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Implementation of Helsinki Final Act

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Eighteenth Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, October 1, 1984–April 1, 1985.

Chapter One

General Assessment of the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document

OVERVIEW

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) represents a framework for the 35 participating states to work to resolve the humanitarian, economic, political, and military issues that divide Europe. The Final Act underscores that each area is of equal importance to genuine security and cooperation in Europe. The Western objective has been to preserve and strengthen this process by a thorough review of implementation of the Final Act and agreement on balanced and constructive steps forward.

The Final Act recognizes that followup meetings are essential for maintaining the Helsinki framework as a vigorous means of addressing problems in Europe. The Madrid followup meeting, the second such CSCE review conference, began on November 11, 1980, and came to a close on September 9, 1983. The Madrid concluding document confirmed and expanded upon the original Helskini Final Act of 1975. It includes significant new provisions in the area of human rights, trade union freedoms, human contacts, free flow of information, access to diplomatic and consular missions, and measures against terrorism.

It also mandated seven follow-on "experts" meetings leading up to the next review conference to be held in Vienna beginning in November 1986. The United States is participating actively and fully in these meetings, both as a means of assessing existing problems in implementation and seeking balanced progress in the CSCE.

This is the 18th semiannual report submitted by the President to the CSCE Commission under the provisions of Public Law 94-304 of June 3, 1976. It surveys significant developments in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid concluding document during the period October 1, 1984 through April 1, 1985. This is the third semiannual report to assess compliance with the provisions agreed upon at the Madrid followup meeting. The purpose of the report is to assist the CSCE Commission in its task of monitoring and encouraging compliance with the Helsinki Accords. These reports are themselves an important element of the U.S. Government's effort to assess the progress and shortcomings in achieving the CSCE goals to strengthen security, expand cooperation, build mutual confidence, and promote human rights.

Review of Implementation

For most of the CSCE participating states, the status of implementation over the current reporting period did not change significantly from earlier periods. The overall record of compliance by the Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe with their CSCE commitments remained seriously flawed, although limited encouragement could be taken from some specific developments. The Bulgarian Government, for example, promised to resolve 16 of the 18 divided family cases currently represented by the United States. For the first time, the Czechoslovak Government permitted Western diplomatic representatives to attend a trial of a case involving human rights. In the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), there appeared to be continued modest improvement in the handling of emigration for humanitarian reasons, in particular for certain family reunification and binational marriage cases. Despite deterioration in the human rights situation during the reporting period, Poland continued to offer its citizens a degree of personal freedom unusual in a Warsaw Pact country. Debate is allowed in the media on a wide range of subjects, although not on issues of fundamental importance to the government. In Hungary, the ruling Communist Party understands that the Western perception that the country seeks to improve its implementation record is key if Hungary is to receive economic assistance. These relatively bright spots must be seen, however, in the context of strict governmental control and limitations on political and religious expression.

Negative developments continued. This period marked the most significant and large-scale violations of human rights in Bulgaria's recent history. Bulgarian officials conducted an aggressive campaign to assimilate ethnic Turks by forcibly changing their Turkish names to Bulgarian ones. Many who resisted were reportedly killed and wounded by security forces, and there were also reports of rape, physical abuse, and torture. Throughout the period, the G.D.R. has continued a policy of dissuading its citizens from contacts with foreign embassies or association to discuss emigration and other "sensitive" issues. Czechoslovakia has experienced a series of arrests and trials resulting from government attempts to restrict religious practice and expression. In Poland, the government's campaign to convince outsiders that the situation had returned to normal was abruptly interrupted when officers of the secret police abducted and murdered pro-Solidarity Father Jerzy Popieluszko. There was also a marked increase in the number of political prisoners, including many former Solidarity activists who were rearrested. The Hungarian Government imposed "police surveillance" against one prominent dissident and extended police harassment of sellers and distributors of *samizdat.* The Romanian Government continues to maintain almost total control over its populace, using intimidation and, occasionally, physical violence with little regard for constitutional guarantees of civil rights.

Soviet implementation of the Helsinki and Madrid agreements has remained clearly unsatisfactory during the 6-month review period. In the international arena, continued prosecution of war against the Afghan people was in flagrant violation of the basic principles guiding relations between states. The Soviet Union also has undermined these key principles by continuing to support the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and Vietnam's war against the Kampuchean resistance.

Persecution by the Soviet authorities of Soviet citizens who attempted to express themselves outside the framework of state-controlled institutions continued at an alarming rate during the 6 months under review. Religious believers, proponents of greater cultural and political rights for ethnic minorities, human rights monitors, and peace activists were alike subjected to harassment and often to arrest and imprisonment. In the Soviet Far East, a community of Pentecostals which was denied the freedom of religion and emigration challenged the authorities. Across the Soviet Union a harsh campaign was instituted against Hebrew teachers and Jewish cultural activists, resulting in more than a dozen arrests. Repression

in the Ukraine was particularly severe, with Ukrainian dissidents and Eastern Rite Catholics subjected to mounting harassment and persecution. In the Baltic states, arrests of religious believers and dissidents continued. A nationwide campaign against all religious denominations struck Hare Krishna disciples, Seventh-day Adventists, Russian Orthodox activists and Baptists alike.

Andrey Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner remained under virtual house arrest at their place of exile in the closed city of Gorkiy. They were denied contact with friends and relatives. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, who was finally transferred from prison to labor camp, had to be hospitalized for 2 months before he was able to face the rigors of work in the camp. Yuriy Orlov remained exiled and isolated in the desolate regions of the province of Yakutia, while several human rights activists confined in labor camps were rearrested shortly before their scheduled release. Others faced a continual deterioration in their conditions of confinement: no family visits, no letters, punishment cells, and beatings. Independent peace activists faced arrests, detentions, and, in some cases, forced emigration from the Soviet Union. Finally, the continued Soviet abuse of psychiatry for political purposes resulted in several premature deaths, as did conditions in labor camps.

Despite commitments under the Helsinki Final Act to facilitate family reunification, the rate of emigration from the Soviet Union continued to decline below the disappointing figures of mid-1984. Some 327 Jews left the Soviet Union from October 1, 1984–February 28, 1985; 273 ethnic Germans left in the same period, and 32 Armenians from October 1, 1984–March 31, 1985. The extremely low level of Jewish emigration was accompanied by a continuation of official anti-Semitic propaganda.

The Soviet authorities continued to exercise tight control on travel outside the country, with only 542 Soviet citizens allowed to make private visits to the United States during the past 6 months. Only 106 Soviet citizens (including spouses) received exit permission to join relatives in the United States.

The Soviet authorities have maintained their traditional strict control of information media, denying Soviet citizens access to all filmed, printed, and broadcast information which might call into question the tenents of Marxism-Leninism or the official line of the Communist Party. Jamming of Voice of America and Radio Liberty native language broadcasts continues.

The Stockholm CDE Continues

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), mandated by the Madrid CSCE review meeting, opened in Stockholm on January 17, 1984. The mandate calls for it to negotiate measures which are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to all of the CSCE area including the European portion of the Soviet Union. Ambassador James E. Goodby heads the U.S. delegation.

The NATO Approach. During the period under review, the NATO countries have continued to focus discussion on the package of concrete measures they introduced in January 1984. It is designed to increase mutual understanding and reduce the risk of surprise attack. It fulfills the requirements of the mandate and builds upon the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) adopted as part of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. It provides for:

- Mutual exchanges of information about the organization and location of the significant military units of all participating states;
- Exchanges of annual forecasts of planned military activities;
- Mandatory notification 45 days in advance of out-of-garrison military activities involving 6,000 or more personnel (in the Final Act, only major military maneuvers involving 25,000 or more troops must be notified, no more than 21 days in advance);
- Mandatory invitation of observers of all participating states to all notifiable activities (in the Final Act, invitation of observers is voluntary);
- Specific arrangements to monitor and verify compliance with these CSBMs; and
- Improvement of the facilities for communication among the 35 participating states.

The Eastern Response. The East continued to focus on its set of declaratory measures, some of which fall outside the mandate for the CDE. It features:

- A non-use of force treaty;
- A no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge;
- A ban on chemical weapons use in Europe;
- Regional nuclear-weapons-free zones in Europe, including the Balkans and the Baltic;
- Reductions in military spending; and
- Unspecified improvements in the confidence-building measures agreed upon in the Helsinki Final Act.

Presidential Statement. Just before the beginning of the fifth round in January, the President met with Ambassador Goodby and afterwards stated:

> The Stockholm Conference has a unique role to play in East-West relations. Its resumption comes shortly after the agreement reached in Geneva between Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko calling for renewed U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Complementing those arms control efforts which seek to reduce force levels, the Stockholm Conference addresses the proximate causes of war—miscalculation and misinterpretation—and seeks to ensure that those forces are never used.
>
> One year ago, I said that, in dealing with the Soviet Union: "We are prepared to discuss the problems which divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise." We have brought this spirit of practicality, fairness and compromise to the Stockholm Conference. It was in this spirit that I addressed the Irish Parliament last June and offered to meet the Soviets' concerns in Stockholm halfway. We agreed to discuss their declared interest in the principle of renunciation of force if this would lead them to negotiate seriously on concrete measures to give effect to that principle.

Rounds Four and Five. The fourth round began November 6 and ended December 14, 1984. Delegates this round completed protracted discussions on the procedural arrangements for negotiations and agreed to establish two working groups to discuss the proposals before the conference in detail. The working groups began meeting during the last 2 weeks of this round. The U.S. delegation expressed pleasure with the new procedural arrangements, noting that they seemed to produce more detailed discussions of the issues raised by proposals.

Round Five began January 29 and ended March 22, 1985. During the first 4 weeks of this round, NATO began to introduce detailed amplifications of its six measures. Eastern delegates continued to charge NATO with being primarily interested in "spying" on the East through the information provisions of the alliance package. Soviet and other Eastern delegations repeated their calls for a non-use of force/no-first-use of nuclear weapons treaty. Neither NATO nor neutral/nonaligned delegations have shown significant interest in these shopworn proposals.

Prospects for the Future. The West continues to believe that serious negotiations in Stockholm should lead to implementation of confidence- and

security-building measures which will make a significant contribution to European security. The sixth round was scheduled to take place between May 14 and July 6, 1985.

Seminar on Economic, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation in the Mediterranean

The seminar met in Venice October 16–26, 1984, mandated by the Madrid review meeting "to review initiatives undertaken or envisaged" by the 1979 Valletta meeting and to "stimulate, where necessary, broader developments in these sectors." The U.S. delegation was headed by Ambassador Raymond Ewing.

Representatives of all eight non-CSCE Mediterranean littoral states as well as representatives of five international organizations were invited to join the 35 CSCE states in the Venice discussions. While all five international organizations sent representatives, of the states invited, only Egypt and Israel attended. Only the 35 CSCE states participated in drafting the report of the meeting.

The report notes a wide range of areas in which economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean might be enhanced. Malta sought to add language which would have 1) cited the "current world recession" and called for extensive assistance to developing countries; 2) called on two UN regional commissions which exclude Israel to pursue cooperation; and 3) "noted" the September Valletta nonaligned meeting and called for more such ad hoc meetings. In the face of strong Western opposition, none of this language was included in the report.

While the report mentions a number of areas for potential cooperation, no commitments to undertake such cooperation were made. The report does not call upon the 1986 Vienna review meeting to recognize or comment upon Venice, nor does it suggest the possibility of additional Mediterranean meetings within the CSCE process.

Cultural Forum Preparatory Conference

The Cultural Forum Preparatory Conference met November 21–December 5, 1984, in Budapest. The U.S. delegation was headed by Ambassador John Scanlan. It adopted an agreed agenda, organizational framework, and work program for the Cultural Forum, which will meet in Budapest for 6 weeks beginning October 15, 1985. The Forum is mandated by the Madrid concluding document to "discuss interrelated problems concerning creation, dissemination and co-operation, including the promotion and expansion of contacts and exchanges in the different fields of culture."

The agenda agreed to in Budapest by the 35 CSCE participating states ensures that the Cultural Forum will deal seriously with cultural values and problems which stand in the way of achieving the free flow of cultural expression envisioned by the Helsinki Final Act. There will be seven 1-week working groups and one 2-week working group covering different fields of culture. This will help facilitate participation in the forum by leading cultural figures. Issues important to the West, including repression of cultural minorities, Soviet policies against the Baltic and Hebrew languages, and Eastern barriers to the free flow of information will be discussed thoroughly in Budapest.

Chapter Two

Implementation of Basket I: Questions Relating to Security in Europe

The first section or "basket" of the Final Act has two main parts. The first part is a declaration of 10 principles guiding relations among states. It sets forth generally accepted precepts of international behavior which the CSCE participating states agree to observe in their relations with one another as well as with other states. The second part of Basket I is devoted to security issues. Here the participating states endorse certain confidence-building measures that are designed to remove some of the secrecy surrounding military activities; they also make certain more general pledges with respect to the importance of arms control and disarmament.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS AMONG STATES

There are 10 principles in the declaration of principles guiding relations among states in the Final Act:

Principle One. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;

Principle Two. Refraining from the threat or use of force;

Principle Three. Inviolability of frontiers;

Principle Four. Territorial integrity of states;

Principle Five. Peaceful settlement of disputes;

Principle Six. Nonintervention in internal affairs;

Principle Seven. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief;

Principle Eight. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

Principle Nine. Cooperation among states; and

Principle Ten. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

The Madrid concluding document contains complementary principles which strengthen and extend the Final Act. These include pledges to take effective measures against terrorism; prevent territories from being used for terrorist activities; assure constant, tangible progress in the exercise of human rights; ensure the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and freedoms; ensure individual freedom to practice and profess religion; consult with religious organizations; favorably consider applications for registration by religious communities; ensure respect for the rights of national minorities; and ensure the right of workers freely to establish and join trade unions and the right of trade unions freely to pursue their activities and other rights.

Implementation of Principle Seven

Although the Eastern countries gave considerable publicity to their signing of the Final Act and, more recently, the

Madrid document, the Eastern record of compliance with the Helsinki principles has deteriorated in important respects, especially in the Soviet Union. The United States remains dissatisfied with the implementation record of the Eastern countries so far, particularly with regard to Principle Seven. This principle calls on the participating states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief.

The following section provides a detailed survey of implementation of the Helsinki principles and related provisions of the Madrid document. It treats specific cases in an illustrative rather than comprehensive fashion. Lack of information detailing abuses in a given country may not indicate their absence.

Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has continued to violate both the letter and spirit of principles guiding relations between states as set forth in the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet Union persists in its occupation of Afghanistan and in its efforts to eradicate national opposition. In conducting its ruthless war against Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has used chemical weapons, bombed civilian targets, used ground and air forces to destroy villages and crops, and employed weapons intended to cripple or maim noncombatants. The Soviet Union also supports the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and Vietnam's war against the Kampuchean resistance. These actions are in direct and willful violation of the general principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act, including respect for the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, and self-determination of peoples.

Soviet performance in the field of human rights (Principle Seven) showed no improvement since the last 6-month review period despite the fact that preparations were underway in CSCE signatory states for the 1985 Ottawa Human Rights Experts' Meeting. Mandated by the 1983 Madrid concluding document, this meeting addresses questions concerning respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms "in all their aspects" as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act. On the eve of this meeting, the unsatisfactory record of Soviet compliance with the Madrid commitment to respect "the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms" was fully evident. Not only was there no let-up in the persecution of dissidents, refuseniks, and religious activists, but suppression of national minorities and harassment of political prisoners and their families continued unabated.

One of the most dramatic confrontations over basic rights occurred in the Soviet Far East. An entire ethnic-German Pentecostal community (more than 20 families) in the village of Chuguevka banded together in two month-long hunger strikes protesting their inability to worship freely and to gain Soviet exit permission to join relatives in the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.).

After years of harassment, community members decided to forbid their children to attend local schools, where they were habitually taunted and beaten; they also renounced Soviet citizenship, an act which brought about persistent conflict with local authorities. On December 10, International Human Rights Day, authorities arrested the community's pastor, Viktor Valter for anti-Soviet activities. Three other community members were arrested 2 weeks later while demonstrating for Valter's release. On February 26 another three members (Nikolay Vins, Anatoliy Khokha, and Gennadiy Maidanuk) were sentenced to 1 year in labor camp for living without internal passports (having sent them in when they renounced their citizenship). Pastor Valter remained incarcerated as the community completed its second month-long hunger strike (including more than 20 children) in February. All members of the community have lost their jobs but have vowed to continue their struggle to depart the Soviet Union in search of religious freedom even if all die in the struggle.

Another major development during the current review period has been the concerted crackdown on Jewish (primarily refusenik) cultural activists and teachers of Hebrew. Moscow observers cannot remember a recent period in which there have been so many unfounded poilitical arrests of Jewish activists. Moscow Hebrew teacher Aleksandr Kholmianskiy was sentenced in Estonia on February 1 to labor camp on the contrived charge of possession of pistol cartridges. Another Moscow Hebrew teacher, Yuliy Edelstein, was sentenced on December 19 to 3 years in a labor camp for alleged possession of drugs. Moscow Hebrew teacher Dan Shapiro was arrested on January 22 and faces charges of anti-Soviet slander. The campaign was not limited to Moscow, however, and took on especial vehemence in the Ukraine. Kiev Hebrew teacher Iosif Berenshtein was sentenced on December 10 (Human Rights Day) to 4 years in a labor camp for allegedly resisting militia. After his trial, Berenshtein was savagely beaten and stabbed while in detention, which resulted in his losing 99.4% of his vision in both eyes. On February 19 Moscow religious Jew Natan Vershobskiy was arrested in Kiev on the false charge of stealing books from the synagogue. In Odessa, Hebrew teacher Mark Nepomnyashchiy was sentenced to 3 years in a labor camp for anti-Soviet slander after he made appeals for the release of his would-be son-in-law, Yakov Levin. Levin, himself a cultural activist, was sentenced on November 19 to 3 years in a labor camp for anti-Soviet slander. Another Odessa cultural activist, Yakov Mesh, was arrested in October, only to be released in December when he nearly died from liver deficiency caused by lack of proper medical attention. In the western Ukraine, in the town of Chernovtsiy, the crackdown continued. Cultural activists Leonid Scherier and Yakov Rosenberg were sentenced to 3 years and 2½ years respectively in labor camp for anti-Soviet slander. Jewish dissident Iosif Zisels, who was arrested on October 19 in the same town, is still awaiting trial on the same charge.

In the Baltics, Jewish cultural activist Vladimir Frankel was arrested on January 15 on charges of slandering the Soviet system after helping with a *samizdat* journal on Jewish affairs. Other cultural activists, such as Boris Shtimelman and Bronislav Tutelman, were detained by Ukrainian authorities for several days without charge. Donetsk Hebrew teacher Aleksandr Stupnikov was forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital for 3 weeks for no apparent reason.

In response to this accelerating campaign against Hebrew teachers and Jewish cultural activists, the Department of State issued a report on January 29 calling on the Soviet Union to end its harassment of these individuals and live up to its commitments as defined in the Helsinki Final Act. However, on March 19, Ukrainian authorities arrested another Jew (and student of Hebrew), Evgeniy Eisenberg, in Kharkov on charges of anti-Soviet slander.

Soviet persecution of Jews was not limited to Hebrew teachers and cultural activists. Nadezhda Fradkova, a Leningrad refusenik seeking nothing more than emigration, was sentenced on December 19 to 2 years in a labor camp for failing to find a job. Prior to her trial she had been held in Leningrad psychiatric hospitals for 5 months. Another Leningrad refusenik, Mikhail Tsivin, was jailed twice during the review period for 15-day periods on the grounds that he had disobeyed authorities.

Even Jewish activists already in labor camp were not immune to further maltreatment. Iosif Begun completed a term of 6 months' punishment in labor camp prison, after which he required hospitalization due to his broken health. In February he was denounced as a Zionist criminal on national television in a "documentary" film about plotters against the U.S.S.R. Another Jewish prisoner, Zakhar Zunshayn, was placed in the punishment cell at his labor camp on two occasions, after which he was sentenced to a 6-month period in the labor camp prison, apparently for not weaving his quota of mesh baskets.

Numerous other groups have similarly been subjected to systematic efforts on the part of the Soviet authorities to stifle if not eradicate expression of independent views and beliefs. These include religious believers of all denominations, independent peace activists, proponents of greater regional autonomy, and those who simply want to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

In the Ukraine, a campaign was also launched against defenders of the independent Ukrainian (Uniate or Eastern Rite) Catholic Church. Vasiliy Kobrin, chairman of an unofficial "Initiative Group of the Committee for the Defense of Believers of the Catholic Church," was arrested on November 12 and sentenced to 3 years in labor camp on March 22 on charges of anti-Soviet slander. He was still languishing incommunicado in prison at the close of the review period. Another group member, Iosif Terelya, was also arrested on February 8 on charges of anti-Soviet activity. Both of these men circulated *samizdat* appeals in defense of an independent Ukrainian Catholic Church and a sovereign Ukraine. They brought to the attention of westerners the fact that hundreds of Ukrainian Catholics had renounced their citizenship in protest of religious persecution and Soviet subjugation of the Ukraine. Another group supporter, 80-year-old Uniate priest Grigory Budzynskiy, was kidnaped by local authorities in late October and forcibly held incommunicado in a local hospital for more than 6 weeks.

Furthermore, Ukrainian activists have suffered particularly severe treatment while in Soviet detention. Ukrainian dissident poet Valeriy Marchenko, who was sentenced in 1984 to a lengthy term in labor camp, died after being denied proper medical treatment—one of several Ukrainians, including Helsinki monitor Yury Lytvyn, to die in detention in 1984.

Attempts to further "Russify" the Ukraine continued during the review period. Although 75% of the Ukrainian S.S.R. is Ukrainian, only 25% of available books are in Ukrainian. Ukrainian cultural and historical objects have been neglected and Uniate churches burned. Ukrainians account for 20% of the Soviet population but 40% of all Soviet political prisoners.

The Baltic Republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have traditionally been a locus of national and religious opposition to the Soviet regime. Forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union during World War II, the Baltic peoples had never developed firm cultural ties with the Slavs despite having once been part of the Russian empire. The Soviet authorities have over the years undertaken a deliberate effort to "Russianize" the population, moving numerous ethnic Russians into the Baltic States and forcibly evicting many ethnic Balts. Knowledge of the Russian language is becoming ever more necessary for educational and professional success in the Baltic republics.

The Soviet regime is especially sensitive to any form of independent expression in the Baltic States. On January 18, Lithuanian Catholic priest Ionas Matulionis was sentenced to 3 years in a labor camp for allegedly disrupting public order while he was leading prayers in a cemetery on All Saints' Day. A cobeliever at the prayers, Romas Zhemaitis, was also sentenced at the same trial to 2 years in a labor camp for allegedly striking a militiaman. Another Lithuanian religious activist, 79-year-old Vladas Lapienis, was arrested on January 4 and sentenced March 29 to 4 years in labor camp plus 2 years internal exile for anti-Soviet agitation and progaganda after he circulated to some friends copies of a draft of his memoirs. In Latvia, religious dissidents also came under attack. Zofiya Belyarchuk and a colleague named Sanderos were arrested in December after they tried to form a Franciscan church group. Another Latvian, Mikhail Bombin, was threatened with arrest for reportedly engaging in unsanctioned activities in support of peace and detente.

During the review period Soviet authorities persisted with an antireligious campaign that to some degree affected all denominations. Even Hare Krishna disciples, about whom information in the past was scanty, came under the KGB spotlight. In the village of Kurdzhinovo, where many disciples moved during the past 3 years in order to escape persecution, authorities conducted numerous searches and arrests. On October 31, disciples Aleksey Bayda and Yuriy Fedchenko were arrested and subsequently beaten. Disciples Vladimir Kustrya and Sergey Priborov were arrested on November 12 and December 28 respectively. In all four cases authorities continued to hold the individuals incommunicado through the end of the review period, not even specifying the charges on which the Krishna followers were being held. Spouses were told the investigations were secret. Meetings with those arrested were forbidden.

Seventh-day Adventists also felt the heavy hand of oppression. In October the Soviet daily newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* announced the arrest in Central Asia of at least seven Seventh-day Adventists, charging that they led parasitic lifestyles and engaged in a variety of illegal activities. While details remain scanty, it is known that the authorities arrested (and tried) Gennadiy Bedarev, Vladimir Vasilchenko, Aleksey Murkin, and his brother, M. Murkin, on charges of anti-Soviet slander. Two other Adventist activists, R. Chernolikova and Ivan Cheremisov, were sentenced for violation of internal passport regulations. The son of Adventist leader Vladimir Shelkov, who died in 1980 in labor camp, was also sentenced to labor camp and denounced in the *Komsomolskaya Pravda* article.

Members of the Baptist faith did not escape the antireligious crackdown, as numerous arrests and trials took place during the reporting period. While certain details remain unclear, it is known that many Baptists were charged with religious crimes (e.g., conducting "illegal" religious services) and political crimes (often for possessing religious literature), while others were sentenced on trumped-up criminal charges. Moscow Baptist Veniamin Napriyenko was sentenced on October 11 to 2 years in a labor camp. Ivan Timchuk, a Baptist from Donetsk, received 3 years on November 24. Vladimir Baklazhanskiy and Ivan Kara were each sentenced in Moldavia on November 27 to 2½ years in labor camp for violation of the laws of separation of church and state. In Belgorod, Baptist Mikhail Azarov was sentenced in late 1984 to 5 years in a labor camp. Baptists Eduard Ewert, Nikolay Loeven (a minister), and Ivan Tkachenko, whose arrests were reported in the 17th semiannual CSCE implementation report, were all convicted of anti-Soviet slander during the fall and sentenced to several years in labor

camp. Mikhail Khorev, a Baptist due to complete a term of labor camp on January 28, was rearrested and sentenced in January to an additional 2 years. The number of Baptists who have been arrested and are still awaiting trial is also long. It includes David Thiessen, Veniamin Abashin, Aleksey Kurkin, Vladimir Pilipchuk, Vitaliy Bozhko, Vasiliy Slyusar, Vladimir Romanyuk, Mikhail Yurkevich, Vladimir Okhotin, Vladimir Korov, and Viktor Pikalov. All were arrested during the autumn. Boris Artyushenko, a Baptist from Kursk, died on December 12 after 4 months in an investigative prison.

Pentecostal followers suffered not only in the Far Eastern village of Chuguevka, as mentioned earlier. In Rostov-on-the-Don, Pentecostal activist Valentina Golikova was sentenced on January 27 to 3 years in a labor camp for anti-Soviet slander. Her husband, who was arrested in 1982 for anti-Soviet activity, is not due for release until 1989. Pentecostal bishop Ivan Fedotov, who was sentenced to 5 years in labor camp in 1981, was placed in the punishment cell of his labor camp for a period of 3 months starting in December after he was found in possession of a 3-ruble note that was planted on him by another inmate. Pentecostal pastor Afanasi Melnik was arrested on November 14 in Vinnitsa. Another Ukrainian Pentecostal, Vladimir Franchuk, was arrested around the same time in Zhdanov on charges of anti-Soviet slander. Franchuk was reportedly the leader of an interdenominational youth camp.

Religious persecution also extended to adherents of Russian Orthodoxy. Russian Orthodox priest Pyotr Lysak was sentenced on December 4 to 10 months in a labor camp on the charge of spending too much time in Moscow, where he had no residence permit. Russian Orthodox activist Vladimir Poresh became the first person to be convicted under the new article 188-3 of the RSFSR criminal code, described in the 16th semiannual report on CSCE implementation, to an additional 3 years in labor camp for "malicious" violation of labor camp rules. And religious dissident Feliks Svetov was arrested on January 23 on the charge of circulating religious literature. His wife is presently in labor camp for editing a religious journal in 1982. Finally, Boris Razveev, a Russian Orthodox activist in Ufa, was arrested in January for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. He was arrested after he sent a manuscript on theology to the West for publication.

Other religious activists were swept up as the regime intensified its efforts to counter growing interest in religion among Soviet youth. Baptist rock musicians Valeriy Barinov and Sergey Timokhin were both sentenced to several years in labor camp in November on trumped-up charges of trying to leave the country illegally. Religious activist Andrey Vasilyev was sentenced in Leningrad to 4 years in a labor camp. Finally, Catholic priest Iosif Svidnitskiy was arrested in December in Novosibirsk.

Many Soviet citizens have sought to focus attention on the general problem of abuse of human rights in the Soviet Union and have suffered persecution as a consequence. Such people are often involved in religious activities or in defense of minority rights, but their prime focus is on the broader effort to expose and alleviate human rights abuses. Within this category, three figures are particularly well-known in the West: Andrey Sakharov, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, and Yuriy Orlov.

Andrey Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner, remained in exile in the closed city of Gorkiy throughout the review period. Soviet authorities have held the couple under virtual house arrest during this time. Neither friends nor relatives have been permitted to visit them, and they are even prohibited from meeting with friends who reside in Gorkiy. Telephone contact with the couple is not allowed, and they are allowed to send only censored telegrams and postcards. Only scientific colleagues of Sakharov have succeeded, on two separate occasions, in gaining permission to travel from Moscow to Gorkiy to visit with the couple for the purpose of conducting scientific talks.

Attempts by the Soviet authorities to portray the Nobel Prize laureate as leading a normal, working life assume an unreal dimension in view of the extensive efforts to isolate him and Bonner in Gorkiy. In view of their past record of medical problems, observers believe that the couple's health must be deteriorating, particularly as advanced medical care is not available in Gorkiy. The efforts to isolate Sakharov and Bonner provide vivid evidence of the Soviet authorities' complete disrespect for the most elementary of human rights and human dignity. Toward the end of the review period there were reports that Sakharov had informed the Soviet Academy of Sciences that he would resign by May 10 if the academy did not intervene to ease his isolation.

Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, was transferred during the review period from Chistopol prison to a labor camp in Perm. Because his health had deteriorated so severely while in prison, Shcharanskiy was hospitalized for 2 months prior to his release into the labor camp. During this period his relatives were unable to ascertain his exact whereabouts until, in early January, they were permitted a 48-hour meeting with him—the first such meeting since Shcharanskiy's arrest in 1977. Despite repeated appeals for clemency for Shcharanskiy, now that he has served more than half of his 13-year sentence, Soviet authorities continue to subject him to punishment for a crime he never committed. In February, he was again denounced in a film shown on national television as an enemy of the U.S.S.R.

Yuriy Orlov, the leader of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, continues to serve a 5-year term of exile in a remote area of the province of Yakutia. He is permitted visits from his wife but is subjected to harassment by local inhabitants. The food rations available to him are barely sufficient to sustain life in the harsh climatic conditions of Yakutia. Despite some illness during the review period, Orlov is reported to be in stable condition. Appeals on his behalf continue to go unheard by Soviet authorities.

Another former member of the Helsinki Monitoring Group, Naum Meiman, continued to encounter obdurate resistance as he persistently sought permission for his wife to travel abroad for medical treatment not available in the U.S.S.R. Inna Meiman, who underwent several dangerous operations during this period, has been flatly denied exit permission.

Soviet defenders of human rights believe it essential to work for a freer flow of information within Soviet society. To this end, activists have produced for many years *samizdat* manuscripts covering literary, ethnic, religious, social, economic, and political topics. Soviet persecution of individuals allegedly affiliated with such *samizdat* production has continued during the review period, despite the fact that the amount of *samizdat* material in circulation has reportedly declined significantly in recent years in the wake of numerous arrests. On October 10, Moscow authorities sentenced Yelena Sannikova to labor camp and exile for just such activity. Lithuanian chemist Lyudas Dambrauskas was sentenced October 3 to 5½ years in labor camp for *samizdat*

memoirs on the 25 years he had spent in Stalinist camps. In late March, Lev Timofeev, an economist, was arrested for his *samizdat* writings calling for economic reform.

While most human rights activists, for various reasons, do not campaign against the Soviet government *per se,* occasionally certain groups do surface that secretly advocate radical change in the political structure. The Soviet authorities continue relentlessly to persecute such groups. On December 18, Moscow authorities arrested Vyacheslav Demin, a self-proclaimed social democrat who led a small group of like-minded colleagues, on charges of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.

Other individual dissidents were also targeted by Soviet authorities during the review period. Leningrad worker Boris Mityashin was sentenced to 5 years in a labor camp and 3 years in internal exile for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. And Vladimir Sytinskiy, a member of the council of representatives of *Smot* (an independent trade union group), was put on trial in early December and subsequently was sent for extensive psychiatric examination.

Persecution of dissidents does not relent even when they are in labor camp. Not only are they subjected to insufficient nourishment, excessive work, improper medical attention, denial of family visits, confiscation of letters, and beatings, but they are often rearrested at the end of their terms on newly fabricated charges if their reentry into Soviet society is considered undesirable. In violation of Soviet law, the husband of Irina Ratushinskaya, a talented young poet, has not been permitted to see her in camp since 1983. On October 23, the wife of Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group member Nykola Horbal arrived at the labor camp from which her husband was to be released that day after serving 5 years. She was informed that her husband had been rearrested the previous day on charges of anti-Soviet slander, later changed to anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Another political prisoner, Viktor Grinev, who was due for release in April 1985, was rearrested in camp in December and sentenced to an additional 1½ year camp term for "malicious disobedience of camp authorities." His wife is presently serving 3 years in exile for her open support of human rights in the Soviet Union.

Other Soviet champions of human rights continue to suffer at the hands of the Soviet state. Anatoliy Marchenko, a member of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, has been permitted no correspondence with his family for more than 1 year. Ivan Kovalyov, also a member of the group, has not been permitted a visit by a relative since 1982. There has been no news of Victoras Petkus, a Lithuanian Helsinki monitor, since August 1983. His health is reportedly very bad after he was held in the labor camp prison from 1983–84. Anatoliy Koryagin, of the Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, went on a 4-month hunger strike in late 1984. He has been repeatedly beaten by wardens in Chistopol prison where he is being held. Vyacheslav Bakhmin, also of the working commission, is restricted to the city of Kalinin, where he was detained by authorities twice in early 1984 for allegedly striking different individuals. On March 29, Bakhmin was sentenced to 3 years in labor camp on the charge of hooliganism, but on April 18 this sentence was overturned on approval. The appeals court reduced the charge and imposed a sentence of 80% reduction in salary for a period of 6 months, to be served at his regular place of work (i.e., without confinement). The reason for this unprecedented action remains unknown.

The Group to Establish Trust between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. is an independent group of concerned Soviet citizens whose nonpartisan, nonpolemical approach to the discussion of arms control and confidence-building stands in sharp contrast to the statements of the officially sanctioned Soviet peace committee. Members of this group continued to be subjected to harassment and persecution during the 6 months under review. Group member Nikolay Khramov was abducted on October 24 and taken to the Soviet Far East where he was ordered to join the army. Upon his refusal, Khramov was placed in prisons and psychiatric hospitals and was told that a criminal case was being opened against him for resisting military service. After almost 4 months of detention, Khramov was unexpectedly set free in February, given a military deferment on medical grounds, and permitted to return to Moscow. However, another group member, Aleksandr Shatravka, who is presently serving a 3-year sentence for anti-Soviet slander, was sentenced in January to an additional 2½ years in labor camp for alleged possession of narcotics. Group members Vladimir and Maria Fleischgakker and Mark Reytman were permitted to leave the U.S.S.R. during the review period, thus depriving the group of several of its more active members. Other members, such as Aleksey Lusnikov, Yuriy Medvedkov, Vladimir Brodskiy, and Aleksandr Rubchenko, were subjected to detention by militia at various times.

Incarceration in psychiatric hospitals is frequently utilized by the Soviet authorities as a punitive measure against individuals whose activities are considered to run counter to the interests of the party and government. The Soviet Union has, in fact, amassed such a deplorable record of abuses of psychiatry that it withdrew from the World Psychiatric Association in 1983 rather than face near-certain censure or expulsion. Far from chastened by the experience, the Soviet authorities continued this inhumane practice during the current review period. Valentin Sokolov, a dissident poet, died in the Chernyakhovskiy special psychiatric hospital in October. Rozalia Kiikbaeva, who was forcibly committed to a Kazakhstan psychiatric hospital in May 1983 for refusing to give up her emigration efforts, died on January 8 at the age of 29 after she was not provided proper medical attention. Her brother Taksyn, who was also forcibly committed to the same institution for his efforts at emigration, was released after he developed serious undiagnosed medical problems. Aleksandr Riga, who was sentenced to indefinite psychiatric treatment during the previous review period, was sent in November to the Far Eastern special psychiatric hospital in Blagoveshchensk.

Despite commitments under the Helsinki Final Act to facilitate family reunification, the Soviet Union continues to deny exit permission to thousands of its citizens who wish to join relatives living abroad. Jewish emigration continued its dramatic decline since the peak year of 1979, when over 50,000 left the country. In the period October 1, 1984–February 28, 1985, 327 Jews left the Soviet Union. This compares with approximately 423 Jews who left the Soviet Union in the first 5 months of the previous review period. The Soviet authorities continue to maintain, despite abundant evidence to the contrary, that the vast majority of Jews who wanted to leave the country have already left and that the rate of emigration is declining naturally as fewer and fewer families remain to be reunited. The authorities have also stated that family reunification refers only to those families divided by World War II.

The current review period has also witnessed a continuation of anti-Semitic rhetoric thinly veiled as "anti-Zionism." Soviet propaganda maintains that Israeli and Western intelligence encourages emigration in order to obtain state secrets from Soviet citizens. It further alleges that "Zionists" collaborated with fascists during World War II to send many innocent Jews to their death. These "Zionist elements," so the argument goes, now comprise the ruling circles of Israel, which have inherited Hitler's fascist mantle. The "Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public," an officially sanctioned group, continues to lead the propaganda attack against Jewish refuseniks and "Zionists," though it has staged fewer public appearances than during the previous review period.

Individual Jewish "refuseniks" (Jews who have been refused when they apply to emigrate) have responded in various ways to official intransigence on emigration. Some have reacted with despair and for the time being have stopped applying to leave, while others apply as frequently as possible—once every 6 months.

Ethnic German emigration from the Soviet Union remained at low levels throughout the reporting period. From October 1, 1984–February 28, 1985, 273 ethnic Germans left the Soviet Union. This compares with 523 during the first 5 months of the previous reporting period.

Armenian emigration to the United States remained very low, with only 32 leaving. Forty-six left in the previous review period.

Romania. The Government of Romania complies with the first six Helsinki principles and advocates them in international forums. Romania does not support the notion that armed forces of ruling Communist Parties have the right to intervene to support another Communist Party faced with domestic or foreign threat to its monopoly of power.

Despite Romania's active role at the Madrid Review Conference and its statements of support for the conference's concluding document, observance of the provisions of that document has been mixed, at best.

The regime's performance in observing basic human rights (Principle Seven) continues to deteriorate. Though the Romanian Constitution contains guarantees of these human rights and fundamental freedoms, it and Romanian law in many cases either explicitly limit these guarantees or set a standard of state control so vague as to make the guarantees meaningless. The constitution enshrines the Romanian Communist Party as the supreme, guiding authority in the country. Under this mandate, the party, the government, and its internal security apparatus tolerate no opposition. All forms of mass media are state-owned and tightly controlled. Freedom of speech is effectively restricted by well-founded fear of what may happen even to reasonable critics.

Romanian citizens must obtain official permission to organize or assemble; this permission is forthcoming only when the activity is seen by the authorities to be in the interest of the state and does not, for example, extend to small prayer meetings in private homes. Romanian Government policy officially discourages emigration by its citizens except for the purpose of family reunification. Many of those who seek to leave face harassment designed to dissuade them.

To avoid significant "passport denial" figures, the Romanian government refuses to accept an "official" passport application (popularly called the "long form") until a decision to issue a passport has been made, a process which may take from 1–5 years from the time of initial inquiry. Once the decision to grant emigration permits has been made, the applicant typically is required to show that he has divested himself of all real property (at confiscatory, state-set rates) and then must rent what he previously owned. Those in employer-supplied apartments typically face eviction. With current housing shortages, the usual result is accommodation in already crowded homes of family or friends—often for several years. Almost without exception, potential emigrants are demoted or fired from their jobs, although (as the government correctly claims) most are offered other employment—typically, digging ditches in a distant city, cutting wood in the forests, or farm labor positions in the provinces, with no provision for family at the proffered job site.

Though officially denied by the government, our experience is that many of those granted exit permits are "given the opportunity" to renounce their Romanian citizenship—for a hefty additional fee—so that they automatically become stateless persons and remain in that status, as well as without employment or schooling for their children, often for many years while attempting to emigrate. However, many of those who are permitted to emigrate for close family reunification are granted regular Romanian emigration passports and do not suffer as harshly. In response to the strong interest of other nations, however, the Romanian Government in the current reporting period has permitted some emigration to continue.

In discussing human rights, Romanian officials in the past have tended to emphasize economic, "quality-of-life" benefits as among the most significant of human rights. By implication, lesser standards of performance should be tolerated, for example, in the area of human freedoms in order to achieve rapid progress toward the primary goal: "The housewife doesn't care about freedom of speech if her cupboard is bare." They have cited housing, dietary, and other statistics (often questionable) as evidence of rapid progress in this area and as a defense against charges of human rights abuses in their country. Recent actual performance by the regime in maintaining the quality of life for its citizens has been abysmal. This winter was especially harsh and highlighted the regime's incapacity to provide essentials such as sufficient heat and energy to its people. Over the years, rigid policies of heavy industrial development have gradually brought Romania, once a primary agricultural supplier for central Europe, to the point where basic foodstuffs are rationed and often unavailable even in the amounts allowed and where the standard of living is probably the lowest in Eastern Europe.

Although it recognizes, supports, and closely controls the activities of the 14 separate church organizations, the expression of religious belief is carefully monitored and discouraged by the government. Communist Party members—virtually all persons with positions of responsibility are members of the party—cannot practice a religious faith. Religious practitioners who go beyond the narrow limits defined by the government are sometimes sharply and brutally rebuffed. The government, many times acting directly through its Department of Cults (the state organ responsible for the activities of the officially recognized faiths), continues to harass activist pastors and congregations. There were, during this period, for example, eight qualified Baptist pastors who had been recognized by the Baptist Union who had not been granted licenses by the Department of Cults. In at least three of these cases, this denial has resulted in the withholding of residence permits for the cities where they preach. (One of these pastors was fined in January 1985 for remaining in the city overnight without permission.)

The congregations also continue to suffer long delays in receiving permission to undertake renovations or extend

their churches. In November 1984, the city authorities in Bistrita demolished a Baptist church, which was under construction and near completion, for infractions of local building codes. In Oradea, the second Baptist church congregation has received assurances that a new church will be completed before demolition of the present structure due to an urban redevelopment plan and, after considerable negotiation, the congregation has accepted a new site offered by local authorities.

Government practices with respect to other denominations are less restrictive: the Romanian Orthodox Church, long established as Romania's major religious body, actively supports the government and is at pains to avoid any open conflict with the regime, although reliable reports indicate some friction, for example, over the continuing destruction of historic churches in the name of "urban renewal." The Roman Catholic Church, long at odds with the regime over the latter's insistence that links with Rome be severed and for other reasons, in this reporting period arrived at informal accommodations which have permitted significant progress toward church goals. The Jewish community— now some 28,000 out of a prewar population estimated at over 900,000 due, to a large extent, to emigration to Israel and the United States—may be relatively better off than some of their coreligionists in Eastern Europe. Romania remains the sole Warsaw Pact state to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel.

The Madrid concluding document states that the participating states "will favorably consider application by religious communities of believers practicing or prepared to practice their faith within the constitutional framework of their states, to be granted the status provided for in their respective countries for religious faiths, institutions, and organizations." Soon after Romania agreed to implement the provisions of the Madrid concluding document, Romania rejected attempts by the Church of the Latter-Day Saints to gain official recognition because "Romania already has enough churches." The Eastern Rite Catholic—or Uniate—Church, banned in 1948, remains illegal. Church leaders petitioned the Madrid conference for reinstatement by the Government of Romania, but there has been no discernible progress toward recognition.

As noted in our previous report, a significant gesture was made by the Romanian Government in releasing Father Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa from prison in August 1984. However, during the past 6 months it has become clear that the gesture was little more than a change of location. Since his release, Father Calciu has been under virtual house arrest; armed, uniformed militiamen restrict entrance to his apartment building entrance, while plainclothes security agents are permanently stationed in the hallway in front of his door and surrounding his building. No contact is allowed with foreigners, either in person or over the telephone, and few, if any, Romanian friends are allowed access. While attending church services or shopping, he is surrounded by security agents who prevent any contact with other people. Father Calciu applied for emigration in September 1984. The Government of Romania has consistently denied this fact and forbids him access to any of the consular officials located in Bucharest.

Self-determination of peoples is given much emphasis in official government pronouncements. Faced with a Hungarian-speaking population some estimate at almost 3 million (out of a total of 23 million) as well as substantial German and numerous other smaller minority groups, the government has adopted measures the effect of which is to discourage cultural and ethnic differentiation.

Terrorist acts, in the past generally held to be less of a threat in Romania because of the Romanian Government's pervasive internal security apparatus, nevertheless occurred here last December with the assassination of a senior Jordanian Embassy official by a member of a Palestinian terrorist organization. The shooting, which occurred at a major (and well-guarded) downtown hotel past which the President drives each day, clearly caught the local security apparatus unaware; the Romanian authorities apparently still have not concluded their investigation of the matter. There were reports in the same period of another Palestinian terrorist plot which was frustrated by local security action and, more recently, of other planned terrorist activity. Romania lends extensive support to a number of "national liberation movements" (the PLO, SWAPO, the ANC, all of which have diplomatic or quasi-diplomatic missions in Bucharest). The government has publicly admitted to material support for such groups, and supplies arms, training, and other support either openly or clandestinely to "national liberation movements" in a number of countries. There also have been other reports that Romania provides sanctuary to terrorists.

Through a number of state and party structures, Romania maintains tight control over the nation's labor force. As in other Soviet-bloc states, trade unions are merely an extension of the party and the state. The last attempt to organize a free trade union here was brutally suppressed in 1979. Despite continued reports of labor unrest, the government security apparatus appears to be successful in stifling further attempts to organize similar new movements. A study by the International Labor Organization (ILO) officially cites Romania as being in violation of its Helsinki commitments by laws prohibiting free trade unions.

Poland. The Polish Government continues to express concern about what it claims are Western attempts to encroach on Polish sovereignty. The Poles insist that economic sanctions introduced by the U.S. Government after the imposition of martial law constitute an interference in Polish internal affairs. The government views Polish-language broadcasts by RFE [Radio Free Europe], VOA [Voice of America], and other Western radio stations in the same light as publication of this report. The Polish government is quick to attack unfavorable reporting by Western journalists on such sensitive subjects as human rights conditions as "provocations" and, thus, intolerable interference.

During the past 6 months Poland was not involved in any situation which could entail the threat or use of force against another state. In this sphere Poland has publicly supported Soviet positions on such issues as the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. The Polish Government is extraordinarily sensitive about the permanence of the country's western frontier. Over the last 6 months the government-controlled media continued its campaign against alleged revanchist forces in West Germany, on several occasions suggesting that such forces are at least tacitly encouraged by U.S. policy and that the United States questions the validity of the Yalta and Potsdam accords and the territorial status quo in Europe.

In addition to expressing special sensitivity about its own borders, Polish Government statements on territorial issues normally parallel Soviet foreign policy pronouncements. Polish statements supporting the peaceful settlement of disputes and deploring the use of force are in line with Soviet foreign policy positions.

The major development in the field of human rights in Poland over the last 6 months was the murder of Father

Jerzy Popieluszko, a popular, outspoken supporter of Solidarity, and the arrest, trial, and conviction of the four security service (SB) officers who were responsible for the crime. The trial was unique in that security officers were put on public trial for illegal actions against a member of the opposition. In addition to Father Popieluszko, between January 1984 and January 1985, 16 Solidarity activists have been deprived of life as a result of the use of force by SB personnel or as a result of involuntary or mysterious disappearances.

Polish authorities allowed a limited number of Western correspondents to attend the trial, and extensive coverage was provided in all Polish mass media. Polish coverage was censored, especially regarding testimony on the possibility that high-level figures were involved in planning the crime. Nevertheless, the trial did provide the country and the world with an inside view of how the Polish security apparatus works and of the atmosphere that prevails in the SB. Toward the end, however, the trial deteriorated as the prosecutor and the judge began to spend more time attacking Father Popieluszko and the church or defending the government's right to make such attacks than they spent on discussing the guilt of the accused. However, all four defendants were convicted and sentenced to long prison terms. The two principal defendants received the maximum term short of the death sentence—25 years—permitted by Polish law, although the government prosecutor has demanded execution for the ringleader. Although the defendants' appeal of the sentence has been rejected, their crime has been classified as "political" to enable them to benefit from any amnesty in the future.

On August 31, 1984, the government convicted two Solidarity leaders in the southwestern city of Wroclaw of incitement to riot under summary procedures in a misdemeanor court. Under these procedures, trials are often completed and sentences imposed on the day of arrest, with sentences ranging up to 3 months in jail plus a fine. During the last 6 months this procedure has also been used twice against Solidarity activist Andrezej Gwiazda, who received sentences for participating in a demonstration on December 16 and for failing to show his identity card to a militia (police) officer. In addition, Solidarity activist Jozef Pinior was sued before a civilian court and ordered to turn over 150 million *zloties* in Solidarity funds which he, as Solidarity treasurer in Silesia, had withdrawn from the bank a few days before martial law was declared.

The number of political prisoners has gradually increased during the reporting period. Of the 22 prisoners not freed under the July 1984 amnesty, eight, including Bogdan Lis and Piotr Mierzejewski, were later released (although Lis is back in jail). According to official Polish sources and confirmed by human rights activists, there are now approximately 163 persons incarcerated for political offenses as opposed to 40 6 months ago. In mid-February the authorities broke up a meeting of several Solidarity leaders in Gdansk and arrested three persons: Lis, Adam Michnik of KOR [Workers' Defense Committee], and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk of Solidarity. (Frasyniuk was one of the two men sentenced to 2-month jail terms in Wroclaw on August 31.) Three others were charged and released, and Lech Walesa was let go with a warning and ordered not to leave Gdansk without permission.

The Polish Government allows significant religious freedom. Churches are free to preach, to publish, and to proselytize. The Catholic Church is allowed to broadcast Sunday mass over state radio, as are the small Protestant denominations on a rotating basis. After a long hiatus the government began to issue building permits for churches in 1980. Since then, construction has begun on approximately 1,000 new churches. However, persons who openly profess their religious beliefs still find it difficult to rise to leading positions in government or industry.

The Roman Catholic Church is overwhelmingly the predominant religious force in Poland. A substantial majority of Poles of all ages and social groups participate regularly in Catholic religious services. The only other religious community with a significant number of followers is the Orthodox Church, with about 5,000,000 members. Approximately a dozen other denominations exist in Poland, and the Polish Government allows them to practice their faith freely as long as they avoid activities construed by the government as political.

Church-state relations have cooled appreciably over the last 6 months. The mixed church-state commission has met less frequently, and in September and February rumored meetings between Primate Glemp and Prime Minister Jaruzelski failed to take place. The church aid plan for private agriculture has stalled. Another round of the "war of the crosses" has been fought, with high school students in the town of Wloszczowa occupying their school for nearly 2 weeks. Bad feelings have been raised by government attempts to prosecute two priests who were involved in the sit-in after promising that no one would be punished.

The Popieluszko affair was the single most important cause of the downturn in church-state relations. Particularly offensive to the church were the government's attempts to turn the later stages of the trial into a "trial" of the priest and of the church. Since that point, relations have cooled markedly, with a sometimes heated public debate being conducted on the alleged extra-religious activities of some priests. In mid-February Cardinal Glemp held a press conference at which he rejected government charges that priests are carrying out "illegal" activities. Even Pope John Paul II came in for an attack in the Polish press.

Solidarity and all other unions were delegalized with the passage of a new trade union law in October 1982. Under this law, Polish workers are allowed to join only newly established official unions. Since 1983 some 20,000 enterprise unions and nearly 130 union federations (which group together enterprise unions from factories performing similar kinds of work) have been formed. In November 1984 the "All-Poland Agreement of Trade Unions" (OPZZ) was founded to serve as an umbrella group for most of these unions and federations. According to government statistics published in late February, the new unions have about 5 million members, some 13% of whom are pensioners. (Solidarity maintains that the percentage of pensioners is around 30% and that many workers have been forced to join or have joined in order to secure fringe benefits the unions distribute.) The total of 5 million members represents slightly over half of Solidarity's peak membership.

As presently constituted, the official unions are not an effective substitute for Solidarity. During the 15 months of Solidarity's legal existence, Poles were free to join the union of their choice. The government has ruled out a return to such union pluralism, saying that "pluralism" is merely the code word for those who wish to create a new anti-socialist political organization. The government has kept up its attacks on Solidarity leaders, attempting to discredit them as antisocialist extremists and tools of such "enemy centers" as RFE and the CIA. This campaign has intensified since the end of the trial of Father Popieluszko's murderers, with propaganda attacks on Solidarity leaders at home and abroad, the arrests in

Gdansk, and the government's refusal to allow Seweryn Blumsztajn, Solidarity representative in Paris, to return to Poland.

The OPZZ faced its first major test in January and February when the government sponsored "consultations" on the issue of food price increases. Shortly after the OPZZ rejected all three alternative versions of the government's pricing proposals, the government agreed to "stretch out" the price hikes over time. A few days later, however, the first increases were suddenly implemented, giving the impression that the government had made plans for such a "compromise" well in advance. The results of the "consultations" are likely to increase the deep skepticism with which most Poles regard the OPZZ's claim to be the independent, effective voice of the working class.

A commission of inquiry of the International Labor Organization reported in June 1984 that several Polish Government actions since the imposition of martial law are in conflict with Poland's obligations under ILO conventions, particularly the conventions on freedom of association and the convention on the right to organize and bargain collectively. When the ILO governing body officially took note of this report in late 1984, Poland announced that it would withdraw from the organization.

Poland officially subscribes to the principle of equality for all citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious background, age, or sex. Belorussians and Ukrainians differ linguistically from the majority, and many are members of the Orthodox or Uniate churches. While they have somewhat greater difficulty building churches, training clergy, and maintaining their languages, there is no legal discrimination against them. While there are allegations that these minorities encounter persecution, this appears to occur in the context of their small numbers and the region's history. There are small Protestant communities in Poland, as well as a very small group of Muslims. At present only a few thousand Jews, most of them elderly, remain in the country.

Women have equal rights under the law, and there is no evidence that discrimination based on sex is a serious problem. Traditional views of women as wives, mothers, and homemakers remain strong. A large majority of working-age Polish women, including almost all those who live in rural areas, are employed. Many women have reached positions of responsibility in their professions, but relatively few have high government or party posts.

Poland engages in many bilateral and multilateral cultural, scientific, economic, consular, military, educational, labor, and recreational agreements which involve exchanges, participation in conferences, and fulfillment of obligations. Poland is a member of the United Nations and related organizations, the Warsaw Pact, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

The government adopts a carefully legalistic approach to the question of international obligations and, in that context, generally fulfills the letter of the obligations it assumes—as it interprets those obligations. However, as noted above, certain Polish Government actions have been found to be in conflict with ILO conventions, and Poland has, on occasion, failed to carry out its obligations under the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. In public statements the Government of Poland condemns terrorism. However, its pronouncements on this issue, as on territorial integrity, tend to be selective. Domestically, Poland has a select antiterrorist unit, controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which has been used to help protect important visitors such as the Pope.

Hungary. Notwithstanding the imposition of police surveillance upon a prominent dissident economist and a further accretion of power by the police, Hungary continued to maintain a comparatively good record concerning human rights issues. The most notable exception to this positive assessment was the authorities' decision to impose "police surveillance" upon Gyorgy Krasso, a dissident and economist who was imprisoned for about 7 years following the aborted 1956 revolution. "Police surveillance" orders—completely extrajudicial proceedings which no court can overturn—are the Hungarian variant of limited house arrest. The recipient of the order must remain home at night, is prohibited from visiting certain public places, must report to the local police station every week, and has restricted use of his telephone.

Reaction to this action taken against Krasso was swift and pointed. Taking advantage of the gathering in Budapest of international delegates for the CSCE Cultural Forum Preparatory Conference, 12 prominent dissidents submitted a petition to the delegations protesting the house arrest order. During the following month, 300 people, including some leading cultural figures, submitted a petition to the authorities demanding that the order be rescinded. In early January, Krasso lost an appeal which cited a regulation that police surveillance cannot be imposed on a legally handicapped person (he suffered a partial loss of hearing during his incarceration during the early Kadar years). After losing the appeal, he suffered a heart attack and was hospitalized. Since Krasso's release from the hospital, he has decided not to comply with the order, and the police have not enforced it to date.

There have been no reports of any other police surveillance order imposed upon anyone for political reasons during the reporting period. Another dissident whose situation has deteriorated during the past 6 months is Romanian-born philosopher Gaspar Miklos Tamas. As in the previous period, the government refused to grant him permission to leave Hungary to study or teach abroad unless he agreed not to return to Hungary. In recent months, he has been unable to support himself by translating articles because the three leading publishing houses claim they have no work for him. Furthermore, an invitation to visit Columbia University was withdrawn, reportedly at the government's behest, and Tamas is experiencing bureaucratic difficulties with the local authorities concerning his apartment. In addition to Tamas, at least 30 persons remain unable to secure passports at the present time for political reasons.

The appearance of *samizdat* continued, although the authorities raised the cost of getting caught in the process of its distribution. In October alone, approximately 54,000 *forints* of fines were levied upon persons caught selling or otherwise handling it. The most damaging action taken against *samizdat* was a mid-January police raid on a "safehouse" outside Budapest in which about 1,000 copies of *Beszelo* were seized—about 50% of the edition's run. Increased police activity was marked by a slight increase in the number of house searches for *samizdat* and other undesirable publications such as Koestler's "Darkness at Noon."

A new legal provision granted the police authority to search a car or person without cause (previously they were permitted to ask for identity documents only). It was the police attempt to examine some papers carried by dissident Gabor Demszky in 1983 which resulted in a nasty scuffle and Demszky's consequent hospitalization. Another development which underscored the limit of freedom of expression was a clash between the Hungarian Writers Union and the authorities following the publication of a poem addressing the fate of the

leader of the ill-fated uprising of 1956, Imre Nagy, and drawing attention to those involved in his execution. The government and party, caught between the hard choices of drawing more attention to the very subject matter they found extremely sensitive and allowing the poet and the Writers Union official to go unpunished, imposed sanctions on the association until satisfied by the poet's resignation as deputy chairman of the Writers Union. The normally settled relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the state were seemingly affected by the Vatican's 1984 pronouncements against "liberation theology." Some Hungarian officials felt those pronouncements contained implicit criticism of existing Eastern bloc states like Hungary.

Government officials reportedly reduced the circulation of the leading Catholic weekly by 10% and rescinded an earlier understanding with the church hierarchy that trained laymen could teach catechism in Hungarian schools and private homes. The Vatican and the government have reportedly failed to agree yet on the appointment of several new bishops to replace those who have reached retirement age. The specialized form of dissent in the Catholic Church, centering around the "basic community" movement, continued during the reporting period. The hierarchy supports the government in Hungary, so the authorities have seen little need to take action against these groups.

The Embassy has learned that Roman Catholic conscientious objectors to military service continue to be tried and sentenced. The hierarchy of the Hungarian church reportedly considers these individuals as both anti-Hungarian and anti-Christian. The Vatican has also allegedly withdrawn its support. Roman Catholic conscientious objectors have consequently been receiving increasingly severe prison sentences while members of two smaller churches that also support the right to conscientious objection have been offered the alternative of unarmed service.

Hungary's record of cooperation with overseas organizations interested in affairs affecting the tiny Jewish community (less than 1% of the population) continued during the reporting period. Numerous delegations visited Hungary to examine and discuss with officials schemes for preserving Jewish culture. Domestic opposition within the small Jewish community continued with the publication of another (second) open letter by a person or group called "Shalom" which advocated the establishment of diplomatic relations between Hungary and Israel and protested against alleged collusion between the official national Jewish office and Soviet propaganda.

German Democratic Republic. There have been no changes in G.D.R. practices regarding the first six principles. The G.D.R. has respected the rights inherent in sovereignty; not used or threatened force; not violated frontiers; respected territorial integrity of states; not settled disputes by other than peaceful means; and there is no clear proof of G.D.R. intervention in internal affairs of other countries, although the G.D.R. continues strong support for Soviet activities in developing countries.

The G.D.R. continues to restrict the fundamental freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, and belief among its people. The activities of the Ministry of State Security's secret police are pervasive. Without judicial controls, the police may install listening devices, open private mail, or interrogate whomever they choose. The West German-based International Society for Human Rights (IGFM) estimates that there are 7,000 political prisoners in the G.D.R. (up 1,000 from last year's estimate), while the "13th of August" working group, a West Berlin human rights group, puts this figure at 10,000 (versus 9,500 last year).

With the exception of church-sponsored events held on church grounds, groups are not allowed to organize events without official approval. Participants in some meetings on church grounds have encountered difficulties with G.D.R. authorities.

Following is a summary of reported examples of G.D.R. violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms during this reporting period.

- Shortly before Christmas, state security police (STASI) guards in the small city of Guestrow shot three youths who were apparently creating a disturbance outside the local STASI headquarters. Two died; the third was reportedly hospitalized with leg injuries. Popular resentment was said to have run high in the Guestrow area, but the event was not reported in the East German media.
- Church newspapers, which unlike other media are not directly controlled by the state, have been delayed, withdrawn from circulation, or self-censored under government pressure because they tried to publish letters or reports dealing with sensitive questions such as the peace movement and environmental policies.
- There have been repeated reports of official discrimination against Christians, including against Christian children in public schools. Practicing Christians are regularly denied advanced education or training in many fields at the university level.

There were also some positive developments to note. After some 30 years of being officially prohibited from practicing their religion, Christian Scientists were able to meet with G.D.R. state officials in December 1984 and arrange the import of limited amounts of church literature. Since then, some limited importation of religious materials necessary for workshop has been allowed. (Christian Scientists and Jehovah's Witnesses are still both under court orders restricting their religious practice, however.) The government has granted permission for some new churches to be built, and a Mormon temple is under construction in Freiberg near Dresden. State pensions have been granted to deaconesses (similar to nuns) working in Evangelical (Lutheran) Church welfare institutions, thereby giving tangible recognition to their considerable contribution to care for the handicapped in the G.D.R.

State and party chief Erich Honecker met in February in Dresden with the senior Evangelical bishop, Johannes Hempel, to reaffirm a 1978 agreement on the role and status of Christians in the G.D.R., including the principle of equal treatment. Hempel later complimented the official press on its fair and balanced coverage of the meeting.

There has been no evident punishment of G.D.R. peace activists who collaborated with Czech dissidents in an independent peace manifesto and later sent an open letter to Honecker (published in Western newpapers) criticizing G.D.R. youth policies.

Self-determination by means of democratic elections is not possible in the G.D.R. Every 5 years G.D.R. citizens are presented with a list of candidates, most unopposed, for the "People's Chamber" (*Volkskammer*) and various local assemblies (*Volksvertretungen*). Though a 1976 election law states that voting will be secret, it is not, in fact, always so, and East Germans who refuse to vote or who reject entire ballots may suffer reprisals.

Foreign diplomats in the G.D.R. are effectively protected by G.D.R. security forces. However, the G.D.R. reportedly provides military training to members of groups which have been associated with terrorism in the past.

Only government-controlled unions are allowed. Strikes are not permitted in the G.D.R., and union assemblies are strictly controlled by the state. G.D.R. unions are a captive political arm of the government and are used to carry out official and party policy.

Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia's compliance with Principle Seven, concerning respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief, remains fundamentally flawed and has not improved significantly during the last 6 months. The government's implementation of the Helsinki Final Act continues to be monitored by a small group of private Czechoslovak citizens who are signatories of "Charter 77" and/or members of the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS). The government, by means of short-term (i.e., 48 hours) detentions, interrogations, searches, intrusive surveillance, seizure of material, and other forms of harassment, does its best to hamper these citizen efforts to monitor CSCE compliance. But we are not aware of any new trials of Charter 77 or VONS activists during the reporting period.

A document released by VONS on November 8, 1984, gives details on the cases of 22 individuals who are in prison because of their activities in the field of human rights and another 54 who face criminal prosecution although they are not now in prison. (Several of these persons, including Rudolf Battek and Jiri Wolf, are serving sentences of 5 years or more.) However, VONS believes that these 76 individuals do not represent the total number of Czechoslovak citizens who are being prosecuted by the authorities because of their activities in the field of human rights.

The 17th semiannual report noted the plight of Jiri Gruntorad who, while serving a 4-year prison term for "subversion," was given an additional 14-month term for filing a complaint against a prison guard who had allegedly beaten him ("false testimony," article 174/1). In a positive development, Mr. Gruntorad, who completed his 4-year term in December 1984, was acquitted of the second charge in January 1985 and has been released from prison. He is currently under a regime of "protective supervision" for 3 years.

Another positive development during the reporting period was the fact that Western diplomatic representatives were permitted, for the first time in memory, to attend a Czechoslovak trial of a case involving human rights. If this practice continues, we would consider it a significant step forward in Czechoslovakia's compliance with the spirit of CSCE.

Previous reports have noted that in March 1984 the Czechoslovak Government had, for the first time, imposed a regime of "protective supervision" against two individuals (Ladislav Lis and Jan Litomisky) who had served prison terms for political dissidence. Since then, Mr. Gruntorad and two other recently released political prisoners—Frantisek Starek and Vaclav Soukup—have also been subjected to such a regime for terms of 2–3 years. The conditions that they must abide by differ in each case, but they include travel restrictions, curfews, and the necessity to report to the police on a regular basis—in Mr. Lis' case, for instance, more than seven times a week. The imposition of such a regime (intended for habitual violent offenders) against persons who have never committed a violent crime is clearly a form of harassment and an infringement of fundamental freedoms.

A continuing violation of Principles Seven and Eight has been the detention without trial of Miklos Duray, a leading spokesman for the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Duray, who was campaigning to ensure the maintenance of the educational rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, has now spent 10½ months (since May 1984) in prison without a trial. In 1982, he was detained on similar charges and released 4 months later, again without a trial.

Another area where the Czechoslovak Government is in serious violation of its obligations under Principle Seven concerns the freedom of individuals to profess or practice their religious beliefs. The government makes considerable efforts to discourage religious practice, especially among the young. One frequently practiced method is to deny higher education to those who engage in religious activity or to their children (such discrimination in education is also commonly practiced against the children of political activists, particularly those affiliated with Charter 77 or VONS.) Individuals who are employed in education, health, and certain other professions are frequently subjected to sanctions at work or loss of their jobs if they openly go to church or perform other religious ceremonies.

Although the Czechoslovak Constitution states that there is freedom of religious practice, in reality this right is strictly limited by a variety of regulations.

One such regulation forcibly dissolved all male religious orders in 1950 and barred female orders from accepting new members. In November 1984, seven people, believed to be members of the Franciscan order, were detained and later charged with "obstructing state supervision over churches and religious societies" (para 178). This case is reminiscent of, and apparently related to, a case involving a larger number of individuals who were arrested in March 1983 and also accused of being Franciscans.

An additional restriction on religious liberty is the requirement that priests and ministers must be licensed by the state, and the licenses may be withdrawn at any time. Priests and ministers who continue following their calling despite revocation of their licenses are liable to criminal prosecution. Religious education of children and intending clergy remains strictly controlled, and unofficial gatherings such as privately celebrated masses, prayer meetings, or educational sessions are forbidden.

The printing and distribution of unauthorized religious materials is treated even more harshly, and those apprehended are liable to criminal prosecution. On October 3, 1984, an accusation of "incitement" (para 100) was leveled against Matej Nemeth, a Catholic priest, who was accused of possessing illegal religious material "aimed against the socialist system." On October 12, three Slovak Protestants—Jan Juhascik, Sr., Jan Juhascik, Jr., and Rudolf Sobanos—were taken into custody because they possessed religious materials which the authorities believed were destined for the Soviet Union. Charges remain pending against them, although they have since been released from custody.

In a similar case during the reporting period, three Slovak Catholics—Alojz Gabaj, Bronislav Borovsky and Tomas Konc—were sentenced on March 21 to terms ranging from 16 to 18 months each for having tried to bring three backpacks filled with religious material across the border from Poland.

Virtually all workers in Czechoslovakia are enrolled in the officially sponsored trade union movement, the Revolutionary Workers' Movement (RON). Intellectuals such as artists, writers, and others are organized in professional associations which are under the control of the Communist Party. No organizations which are not approved by the state are allowed to exist in Czechoslovakia; unauthorized trade unions are

also not permitted. Therefore, workers are not allowed "freely to establish" unions, nor are they allowed freely not to be members of the regime-sponsored workers' organization. Rights of unions—such as the right to strike—do not exist, although on occasion the official workers organizations within industries or factories have been able to gain some improvements in working conditions through negotiation with plant management.

In its official statements, the Czechoslovak Government has always proclaimed its adherence to Principle Four, respecting the territorial integrity of all CSCE states. On October 30, 1984, however, Czechoslovak border guards crossed into Austrian territory, where they shot—and killed—a Czechoslovak citizen, 25-year-old Frantisek Faktor, who was attempting to flee to Austria. In addition to violating the territorial integrity of a neighboring state, this action illustrates the consequences of the Czechoslovak Government's continued unwillingness to allow its citizens to travel freely.

Czechoslovakia publicly maintains its opposition to all forms of international terrorism. To what extent official internal policy and actions mirror this public stance is impossible to say. Occasionally, Western press reports carry stories alleging that there are terrorist training camps on Czechoslovak territory. We are, however, unable to verify these reports.

Bulgaria. The Bulgarians continue to respect Principles One through Six. However, during this 6-month period, the regime reached a new high level of violations of basic human rights and minority rights. Bulgarian officials have not prevented security forces from committing the reported rape, detention, and murder of members of the ethnic Turkish minority during the government's campaign to assimilate these people by forcing them to change from Turkish names to Bulgarian names.

The Embassy has obtained reports from eyewitnesses that whole villages were surrounded by militia and army forces while ethnic Turks were rounded up and forced to exchange personal documents containing Turkish names for documents with Bulgarian names. The preponderance of evidence indicates that persons who resisted or tried to escape were shot and some women were reportedly raped as the Bulgarian forces "sought vengeance for 500 years of Turkish rule." The wounded were reported to have been denied medical treatment. Travel in and out of the ethnic Turkish areas was heavily restricted. The Bulgarian authorities stopped Western diplomats and journalists, sometimes at gunpoint, from gaining access to the affected areas.

We have been unable to obtain exact figures on the numbers of deaths; estimates vary. There is no disagreement, however, among Western embassies that numerous deaths have taken place. It may have been the reported deaths of two militiamen that sparked violent reactions by militia comrades which brought about the deaths of numerous ethnic Turks.

The goal of the assimilation campaign appears to be simple: the total elimination of any minority identities in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government, however, has refused to acknowledge that any deaths have occurred, and, until recently, it refused to acknowledge the existence of an assimilation program. Assimilation is still characterized by the Bulgarian authorities as "voluntary." The Bulgarian Government has protested Western interest in the assimilation campaign as "interference in internal affairs," which the Embassy rejected, and mounted a propaganda campaign claiming that Western nations are "slandering" Bulgaria by promulgating information in the Western media about the assimilation campaign. Toward the end of this period, we learned that prominent ethnic Turks were being held at the Belene Island prison camp.

In addition to the repression of minorities, but in some respect linked to it, has been the heightened repression of religion during the past 6 months. During the assimilation campaign mentioned above, increased numbers of mosques were alleged to have been closed and some demolished. Muslim rites such as circumcision and burial were confirmed to be forbidden. "Tame" Imams have come out publicly stating that such rites are "unhealthy." We have learned that the teaching of the Muslim faith is now forbidden in many areas, as is the use of the Turkish language.

The oldest and most prominent Protestant church was forced to accept a government-appointed pastor who earlier had presided over the demolition of two other churches in the country. The congregation's choice, two brothers named Kulishev, were forced from the pulpit and imprisoned. There is a strong likelihood that some members of the congregation have gone underground in order to continue church meetings.

The Catholic Church still lacks juridicial recognition in Bulgaria, and its clerics are subject to official harassment. According to reliable sources, two of the major problems facing the Catholic Church in Bulgaria include the restrictions on Catholic youths from gathering in meetings prior to their 16th birthday and the lack of seminaries. During the period, Cardinal Koenig of Vienna visited Bulgaria at the invitation of the Austrian Ambassador. Although he was met cordially by Bulgarian officials, he was not able to meet privately with Bulgarian Catholics.

During the period the Bulgarian Government has not taken any steps toward greater cooperation on the prevention or suppression of international terrorism. Although we do not have any new information to add during this period on Bulgarian support for terrorist groups, we have no reason to believe that Bulgarian support either directly or indirectly has been reduced.

As a probable corollary to the assimilation campaign, internal terrorism has become a problem in Bulgaria, and authorities cite their efforts against internal terrorism as evidence of compliance on the suppression of terrorism. As a result of a train bombing, a hotel bombing, a railway station bombing, and an airport bombing, Bulgarian authorities have increased visible internal security mechanisms. We have noted increased roadblocks and heavily armed guards around public buildings and the appearance, for the first time, of a paramilitary organization dubbed by diplomats as the "Red Berets." This latter organization has supplemented regular militia security on diplomatic establishments, chanceries, and residences throughout Sofia. There are also indications that the "Red Berets" were active in the suppression of ethnic Turk resisters. For the first time in our memory, regular militia guards have been issued automatic weapons. Bulgarian authorities are clearly nervous about internal threats from terrorists.

The authorities are committed to the protection of diplomatic missions from acts of terrorism, but Bulgarian efforts to thwart terrorism have not been in consultation or cooperation with Western missions or governments. In fact, our efforts to obtain information on the security situation have been met with official silence or refusal to discuss the subject.

Throughout this period of heightened security, Embassy officers from various Western missions have witnessed actual incidents of police-state tactics as citizens were subject to identity checks and forcible removal from public transportation at gunpoint.

Principle Eight: Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples

Principle Eight reaffirms the right of all peoples to determine freely their own political status and to pursue their political, social, and cultural development without outside interference. Preferences of ordinary citizens are, of course, difficult to ascertain in countries which allow no political opposition and restrict the right of free expression. In connection with Principle Eight, the United States continues not to recognize the forcible and unlawful incorporation of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia into the Soviet Union. Expressions of nationalism in the Baltic republics, as detailed elsewhere in this report, and in other non-Russian republics are severely repressed by the Soviet Government.

The United States has also made clear that, in accordance with Principle Eight, the resolution of Poland's problems by the Poles themselves can best be achieved in an atmosphere of calm and moderation free of all outside interference. However, the Soviet Union continues to exert pressure on Poland's political process.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union's 5-year occupation of Afghanistan continues to strike at the heart of the Final Act principles related to the rights of sovereign countries, refraining from the threat or use of force, the right to self-determination, and the acceptance of rules of international conduct. With a permanent military presence of over 115,000 troops, Soviet armed forces have directed a calculated terror campaign, including destruction of villages, killing of women and children, poisoning water supplies, burning crops, and, most recently in the Panjsher Valley, indiscriminate high-altitude bombings against civilian targets in an effort to demoralize the resistance. In Southeast Asia, the Soviets continue to provide the Vietnamese with the support necessary to maintain Hanoi's efforts to subjugate and colonize neighboring Cambodia.

DOCUMENT ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

The signatories to the Helsinki Final Act are required by the act's Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament to give prior notification of "major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with possible air or naval components." Notification is required for maneuvers that take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating state and must be made 21 days or more in advance of the start of the maneuver. The notification "will contain information on the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the maneuver, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, and the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. Participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces."

In addition, signatories are encouraged to engage in other confidence-building measures (CBMs) on a voluntary basis. These voluntary CBMs include the invitation of observers to maneuvers and prior notification of major military movements and exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops.

Implementation

The United States and its NATO allies continue their excellent record of implementation of these CBMs. The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) notified the major maneuver "Central Guardian," which took place on January 21–31, 1985, on F.R.G. territory with the participation of approximately 72,000 troops from the United States, the F.R.G., Luxembourg, and France. Observers were invited to attend by the Federal Republic. A voluntary notification was also made by Norway of the maneuver, "Cold Winter 85," which took place on March 15–21 on Norwegian territory with the participation of about 10,000 troops from Norway, the Netherlands, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

Among the neutral and nonaligned (NNA) countries, Sweden made a voluntary notification of the maneuver "Vastgrans," which took place from February 18 to March 5, 1985, involving 22,000 Swedish troops. Observers were also invited to attend.

The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies did not provide formal notification of any military maneuvers in the present reporting period, and there is no indication that maneuvers involving more that 25,000 troops occurred. The G.D.R. media reported on February 9–10 that a combined military exercise involving Soviet, East German, and Polish troops would take place on G.D.R. territory but did not indicate the duration of the exercise or the size of the forces involved. Such reports cannot be considered a notification under the Final Act.

The Eastern record of compliance with the spirit, and in some cases the letter, of the confidence-building provisions in the Final Act has generally been poor. When notifications are made, they usually provide the bare minimum of information required. Czech notification of "Shield 84" last August failed to specify the dates and location of the exercise as well as the countries taking part. Similar omissions occurred in the notification of "Shield 82" by Bulgaria. In September 1981, at a time when great pressure was being put on Poland, the U.S.S.R. failed to live up to its Helsinki obligations by not specifying the number of troops participating in the major maneuver "Zapad 81," which led to a formal protest by the United States. The voluntary notification of maneuvers involving fewer than 25,000 troops and the invitation of observers from NNA or NATO countries have also been the exception rather than the rule. The only discretionary notification by the U.S.S.R. occurred in 1983 for the maneuver "Dnestr" to which, in a rare move, observers were invited to attend from Turkey, Greece, Italy, and a few NNA states.

It remains to be seen whether the Eastern performance noted above will improve when the Warsaw Pact next holds maneuvers of a size which will require notification.

Chapter Three

Implementation of Basket II: Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology, and of the Environment

Some improvements were noted in the implementation of Basket II provisions by the Soviet Union and the East European countries during the review period, but the level of implementation continues to be generally unsatisfactory. Commercial contacts were broadened slightly in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and certain other Eastern European countries, with an increase in official missions and businessmen visiting these countries. Business facilitation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries continues to remain far below Western standards. Countertrade demands continue to complicate business relations with these countries, but there has been some decrease in the pressure put upon Western firms to engage in such trade practices. The economic reporting performance of the Soviet Union and other covered Eastern European countries deteriorated during the review period as many of these countries sought to mask increased economic problems.

The following country-by-country survey specifies the extent to which the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries have implemented the Basket II provisions of the Helsinki accords.

Soviet Union

General Assessment. Soviet implementation of Basket II provisions improved slightly but continues to be poor. General business conditions underwent little change during the reporting period. There is promise of improvement in firms' access to direct telephone lines to the West, although only a few U.S. firms have received new lines. Business visitors had fewer complaints regarding difficulties in obtaining Soviet visas. Soviet publication of economic performance data has become more restrictive with the omission of some categories from the monthly production statistics.

Business Working Conditions. U.S. business representatives are generally able to obtain appointments with Soviet trade officials and have few complaints about interference in their business activities. Access to end-users has never been good in some industries and has not improved. U.S. firms report an increase in the number of inquiries from Soviet foreign trade organizations (FTOs).

Business Offices. One U.S. firm lost accreditation during the period under review. It was charged by the Soviets with questionable business practices including bribery, according to one Soviet press article. In all, there are now 26 accredited U.S. firms with offices in Moscow and one, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Marine Resources, with an office in Nakhodka. Most nonaccredited firms continue to have problems in meeting their requirements for office equipment, vehicles, and clerical support.

Hotel and housing accommodations for businessmen have not changed. Visiting businessmen generally are able to obtain suitable hotel accommodations. Housing is satisfactory, although there is an ongoing problem about adequate provision for fire safety in the housing made available to business representatives. Business representatives have lodged few complaints about travel and visa restrictions, but ongoing problems occur for business representatives traveling by automobile for equipment installation inspections. Representatives are barred from using restricted roads and face increased travel time as a result. The Nakhodka-based representative must use the Khabarovsk airport instead of the much closer one at Vladivostok.

Accredited representatives of U.S. firms, whether actually resident in Moscow or not, occasionally have difficulty renewing their accreditation. Denials tend to be made without explanation, but usually appear to reflect official opposition to marriage to, or the emigration of, Soviet citizens.

Other Working Conditions for Business Offices. International communication links continue to be limited. Some offices of Western businesses in Moscow have received new telephone lines which permit direct dialing out of the U.S.S.R. A number of resident U.S. firms have sought and been promised by the Ministry of Communications direct dialing capability. Only a few firms have received the new service, although several others expect it in the very near future.

An active period of complaints about miscellaneous *Sovincenter* fees and restrictions on imports for Soviet staff appears to have passed with no final resolution. There have been several recent complaints regarding *Sovincenter* provision of basic support services.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The availability of economic and commercial information decreased slightly during the reporting period. Several categories have been omitted from monthly production statistics published by the Soviet Union. Further omissions occurred in early 1985, perhaps reflecting an effort to obscure the poor performance of the Soviet economy. The availability of general information of the economy remains limited and the quality of the statistical data is often poor. Access to Soviet officials for discussion of current economic development remains severely limited.

Soviet policy toward cooperation arrangements has not changed. Soviet officials encourage such cooperation under mutually beneficial terms whenever an opportunity arises, although there is some skepticism about long-term relationships with U.S. firms. We are not aware of any new complications for existing cooperation arrangements with U.S. firms.

Official Visits. In January, a U.S. delegation headed by the Under Secretary of Commerce visited the Soviet Union for working-level talks on bilateral trade issues. Some CSCE Basket II concerns, such as business operating conditions, were discussed. Business visits continue, including those by senior executives of major U.S. firms.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. The trend continues away from requiring Western firms to link specific sales contracts with purchase contracts. However, the Soviets continue to insist that companies from which they buy engage in purchasing activity in the Soviet Union.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Policies affecting small and medium-sized enterprises are not different from those affecting other companies.

Romania

General Assessment. Romanian foreign trade policy continues to stress the country's need to enlarge its trade surplus to build up foreign exchange reserves and retire foreign debt. Trade officials are under instructions to limit hard-currency imports and generally to require Western firms which conclude sales contracts with Romania to accept payment in counterpurchases of Romanian goods. Over the last several years, the proportion of Romania's trade with other soft-currency countries, and especially CMEA, has grown as total volume of trade fluctuated downward. G.D.R. 1984 trade figures, however, indicate Romania's trade volume is increasing once again. Trade with CMEA and other soft-currency countries nevertheless continues to be predominant given the G.D.R.'s reluctance to assume new hard-currency credit obligations with the West and Japan. A policy of limiting investment and reorganization of foreign trade has also contributed to a decrease in the number of contracts concluded with Western firms. While information provided U.S. businessmen working on specific projects is considered adequate, official information on the performance of the Romanian economy and international trade is tardy and incomplete. Transient and resident accommodations for businessmen are adequate though expensive and of uneven quality. Foreign firms' high local operating expenses in the face of poor sales prospects remain a significant burden to the development of trade.

Business Working Conditions. Embassy officers have generally had good access to government officials concerned with U.S.-Romanian trade and economic relations. Visiting U.S. Government officials and businessmen obtain appointments with their Romanian counterparts easily in most instances. Senior-level U.S. officials and business leaders are often received at the highest official level of the Romanian Government. Businessmen have adequate access to directors of foreign trade organizations and their staffs. However, as a result of recurring personnel changes at FTOs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, businessmen have difficulty pinpointing responsible decisionmakers for negotiations. Advance planning and appropriate notification to the U.S. Embassy generally facilitate establishment of appropriate business contacts.

During the past 6 months, there have been two openings and two closings of U.S. firms' Bucharest offices. Twenty-nine U.S. firms with separate offices are now represented in Romania. From past experience, authorities take 6–8 months or longer to process applications of Western firms to open business offices. Commercial office space in one of the several downtown hotels is commonly offered firms in Bucharest. Firms may also rent space on premises owned by the Romanian Government agency "Argus." Romanian employees of foreign businesses must be hired through Argus. The cost of maintaining business offices in Romania is high. Rents charged by official Romanian agencies are comparable to market rates in major world commercial centers. Extremely high cost of telecommunications services is an impediment to the development of commercial relations.

Acceptable hotel accommodations are available for transient businessmen at rates comparable to world commercial centers. Resident businessmen are referred to the National Tourist Office to locate housing. The search for adequate housing is difficult and time consuming. Prices for residential space are comparable with those in Western Europe, though furnishings and facilities are often inferior. Rental and utility charges have remained constant over the past few years.

Visa restrictions are minimal and business travel is not impeded.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Information for businessmen seeking Romanian commercial contacts is readily available, and Romania continues to distribute in several languages a range of information on doing business in the country. Romanian performance on publication of statistical data, however, is very poor, and is noteworthy for the omission of much basic statistical information common to government reporting elsewhere. Organized data on the performance of the domestic economy are published only once a year, generally 12–14 months after the close of the year covered. Data often are not comparable year to year, and indices are neither reliable nor adequately defined. As a result of negotiations on rescheduling of foreign debt, Romania continues to provide more financial information to foreign banks, foreign governments, and international financial institutions than it provided in the past. The requisite financial data for the first half of 1984, however, was distributed in early 1985, much later than usual.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation. As a policy, the Romanian Government promotes the concept of joint ventures and production collaboration. However, only one such venture involving a U.S. firm exists in Romania. Romania is interested in cooperating with American companies in third-country markets, particularly in the development of natural resources and large construction projects. Although such projects have been discussed, no third-country cooperation agreements with U.S. firms (except for ordinary subcontracting arrangements) have come to the attention of the Embassy.

Official Visits. The U.S.-Romanian Economic Commission and the Romanian-U.S. Economic Council ensure regular contact between senior-level U.S. officials and businessmen and their Romanian counterparts. The 1985 meetings of the commission and the council are scheduled to take place in Bucharest.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. As a result of the recent policies aimed at generating hard currency to make payments of principal and interest for reducing foreign debt, Romania has changed the emphasis of its countertrade policies. On the one hand, Romanian purchases of Western goods without countertrade have continued to decline significantly. Thus, Romanian enterprises routinely ask Western firms seeking to sell goods to take payment in counterpurchases of Romanian manufactured goods from the Ministeries of Machine Building and Machine Tools. On the other hand, U.S. firms have encountered difficulty in setting up countertrade for their products when they buy Romanian goods. Romanian organizations want U.S. firms to buy their products for hard currency and not link purchases of Romanian goods to purchases of U.S. goods. Consequently, a policy of what could be called "one-way countertrade" has developed in trade with the West.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Romania trades regularly with small and medium-sized U.S. firms. Such companies are often represented in Bucharest by agency firms, which maintain offices and so allocate the expense of establishing representation. Agency firms are also

better able to deal with Romanian pressures for counterpurchases, which might otherwise force smaller firms out of the market.

Poland

General Assessment. There has been no official change in the government's policy and attitude toward economic/commercial cooperation during the last 6 months. Relaxed passport regulations combined with the slightly improved economic situation have facilitated business travel, but generally the economic crisis has, as it did in the previous reporting period, kept Western commercial interest below normal. The Polish Government signed a debt rescheduling agreement with its commercial bank creditors and has made progress in negotiating rescheduling arrangements with its official creditors. These developments have marginally improved Poland's credit reputation and have led to the restoration of some short-term, trade-related credit facilities, which may, in the future, increase Western business interest in Poland. There has been good cooperation in permitting travel of U.S. business, commercial, and agricultural representatives to Poland. A marked increase in U.S. business travel to Poland was noted during the reporting period.

Economic difficulties persist, despite slightly improved results in 1984. Exceptionally cold weather throughout January and February set the economy back, although the initialing of a rescheduling agreement with the Paris Club creditor governments provided a bright spot in an otherwise bleak picture.

Business Operating Conditions. There were no new developments affecting access to Polish business contacts and commercial officials, which is excellent for an East European country. No American firms applied during the reporting period for permission from the Ministry of Foreign Trade to open representative firms. U.S. business representatives continue to establish so-called "Polonian" businesses, bringing the total of such U.S. operations to 70. Hotel accommodations for visiting business representatives remain available, and business representatives who wish to reside in Poland can generally find suitable housing, though it remains in short supply. There are no restrictions on business travel within Poland and, for the most part, business visas are not difficult to obtain. Air service to and from Poland is adequate.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The Western business community has full access to organization information, although the accounting methodology is different from that used in the West and, as such, is sometimes of little use to the business visitor. The government publishes regular economic statistics, which include foreign trade and industrial production data. Most of the disaggregated information is not current and does not contain enough detail to permit thorough economic analysis or adequate market research.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation. There were no changes in Poland's policies or attitudes concerning economic and commercial cooperation during the reporting period. Poland continues to seek foreign investment in underutilized or idle industrial capacity but has yet to pass enabling joint-venture legislation to encourage this process. Licensing arrangements remain possible, as well as joint production arrangements in and for third markets. There have been no major cooperative arrangements involving U.S. firms during the reporting period, though small-scale cooperative arrangements continue to be made.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Poland neither encourages nor discourages countertrade, and no new legislation relating to countertrade was passed during the reporting period. The frequency and nature of countertrade requests vary and generally are possible only in products of which Poland possesses an oversupply.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Small and medium-sized businesses have not experienced any particular problems during the reporting period, with the exception of certain firms operating under the "Polonian" law. The Polish Government levies up to 85% income tax on earnings by these firms, thus making it difficult for many of them to operate profitably. Furthermore, in February, the Parliament enacted legislation raising the mandatory escrowed safety deposit such firms pay to $5,000 from $1,000. Despite these obstacles, most Polonian firms continue to prosper, and their existence enjoys official backing when their operations help fulfill Polish Government economic aims. (Firms which would compete directly with a Polish enterprise or exporting agency are usually denied permission to operate.)

During the reporting period there has been no new legislation affecting small and medium-sized enterprises' participation in trade and industrial opportunities.

Hungary

General Assessment. Prudent central bank management has provided Hungary with reserves totalling $2.5–3 billion, more than equal to Hungary's short-term debt obligations. Net indebtedness is down to about $4–4.5 billion and has been restructured to eliminate short-term, high-interest borrowings in favor of medium-term and/or concessional interest loans. The last of the import restrictions which were introduced as a result of the 1982 liquidity crunch have been withdrawn. However, problems will remain on the current account side, as Hungary needs to seek other hard-currency markets for its agricultural goods and develop manufactured items salable in non-ruble markets in order to continue to generate a current account surplus. Fortunately for Hungary, it is seen in a highly favorable light by the international banking community, and private bank lending is available to help meet Hungary's development needs. This replaces IMF [International Monetary Fund] lending, the Fund and Hungary having mutually agreed to forego a third 1-year standby program. Cooperation between the Government of Hungary and the Fund, nonetheless, remains close in the financial sector. The larger question of restructuring the economy, which was ducked at last year's April Central Committee meeting, has been evaded once again, and therein may lie the seeds of Hungary's future problems.

Business Operating Conditions. Working conditions for Western business remained satisfactory during the reporting period. Deluxe and first-class hotel accommodations for business travelers, as well as for convention and tourist purposes, are still expanding. Medium-level, medium-priced hotel rooms are still at a premium, though several hotels in this category are undergoing renovation. Business access remains generally satisfactory. Businessmen with small and medium-sized firms still experience some difficulty and delay in getting access to end-users. On the other hand, some end-users are exercising new autonomy with recently gained foreign trading rights and have actively sought out Western business partners without a government or foreign trading organization middle man. The total number of Hungarian firms permitted

such full foreign trading rights continues to grow. The representatives of three U.S. firms with accredited offices (Pan Am, National Bank of Minneapolis, and Dow Chemical) are well-established, but costs of operations are still high. Experience shows that Hungarian laws and regulations do not formally apply to such business representatives, and services affecting everyday life in Hungary are sometimes neglected because no Hungarian office wants to take responsibility for decisionmaking, particularly in regard to issuing certain permits (e.g., rental contracts). Western firms seeking office and housing accommodations can expect considerable delays. Other facilities, such as telephone and telex, also require substantial time to obtain.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Business and commercial information, while not usually available in forms such as Western-style annual reports, is disseminated fairly freely in newspapers, journals, and specialized economic publications. Enterprise and plant visits continue to provide detailed information, since Hungarian commercial representatives and managers have shown a disposition to discuss matters freely when specific questions are posed.

Hungarian cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank (as well as a domestic realization that more data need be available) have resulted in a fundamental qualitative improvement in economic and financial information available in the West.

The number of active cooperation arrangements between U.S. and Hungarian firms remains about 60. Western companies are encouraged to explore new ways of doing business beyond traditional buying and selling and one-time-only commission work. Industrial cooperation arrangements continue to be touted as the basis for Hungary's trade expansion program. The Hungarian Government has maintained its commitment to promote joint ventures and other forms of cooperation, pursuing systematic trade promotion and marketing in U.S. regions. In late 1982, the Hungarians announced new, more liberal regulations on the possibility of new investors utilizing duty-free zones in the country. So far they have not proven to be a substantial inducement in expanding foreign investment.

Official Visits. Hughes Aircraft, McDonald's, Tenneco, General Motors, and General Foods sent major trade missions to Hungary during the reporting period.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Hungarian enterprises continue to demand countertrade arrangements, although Hungarian banks downplay strict countertrade arrangements as true business enhancers.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Hungarian policies toward small and medium-sized enterprises do not differ significantly from the general pattern described above.

German Democratic Republic

General Assessment. Cooperation during the last 6 months in the fields of economics, science, and technology continued at about previously noted levels.

Business Working Conditions. Access to G.D.R. officials was somewhat improved during this reporting period, particularly during the 1985 Leipzig Spring Fair. The G.D.R. continues to require prior approval for U.S.-G.D.R. business and social contacts. Foreign businesses are required to deal through a limited number of G.D.R. service organizations, effectively curtailing their contacts with G.D.R. officials.

Five U.S. companies now have offices in Berlin, an increase of one during this reporting period. Operating conditions for established offices remain unchanged. Two are staffed by G.D.R. citizens, one by an Austrian national, and one by a Belgian national. Western firms wishing to establish offices in East Berlin are required to rent space either in the International Trade Center, which has strict access controls, or in a building which is only for the use of the firm.

Visiting businessmen are normally required to stay in expensive hotel accommodations which require payment in convertible currencies. However, less expensive accommodations and payment in G.D.R. marks is permitted in cities lacking first-class hotels. Travel is virtually unrestricted, and no U.S. business representatives have complained to the Embassy about unavailability of hotel accommodations.

Resident business representatives are permitted to rent but not buy housing in the G.D.R. Available housing is usually expensive and standards vary, although some is quite good. All housing services must be obtained through a state-operated agency which determines the rent as well as the location of housing for foreigners.

Restrictions on travel and visas for foreign business representatives have not caused problems to the Embassy's knowledge. Persons in possession of G.D.R. hotel vouchers are generally issued visas upon arrival at border-crossing points. In addition, visas for day visits to Berlin (East) are obtainable at designated Berlin-sector crossing points with little delay. Eastern business representatives residing in or maintaining offices in the G.D.R. are often issued multiple-entry visas valid for 1 year. Nonresident business representatives generally receive one-entry visas unless multiple-entry visas have been requested on their behalf by a G.D.R. trading partner.

All visitors to the G.D.R. including nonresident foreign business representatives are required to exchange approximately $10 per day into G.D.R. marks. Any unspent G.D.R. marks cannot be converted back into Western currency but must be either forfeited or deposited in a special account for use upon the visitor's return.

G.D.R. customs regulations prohibit the importation of printed material with the word "German" in the text or in the address. This has continued to create certain problems when business literature containing this word arrives and cannot be distributed.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The type, quality, and timeliness of economic and commercial information released by the G.D.R. is considered unsatisfactory by Western business. The main source of G.D.R. economic data is the Annual Statistical Yearbook published by the G.D.R. State Central Administration for Statistics. The yearbook is not issued on a timely basis; it is usually 10–15 months late. The small portion devoted to foreign trade usually lumps export and import figures together in one number. Furthermore, Western business representatives often question the reliability of the information provided.

The G.D.R. foreign trade bank (*Deutsche Aussenhandels Bank*) annual report offers only highly aggregated information on the hard currency value of G.D.R. imports and exports and provides no specifics on G.D.R. foreign debt. It does not fully serve the needs of banks and firms seeking to evaluate potential business relationships. The

G.D.R. also does not provide information on total balance of payments, aggregate net and gross foreign debt, cash flow projections, and statements of sources and uses of funds.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. Joint ventures involving joint ownership and foreign ownership of business in the G.D.R. are not permitted under G.D.R. law. However, the G.D.R. is interested in engaging in joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements in third countries. A few French and Austrian firms have been involved with the G.D.R. in such cooperative ventures in third markets. The G.D.R. prefers to pay for Western technological investment by shipping products back to the Western partner under countertrade arrangements.

The first joint manufacturing effort between the G.D.R. and U.S. industry was agreed to in October 1984. The accord called for the production of compact "M-25" G.D.R. trucks in Columbus, Ohio, over the next 5 years. U.S. participants are "Technik and Trade" of Cleveland, and "Trident Motors" of Columbus. A major new cooperative arrangement was also concluded in late 1984 with Volkswagen for production of VW engines in the G.D.R.

Official Visits. There were no significant visits of an economic or commercial nature during this reporting period.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. The G.D.R. actively seeks countertrade arrangements to avoid paying in hard currency. The G.D.R. will usually seek to purchase goods abroad only on condition that payment for the imported goods will be in G.D.R. goods rather than hard currency. Cooperation agreements for production with the G.D.R. are often coupled with "buy-back" features. Most U.S. firms dislike these arrangements, especially since they often experience difficulties in obtaining the type, quantity, or quality of goods desired. G.D.R. pressure for countertrade may ease with improvements in the G.D.R.'s hard currency situation.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises do not generally encounter problems different from those faced by larger enterprises.

Czechoslovakia

General Assessment. The past 6 months saw no substantial change in Czechoslovakia's economic policies. Trade with the Soviet Union and other "socialist" countries rose faster than other trade in 1984 and accounted for nearly 77% of total trade. Foreign financial policy remained conservative as Czechoslovakia continued to reduce its net hard-currency debt and to refrain from taking on significant debt obligations with "nonsocialist" countries.

Political relations with the United States remained cool during this period, and there was little significant activity in commercial relations between the two countries. Bilateral actions of note included a 1-year extension of the Civil Aviation Agreement which permits Czechoslovak Airlines to continue operating to New York and the negotiation of a voluntary restraint arrangement (VRA) on steel exports to the United States which should permit Czechoslovak steel products to retain a place in the U.S. market.

Contacts between foreign businessmen and their Czechoslovak counterparts are strictly controlled by the Czechoslovak Government. Foreign businessmen often find it frustrating and time-consuming to attempt to do business with Czechoslovakia. To some extent, however, this is due to the cumbersome and bureaucratic nature of the system rather than to any specific discrimination against foreigners. It is difficult, in most cases, for businessmen to make initial contacts with end-users. Such contacts are generally possible only after relations have been established with foreign trade organizations.

Business Operating Conditions. No new American business offices were established during this period nor were any existing offices closed. One U.S. firm is reported to have made an agreement with a local FTO to establish a significant inventory and sales organization which will promote its business in areas of advanced technology. One U.S. firm reported that it faces the loss of the lease on its local office space which is being rented from a private landlord. Other U.S. firms with offices in Prague appear to have adequate space, generally in convenient locations, but firms faced with losing existing space would probably have problems in locating suitable space quickly.

There are no resident American businessmen. Other resident Western businessmen appear to have suitable housing. Some is obtained through official Czechoslovak offices; others are able to locate space and arrange accommodation directly with private landlords.

Visas for foreign businessmen are generally not a problem. It may be difficult to obtain visas due to the small number of Czechoslovak visa-issuing offices abroad. Visas are rarely denied to businessmen, except in the case of businessmen who were originally Czechoslovak citizens.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Many foreign business and government analysts continue to believe that the extent and timeliness of economic/commercial information made available in Czechoslovakia is inadequate. The detail of available information in the foreign trade area, for example, is not sufficient for many market research purposes. Information on plans for investment for the new 5-year plan (1986–90) is very limited. To some extent, this is a result of continuing discussion and lack of final decisions of the matter; more importantly, however, it is the reflection of a policy of limiting availability of economic/commercial information.

There is no joint venture law in Czechoslovakia so there is no opportunity for direct foreign investment in Czechoslovakia. There are, however, a considerable number of Czechoslovak-owned and -controlled firms in Western countries. These firms generally are involved in promoting sale of Czechoslovak goods, maintaining inventories, and in installing and providing service for Czechoslovak equipment. In the United States, such firms are involved, for example, in sale of machine tools, motorcycles, textile equipment, and other manufactured items.

In Czechoslovakia, long-term cooperation agreements exist with some Western firms. We are not aware of significant agreements of this type involving U.S. firms.

During this period, progress was made on implementation of licensing agreements with U.S. firms in the petrochemical industry which were signed during the previous period. Negotiations continued on some additional licenses for technology in this industry.

Official Visits. Deputy Special Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer visited Czechoslovakia in March to negotiate a voluntary restraint arrangement on exports of steel to the

United States. Agreement in principle was reached, and it is anticipated that final details on wording of the arrangement will be worked out quickly. Conclusion of this understanding would permit Czechoslovakia to continue exporting to the United States a modest quantity of steel (i.e., up to 40,000 tons per year) related to its traditional exports in this market as part of the arrangement. Dumping actions which were brought against Czechoslovakia by U.S. steel producers in this period will be withdrawn.

The sixth plenary session of the U.S.-Czechoslovak Economic Council was held in Prague, October 29–31. Representatives of over 50 U.S. and Czechoslovak industrial firms, banks, and government agencies participated in the session, which reviewed the course of U.S.-Czechoslovak commercial relations and considered problems and solutions affecting such trade. In February, the U.S. section selected a new chairman to replace the outgoing chairman.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Development David Diebold visited Prague to take part in the economic council session.

The CEO and chairman of a major Fortune 500 consumer goods producer visited Prague in November for discussion with government officials and business partners. A number of other U.S. businessmen, including representatives of most major banks, also visited Czechoslovakia.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Czechoslovak firms continue to request countertrade commitments in dealings with U.S. firms. The Czechoslovak Government states that countertrade is not official commercial policy of the government. During this period, one U.S. firm in the capital goods industry signed a letter of intent under which it would purchase $10 million worth of Czechoslovak components for its U.S. and European production. The letter follows major purchases of the U.S. firm's equipment for use in a Czechoslovak project in a third market. In general, U.S. firms have not reported that Czechoslovak countertrade demands are unduly onerous. In some instances, U.S. firms have instituted on their own significant purchases from Czechoslovakia unrelated to specific Czechoslovak purchases in the belief that the goodwill engendered by such purchases could be beneficial even in the absence of specific countertrade demands.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. No developments indicating changes in policy toward small and medium-sized enterprises came to our attention during this period. Private enterprises continue to be restricted to some private agricultural production and small service businesses. At least one regional government organization pointed out during this period that a larger number of permits had been given to small service personnel during this period.

Bulgaria

General Assessment. Although Bulgaria continues its heavy orientation toward the CMEA, it has shown a parallel interest in increased trade with the developed West. There are both economic and political reasons to manifest "normal" contacts with the West. The Soviet Union continues to demand higher quality goods from its CMEA partners, and Bulgaria has responded by attempting to modernize its facilities. Most investment projects have been directed towards renovation.

The harsh 1984–85 winter may have jeopardized Bulgarian efforts in industrial intensification as authorities were forced to spend scarce hard currency for energy.

Bulgarians still produce low-quality products. They are fully cognizant of their need to rely on Western licenses, processes, and equipment. For this reason, Bulgarians generally give red carpet treatment to businessmen who might provide certain technologies. Businessmen who represent industries that do not interest the Bulgarians encounter difficulties.

Business Working Conditions. Although Bulgarian officials now seek expanded contacts with Western business in selected high-technology areas, business conditions have not improved noticeably during the period.

No U.S. firms opened business offices in Bulgaria during the period. Many U.S. businessmen remain hesitant about entering into business relationships with Bulgarians. Bulgarian joint venture laws are unrealistic and too bureaucratic for most profit-conscious Western businessmen. Bulgarian officials have made positive overtures toward the U.S. Government signaling Bulgaria's desire for increased bilateral trade.

Bulgarian authorities have not taken any steps during the period to improve accommodations for Western businessmen. Hotel accommodations suitable for Western businessmen are expensive. Resident Western businessmen are subject to complex rules and procedures regarding permanent housing. Rents for offices are quite high. Bulgaria is considered a hardship post by almost all resident Western businessmen. All foreign business will eventually be required to locate at a Moscow-styled "International Trade Center" when its construction is completed.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The Bulgarians disseminate relatively little useful economic information and eliminate any references to local economic problems. For example, the 1984 Statistical Yearbook omitted a standard section on overall agricultural production (which confirmed that 1984 was a bad year for agriculture in Bulgaria).

Official Visits. There were no official U.S. visits during the period.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Toward the end of the period, countertrade demands by the Bulgarians appeared to be on the rise, probably reflecting the hard currency difficulties brought on by the scramble to obtain energy. The rise in countertrade demands has been especially significant toward Western European countries and Greece in particular. However, countertrade demands are not made against the highest priority goods such as electronic components. The Bulgarians always seem to find ample hard currency to make purchases in this area.

Chapter Four

Implementation of Basket III: Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Basket III is intended to promote the free flow of information, ideas, and people among the participating states.

This section of the Final Act contains specific measures which the participating states resolve to undertake to foster human contacts, improve access to information, and promote cultural and educational exchanges. Basket III and Principle Seven of Basket I, strengthened by provisions of the Madrid concluding document, constitute the principal human rights provisions of the Helsinki process.

HUMAN CONTACTS

In the Final Act, participating states commit themselves to facilitate family reunification and meetings, marriage between citizens of different states, wider travel for business or professional reasons, improvement in the conditions of tourism, meetings among young people, and sports contacts.

In addition, the Madrid concluding document contains a number of provisions that strengthen and extend the human contacts commitments in the Final Act. The participating states have pledged: to deal favorably with applications for family meetings, reunification, and marriage; to decide upon marriage and family reunification applications within 6 months; to ensure that rights of applicants for family reunification are not prejudiced; to provide necessary forms and information to applicants for emigration; to reduce emigration fees; to inform emigration applicants of decisions expeditiously; to assure access to diplomatic missions; and to facilitate contacts among representatives of religious faiths.

Family Visits

To some extent, the Helsinki process has led to freer travel policies in the East, but much remains to be done to achieve CSCE goals in this field. In general, the Eastern countries have maintained a policy of stringently limiting and controlling their citizens' movement abroad. It should be noted that the U.S.S.R. has ratified the UN Charter and other international documents on human rights, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in which the right to leave one's country and return thereto is enumerated. But in practice, the regime denies Soviet citizens this right. Travel outside the U.S.S.R. is prohibited except for the departure of limited numbers of authorized personnel. Even in those cases, travel is restricted primarily to Eastern countries and is under strict government control. The reunification of divided families is the only officially recognized basis for emigration from the Soviet Union, but the actual Soviet record of compliance even in this regard is poor.

Restrictive practices in the countries of Eastern Europe vary considerably. Some countries are nearly as restrictive as the Soviet Union. Others have been relatively lenient in allowing their citizens to travel abroad.

The U.S. Government regularly intercedes with Eastern governments on behalf of relatives of American citizens who have been refused permission to emigrate to join their families in the United States. U.S. Embassies abroad submit periodic lists of these people to local governments. The accompanying table shows the number of these cases being monitored officially by the United States as of April 1, 1985.

Soviet Union. Soviet practices concerning family visits remain as described in previous semiannual reports. In general, few Soviet citizens are granted exit permission to visit relatives in the United States. Most are retired and have close family members in the United States. It is rare for an entire Soviet family to receive permission to travel to the United States.

The Embassy has no access to statistics on the number of people granted exit permission by the Soviet authorities for visiting the United States. During the period October 1, 1984–March 31, 1985, the Embassy and consulate general issued U.S. visas to 557 Soviet citizens for private visits to the United States.

The Soviet authorities often arbitrarily refuse visas to U.S. citizens seeking to visit relatives in the U.S.S.R. During the period covered by this report, some Americans have been denied the opportunity to visit their Soviet spouses and fiances.

Officers of the U.S. Embassy continue to make regular representations to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on behalf of Soviet applicants for U.S. visitors' visas. Regrettably, during the reporting period, the Soviet authorities did not reverse any earlier refusals of exit permission.

Romania. Most of the 849 tourist visas issued to Romanians during the reporting period were for visits to relatives in the United States. This represents a decline from the level of the previous reporting period, part of which is due to seasonal factors. In general, opportunities for Romanian citizens to travel to the West are rare.

Divided Family Cases

	Nuclear Families[1]		Non-nuclear Families[2]	
	Cases	*Individuals*	*Cases*	*Individuals*
Soviet Union	108	381[3]	—	—
Romania	82	122	554	1073
Poland	187	384	269	871
Hungary	2	4	0	0
G.D.R.	0	0	8	19
Czechoslovakia	1	1	2	8
Bulgaria	10	18	2	5

[1]Spouses and their minor children.
[2]These cases involve the separation of other relatives such as brothers and sisters.
[3]Figures for the U.S.S.R. include both nuclear and non-nuclear families.

By contrast, relatives of Romanians are encouraged to visit Romania and rarely encounter problems obtaining entry visas.

Passport issuance procedures are arbitrary and unpredictable, and only those persons approved by the Communist Party are assured of receiving tourist passports. Many Romanians who would appear to qualify under Romanian law are refused without explanation. Others may receive tourist passports only after months, sometimes years, of waiting. Rarely are entire families issued passports at the same time for a visit abroad. Usually at least one member of the immediate family must stay behind to ensure that his relatives return. Should the traveler(s) not return to Romania, it is often years before the remaining member(s) will be permitted to leave the country. Family members remaining in Romania often endure considerable pressure to divorce or renounce those who have left and are harassed if they refuse.

Although some visitors obtain Romanian visas in advance of travel, the majority arrive at Bucharest's international airport or at land borders without visas. Entry permission is almost always granted on the spot and the fee is moderate ($11.50). First-degree relatives of Romanian citizens are exempt from the prohibition against staying at other than government-run facilities, as well as from the requirement to purchase $10.00 of local currency per day of the anticipated stay.

Poland. The liberalization of passport issuance announced at the end of martial law in July 1983 and enacted into law during the spring of 1984 has led to a relative easing of difficulties associated with travel to the United States.

The Embassy estimates that about 23,000 exit permits were issued for visits to family members in the United States during the reporting period. The number of visas issued by the Embassy and consulates in Poland was 18,039.

A notarized letter of invitation, signed by a friend or relative and verified by a Polish consulate in the United States, is required in order to obtain a tourist passport. The letter is considered valid for 6 months from the date of verification. Despite the liberalized issuance policy, many Poles, particularly professionals, still experience problems in obtaining passports. Difficulties in obtaining passports for travel to the U.S. are threefold:

- Applicants must obtain an invitation certified by a Polish consulate in the United States. Since these invitations are valid for only 6 months and often expire before the passport has been issued, a second invitation is required in many cases.
- Passports are often denied to immediate family members of individuals who left Poland on tourist passports and failed to return.
- Trained professionals such as engineers, doctors, and skilled artisans are considered essential personnel and often cannot obtain passports for unofficial travel.

The U.S. Embassy knows of no restrictions or difficulties for Americans visiting their relatives in Poland.

Hungary. During the preceding 6 months, 2,060 visas were issued for family visits to the United States. The decrease from the previous 6-month period reflects a normal seasonal adjustment. The figure is up slightly from 1,772 in the equivalent period a year ago. The figures indicate a continued liberal approach to family visitation by the Hungarian Government.

The two most frequent reasons for denying exit permits to Hungarians who wish to visit the United States are insufficient time (less than a year) since the last visit to the West or insufficient proof of the ability of the U.S. sponsor to provide support. Also, a Hungarian usually may not visit a person who has remained away from Hungary under circumstances considered illegal under Hungarian law until 5 years have elapsed. An exit permit may also be denied if the potential visitor is responsible for a close relative having remained abroad illegally. An official statement published in the Hungarian press claims that 99% of applications for travel to the West and 98.6% of applications for travel to socialist countries are approved. The U.S. Embassy doubts that the figure is so high but has no statistics to dispute it.

Visas are seldom denied to Americans for family visits to Hungary. The Foreign Ministry never supplies reasons for the 5–6 annual refusals of which the Embassy is aware but considers Embassy requests for review, sometimes with positive results.

Some Hungarian males of military age are receiving exit permits for tourist (although not immigration) travel to the West which probably would have been denied several years ago. The Hungarian authorities have published regulations that provide prospective travelers with military obligations an indication of their rights. They indicate that normally an applicant in this category may not be denied permission to travel because of pending military obligations unless service is scheduled to begin within 6 months. This is apparently a step to increase the predictability and reduce the arbitrariness of the travel system as applied to applicants of military age.

German Democratic Republic. The G.D.R. continues to limit severely travel by its citizens to the United States or noncommunist countries for family visits. The approval or denial of applications for such travel is a political decision. The criteria for these decisions are not made public. As an exception, pensioners (age 60 for women and 65 for men) are generally permitted to travel to the West. As a rule, nonpensioners can apply to visit close relatives only on the occasion of a specified family event, such as a death, birth, life-threatening illness, wedding, 25th or 50th wedding anniversary celebration, confirmation, first holy communion, and 60th, 65th, 70th, 75th, and any further birthday celebrations.

In all cases, an applicant wishing to travel in the West must provide documentation proving both the relationship and the purpose of his travel. The total number of applications submitted and denied is not publicly available, but many applicants in the above categories are refused permission to travel.

During this reporting period, the Embassy issued 477 visas for family visits to the United States. We are aware of only one case in which an American citizen has been refused permission to visit the G.D.R. since December 1982.

G.D.R citizens in positions deemed "sensitive" by the government may not be visited by close relatives who live in the West. Emigrants from the G.D.R. must generally wait 5 years before they can return to the G.D.R. to visit relatives.

Czechoslovakia. The travel of Czechoslovak citizens to the West continues to be severely restricted, although the actual number of travelers from all categories has increased somewhat. Exit permits were issued for 1,300 visits to family members in the United States during the past 6 months. An equal number of U.S. visas were issued for such visits, a decrease of 15 visas over the same period a year ago.

Most Czechoslovak citizens allowed to travel easily to the United States to visit relatives are retired and elderly. Persons in the work force are not usually allowed to travel abroad with all members of their immediate family. Most U.S. citizens obtain visas to visit Czecholovakia without difficulty, often in 1 day. Many U.S. citizens of Czechoslovak origin, however, continue to be refused visas with no explanation, sometimes after receiving several visas in the past. The Embassy has made representations to the host government on behalf of 6 such citizens during the reporting period. Since the replies received from the Foreign Ministry are often equivocal (e.g., "the person should reapply at the Embassy in Washington, D.C."), we do not know what our success rate is, although we estimate it at around 30%. We have received suggestions from the host government that citing special humanitarian considerations—extreme age or serious illness of family members—may be helpful. In a few such cases, our representations seem to have been successful.

Bulgaria. Exit permit issuance policy is uneven. U.S. tourist visas were issued to 226 Bulgarians during the past 6 months, many for visits to family in the United States. It is usually easier for Bulgarians to obtain permission to see parents, children, or siblings residing in the United States than more distant relatives or friends. Permission is likely to be denied or delayed if the U.S. relative was a highly publicized defector.

Bulgarian citizens must provide an affidavit of support from their U.S. relatives when they apply for a passport and exit visa. Delays in issuance extend from months to years. The delays sometimes appear arbitrary, and some administrative units appear more willing to issue the necessary documents than others. Ethnicity continues to play a role in visa issuance. The Turkish Embassy reports that no persons from the ethnic Turkish community have left Bulgaria legally during the period. The government has suspended issuing passports valid for travel to Turkey. Americans wishing to visit Bulgarian relatives still face difficulties once they reach Bulgaria. Despite official efforts to encourage persons born in Bulgaria to return, these persons face problems in obtaining permission to reside with their Bulgarian relatives during the visit, and registration procedures are cumbersome and time-consuming.

Family Reunification

Soviet Union. Soviet authorities continued their poor performance in fostering family reunification during the period October 1, 1984–April 1, 1985. While they continue to recognize family reunification as the only grounds for issuing exit permission, their definition of "family reunification" is now so narrow that, in practice, only immediate family members receive exit permission. In some cases, the authorities have refused exit permission if any applicant in a family has more relatives in the Soviet Union than in the United States. During the reporting period, 65% of all Soviet emigration cases to the United States involved the reunification of spouses. Of the remaining cases, half involved the reunification of parents with children and half were cases of reunification of siblings. The Soviet authorities continue to deny applications for exit permission on the grounds that applicants had access to "state secrets"—a broad and undefined concept. In many cases, applicants have been denied exit permission with no reason given or with only the vague comment that "your emigration is not feasible at this time" or "the international situation does not warrant your emigration."

During the period in question, persons who received exit permission to emigrate to the United States reported that it took from 1 month to 1 year. The authorities responded to applications for exit permission in an average of 3–4 months. Sixty percent of those persons joining a relative other than a spouse had been refused exit permission on an earlier application. Emigration officials continue to refuse to accept certain applications for emigration to join family members in the United States. In these cases, the spouse left the U.S.S.R. with temporary exit permission and applied for refugee status in the United States. In other cases, the relative in the United States obtained exit permission to go to Israel, but then went to the United States. In both the foregoing categories, the Soviets refuse to recognize the U.S. relative's invitation to Soviet family members.

During the reporting period, 28 Soviet nationals applied for U.S. immigrant visas for family reunification. In addition, 39 Soviet citizens applied for reunification with relatives in the United States under the Accelerated Third-Country Processing Program (ATCP).

Immigrant visas were issued for 28 family reunification cases, compared with 45 issued in the previous reporting period. Under the ATCP program, 39 persons were documented for admission to the United States, compared with 48 during the previous reporting period. Fifty percent of all persons in both programs were Armenians.

It is difficult to estimate the number of Soviet citizens who are refused exit permission since many refusals are not reported to the Embassy. The Embassy now has on file, however, 414 immigrant and fiance(e) visa petitions. In addition, approximately 1,000 other families, comprising approximately 3,000 persons, expressed interest in being reunited with relatives in the United States through the ATCP Program. Some individuals have been seeking Soviet exit permission for more than a decade. The Embassy also has a list of 1,763 individuals who have repeatedly been denied Soviet exit permission to Israel but continue to apply. From October 1, 1984, to February 28, 1985, a total of 327 Jews departed the Soviet Union via Vienna, the primary exit point. This compares with 423 during the corresponding period 1 year ago and 18,876 5 years ago. A large number of Soviet citizens continue to apply for emigration to the F.R.G., although only 273 were successful from September 1, 1984, through February 28, 1985, as compared to 523 for the corresponding period in 1984. It remains clear that each year several thousand Soviet citizens apply for and are denied exit permission to join relatives abroad.

While there continues to be considerable interest in U.S. interventions in support of Soviet citizens applying for exit permission, Soviet authorities have been completely unresponsive to these representations during the reporting period. In every case in which the authorities have responded to an Embassy representation on behalf of a divided family, the response has been negative. The Embassy maintains a representation list which contains names of Soviet citizens who have repeatedly been denied permission to join relatives in the U.S. over the past 6 months. Only one case involving one person has been favorably resolved.

Romania. Host government performance has improved somewhat during the current reporting period, both in terms of waiting time and numbers of family reunification cases resolved. There are, however, a large number of unresolved cases. The average waiting period from initial application to final approval is well in excess of the 6 months envisaged in the Madrid con-

cluding document. Embassy experience is that a minimum of 8–12 months is required in the average family reunification case. Official Romanian policy remains opposed to emigration for purposes other than family reunification. For would-be emigrants, the application process remains a frustrating and uncertain experience which entails real hardships and often lengthy delays. Applicants nearly always face reduction of job status and wages or, in some cases, reportedly, outright dismissal, along with loss of public services. Many are exposed to public denunciation in one form or another, and their children may be discriminated against at school. Finally, access by visa applicants to the Embassy consular section is carefully controlled by Romanian militia guards. Periodically, would-be applicants are prevented from entering our compound. Others have been warned by officials not to approach the Embassy.

The number of Romanians applying for U.S. entry documents to be reunited with their relatives was 1,188 during this reporting period. Emigration visas and third-country processing (TCP) cases completed during the reporting period were 172 and 1,634 respectively. Approximately 30% of TCP issuances are for the purpose of family reunification. Also, 473 visas "91," "92," and "93" cases were issued entry documents during the reporting period.

The Embassy has found it necessary and useful to present the government with a representation list of outstanding emigrant visa cases each quarter. The government has been reasonably responsive to the Embassy's representations, with a few notable exceptions. Of the 198 cases (544 persons) on the Embassy's October 1984 representation list, 35 cases (64 persons) have now been resolved. Taking into account additions to the list since October, the Embassy expects to present the Romanian Government with a list of approximately 200 cases (550 persons) in early April.

The cost of Romanian exit documents is exorbitant in relation to the Romanian worker's average monthly income (2,500 *lei*). A Romanian passport (with citizenship) and exit visa costs 1,165 *lei*, and the cost of an extension of the exit visa is 965 *lei*. The cost of a stateless passport is also 1,165 *lei*, but renunciation of Romanian citizenship adds an additional 3,000 *lei* to this figure. (One U.S. dollar equals 13.50 *lei*.)

Poland. The Polish Government is apparently taking the problem of family reunification more seriously than in the recent past. During the reporting period, the Embassy's list of divided families has grown more slowly than previously. The Embassy's divided families list contains the names of families who have been denied permission to emigrate to rejoin their family members in the United States. As not all such individuals inform the Embassy of their problems, the list is not comprehensive. On April 1, 1985, the list contained the names of 446 families consisting of 1,257 individuals.

During this 6-month period, approximately 1,150 individuals applied for emigrant visas to join family members. During the past 6 months, 1,118 emigrant visas were issued for the purpose of family reunification. The Embassy further facilitated the travel of 233 spouses and children of asylees and refugees to the United States for family reunification.

Embassy representation appears to be helpful in many cases on the divided families list. The Embassy is unable to measure precisely the impact of its interventions, as the Polish Government does not indicate whether issuance of an emigration passport is linked with U.S. representations. Many recent issuances appear to be based on the provisions of the new passport law.

In this period, a total of 9 families involving 20 persons were added to the Embassy's divided families lists, while 9 cases involving 18 persons were resolved. If Polish citizens going to the United States to join nuclear family members are considered separately, 5 cases involving 13 persons have been added to the divided families list in the reporting period, while 4 cases involving 10 persons were resolved.

Hungary. Hungarian performance on family reunification continues to be good. In many recent cases the government has granted emigration permission to achieve family reunification at the first application even though the applicant may have been ineligible under the strict application of Hungarian law.

After a period of few or no divided family and emigration problem cases, the Embassy now counts three cases of eight persons. Two are divided families and one an emigration problem. One divided family case was solved during the last 6 months. The current list was presented in February. The Embassy believes that the divided family problems stem from lower-level officials strictly applying Hungarian law to the applicants. A favorable solution to the divided family cases is expected; the emigration case would involve an extraordinary application of a relief clause in Hungarian law.

During the reporting period, 38 Hungarians applied for immigrant visas for family reunification, and the Embassy issued 38 visas for the same purpose. There are several official reasons for refusing emigration permission.

- Requesting emigration to a relative remaining abroad illegally for a period of less than 5 years or for whose illegal absence one is responsible;
- Not having attained the legal minimum age for emigration (55);
- Requesting emigration to a relative not prescribed by law;
- Lack of permission from the Hungarian Ministry of Defense—in the case of males of military age who have not partly or completely fulfilled their military obligation; and
- Emigration would be contrary to the public interest or a combination of the above.

An emigration passport costs 1,000 *forints* (approximately $20.00). Minors under 14 are included at no extra charge. In addition, there is a passport application fee of 250 *forints* (approximately $5.00). If the passport application is refused, the cost of the passport is refunded, but the application fee is forfeited.

German Democratic Republic. The G.D.R. issued approximately 5,000 emigration visas during this reporting period. Many of these people left for family reunification. The number of visas issued after a surge in early 1984 was consistent with previous years, when an average of 600–1,000 visas were issued monthly. Only a fraction of those desiring to leave the G.D.R. have been allowed to do so. Some Western sources estimate that as many as 500,000 applications are pending.

During this reporting period, the G.D.R. gave wide publicity to a claim that 20,000 prior emigres to West Germany now wanted to return to live in East Germany, many for family reunification reasons. Shortly afterward, G.D.R. authorities announced that some applications to return would be approved, particularly cases of families with children. As yet, there are no reports of anyone actually returning under this program, and it appears that only a few may actually apply and be admitted.

An October 1983 G.D.R. law on emigration addresses only emigration for reunification with "first-degree" relatives (parents and children) or joining a spouse. While some applicants with relatives in the West who are not first degree have been allowed to

emigrate, the law has in general been used restrictively against those who do not have first-degree relatives in the West.

The experiences of exit visa applicants vary. In most cases, applicants wait at least a year for exit permission from the G.D.R., but some cases have taken 3 or more years. While some East Germans have been able to lead normal lives after submitting an exit visa application, others have been subject to reprisals of varying degrees of severity. Some human rights groups believe that half of the estimated 7,000–10,000 political prisoners in the G.D.R. were imprisoned after filing for exit permission or attempting to leave the G.D.R. illegally. Some applicants have lost their jobs or have had to take menial work. G.D.R. authorities sometimes visit the homes of exit applicants to try to intimidate them into withdrawing their application. Occasionally children face discrimination and harassment in school. Successful applicants must usually renounce their G.D.R. citizenship and are issued stateless passports.

G.D.R. officials commonly tell applicants that it is "not possible" to submit an exit application, but if applicants persist with submission of a written statement, it will generally be accepted by G.D.R. authorities as a de facto application. Applicants are usually not informed of the status of their case until a final decision is made. Denial of the application is given orally without explanation, and some people thus refused are advised that any future applications could lead to difficulties with the police or worse.

A few G.D.R. citizens who have applied for emigration to the F.R.G. or West Berlin intend eventually to join relatives in the United States. Others apply for emigration directly to the United States, though they intend to remain in the F.R.G. or West Berlin. It is, therefore, difficult to know the exact number of persons allowed to leave the G.D.R. for family reunification in the United States. Some applicants who have been given very limited periods as deadlines for leaving the G.D.R. have been documented for a U.S. destination to enable them to meet G.D.R. exit requirements.

The continued G.D.R. practice of severely limiting access to Western missions has inhibited potential emigrants from visiting these missions to inquire about emigration procedures. Virtually all nonofficial visitors to the U.S. Embassy can expect to be stopped by G.D.R. police, have identification cards checked, and possibly be detained following their visit to the Embassy. Many East Germans have been warned to have no contact with Western missions, under threat to their well-being, and some people have been required to sign a document acknowledging that visiting a foreign mission without permission is a violation of G.D.R. law which makes them subject to prosecution.

The Embassy makes representations to the G.D.R. by periodically presenting a list of cases of direct interest to U.S. citizens. Lists given to the Foreign Ministry during the last reporting period included 10 cases involving 23 people who wished to go to the United States for family reunification. Seven of these cases involving 18 people were resolved by the end of this reporting period. One emigration application (three people) was denied with no reason given. The most recent list presented to the Foreign Ministry on February 13, 1985, contained 10 cases involving 27 people under family reunification. Three of the cases (nine people) were resolved in March. One additional case (one person) was added in March. Seven cases (11 people) remain unresolved.

Emigration fees are not burdensome. A passport costs about $6.00, an exit visa about $3.00.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak record on family reunification is generally good, at least regarding the immediate relatives—spouses, children, and parents—of U.S. citizens. The Czechoslovak Government does not regard married sons and daughters or siblings of U.S. citizens as needing reunification since their basic family units are with them in Czechoslovakia.

During this period, the U.S. Embassy received 29 new immigrant visa cases involving 49 persons, 9 more than during this period last year. The Embassy also received 19 new "visas 93" (family of refugees) cases involving 37 persons.

The Embassy issued 28 immigrant visas to family members of U.S. citizens and permanent residents during this period, a decrease of 5 from a year ago. Three family members of refugees (two "visas 93" cases) were also processed.

The Embassy's divided families list includes three cases (nine persons): one minor son of a U.S. citizen; two married daughters of U.S. citizens; and their children. One of the daughters of a U.S. citizen has been informed that she and her family will be allowed to renounce Czechoslovak citizenship and emigrate on stateless passports.

Immediate families of U.S. citizens are generally allowed to emigrate relatively expeditiously. However, since Czechoslovak policy is to discourage emigration of the work force, married sons and daughters of siblings of U.S. citizens frequently experience great difficulty in obtaining exit documents and often must wait many years, reapplying repeatedly before receiving exit permission. Decisions on exit documentation often seem arbitrary and as dependent on where the applicant lives and applies for permission to emigrate as on the merits of his case. The U.S. Embassy has on file approved petitions for over 100 immigrant visas but has had no word from most of those concerned since they were sent notification of their petition approval, presumably because of the difficulty in obtaining exit documentation. Families of refugees—visas "93" cases—can expect lengthy waits. Almost all have to wait until the refugee is naturalized as a U.S. citizen before they can obtain exit permission. In two cases, visas "93" beneficiaries renounced Czechoslovak citizenship in order to receive exit documentation—which was granted almost immediately. Czechoslovak families of non-Czechoslovak refugees in the United States are usually granted exit documentation without difficulty.

Assembling the documents needed to apply for emigration usually takes a minimum of 6 weeks. The processing of an emigration application takes from 6 weeks to 6 months from the date the completed application is submitted; the average time is 3 months. If the application is refused, it is possible to file an appeal within 15 days; but if it is refused a second time, the applicant must wait 3 months before submitting a new application. Often people are told it is useless to reapply, but it is rare that a new application is not accepted.

An emigrating Czechoslovak's most severe expense is often the education payment levied, in theory, to reimburse the government for university and postgraduate education. Some applicants have had to pay up to the Czechoslovak *koruna* equivalent of $1,000—6 months' wages for an average wage earner.

Bulgaria. There has been no general change in Bulgaria's attitude toward freedom of emigration. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian Government has promised to resolve 16 out of 18 of the divided family cases the U.S. Government has represented to it during the reporting period. These 18 cases involve 54 persons who should become eligible to emigrate. We expect the Bulgarian

authorities to honor their promise to allow these persons to emigrate. As of this writing, however, none of the persons involved has come to the Embassy for his visa, although we have heard informally that one woman received her Bulgarian passport.

Binational Marriages

In accordance with the Final Act, the participating states pledge to consider favorably applications for entry or exit for citizens of another participating state. There is a mixed record of implementation of this commitment by the Soviet Union and East European countries. In the Madrid concluding document, the participating states committed themselves further to deal favorably with binational marriage applications and to decide on applications in normal practice within 6 months. The following chart indicates the problem cases that the United States was monitoring as of April 1, 1985.

Soviet Union	20
Romania	49
Poland	5
Hungary	0
G.D.R.	11
Czechoslovakia	1
Bulgaria	0

Soviet Union. During the review period, 81% of the spouses whose applications were processed by the Embassy received exit permission on the first application. Of the remaining spouses, 55% were granted exit permission on the second application and 45% on the third. During this period, ten spouses who had been refused exit permission at least twice previously were again denied.

Although Soviet authorities informed the Embassy that they had introduced new procedures for fiance(e)s applying for visas to come to the Soviet Union to marry Soviet citizens, these procedures seem to have been arbitrarily enforced. None of the applicants following the new procedures has been successful in obtaining a "finance(e)" visa, although some Americans have married Soviet citizens while in the Soviet Union on tourist visas. It would seem that Soviet authorities have applied the new regulations selectively to prevent certain marriages from taking place.

Americans who marry Soviet citizens are not required to register with the Embassy or consulate general. The Embassy generally learns of binational marriages when an American files an immigration petition for a Soviet spouse or has the Embassy notarize a statement required by Soviet authorities to register the marriage. Between October 1, 1984, and March 31, 1985, 63 American citizens and permanent resident aliens requested a "marriage statement" at the Embassy and consulate general.

During the reporting period, 25 citizens were issued immigrant visas to joint American spouses. In addition, 19 Soviet citizens received exit permission and were documented for U.S. entry through the ATCP program to join spouses. The Embassy is aware of at least three cases in which fiance(e)s have sought reunification without success. Not infrequently, the American is denied a visa to enter the U.S.S.R. to marry, while the Soviet citizen is denied exit permission.

The Embassy maintains a representation list of Soviet citizens who have repeatedly been denied permission to join American citizen spouses. During the reporting period, one of these spouses received exit permission, according to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Romania. Marriage to foreigners is officially discouraged, and obtaining approval is difficult. Although most applicants are eventually successful, securing official approval is a trying and time-consuming undertaking which requires a wait of 12–24 months. There has been no appreciable change in the Romanian Government's approach to binational marriages during the reporting period. It approved 14 binational marriages during the period. The Embassy estimates that the government issued 25 exit permits and entry visas to spouses for the purpose of binational marriage. The Embassy estimates that 36 binational marriage cases were delayed more than 6 months during the reporting period.

Poland. The marriage of American citizens to Polish citizens is much easier in the United States than in Poland. The permission of a Polish court is required to marry in Poland, with the average length of court proceedings about 4 months. Complications arise from the fact that the U.S. Government does not issue documents stating that American citizens are free to marry, so the United States citizen must convince the court that he is unmarried. Also, as the Polish Government does not recognize U.S. divorces involving Polish nationals, such a divorce must be repeated in the Polish courts. This process generally takes 6 months.

The number of binational marriages is impossible to estimate, since no formal statistics are compiled on the subject. During the period October 1984 through March 1985, the Embassy issued 28 visas to Polish citizens for binational marriage. During the same period, the Polish authorities issued 28 exit permits to Polish nationals for the same purpose. No exit permits were delayed for more than 6 months. During the reporting period, the Embassy made one special representation to assist in the issuance of an emigration passport to the spouse of an American citizen. The Polish Government was reponsive to our representation and issued the passport.

Hungary. Binational marriages continued to present no problem in Hungary during the reporting period. The Embassy received or approved 25 petitions for binational marriage immigrant visas. The Embassy issued 35 immigrant visas to Hungarian spouses of American citizens and one to the spouse of a legal resident of the United States.

The percentage of cases of Hungarian males of military age who received emigration permission after having served at least a portion of their active duty requirement continued to increase. This favorable trend applies broadly to young applicants, including highly trained personnel such as physicians.

German Democratic Republic. The G.D.R. appears to be following the letter of the October 1983 law which provides that applications for binational marriage cases will be settled within 6 months of application. The G.D.R. does not consider an application to have been made until all required documents have been presented. Once the documents are accepted, permission to marry and emigrate is generally granted within 6 months, provided the couple marries in the G.D.R.

Before mid-1983, an applicant was permitted to emigrate to marry a foreigner in his home country. With the law of October 1983, this permission was generally restricted, forcing applicants to apply first for permission to marry in the G.D.R. Now emigration can normally be granted only after marriage, although the Embassy was aware of a few exceptions to this rule in December 1984 and early 1985.

Of the 13 binational marriage cases on the Embassy's list as of October 1, 1984, 8 cases were resolved during the last 6 months. One additional case previously unknown to the Embassy was

also resolved. One application to marry in the G.D.R. was denied with no reason given. Five new cases came to the Embassy's attention during the reporting period, making a total of 10 cases on the most recent list dated February 13, 1985.

Czechoslovakia. Although the processing of marriage applications is lengthy (approximately 3 months), the Czechoslovak record is generally good on binational marriages. However, in the past some U.S. citizens of Czechoslovak birth have been refused entry visas, and some Czechoslovak fiances have been refused exit visas for the purpose of marriage.

During this reporting period, 10 binational marriages came to the attention of the Embassy, the same number as a year ago.

The Embassy estimates that 10 entry permits were issued to U.S. citizens for binational marriage and that 10 exit permits were issued to spouses of U.S. citizens.

Bulgaria. There were five binational marriages during the period involving American citizens or permanent resident aliens. While the authorities do not officially discourage binational marriages, obtaining the necessary approval is a cumbersome process.

Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons

The Final Act signatories agreed to facilitate travel for personal or professional reasons. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union and most other East European countries basically do not permit personal or professional travel abroad by their citizens except under conditions of strict government control and monitoring. They generally encourage visitors from the West. However, visitors who attempt to see refuseniks or dissidents or who bring in forbidden religious articles or literary materials are subject to harassment.

Soviet Union. As a general matter, the Soviet Union encourages Western tourism. Relatively inexpensive rates are offered to large groups, which are less troublesome to program than the individual tourist, who pays for his comparative liberty at premium prices. Soviet authorities are seeking to define tourism in an increasingly narrow way which rules out contact with any Soviet citizens other than in meetings arranged by tourist agencies.

The Embassy has no means of estimating the total number of tourist and other nonimmigrant visas issued to Americans by Soviet Embassies and consulates. It appears, however, that there has been no significant reversal in the decline in the number of American tourists visiting the Soviet Union noted after the Korean Air Lines incident in September 1983. Officials of the Soviet travel agency *Intourist* have stated that as many as 60,000 tourists visited the U.S.S.R. during 1984. If such figures are accurate, the number of private Americans visiting the Soviet Union is approximately 50 times the number of Soviet citizens permitted to make private visits to the United States.

The U.S. Government travel advisory for Leningrad was lifted on March 6. Since that time, however, some American tourists have been harassed and intimidated by Soviet authorities after meeting privately with Soviet citizens.

Approximately 542 B-2 visas were issued to private Soviet visitors during the reporting period. More than 1,813 visas in other nonimmigrant categories were issued, including diplomatic, UN Secretariat, journalist, business exchange, and transit visas, as well as visas for Soviets on officially sponsored tourist trips.

Pursuant to a bilateral exchange of notes on July 30, 1984, several new categories of visa applications now require expeditious processing. The Embassy must now make a decision on applications for visas for personnel assigned to the Soviet UN Mission, as well as for Soviet officials in transit, within 7 working days. Similarly, the requirement that U.S. visas for diplomatic personnel be issued or denied within 5 working days has been expanded to include employees of the Soviet consulate general in San Francisco. The new requirements apply, *mutatis mutandis,* to the same categories of U.S. official personnel applying for Soviet visas. During the reporting period, the Embassy has noted numerous cases—mostly involving temporary assignments to the Embassy—in which the Soviets have not conformed with the time limits specified. Outside these official categories, Americans applying for visitors visas must wait varying lengths of time, depending upon the purpose of their travel and how the Soviet authorities perceive the trip. Thus, authorization may be granted in as little as 2 days; more commonly, a private visitor must wait 2-3 weeks, often until the very eve of departure, to learn whether his visa has been granted or denied. To reciprocate for the practice of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, which charges a $10.00 fee for private applications, the Embassy and consulate general on March 1, 1985, introduced a $10.00 charge for tourist and some other visas.

Romania. Opportunities for Romanian citizens to travel abroad for tourism remained restricted during the reporting period. Western tourists, on the other hand, are encouraged to visit Romania and rarely encounter problems obtaining entry visas.

The time required for Romanians to complete exit formalities varies from weeks to years. Such travel remains a rare privilege. The total cost for a new tourist passport with exit visa is 440 *lei* (about $31.00). If a person has a valid passport on file with the passport authorities, the cost of the new visa is 75 *lei.* The Embassy issued 762 tourist visas (B-2) to Romanians during the reporting period. Other nonimmigrant visas were issued to 774 Romanians during the same period.

In 1984, the government counted approximately 20,300 arrivals in Romania by Americans. Figures given to the U.S. Embassy by the government count arrivals rather than the number of visas issued, and the Embassy assumes that the number contains some multiple entries by the same individuals.

Tourist visas for the United States are normally issued on the day of application, unless a waiver of ineligibility is required. Waiver cases take from 3-5 working days to complete. U.S. visa fees are set to reciprocate the fees charged for corresponding Romanian visas. Romanian and U.S. fees are currently 98 *lei* ($7.00) for a single-entry visa and 630 *lei* ($46.00) for a multiple-entry tourist visa. Romania encourages tourism, and visas are granted freely to tourists on application abroad—usually within 3-5 working days—or upon arrival at points of entry.

American tourists generally encounter no restrictions on travel within Romania. U.S. evangelists, however, who attempt to meet with Romanian religious groups or families are likely to be questioned and warned to refrain from such activities. Purely social contacts with Romanians are also difficult, since the government officially discourages Romanians from associating with foreigners without prior approval. U.S. visitors to Romania must exchange $10.00 per day.

Poland. The Polish Government actively seeks U.S. tourism. This is an important source of hard currency for the

Polish economy. American tourists visiting Poland during the reporting period experienced few difficulties with local authorities. There are no restrictions placed upon American citizens for travel within Poland. There is, therefore, little necessity for the U.S. Government to facilitate travel and tourism by American citizens to Poland. The Embassy cannot estimate the number of tourist and other nonimmigrant visas issued to Americans desiring to visit Poland.

American visitors to Poland are required to exchange $15.00 per day at the official exchange rate. If they are visiting family in Poland, only half this amount must be exchanged.

The Embassy and constituent posts at Krakow and Poznan issued 20,095 nonimmigrant visas in the reporting period, of which 18,039 were B-2 (tourist) visas. This represents a significant increase, since less than half that number of visas were issued during the previous reporting period.

The average duration of host country exit formalities for tourist travel is 2 months. The estimated average total cost is $20.00.

The estimated average duration of the visa application process for Americans visiting Poland is unknown. The Embassy can process nonimmigrant visa applications for tourism from Polish citizens within 3 hours, unless a waiver of ineligibility must be sought for Communist Party membership. Waivers of ineligibility are obtained from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service within 7–10 days. Tourist visas cost $10.00 or the equivalent in local currency, based on reciprocity between the two countries.

Hungary. Hungarian performance continued to be comparatively good. According to official statistics, almost 5.6 million Hungarians traveled abroad in 1984, about 20% more than 1983. Of these travelers, 5.1 million went to socialist countries and 600,000 to nonsocialist countries. Travel to Hungary, particularly from nonsocialist countries, also continues to increase and is encouraged. Hungarian travel agencies continue to allow Hungarian citizens to purchase a wide variety of services, including airplane tickets, hotel rooms, and some tour costs, in *forints*, thus reducing to some extent the pressure on the private traveler to obtain convertible currency. As noted above, in many cases Hungarians may purchase tickets on Western airlines in *forints*.

Since mid-1983, more liberal provisions for Hungarians to work abroad for up to 5 years have been in force. The press reports that several hundred applications have been approved, mainly to the F.R.G. and Austria, during the reporting period. It is still too early to assess how many Hungarians will be able to take advantage of this (the regulations require that the individual have a firm job offer before application is made).

Hungarian authorities continue, however, to respond arbitrarily to applications for travel for personal or professional reasons submitted by dissidents. Some applications are approved, but others are denied or delayed without reasons being provided to the individuals concerned.

The U.S. Embassy issued 1,345 tourist visas to Hungarians during the period. Once again, seasonal factors account for the substantial decrease from the last reporting period. The figure is an increase from the equivalent period a year ago (1,109) and appears to reflect the attractiveness of purchasing air tickets in *forints*. Other nonimmigrant visas were issued to 1,298 Hungarian citizens. This is an increase from the 1,173 figure of the parallel reporting period.

Based on information received from the Hungarian Government, the estimated number of American tourists visiting Hungary during 1984 is 93,000. This is an increase of 20% over 1983 and is expected to increase by at least 15% more in 1985.

Seventy-two percent of Hungarian applicants (noncommunist affiliation waiver cases) received visas in 1–2 days. Twenty-eight percent, for whom waivers of ineligibility were required from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service in Vienna or Washington, received visas within 2 weeks (sooner—within 1 day—in emergency cases). U.S. visas cost $6 for a single entry, $9 for a double entry, and $21 for a multiple entry.

Visa fees are normally reciprocal, but it is believed that Hungarian fees are 40% higher than ours. Upon confirmation of this, which is expected shortly, the Embassy will adjust U.S. visa fees upwards.

The Hungarian Embassy in Washington and consulate in New York generally issue visas within 24–48 hours to nonofficial visitors. Visas are available at the Budapest airport and some land borders, but the Embassy is aware of 5–6 refusals annually to dual nationals. Official U.S. Government visitors are generally covered by the 7-day reciprocal agreement.

Generally, a 30-day period is necessary to receive a passport for tourism to the West. Processing for a visit to a socialist country takes 2 weeks. Exit permits for tourism, whether to the West or to socialist countries, cost 350 *forints* (approximately $7.00). In addition, the applicant must pay a postage fee of approximately $2.00 for an exit permission to a Western country. The full price for an exit permission for a family visit to a Western country is 350 *forints* (approximately $7.00). Western permits are valid for a single trip. Permits to socialist countries are for multiple trips and valid for 5 years. They have become more uniform. Western exit permits have become cheaper and socialist country permits more expensive. Previously, the price for a Western tourist permission was 600 *forints* and for a family visit, 400 *forints*. The price for socialist country visits of both types was 100 *forints*.

Hungary has no currency conversion requirement for U.S. visitors. Applicants may have to produce proof of sufficient funds to cover their planned stay and departure, particularly when extensions of stay are requested.

There are no travel restrictions except for military areas. There are no significant problems in the field of travel/tourism.

German Democratic Republic. Most G.D.R. citizens remain unable to travel to the West. Only pensioners can obtain permission to go to the West with relative ease. Exit formalities for G.D.R. citizens who travel abroad usually take 4–10 weeks. The total cost of a G.D.R. passport and visa is about $9.00.

Currency exchange requirements diminish travel to the G.D.R. by Westerners. Westerners can, however, generally obtain visas to visit the G.D.R. without difficulty. Exceptions are those who have emigrated recently from the G.D.R. or who wish to visit East German relatives who have filed exit applications.

The processing of G.D.R. tourist and business visa applications takes about 6 weeks in the United States and less time in the F.R.G. or West Berlin. If a traveler is in Berlin and purchases a voucher showing prepaid reservations in G.D.R. hotels, a visa can be obtained the same day. Day visas limited to East Berlin can be obtained by Americans in a few minutes at specified Berlin-sector crossing points.

A G.D.R. single-entry tourist or business visa costs about $5.00; a multiple entry, about $14.00. A day visa for East Berlin costs about $2.00. In addition, the official G.D.R. travel agency which processes visa applications charges those over 16 a handling fee of $22.00 per person. With the exception of most F.R.G. pensioners, who must purchase about $5.00 in G.D.R. currency per day, the G.D.R. requires those 15 and over to purchase about $10.00 and 14-year-olds to purchase about $3.00 in G.D.R. currency per day. Those under 14 are exempt from such currency conversion requirements. This money cannot be reconverted into hard currency or taken out of the G.D.R.

U.S. visitors are prohibited from traveling in areas adjacent to G.D.R. military installations, and permission must be obtained for travel within 5 kilometers of the G.D.R. border, except when entering or leaving the country.

The Embassy issued 477 tourist visas (B–2) and 460 other types of nonimmigrant visas to G.D.R. citizens during this reporting period. These represent normal figures for such a period. No information is available on how many G.D.R. visas were issued to Americans.

U.S. tourist visas are issued within 1 working day, except for cases which require waivers of ineligibility. The latter take an average of 10 days to 2 weeks and include the majority of applicants because of affiliation with communist organizations. Those wishing to travel to the United States for business reasons who are not ineligible generally wait 5 working days for a visa. A U.S. B–2 visa costs $8.00 for a single entry, $16.00 for two entries.

The U.S. Embassy has not intervened in any case involving tourism and travel.

Czechoslovakia. Theoretically, Czechoslovak citizens are allowed to travel to the West every 3 years. The actual granting of exit documentation for this purpose, however, varies considerably. Some individuals travel to the West every year; others are never allowed to leave Czechoslovakia; others may only travel to countries in Eastern Europe. One major restraint on the travel of Czechoslovaks to nonsocialist countries is the need to receive foreign currency allotments. When the Czechoslovak tourist has a guarantee from a U.S. citizen immediate relative that all expenses will be paid, the exit documentation is often forthcoming. Tourism to Czechoslovakia in general is encouraged, although former Czechoslovak citizens frequently experience difficulties in obtaining entry visas. Officially, the government is required by its own regulations to respond to all applications for exit permission within 30–60 days of submission. In fact, the process often takes much longer.

The U.S. Embassy issued 1,447 tourist visas during this period, a decrease of approximately 100 over a year ago. Total nonimmigrant visa issuance was 2,534, approximately the same as last year.

In addition to applying for passports and exit permission, persons desiring to visit countries outside the Warsaw Pact must submit an application for a hard currency allocation in January of the year in which they wish to travel. The maximum allocation is currently $380.00 based on a total of $18.00 per day per adult ($9.00 for children). In obtaining this hard currency, Czechoslovaks must pay 25 Czechoslovak *koruna* for each dollar, a rate which may approximately reflect the free market rate in the West, but one which is more than twice the current "official" ratio of *koruna* to dollars—over 12:1—given to U.S. tourists in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovaks visiting close relatives in the U.S. are not required to change more than a minimal amount, however. Czechoslovaks applying to travel also need permission from their employers and a police certificate.

U.S. tourists are required to change about $10.00 into local currency daily. Children and certain exceptional cases are required to change only half the amount. Currency exchange regulations are strictly enforced, and the Embassy frequently receives after-hour telephone calls during peak travel months from American tourists who failed to exchange enough money, allowed their visas to lapse, and found as a consequence that Czechoslovak hotels were not allowed to house them. Embassy officers have had to contact police authorities and arrange for exceptions to be made until the tourists were able to change money and extend the visas.

Tourists are not restricted in their travel around the country, although certain localities are declared off limits. However, if a tourist loses his travel and identity documentation, he usually has to wait 3–5 days before he receives exit permission. Embassy efforts to assist in hastening departure approval in such cases have met with very limited success. A 3-day delay is usually the minimum.

Bulgaria. Very few Bulgarians are permitted to visit the United States solely for tourism as opposed to family visitation. Those traveling on tourist visas for reasons other than family visitation are usually quasi-official, such as sportsmen participating in competition.

Religious Contacts

The Final Act confirms the legitimacy of religious contacts among the participating states. In the Madrid concluding document, the 35 CSCE states committed themselves to implement the Final Act further so that religious faiths and their representatives can "develop contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information." Nonetheless, as noted in more detail in the section on religious freedom in Chapter Two of this report, unfettered religious contacts and exchanges of information are actively suppressed in the Soviet Union and some East European countries, where strict state supervision of religious activities is the rule.

Soviet Union. The Soviet Government does not oppose contacts with religious groups from the West as long as only approved representatives of officially registered churches participate on the Soviet side. The Russian Orthodox Church, indeed, is an active propagandist for official Soviet policy on questions of arms control and disarmament. From February 11–13, 1985, the Russian Orthodox Church hosted a third annual roundtable discussion in Moscow on the topic of "New Dangers to the Sacred Gift of Life: Our Tasks." The discussion included a number of U.S. church leaders as well as participants from other countries.

It is not uncommon for Soviet church leaders to invite individual Western clerics to the Soviet Union. In addition to introducing such guests to places of religious and historical interests, church leaders emphasize the theme that the Soviet people sincerely want peace and that the only roadblock to reduced tensions in the world is the intransigence of Western political leaders.

Travel abroad is also allowed for certain church representatives, and a number of Soviet Baptist leaders visited various U.S. Baptist churches during the reporting period. They, like the Russian Orthodox clergy, are careful to echo official Soviet propaganda in their dealings with foreign churches.

Romania. Unofficial contacts with the outside religious world are actively discouraged and sometimes obstructed. During the current reporting period, the Romanian authorities have denied a visa to at least one Western pastor and refused entrance to at least three other religious activists in possession of valid tourist visas issued by Romanian consular officials abroad.

In December 1984, a delegation from Christian Response International succeeded in meeting with state and country officials responsible for religious affairs and with members and leaders of several religious groups, with the notable exception of Father Calciu-Dumitreasa. The group was expressly forbidden by the Romanian authorities from attempting to make contact with Father Calciu. An official request for a meeting was denied. The government appears to reward those religious groups which conform and to frustrate the efforts of others which put their religious beliefs ahead of state ideology.

Poland. The Embassy currently issues nonimmigrant visas to clergymen at the rate of approximately four per week. Most Polish clergy seem to have no difficulty in obtaining passports for travel abroad. Frequently, they are able to do this on significantly shorter notice than other travelers. As far as we are aware, representatives of various U.S. religious denominations have been able to travel to Poland without interference from the Polish Government.

Hungary. Hungary has a good record in this field. There are substantial contacts, and travel is considerable in both directions. The Embassy is not aware of particular difficulties for any denomination.

German Democratic Republic. Clergy and lay members of Western churches have been permitted to attend church synods and conferences held in the G.D.R. and some G.D.R. religious leaders have been allowed to attend similar meetings in the West. There is a small private exchange of U.S. and G.D.R. pastors.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak record on facilitating travel to Czechoslovakia by religious officials is mixed. When the proposed visit serves the purpose of the state or takes place between an officially recognized religious institution in Czechoslovakia and counterparts from Western Europe or North America, visas are usually granted with relatively little difficulty. However, the government has thus far shown no intention of allowing Pope John Paul II to visit Czechoslovakia, despite petitions, signed by thousands of Czech and Slovak Catholics, inviting him to lead celebrations scheduled for July 1985 in honor of the 1100th anniversary of the death of St. Methodius.

Unofficial or unsanctioned visits from religious groups seeking to meet for purposes considered illegal by the Czechoslovak Government, such as importing Bibles and other religious literature printed in the Czech or Slovak languages in the West, carrying on religious training, and similar activities, meet with severe punishment when discovered by the regime. Three Slovak Catholics were given sentences of 16–18 months in March 1985 for having tried to carry religious material from Poland into Czechoslovakia. Similarly, three Slovak Protestants were detained in Kosice in October 1984, allegedly with a carload of Bibles destined for the Soviet Union.

The Czechoslovak Government has also shown itself to be quite sensitive about members of Western religious peace groups who have traveled to the country to make unofficial contacts with Czechoslovak citizens, e.g., Charter 77 spokespersons.

Bulgaria. Religious institutions continued to endure tight official scrutiny, with the Bulgarian Orthodox Church enjoying a favored position. There were no significant changes noted in the frequency of religious contacts or Bulgarian policy toward proselytizing. Church sermons tended to stress matters of personal devotion. If social topics were touched on at all, the clergy was careful to hew to officially approved positions.

INFORMATION

The Final Act signatories agreed to facilitate freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage cooperation in the field of information and exchange of information with other countries, and to improve the working conditions of journalists. The Madrid document contains a number of new provisions which strengthen the Final Act. Included among these are provisions that commit the participating states to: encourage the sale and distribution of printed matter from other states; decide journalists' visa applications without undue delay; grant permanent correspondents and their families multiple-entry and -exit visas valid for a year; provide more extensive travel opportunities for journalists; increase possibilities for foreign journalists to establish contacts with sources; and allow journalists to carry with them reference material and personal notes.

Dissemination of Information

The dissemination of all types of information is under strict state control in the Soviet Union and most of Eastern Europe. The authorities there exert control over the information available to the public and have a powerful censorship apparatus to ensure that what is published or broadcast conforms to ideological standards established by the government and the Communist Party. As a rule, information from foreign sources is strictly limited and controlled. Contrary to the Final Act's aim of freer dissemination of information, several Eastern countries continue to jam Western radio broadcasts.

Nonetheless, examination of individual countries reveals a varied pattern of adherence in practice to Final Act principles on information.

Soviet Union. There have been no changes during the period under review concerning access by Soviet citizens to information in general and the U.S. media and opinion specifically. American films continue to be shown to Soviet audiences on a select basis only. All VOA native language programs and RL [Radio Liberty] broadcasts are still jammed.

Romania. Overall, the Romanian Government restricts information available domestically. Strict censorship is enforced; foreign and even local news items are carefully selected. The media and film are used primarily to inform and educate the public according to party dictates, to exhort, and to enhance the image of the government, the party, and especially its leadership.

In the last reporting period, no Western periodicals or publications were sold in Romania. No American communist publications have been noted here.

No American books or periodicals are sold at Romanian newsstands or by subscription through the mail to Romanian citizens. Limited numbers of Romanians gain access to American and Western publications through foreign missions' information centers and libraries. Some American books are available for sale in secondhand bookstores.

Romania does not encourage the sale or distribution of printed matter from other states and, in fact, seeks to control and restrict foreign publications.

Romanian TV shows at least one American film every 3 weeks and at least one American science item per week. Older American films are shown regularly in Romanian theaters. Due to the severe energy crisis in Romania this winter, ROMTV cut back its air time drastically. As a result, opportunities for the airing of American productions were reduced. During this period, at least one American-made serial appeared weekly.

Poland. Although not as open as during the Solidarity heyday, the Polish media still remain the least shackled in the Warsaw Pact. While following the approved government line on international issues and attacking VOA and RFE [Radio Free Europe], the press continues to be a forum for lively debate on some domestic issues.

Long articles appearing in such periodicals as *Tygodnik Powszechny*, *Tu I Terza,* and *Polityka* present contending views on economic reform, party ideology and cadre policy, the extent of dialogue with various spheres of society, the role of the church, and administrative reforms such as the proposed reform within the judicial system. The press also freely discusses social and family problems, acute housing conditions, drug and alcohol abuse, poor medical services, problems in education, difficulties raised by students, and many other issues highlighting the imperfections of life in Poland. The recent trial of Internal Affairs Ministry officials in the case of the murder of Father Popieluszko was widely covered by the Polish media. The most interesting aspects of the proceedings were excerpted verbatim in the Catholic press, and Polish radio carried special evening coverage with taped excerpts of the day's testimony. Well-known officials and journalists participated in press and media discussions of public issues. Many journalists dismissed after "verification" of political orthodoxy or who resigned in protest over martial law are now active in small-circulation periodicals.

The more orthodox government authorities attempt to retain tight control over what they consider the most influential print and electronic media. Their goal is for journalistic products to adhere to the prevailing government line. However, they often have to be satisfied with an absence of criticism rather than enthusiastic backing. Press censorship is still practiced, and many articles are self-censored before they reach official eyes. The controversial articles which appear are often the result of prolonged bargaining with the censors. Within the imposed and perceived parameters, however, the Polish audience is exposed both to ideas and to means of handling controversial issues which receive little or no public exposure in most other East European countries.

No American periodicals are sold publicly in Poland. Personal and institutional subscriptions to some titles are still possible, depending on the availability of hard currency. The USIA-produced *Ameryka* and *Problems of Communism* continue to be banned.

No American periodicals or books are presently sold at newsstands, although some U.S. news weeklies are found in public reading rooms. Public and university library purchases of new books and periodicals from the United States are severely limited by a lack of hard currency. The Embassy has received no reports of the removal of books from library shelves. Thus, American books and periodicals already in library collections—principally university libraries—remain available to users.

The control of hard currency expenditures outside of Poland makes it almost impossible for an individual to subscribe to an American periodical. Gift subscriptions paid for abroad usually arrive through the Polish mails. By contrast, the public sale of books and periodicals from the U.S.S.R. and other communist countries is widespread, and prices are comparable to those for Polish publications. The government facilitates private subscriptions to periodicals from communist countries by permitting subscribers to order them through the Polish central subscription office.

Twenty-three American films are playing in Warsaw's cinemas. Titles which have arrived most recently include "Return of the Jedi," "Missing," "The Border," "Coma," "E.T.," "Brubaker," "Blue Thunder," "War Games," and "Terms of Endearment." Polish television continues to show old American films with fair regularity. A Jane Fonda film festival was recently featured on Polish TV, and some of the most recent offerings include "Shogun," "Paper Moon," "New York, New York," "A Bridge Too Far," and several sequences from "The Wonderful World of Disney."

Approximately 75% of VOA Polish-service shortwave broadcasts were jammed during this period. No VOA Polish mediumwave broadcasts have been jammed, and reception on this band continues to be good. Eighty percent of Polish RFE broadcasts were jammed. VOA English service has not been jammed.

Hungary. Embassy information programs have experienced a major upswing in the past 6 months, beginning with the visit of VOA Director Gene Pell. The visit of USIA [United States Information Agency] TV Deputy Director Richard Levy also broke new ground and uncovered considerable interest in the USIA's WorldNet product. The Hungarians had already approached the Embassy to provide them satellite coverage of the elections and have expressed great interest in receiving WorldNet. The Embassy is planning a WorldNet program on cardiology with the official blessing and active participation of the Ministry of Health.

Copies of Western publications, including the *International Herald Tribune,* the *Frankfurter Allgemeine, Time, Newsweek, The Economist, Der Spiegel,* etc., are, as a rule, available at between 50 and 60 outlets in Budapest and elsewhere in Hungary. Such publications are usually sold at the major hotels and can be purchased with local currency. A recent exception to the usual availability of Western publications took place when two issues of *Time* carried excerpts from a book written by a Soviet defector. Neither issue was available in Budapest, even though the Embassy ascertained that both issues were received from the distributor. Some American communist publications are also visible, but the numbers and the percentage of the market are unknown. It is possible, but expensive, for a Hungarian citizen to subscribe to Western periodicals, and payment can be made in *forints.* Probably only an insignificant number of Hungarians avail themselves of this opportunity. Government and party officials, and many who work in the media, have access to such publications, and most established institutions receive a limited number of subscriptions. The Embassy library receives the *International Herald Tribune,* the *Sunday New York Times, USA Today,* and a full range of magazines. They are read mostly by younger people. To compensate for reluctance on the part of some of our contacts to use the facilities, the post has expanded its outreach program. Tables of contents of periodicals and lists of new books are sent to major institutions.

Hungary translates a large number of foreign literary works. In 1983, 36 U.S. works were published in 2,202,000 copies, while 42 Soviet works were published for a total of 774,000 copies, indicating the preference for American literature. In all, 315 foreign literary works were translated for a total print run of 10,827,000 copies.

The Hungarian media closely follows Soviet positions on foreign policy issues with some notable exceptions, e.g., the development of relations between East and West Germany. Generally, the United States is criticized as the primary cause of East-West tension. Media rhetoric is often strident when dealing with the United States, but both radio and television have given access to American spokesmen through interviews on such issues as arms control. At the same time, personal relations with all levels of the media—in particular, television—could not be more cordial.

American films remain the favored attraction for Hungarian audiences. Hungarian TV regularly features American films or TV series.

Hungarians regularly listen to Western radio broadcasts. The Hungarian language services of RFE, VOA, and the BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation] are all popular. There has been no evidence of jamming.

German Democratic Republic. To the maximum extent feasible, the G.D.R. Government attempts to control information available within its territory. All media have as a prime responsibility the inculcation of values and beliefs favorable to the government and to the economic and social system it has established. A subsidiary goal is to present countries with differing political, social, and economic structures, including the United States, as unsuccessful in meeting the basic needs of their citizenry. G.D.R. coverage of U.S. foreign and domestic affairs continues to be, on the whole, critical, often quoting negative comments from the U.S. press out of context or presenting distorted pictures of life in the United States. There are occasional positive comments about the United States, but these are exceptions to the rule.

The print media are effectively controlled. In general, only publications listed in the G.D.R.'s postal publication register may be imported. Materials not listed are regularly confiscated at border and sector crossings. The Embassy has been able to distribute to official and unofficial contacts a variety of printed materials including the USIA-produced magazines *Dialogue*, *English Teaching Forum*, and *Problems of Communism*. To the Embassy's knowledge, these publications usually reach their recipients, whether mailed or delivered by hand.

G.D.R. broadcasting stations are state owned and directed, but television and radio from abroad cannot be easily controlled. About 80% of G.D.R. households receive television from the F.R.G., and practically every household receives Western radio stations. The state does not discourage receiving foreign broadcasts but does try to counter criticism in foreign newscasts with stories on its own programming.

U.S. magazines and newspapers, other than those published by the U.S. Communist Party, are not available to the general public. Libraries and official institutes do receive U.S. magazines, scholarly journals, and daily papers. The circulation of all of these publications, even within those university sections or institutions permitted to subscribe to them, is restricted. The *International Herald Tribune* and other Western papers are also sold for hard currency to foreigners in a few hotels catering to Western visitors.

It is difficult to purchase U.S. books and periodicals, other than those of the U.S. Communist Party, at bookstores and newsstands. U.S. materials in libraries are for restricted circulation. Only a very few researchers and scholars have subscriptions to U.S. publications. Although that is due in part to the difficulty of paying for them in hard currency, it also reflects official reluctance to grant the postal license necessary to receive such materials through the mail. About 30 U.S. titles each year are translated and printed by government-owned publishing companies, mostly titles in the public domain, but the printings are small and the books often hard to obtain. The Embassy sends books to recipients in the G.D.R. and has exhibited books both in the Embassy library and in the book fair in Leipzig. The G.D.R. law holds that books "whose content violates the preservation of peace or in some other way is counter to the interest of the socialist state and its citizens" may not be distributed. There is no encouragement of any kind for wider usage of U.S. books and periodicals. G.D.R. visitors are occasionally permitted access to the Embassy's library facility to attend special events.

In theaters in the G.D.R., approximately 120 foreign films will be shown in 1985. Of these, about 15 will be U.S. films. In addition, G.D.R. television purchases older U.S. feature films for broadcasts. A wider variety of films on American life is now shown than 2 years ago; some of the films are chosen for their entertainment value and not just because they present negative or violent views of U.S. society.

VOA, RFE, and RIAS [Radio In American Sector] broadcasts are not jammed in the G.D.R. G.D.R. journals, however, contain articles accusing these services of being agents of the CIA and presenting anti-G.D.R. propaganda.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Government's record on the dissemination of printed, filmed, and broadcast information continues to be poor. Although information originating from socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, is prominently published and broadcast, information from other sources, notably the United States and Western Europe, is hard to obtain and often restricted by the government. Broadcasts and publications that shed unfavorable light on Czechoslovakian or Soviet society and policy are particularly disapproved of by the authorities.

No American publications are sold openly in Czechoslovakia except for a few copies of the U.S. Communist Party newspaper *Daily World*, which appear on newsstands irregularly.

American books and periodicals are not generally available, although some are available on a restricted basis in technical and university libraries. During the reporting period, the Government of Czechoslovakia did not interfere overtly with the operation of the American Embassy library in Prague, which makes its nearly 50,000 American books and 114 current U.S. periodicals (in English) accessible to the public daily. Free access to the library, however, is impeded by the presence of armed Czechoslovak guards outside the Embassy and the widespread fear among Czechoslovak citizens, by no means discouraged by their government, that they will have difficulties should they visit the library. English departments at the major Czechoslovak universities maintain collections of American literature, but these contain many gaps, particularly in recent American fiction and criticism. Moreover, the departmental libraries are generally open only to faculty members and students majoring in English. The Embassy's press and cultural section distributes 164 subscriptions to American periodicals (105 titles) to Czechoslovak individuals and institutions. The Embassy, however, continues to receive complaints from private Czechoslovak citizens that subscriptions to American magazines, Embassy library "outreach" materials, the USIA Czech-Language magazine *Spektrum*, and other publications are often interrupted.

A 1983 directive issued by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Communications and the Federal Office of Press and Information changed the terms of payment for subscriptions to periodicals from "nonsocialist countries" from Czechoslovak *koruna* to U.S. dollars or other convertible (hard) currency and is still in force. Since payment by individuals and institutions—even those relatively few who are permitted access to Western publications—is a real burden, the long-term result of the directive probably is a substantial reduction in the number and variety of foreign publications purchased from the West.

American films make up a sizable percentage of the films shown commercially. Among the U.S. films screened in Prague's dozen principal central city moviehouses during the reporting period were "E.T." and "Tootsie." Most U.S. films are at least several years old and contain nothing that could be considered offensive to socialism or the Czechoslovak Government. American films rarely appear on Czechoslovak television.

Radio Free Europe is jammed heavily in Prague and other major cities, but it is often possible to receive its transmissions in the countryside. Voice of America is not jammed. RIAS is not jammed, but the signal is not strong enough to be heard clearly.

Bulgaria. The media in Bulgaria remains tightly controlled by the party, and the likelihood for any change is slim. No Western periodicals, except for those published by Western Communist Parties, are sold in Bulgaria. Embassy officials have seen Western publications such as the *International Herald Tribune* in the offices of officials and presume these are acquired by special subscription. Bulgarian citizens are not permitted to hold private subscriptions to Western journals. This is as much a function of the inability of Bulgarian citizens to hold convertible foreign currency as it is restriction on what they may read. Western publications are available in the national library for those who are able to get a membership.

Books by selected American authors are available in translation, but they are not abundant and are often sold out immediately. Some textbooks in English are stocked.

During the past 6 months, Bulgarian television has shown more Western films on a regular basis. Western films and in particular American films are regularly shown—and are popular—in Bulgarian cinemas. Two recent films were "Love Story" and "Close Encounters of the Third Kind." One Bulgarian cinema is currently showing an American film every Monday and Friday.

Working Conditions for Journalists

Soviet Union. During the reporting period, the harassment of journalists continued. An AP correspondent was accosted and photographed on a public street where she was walking with a Soviet acquaintance. The men involved identified themselves as members of the KGB. Later, the correspondent was attacked in the press. Another American journalist was accused falsely of immoral actitivies. Repeated Embassy intervention was necessary to get the Soviet authorities to ease the pressure that had been exerted on the journalist. Six months later the journalist was attacked in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* for tendentious reporting. Quasi-private and public attacks and harassment are attempts to intimidate Moscow-based journalists as well as Soviet citizens who might come into contact with them. The message is that Soviet citizens must beware of contacts with foreign journalists. The Soviet authorities, through conscious policy, continue to deny American and other foreign journalists conditions needed for the legitimate practice of their profession.

During the past 6 months, Soviet visas have been granted routinely to journalists accredited to Moscow. A number of temporary visas have been granted, not only for journalists coming to Moscow as temporary replacements for Moscow-based colleagues but also for journalists coming to the Soviet Union on various assignments of their own.

Soviet authorities continue to refuse approval of the longstanding application of the *Wall Street Journal* to open a Moscow bureau. They have not denied the request but have said frankly that they will take their time "studying the application." In discussions regarding the application, Soviet authorities have made it clear that the cause of the long delay is official Soviet displeasure with the publication's editorial policies. The *Washington Times* has also applied for permission to open a Moscow bureau. They have met the same stonewalling tactics encountered by the *Wall Street Journal* and for the same reason—the Soviets do not like the editorial opinions expressed in the newspaper.

Thirty-two American journalists are permanently accredited to the Soviet Union. This number includes journalists from the *Daily World* and *Pilot*. In addition, there are seven resident, permanently accredited American technical personnel. All have multiple-entry/exit visas valid for 1 year.

No American journalists were expelled during the review period, although authorities tried through intimidation to force two correspondents to leave.

In the last 6 months, 3 permanent and 11 temporary visas have been granted to local national journalists, including the family members of permanently assigned journalists, traveling to the United States. No such visas have been refused; however, action on a Soviet application to send a teletype operator to the TASS office in the U.S. has been held up as part of the effort to encourage Soviet approval of the *Wall Street Journal* and *Washington Times* bureaus. At Soviet request, two of the three I visas granted during the reporting period to a TASS correspondent and his wife were cancelled in favor of a replacement.

Romania. Western journalists frequently complain of bureaucratic frustration, obfuscation, and misrepresentation, despite government protestations of frankness and cooperation. All interviews must be cleared by the Romanian news agency, *Agerpres*, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The government thus exercises almost complete control over Western journalists' contacts. Many Western journalists do manage to make some unofficial contacts with Romanian citizens and officials; however, Romanian law requires citizens to report each substantial contact with foreigners to internal security authorities. By and large, Western journalists depend heavily on diplomatic and Western business contacts as sources of information. Some American and Western news agencies employ governmentally approved Romanian citizens as stringers in Romania.

No permanently accredited American journalists reside in Romania. Three accredited American journalists reside outside the country and have multiple-entry visas. One of these, as a result of an article he wrote, was advised by the authorities not to return to Romania. Approximately 20 visas per year are granted to visiting American journalists. Some visas are granted journalists expeditiously while other applications seem arbitrarily involved and drawn out.

One American journalist was refused a working visa during this period. Two others have asked for Embassy assistance in obtaining visas which were not forthcoming after 3 months' wait.

The government provides opportunities for journalists to travel under strictly controlled conditions, usually only to areas selected by the government and always accompanied by state guides and escorts.

There have been no problems in getting government authorization for radio and television journalists to bring their own technicians, equipment, and professional reference material into the country. There is a meticulous recording of serial numbers. In the case of typewriters, a sample of the typeface must be submitted as well.

No American journalists have been expelled from Romania in recent years.

Between 5 and 10 U.S. visas are granted each year to Romanian journalists, primarily for short visits. Visa applications are handled expeditiously but are usually received from the Romanian Government on very short notice.

American and other national press centers are allowed for certain events. There is an operating Romanian foreign press club where periodic press conferences are held. Other activities at this press club are very rare.

Poland. Although interviews with government officials must be arranged through the government press enterprise, *Interpress*, and the Foreign Ministry Press Department, resident and visiting American journalists rarely report difficulty in obtaining access to important sources and, in fact, rank Poland high on the list of East European countries in terms of general access. The government spokesman schedules weekly press conferences for foreign correspondents which are well attended and often go far beyond a simple statement of government views. Foreign journalists may travel freely without prior permission, although many have been stopped by provincial authorities for document checks and inspection of the contents of their motor vehicles. TV correspondents have been subjected to harassment, including temporary detention and the seizure of equipment, when attempting to cover demonstrations. Selected Western media representatives were allowed to cover a recent trial in Torun.

Technical equipment is imported without restriction, but technical assistance is not: American television networks are allowed one permanently accredited correspondent as well as an accredited producer. Additional permanent technical personnel, such as film crews, must be hired locally.

The Embassy has heard no reports of either visiting or resident journalists not being able to carry reference material for professional use.

Although resident correspondents are not required to hire personnel through a central government office, as is the case in some East European countries, Polish national employees must be approved and registered with the Foreign Ministry. The authorities continue to harass some news organizations with bureaus in Warsaw by refusing to allow selected employees of these organizations to continue working and rejecting work permit requests.

There are now 13 permanently accredited U.S. journalists and two television producers in Poland. They and their families have multiple-entry visas which must be renewed every year. The government recently extended the validity of multiple-entry visas for resident foreign correspondents from 6 months to 1 year.

Two new permanent accreditations were granted to U.S. media representatives. The Embassy estimates that some 27 visas have been granted to U.S. journalists not permanently accredited. The Embassy knows of no refusals of visas or of any visa extension requests having been denied. The Embassy knows of no delays in issuing visas for visiting correspondents.

There are no travel restrictions in Poland for resident or visiting foreign journalists.

No American journalists have been expelled from Poland during the reporting period.

One visa for permanent accreditation was issued to a Polish journalist during the reporting period. Four visas were issued to journalists for short visits to the United States. No U.S. visas were refused to Polish applicants nor did the Embassy delay any decisions.

One press center, *Interpress* in Warsaw, is open to both national and foreign correspondents.

Hungary. American journalists visit Hungary often and experience no difficulty obtaining visas. The Foreign Ministry has a press center, called *Pressinform*, to assist foreign journalists. Reports of its cooperation and efficiency have been generally favorable. The center is open to national as well as foreign journalists. By appointment, foreign journalists also have access to the press center of the Hungarian Journalists Association.

Several U.S. journalists have entered Hungary using the system of multiple-entry visas approved in 1982. With advance notification to either a Hungarian Embassy or the Foreign Ministry, radio and television journalists can bring their own technicians and equipment, which must be registered with customs both upon entering and leaving the country. They can also take with them without difficulty reference materials for professional use. The Embassy is not aware of any difficulties imposed on foreign journalists who seek to establish and maintain personal contacts and communications with either official or nonofficial sources. There are no areas closed to travel in Hungary.

During the reporting period, no visas were refused or delayed more than 6 months. A Dutch journalist, however, intending to cover the XIIIth Party Congress, was reportedly denied a visa because of his contacts with Hungarian dissidents. There are no U.S. journalists permanently accredited to Hungary, although both AP and UPI have Hungarian representatives, along with the *Daily Worker* and *Amerikai Magyar SZO*.

The Embassy knows of no American correspondents who have been expelled from the country. During the reporting period, five visas were granted to Hungarian journalists permanently accredited to the United States. Twenty-two were issued to Hungarian journalists for shorter periods.

The press section of the Foreign Ministry and *Pressinform* have been very helpful. There have been no notable problems.

German Democratic Republic. Foreign journalists are accorded courteous and correct treatment. Their ability to report on events in the G.D.R. is hampered by laws which limit their ability to travel without prior permission, to make appointments directly with G.D.R. officials and individuals, and to receive needed information. These laws, however, are not always applied.

A representative of the *Communist Daily Worker* and an AP correspondent are permanently accredited to the G.D.R. The number of temporary visas issued to American journalists during this reporting period is unknown but, due to the demand for coverage of events in this country, the number probably increased over the last reporting period. Occasionally, visa requests for technical crew, television cameramen, and the like are denied—evidently to encourage the use of local crews. No journalists have been refused visas to our knowledge. The non-American journalists employed by AP and the *Daily Worker* correspondent have multiple-entry visas valid for 1 year.

The new AP correspondent was kept waiting for accreditation for several months, evidently while the G.D.R. authorities tried to convince the Associated Press to send a U.S. citizen as its reporter rather than a European.

All travel outside of Berlin must be approved by the Foreign Ministry. In practice, the authorities usually are tolerant of travel without prior approval, but they have the legal basis to stop such travel if they wish.

Western journalists must have Foreign Ministry approval for interviews or any significant contact. By G.D.R. law, many G.D.R. citizens may not maintain contact with foreign journalists. Access to information and people remains carefully controlled by the state.

Authorization to bring technicians and equipment into the G.D.R. has generally been granted. For certain events, the G.D.R. has claimed insufficient time to process applications. G.D.R. authorities insist that foreign journalists, like other foreigners, are subject to restrictions on the printed material they can bring into the G.D.R. In fact, however, journalists generally have had no trouble in bringing in needed materials.

Only one visa was issued to a G.D.R. journalist during this period, a representative of the East German news service (ADN) to the United Nations. G.D.R. journalists, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on their behalf, have claimed that the U.S. issuance of only single-entry visas and the requirement that new visas be requested when the journalist has traveled outside the United States violate freedom of travel for journalists. G.D.R. officials also complain that it usually takes about 2 weeks for a G.D.R. journalist to get a U.S. visa, whereas corresponding visas are issued within a couple of days to U.S. journalists.

An international press center with facilities open to foreign journalists is located in East Berlin. During the Leipzig fairs, a press center is also open in Leipzig.

Czechoslovakia. The Government of Czechoslovakia's handling of Western journalists has not changed significantly since the last reporting period. Press centers for foreign journalists function in Prague and Bratislava, but the quality of information provided is low. Working conditions for foreign journalists are not dangerous, but access to government officials and "newsworthy" data is sharply restricted. Two press centers are open to foreign journalists in Prague and Bratislava. Nearly a dozen short-term visas were granted to American newsmen by local authorities in connection with permanent accreditation. Visas for Western journalists not permanently accredited totaled approximately 70, according to Czechoslovak officials. VOA East European correspondent Jolyon Naegele was granted long-term, nonresident accreditation in March 1985. Two CBS-TV correspondents have been waiting since February 1984 for a response to their requests for permanent nonresident accreditation. There are half a dozen nonresident American journalists in Prague. The sole resident U.S. journalist represents the *Daily World*, the organ of the Central Committee of the U.S. Communist Party.

There are no travel restrictions for accredited journalists except in security areas. Several tours for resident correspondents are organized by the Foreign Ministry press department each year. However, the government has not provided more extensive travel opportunities for American journalists.

The opportunities for foreign journalists to establish and maintain personal contacts and communications with their sources have not improved.

The Czechoslovak Government permits radio and television journalists to bring their own technicians and equipment but encourages the use of locally supplied technical personnel and equipment. Journalists are permitted to carry reference material for professional purposes with them, but such material can be, and usually is, perused by border guards and customs officials both on entering and leaving Czechoslovakia. VOA correspondent Naegele was subject to a 45-minute search of his belongings upon exiting Czechoslovakia in December 1984.

To our knowledge, no American journalists were expelled during the reporting period.

During the reporting period, three new U.S. visas were granted to local national journalists for permanent accreditation and shorter visits. At present, there are four accredited Czechoslovak journalists in the United States.

Bulgaria. Although there was an increase in visits to Bulgaria by Western journalists during this reporting period, working conditions for journalists are still poor. If a journalist is willing to follow a government-prepared program he is likely to enjoy his stay in Bulgaria. Journalists who are looking for news usually leave Bulgaria disappointed if they expect frank responses from government officials. During this period, the *Agence France Presse* correspondent resident in Vienna and accredited to Bulgaria was told not to visit Bulgaria again because the government did not like the "tone" of his articles. During a government-sponsored press conference on narcotics in February, selected Western journalists were called out to receive an oral reprimand for their reporting on the campaign against ethnic Turks. The authorities have also tightened up the visa regime, requiring journalists to declare in advance which areas they want to visit during a trip to Bulgaria. Some journalists who attempted to cover the assimilation campaign were detained by police and forcibly returned to Sofia by the authorities. Others were allowed to "visit" ethnic Turkish areas as long as they remained with their government-appointed guides.

No American journalists reside in Bulgaria. The VOA correspondent in Vienna was recently accredited, raising the number of Americans accredited to six. TV and film crews are allowed to bring their equipment into the country. However, uncontrolled contact with regular Bulgarian citizens is discouraged. Bulgarian citizens realize they might be subject to harassment or formal charges if they speak to a journalist.

The Bulgarians have opened a new press center at the Park Hotel Moskva, which falls under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry. It is not staffed on a day-to-day basis, but the press club which is co-located with the press center is available to accredited journalists during regular working hours. Prior to the cancelled Warsaw Pact summit in January, a special press center was set up at a more expensive hotel. Visiting Western journalists, however, had to learn from reports outside of Bulgaria that the summit had been cancelled.

COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN THE FIELDS OF CULTURE AND EDUCATION

This section of Basket III commits the signatories to facilitate cultural and educational exchanges, improve access to cultural achievements, expand contacts between educational institutions, increase international scientific cooperation, and encourage the study of foreign languages.

General Considerations

Exchanges are an integral aspect of relations among the 35 participating CSCE nations. The examples listed in this section constitute a partial accounting of exchanges between the United

States and East European countries during the reporting period. These highlights are indicative of the scope of the exchanges and cooperative ventures in progress, many of which have been underway for some time. Some are conducted under U.S. Government auspices with U.S. Government financial assistance. Others are strictly private and only come to our attention through the visa application process or when problems arise.

Soviet Union. During the reporting period, negotiations for a new official exchanges agreement on cultural, educational, scientific and technical, and other fields between the United States and the U.S.S.R. have been continuing in Moscow. If an agreement is concluded, it would be the first official bilateral exchanges agreement renegotiated since 1979, when negotiations were suspended after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

Cultural and educational exchanges and cooperation remained at a rather low level during this period, although there were a few signs of an expansion of activity. In November, singer John Denver gave a series of concerts in Moscow and Leningrad. Individual Americans continue to participate in international fairs, festivals, and cultural meetings in the Soviet Union, although levels of participation are lower than in the late 1970s; some Soviet artists and performers have been invited privately to the U.S. for similar purposes, but sometimes Soviet authorities do not permit them to travel.

The ACYPL (American Council of Young Political Leaders) sent a delegation to the Soviet Union to explore possibilities for further ACYPL exchanges with the U.S.S.R. This was followed by a return visit of a Soviet delegation.

Participation in educational exchange programs administered by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Higher Education continues to rise each year. Late placements and delays in visa issuance continue and sometimes lead U.S. candidates to withdraw. Over 70 participants from each side are expected to take part in these exchanges during the 1985–86 academic year (an increase of 15 over the current academic year) if current expectations are correct.

Romania. Under the current 2-year Program of Cooperation and Exchanges, U.S.-Romanian academic/educational relations continue at an acceptable level for the United States, but Romania has not fully utilized its quotas for research scholars in the United States. American researchers continue to face problems and delays in obtaining access to materials. The "American Theater Today" exhibit had a successful showing in Bucharest and is scheduled for additional showings in two provincial cities in summer 1985.

Poland. There is no official bilateral exchanges agreement between the United States and Poland. Through nongovernmental organizations, Poland continues to send orchestras, art exhibits, and other such attractions to the United States. Various American artists and musicians continue to visit Poland, and Poles continue to visit the United States under private arrangements. A shortage of hard currency to pay Western performers tends to keep the number of American visiting artists at a low level. The Fulbright and private academic exchanges continue.

Hungary. The current 2-year bilateral exchanges agreement between the United States and Hungary will be renegotiated in fall 1985. These 2-year implementing programs have expanded since the signing of the general umbrella agreement in 1977. Over the past year, more than 20 Hungarians traveled to the United States on the International Visitor Program. The Fulbright Lecturer Program also has expanded. The first privately funded chair in American studies, in the memory of Otto Salgo, at Budapest's Elte University, is in its second year, and there have been a number of other university initiatives without official U.S. involvement.

One indication of the state of U.S.-Hungarian educational relations is the increased interest in academic exchanges: the Agricultural University has requested assistance in establishing an exchange program with the United States; the University of Pecs now requires third-year English students to spend a year abroad, preferably in the United States, and is seeking American partner institutions; Hungary is now interested in Fulbright student exchanges and, for the first time, a binational cooperative selection process.

German Democratic Republic. There is no bilateral agreement on cultural and educational exchanges between the German Democratic Republic and the United States. The United States has had only very limited success in arranging visits by specialists, U.S. participation in fairs and festivals, or exchanges of performing artists. G.D.R. national media have, however, reported positively on these limited cultural programs and visits. In the field of education, several U.S. institutions are involved in academic exchange agreements with universities of the German Democratic Republic. The record for honoring commitments and arranging access for American scholars has been generally good. The greatest barrier to cooperation in the field of culture is the problem of access imposed by the Government of the German Democratic Republic. Public access to the U.S. Embassy and the Press and Cultural Section remains a problem. The presence of guards at the entrance and regular I.D. checks in the vicinity tend to dissuade many visitors.

Czechoslovakia. Overall bilateral relations in the field of culture have remained static during the reporting period. Czechoslovak authorities have displayed some marginal interest in U.S. efforts to expand programs in the cultural area by approving an American art exhibit at a Prague museum for June-July 1985. A major Czechoslovak exhibit, "The Precious Legacy: Judaic Treasures from the Czechoslovak State Collections," opened in Washington in November 1983 and is now in the fifth city of a six-city tour of United States. American performers have performed in Czechoslovakia during the reporting period with no apparent difficulties. Several Czechoslovak specialists have participated in USIA-sponsored International Visitor group projects during this period. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been somewhat less reluctant to approve visits by American specialists under U.S. Embassy sponsorship. Thirteen such visits took place during the reporting period.

Cooperation and exchanges in the field of education have not changed during the past 6 months. The Fulbright Program between the U.S. and Czechoslovakia remains a modest one, with two Americans at Czechoslovak institutions and three Czechoslovaks in the United States. Exchanges under IREX (the International Research and Exchanges Board) have not increased significantly. No expansion is planned for the English-teaching seminars held in Czechoslovakia during the summer, in which five American lecturers participate with Embassy support. During the reporting period there have been no complaints from U.S. exchangees regarding access to archives and libraries.

Bulgaria. Cultural and educational exchanges between the United States and Bulgaria are conducted under a

2-year bilateral exchanges agreement. The agreement was renegotiated in December 1984. The Government of Bulgaria has shown increased interest in student exchanges. For the first time, the agreement calls for an exchange of graduate students, and Bulgarian officials have expressed interest in sending Bulgarian graduate students to U.S. universities. Although educational exchanges are part of the exchanges agreement, more private exchanges take place without the involvement of the U.S. Embassy in Sofia. While the Bulgarians appear to have accepted the Fulbright program, most private exchanges involve only short-duration visits by scholars rather than more permanent arrangements.

Culture

Books and Publishing. The United States and the U.S.S.R. continue to distribute in each other's country their official monthly publications, *America Illustrated* and *Soviet Life*. Out of 60,000 copies of *America Illustrated* delivered for newsstand sales, Soviet authorities continue to return several thousand copies, ostensibly as unsold. In Poland, prohibition of newsstand sales and distribution of the U.S. Government Polish-language publication *Ameryka* continued during the reporting period.

Performing Arts. Public performances in Moscow and Leningrad by American singer John Denver were organized by the Soviet-American exchange program of the California-based Esalen Institute. The institute also fielded an exhibit of American books on health issues in January in Moscow and Novosibirsk. A return exhibit of Soviet books is planned for Los Angeles and San Francisco in spring of 1985.

In March 1985, American dance lecturer Leslie Friedman, under sponsorship of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, gave modern dance demonstrations at several Soviet institutions in Moscow and Leningrad. Friedman also completed a similar program in Hungary under USIA sponsorship, appearing before audiences at the University of Pecs, the Budapest Artists' Club, the ballet company of Gyor, and at the Ballet Institute.

American pianist Martin Berkofsky performed at the Prague Conservatory on December 7, 1984. His visit was arranged by the U.S. Embassy in Prague.

The Prague Symphony Orchestra began a 40-day concert tour of the United States during the reporting period. Other Czechoslovak performing artists touring the United States during this period included: opera soloist Peter Dvorsky, 13 soloists of the Czech Chamber Orchestra of the State Philharmonic (Brno), and the Panocha Quartet of the North Bohemian Philharmonic (Teplice).

American guitarist Pat Metheny and the "Pat Metheny Group" gave four concerts during a 1-week tour of Poland. The tour was arranged by the Polish Jazz Society.

American soprano Myrna Bismarck performed the title role in "Turandot" in Warsaw in March 1985.

American musicians were well-represented at the 1984 Jazz Jamboree in Warsaw, October 25–28, 1984. Among the U.S. artists in attendance were Ornette Coleman, Cecil Taylor, New Yoruba, the Ray Charles Group, and Woodie Shaw.

The Joanne Brackeen Quartet gave three performances in Hungary in October 1984 under USIA sponsorship.

Film. A "Festival of the Films of Hungary" began a 10-city U.S. tour in March 1985. The festival was arranged by *Hungarofilm* and the American University with assistance from USIA.

Exhibits. A "Bionics USA" exhibit on U.S. medical advances displayed at the American Embassy Library in Prague was visited by over 5,000 Czechoslovaks during the period January 21–February 10, 1985. This exhibit was also displayed in Budapest during the reporting period.

The USIA exhibit, "American Theater Today," completed its showing in Bucharest in October 1984.

Exchange Visits by Specialists. Ingmar Hucl, Pro-Rector for Research, Slovak Technical University (Bratislava), and Frantisek Zaloudek, Special Assistant, Department of Higher Education, Czechoslovak Ministry of Education, participated in the USIA-sponsored International Visitor Program, "New Technology for Higher Education," February 16–March 15, 1985.

Jiri Kotalik, Director of the Czechoslovak National Gallery, visited the United States in February 1985 to attend the opening of a Rousseau exhibit as the guest of the Museum of Modern Art.

Alan Platt, Director of European Arms Control Issues for the Rand Corporation, visited Prague under USIA auspices in November 1984. His program included meetings at the Institute for International Relations in Prague.

U.S. radio commentator and jazz specialist Felix Grant gave a series of talks on the latest developments in American jazz in Prague December 10–13, 1984. His visit was arranged by the U.S. Embassy in Prague.

William Hanna of Hanna-Barbera Productions visited "Film Polski" studios to explore opportunities for cooperation in cartoon animation in November 1984.

Antol Bokay, Associate Professor and Vice Dean, Janus Pannonius University (Hungary), visited the United States under the auspices of the International Visitor Program in March-April 1985. The purpose of the visit was to discuss with university administrative officers the organization and administration of institutions of higher learning.

Karoly Bogi, Head of the Department for Water Resources Management, Institute for Water Management (Budapest), visited the United States in March 1985 under the International Visitor Program.

Jozsef Veress, Deputy Director of the Hungarian Film Institute, completed a 1-month visit of the United States under the International Visitor Program in February-March 1985.

Mihaly Kornidesz, President of Hungarian Television, visited the United States in November 1984 under the International Visitor Program. The purpose of the trip was to meet with U.S. television companies and with the Radio-Television Department of the United Nations.

Endre Gomori, Foreign Editor of Hungary's *Magyororszag*, a weekly magazine on international affairs, visited the United States in November 1984 under the International Visitor Program.

Angelov Trifonov, Vice Rector of the Higher Pedagogical Institute of Shumen (Bulgaria), visited the United States in October and November 1984 under the International Visitor Program.

Lyubomir Nikolov, Poetry Editor for *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), participated in the International Writers Program of the University of Iowa during the period September-November 1984.

Ilion Stamboliev, Associate Professor and Vice Dean of the Higher Institute of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering (Sofia, Bulgaria), visited the United States in December 1984 to study developments in the area of medical electronics.

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Author Erskine Caldwell attended the Fifth International Meeting of Writers in Sofia in October 1984.

George Bullock, President of Bullock Associates (Washington, D.C.), visited Bucharest under USIA auspices to discuss the results of the 1984 U.S. elections.

Economist Walter Goldstein visited Bucharest under USIA auspices in November 1984. In the course of his stay, Goldstein spoke on U.S. monetary policy and other economic issues at the Romanian Academy of Economic Studies and the Romanian Institute of World Economy.

Ioan Grigorescu, Vice-President of the Romanian Filmmakers Association, visited the United States in October-November 1984 under the International Visitor Program.

Romanian film director Andrei Blaier and Alexandru Tatos visited the United States in November 1984.

Education

Fulbright Program. The following table shows the number of lecturers and researchers exchanged during the reporting period under the Fulbright program.

	From U.S.	To U.S.
Soviet Union	7	5
Romania	3	0
Poland	1	2
Hungary	2	0
G.D.R.	0	0
Czechoslovakia	0	0
Bulgaria	2	1

International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) Program. Figures for the IREX program in the U.S.S.R. and other East European countries follow:

	From U.S.	To U.S.
Soviet Union	24	43
Romania	2	6
Poland	8	5
Hungary	6	0
G.D.R.	7	14
Czechoslovakia	6	4
Bulgaria	4	3

Language. Programs for Russian language study between American colleges and universities and Soviet academic institutions, such as Moscow's Pushkin Institute and Leningrad State University, remain active. American students travel to Leningrad State University for language study under the auspices of the Council on International Educational Exchange (CIEE). The American Council of Teachers of Russian (ACTR), Ohio State University, and Middlebury College provide opportunities for American college students to undertake advanced language study in Moscow at the Pushkin Institute. In addition, a number of private U.S. commercial organizations have language study programs in Leningrad for American college students. Approximately 220 Russian-language students from the United States will study on these programs during the coming year.

In Poland, U.S. students were able to participate in Polish language and culture courses under the auspices of the institution-to-institution agreements existing between U.S. and Polish universities, such as the SUNY (Stony Brook)-University of Warsaw and the University of Connecticut-Jagiellonian University programs. ■

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