transmitted from abroad via television or radio, which by their nature can not be controlled at the borders, all cultural offerings must be approved by state authorities before being made available to local audiences. The G.D.R. forbids the circulation of all unapproved books, films, publications, and other forms of cultural expression. It makes available those elements of foreign culture which it considers favorable to its world view by providing subsidies and arranging publication and distribution of these materials. All other cultural products are not only discouraged but actively proscribed. Only individuals with G.D.R. permission can attend invitational film showings at the U.S. Embassy in Berlin.

The Sorbs, numbering about 45,000, constitute the only remaining substantial ethnic minority in the G.D.R. There is no apparent cultural or governmental discrimination against this group. Schools in areas with a Sorb population have specially designed curricula that emphasize aspects of the Sorb culture, and instruction is offered in Sorbian. Sorbs are well integrated into the general population.

Bilateral relations in the field of education have remained relatively constant over the reporting period. Although there are no governmental programs, academic exchange programs in the G.D.R. are organized under the IREX program, as direct university-to-university programs, or under the limited National Academy of Sciences exchange agreement. The several American institutions involved have indicated interest in expanding the scope of these programs but have been critical of G.D.R. efforts to keep American participants separate from their G.D.R. colleagues and distant from G.D.R. students. Exchanges are underway between Johns Hopkins and Humboldt, between Minnesota and Humboldt, between Kent State and Leipzig, between Brown and Rostock, and between Colby College and Schiller University. The U.S.-G.D.R. Friendship Society also has a limited number of scholarships for U.S. students.

IREX provides 60 man-months of exchanges in each direction. In general, the G.D.R. has provided access to library and archival material requested, except in the case of archives under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, which has major historical holdings. Scholars not under IREX or a university-to-university program can seldom arrange access to G.D.R. materials. G.D.R. education and other authorities have not provided access to individuals for these scholars, nor have they permitted access to statistical data or given permission for interviews, except in a very few instances. In general, however, after an academic or research program has received the necessary clearances, the G.D.R. authorities are scrupulous in assisting the scholar in carrying it through.

Czechoslovakia. Overall bilateral relations in the field of culture have remained static during the reporting period. Czechoslovak authorities have displayed some marginal interest in U.S. efforts to expand programs in the cultural area by approving an American art exhibit at a Prague museum for June-

July 1985. A major Czechoslovak exhibit, "The Precious Legacy: Judaic Treasures From the Czechoslovak State Collections," was shown in Hartford, Connecticut, through July 1985. American performers, including Hal Holbrook, have performed in Czechoslovakia during the reporting period with no difficulties.

Czechoslovak authorities have shown no interest in visits by Czechoslovak specialists to the United States, although two experts in environmental studies and two specialists in energy, among a few others, were allowed to participate in USIA-sponsored projects. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been somewhat less reluctant during the review period to approve visits by American specialists in American literature and other fields under U.S. sponsorship.

While the Czechoslovak Government makes little effort to encourage the publication and dissemination of written works from the United States, American literature in translation can be found in most major bookstores. Books chosen to be translated often seem to be selected with an eye to their negative picture of life in America rather than their literary merit. American fiction is translated regularly for the literary magazine *World Literature*. Customs duties have not been lowered to encourage the dissemination of and access to books, films, and other forms of cultural expression from the West.

Cooperation and exchanges in the field of education have not changed since the last reporting period. The Fulbright Program between the United States and Czechoslovakia remains a modest one, with two Americans at Czechoslovak institutions and three Czechoslovaks in the United States. Exchanges under IREX have not increased significantly. No expansion is planned for the English-teaching seminars held in Czechoslovakia during the summer, in which five American lecturers participated with U.S. Government support. During the reporting period, there have been no complaints from U.S. exchangees regarding access to archives and libraries.

Bulgaria. Cultural and educational exchanges between the United States and Bulgaria are facilitated by a 2-year bilateral exchanges agreement, which was signed in December 1984. Problems over the interpretation of the agreement continue, however, as Bulgarian officials attempt to read strict interpretations into the agreement in order to prevent direct contact between our Embassy and Bulgarian cultural and media institutions. Contrary to the agreement, the Bulgarian Government has refused to permit a USIA multimedia exhibit on "Filmmaking in America" for the time period the Embassy proposed.

The Bulgarian Government still discourages its citizens from visiting the Press and Culture Section of our Embassy in Sofia, but there were more Bulgarian visitors during the current period than before. Popular demand for the USIA Bulgarian-language publication *Spektur* is growing. Our Embassy's distribution of *Spektur* has risen from 6,000 copies per quarter to 8,000.

Bulgarian authorities continue to set bureaucratic blocks in the way of USIA-sponsored American Participant (AMPART) visitors. The U.S. has only been able to program one AMPART visitor during 1985, as opposed to three to four in previous years. The Government of Bulgaria has shown increased interest in student exchanges. The 1984 agreement, for the first time, calls for an exchange of graduate students, and Bulgarian officials have expressed interest in sending Bulgarian graduate students to U.S. universities. Although educational exchanges are part of our bilateral exchanges agreement, private exchanges take place without official U.S. Government involvement. While the Bulgarians appear to have accepted the Fulbright Program, most private exchanges involve only short-duration visits by scholars rather than long-term arrangements.

Culture

Books and Publishing. U.S. presence at the August 1985 Moscow International Book Fair was greater than at the previous fair 2 years earlier. This was primarily due to participation of the large U.S. book wholesaling firm Baker and Taylor and, for the first time since 1979, the Association of American Publishers. There was also a continuing presence by a few U.S. trade publishers and by several scientific and religious publishers, such as the Association of Jewish Book Publishers. As at previous fairs, there were controversies, involving visa denials to some U.S. publishers and observers, Soviet confiscation of books and catalogs, and obtrusive Soviet control procedures. Nonetheless, thousands of Soviets had the opportunity to view and read a broad sample of American books.

The United States and the U.S.S.R. continue to distribute in each other's country their official monthly publications, *America Illustrated* and *Soviet Life*. Out of 60,000 copies of *America Illustrated* delivered for newsstand sales, Soviet authorities continue to return several thousand copies, ostensibly as unsold. In Poland, prohibition of newsstand sales and distribution of the U.S. Government Polish-language publication *Ameryka* continued during the reporting period. The U.S. Embassy in Sofia distributes 8,000 copies of the quarterly Bulgarian-language magazine *Spektur*.

Performing Arts. In June, singer/songwriter John Denver returned to the Soviet Union for a series of concerts in Moscow, Leningrad, and Tallinn which were attended by a total of over 10,000 people. Denver's tour was organized under the auspices of the Esalen Institute and the Soviet Ministry of Culture's concert organization, *Goskontsert*. This represented the first time since the lapse of the previous cultural exchanges agreement at the end of 1979 that an American performer had appeared before large Soviet audiences on a full-scale concert tour, albeit under private auspices.

In July 1985, the Louisiana Repertory Jazz Ensemble gave performances in Moscow, Leningrad, Warsaw, Gniezno (Poland), and Prague. In Poland, the group gave concerts at Warsaw's Aquarium Jazz Club and at the Gniezno Festival of Traditional Jazz.

Singer Bob Dylan appeared briefly at an international poetry festival on the eve of the Moscow International Youth Festival.

Choreographers Ivana Kubicova and Marcela Benoniova (Czechoslovakia) and Jerzy Lescynski (Poland) participated in the "1985 International Choreographers' Workshop" sponsored by the American Dance Festival in June–July 1985 in Durham, North Carolina.

American actor Hal Holbrook presented "Mark Twain Tonight" in Prague in May 1985. The performances were arranged by the Czechoslovak concert agency, *Pragokoncert*, and USIA.

The San Francisco Boys Choir, sponsored by Friendship Ambassadors, toured Poland in July 1985, performing primarily in churches in Warsaw, Poznan, and Krakow. During the same month, the Chopin Singing Society of Buffalo, New York, participated in the Festival of Polonia Choirs in Koszalin, Poland.

Film. Fourteen U.S. films were entered in the Fourth World Animated Film Festival which took place in Varna, Bulgaria, last summer.

Exhibits. A USIA exhibit, "American Theater Today," which had a highly successful showing in Bucharest during the previous reporting period, was

mounted in the late spring of 1985 in two Romanian provincial cities, Cluj and Timisoara.

A major Czechoslovak exhibit, "The Precious Legacy: Judaic Treasures from the Czechoslovak State Collections," closed in Hartford, Connecticut, in July 1985 after a 2-year, six-city tour in the United States. The exhibit was organized by the Smithsonian Institution Traveling Exhibition Service in cooperation with the Czechoslovak Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Culture, the National Committee of the City of Prague, and the State Jewish Museum in Prague.

An exhibit on the U.S. liberation of western and southern Bohemia in 1945, on display at the American Embassy Library in Prague during May 1985, was viewed by nearly 10,000 Czechoslovaks.

An exhibit of American Indian art opened in June 1985 in Prague at the Haprstek Museum of Asian, African, and American Cultures. The exhibit was cosponsored by the U.S. Embassy and the Czechoslovak Ministry of Culture. It was the first such cosponsored art exhibit in Czechoslovakia since 1974.

An American exhibit, "The PC [Personal Computer] Revolution in America," was shown at the 27th International Engineering Fair in Brno, Czechoslovakia, September 11-18, 1985. A smaller version of this exhibit was mounted in the U.S. Embassy Library in Prague following the Brno fair.

Education

Fulbright Program. The following table shows the number of lecturers and researchers exchanged during the reporting period under the Fulbright program.

	From U.S.	To U.S.
Soviet Union	2	0
Romania	15	6
Poland	25	21
Hungary	7	9
G.D.R.	0	0
Czechoslovakia	3	2
Bulgaria	3	5

International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) Program. Figures for the IREX program in the Soviet Union and other East European countries follow:

	From U.S.	To U.S.
Soviet Union*	62	39
Romania	3	6
Poland	7	11
Hungary	8	8
G.D.R.	9	14
Czechoslovakia	3	9
Bulgaria	18	3

*These figures do not reflect the actual balance in the Soviet-U.S. IREX program, because most Soviet participants arrived in the United States after the end of the reporting period.

Language. Programs for Russian language study between American colleges and universities and Soviet academic institutions such as Moscow's Pushkin Institute and Leningrad State University remain active. American students travel to Leningrad State University for language study under the auspices of the Council on International Educational Exchange. The American Council of Teachers of Russian (ACTR), Ohio State University, and Middlebury College provide opportunities for American college students to undertake advanced language study in Moscow at the Pushkin Institute. In addition, a number of private U.S. commercial organizations have language study programs in Leningrad for American college students. Approximately 220 Russian-language students from the United States will take part in these programs during the coming year.

The American Council of Teachers of Russian and the Soviet Pushkin Institute completed work on the second volume of a Russian language textbook, a cooperative effort begun several years ago.

In Poland, U.S. students were able to participate in Polish language and culture courses under the auspices of the institution-to-institution agreements existing between U.S. and Polish universities, such as the SUNY (Stony Brook)-University of Warsaw and the University of Connecticut-Jagiellonian University programs. About 40 Americans participated in the 1985 summer course in Polish culture and history for foreigners at the Catholic University of Lublin. There is also a summer program of Polish language study conducted under the auspices of the Kosciuszko Foundation and held at the Jagiellonian University. ■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • March 1986
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☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1986-491-783:20086